Operation Peace of Galilee: Israeli Air Force against Syrian air defense, commanded by Soviet officers

At the end of the investigation into the causes of the defeat of the Arab air defense system in 1973, the Soviet military concluded that the culprit was Arab cowardice and technical illiteracy.

Therefore, the Soviet military-political leadership decided that in the next war with Israel, only Soviet officers would be in command of anti-aircraft missile divisions and batteries. And the Arabs - only "in the background," - dig in, roll in, etc.

In June, the Israeli Air Force 1982 utterly defeated a group of forces and air defense weapons of Syria deployed in Lebanon. This article offers readers an analysis of the operation "Peace of Galilee" in terms of the actions of radio engineering troops.

OPERATION "WORLD GALILEE"

In the spring of 1981, the civil war in Lebanon broke out with a new force. Syrian troops, located along the Damascus-Beirut highway, advanced north into the mountainous areas north of the highway and north-east of Beirut. In July, parts of the Palestine Liberation Organization in southern Lebanon attacked Israeli cities and settlements in the north of Galilee from Soviet 1981-mm M-130 guns and 46 multiple rocket launchers from Soviet 33 guns. In turn, Israel, not long in waiting, bombed the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization, its warehouses in Beirut and the PLO base throughout Lebanon.

On Thursday 3 June 1982, the Israeli ambassador to the UK, Shlomo Argov, left the Dorchester Hotel in London after a dinner party. He was waited by a Palestinian terrorist who shot and seriously wounded the ambassador in the head. The official Tel Aviv decided that in this situation he could no longer remain indifferent.

June 4, 1982 Israeli aviation inflicted missile and bomb attacks on PLO facilities in the Beirut region and throughout Lebanon. The PLO immediately responded by shelling Israeli settlements in the Northern Galilee with artillery and MLRS.

Another major conflict in the Middle East became inevitable.

June 6 in 11.00 Israel's large armored units crossed the Lebanese border. Operation "Peace of Galilee" began. From the very beginning of the conflict, the Syrian air forces began to take the most active part in the battles, but already in the first stage of the operation six MiG-21 were lost in the air battles.

From a military point of view, one of the most significant events in Operation Mir Galilee occurred on 9 on June 1982. Since the Israelis decided to dislodge Syrian troops in Lebanon from the twenty-five-minute zone from the Israeli border, Tel Aviv needed to achieve air supremacy. This was prevented by anti-aircraft missile and radio engineering units deployed by the Syrians in the Bekaa Valley a year before Operation “World of Galilee”. The ZARV SAR was armed with the S-75, S-125 and Krug (“Square”) SAMs.

Tel Aviv made a decision - to destroy the Syrian air defenses in the Bekaa Valley. 9 June 1982. In 14.00, the Israeli Air Force exposed its positions ZRV and RTV with surprise air strikes. In just two hours, 19 spy has been completely destroyed. Another 4 srdn were seriously damaged. Heavy losses suffered and units of PTB. Not a single Israeli aircraft was hit during a massive attack of air defense weapons.

Then the confrontation unfolded in the air sphere. One of the largest air battles in the Bekaa Valley stories Arab-Israeli wars. According to some reports, in the skies of Lebanon converged about Israeli aircraft 100 and the same number of Syrian. During the first day, 29 Syrian aircraft were shot down in aerial combat. The Israeli Air Force did not lose a single car. During the first week of fighting, all were shot down by 86 Syrian aircraft of the types MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-22. The Israelis lost only the 2 helicopter and the Skyhawk, shot down by the PLO missile.

Airborne and airborne battles resulted in Israel conquering full air supremacy. The victory in the air and on the ground was so convincing and unambiguous that it caused considerable anxiety in the USSR and the states participating in the Warsaw Pact.

GROUPING RTV SYRIA

The Syrian radio troops grouping in June 1982 was armed with more than 100 Soviet-made radar stations developed by 1950-60's: П-35, П-37, П-14, П-14Ф, П-12, П-15 ; radio altimeters: PRV-11, PRV-13. From 1982, the P-40, P-19 radar and PRV-16 radar radar were delivered to Damascus air defense troops.

