Military Review

Plutonium Cases

47
At a nuclear security summit held in Moscow in April 1996, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said that in connection with the process of nuclear arms reduction in Russia, 500 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and about 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium would be released from the defense program. Subsequently, this position of the Russian Federation was officially confirmed in the statement of the President of the Russian Federation at the 41st session of the IAEA General Conference in September 1997. Releasing such a huge amount armory materials put on the agenda the issue of their disposal.


In accordance with the Russian-American agreement of July 1998, a joint steering committee was established to coordinate scientific and technical work on the disposal of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, and a joint working group was formed to estimate the cost of disposal.

Theory and practice

From the very beginning, the Russian approach to disposing of surplus weapons-grade plutonium was based on two key points:

plutonium is a valuable energy resource. In the context of the concept of a closed nuclear cycle adopted in Russia, priority in the method of plutonium disposition should be given to its use in nuclear fuel of power reactors;
Since plutonium disposition involves significant financial costs, to speed up the process, the United States and other countries must provide funding for a full recycling program in Russia.


According to the agreement between the governments of the Russian Federation and the United States on plutonium disposition, which was signed by 29 on August 2000, each of the parties committed to recycling 34 tons of its excess weapons-grade plutonium by using it in MOX fuel, followed by irradiation in power reactors. The agreement provided for the synchronization of the recycling programs of the parties (the start of recycling, its pace, etc.). The implementation of the Russian recycling program involved the provision of financial assistance from the United States and a number of other Western countries. The cost of the Russian recycling program at the time of signing the agreement was estimated at 1,8 billion dollars.

Plutonium CasesIt was planned that the practical implementation of the agreement will begin in the second half of 2009, and the recycling programs will be fully completed in 2025. In Russia, it was supposed to use the BN-600 fast neutron reactor and four light water VVER-1000 reactors of the Balakovo NPP to irradiate MOX fuel, in the USA - light water reactors.

Practical implementation of the agreement from the very beginning faced serious difficulties. These include the different approaches of the parties to issues of civil liability for damage and financing of the recycling program. With the signing of the protocol in September 2006, which ensures parity of the parties in all aspects related to the implementation of the agreement, the problem of civil liability was removed, but with the financing of the Russian program, everything turned out to be more complicated. As a result of negotiations on the preparation of an agreement on sources and funding mechanisms, the total donor fund from the United States and other G8 countries by the end of 2005, amounted to about 850 million dollars. At the same time, the estimate of the total cost of the Russian recycling program by that time had grown from 1,8 to four billion dollars. In April 2007, the American side notified Russia that the amount of the donor's contribution to 850 million dollars is final. Under the current conditions, financing the program from the Russian budget was considered inexpedient, since disposing of plutonium through its use in MOX fuel of light-water reactors did not correspond to the country's long-term development strategy for nuclear power. In this regard, the lack of external funding led essentially to denouncing the agreement.

Considering that refusal to fulfill the agreement could negatively affect both Russian-American relations and Russian relations with other countries, Rosatom initiated consideration of such a change in the scenario of the plutonium disposition program in our country, which would be in line with Russia's plans for developing nuclear energy. and would be acceptable to both parties.

As a result of consultations held in 2007, the American side agreed with the proposals for the implementation of the Russian program for disposing of excess plutonium. In November, US Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and the head of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Sergei Kiriyenko, signed a joint statement regarding the new 2007 disposal plan for tons of excess plutonium. According to this document, Russian-made weapons-grade plutonium will be disposed of by using it as a MOX fuel, followed by irradiation in the BN-34 fast neutron reactor, which is currently operated at the Beloyarsk NPP, and in the BN-600 reactor being built on the same site. In subsequent consultations after signing the statement, the representatives of the United States and Russia agreed on changes in the 800 intergovernmental agreement of the year. The amended agreement, reflecting the new interpretation of the relevant technical issues and other changes necessary for the implementation of cooperation, was signed in 2000 and entered into force in July 2010.

