Military Review

Once again about tanks, Soviet and German

144
Once again about tanks, Soviet and German



The one who does nothing is not mistaken
(popular wisdom)
Anything not to know is not shameful.
(D. Diderot)


Necessary preface.

This section, as well as the above epigraphs, is not the author’s desire to get into great literature, but only the need to identify some initial points that may remove (or significantly reduce) the indignation of the dear participants of the forum in case of noticed errors of different levels of depth. This work does not pretend to be true in the last resort, but is only a weak attempt by the author to understand a pile of facts and data that are available in the literature and on the Internet, about the tactical and technical characteristics tanks, which were in service with the Red Army and the Wehrmacht by June 22, 1941, as well as an attempt at a small analysis and generalization of those. As far as I have succeeded, you must judge ...

Where to start?
Before arguing, let's agree on terms.
(ancient greek wisdom)


The question in the title of the chapter is not a tribute to the Russian mentality with its eternal problems. As it seems to the author, one of the stumbling blocks when comparing and evaluating tanks of the USSR and Germany during the period of the beginning of WWII is that at that time there was no single tank concept in the world. And, therefore, a single classification of tanks. And only with time, when tanks became an independent type of armed forces, when the tasks and capabilities of tank formations became clear, the tactics of their use became clear, then the classification of combat vehicles began to crystallize. At the same time, it was different in different countries (in accordance with their vision of armored vehicles). And it turned out to be the first (but far from the last and not the most difficult) problem that had to be faced. Thus, in England and France, tanks were considered a means of reinforcing infantry and were divided into infantry escort and cruising tanks. In the USSR, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, there was already a classification system based on the weight of the machine: light (up to 20 t), medium (20 - 40 t) and heavy (over 40 t). The use of such a classification is obviously related to the carrying capacity of bridges and railway platforms.

The German army also had the same classification, but it was based on the power of weapons: tanks with machine guns, tanks with light cannon weapons and tanks with heavy cannon weapons. Light cannon armament included cannon caliber from 20 mm to 50 mm, and heavy cannon armament - cannon caliber from 75 mm and above.

In our comparative analysis, I will use the proven Soviet classification system, and not only for reasons historical proven by time. In my opinion, the weight of the machine characterizes its security, since its main share falls on the armor protection of the hull and turret (sheet thickness). Based on this criterion, we will evaluate and compare combat vehicles of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the eve of the Second World War (Table 1):

Table 1.

The proposed classification of German and Soviet tanks by type



However, this approach, according to the author, is not complete enough: light tanks are quite different in composition and power of weapons. This is due, apparently, to the fact that, historically, the search for solutions to the configuration of the combat vehicle was allotted little, and the military had to approach the formation of tank units on the principle of "what we have" and not "what you will."

On this basis, light tanks are also divided into two subgroups: machine-gun and machine-gun (guns of caliber up to 37 mm inclusive). For medium and heavy tanks such a unit does not make sense: in them machine guns are clearly auxiliary weapon.

Second The comment will concern the use of tanks on the battlefield. Of the variety of tasks to be solved, according to the author, the main ones are two:
a) the destruction of enemy personnel (infantry);
b) the opposition of the enemy's armored vehicles, first of all to tanks.

The solution to the first task is a rather trivial task: since the times of ancient Egypt, humanity has found more and more effective means to destroy its own kind. In the light of the use of tanks, this solution is as follows: a cannon of the highest possible caliber with a powerful high-explosive fragmentation projectile and machine guns, also in the maximum possible quantity. An indicator of the success of the second task will be the value of armor penetration of a tank gun.

In a purely psychological aspect, the task of comparing something or someone in the human consciousness implicitly assumes the presence of an element of competitiveness, confrontation. This confrontation can be resolved either in terms of “who will shout louder (jump, throw, lift, etc.), or in terms of direct clarification one-on-one“ who is in charge at home ”. It seems that in the aspect of the realities of wartime, the second approach would be more correct, i.e. situation of direct collision of tanks of two opposing sides. And, therefore, from all the performance characteristics of tank guns, we choose only the value of armor penetration. All other characteristics, if necessary, will be considered as auxiliary.

Third: Many German (and some Soviet) tanks, despite the different markings, were of the same type, differing in minor technological details, or represented a continuous line of improving combat qualities. In this case, the most successful modification will be selected as the comparison machine.

Fourth The remark concerns the comparison of calibers: in German and Soviet practice there existed a slightly different reference system. The first defines the caliber as the distance between the opposite fields of the rifling (A); the second is the distance between the bottom of the opposite rifling (B). In the USSR, the first system was adopted, in Germany - the second [1]. On this basis, instruments of similar calibers (especially small-caliber) will be considered as belonging to the same group. For guns of large calibers (for example, 76 mm and more), this difference is not significant.


Finally, fifth: All tanks will be compared according to their declared performance characteristics. Other factors, such as the quality of the manufacture of armor and ammunition, crew training, the practice of use in combat conditions, etc. will not be taken into account. Similarly, the armor of all tanks is considered identical in its strength characteristics and the protective property will be considered only in terms of its thickness. Nor will we go into the nuances of determining the qualitative (initial and guaranteed) and quantitative (in the USSR, they were more stringent) characteristics of the armor penetration criteria [2].

Light machine-gun tanks.

To begin with, we will clarify the following thesis: a direct collision of such combat vehicles is not only hypothetical, but also highly unpromising: the vehicles of this class had anti-bullet and anti-fragmentation booking, and its defeat with standard weapons was very problematic.

German machine gun tanks of the beginning of the Second World War are represented by machines. T - I modifications А и В. The Soviet range is much broader: amphibious tanks T-37, T-38, T-40, T-26 early modification (sample 1931) (table 2). From a purely methodological point of view, the T-27 tankettes should be attributed to this same group, however, we will not consider this class of armored vehicles due to the deadlock of this branch of the development of military vehicles. We will also not consider armored cars (although Soviet cannon BA were armed with tank 45-mm guns) because of their auxiliary character.

Table 2.



As can be seen from the table, the German T - І exceeded only the Soviet T-38 both in terms of the thickness of the armor and in firepower, which is not surprising: the T-38 is a floating tank. But at the same time, he was hopelessly behind both the newer T-40 amphibious tank (in firepower) and his peer T-26 (in terms of protection). At the same time, the floating T-40 could well have been a deadly adversary for the T-I: its heavy machine gun coped well with thin armor of machine-gun tanks. Superior Soviet tanks of their opponents and ammunition.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Floating T ‒ 40 surpassed the German LINEAR T - I.

Light machine-gun tanks.

This group is made up of German T - I (C), T - II (AC и F), T - III (A-g)Czech 35 (t) и 38 (t)Soviet T-26 (sample 1932 g) and BT-2 (Sample 1932 g) (Table 3). It seems to be the most difficult in terms of classification. Machines of this class differed not only in design (Soviet tanks were two-tower - a clear echo of the First World War, when the main objective of the tanks was the destruction of infantry in the trenches, and the possibility of simultaneous firing in two different directions was a pretty attractive quality that single-tower tanks lack), but also weapons. It represented a rather variegated palette: from automatic 20 mm guns that had a clear aviation (or anti-aircraft) origin, to small-caliber artillery, developed on a very different basis. Without going into details of the genesis of the development of the armament of these tanks, we confine ourselves to considering their performance characteristics.

If the tanks of the T-I and T-II series are becoming more or less clear, then the "troika" require some clarification. To begin with, the cars of the first four episodes (AD) were most likely experienced specimens, which practically did not have to fight (information on this is contradictory. For one of them, all 95 machines were cut into metal and spare parts, according to others, some of them happened to take part in the Norwegian and Danish operations). The first really massive and battle tank was the modification Е and all subsequent ones. In the original version, they were installed 37-mm guns KwK 36 L / 46, which in 1940-41. were replaced with 50-mm KwK 38 L / 42 (the reserve of modernization allowed it). The same applies to series tanks. E и G. In this part, only machines with 37-mm guns will be considered, since by the beginning of the Second World War the Wehrmacht had T-III with both 37-mm and 50-mm guns, which will be discussed below. Here are their characteristics:
Table 3.


*) - here and below: this entry only says that the data is NOT AVAILABLE BY THE AUTHOR.

It immediately catches the eye that tanks of this category are sharply divided into two weight groups: some have approximately the same combat weight (8 - 10,5 t), while T - III discords with a value in the area of ​​20 t. Such a sharp increase in weight is not accidental: The first modifications of the tank had a mass of 15,5 T (Ausf a)which gradually increased to 19,8 t (Ausf d). These changes were made in connection with the demand of the military to strengthen the protection of the tank, which was reflected in an increase in the thickness of the armor (and, accordingly, the weight of the tank). At the same time, all other characteristics either remained unchanged (armament) or underwent minor changes (engine power, chassis). The “troika” of the early modifications of the A - D essentially remained experimental machines, and I consider their consideration in this aspect to be meaningless.

As for weapons, then it should also be discussed in more detail, since there is considerable inconsistency in it.

To begin with - German 20-mm guns. EW 141 gun - Aviation automatic weapon, adapted for installation on the tank. True, in the literature you can find the opinion that this is not a gun, but a heavy machine gun. The author failed to find any data on the range of ammunition and their capabilities.

20-mm guns KwK 30 L / 55 и KwK 38 L / 55 they are essentially the same weapon developed on the basis of a small-caliber anti-aircraft gun and differing in their purely technological features. Ammunition and characteristics are the same (hereinafter, the data are given only for armor-piercing projectiles of all types used on these guns) [3, 5, 7]:
Table 4.


More serious opponents were tank guns A-3 and A-7 of captured Czech tanks 35 (t) and 38 (t).

Škoda 37 mm A3 (German version 3,7cm KwK 34 (t)) - anti-tank 37-mm gun manufactured by Škoda, mounted on Lt vz 35 tanks. The barrel length was 39 calibers (1448 mm), the initial speed of an armor-piercing projectile with a mass of 0,85 kg was 675 m / s, which was enough to break through the 40-mm armor plate at a range of 500 m. with [0,825].
Table 5.



Škoda 37 mm A7 (in German sources is listed as 3,7 cm KwK 38 (t)) - anti-tank 37-mm gun, produced by the Czech company Škoda. The barrel length is 42 caliber (1554 mm), which provided the 0,853 kg projectile with an initial speed of 750 m / s.

For him, shells of two types were supposed: Panzergranate 39 (PzGr.39) and Panzergranate 40 (PzGr.40). The armor penetration table for this weapon [6, 7]:
Table 6.


Both guns have quite similar characteristics and use the same ammunition. Good ballistic performance made these tanks mortally dangerous opponents for Soviet tanks of a similar class at all distances with aimed fire.

German 37-mm gun KwK 35 / 36 L / 46,5 Rheinmetall-Borsig had a barrel length in 45 gauges (1717 mm), which gave the following characteristics to the armor-piercing shells:
Table 7.



Soviet tank gun B-3 was developed by P. Sachaentov on the basis of the German anti-tank gun company "Rheinmetal". Both guns had the same ballistics and device, with the exception of the bolt: like all other designs of the Syachentov, it was with 1 / 4 automation. The armor penetration of the B-3 was as follows: [8]
Table 8.


Of all the tanks in this category, only Soviet T-26 and BT-2 on one side can be considered worthy opponents, and trophy Czech 35 (t) and 38 (t) on the other. All the others simply do not stand up to criticism and can only be considered full-fledged fighting vehicles on 1941. They can only be an unrestrained optimist.

Light cannon tanks

The appearance and existence in the armies of a number of countries of the above tanks with such strange hybrid weapons, according to the author, is due solely to the level of technical equipment of the armies of that time. Let's not forget that all of these machines appeared at about the same time: in the beginning - the first half of the 30-s. The low power of the then existing engines, the insufficient hardness of the armor, the large mass-dimensional characteristics of large-caliber guns — all this made it impossible to install powerful guns in tanks.

But, as you know, progress never stands still. If there is demand, supply will inevitably appear. And the military sphere is a source of inexhaustible demand. And the designer gradually developed more and more acceptable models of tank gun armament. So, from the middle of the 30-ies, a classic light tank model appeared: the weight of the 15 - 20 t, anti-bullet and splinter armor, high mobility. The gun was installed as a compromise between mass-dimensional characteristics and the maximum possible power. With the characteristics of a light tank, these were mainly anti-tank guns.

On the Soviet side, such T-26 steel tanks of the 1933 model with subsequent modifications (1937 g. - conical tower and inclined sheets of the tilled box, 1939 g. - booking reinforcement), BT-5 and BT-7.

From a series of tanks T - III deserve consideration modifications Е и F. If the first of them was the result of design development, then the second was a response to the cruel realities of wartime. In particular, it was necessary to increase the reservation. But further modifications of the "triples" (T - III (H) and T - III (J)), on the basis of the principles voiced above, should be referred to as average.

Consideration of a series of tanks in this category will be somewhat unconventional. T - IVwhich almost all researchers attribute to heavy German tanks, although they make a reservation that this is a classification according to the caliber of the gun. But, just as faithful to the above declared commitment to a single classification, the author will assign them to this class. As for the instrument, then it will certainly be discussed further.