Of the more 1600 potential objects of X-NUMX radar reconnaissance accounted for modern for those times samples of combat vehicles of the USA, Israel and France (Kfir, Skyhawk, F-36 Phantom, F-4 Eagle, F-15, Mirage. More than 16% for unmanned aerial vehicles (BQM-38, MQM-34, Mastiff for reconnaissance and radio countermeasures).

The Israeli Air Force strike aircraft were armed with Shrike and Standard AWP missiles homing on radio emission.

To create a complex jamming environment, Israel used ground-based centers for active noise interference with power up to 1000 W (used to suppress communications equipment, air traffic control systems, and radar systems of anti-aircraft missile and radio troops).

Israel used special aircraft - jammers of the Boeing-707 type “Arava”. From the zones of burglary, they created noise and multiple pulse-response interference in the centimeter, decimeter and meter ranges. The power spectral density was 30-40 W / MHz in the barrage and 300-400 W / MHz in targeted modes.

Shock aviation was equipped with interference transmitters mainly centimeter range 200-300 watts. This equipment provided 3-5 W / MHz spectral power density levels in the barrier mode, 30-50 W / MHz in targeted mode and up to 600 W / MHz per pulse.

The following tasks were assigned to the Syrian radio troops grouping:

- conducting radar reconnaissance in order to reveal the beginning of a surprise attack by an air enemy;

- radar support for the combat control bodies of the main command of the armed forces, air force units and air defense units for timely bringing to the highest levels of combat readiness; target distribution (target designation) (guidance) to anti-aircraft missile forces and aviation units for combat control;

- radar flight support aircraft of the Air Force;

- rendering assistance to air traffic control bodies in compliance with the procedure for using airspace.

To accomplish these tasks, the established group of radio engineering troops had two separate radio engineering battalions with ten radar companies (radar posts) in each. Radar posts of the grouping were deployed in the Northern and Southern regions of the country, as well as around the major administrative, political and economic centers of the country.

The command posts of the separate radio battalions, which served as reconnaissance and information centers, were deployed at two central command posts: TsKP-1 Damascus (10 radar posts of the Southern region of the country) and TsPP-2 Homs (10 radar posts of the Northern region of the country).

The distances between the radar posts were from 80-100 to 200 kilometers.

The spatial characteristics of the tri-band radar field (removal of detection lines, the height of the lower boundary of the solid radar field, the height of the upper boundary of the solid radar field, the overlap rate of the radar field) created by the group of radio engineering troops before the outbreak of hostilities were:

- the height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field: over the territory of Syria, in the coastal region and along the line of divorce with Israel - 500 m;

- on the border with Lebanon - 500 m;

- over the territory of Lebanon - 2000 m (with the deployment in 1981 in the settlements of Hilda and Rayayak (Lebanon) radar stations in the coastal region and the Bekaa Valley only in selected sectors - 200-500 m;

- on the border with Turkey - 1000-3000 m;

- on the border with Iraq - 3000 m;

- the height of the upper boundary of the solid radar field over the territory of Syria - 25000 m;

- The depth of the radar field (removal of detection lines) beyond the Syrian-Israeli border was 50-150 km, which made it possible to detect shock, loops and support teams, unmanned aerial vehicles almost at take-off from airfields with 500-1000 m climb and confidently accompany on the entire flight route;

- overlap ratio of the radar field - 2-3.

At heights 100-200 m, the radar field had only a focal character.

The potential information capabilities of the radio engineering forces of the Northern and Southern regions of the country in a non-automated mode supplied 150-200 targets.

In the case of a decentralized, non-automated method of issuing radar information used in the control system for combat means of aviation, anti-aircraft missile forces for target distribution, target designation (guidance), its quality (accuracy, discreteness, accuracy, completeness, latency) met the requirements.

It was determined on the whole by a sufficiently high performance (first of all, accuracy) of the information output by the radar stations that were in service with the radar posts.

With the centralized non-automated method of issuing radar information (alert) to the command posts of aviation brigades, the main guidance post (GPN) and aviation control points (PN) of aviation, the command posts of anti-aircraft missile brigades with the CCP of the North and South regions of the country accuracy (the value of the mean square error) information was 6-10 km, and its lag time reached 6-8 minutes.