In accordance with the amended agreement, each of the parties pledged to proceed with the disposal of 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium (25 tons in the form of metal and 9 tons in the form of dioxide powder) in 2018 and complete the process in 15 years. Both sides assumed to use the same method of disposal, namely the use of all 34 tons for the production of MOX fuel.

The entry into force of the amended agreement made it possible to hope that the parallel national programs for plutonium utilization, subject to stable long-term funding, would complete the necessary industrial infrastructure in 2016 – 2017 and each side would start transferring excess weapons-grade plutonium to MOX-fuel and its irradiation in reactors. However, the course of further events refuted such predictions. In 2012, discussions on the use of alternative disposal methods were resumed in the United States. To develop an appropriate decision, an expert group was formed by the US Department of Energy. Prior to the presentation of the report by this group, which is expected at the beginning of 2014, the construction of the American plant for the production of MOX fuel is suspended.

Program status in Russia and the USA

The Russian executive agent under the agreement, Rosatom, is successfully implementing the national program, without making any amendments of a fundamental nature to it. Active work continues on the construction of a sodium-cooled BN-800 fast neutron reactor (Zarechny town, Sverdlovsk region), the energy launch of which is scheduled for September 2014. A chemical-technological complex for the manufacture of MOX-fuel was launched in test mode at the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (Dimitrovgrad, Ulyanovsk Region) to ensure the starting load of the BN-800 reactor. The cost of the object - 1,7 billion rubles. In December, 2013 began loading the hybrid (uranium and MOX) fuel into the reactor core, which certainly indicates a significant advancement of the program. With the commissioning of the plant for the production of MOX-fuel at the mining and chemical plant (MCC) in Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Territory) in 2016, the BN-800 reactor will be fully transferred to the use of MOX-fuel. The project cost of the plant is seven billion rubles.

It should be noted that the use of fast reactors for the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium has some peculiarities. First of all, it is the ability to turn out new plutonium, the quality of which, when using the side uranium screens of the core can even exceed the quality of weapons-grade plutonium. It is for this reason that Article VI of the agreement establishes a ban on the reprocessing of irradiated fuel and screens throughout the entire process, up to and including the full disposal of 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium.

According to the latest data from the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the initial estimated cost of a MOX fuel plant being built at the Savannah River Nuclear Center (South Carolina) has increased from 4,8 billion to 7,7 billion, and its planned commissioning period has been rescheduled from 2016 on 2019 year, and 3,7 billion dollars have already been invested in the construction of the facility.

Taking into account this circumstance, and also taking into account the budget sequestration introduced in 2013 year (including the reduction of defense expenditures on 454 billion dollars before 2021), the US administration recorded in the accompanying letter to the April budget request of the Department of Energy to Congress on 2014 fiscal year provision on the intention to slow down the construction of the MOX plant, as well as to consider alternative, less costly methods for plutonium disposition. In pursuance of this directive, the financing of the NNSB in the 2014 fiscal year in terms of the construction of the MOX plant was cut by 115 million dollars compared to 2012, when 435 million was allocated. Moreover, no funds for these purposes are provided for in the 2015 – 2018 years.

In an effort to neutralize rumors in the expert community that the steps taken by the administration actually cancel the Russian-American agreement on plutonium, First Deputy Energy Minister Daniel Poneman said in an interview that the United States does not refuse to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium, but would like to solve this problem optimally both financially and technologically, as he has already informed the Russian colleagues.

Last year, at the direction of Energy Minister Ernest Moniz, an expert group was established to analyze alternative methods for plutonium disposition. She had to present her conclusions in January of 2014 in order to use them in the preparation of the NNSA budget request for 2015 year. Deadline for submission to Congress - February.