Thus, this niche is filled with German tanks of the series. T - IV modifications А, B, C, D и E. The remaining modifications of the Quartet can rightfully be attributed to medium tanks.

A few words about the differences between these modifications. As usual, the first two were actually identical machines, the differences of which were technological in nature. Modification С already had a more or less massive, but its main difference from the version B was in a more powerful engine and booking a gun barrel. Series machines D received more powerful armor and another mask gun. As for the series of tanks Еthey became the brainchild of the Polish campaign and were distinguished by enhanced armor in the form of additional armor plates on the frontal (30 mm) and onboard (20 mm) armor. Since the main modifications with which Germany entered World War II were D и Еwe confine ourselves to their consideration (with a formal increase in the weight of the tank Е to 21 t).

Soviet BT - 5 и BT - 7 were representatives of one row and the "seven" was the result of further modification and improvement of the line of high-speed tanks. At the same time, it continued to improve even after its adoption. Thus, in 1937, the tank received a conical turret and increased ammunition, in 1938, the caterpillar belt was replaced (with a fine one), the suspension was increased, the rubber bandages were eliminated (the tanks were wheel-tracked), and the fuel stock was increased. In addition, a modification of the BT-1939M was released in 7, in which the B-2 diesel was installed. Otherwise, its characteristics remained unchanged. From the BT series, the most massive was the BT tank - 7 and BT - 7М (a total of about 6000 pcs), which we will consider the characteristics of which.
Table 9.



German 50-mm gun KwK 38 L / 42 It was also developed by the designers of the company Rheinmetall-Borsig. It had a barrel length 42 caliber (2100 mm), rate of fire - 15 shots per minute. Used for shooting shots: [3, 7]
Table 10.


The next modification is 50-mm gun KwK 39 L / 60 - was a modified long-barreled version of the KwK 38 L / 42 gun. The main difference was the greater length of the charging chamber, associated with an increase in the length of the sleeve from 288 mm to 420 mm. The same shots were used for shooting: [3, 7]
Table 11.


Already at first glance it can be seen that this option was distinguished by much more power and represented, respectively, a greater danger to the tanks.

On all T-IV tanks of early modifications there was one and the same instrument: short-barreled 75-mm gun KwK 37 L / 24 with a barrel length 24 caliber (1765,3 mm). It was designed to combat defensive fortifications (this explains the relatively short barrel), but the presence in its ammunition armor-piercing projectile allowed the tank to successfully fight with armored vehicles protected by anti-bullet or light anti-bullet armor. Her ammunition included shots:
Table 12.


Unfortunately, the data on the characteristics of the projectiles of this gun are not very common, so the author will operate only on his possession, bearing in mind that the armor-piercing effect of the cumulative projectile is much more than the usual armor-piercing and does not depend on the distance.

Soviet 45-mm tank gun 20K was adapted to the fire as armor-piercing, high-explosive fragmentation projectiles. Penetration was as follows [4]:
Table 13.



A brief introduction of the German cannons and the Soviet 20KT's TTX indicates that in a direct collision of Soviet and German tanks of this class, the triples tank guns hit the Soviet T-26 of all modifications from all angles at sighting distances. Soviet tanks were dangerous for the T-III only from a distance of less than 1500 m, which made them virtually defenseless when they met with them in a frontal collision.

Although the Quartet, who were less adapted for anti-tank combat, were also dangerous for Soviet light tanks from a distance of 3000 m, while they could confidently fight their counterparts only from distances not exceeding the same 1500.

To help our tanks overcome this dangerous zone of unrequited fire without significant losses, according to our military theorists, there must have been greater mobility (the specific power of the BT was 30-35 hp / t with an average ground pressure 0,75 kg / cm2 and speed 40 km / h against similar indicators T - IV in 14-15 hp / t, 0,77 kg / cm 2 and 20 km / h). In addition, the chances of success gave a higher rate of fire of the semi-automatic 20KT compared with the KwK 37 and greater ammunition.

As for the tanks of the first two groups, all the cannon tanks were practically invulnerable for them, while remaining dangerous for them at all distances of aimed fire.

Medium tanks

Only three German cars belong to this category of tanks: T - III (H, J) и T - IV (F)having the second marking F1.

The modification of the T-III series machines was mainly in the direction of increasing the thickness of armor. Armament remains the same - 50-mm cannon KwK 38 L / 42. The weight of the tank increased to 21,5 - 21,8 t, which only worsened the kinetic parameters of the tank. The modernization of the T-IV tank was developing in the same direction: reinforcement of the reservation and, as a necessary measure (tank weight reached 22,3 t), the use of wider tracks. Armament also has not changed: 75-mm gun KwK 37 L / 24.

Soviet medium tanks were represented by three-turrets. T - 28 and legendary T - 34. Having become the hallmark of Victory, the T - 34 was put into service at the end of 1939 and met the war almost unchanged (only technological changes were made to improve maintainability and improve manufacturability in production). The most significant changes include the installation of a more powerful 85-mm cannon in the new turret and an increase in the number of people in the crew from four to five. As for the T-28, it was an ambiguous design. Built in 1932 as an infantry support tank (sad remnant of the “Tukhachevsky era”), it turned out to be a very good vehicle for its time and for solving its tasks, which remained in the army and went through several minor reconstructions (replacing the KT-28 cannon with L-10, installation of a stern machine gun in the turret, replacement of a cylindrical turret with a conical turret, installation of screens), which did not significantly change its combat properties.

Table 14.


Since the armament of the German tanks was discussed above, let us examine only the characteristics of the Soviet tank guns.

76-mm gun L-10. All that was found: an armor-piercing projectile with an initial speed of 555 m / s at a distance of 500 m punched armor with a thickness of 61 mm, on 1000 m - 51 mm (at an angle of meeting 60 degrees).

76 mm F-34 gun - tank gun of Gorky Plant No. 92, which, starting from 1941, was equipped with T-34 tanks serially. The design of the gun began in 1939, the gun was an elongated version of the F-32 tank gun and was originally designed to arm T-28 and T-35 tanks. The design of the gun was completed on 15 March 1939 of the year, the first tests of the gun mounted on the T-28 tank passed on October 19 1939 on the Gorokhovetsky testing ground. However, the rearmament of the T-28 and T-35 tanks was decided to be abandoned, and the gun was reassigned to the new T-34 tank, in which the first firing of the F-34 gun was made in November of the 1940 year. In addition, the tests were carried out on the tank BT - 7A.

The armor penetration of F-34 shells was as follows (guaranteed penetration):
Table 15.



The range of armor-piercing projectiles was 4000 m, high-explosive fragmentation - from 9000 to 13000 m, fragmentation (shrapnel) - 6000 - 8000 m depending on the type of ammunition used. The calculation carried out according to the following method allows us to estimate the armor penetration rate at a distance of 2000 in 51 mm at the meeting angle of 90 degrees and 36 mm - at 60 degrees. Practical rate of fire was 3 - 5 shots per minute.

Heavy tanks

In this category of combat vehicles, no comparison is foreseen due to the complete absence of those in the German army. Soviet cars are represented by the most propaganda tank. T - 35 and the most powerful tank on the 1941 year KV - 1.

Immediately make a reservation: the tank KV - 2 in this context will not be considered. His 152-mm howitzer was designed entirely for other purposes, namely, to break the front edge of a heavily reinforced enemy defensive line, destroy powerful pillboxes and storm URs. By the nature of the tasks to be solved, this machine could be safely attributed to ACS, but a number of features: the presence of a rotating turret, powerful booking, the ability to solve independent tasks — quite distinctly distinguish it from self-propelled artillery. In my purely subjective opinion, the KV - 2 should be attributed to a non-existent type of armored personnel carrier, namely, to assault tanks, i.e. vehicles that are able to solve both tank and artillery tasks.
Table 16.



Tank T - 35 It was developed in the 1932 year as a heavy breakthrough tank and fully corresponded to the realities of the combined arms battle of the time, namely: the presence of large masses of infantry and cavalry; defense in depth, filled with a large number of wire obstacles; the almost complete absence of anti-tank artillery. Therefore, the main purpose of such a tank was to fight precisely with these dangers. The infantry and cavalry were supposed to be destroyed with massive machine gun fire (6 units, 7,62-mm DT machine guns installed in three of its five towers completely blocked all possible attack directions), artillery and closed firing points were suppressed by 76-mm guns CT-28 (later - A-10), and in order to defeat the tanks that were then in the armies of the likely enemy, two 45-mm 20K guns were installed, also providing fire in all sectors. The characteristics of all these guns have been discussed previously.

In the 1939, all the T - 35 tanks available in the Red Army were upgraded: they increased the armor of the frontal part of the hull to 70 mm, the sides and the turret - to 25 mm, replaced the gun. Armor protection of the stern and roof remained unchanged: 20 and 14 mm, respectively.

Heavy tank KV - 1 1940 was developed in the winter of the year and was a generalized experience in the design and production of heavy tanks in the USSR, which also took into account the new tasks facing the troops. Among the requirements for this car were the following: powerful anti-missile booking, able to withstand the new anti-tank guns; a universal weapon capable of not only destroying enemy firing points and its fortification, but also confidently striking all types of enemy tanks that existed at that time.

As such a gun was used gun F-32 V.G. Grabin. In modern literature, the view is often expressed that the KV - 1 tank is insufficiently armed, and at the same time they claim that the 76-mm F-22 is the best that we then had for tanks. This statement, as the author sees it, is rather crafty. An 85-caliber tank gun based on the 52K anti-aircraft gun was in development and could well have been created by that time, while the spacious Voroshilov Tower made it possible to install it without any problems with the presence of space. The problem was different: ironically, but for such a powerful weapon in the tank then there were no tasks. The armor of all enemy tanks was so thin that the BB shells pierced through both sides and flew through without destroying it. In addition, there is also an economic component: the larger the caliber, the more expensive each shot in the country. Therefore, the F-32 caliber 76 mm was found to be quite appropriate for its purpose. It remains only incomprehensible why the F-34 gun, which appeared a little later, was not installed on it. Probably, our old Russian approach is “so good, and the best is the enemy of the good.” Who knows….

In any case, not wanting to spend time discussing the “why and how” questions, the author will limit himself to considering what happened.

The semi-automatic 76-mm tank gun L-11 designed by the Leningrad Kirov Plant with mechanical-type semi-automatics had a barrel of 30,5 caliber length (2324 mm), which allowed making 6 - 7 shots / min. The initial speed of the RP of the projectile was 635 m / s, BB - 612 m / s with the following armor penetration values:
Table 17.


* - calculated according to the following method

In its characteristics, it largely coincided with the f-32 gun of its competitor Grabin, somewhat inferior to it in reliability. And although the history of adopting these guns is replete with interesting and sometimes very intriguing moments, we note only that moment that the availability of well-functioning production caused a compromise: take the L-11 guns into service for the tanks of the Kirov plant, which, obviously, was quite logical .

76 mm F-32 gun - semi-automatic with copy-type semiautomatic, which allowed 5 to be done - 6 shots / min. The barrel length 31,5 (2400 mm) informed the RP projectile initial speed 638 m / s, BB - 613 m / s, which provided the following values ​​of armor penetration:
Table 18.


* - calculated according to the following method

V.G. Grabin mentions that the F-32 was, at the request of the customer and against the will of the designers, noticeably shortened with a perceptible loss of combat qualities for the sake of the then prevailing fear that the tank could hit the ground with a gun. This did not allow F-32 to realize all the capabilities originally incorporated into its design.


So, all the tanks of the Red Army and Wehrmacht that existed on 22 on June 1941 were systematized (to what degree of adequacy, judged by dear readers), now it's time to decide what to do with it. Consider how the available performance characteristics allowed us to solve the problems noted above.

Machine-gun tanks were well suited for the purpose of destroying enemy personnel in open battle, but were ill suited to attack defensive lines. Even a simple trench significantly increased the survivability of the infantry, while the tank itself remained open to defeat by all available means of fighting it. The cannon armament of machine-gun cannon tanks was also not very suitable for these purposes: the power of the high-explosive fragmentation projectile caliber 37- or 45 mm is clearly insufficient for creating a "cloud of fragments" and for defeating enemy DOTs.

The guns of medium and heavy tanks were much better suited for solving the first of the noted tasks, especially the 75 / 76 mm caliber, which is quite understandable - the tools of such a caliber were created just in time for this.

But the question of what will be the result of the collision of these machines in a collision with each other, requires more detailed consideration.

A bit of math

Being a chemist by education, i.e. “Creeping empiricist”, the author could not help trying to find some mathematical generalization of the data on the armor penetration of German and Soviet tank guns. Since the armor penetration curves have a form close to exponential, they were approximated by a type curve

where Br is armor penetration, b (0) and b (1) are coefficients, the meaning of which can be determined as follows: b (0) is the maximum possible thickness of the pierced armor, b (1) is an indicator of the velocity of a projectile’s fall (figuratively speaking hands "of the tank gun) and flatness of the trajectory (having slightly sinned against the rigor and scientific terminology, we call this value a" ballistic characteristic ").