In Lebanon there are two high mountain ranges (the mountains of Lebanon, reaching heights 2-2,5 thousand meters south of Beirut, and the mountains of anti-Lebanon, reaching heights 3 thousand meters near the mountain Hermon). These mountain ranges divide the country into 4 parallel zones stretching from north to south; the coastal plain, the ridge of the mountains of Lebanon, the valley of the Bekaa and the ridge of anti-Lebanon, along which the border between Lebanon and Syria. The Litani River crosses a large part of Lebanon from east to west, starting in the Bekaa Valley region and flowing into the Mediterranean Sea. Over the south, the Bekaa Valley and the approaches to Israel are dominated by the heights of Beaufort (800-900 m at the bend of the Litani River. Mountainous areas are not suitable for deploying PTB units. Opportunities for maneuver are also extremely limited. The roads in Lebanon are narrow and were (June 1982) in bad condition.

The purely military features, in particular, the dynamic nature of the combat operations of tactical aviation, which required rapid deployment, the ability of radar posts to independently issue radar information to command posts of aviation and anti-aircraft missile brigades, were not taken into account.

The radar, communication system and display facilities made it possible to simultaneously aim 24 fighter planes (groups) on 24 aerial targets, including 5 guidance using the automated control system Air-1П.

The noise immunity of the established group of radio engineering troops of Syria was determined, first of all, by the individual noise immunity of its radar stations in service. This indicator was influenced by the placement of the radar in combat order of grouping (removal of special jammers from the embarrassment zones, locations of ground jamming centers, active noise jammers as part of the aviation strike groups). Of course, the noise immunity of the group had a significant impact on the capabilities of the listed tools to create maximum levels of the spectral power density of the ACP.

From the fleet of radar stations that were grouped:

Radar P-35, P-37, PRV-11 - could be used only in a noiseless situation. In addition, the use of the latter in the conditions of mountainous terrain, significantly limited the spatial capabilities of these radars due to the lack or low effectiveness of the MTS equipment;

Radar P-12, P-18 - due to the lack of noise immunity could be used in a simple air situation. Only the placement of these radar stations on the flanks could somewhat mitigate the impact of interference and allow radar reconnaissance in certain sectors;

Radar P-14F - had a high individual noise immunity, but not enough competent placement of these radars near mountain ranges, the intensity of the reflections from which reached 60-70 dB (and exceeded all reasonable limits for the period under consideration for suppressing interfering signals and selecting them against the background of moving targets) , in fact, nullified the advantages in noise immunity of the said radar;

Radar P-15 - in terms of its individual noise immunity, it was capable of maintaining radar reconnaissance and issuing radar information at low altitudes when using active noise interference of low and medium intensity in certain sectors (directions).

Other types of radar that were in service with the group, in terms of noise immunity from the previously discussed did not differ in principle.

The created group as a whole was able to provide combat missions under conditions of low-intensity active noise interference (up to 5-10W / MHz), and in certain sectors (on separate directions) under conditions of active noise interference of medium intensity (30-40W / MHz).

Radar support for combat operations of anti-aircraft missile forces was not organized due to the lack of direct communication channels for transmitting radar information to crews of zrbr and zrdn radar posts. It was carried out mainly with the help of autonomous reconnaissance and targeting means, which significantly reduced the ability of anti-aircraft missile battalions to conduct independent combat operations against suddenly appearing targets.

The combat formations of the radio engineering groupings in engineering were equipped mainly in the field version. The system of false and spare items was not created. Masking and camouflage techniques were not made. Practically, the radar posts were not changed from the moment of deployment, which allowed the enemy to open and have their exact dislocation.

MILITARY APPLICATION OF RTV GROUPING

The organization of radar reconnaissance and radar support for the combat control bodies of the Armed Forces General Command, units of the Syrian Air Force and Air Defense has not changed since the beginning of the conduct of hostilities and during them until 8 June 1982.

In the absence of active noise, the grouping of radio engineering troops conducted radar reconnaissance and detected enemy aircraft in the areas of their home airfields at altitudes of 500-1000.