The experts considered about thirty options and ultimately settled on three options:

immobilization (vitrification) of weapons-grade plutonium together with highly active long-lived radioactive waste and placing the resulting mass in special containers using the so-called can-in-canister technology. At the beginning of the process, plutonium powder is immobilized in small glass or ceramic jars, placed further in special containers with a total capacity of up to 28 kilograms each, into which glass melt mixed with radioactive waste is poured. According to experts, the above-described process of vitrification could be organized on the MOX plant under construction in Savannah River (the availability of the facility today is 60 percent) after making minor changes to its design. It would be possible to use the site of this center for the temporary storage of special containers until the permanent storage is commissioned. According to preliminary estimates, such an approach offers significant cost savings, since in this case such expensive technological steps are excluded, such as purification of plutonium powder from impurities and manufacture of fuel assemblies for reactors, which is typical of the process of plutonium utilization through irradiation in MOX fuel;
immobilization of plutonium without mixing of radioactive waste. In this case, we are talking about the immobilization of plutonium powder in ceramic matrices and their subsequent placement in wells from three to five kilometers deep, which should make unauthorized access to nuclear weapons material difficult;
disposition of excess plutonium in the US Department of Energy’s pilot radioactive waste repository (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico (a series of cavities dug in salt deposits at a depth of 650 meters). This option does not provide any radiation barrier against potential intruders.


All of these options are contrary to Article III of the intergovernmental agreement, which defines the only method of disposal - irradiation in power reactors. The last two options do not meet the standard spent fuel. In this regard, a departure from one of the principal provisions of the agreement is unlikely to find a positive response from Russian experts, who have always argued that the actual disposal of weapons-grade plutonium is possible only when plutonium is irradiated in MOX fuel from power reactors, ensuring the irreversible removal of this material from the weapons program. Other approaches proposed by the Americans do not exclude the possibility of intentional or unauthorized extraction of weapon-grade plutonium from its storage and reuse for weapons purposes.

American influence

Whatever the decisions of the American administration regarding the methodology for implementing the national program for disposing of excess weapons-grade plutonium, they are unlikely to affect the disposition of plutonium by the Russian side. The federal target program of Russia “Nuclear energy technologies of the new generation for the period 2010 – 2015 and up to 2020 of the year” provides for the use of fast neutron reactors with mixed uranium-plutonium fuel, and the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium is built into this program.

The question is how the American decisions will affect the fate of the agreement and whether the parties will be able to find mutually acceptable solutions for its preservation.

It can be assumed that even in the case of the Americans refusing to dispose of plutonium by the previously agreed method of exposure, the parties will try to keep the agreement. This is primarily due to the desire to avoid the negative political consequences for the process of reducing nuclear weapons and the non-proliferation regime that may arise if it is terminated.

Obviously, the development of such an agreement should take into account the current realities that are significantly different from the existing 20 years ago, when the question was raised about the need to dispose of released weapons-grade nuclear materials.

The main motivation for disposing of weapons-grade plutonium surplus was the elimination of the risks of its possible embezzlement and illicit trafficking, due to concerns about the relatively inadequate storage system for weapons-grade nuclear materials (SNF) in Russia. However, the situation with their storage over the past 15 years has changed dramatically. Modern high-capacity storage facilities equipped with modern technical systems of physical protection were built at the Mayak Combine and the Mining-Chemical Combine, a modern state system for accounting and control of nuclear materials was developed and put into operation. Methods of training and certification of staff are aligned with modern requirements. The implementation of all these measures in the Russian Federation has essentially minimized the risks of theft and illicit trafficking of the SNM.

The need to make the process of reducing nuclear weapons irreversible was an additional motivation for disposing of surplus. However, as a result of reductions carried out in the past two decades, the level of nuclear weapons has decreased many times and the declared surplus of weapons-grade plutonium can in no way form the basis for the reversibility of this process. The maximum possible number of warheads on each side is limited by the loading capacity of their means of delivery. Having more warheads than can be placed on delivery vehicles hardly makes sense. As is known, in accordance with the current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the number of carriers on each side by the end of 2018 should not exceed 700. For the United States, taking into account the maximum possible load of carriers, the required number of warheads is about four thousand, which is slightly less than what they currently have. According to expert estimates, no more than 20 tons of plutonium are needed to maintain such an arsenal. We also take into account that even after deducting tons declared as surplus of 34 in the arsenals of each of the two nuclear powers, more than 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium remain - this amount is enough to produce 12 500 warheads. In this context, it becomes obvious that the disposal of declared excess plutonium is not a determining factor affecting the irreversibility of the reduction of nuclear weapons, and is more symbolic.