The data of calculations and performance characteristics of the tools are presented in the table:
Table 19.


* - values ​​calculated by two points

According to the calculation data, you can immediately see a fairly obvious correlation: the value of b (0) is directly proportional to the magnitude of the kinetic energy of the projectile (muzzle energy). As for the value of b (1), its expression is not so obviously related to the parameters of the gun and the projectile.

This mathematical model allows you to calculate a table of target destruction at different distances and build armor penetration curves. For German guns, they look like this:
Defeat table

Armor penetration curves


for the Soviet - so:
Defeat table

Armor penetration curves


Calculated values ​​are highlighted in bold, which are well (I would say excellent) consistent with the table data.

Based on the exponential dependence of armor penetration on the distance, it is possible to calculate the limiting armor penetration distance using the formula

where Tbr is the thickness of the armor, X is the distance at which it makes its way.

Below are the tables of calculated distances for the considered tanks, based on the assumption that they occur forehead-by-forehead:
Table 22.



The shaded cells show negative values, which by themselves have no physical meaning, but are a good illustration of the “uselessness” of these guns against these tanks, so to say, the magnitude of the value indicates the degree of this “uselessness”. In practical terms, this may be some characteristic of the possibility of upgrading an instrument, i.e. the answer to the question: could ETA gun, in principle, penetrate the armor of this tank.

Even a simple comparison of the data shows that the characteristics of the B-3 gun practically do not differ from those of the Czech-made A3 and A7 guns, approaching the latter more. The 20K gun, having an average caliber between the German A7 and 50 Kwk, is inferior to them in the muzzle energy, but surpasses in the flatness. 50-mm KwK 39 L / 60 looks especially great in this class, surpassing all predecessors up to 1700-1800 m distances. For the initial BOB period, such a “long arm” was just a great indicator and this system obviously shows the maximum possible characteristics for guns such calibers.

Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 75-mm guns KwK 37 L / 24 installed on all tanks of the Pz IV modification, unnecessarily - a short barrel with a large caliber could tell a sufficient amount of kinetic energy, but with a pulse value of 385 (kg m / s) she could not provide greater flatness of the trajectory. In other words, it was a vehicle against infantry, which could more or less effectively fight tanks at close distances (for large ones it was difficult to carry out mounted aimed fire at a maneuvering target).

As for the Soviet "heavyweights", then everything is just plain and clear: the guns had enormous potential, which allowed them to more than effectively solve both anti-tank and anti-personnel tasks. Despite the fact that the barrels of these guns were trimmed compared to their field counterparts, with a high initial velocity of the projectile, they maintained high (and for some purposes and excessive) armor penetration, as well as effectively solving anti-personnel tasks (destruction of manpower, destruction of pillboxes , battery fire suppression), which were solved by a wide range of projectiles (this information is not given in this article, but is widely represented on the Internet).

Now about the possible development of the situation when meeting the opponents in various combinations.

To do this, we first group the tanks into groups according to the thickness of the armor (1 criterion), ordering them within the groups according to the tools installed on them (2 criterion). In the Wehrmacht it will look like this:
Table 23.



A similar table for Soviet tanks gives the following distribution:
Table 24.



What could wait for them when they met on the battlefield "forehead-to-forehead"?

20-mm guns of light German tanks represented a relative danger only for light tanks T - 26 model 1931 g. And BT-2, and then only from a distance of no more than 500 m, while they confidently hit T - II (A) starting with 2500 m. More serious opponents were stronger T-I (C) reservations, whose armor made their way only from 850 m and even more thick-skinned T-II (F), which were taken only from 500 m. For the rest of the Soviet tanks they did not pose any danger.

It makes no sense to look at single combat with other Soviet tanks: only relatively poorly booked T-28s could be hit by “Czechs” from a distance of no more than 900 m, while they themselves could be guaranteed to be destroyed by them from a distance of 4 km. The same applies to the T - I (C), whose 30-mm armor was penetrated by the Soviet L-10 with km 3,5.

With this phrase, we smoothly moved from the first group of German tanks to the second. More powerful weapons made them deadly opponents for our T-26 and BT of all modifications, shooting from distances from 2,5-x to 3,5 km, while those could bring them damage only from a distance of 1000-1300 m, which was clearly not enough with a tank duel. The only salvation was the successful concentration of fire and maneuver, as well as the use of support forces (artillery, infantry, aircraft). And only the old T - 28 still quite confidently could keep opponents at a distance of 3 km or more.

A hypothetical meeting of tanks of the second group could well look the most dramatic. Not the most convincing for this 50 KwK 38 artillery system was reinforced with more solid armor, and the 75 KwK 37 already had enough penetration, as the Germans believed.

Soviet counterparts could oppose not only quite solid armor protection, but also powerful 76-mm guns. At the meeting of these cars, the Germans had an advantage only over T - 28, which they acquired at a rather high price - thick armor led to the almost complete exhaustion of the reserve for upgrading the "triples". As for the "fours", the approximate parity with the T - 28 could put the German designers before a difficult dilemma: to increase the thickness of the armor or to increase the power of the gun. Do not be on the battlefield of the legendary "thirty-four", then perhaps they would have gone the standard way: to increase the thickness of the armor plate is always easier than developing a new artillery system. But the almost complete impossibility of penetrating the T-34 frontal armor with tank guns solved the task unequivocally - to create a weapon that can hit Soviet tanks from a distance of more than 2000 m to keep them at a safe distance. The very same T - 34 could deal with any of his opponents from any distance, while remaining invulnerable from any distance of aimed fire.

Talking about HF - 1 fights with the Germans is not necessary: ​​they could only be dealt with in the Wehrmacht with the help of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and corps artillery.

With such an abundance of used tank guns both in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, the question naturally arises: what kind of gun was better? As you know, the most difficult answers have to look for the most simple questions. This is no exception. I will try to answer it from my bell tower.

Distracting from the specific requirements that the military set before the designers, the author will allow himself to define as criteria high muzzle energy (b0) and the ability to retain striking abilities (b1) for a long time. According to the first parameter from 37-milemetrakov, the Soviet B-3 seems to be the most acceptable, according to the second - the Czech A3. From the combination of both, almost none of them has an overwhelming superiority and the choice in favor of any lies entirely in other planes.

The second group of guns demonstrates the clear superiority of the German gunsmiths, especially the 50 Kwk39 / L60 cannon, surpassing the only Soviet 20K in magnitude of muzzle energy. The high ballistic characteristics of these guns made it possible to put up with their rather rapid fall (which is understandable: no one has yet canceled air resistance).

But in the third group of guns, the Soviet guns had no analogue: high muzzle energy, pulse values ​​of about 4000 kg m / s in combination with a large mass of projectile made it possible to maintain high armor penetration at long distances.

Summary

So, whose tanks were better? The answer is obvious. The mere abundance of modifications of the Wehrmacht’s combat vehicles indicates that unfinished models were put on stream, the shortcomings of which were eliminated during combat operation. Pure machine-gun tanks and tanks with small-caliber guns of aviation origin at the beginning of the forties is not even technical stupidity. Such a machine could be dangerous only for tanks of the “era of Tukhachevsky”, but not for the works of Koshkin and Kotin. Even the somewhat archaic looking T - 28 was obviously too tough for them, what to speak of more powerful or more modern machines. Even Soviet armored cars armed with the same 20K guns were dangerous for these “Wehrmacht armored monsters” at distances where they didn’t really get “miserable guns” *. Increasing the booking is the easiest way to increase the survivability of the tank in battle, but it is also the most unpromising. Weight gain, reduced mobility, the need to increase engine power - all these tricks quickly eat up the resource of modernization and, sooner or later, put designers to the need to develop a new car. The failure of Polish tank forces and the headlessness and carelessness in using tank forces in France played a cruel joke with the Germans: they never met a really serious opponent. The episodic use of the English Matilds in France did not make the conclusions either: the monstrosity of the tank, combined with their meager numbers, made it possible to solve this problem by other non-tank means. German anti-tank artillery was not in the best condition either. Having generally more powerful systems, they remained at the level of the tasks of the beginning, at best - the mid-thirties.

Soviet tanks did not suffer from pettiness, although they, too, were not without flaws. These are low reliability of engines, low quality of optics, lack of sufficient radio stations, low level of comfort, and crew overload with work — this is not a complete list of the problems of our combat vehicles. Add here and the low professionalism of specialists (mechanics were taken from collective farm tractor operators, commanders were generally taught at accelerated courses), and a large percentage of defects in the production of ammunition (it is here that one must look for the cause of the low REAL efficiency of the "forty", and not in their inherent depravity), and many other things, but the combat vehicles themselves were quite modern and fully meeting the challenges of not only modernity, but also some future. Tanks of earlier releases were more or less specialized, T - 34 and KV - 1 were universal tanks. Machines of this class were not in any other country in the world. As for the Wehrmacht, only the luck of the first year of the war gave the German designers a head start to develop effective objections to Soviet realities. Only in the summer of 1942, Pancervafe received a car that remotely matched the X-34 development of 1940, and only in the summer of 1943, the Panthers, slightly superior to their prototype, and the Tigers, which are significantly superior to the X-1, developed the same already forgotten 1940 th. And this is despite the fact that the Soviet response to this zoo was followed in half a year and a year, respectively. Comments, as they say, are superfluous ...
____________________
*) This quote is taken from some publications of Russian “historians” who clearly tried to hide the truth ...

Conclusion
I do not need a friend who agrees nods to every word I say. It makes my shadow much better.

(Socrates)


The number of copies broken in discussions on this issue, certainly exceeds the number of them broken in real battles of human history. By adding another twig to this pile, the author did not set an objective to simply clutter up the space. As Moliere said, “all genres have the right to exist, except for boring,” and if so, then this point of view on this problem, as the author seems, also has a right to exist. By presenting this review to the public, the author hopes for constructive criticism. Also, the author will be grateful if dear opponents point out errors in calculations and facts. These comments can be voiced both on the forum and in personal communication.



Literature
In this section, I also want to make a reservation. Information gathering took more than one year and did not have the character of a target. Simply the author himself wanted to understand the existing situation. That is why a large amount of data was already stored in the form of numerical characteristics, not marked with links. Therefore, the author apologizes for the incomplete list of sources of information below:

[1] http://www.armoury-online.ru/articles/ammo/pistol-ammo/calibres/
[2] http://vif2ne.ru/forum/0/arhprint/936479
[3] http://www.battlefield.ru/armor-penetration-german-guns.html
[4] http://opoccuu.com/20k.htm
[5] http://dzromon.narod.ru/gun/push/20mm.htm
[6] Wikipedia, article "Skoda 37 mm A7"
[7] http://vn-parabellum.narod.ru/ger/ger-t-gun-pen.htm
[8] Wikipedia, article "37-mm tank gun model 1930 of the year (5-K)"
And also:
M. Svirin. Artillery armament of Soviet tanks 1940-1945. Armada-Vertical, #4
M. Baryatinsky. Light tanks of the Second World War. - M .: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2007.
M. Baryatinsky. Tanks of the Second World. - M .: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2009.
Tanks of the world. / Compiled by R. Ismagilov. - Smolensk, Rusich. 2002.
Author:
144 comments
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  1. omsbon
    omsbon 12 February 2014 08: 33
    +19
    Thank you to the author for the work done! Very interesting!
    1. Puxlo
      Puxlo 12 February 2014 18: 08
      +2
      I agree, thanks to the author for his work. Good article
      1. Vadivak
        Vadivak 13 February 2014 15: 11
        +2
        Quote: Puxlo
        I agree, thanks to the author for his work. X


        I am joining. But I do not agree in detail.



        The Germans had heavy tanks until 1939. Nb.Fz. And even used during the operation to occupy Norway in the amount of as many 3 pieces.
        1. Alex
          14 February 2014 00: 18
          +3
          Vadivak, thanks for the cool photos of Rheinmetal, I don't have any. Can I go to your personal archive?

          The Germans had heavy tanks until 1939. Nb.Fz. And even used during the operation to occupy Norway in the amount of as many 3 pieces.
          That's it - three pieces. Which, EMNIP, remained in the same place. And they didn’t.