The group of combat aircraft, which patrolled in the zones at a distance of up to 100 km from the coastline, were continuously accompanied. The collection, processing and issuance of radar information was carried out in a centralized, non-automated way.

However, on the eve of the massive strikes, Israeli aircraft, taking into account the danger of two radar posts deployed in Lebanon in the settlements of Hilda and Rayyak and located in the direction of the main attack, destroyed these posts (8 June in 14.50 - RLP and Mon Hilda; 9 in June in 14.40 - RLP Rayak).

Directed to restore the RLP in the settlement Rayak two P-15 radars on the morning of June 10 were attacked on the march by Israeli aircraft. One radar was destroyed, the other received medium damage.

Suddenly (for the command of the Syrian armed forces, and Soviet military specialists) was Israel’s integration of EW facilities (EW mobile and stationary centers on the Golan Heights, special crews of the active jamming Boeing-707 Aura, Weasle ", aerostatos, producers of passive interference, unmanned aerial vehicles EW).

In addition, skillful and prudent methods of using them were noted, which allowed the Israeli side to gain a decisive advantage and take the air defense grouping as if in "interfering ticks".

For 4-5 minutes before the start of the first massive strike (9 June 1982, in 14.00), intense active noise interference was produced by radar detection and tracking devices. In addition, the Israelis put powerful discrete interference to complicate the air situation and simulate the false direction of the flight of strike aircraft.

For the first-line radar posts of the Syria TTV constellation (located in the direction of the main strikes of Israeli aviation), the interference power spectral density levels were up to 200-300 W / MHz in the centimeter and decimeter bands and 150-200 W / MHz in the meter range.

This led to a decrease in the spatial characteristics of the radar field on the 75-90% in the centimeter and decimeter ranges and on the 50-75% - in the meter range.

The radar stations of the centimeter and decimeter ranges were almost completely suppressed, while for the radar stations of the meter range, the effective suppression sectors were 45-50 degrees.

For radar stations located deep in the combat formations of the PTB group, the effect of active noise interference was less effective. However, for them, the reduction of the spatial capabilities of the radar was: up to 40-60% in the centimeter and decimeter wavelengths, the effective suppression sectors reached 20-25 degrees; 30-40 hail - in the meter range of waves, effective suppression sectors reached 10-15 hail.

In fact, as a result of active noise interference, radar facilities (P-35, P-12, PRV-13 radars) on the Marge-es-Sultan GPN and radar posts in Dusheyer, Kisoua (RLP and MON) and Madar radar stations.

At radar stations located at a distance of more than 100 km from the combat area, only certain sectors (effective suppression sectors - 10-25 hail) were suppressed by active noise interference (medium intensity), and outside their detection and target wiring were possible.

Intensive radio-electronic suppression of radar facilities of a group of radio-technical forces in the main directions of Israeli aviation strikes resulted in almost a loss of the radar field. The lack of radar information (the presence of only fragmentary data on the actions of Israeli aviation), the deterioration of its quality, the sharp decline in information capabilities in the number of simultaneously issued targets, supplemented by circumstances (in fact, serious omissions in the organization of combat use) led to the following facts.

Alert air brigades was possible only with GPN through RIC KP (decentralized issuance of radar information from the RLP control points was not organized). Alert anti-aircraft missile brigades was made only on the alert networks from the RIC TsKP (decentralized issuance of radar information on the command post zrbr, the radar was not organized).

ERRORS AND THEIR REASONS

The main reasons for the lack of effectiveness in the combat use of the Syrian radio-technical grouping were the following:

- low individual noise immunity of radar facilities;

- the radar field (tri-band) created by these means, taking into account the geographic features of the combat area (its limited size), was not able to “take a hit” at such high levels of the spectral densities of interference power created by the Israeli side, although radio engineering units did everything possible to combat missions;

- the suppression and destruction of ground and air suppliers of interference were not made;

- The combat formations of units and subunits were distinguished by low survivability and poor masking. The positions of the radar stations were insufficiently equipped in engineering terms. Spare and false positions were absent;

- issues of a flexible combination of centralized and decentralized alerts have not been worked out;

- the absence of radar facilities even at command posts of air guards (with the exception of one);

- low level of automation of control over forces and means of radar reconnaissance;

- insufficient use of maneuverable capabilities of radar facilities;

- preparation of the entire positional area for maneuverable combat use was unsatisfactory.