Given this, Russia can agree with any of the disposal methods that the United States considers acceptable for itself. In exchange, the Russian side has the right to demand a waiver of the provisions of the agreement prohibiting the reprocessing of spent fuel and screens until the complete disposal of 34 tons of excess plutonium. Moreover, taking into account the view of many American experts on the equivalence of weapons-grade and reactor-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons, the Russian side could also insist on increasing the proportion of disposable plutonium in the form of dioxide powder. This would enable Russia to include part of 48 tons of civilian plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and stored at the Mayak plant in the recycling process.

The other principle of the agreement - concurrency, or in other words - the implementation of the agreement by both parties in a synchronous manner, can also be audited. However, the rejection of this principle is possible, if it does not arise difficulties in the development and implementation of measures of international control over the process of disposal. It appears that in the event of the United States refusing the previously agreed method of exposure, the preservation and implementation of the provisions of the monitoring and inspection agreement will not be a priority for the Russian side. In the context of the possible involvement of other nuclear countries in the process of reducing nuclear weapons, the preservation of this situation is important because it provides an opportunity to work out methods and practices for implementing international control over the disposal of nuclear materials.
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http://vpk-news.ru/articles/19096
47 comments
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  1. And Us Rat
    And Us Rat 13 February 2014 15: 21
    0
    FSUE PO "Mayak"
    1. Andrey Yuryevich
      Andrey Yuryevich 14 February 2014 06: 13
      +2
      river Techa - "gift" from "LIGHTHOUSE" ... phonit even today.
      1. Andrey Yuryevich
        Andrey Yuryevich 14 February 2014 06: 50
        +1
        for those who are minus, come swim in Thecha ....
        1. Geisenberg
          Geisenberg 14 February 2014 19: 41
          0
          Quote: Andrew Y.
          for those who are minus, come swim in Thecha ....


          Come on, better to you ...
        2. tilovaykrisa
          tilovaykrisa 14 February 2014 21: 12
          0
          I agree that such plants need to be built somewhere in the desert or in the Baltic states.
          1. clidon
            clidon 14 February 2014 22: 15
            0
            For the trail to go to the Leningrad region? "Mayak" and so is practically on the outskirts (especially during the construction period), it was just then that the harmfulness of nuclear production was underestimated. Yes, it was not up to harm.
  2. tommytros
    tommytros 13 February 2014 15: 35
    -1
    Even if we honestly destroy excess plutonium, the Russian Federation and the United States will have so many reserves to erase the planet into powder 700 times.
    To convert surplus plutonium into MOX fuel, it is guaranteed to get rid of radioactive waste.
    1. I think so
      I think so 13 February 2014 16: 24
      +3
      Well, and why, then, the United States (notebook guardians for the environment) categorically do not want to do this? But because they are PREPARED IN THE WAR.
      1. avg
        avg 13 February 2014 17: 14
        +3
        It seems that if the United States refuses the previously agreed method of exposure, the preservation and implementation of the provisions of the monitoring and inspection agreement will not be a priority for the Russian side.

        Perhaps this is so, experts know better. But, I know for sure that you should not miss the slightest opportunity to poke mattresses in the face with their own de.r.mo. yes
      2. vo.dum
        vo.dum 13 February 2014 19: 14
        -1
        They’re getting ready ... and when they didn’t want to rob someone? .... they have such a nature ... Mine them all and keep the button closer so that temptations do not arise ... soldier
      3. SSR
        SSR 14 February 2014 04: 29
        0
        Quote: I think so
        Well, and why, then, the United States (notebook guardians for the environment) categorically do not want to do this? But because they are PREPARED IN THE WAR.

        In fact, not everything is so "categorical", for example, enrichment of uranium costs ten times cheaper in our country, disposal of apples is necessary (they cannot be stored forever) in general, so far everything is fine with us.
      4. Geisenberg
        Geisenberg 14 February 2014 19: 44
        0
        Quote: I think so
        Well, and why, then, the United States (notebook guardians for the environment) categorically do not want to do this? But because they are PREPARED IN THE WAR.