          By the way, here is the question. The Germans certainly had experience in the design and production of heavy weights. Why did you stop? Not enough resources? Thought, and so manage? Did you see any goals?
          1. anomalocaris
            anomalocaris 15 February 2014 03: 07
            0
            Because of the "blitzkrieg" concept. They were very successful in crushing Poland and bathing the British with the French in the English Channel. In fact, they did not have the experience of using heavy tanks, which are primarily intended to break through prepared defenses. The Germans suppressed the defense lines either by aviation or by maneuver (in several episodes, heavy artillery was used very effectively). But the main thing was precisely the maneuver of tank groups reinforced by infantry; the heavy tank did not fit into this concept. Unlike the Red Army, which just had to gnaw through Mannerheim's line.
            And so the Germans developed a heavy tank for themselves. Only this task was not a priority for German designers. Until 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
            1. Alex
              15 February 2014 15: 15
              +2
              I also think something like this. Yes, 22.06.41 was largely a revelation.
              1. anomalocaris
                anomalocaris 17 February 2014 15: 56
                +1
                Why think the Germans began to develop the V30001 back in 1936 ...
    2. Vend
      Vend 14 September 2018 13: 38
      0
      The answer to the question why the troops of the Red Army rolled back to Moscow remains open. They were superior in tanks, in artillery too. To the author a huge + for the article and research.
  2. ramin_serg
    ramin_serg 12 February 2014 09: 24
    +6
    Yeah, I’ve read so much useful information.
    1. svp67
      svp67 12 February 2014 11: 50
      +11
      Quote: omsbon
      Thank you to the author for the work done! Very interesting!

      Quote: ramin_serg
      Yeah, I’ve read so much useful information.

      Yes, the work has been done great, but very ONE LIKE ... Having set himself the task of finding out whose tanks are BETTER, the author missed a lot of factors that fundamentally change a lot from his own, as he considers logical formulas.
      Not fully taken into account:
      1. The quality of ammunition, in this case armor-piercing.
      2. The quality of the sights.
      3. Visibility from the tanks, that is, the presence and placement of monitoring devices, as well as their quality and dead zones.
      4. Ergonomics and distribution of duties among crew members.
      5. Commanding controllability of tanks.
      And without taking these factors into account, it is impossible to explain why our tanks were moving in the attack "in a handful", in every possible way "snuggling" to the commander's tank. Why did our tankers often "ignore" and counteract the actions of enemy tanks? Why with such ease the German tanks evaded head-on clashes with our tanks and, making a maneuver, went out to the flank or rear of our tank units and approaching them at a minimum distance, produced their defeat. Why even fixing a hit on the enemy's tank, our tankers did not achieve its destruction ... Only the comprehension of these and other WHY (like - organized interaction with reconnaissance aviation and battlefield aviation, as well as with infantry and artillery, skillfully organized logistic support), and not just "juggling" mm and kg, will give in many respects an understanding of why our tens of thousands of tanks could not stop three and a half thousand German tanks in the first years of the war
      1. Hug
        Hug 12 February 2014 15: 25
        +11
        Re. svp67:
        ... Yes, the work has been done great, but very LONELY ...


        Everything in our life is relative. It seems to me that the author did not set himself the goal of embracing the immensity - otherwise, and taking into account your comments, this would be a defense of the dissertation (one of the parts included in the dissertation) after the end of adjuncture, or a solid monograph. In our case, this is an article for educational program and broadening the horizons of the bulk of visitors to the forum.
        IMHO: the author coped with the goal. Article (+), author - thanks!
        1. Alex
          12 February 2014 18: 31
          +6
          Quote: Kram
          IMHO: the author coped with the goal. Article (+), author - thanks!
          Thank. A kind word is also pleasant to a cat (folk wisdom).
      2. Alex
        12 February 2014 18: 29
        +6
        In this work, I did not consciously analyze these aspects: here, as you rightly noted, everything is very complex and interconnected. Tanks were analyzed and compared
        according to their declared performance characteristics
        Without arguing with the importance and, often, the exceptional importance of these factors, I find myself analyzing them without being an expert in this matter. Anyway, bye ... wink
      3. Nekrasova
        Nekrasova 4 December 2017 20: 29
        +1
        I agree completely, as well as the small resource of the B2 engines and, to a lesser extent, the chassis, until the end of 1942, + the excellent qualities of the German "thin" cemented armor.
    2. lestad
      lestad 12 February 2014 22: 54
      -1
      Yeah winked is it possible for more compact info
  3. dv-v
    dv-v 12 February 2014 09: 27
    +7
    can be praised for the amount of work done, but, continuing to remember the ancient Greeks, this is Sisyphus labor. the army manuals of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, the tactical techniques of both, the military industry, design bureaus, and belt-restoration units — from the army to the deep rear, and, no less important, the anti-tank artillery with ground attack aircraft somewhat behind is precisely what makes this work useless. though curious.
    1. avt
      avt 12 February 2014 10: 08
      +6
      Quote: dv-v
      can be praised for the amount of work done, but, continuing to remember the ancient Greeks, this is Sisyphus labor. army manuals of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, tactics of both,

      Well, the author does not pretend to be at that depth at all. But if we compare it with the work of Svirin, one of which he refers to, there is a lack of specific documents based on the results of tests on the shelling of vehicles, both ours and German. It would be more numerous than numerous calculations.
      1. Toporkoff
        Toporkoff 12 February 2014 10: 49
        +1
        can be praised for the amount of work done, but, continuing to remember the ancient Greeks, this is Sisyphus labor. the army manuals of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, the tactical techniques of both, the military industry, design bureaus, and belt-restoration units — from the army to the deep rear, and, no less important, the anti-tank artillery with ground attack aircraft somewhat behind is precisely what makes this work useless. though curious.

        I agree, it is necessary to dance from the concept of using tanks, and not from the thickness of the armor or the caliber of the gun.
    2. Bigriver
      Bigriver 12 February 2014 11: 01
      +8
      Quote: dv-v
      can be praised for the amount of work done, but, continuing to remember the ancient Greeks, this is Sisyphus labor. army manuals of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, tactical techniques of both, ..

      Very true noticed.
      ... is an attempt by the author to understand a pile of facts and data ... about the tactical and technical characteristics of the tanks that were in service with the Red Army and the Wehrmacht by June 22, 1941, as well as an attempt to briefly analyze and generalize them.

      TTX is a derivative of the task. From doctrine, charter, etc.
      The tank units of the Wehrmacht were a blitzkrieg tool, in which tanks, relatively speaking, were only the tip of the tool.
      And in the initial period of the war in the East, they (TD, TK, TG), as a rule, did not set themselves the task of smashing and defeating the tank "hordes" of the Red Army head-on. This was done by artillery (Kampfgruppen, divisions, corps). Only from the 43rd year there was a massive expansion of the TD functions to a mobile device with breakthroughs.
      The Red Army is even more difficult. All 30 years was a theoretical study of actions and the search for forms of tank formations. This process lasted until the mid-end of the 43rd.
      The main sores of all our actions with the use of tanks at the beginning of the war were: inconsistency of operations with the combat arms and neighboring formations, throwing in the counter and attack tanks in bulk, without providing infantry support, artillery, aviation, inability to correctly select and calculate the direction of strikes, their depth . Material and technical support and reliability of materiel - has long become a commonplace.
      Thus, a comparison of the lengths of spears, swords, thicknesses of bibs and shields of knights does not give us an answer why it was so and not otherwise?
      Methodology, rethinking the combat experience of mobile connections of two parties - this is the subject for a thick-thick and super-interesting monograph soldier
      1. dv-v
        dv-v 12 February 2014 12: 12
        +1
        exactly! even in a rather superficial documentary about the Second World War on the first channel, the alignment was given of how battle tactics changed throughout the war.
        1. family tree
          family tree 12 February 2014 22: 05
          +2
          Quote: Toporkoff
          I agree, it is necessary to dance from the concept of using tanks, and not from the thickness of the armor or the caliber of the gun.

          And who's stopping? Yes, even from the stove.
          This work does not pretend to be true in the last resort, but is only a weak attempt by the author to understand a pile of facts and data that are available in literature and on the Internet, about the tactical and technical characteristics of tanks, which were in service with the Red Army and the Wehrmacht by June 22, 1941,
  4. Old scoop
    Old scoop 12 February 2014 09: 29
    -1
    If we look more broadly, we can note the technical lag of the USSR from Germany and Czechoslovakia. Training for the production and maintenance of equipment was also not up to par. All these are objective reasons for the production of inexpensive, technologically advanced and easily mastered equipment.
    Sherman, too, was not the crown of American tank building. The emphasis was on quantity and cheapness to the detriment of the performance characteristics.
    1. bistrov.
      bistrov. 12 February 2014 11: 43
      +8
      Quote: Old scoop
      If we look more broadly, we can note the technical lag of the USSR from Germany and Czechoslovakia.

      In what and where did you see the technical lag? The author spent an hour trying to prove to you that Soviet tanks were more perfect than German ones, and the reaction of the Germans to the changes in general was longer than the USSR. And about "Sherman" M-4, I generally keep quiet. Archaic front-wheel drive and then, this star engine! By the way, all German tanks were front-wheel drive. After the war, the whole world will accept the Soviet school of tank building: the engine and transmission from behind, with the exception of Israel. And you say "technical lag"!
      1. dv-v
        dv-v 12 February 2014 12: 23
        +1
        you should expand your horizons about the history of tank building - each design school is rich in both brilliant and mediocre solutions.
        1. ddmm09
          ddmm09 12 February 2014 12: 41
          +2
          Each solution requires a test of practice; it is not known in advance whether this solution is ingenious or useless.
          1. dv-v
            dv-v 15 February 2014 08: 38
            -1
            as I understand it, you have no idea what you are discussing - for example, Germany, being the birthplace of a diesel engine, continued to equip tanks in the WWII with gasoline maybachs. do you think that the years of the war and the sovets tanks did not convince them of the wrong choice?
            1. July
              July 15 February 2014 15: 36
              +2
              As the "birthplace of diesel", Germany had a difficult time with diesel fuel. It was planned to put a diesel engine on the "Panther", but ... not destiny. smile
              1. dv-v
                dv-v 16 February 2014 05: 16
                -1
                Did you learn organic chemistry at school? what do you remember about oil refining? and then, you know, from 97th to 2003th I worked in the chemical analysis laboratory at the oil refinery.
                1. July
                  July 16 February 2014 08: 40
                  +1
                  And what does the oil distillation, the place of your work (in the laboratory and a cleaner you can work or just wash the tubes) and the problems of Nazi Germany with diesel fuel and gasoline?
                  1. dv-v
                    dv-v 17 February 2014 07: 25
                    -2
                    those. do you seriously think that I will not notice that my two questions have not been answered? and my "top five" in chemistry and long-term work is intended only to push you to a sensible answer to the questions asked - you can merge as you like, including the way you have demonstrated, but I still hope to awaken you at least an attempt to google an article about oil refining, find out at least the basics.

                    By the way, once again you’ll blurt out about the diesel shortage, add to your thoughtful head information for consideration - the Kringsmarine’s submarine fleet was equipped with diesel engines. and although marine oil is there, it is made by mixing fuel oil with gasoil. and the quantity ... however, there was a deficit in large surface water, yes, but Hitler decided there that the grain was useless.
    2. Sour
      Sour 12 February 2014 14: 25
      +1
      Quote: Old scoop
      The emphasis was on quantity and cheapness to the detriment of the performance characteristics.

      Maybe.
      But this massive and supposedly cheap tank had a tower electric drive, a vertical guidance stabilizer, one or even two radio stations, highly developed optics, and rubberized low-noise track tracks.
      The Sherman is definitely a massive tank. But it's not very cheap. Technically, it is quite sophisticated, at least compared to the German T-4.
      1. family tree
        family tree 12 February 2014 22: 15
        +2
        Quote: Sour
        Maybe.

        Wet ammunition forgotten and the location of the fuel tank. hi
  5. Owl
    Owl 12 February 2014 09: 34
    +12
    Informative. The most important conclusion: people (soldiers and officers) fight and win, the equipment and weapons are used by them, the preparedness, training and determination of German soldiers and officers at the beginning of the war exceeded the training of personnel of many units of the Red Army (the exception was units of border troops and army units deployed at the border). The training of crews of new types of tanks (T-34 and KV) was low (the indicator of the practical driving of driver mechanics was 0,5-3,5 hours, ignorance of the material part), and therefore a huge amount of equipment was abandoned due to technical damage and due to improper use.
    1. vladimirZ
      vladimirZ 14 February 2014 06: 12
      +1
      The most important conclusion: people (soldiers and officers) fight and win, the equipment and weapons are used by them, ...


      Yes. this is the main thing.
      The level of education of the personnel of the Red Army, the majority of which had only primary education, essentially knew only how to read and write, did not allow them to master and competently operate tanks in the shortest time possible.
      And the command staff of the Red Army, in the first half of the war, did not properly know how to organize and conduct combat operations of tank troops in a highly mechanized war.

