Military Review

Practice makes adjustments. use of crank gear in battles in Chechnya

22
Battle example. The motorized rifle battalion fought a fierce battle in Grozny. His commander had a fairly stable relationship with subordinate companies and platoons. The issues of interaction with neighbors, tank crews, paratroopers, aviation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs divisions managed to solve with great difficulty - lacked radio facilities. When, after urgent requests, the senior chief allocated the command and staff machine (KSHM) from the reserve, the problem was removed, as they say, from the agenda. Namely: with its help, a stable connection was maintained not only with the higher headquarters and interacting units, but also through one or two instances down.


Practice makes adjustments. use of crank gear in battles in Chechnya
Command and Staff vehicle P-145BM “Chaika” based on the armored personnel carrier BTR-60PA



Command and Staff Machine BMP-1KSH ("Stream-2", 774 object) based on the BMP-1



The command and staff vehicle Р-142Н (“Deimos-N”) based on the GAZ-66 vehicle


An analysis of the experience of providing control in formations and units during combat operations on the territory of the Chechen Republic suggests that radio communication remains the main means in the tactical link. Especially in a regiment, a battalion, a company and a platoon, where KShM, wearable radio stations, and radio equipment of armored objects are widely used for control (tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles).

In battles, KSHM was used on an armored (P-145BM and BMP-1KSH) and automobile (P-142Н) bases. Each of them, as a rule, worked in one shortwave (KB) and one – two ultrashortwave (VHF) radio networks. If the crew had a shortage of personnel (and this was not uncommon), then one radio operator kept in touch in several radio networks, using the prefix for selective calling of correspondents. When it was necessary to have communication with subordinate subdivisions one or two instances down, as well as to resolve issues of interaction with artillery and other branches of the military, the capabilities of VHF stations for automatic reorganization to pre-prepared frequencies were used.

At the same time, shortcomings in the work of the command and staff vehicles were also identified. In particular, in those that have been in service since the seventies. Take R-145BM. As is known, it is mounted on the BTR-60 transport base, inferior to the combat equipment of motorized rifle units, for example, the BTR-80. As a result, during the battles, such CMVs often failed. And since the repair units of the units are poorly equipped for restoring the BTR-60, the repair agencies were eliminated from the central subordination.

In addition, the P-145BM is easily distinguished from linear combat vehicles. Therefore, such KShM militants sought to disable in the first place. Especially during the battles in human settlements. This led to a disruption of control. At the same time, in units and subunits where command and staff vehicles were deployed on the base of the BMP-1, they are quite difficult to find among other infantry fighting vehicles. Consequently, here and the losses were less.
As for the P-142H, which are equipped on the chassis of the GAZ-66, they are even vulnerable to small weapons. Therefore, in some parts of the loss of such KSHM reached 50 percent or more.

As practice has shown, the above-mentioned command and staff vehicles are equipped with outdated communication tools that cannot fully meet management needs. Thus, during the fighting in Chechnya, it was often necessary to bring the information to the commanders and headquarters in a documented form. However, this could not be done - there is no such equipment in the CSM.

It should also be noted another disadvantage of the crank. When the motorized rifle and airborne battalions performed independent tasks, acting in isolation from their regiments, they were often managed not only by the commanders of units and formations, but also by the leaders of higher instances. With the help of staffing means included in the KSHM kit, it was very difficult, if not impossible, to communicate with, for example, the commander of the united group. Therefore, these units had to attach more powerful radio stations and other equipment. As a result, the MSS and PdB communications centers became cumbersome, and their mobility and intelligence protection declined sharply.

And further. The commanding staffs do not have aviation radio stations, and the aircraft managers, who are separated from the command and control group with their own communications equipment, are usually not stationary at the battalion’s NRMs. Therefore, the interaction of units that fought or made a march, with supporting (covering) their planes and military helicopters was difficult. It happened that the airmen acted inefficiently, and sometimes inadvertently struck their troops.

In our opinion, the question of the power supply for the cranking machine remains unsolved. The main power source is a gas-electric unit AB-1-П / 30. However, it has insufficient operational life of the engine 2SDV. The reserve is the generator of the engine power takeoff of the car (armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle), but it can only be used in the parking lot. In addition, a large amount of fuel and lubricants is consumed. Moreover, the P-142Н and BMP-1KSH do not provide for the possibility of powering the equipment from the 220 B electrical network.

It seems that the time has come to create a new generation of command and control vehicles that must meet the following requirements.

First, all KSHM need to be mounted only on an armor base. Outwardly, they should not differ from linear combat vehicles. It is advisable to include in the kit a documented communication technique operating through channels formed by our own radio facilities. As well as the equipment for determining its location, transmitting (receiving) navigation information. This will improve the quality of control at the tactical level.
Secondly, it is desirable to foresee the possibility of installing (if necessary) small-sized portable satellite communication stations in new KSHMs. As a result, it will be possible to liaise with governments of any rank.