        Probably because in the USA everything that the government says does not correspond to the real state of affairs. Even more likely is the opposite. That is, it is guaranteed when this country claims environmental problems and the need to solve them. In fact, it is about how to make the planet even worse.
    2. Geisenberg
      Geisenberg 14 February 2014 19: 42
      -1
      Quote: tommytros
      Even if we honestly destroy excess plutonium, the Russian Federation and the United States will have so many reserves to erase the planet into powder 700 times.
      To convert surplus plutonium into MOX fuel, it is guaranteed to get rid of radioactive waste.


      In your opinion, one thermonuclear bomb erases a planet in powder ??? This is not a drop of nicotine, which the horse kills, and the hamster tears to shreds.
      1. clidon
        clidon 14 February 2014 20: 47
        0
        The military wrote off this plutonium - they do not need it. So, in principle, it’s on the grandfather himself surpluses from which one way or another will have to get rid. But this, of course, is not uranium, which is being torn with hands, it is plutonium, which requires investment for its disposal. Therefore, there is not much enthusiasm for everyone. )
      2. tommytros
        tommytros 15 February 2014 11: 12
        0
        Where did you think it was about one bomb?
        It is necessary to read more carefully: the Russian Federation and the USA will have so many reserves to erase the planet into powder 700 times.
        Obviously, you do not know that the mass of a bomb and explosive power are not the same thing. One kilogram of plutonium-239 could produce an explosion that would be equivalent to 20000 tons of TNT
        For example, in Topol - about 15 kg of plutonium.
        1. clidon
          clidon 15 February 2014 12: 38
          0
          There is one more nuance. Uranium is already partially disposed of from nuclear munitions. That is, the remaining stocks of plutonium can only go to purely plutonium ammunition, which will significantly reduce their effectiveness.
      3. The comment was deleted.
  3. Lk17619
    Lk17619 13 February 2014 15: 42
    +9
    Eh, amerikosy, amerikosy ..... Wanted to seize our nuclear potential and keep it at home .... What a cunning thing)))
  4. Same lech
    Same lech 13 February 2014 15: 45
    +7
    Whatever the decisions of the American administration regarding the implementation of the national program for the disposal of excess weapons-grade plutonium, they are unlikely to affect the course of plutonium disposal by the Russian side