      It is enough to recall only the pre-war (1941) decision of the General Staff of the Red Army (G.K. Zhukov) on the creation of dozens of clumsy, poorly equipped, due to the large number (1000 units) of tanks, mechanized corps, which also combine tanks of several models, because which significantly complicated their repair and maintenance.
      Only after suffering significant defeats in 1941-42, the soldiers of the Red Army were able to master the "science of victory" and began to gain the upper hand over a strong enemy, the German army.
      We must never forget the slogan of Stalin I.V. "Cadres are everything."
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 14 February 2014 15: 38
        +1
        The level of education of the personnel of the Red Army, the majority of which had only primary education, essentially knew only how to read and write, did not allow them to master and competently operate tanks in the shortest time possible.
        this is exactly what I am trying to explain to the author that illiterate and inexperienced will even guess Т90 near Smolensk in the summer of 41))))
        It is the continuation that reveals the issue of personnel and tactics that I want to demand from the author, although everything that can already be said is already, but it would not hurt to repeat
        1. Alex
          15 February 2014 15: 23
          +2
          Quote: Stas57
          that’s what I’m trying to explain to the author,
          Go ahead, don’t have to explain THIS to me. Even a no brainer understands that a tank without a crew is just a pile of iron. But I'm trying to explain to you that the car is better than the cart. Moreover, no one canceled the coachman's skill: I, for example, would ruin even a car with artificial intelligence in no time, and my brother would slip through the eye of a needle on any one. So, it is not clear why you are trying to replace the question "whose tanks were better on June 22, 1941" with the question "who better used their tanks on June 22, 1941".
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 15 February 2014 16: 38
            +1
            Quote: Alex
            So, it is not clear why you are trying to replace the question "whose tanks were better on June 22, 1941" by the question "who better used their tanks on June 22, 1941".

            because the 22nd number and further showed that superiority in the performance characteristics of tanks does not matter, if at the wheel / steering wheel / levers yesterday's groom, with experience = 0. Because your performance characteristics are nothing more than "spherical horses in a vacuum" that have very little to do with the reality of the battle, because according to the performance characteristics, the plane develops 50 km more than in real life, because the flashlight is not closed, because 45ka should cover from 1 km guaranteed, and it is with 600 with difficulty because the cores are ek and so on and so on.
            Because these millimeters do not matter if you do not know how to use, but you do not take this into account at all.
            and the experience of war confirmed my words.
            1. svp67
              svp67 15 February 2014 16: 42
              +1
              Quote: Stas57
              Because your performance characteristics are nothing more than "spherical horses in a vacuum" that have very little to do with the reality of the battle
              Everything matters. When you know what it is and understand how to use it
              1. Stas57
                Stas57 15 February 2014 17: 11
                0
                Quote: svp67
                Everything matters. When you know what it is and understand how to use it

                Well, yes, according to the performance characteristics of the KV, it covers trenches like a nefig, but in life it rolls near the curb, because the driver only saw it yesterday, because there is no fuel, there are no spare parts, shells in another warehouse, it burned clutches, boiled and so on and so on tp
                and now this pride of our performance characteristics is the subject of photography with a smiling fritz.

                on TTX, the HF covers the trenches as nefig do, but according to reality, the treshki, having received an order, quickly disappeared into the terrain, and the HF, without communication, without maps and intelligence data, runs into a battery of 10 cm guns, 88 anti-aircraft guns,
                and now this pride of our performance characteristics is the subject of photography with a smiling fritz.

                therefore, I wanted to clarify with the author whether there would be a second part with a description of combat use and military production.
                I realized that it will not.
  6. Voodoo
    Voodoo 12 February 2014 09: 43
    +4
    A good article ... a lot of information ... Thanks to the author))) However, the question is complex and ambiguous ... I would not rush to conclusions))
  7. RBLip
    RBLip 12 February 2014 09: 49
    +1
    good article, very informative. but totally agree with the dv-v comment hi and he would also add that iron is iron. you need to consider all this in a complex. who is sitting behind levers, who is aiming a gun, who, finally, is repairing this iron. maintainability data is needed (after all, it is very important at what speed a wrecked car will appear on the battlefield). and so, the author revealed the topic precisely within the boundaries that he outlined for himself.
  8. igordok
    igordok 12 February 2014 10: 38
    +4
    Authors - stop doing this. Today there are two articles, large and informative in size (this and "Myths of the Great Patriotic War. Papier-mâché helmet" http://topwar.ru/39670-mify-velikoy-otechestvennoy-kaska-iz-pape-mashe.html), which do not read diagonally, here it is necessary to read it. Have mercy on our time. good
    1. family tree
      family tree 12 February 2014 22: 18
      +1
      Quote: igordok
      Have pity on our time. good

      To hell with Lewinsky! And his hat, there too!
  9. kirpich
    kirpich 12 February 2014 10: 54
    +1
    After reading the whole article, you can safely enter the Academy of Armored Forces. laughing
  10. July
    July 12 February 2014 11: 30
    0
    A lot of work has been done, but to invent something new in the qualification of tanks was not worth it. Everything has long been known and nothing complicated.
    On the eve of the war Soviet tanks were classified by combat weight light, medium and heavy.
    German tanks classified by caliber weapons to the same light, medium and heavy.
    According to this qualification, the T-IV tank was classified as a heavy tank, and therefore the assertion that the Germans did not have heavy tanks on the eve of the war is incorrect.
    This tank was created as heavy. At a meeting of the Wehrmacht Arms Office on January 11, 1934, a tank building concept was developed, which was based on the ideas of Guderian and Lutz on the release, in addition to light tanks TI and T-II, medium and heavy tanks. Medium tanks were supposed to be armed with anti-tank guns, and heavy ones were large-caliber guns for fire support of infantry and other types of tanks.
    The weight of the heavy tank was limited to 24 tons due to the low carrying capacity of most bridges in Germany. For secrecy, the project of this tank was called "Medium Tractor", or "Escort Vehicle".
    So there is no lie in the history of WWII when they talk about heavy German tanks. There is no fiction in the memoirs of General Lukin about the participation of heavy German tanks in the battles near Smolensk.
    Later the German classification changed and the T-IV began to belong to medium tanks after the appearance of the "Tiger" and "Panther".
    And one more clarification. Do not underestimate the German designers in the sense that the T-34 and even BT and T-26 inflicted defeat on German tanks during tank battles. It's just that the Germans (and indeed in the world, in the USSR too) before WWII it was considered that "tanks do not fight with tanks." Therefore, the requirements for tanks were presented not as for fighting tanks, but for supporting the infantry, participating in breaking through the defense and for entering the breakthrough.
  11. Bigriver
    Bigriver 12 February 2014 11: 37
    +5
    With all due respect to the work of the author, there are many incomprehensions, inaccuracies and errors in the text.
    About everything, from top to bottom I will not smile But, for example:
    ... one of the stumbling blocks in comparing and evaluating tanks of the USSR and Germany during the WWII period is that at that time there was no single tank concept in the world. And only with time, when tanks became an independent type of armed forces, the tasks and capabilities of tank formations became clear, the tactics of their application became clear, then the classification of military vehicles began to crystallize. Moreover, in different countries (in accordance with their vision of armored vehicles) it was different. So, in England and France tanks were considered a means of reinforcing infantry and were divided into infantry escort tanks and cruising. In the USSR, by the beginning of World War II, a classification system based on the weight of the machine was already formed: light (up to 20 tons), medium (20 - 40 tons) and heavy (over 40 tons).

    Throughout the 30s, both in the USSR and in Germany, "tanks" were already an independent type of the Armed Forces. Until 1942, we called it: armored troops. After 42nd: armored and mechanized troops. Germany has the Panzerwaffe.
    Escort tanks entered infantry formations. Cruising - to tank.
    Our classification grows from the theory of dividing tanks into "long-range" and NPP. That is, from the types of applications and tasks. Bridges have nothing to do with it.
    ...The German army also had the same classification.But it was based on the power of weapons: tanks with machine gun weapons, tanks with light cannon weapons and tanks with heavy cannon weapons. Light cannon weapons included cannons of a caliber from 20 mm to 50 mm, and heavy cannon armaments included cannons of a caliber of 75 mm and above.

    No, another. The Germans did not have infantry escort tanks. Their role was played by individual divisions of Shtugov and other self-propelled guns. They belonged not to the Panzerwaffe, but to artillery.
    The fact that German tanks were divided according to the power of weapons has not yet been documented by anyone. This is discussed and discussed. The fact is that there were no heavy companies and battalions of tanks in the Wehrmacht TD. "Fours" with 75 mm were included in the companies of medium tanks. The rest of the little thing - in the light companies.
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 18: 38
      +3
      Quote: BigRiver
      The Germans did not have infantry escort tanks.
      So I didn’t seem to say that.
  12. Per se.
    Per se. 12 February 2014 11: 46
    +10
    It's not just about whose tanks are better. The Germans, when attacking France, had mainly T-I and T-II, that is, light tanks, but reduced to armored fists, against the French tanks, stronger in armor and weapons, but scattered. When Germany attacked the USSR, we had an undeniable superiority in tanks, both in the total number (several times) and in the strength of new vehicles, in addition, the number of new T-34 and KV-1, KV-2, commensurate with the number T-III and T-IV, the main modern Wehrmacht tanks thrown against the USSR (the rest are light tanks, the same T-I, T-II and captured equipment). Faced with our new tanks, the Germans very quickly drew conclusions, not only on forcing the creation of the "Panther" and "Tiger", but also on the modernization of "triplets" and "fours", the creation of a whole fleet of self-propelled guns on the chassis of outdated and new tanks. Here I do not agree with the author that numerous modifications are evidence of some kind of backwardness or imperfection, this is efficiency in the conclusions. By the Battle of Kursk, the main German "Panzers" were quite at the level of countering the T-34 and KV, and the appearance of the "Tigers" temporarily shifted the advantage to the Germans. Surprisingly, but until the very end of the war, the Germans managed to create an advantage in the direction of their counterattacks, including against tanks. Why am I saying all this, why are we picking up the ashes of history here, and in order to understand that it is important not only to have good tanks, good crews, it is important to ORGANIZATION and interaction between the branches of the armed forces. Otherwise, as they used to say in ancient times, a ram commanding an army of lions will lose to a lion commanding an army of rams. I will conclude with one more quote, whose author Klyuchevsky: "History teaches nothing, but only punishes for ignorance of the lessons." Russia has had too many cruel lessons that we must not forget now, let alone not know them.
    1. Metlik
      Metlik 12 February 2014 21: 11
      +1
      I agree. Blitzkrieg is a theory that was built on operational intelligence, excellent communications and quick interaction between the various branches of the armed forces. So the Germans had an advantage in tanks or not - this is not the main thing.
  13. bbss
    bbss 12 February 2014 12: 16
    0
    The author does not mention the KV-2 anywhere, but he was quite a production car. And the literature in the public domain is much more than the author managed to use ...
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 18: 43
      +4
      Quote: bbss
      The author does not mention KV-2 anywhere,
      I mention, and in a very specific way.

      And the literature in the public domain is much more than the author managed to use
      More than. And the one is listed in which, basically, tables of armor penetration of the installed guns were given. It seems to me that it makes no sense to list several pages of literary sources, which for the most part contain the same data (and in some even the citations are accurate to the point).
    2. BM-13
      BM-13 25 June 2014 16: 15
      +3
      Quote: bbss
      The author does not mention the KV-2 anywhere.
      Yes, it seems like it mentions. It is necessary to read carefully.
  14. July
    July 12 February 2014 12: 36
    +1
    Our classification grows from the theory of dividing tanks into "long-range" and NPP. That is, from the types of applications and tasks. Bridges have nothing to do with it.

    You confuse the classification by type and purpose. And these are two big differences.
    No, another. The Germans did not have infantry escort tanks. Their role was played by individual divisions of Shtugov and other self-propelled guns. They belonged not to the Panzerwaffe, but to artillery.

    Error again.
    I will give you the official concept of tank building in Germany based on the ideas of Guderian and Lutz, adopted in 1934.
    Apparently these generals had no idea what they wanted and what they wanted.
    At the same meeting, it was specifically about the creation of "line tanks" - medium and heavy. And the task of the heavy was precisely to support the infantry and other types of tanks with fire.
    As for self-propelled guns, here is a mistake. The self-propelled guns owe their birth to Manstein, and at first some military leaders spoke out against them, just saying that the T-4 was already being created to support the infantry and there was no point in creating something else.
    But common sense prevailed.
    Self-propelled guns were created on the chassis of tanks and belonged to armored weapons, they were included in the tank divisions along with the SZO (self-propelled anti-aircraft guns) and medium armored personnel carriers with artillery weapons.
    And they belonged to the Panzervaffe as part of the tank divisions.
    For example, in the 7th tank division there were self-propelled guns sIG33, SZO FlaK L / 56 (on a Sd Kfz 8 tractor) and medium-sized armored personnel carriers Sd Kfz 251/22, which were part of artillery divisions, anti-tank divisions and platoons.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 12 February 2014 13: 57
      +1
      Quote: July
      You confuse the classification by type and purpose. And these are two big differences.

      At first it was for its intended purpose (30th), then, before the war itself, by weight.
      According to Svirin, the pre-war Soviet classification:
      1. Floating ultralight tank (up to 5 tons).
      2. Main escort tank / light (up to 22 t, T-50).
      3. Medium tank (up to 36 tons).
      4. Heavy tank (up to 60 tons).
      5. Superheavy tank (up to 100 tons).
      No, another. The Germans did not have infantry escort tanks. Their role was played by individual divisions of Shtugov and other self-propelled guns. They belonged not to the Panzerwaffe, but to artillery.