Thirdly, the equipment for the command and staff vehicles of the battalion and regimental level must necessarily include an aviation radio station. A non-standard aircraft carrier, prepared from staff officers, for example, ISB or MSB, will work on it.

Fourthly, the issue of power supply of the CRG should be addressed taking into account the integrated use of various power sources.
In conclusion, we note that, despite the shortcomings, the command and staff vehicles in service with well-trained crews were quite successfully used in battles in Afghanistan and Chechnya. However, in order to ensure higher combat effectiveness of units and subunits equipped with modern means of warfare, it is necessary to have CMMs that meet the highest requirements for troop command and control.
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22 comments
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  1. svp67
    svp67 21 February 2014 07: 54
    +6
    An article from 1997, and questions are needed ...
    That's just I would like to slightly change the first paragraph
    Firstly, all KShM needs to be mounted only on an armored base.

    Apparently it would be better like this:
    Firstly, all KShM needs to be mounted only on an armored base, corresponding to that which is in service with units ...
    1. Suvorov000
      Suvorov000 21 February 2014 10: 12
      0
      This is yes, for example, the company company shot our KShM R-142N, with words and with your body armor you will shut down the equipment, God forbid what happens to it, kung as a colander
    2. Civil
      Civil 21 February 2014 10: 13
      +1
      decentralized communications, as well as unmanned repeaters.
      1. Argon
        Argon 21 February 2014 12: 48
        +6
        In terms of communication, he is not a specialist, but the bases for them are allocated on the principle that you are wretched, which is not suitable for you. As a rule, the KShMka is dragged in tow and repaired last. In my opinion, most of the shortcomings have been eliminated in the KShM based on MT-LBu, if not I am mistaken, the "Betta" complex I know that there was always a connection from it, it could receive a fax, data on topographic location. There was a literate person, he "made a little trick" there, and we called Megofon for free.
  2. Evgeny_Lev
    Evgeny_Lev 21 February 2014 09: 27
    +1
    It seems to me that the radio engineering means have developed so much that there is no need to single out one radio node on a single technique. It seems that it is possible to equip each operational unit of an operational unit with communication means with anyone, it is necessary to place electronic warfare equipment in a separate technique.
    1. svp67
      svp67 21 February 2014 10: 59
      +1
      Quote: Evgeny_Lev
      It seems to me that the radio engineering means have developed so much that there is no need to single out one radio node on a single technique.

      No, you are wrong, the internal layout of combat vehicles is very dense, and as soon as the "vacated" space, due to more advanced technology, is immediately "clogged" with other necessary equipment, therefore the need to create specialized communications equipment at the battalion level is a necessity, as there it, in the sense of additional communication equipment, is installed at the expense of ammunition ...
      1. shurup
        shurup 21 February 2014 16: 07
        0
        No, Eugene is right. If the battalion has 30 units, then all of them should be interchangeable in terms of communications. The battalion commander, having only a personal code, should be able to control from any unit, and not be tied or carry a suitcase with him.
        KShM is intended for the headquarters, which is in the rear, because each horse-drawn cart with a kitchen cannot be equipped with a computer.
        1. svp67
          svp67 21 February 2014 21: 12
          0
          Quote: shurup
          The battalion commander, having only a personal code, should be able to control from any unit, and not be tied or carry a suitcase with him.