    In other words, Americans are given the right to cheat with a WEAPON PLUTON.
  5. Goodmen
    Goodmen 13 February 2014 15: 52
    +4
    If we agree with the USA about something, then some garbage in the end turns out ...
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 13 February 2014 16: 14
      0
      And someone thinks these missiles are similar ???
    2. leon-iv
      leon-iv 13 February 2014 17: 40
      -2
      YY again in a new circle. We are waiting for arguments why Poplar NOT a HEAVY rocket should compete with the Voivode, who is already making a replacement.
    3. Power
      Power 13 February 2014 18: 47
      +1
      I agree with all these "poplar" firecrackers compared to what it was. "Libroids" want to leave us naked.
  6. Goodmen
    Goodmen 13 February 2014 15: 55
    +4
    The USA agrees with us only if we receive only our own benefit.
    They are unlikely to go with us for a partial benefit (compromise).
    1. clidon
      clidon 13 February 2014 17: 15
      +3
      Well, why is this stupid picture that is lying. And ICBM "Satan" ("Voevoda" that is) is still in service. there was no ratified decision to destroy them, and the Americans did not break a single strategic arms reduction treaty with us.
      1. Goodmen
        Goodmen 13 February 2014 18: 10
        0
        De jure - possible.
        But de facto ...))))) that they push their missile defense at our borders?
        ?
        1. arane
          arane 13 February 2014 18: 30
          +3
          Yes, everything is simple. intercepting our missiles during acceleration is incredibly simpler than catching warheads after the warhead is divided into a dozen small pieces of iron in space. And to intercept at the start you need to be near.
          Apparently getting ready ...
        2. clidon
          clidon 13 February 2014 19: 02
          0
          De facto, they did not violate any agreements with us. They denounced the ABM agreement, yes, but within the framework of the law. Moreover, under this agreement no missiles were destroyed, there was no deception. We absolutely can also withdraw from any treaties, including this plutonium agreement. True, there is no particular sense in this.
    2. leon-iv
      leon-iv 13 February 2014 17: 42
      0
      Whose will you be Right / Left / Esser And you read the START Treaty then?
      1. Goodmen
        Goodmen 13 February 2014 18: 21
        0
        WHOSE? )))))
        ... look at the checkbox ...
        But I didn’t read the agreement ... and to hell with it with the agreement ... the Americans froze their mines, poured concrete ...
        And we, on our own, in a big way ... blew up to the benches ...
        A familiar acquaintance told me in the 90s ...
        And I myself managed to work within the framework of the agreement on "limiting the distribution" ...
        Didn’t our train hear anything about the trains?
        ... so that there is reason to believe in the destruction of "Satan" .... but with 100% probability I do not say ...
        1. leon-iv
          leon-iv 13 February 2014 22: 24
          +1
          Pasternak did not read but condemn (c)
          I heard about trains I think that PGRK is better. Although their creation was again lobbied unfortunately (but this is my IMHO).
          And why do you call the governor Satan? And yes it is being disposed of by Yuzhmash now Nenya, who traded the secrets of the USSR right and left. I recommend a closer look at the Khetai space program. A new heavy missile is being made at Makeev’s design bureau in Miass.
  7. My address
    My address 13 February 2014 16: 15
    +2
    It seems that there is a corresponding education, but I did not understand half. I did not understand the thoughts of the authors. But I read it twice. Presentation, to put it mildly, neither in .. nor in the Red Army. Take the third paragraph from the bottom and in it the first two sentences. One contradicts the other! Why is the word "However" at the beginning of the second sentence and "not" in the middle ?! And there are many such incomprehensible "nuances" in the article. Moreover, the meaning of the article is clear.
    After this, a normal person will begin to think that techies are completely abnormal. But nuclear power is only for the elect, unfamiliar with the syntax.
    1. dr.star75
      dr.star75 13 February 2014 16: 25
      +4
      I thought only I didn’t understand anything! request
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. siberalt
      siberalt 13 February 2014 21: 33
      +2
      Somehow, the author did not mention the Chernomyrdin-Gore agreement, under which we sold 186 tons of uranium converted into fuel uranium at 35 cheaper than the oil calculated for the heat-generating capacity, respectively. Russia is now disarming at a rate four times that of the United States. The agreement was signed at the level of our governments and was not submitted to the Duma for ratification. This topic is very dark. In various sources there is no consensus. So far, the United States is in charge of this issue.
      1. clidon
        clidon 13 February 2014 21: 37
        0
        Not 185, but 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium, quite at the market price of that time.
  8. I think so
    I think so 13 February 2014 16: 19
    +3
    All these manipulations by the United States with all kinds of treaties strengthening some (NPT) denouncing others (on missile defense) descent on the brakes of the third (the treaty described in the article) clearly shows PREPARATION FOR NUCLEAR ATTACK ON Russia. All the terms in these agreements in one way or another converge by 2018 (the physical reduction of carriers, the end of the deployment of its missile defense system, the disposal of plutonium for some reason is postponed to 2019-20). Only a blind person does not see such strange combinations of key numbers and dates ... Oh, it was not for nothing that they in the NPT demanded to indicate the EXACT location of ALL strategic mine installations and PROHIBITED (!) To have FALSE positions ... Such requirements are beneficial ONLY TO WHO WHO PLANET THE FIRST ATTACK. And the Russian leadership, like blind puppies or sacrificial sheep, goes and signs these treaties ... perhaps signing the Russian people for extermination ...
    1. Andrey57
      Andrey57 13 February 2014 17: 10
      +1
      Russia actually refused to disclose the exact coordinates and location of the nuclear warheads, both on strategic carriers and with regards to tactical warheads.
      1. clidon
        clidon 13 February 2014 17: 18
        0
        The contract concerned the carriers, so everything is right about the mines. START-1 was even tougher with regard to mobile installations, which were limited to a relatively small duty area and were available for inspection upon request. START-3 in this regard is much more loyal.
      2. Ingvar 72
        Ingvar 72 13 February 2014 18: 20
        +1
        Quote: Andrey57
        Russia actually refused to disclose the exact coordinates and location of nuclear warheads