      Error again.
      I will give you the official concept of tank building in Germany based on the ideas of Guderian and Lutz, adopted in 1934.
      At the same meeting, it was specifically about the creation of "line tanks" - medium and heavy. And the task of the heavy was precisely to support the infantry and other types of tanks with fire.
      Self-propelled guns were created on the chassis of tanks and belonged to armored weapons, they were included in tank divisions along with SZO (self-propelled anti-aircraft guns) and medium armored personnel carriers with artillery weapons.
      And they belonged to the Panzervaffe as part of the tank divisions.

      Are we talking about the whole evolution of formations and tanks from the end of the 20s to the Victory? smile
      Maybe it should be limited to 1941?
      Heavy "fours" in medium tank companies? Or do you think that there were heavy companies in the Wehrmacht TD? At 41-42 confirmation is required.
      And you claim that SAU divisions ORGANIZATIONAL included in the TD? And the self-propelled guns, respectively, wore .., what buttonholes?
      And you too lazy to see the states? wink
      About the fact that they are attached, I do not mind. In the same way, regiments were attached to us, and later self-propelled brigades — SD, KK, MK, TK, etc.
  15. Leshka
    Leshka 12 February 2014 12: 43
    +1
    well done handsome author
  16. vomag
    vomag 12 February 2014 12: 59
    +3
    Quote: Per se.
    Surprisingly, until the very end of the war, the Germans managed to create an advantage in the direction of their counterattacks, including tanks.

    The Germans took parts from one sector of the front (say minor or where they went over to the defensive and strengthened the parts to say counter strike or attack) they had such a joke - do you know why the Führer loves to transfer parts from one edge of the front to the other? ways they are better preserved!
  17. goody
    goody 12 February 2014 13: 04
    +1
    Good article, thanks to the author!
  18. July
    July 12 February 2014 13: 06
    0
    Quote: bbss
    The author does not mention the KV-2 anywhere, but he was quite a production car. And the literature in the public domain is much more than the author managed to use ...

    This miracle on caterpillars would not have been born at all if Koshkin had not been Voroshilov’s son-in-law.
    Heavy, slow, shoot only along the line of the hull or at a small horizontal angle. It is dangerous to use it on a slope - it could roll over due to a high center of gravity. When shooting at 90 degrees to the line of the hull, the result could be the same - somersault.
    Actually, the KV-1 was not finalized either: with a seemingly low specific pressure on the ground, it got stuck where the thirty-four passed freely, the transmission couldn't stand the long marches on most cars, the crews threw the KV into the 41st from -failure of the transmission and the inability to repair it on its own.
    The designer, who received the Stalin Prize for the development of the IS-2 chassis, also worked for the KV, as he himself admitted that the tank was raw and should not be taken into service.
    It was not for nothing that Stalin, after the very first battles of the KV-1, raised the question of what could be removed from service. And they removed it quickly. Another modification began to be produced - "C".
    1. sapran
      sapran 12 February 2014 19: 08
      0
      Excuse me Koshkin involved in the KV-2? (or KOTIN)?
    2. family tree
      family tree 12 February 2014 22: 36
      +3
      Quote: July
      This miracle on caterpillars would not have been born at all if Koshkin had not been Voroshilov’s son-in-law.

      Kotin, actually. This miracle on the tracks was really a miracle in tank building, in the real sense of the word. Everyone believed that the return of 152 mm guns would not stand the shoulder strap and if the tower is not torn off, then it will jam. What a miracle request
  19. Max_Damage
    Max_Damage 12 February 2014 13: 24
    0
    What do you mean "Soviet tanks had low quality optics"? The USSR and Germany jointly developed optics before the war.
    1. sapran
      sapran 12 February 2014 19: 12
      0
      Well, it is possible that there was something else in mind.
      1, the overall construction of the sight is convenient both in production and in use, but the quality of manufacturing of lenses (glass) is from a different category (although high-quality glass and the construction of sights from the second half of the Second World War and the first post-war generation are clearly slammed from the Germans as well as the machine a park...)
    2. EvilLion
      EvilLion 12 February 2014 20: 00
      0
      Well, for example, a periscope with metal mirrors. Will you see much in this?
  20. washi
    washi 12 February 2014 13: 28
    +1
    And if you think about it, there were and are only two normal schools of tank building: Soviet and German. And this confrontation continues. All the rest are either an imitation ("Challenger" and the Chinese series) or a cross ("Abrams"). The French with their "Lekrerk" tried to do something of their own, but again it turned out at the B-1 level /
    And so - the design of the tanks reflects the strategy.
  21. Aleks tv
    Aleks tv 12 February 2014 14: 13
    +3
    Wonderful article.

    1. The analysis of tanks of "small caliber", present in the troops at the beginning of the Second World War, and not only the T-34 and KV-1, as everyone else is doing. Those. the material is quite rare.
    2. Excellent tabular data comparing the reservation and the characteristics of the tank guns of the USSR and Germany (plus the Czech Republic) are worthy of placing this material in the archive of those interested in the history of armored vehicles.

    One note:
    Somehow replace the title of the article, as this is highly SPECIALIZED information.
    The analysis is not tanks, as such, but reservation and characteristics of tank guns. But besides this, there are also sights and observation devices, communications and control systems. And this is only one aspect of the analysis. If we consider the totality of the combat and driving qualities of the tank, then there will be even more questions (echoing Sergey’s comment cvp67).

    And according to the material voiced by the author - MANY THANKS Alexander “Alex” Bereshchenko.
    The volume, quality and rarity of information is impressive ...
    drinks
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 18: 48
      +4
      Quote: Aleks tv
      MANY THANKS Alexander “Alex” Bereshchenko.
      The volume, quality and rarity of information is impressive ...
      Thank you for such an impressive assessment of my creation. hi
      1. family tree
        family tree 12 February 2014 21: 59
        +3
        Still! This is what VO needs. There will be no search.
        ps crying Already take envy, and why am I so not able to? what
        1. Alex
          13 February 2014 12: 18
          +4
          Quote: perepilka
          Still! This is what VO needs. There will be no search.

          Thanks for your support hi!

          ps Already take envy, and why am I so not able to?
          You know how. They just didn’t try ... Dare, and we will support you drinks fellow
  22. July
    July 12 February 2014 14: 55
    0
    Quote: BigRiver
    Are we talking about the whole evolution of formations and tanks from the end of the 20s to the Victory? smile
    Maybe it should be limited to 1941?

    So I confine myself to the 41st. In the 41st, the Germans had a classification of tanks precisely on the caliber of weapons. And according to this classification, the T-4 was heavy. What is the problem? Was the heavy tank heavier? So the Germans did not care, they had their own classification. In other countries, a different qualification (linear and other ...) was generally preserved.
    Heavy "fours" in medium tank companies? Or do you think that there were heavy companies in TD Wehrmacht? At 41-42, a confirmation is required.

    What are you talking about? What "heavy" medium tanks in companies? Do you understand what you are saying?
    Did I say something about "heavy companies"? I didn't even stutter about it.
    As for confirmation, on June 22, 1941, for example, the 1st Panzer Division included:
    T-1 - 15 pcs.
    T-2 - 43 pcs.
    T-3 - 75 pcs.
    T-4 - 28 pcs.
    Commander T-3 - 8 pcs.
    And since the company (since it was so impatient for you) - 4 platoons (each from 3 to 5 tanks, at different times), you can calculate how many in this division there was a company of T-4 tanks belonging to that time to heavy tanks. Roughly speaking, two companies.
    And you claim that SAU divisions ORGANIZATIONAL included in the TD?

    Конечно. ORGANIZATIONAL were part of the TDas attached parts. What's the matter? What misunderstandings?
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 12 February 2014 16: 31
      +2
      Quote: July

      1. In the 41st Germans had a classification of tanks precisely on the caliber of weapons. And according to this classification, the T-4 was heavy. What is the problem?
      2. ORGANIZATIONAL were part of the TD, as attached parts. What's the matter? What misunderstandings?

      1. The Germans did not have a classification by caliber. The four was created in the mid-30s as a battalion commander's tank and to provide fire support for the battalion. Except for you, no one, neither from the historians, nor from the practicing commanders of the Wehrmacht and SS, called this tank heavy. The only problem is this - your creative contradicts the existing real "picture".
      Note. Even the Panther Brigade or Regiment does not carry the word "heavy" in its name. In the understanding of the Germans, this is the TD line tank, which replaced the Pz-IV, which also became linear. But, on the contrary, we have: "the seamstress panzer abtaylung Tiger". What in our Russian sounds like: a heavy tank battalion.
      2. Your laziness and not curiosity - curious :))) The assault artillery divisions were not included in the Panzerwaffe and belonged to artillery. It is easily verifiable. None of the Shtug divisions were attached to and did not belong to the state of any tank division of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941. These divisions were attached to the ARMY corps. That is, they interacted with infantry and motorized divisions.
      In general, the evolution of self-propelled units and subunits is a rather voluminous topic. I only note that the consolidation of self-propelled units in the organizational structure of the panzer-grenadier, and later tank divisions began during the 43rd year of the year and ended with the onset of the 44th.
      PS And still pay attention to the tabs :)) And also trace the evolution of the states of the tank divisions.
  23. surovyi kot
    surovyi kot 12 February 2014 15: 36
    +1
    Globally, I disagree with only one thesis, namely, that the Germans were lucky at the beginning of the Eastern campaign. In fact, if you study the materials of the Nuremberg trial, you will see that the command staff of the Wehrmacht consisted of 90% of the veterans of the First World War - they were experienced and skillful commanders.
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 18: 52
      +6
      Quote: M
      Globally I disagree with only one thesis, namely that the Germans were lucky at the beginning of the Eastern campaign.
      By the word "luck" I did not mean simple luck (as in a casino), but a well-established term synonymous with "military luck" (as, for example, A.V. Suvorov was a successful commander). But what stands behind it is already a separate question: who has experience, ingenuity and knowledge, who has a "good deal, my friend".
  24. July
    July 12 February 2014 15: 44
    +1
    Quote: BigRiver
    And in the initial period of the war in the East, they (TD, TK, TG), as a rule, did not set themselves the task of smashing and defeating the tank "hordes" of the Red Army head-on. This was done by artillery (Kampfgruppen, divisions, corps). Only from the 43rd year there was a massive expansion of the TD functions to a mobile device with breakthroughs.

    It was from the beginning of the war that the emphasis was placed on breaking through tank divisions into the depths of defense, in order to cover and further destroy the encircled troops. This was the principle of a blitzkrieg in the USSR.
    The task was to destroy the army in general in border battles and prevent its retreat and preservation. And the tank divisions in the composition of the MK coped with this. Then, suitable infantry and motorized divisions were destroyed, and tank divisions were redirected to another direction. Without such blows, a blitzkrieg would not have been possible for the Germans at all.
  25. July
    July 12 February 2014 16: 28
    +1
    "... only the luck of the first year of the war gave the German designers a head start for developing effective objections to Soviet realities."

    Absurd.
    There was no luck. There was a pattern. Little would have changed even if Stalin had brought the army into combat readiness not on the night of the 22nd, but on the 20th of June. The initial losses in the planes would be less, it is even possible that the Germans would be stopped at the turn of Vyazma ... But the initial stage of the war would be in favor of the Germans.
    And do not rely on the stupidity of German designers, they say, they got a head start. And then the author does not know that Hitler’s order does not carry out any development if the result cannot be obtained within six months.
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 19: 00
      +5
      Quote: July
      Absurd.
      There was no luck.
      I understood the error. In the future (if the muse still inspires something) I will try to use less ambiguous words and terms.

      I repent and sprinkle ash on my head.

      But seriously. But I just don't think that the situation in June 1941 is the result of a "fatal coincidence of circumstances." Everything was much more serious and deeper, so that everything could be reduced to a simple set of easy and understandable truths. I am not going to crawl into this problem, I myself have not yet fully mastered everything, and there are quite a few opinions (and on this site as well) on this problem: from the theory of a direct conspiracy to confusion and confusion. But the fact that the Wehrmacht laid out "all the cards" that it had on the table is without a doubt. And the more serious the situation was. And the more significant is the feat of our grandfathers. (My grandfather, by the way, from the first day at the front, was first wounded near the Neman).
  26. alal
    alal 12 February 2014 16: 33
    0
    Quote: Per se.
    Russia had too many cruel lessons that we must not forget about now, and even more so, not to know them.

    Grozny showed how they "learned"
  27. Bigriver
    Bigriver 12 February 2014 16: 41
    0
    Quote: July
    Quote: BigRiver
    And in the initial period of the war in the East, they (TD, TK, TG), as a rule, did not set themselves the task of smashing and defeating the tank "hordes" of the Red Army head-on. This was done by artillery (Kampfgruppen, divisions, corps). Only from the 43rd year there was a massive expansion of the TD functions to a mobile device with breakthroughs.

    It was from the beginning of the war that the emphasis was placed on breaking through tank divisions into the depths of defense, in order to cover and further destroy the encircled troops. This was the principle of a blitzkrieg in the USSR ...