          What are you saying, poor Kombat ... This is What kind of a suitcase is he carrying with him? And why for each armored station a radio station for communication over 30 km? Better to take extra ammunition or fuel. But KomBat and its Chief of Staff are needed to communicate with the Higher Command
    2. c3r
      c3r 21 February 2014 23: 05
      +2
      The concept of a communication node is not in vain invented and is still used. On the scale of the detachment, platoon and company, it may not be necessary, but for a higher level, a thin layer spread along the forward link will be harmful and even dangerous.
  3. 1969s9691g.
    1969s9691g. 21 February 2014 10: 13
    +10
    there was a connection 25 years ago and now it’s a sore subject. It’s just not there. In 2008 they drove on mobile phones ... Shame, because everything is old and unnecessary. Let them buy from the Chinese if they ventured their businesses and made bazaars and recreation centers and all shit.
  4. max702
    max702 21 February 2014 11: 23
    +6
    Yes, communications are the main trouble of our army, the weakest link, and the outcome of the battle depends on the transfer of operational information. And when I see in the pogo reports how they work on different tablets, laptops and other things .. I understand that the soldiers with the connection of the Second World War suffer for a long time ..
  5. ivanovbg
    ivanovbg 21 February 2014 12: 23
    +2
    In the 90s I was a senior radiotelegraph operator at Chaika and Deimos. He also worked on the Bulgarian KShM R-81 "Dolphin", on a tracked base, it seems MTLB-U, and also on the KShM R-71 "Mimosa", she was on a UAZ-loaf, crew of 2 people. - radio operator (he is also the commander of the car) and driver. There were only two radio stations on Mimosa, one on HF and one on VHF. Mimosa was intended to provide communications in the rear units of the battalion, regiment and brigade - medical battalion, fuel and lubricants and ammunition for the regiment and brigade, etc. Although the KShM were at different transport bases (armored personnel carriers, GAZ, UAZ), the radio stations in them were the same - R-123, R-130, R-111, so the radio operator did not care which KShM would work on.
  6. Shadowcat
    Shadowcat 21 February 2014 12: 25
    0
    um .... and does the Typhoon family not solve the problem of armored casing?
  7. shurup
    shurup 21 February 2014 14: 09
    +1
    I repeat - the radio on the armored car! And the commander is where the radio is. The enemy should not know where the commander is, and therefore should not know where the radio is.
    Agree that it will be strange to see an armored car in a convoy of motor vehicles?
    Fuel trucks have already learned to disguise as airborne.
    The presented samples still had two remote control channels, limited by a long telephone line. So add the fifth point.
  8. Stasi
    Stasi 21 February 2014 15: 46
    0
    The problem of communication of all military structures and units is still very acute. In modern warfare, the speed of transmitting and receiving information is of strategic importance, especially taking into account the development of modern electronic warfare systems, interception and decryption systems that will be used by the enemy in every way. In addition, BOMANS are needed for more effective military operations in addition to modern KSM; they were also very scarce in Chechnya. The interaction of BOMAN and KSM is very important. BOMANS provide reconnaissance of enemy firing positions and guidance of artillery and air strikes on them.
  9. Prutkov
    Prutkov 21 February 2014 18: 31
    0
    The problem with the power of the CABG and the documented data transfer, in fact, has been and remains. It is clear that portable communication satellite stations today are fantastic. In addition to ground stations, the satellites themselves are also needed. But a number of issues can be resolved now. It would be very nice to add a small-channel radio relay station with directional antennas (similar to the R-415) to the composition of a CABG. Even if for this it will be necessary to throw something out of the car. Experience has shown quite effective work of these RRS. Especially in difficult electronic environments. The problem with the RRR R-415 is that they are on a wheelbase. And give to the mechanized battalion does not work. A telecode set-top box is required, capable of transmitting short encrypted documentary messages over radio channels in a complex electronic environment. I don’t see any particular problems when solving these problems. Only political will is needed.
  10. awg75
    awg75 21 February 2014 19: 33
    +2
    the best KShM on the basis of MTLB-U who fought on them I think will confirm
  11. Manul
    Manul 22 February 2014 00: 15
    +1
    Communication needs to be constantly developed and more attention should be paid to this issue than we previously had. And even more than they are given strength to the west. Enough to be the last. It should be centralized, and duplicated and individual. That is, even when all the machines will be incapacitated, each individual walkie-talkie could carry the functions of command and systematization. I don’t know about the reservation. Maybe invisibility is more important. For example, a KShM under the guise of a simple carrier, which will be bombed last after tanks and armored personnel carriers. And maybe all the options for each part. Because there is no connection, there are no troops. The same thing excites me at sea. The communications ship will be shot at the first moment. Everyone already knows what role he plays. There are several ships per squadron and small missile and anti-aircraft defense ships assigned to them. Only when we manage to build all this .. what
  12. 1969s9691g.
    1969s9691g. 22 February 2014 13: 09
    0
    year on r-142. The machine is super. warm it is light. the truth of the radio station is still of the Stone Age. it was especially a kit under the ass. Together it was hard to carry. times over the entire range. it’s impossible to listen? the platoon commander and the company commander are in communication. and we have a lot of horsepower and stamina. They say strength for one hour. The truth was 87-89 years. Now they brag about it on TV. part of the doubt. the recent war in the Caucasus is confirmation. and generally, in training for half a year they fooled my head with a telegraph. The troops didn’t come in handy. Although all these points and dashes are a cool thing. It’s a pity that everything has already been forgotten.
  13. Zomanus
    Zomanus 22 February 2014 13: 16
    0
    By the way, I would like to see a review article on the state of communications in the troops. Including wearable communication and cshm. And then I feel like we have everything on this topic at the 90 level.
    1. 1969s9691g.
      1969s9691g. 23 February 2014 10: 01
      0
      rather, at the level of the 90s of the 19th century.
  14. Akuzenka
    Akuzenka 22 February 2014 15: 43
    0
    Pleases. There is no military thought in one place!