        I don’t know how accurately, but they can be traced from the satellite, along the radioactive trail. Submarines sort of figure this out. Better yet, ask Asket, he’s a rocket launcher, he should know. Aw, Ascetic?
    2. clidon
      clidon 13 February 2014 17: 17
      +1
      Such requirements are beneficial ONLY TO WHO WHO PLANET THE FIRST ATTACK.

      Such requirements are necessary for accounting for ICBMs so that both sides have only declared missiles and this can be verified. Or were you going to take the Americans word for word?
  9. lexx2038
    lexx2038 13 February 2014 16: 24
    +6
    We cut and exploded our missiles, but they dismantled our own and stacked them on shelves, I think that it doesn’t smell like parity here. It is necessary to act as it is profitable to us-the rest, went to F! Of course, you can conclude a contract with the crooks, but in a tyhara, do it your way.
  10. demel2
    demel2 13 February 2014 16: 32
    +2
    The conclusion from the article, in no case to negotiate with the p. Endos, will still try to obbat.
  11. 11111mail.ru
    11111mail.ru 13 February 2014 17: 08
    0
    From my point of view, the article is kind of ... muddy! Concerning the implementation of the USA agreements ... I'll tell you a parable. A colleague used to say: I get up in the morning, I know that somewhere I’m on the booth today, I don’t know who is where and how, but I know what exactly — on the boot! Here are the amers - exactly .... t!
    1. arane
      arane 13 February 2014 18: 34
      +1
      So, we just know who, where and in what. It’s not clear why we allow it.
  12. clidon
    clidon 13 February 2014 17: 35
    +1
    Everything should be simpler - the Americans are going to fulfill their obligations (within the framework of the agreement) for disposal - we start similar programs, do not start, we suspend and leave this plutonium in storage. Or we conclude a new agreement that provides new methods for the destruction of Pu
  13. polkovnik manuch
    polkovnik manuch 13 February 2014 17: 46
    0
    The article is somehow confusing, everything is like in a fable "when there is no agreement in the" comrades ", their business will not go well." You cannot trust the Amers, our "Satan" was cut, but they were antediluvian mines, but they took apart bombs So they were freaking out, the program was filmed. Borka was drunk, in front of the screen, letting go of snot of joy. I hope there will be a couple of colonels who, out of a hangover, forgot the order to carry out the destruction.
  14. ilya_82
    ilya_82 13 February 2014 18: 59
    +2
    and I built the main building for the BN-800 reactor
  15. Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 13 February 2014 19: 16
    +1
    Why destroy fuel? And if a very large asteroid is required to explode? Why it is impossible to receive new fuel at development of it? Some nonsense. Thoughtless wastefulness.
    1. Sergey Sitnikov
      Sergey Sitnikov 13 February 2014 21: 23
      0
      what river is flowing there ????))))
  16. Duke
    Duke 13 February 2014 19: 53
    +4
    Plutonium
    Plutonium, element number 94, was discovered by Glen Seaborg, Edwin Macmillan, Kennedy, and Arthur Wolh in Berkeley in 1940 when they bombarded a uranium target with deuterons from a sixty-six-inch cyclotron. In May 1940, the properties of plutonium were predicted by Lewis Turner.
    A total of 15 plutonium isotopes are known, all are radioactive. The most significant for the design of nuclear weapons:
    Pu238 -> (86 years old, alpha decay) -> U234
    Pu239 -> (24 360 years, alpha decay) -> U235
    Pu240 -> (6580 years old, alpha decay) -> U236
    Pu241 -> (14.0 years, beta decay) -> Am241
    Pu242 -> (370 000 years, alpha decay) -> U238
    Physical properties of plutonium
    Plutonium is a very heavy silver metal, shiny like nickel when just refined. This is an extremely electronegative, chemically active element, much more so than uranium. It quickly fades, forming a rainbow film (like a rainbow oil film), initially light yellow, eventually turning into dark purple. If the oxidation is quite large, an olive green powder of oxide (PuO2) appears on its surface.