    Re-read carefully the subject of the comment, and then your comment. Think and find the answer.
  28. July
    July 12 February 2014 16: 46
    0
    Quote: BigRiver
    Re-read carefully the subject of the comment, and then your comment. Think and find the answer.

    I read it. With all punctuation marks. It is written in normal Russian. That's why he gave the answer. Otherwise, what you have written is not interpreted in any way. Perhaps you wanted to say something different, but "it happened"?
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 12 February 2014 17: 05
      +1
      Quote: July

      I read it. With all punctuation marks. It is written in normal Russian. That's why he gave the answer. Otherwise, what you have written is not interpreted in any way. Perhaps you wanted to say something different, but "it happened"?

      Well, I repeat in other words, I'm not lazy.
      The mobile formations of the Wehrmacht did not set out to defeat the armored forces of the Red Army in the oncoming battle. As a rule, a campfgroup, in a collision with a strong opposition using a significant number of tanks of the Red Army, avoided contact (to the side, with a fan), connected our tanks with the battle of its anti-tank squad from the campfang group and hit the flank and rear of our formation. But they could have, in general, having encountered strong opposition much more to the right or left to transfer the blow inland.
      The task of the mobile connection was not to destroy our tanks. The task was to develop tactical success into operational success: disorganizing defense, preventing the occupation of intermediate lines, destroying artillery and mortar batteries, headquarters, intercepting communications, etc.
      Immediately, the second echelon of the tank division from the motorized infantry was introduced into the cavity of the wedged wedge, and a little later the forces of the infantry divisions, which created the dense shell of the future boiler.
      And in the boiler, without security and with lost control, you won’t get much: ((Even with the best tanks.
  29. yacht
    yacht 12 February 2014 17: 14
    +1
    Very interesting article. But it does not take into account when comparing many nuances, it would seem such a "trifle" as the possibility of full radio communication between tanks or the quality of optics and much more, up to repairing the vehicle in combat conditions. Although it is clear that it is not possible to grasp the immensity.
  30. Kars
    Kars 12 February 2014 17: 22
    +3
    I carefully read only the beginning and the summary. So I did not understand what this article was for. How was the educational program?

    So whose tanks were better? The answer is obvious. The sheer number of modifications of the Wehrmacht's combat vehicles suggests thatthen unfinished models were put on the stream, the shortcomings of which were eliminated in the process of combat operation. Purely machine-gun tanks and tanks with small-caliber cannons of aviation origin at the beginning of the forties - this can not be called even technical stupidity. Such a machine could only be dangerousfor tanks "era of Tukhachevsky"but not for the creations of Koshkin and Kotin

    the resume generally began with impenetrable stupidity; otherwise, such conclusions cannot be called.
    I’ll dwell on the highlighted points - where does this conclusion come from the variety of models? The Germans are just pedantic. Try to look at all the T-34-76 modifications, although the index will be the same everywhere, but they are different, even for some nodes non-interchangeable.

    about the era of Tukhachevsky - like in the USSR on 22 on June 1941 there were solid T-34 and KV.

    the article left a strange impression.
  31. Langeo
    Langeo 12 February 2014 17: 24
    0
    At least one picture would be inserted.
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 19: 05
      +4
      Quote: Langeo
      At least one picture would be inserted.
      You know, I wanted more than one. But I was so tormented with the interface (I was a self-educating kettle in computers) that I was already glad at least to stop the moderators from tormenting me with their lack of learning.

      Not quite on the topic, but if anyone can conduct a small educational program for me (in particular, on the insertion and design of drawings, here is a complete blockage), write in a personal. I will be immensely grateful.
      1. Aleks tv
        Aleks tv 12 February 2014 19: 21
        +1
        Quote: Alex
        on the insertion and design of drawings, there is a complete blockage

        Alexander:
        -An insertion of drawings here, in comments?
        -Or an article?
  32. July
    July 12 February 2014 17: 25
    0
    Quote: BigRiver
    1. The Germans did not have a caliber classification. Four created in the middle of 30's as a tank of the battalion commander and for fire support of the battalion.

    Are you sure of this?
    Do you even read what is further written in that book where it came from.
    Note. Even the Panther Brigade or Regiment does not carry the word "heavy" in its name. In the understanding of the Germans, this is the TD line tank, which replaced the Pz-IV, which also became linear. But, on the contrary, we have: "the seamstress panzer abtaylung Tiger". What in our Russian sounds like: a heavy tank battalion.

    You know, not only I paid attention, but this has long been known. And "Panther" never "carried the word" heavy ", because according to the design assignment it was designed as a medium tank to replace "triples".
    Do you at least read that book carefully.
    In general, I have no more questions for you. I would like to wish not only to read, but also to understand what is written. And for this, one illustrated guide is completely insufficient.
  33. July
    July 12 February 2014 18: 26
    0
    Quote: BigRiver
    The mobile formations of the Wehrmacht did not set out to defeat the armored forces of the Red Army in the oncoming battle.

    Quite right (although this was part of the task of tank divisions - the first tank battle)
    As a rule, a campfgroup, in a collision with a strong opposition using a significant number of tanks of the Red Army, avoided contact (to the side, with a fan), connected our tanks with the battle of its anti-tank squad from the campfang group and hit the flank and rear of our formation.

    You know, it’s somehow indecent the regiments of the tank division of the Kampfgroup. Not serious for such an expert.
    Or they could and in general, upon encountering strong opposition much more to the right and left to transfer the blow inland.

    Not only "they could", but exactly so they did, so they were prescribed. Without any "fans".
    The task of the mobile connection was not to destroy our tanks. The objective was to develop tactical success into operational:

    The task of tank divisions in the breakthrough was precisely the destruction of enemy tanks, only the Germans did not try to use tanks for this in the oncoming battle, but put forward anti-tank equipment, saving the tanks for subsequent counterattack and pursuit.
    Immediately, the second echelon of the tank division from the motorized infantry was introduced into the cavity of the wedged wedge, and a little later the forces of the infantry divisions, which created the dense shell of the future boiler.

    It was not immediately introduced, since the motorized infantry of the tank division was small and could not solve large-scale tasks to block large formations.
    And then, you start about tanks in a breakthrough, and "develop success" already about breaking through the enemy's defense.
    In the breakthrough, having reached the operational space, the tank division was not all in one direction of the pearl, but, as a rule, was divided into a couple of directions, interacting with neighboring units.
    Light tanks with motorcyclists and infantry on armored personnel carriers with light anti-aircraft guns went into the lead, because self-propelled guns and "serious" self-propelled anti-aircraft guns with self-propelled anti-aircraft guns had a lower movement speed. Following were medium tanks with a motorized main body of infantry, and the rear of the "four" parade and heavy self-propelled guns.
    The advance detachments conducted reconnaissance and, having found fortified positions that they could not overcome on the move, immediately called up aviation (the interaction of aviation and tanks with the Germans was well worked out). While the aircraft were processing the enemy, the rest of the tanks and self-propelled guns were pulled. Suppressed resistance and moved on in the same order. This is if it was not possible to get around.
    That's how they perl in breakthroughs.
    For tank divisions in breakthroughs, it was not so important to capture cities, but to cut the lines of communication, the approaches of the reserves and the ways of supplying the front that remained behind. Almost parts of these divisions were surrounded, but the Germans in the first period of the war were not afraid of this at all.
  34. Bigriver
    Bigriver 12 February 2014 18: 26
    0
    Quote: July

    Do you even read what is further written in that book where it came from.
    You know, not only did I pay attention, but this has long been known.
    In general, I have no more questions for you. I would like to wish not only to read, but also to understand what is written ...

    Which book do you mean?
    The panther was planned And to replace the triples, And to replace the fours. But, this concerns the issue under discussion weakly.
    To the words "for a long time" and "known" it is worth adding "all" laughing And that will be the answer in essence!
    I understand you. It is very difficult to maintain psychological stability when you do not have a single answer on the questions I have asked.
    In general, you have a strange way of talking love First, throw in your own or replicated creatives hanging out on the net, and when you are asked questions about the case, you run from them in a circle and be rude.
    You should be calmer. You just need to answer questions and have a dialogue. I’m answering yours, although rudeness oozes in each of your posts. I give a discount on friendly maximalism :))
    hi
  35. July
    July 12 February 2014 18: 51
    +1
    Quote: BigRiver

    Which book do you mean?
    The panther was planned And to replace the triples, And to replace the fours. But, this concerns the issue under discussion weakly.

    "The conclusions were very disappointing. Projects of 20-ton medium tanks, developed since the end of the 30s ... as a replacement for "triplets" they lost strongly to the thirty-fours. "
    That is why the Panther was designed as a replacement for the medium T-3.
    Here is a quote from the same book I meant. You almost word for word about "battalion commander's tank to support the battalion." So I advised you to read what is written there and not only read, but also understand, relate to what you read.
    To the words "for a long time" and "known" it is worth adding "all" laughing And that will be the answer in essence!
    First, throw in your own or replicated creatives hanging out on the net, and when you are asked questions about the case, you run from them in a circle and be rude.

    It will not be difficult to clarify which of my creatives are replicated and hang out on the network? I myself am interested in knowing this. And where did you get that it's mine?
    And at the expense of "rudeness" make no mistake. You, apparently, have no idea what rudeness is, if you please write it.
  36. wanderer
    wanderer 12 February 2014 19: 17
    +2
    I’m far from the tanks like the moon, but I liked the article.
    This is an article, not a monograph on tanks of the Second World War.
    Concrete questions are considered - artillery systems, ammunition and a bit of reservation.
    Why don't the amateurs correct themselves describe the same sights, optics, tactics, maintainability, etc. etc., but for one structure and organization of the "panzerwaffe?"
    It would be very interesting. No fools.
  37. sapran
    sapran 12 February 2014 19: 22
    0
    In vain you sow "confusion" at the beginning of the article says the ancient Greek definition of the conditions for participation in the dispute ... read and agree on the sources, terms and their interpretation ... Otherwise they grappled ...
  38. DesToeR
    DesToeR 12 February 2014 20: 16
    0
    A brief introduction of the German cannons and the Soviet 20KT's TTX indicates that in a direct collision of Soviet and German tanks of this class, the triples tank guns hit the Soviet T-26 of all modifications from all angles at sighting distances. Soviet tanks were dangerous for the T-III only from a distance of less than 1500 m, which made them virtually defenseless when they met with them in a frontal collision.

    Although the Quartet, who were less adapted for anti-tank combat, were also dangerous for Soviet light tanks from a distance of 3000 m, while they could confidently fight their counterparts only from distances not exceeding the same 1500.


    What are 1500m? If the 45mm cannon of Soviet tanks could effectively deal with German tanks at least at a distance of 1000m it would be just great. Actually 20K was dangerous for German medium tanks at a distance of up to 500m, and then with a good angle of the projectile with armor. Apparently, the author is not aware that the distance of tank firing of 1000m or more during WWII was simply gorgeous. For example, the first tank that could effectively hit the enemy at a distance of 1000m or more was the German Tiger with an 88mm gun, firing 10kg shells at an initial speed of about 800m / s. Before him, the distance of the tank battle rarely exceeded 500m and practically did not take place from a distance of 1000m. Only with the advent of long-barreled medium and large-caliber guns, as well as with the improvement of sights, the range of actual shooting began to grow. This is 1943. and further.
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 21: 10
      +4
      Quote: DesToeR
      Apparently, the author is not aware that the distance of tank firing at 1000m or more during WWII was simply gorgeous.
      The author is in the know. As well as many others. This is not about the REAL results of the shooting, but about the POSSIBILITIES of the guns coming from the STATED TTH. Your comment indicates that you did not read the article carefully (or did not understand what it was about). There is no point in writing about how things were in reality - everyone knows this well. But the reasons for this are as little discussed, more and more about repression and overheated cores. Maybe this is all correct, but the subject of the article was other questions. So there is no need to "shine" with erudition: about the "Tigers" with their magnificent weapon (which, by the way, I consider the best tank gun), I know, I dare say, no less than yours.
  39. Alf
    Alf 12 February 2014 20: 44
    -4
    Quote: DesToeR
    What are 1500m? If the 45mm cannon of Soviet tanks could effectively deal with German tanks at least at a distance of 1000m it would be just great. Actually 20K was dangerous for German medium tanks at a distance of up to 500m, and then with a good angle of the projectile with armor. Apparently, the author is not aware that the distance of tank firing of 1000m or more during WWII was simply gorgeous.

    This is another flower-author estimates about the results of firing at 4000 (!) Meters.
    In general, a rather strange article, some kind of messy.
    1. Alex
      12 February 2014 21: 12
      +4
      Quote: Alf
      This is another flower-author estimates about the results of firing at 4000 (!) Meters.
      See answer DesToeRa.

      In general, a rather strange article, some kind of messy.
      I haven’t seen yours at all.