    Plutonium readily oxidizes, and quickly corrodes even in the presence of slight moisture. Strange, but it becomes rusty in an inert gas atmosphere with water vapor much faster than in dry air or in pure oxygen. The reason for this is that the direct action of oxygen forms an oxide layer on the surface of plutonium, which prevents further oxidation. Exposure to moisture produces a loose mixture of oxide and hydride. A drying oven is required to prevent oxidation and corrosion.
    Due to its radioactivity, plutonium is warm to the touch. A large piece of plutonium in a thermally insulated shell is heated to a temperature above the boiling point of water.
    The main physical properties of plutonium:
    Melting point: 641 ° C;
    Boiling point: 3232 ° C;
    Plutonium has many specific properties. It has the lowest thermal conductivity of all metals, the lowest electrical conductivity, with the exception of manganese (according to other sources, it is still the lowest of all metals). In its liquid phase, it is the most viscous metal.
    As temperature changes, plutonium undergoes the most powerful and unnatural density changes. In its most dense form, plutonium is the sixth density element (only osmium, iridium, platinum, rhenium and neptunium are heavier than it).
    The special production of plutonium for weapons containing almost exclusively 239Pu is required mainly because isotopes with mass numbers 240 and 242 create a high neutron background, making it difficult to construct effective nuclear munitions, in addition, 240Pu and 241Pu have a significantly shorter half-life than 239Pu, because of which the plutonium parts are heated, and the heat sink elements have to be additionally introduced into the design of the nuclear munition. Even pure 239Pu is warmer than the human body. In addition, the decay products of heavy isotopes spoil the metal crystal lattice, which can lead to a change in the shape of plutonium parts, which is fraught with a failure of a nuclear explosive device.
    In principle, all these difficulties are surmountable, and nuclear explosive devices made of "reactor" plutonium were successfully tested, however, in ammunition, where compactness, light weight, reliability and durability play an important role, exclusively specially produced weapons-grade plutonium is used. The critical mass of metallic 240Pu and 242Pu is very large, 241Pu is slightly larger than that of 239Pu.
  17. grotto
    grotto 13 February 2014 20: 59
    0
    States in contracts so artfully formulate the meaning of the articles that they allow them to circumvent these articles formally without violating the contract itself. And this, judging by the publications, is very close. But what is the level of negotiators on our part, that this is possible. It is noteworthy that the article again proposes to go on occasion and to continue the implementation of previously adopted agreements, no matter what. Again didn’t imagine something?
  18. Sergey Sitnikov
    Sergey Sitnikov 13 February 2014 21: 16
    0
    Quote: My address
    It seems that there is a corresponding education, but I did not understand half. I did not understand the thoughts of the authors. But I read it twice. Presentation, to put it mildly, neither in .. nor in the Red Army. Take the third paragraph from the bottom and in it the first two sentences. One contradicts the other! Why is the word "However" at the beginning of the second sentence and "not" in the middle ?! And there are many such incomprehensible "nuances" in the article. Moreover, the meaning of the article is clear.
    After this, a normal person will begin to think that techies are completely abnormal. But nuclear power is only for the elect, unfamiliar with the syntax.


    No offense pliz)), those two sentences just need to be truncated (mentally) and) everything is the message is normal, I would only combine them into one, because they themselves show a retrospective of the common (RF-USA) goal and the path to it, and reality (subsequent narration) went a different way, i.e. aging, reduction, media power optimization.
  19. leon-iv
    leon-iv 13 February 2014 22: 24
    +1
    Pindets Communication level on the topvar fell below the baseboard !!! 111
  20. Bakht
    Bakht 13 February 2014 22: 45
    0
    Our answer to Chamberlain
  21. Akuzenka
    Akuzenka 14 February 2014 00: 28
    +1
    There’s always a tricky bolt .... you know what. From next year, vigorous trains will begin to run again. And not a trifle, but pind wasps unpleasant.