      Maybe what you say in the case?
  40. voliador
    voliador 12 February 2014 20: 48
    +1
    Good, interesting article. To the author plus.
  41. Stas57
    Stas57 12 February 2014 21: 48
    +1
    Talking about HF - 1 fights with the Germans is not necessary: ​​they could only be dealt with in the Wehrmacht with the help of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and corps artillery.

    meaning probably fights tanks vs tanks?
    although yes, the square was still not a terrifying problem for the German TD, at least it had everything necessary to solve this problem, as correctly noted above, it is necessary to pay special attention to the tactics and application of the German tank divisions, especially the analysis of the blade’s tip-camp group the creation of which took into account the strengthening of the CG by all possible means of effective vocational training.
    ps, lung howitzers 10.5 also hit HF, horseradish yield, but used.
    PPS I respect the author for his work, but in general it’s impossible to embrace everything in the subject, and if desired, I can also cling to little things. However, I look forward to continuing and advise you not to get involved in rivet metering. In reality, the review, communication and coordination of the crew were much more important than mm of armor.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 13 February 2014 17: 03
      0
      Well, in general, I'm waiting for a continuation, a logical continuation, if it does not exist, SW. the author, I’ll go and zaminusuyu article, because just a comparison of millimeters of armor and caliber is completely empty lesson, without a corresponding continuation, all work is completely meaningless
      so I look forward with great impatience
  42. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 12 February 2014 21: 50
    +2
    Article plus. A normal attempt by a normal person with his mind based on the performance characteristics of the tanks of the opposing sides to draw some conclusions. It is commendable. Without "urapatriotism", based on solid logic.
    On my own behalf, I will only add that in real battles people and minds are at war. And how to use the best qualities of your vehicle, accept or refuse a battle - it all depends on the tank commander and the situation on the battlefield. Not the least role is played by the "quirks" of the command. Based on these factors, we get the statistics of the initial period of the Second World War, and there are also the tasks of each particular battle and the tactics of the battle, which are subject to the methods of using available military equipment. And sometimes you didn't have to choose what to stand against the attackers. This is the real truth of history. People are fighting, and technicians are only weapons in the hands of people ...
  43. motorized rifle
    motorized rifle 12 February 2014 22: 02
    +2
    I read the article, well, the author himself says that he thinks so, i.e. not special, but trying to figure it out. Accepted! Approved! I read the comments and, as always, going aside, the question is not about who BETTER was able to use tanks, but whoever had BETTER! What are you arguing about? Just imagine that the Red Army and the Wehrmacht exchanged tank fleets, i.e. they have all these BT and HF, and we have from T-38 (t) to T-4. Questions about the capture of Moscow will be? In my opinion, it was precisely the superiority in the military equipment of the ground forces, qualitative and quantitative, that could eventually compensate for its unsuccessful use in the initial period of the Second World War.
  44. xomaNN
    xomaNN 12 February 2014 22: 03
    +2
    Serious analytical work has been done by the author. I agree that constructively and in many respects technologically our tanks were better at the beginning of the war. But, unfortunately, either the oppressive atmosphere of "purges" and incompetent commanders getting into the leading positions in the tank forces. Either our "maybe", and the strategic miscalculations of the Red Army did not allow at the beginning of the war to adequately use tanks effectively
  45. family tree
    family tree 12 February 2014 22: 48
    +2
    Congratulations to VO with the new Author! Fuh, the men in Ukraine have not yet transferred drinks
    Alex good
  46. July
    July 12 February 2014 23: 22
    0
    Quote: sapran
    Excuse me Koshkin involved in the KV-2? (or KOTIN)?

    Kotin, of course.
    I apologize, did not notice a mistake.
  47. July
    July 13 February 2014 00: 42
    -3
    They said that the article was without cheers-patriotism.
    Personally, I have a different opinion:
    “So, whose tanks were better? The answer is obvious. Already the abundance of modifications of the Wehrmacht's combat vehicles alone suggests that ... Purely machine-gun tanks and tanks with small-caliber cannons of aviation origin at the beginning of the forties - you can't even call it technical stupidity... Such a machine could only pose a threat to tanks of the "Tukhachevsky era", but not to the creations of Koshkin and Kotin. Even the somewhat archaic-looking T - 28s were clearly too tough for them, .... "
    There is simply a poorly disregarded statement that Soviet tanks were better before the attack of Geriania on the USSR.
    And the "criticism" that Soviet tanks also seem to be, somehow and somewhere ... resembles Roosevelt's dictum: "Samosa, of course, is a son of a bitch, but this is our son of a bitch."
    What kind of tanks of the "Tukhachesky era"? Renault?
    Who said that machine-gun tanks and tanks with aircraft cannons from the Germans "even technical stupidity" can not be called.
    Maybe the author forgot about the Soviet T-38 and T-40 tanks with their weapons? And the T-60 with its 20-mm cannon, which was urgently put into production at the beginning of the war and the first tanks passed already on November 7 at the parade, can you also not call it "technical stupidity"?
    And who told the author that the T-28 was too tough for German light tanks with aircraft guns with its side and stern armor 20 mm?
    With the same success we can say that the "Tiger" was too tough for the Soviet T-70, but these little "tigers" were burned.
    And why should a light tank be "tough" in general, and even more so heavy? Light tanks have a completely different purpose.
    The question itself, "whose tanks are better," is also incorrect in this setting.
    Once the author undertook to compare the tanks of the beginning of the war, so compare by types of tanks. Medium to Medium, Light to Light ...
    And here it’s easy to make a mistake. For example, in 1940, on comparative tests in Kubinka, the T-3 gave the T-34 a head start and even the question arose whether to remove the T-34 from production.
    So what? We conclude that the T-3 was better than the T-34 ?. Absurd. Well, the T-34 rumbled so that they heard it for a dozen kilometers, well, it furnished the T-3 in speed on the T-34 highway ... What follows from this? What is he better?
    You cannot compare all types of tanks with a herd and say that these are all better, and these are getting worse. Tanks are assessed by class and objective (comparatively) conclusions can only be made on the basis of combat practice. The T-34 was inferior to the Panther in terms of armor, but it was recognized as the best medium tank of the WWII, not the Panther.
    1. Alex
      13 February 2014 11: 34
      +5
      Quote: July
      They said that the article was without cheers-patriotism.
      Personally, I have a different opinion:
      And I sacredly respect your right to it. Just like any other.

      What kind of tanks of the "Tukhachesky era"?
      Machine-gun two-tower T-26, multi-tower T-35, imho.

      Maybe the author forgot about the Soviet T-38 and T-40 tanks with their weapons?
      No, and the first part is said about them. And even they are compared, exactly as much as they deserve it.
      And the T-60 with its 20-mm cannon, which was urgently put into production at the beginning of the war and the first tanks passed already on November 7 at the parade, can you also not call it "technical stupidity"?
      How many T-60 were on 22 on June 1941? Right, zero. And their production during the Second World War, IMHO, is not stupidity, but an act of despair (I think you understand the reasons).

      And who told the author that the T-28 was too tough for German light tanks with aircraft guns with its side and stern armor 20 mm?
      The author considered the simplest option - "head-on-head", otherwise it would have been a dissertation (and not very good, because it was not written by a graduate of the Academy of Armored Forces). The sides and stern are the most vulnerable spots of tanks, but. agree, and not the most affordable. The bottom is even less armored, but no one shoots at it.

      Once the author undertook to compare the tanks of the beginning of the war, so compare by types of tanks. Medium to Medium, Light to Light ...
      This is exactly what the author did, but according to his classification, which is uniform for both Soviet and German tanks. Do you disagree with this interpretation? Give yours and argue it, I will be happy to get acquainted with the new concept or with new confirmations of the old.

      In fact, I got the impression that you, dear opponent, read the material "diagonally". If you took the trouble to read the introductory and explanatory sections (and in science it is customary), you would not heap these nonsense and accuse the author of what he did not do or was not going to do. Anyway, in your post I have not seen a single thought. Just as I have not met any of your articles on the site. As for the categorical presentation, it suggests your capriciousness, scientific immaturity and youth. But nothing, do not despair, with age it goes away.
  48. Ivan Tarasov
    Ivan Tarasov 13 February 2014 06: 30
    -4
    Read to The first system was adopted in the USSR, the second in Germany
    Further there is no point in reading.
    The author is completely incompetent.
    1. Alex
      13 February 2014 11: 39
      +4
      Quote: Ivan Tarasov
      I read to. In the USSR, the first system was adopted, in Germany - the second.
      Further there is no point in reading.
      The author is completely incompetent.

      And also Svirin, Kolomiyets and Shirokorad. Give a link to another vision.
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 13 February 2014 16: 58
        +1
        Quote: Alex
        And also Svirin, Kolomiyets and Shirokorad. Give a link to another vision.

        Well, actually yes, Baryatinsky and Shirokorad do not work in the archives, the basis of their work is the compilation of Western books.
        Kolomiyets and Svirin are better, but the bulk of their work is a little outdated, new data has appeared, which so far there is no one to put into scientific circulation.
        well this is for information
        1. Alex
          14 February 2014 00: 29
          +3
          Quote: Stas57
          Kolomiyets and Svirin are better, but the bulk of their work is a little outdated, new data appeared, which so far there is no one to enter into scientific circulation, almost no one.
          well this is for information
          But I didn’t know about it. Well, if it is radically different from previously accepted concepts - I tear my clothes.

          А "minus article" - By God, somehow childish. I’m not sorry, but it’s better to work together for a start, huh? fellow
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 14 February 2014 15: 39
            0
            And "zaminusyu article" - by God, somehow childish. I'm not sorry, but we'd better cooperate first, huh?

            Shein Ulanov, "Order in the Tank Forces" on your shelf
      2. Ivan Tarasov
        Ivan Tarasov 14 February 2014 00: 35
        -1
        And also Svirin, Kolomiyets and Shirokorad. Give a link to another vision.

        Yes, there is no other vision.
        Check out the dimensions of the German 75 mm projectile:
        http://i2.guns.ru/forums/icons/attachments/50191.gif
  49. CAMS
    CAMS 13 February 2014 06: 58
    +1
    on the radio "Voice of Russia" in the internet, there is an interesting program "theory of delusions" in its archive, "the first Soviet tanks T-34". many interesting facts are given by the authors of this program about the shortcomings of the T-34. for example such a fact. on a test shelling, the tank showed good penetration, but when serial production began, this figure fell sharply due to technological difficulties in rolling steel. There were flaws that were solved already during VO. It would be interesting to find and listen to. just for heaven's sake don't think that I don't admire the t-34.
    1. Alex
      13 February 2014 11: 43
      +5
      As for me, such discrepancies are commonplace. It is one thing, half a year - a year to make one or two prototypes, almost manually collecting corners and licking all the inconsistencies, another thing is mass production by tens of thousands. Yes, even in wartime conditions and during evacuation. I wonder if the Germans (if they had such an opportunity) could repeat this production and economic feat? It seems that no.
  50. DesToeR
    DesToeR 13 February 2014 07: 55
    +1
    Quote: Alex
    The author is in the know. As well as many others. This is not about the REAL results of the shooting, but about the POSSIBILITIES of the guns coming from the STATED TTH. Your comment indicates that you did not read the article carefully (or did not understand what it was about). There is no point in writing about how things were in reality - everyone knows this well. But the reasons for this are as little discussed, more and more about repression and overheated cores. Maybe this is all correct, but the subject of the article was other questions. So there is no need to "shine" with erudition: about the "Tigers" with their magnificent weapon (which, by the way, I consider the best tank gun), I know, I dare say, no less than yours.

    I read the article carefully only up to 1500m. Further superficially, as All these formulas for analysis are very simple and have long been deduced. Comparisons of guns and millimeters of armor have long been carried out, moreover, during WWII. If you already apply the analysis, then I would like more variables in the models and not as battered as the caliber, weight or thickness of the armor. There is nothing to consider: they will have a regression coefficient of more than 80% for sure. In addition, the essence of the analysis is not in the methodology or brilliant volumes of calculations, but in the final conclusions, and they are, to put it mildly, strange.
    1. Alex
      13 February 2014 11: 55
      +3
      Quote: DesToeR
      All these formulas for analysis are very simple and have long been deduced.
      I did not claim any discovery or revelation. As for the formulas, I have not met any of them, except for the famous empirical formula of Krupp. I also played with it, and also got some interesting results, but I don’t know how to interpret them. Do you have anything more than mine and obscure phrases? With great pleasure I will get acquainted with these data.

      In addition, the essence of the analysis is not in the methodology or brilliant volumes of calculations, but in the final conclusions, and they are, to put it mildly, strange.
      I completely agree. And, it seems to me, the conclusions from this data within the framework of this model and these limitations correspond to the methodology. Is there another approach that can be formalized and evaluated? With no less pleasure I will take care of this model (and even with your help and participation).

      By publishing these materials, I did not intend to show how smart I am. Rather the opposite: tired of chewing all this dull chewing gum - "plywood planes", "cardboard tanks", "pathetic little fluffs", "stupid commanders", "evil commissars", "bloody chekists", "cowardly Russians" - so he hoped for a fruitful discussion. So far, for the most part I see only chatter. Even those data that I do not have, none of the "clever" and "detractors" did not give, as I asked.