The combat use of Syrian radio troops in the Lebanese conflict confirmed the increased role of radio troops in the country's air defense system as the main source of radar information, on which the quality of control depends, and hence the success of combat operations with enemy aircraft and unmanned weapons.

There are no trifles in the totality of the elements constituting the content of combat use; however, they are based on the used technical means combined into a single information system, functionally linked to the actions of fire weapons (anti-aircraft missile forces and aviation).

Peter Moiseenko Colonel, Head of the Tactics and Armament Department of the Radio Engineering Forces of the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense, Candidate of Military Sciences
Valentin TARASOV Major General, Associate Professor of the Tactics and Armament Department of the Radio Engineering Forces of the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor

Comments

[Cormorants]

Disputes continue, who is Syria: The US Enclave (Israel). Israel is still figs snooping into Syria, quickly get on the brain.

[sergey32]

So far, the Jews have Arab air defense as they want, as their last year’s attacks on Syria showed.

[Vovka levka]

Quote: sergey32

So far, the Jews have Arab air defense as they want, as their last year’s attacks on Syria showed.

This is a pattern. The fact that this will be so was known to the Soviet military specialists for a long time. And there was an unspoken taboo on this matter, this is called politics. And the fact that people are dying, and who cares when.

[siberalt]

Great local battle strategists!

[svskor80]

Israel has a European type of army, the Syrian army they, alas and ah, will always be stupid. In Syria, even with partisans it will be easier to fight than, for example, in Chechnya. But right now, in Syria, Israel simply has nothing to do.

[ultra]

Quote: svskor80

Israel has a European type of army,

What is this? Like a "renovation"?

[washi]

Quote: svskor80

Israel has a European type of army

Rather, the Russian type, because they put it, including ours. Yes, and many of her fighters from the descendants of our settlers.
The fact that they sold for greens is already politics and mercatilism traditional for Jews

[Professor]

Quote: Vasya

Rather, the Russian type, because they put it, including ours. Yes, and many of her fighters from the descendants of our settlers.

Yeah, Russian. Like the same. There are no charters in Tsakhal ...

Quote: Vasya

The fact that they sold for greens is already politics and mercatilism traditional for Jews

Do not like Jews?

[AK-47]

Quote: professor

There are no charters in Tsakhal ...

"Kin-dza-dza" in the fall: "What is the point of living in a society where there is no color differentiation of pants."

[Professor]

Quote: AK-47

"Kin-dza-dza" in the fall: "What is the point of living in a society where there is no color differentiation of pants."

And how can you call the army a collection of individuals of both sexes of 18 years old where there is completely no drill training?

PS
And what tradition of the Russian army can be attributed to the commander by name and on you and the fact that the chief of staff and ordinary are dressed in the same uniform?

[AK-47]

Quote: professor

And how can you call the army a collection of individuals of both sexes ...

Do I have something with vision?

[MACCABI TLV]

with sarcasm

[Angro Magno]

By name and you came up with Kerensky.

Then there was the Red Guard, and then the army during the Civil War. True, the Jewish commissars were wearing leather jackets.

[voliador]

Well, why love?

[Pimply]

Quote: Vasya

Rather, the Russian type, because they put it, including ours.

The original example is the British Army.

[atalef]

Quote: svskor80

Israel has a European type of army, the Syrian army, alas, they will always

In general, the Syrian army is entirely built according to the type of Soviet armed forces

Quote: svskor80

In Syria, even with partisans it will be easier to fight than, for example, in Chechnya.

why?

[voliador]

The Syrian army was never built like the Soviet Army. Only our weapons were.

[Fedya]

Israel has a little something behind it .. the Indianostan stands, but who is Syria?

[Ivan Petrovich]

good article for our haters.
"Military affairs are simple and quite accessible to the common mind of a person. But fighting is difficult." K.Klausewitz. Remember, just in case ...

[cosmos111]

Quote: Ivan Petrovich

good article for our haters.

article complete nonsense (((
it is not announced how much specifically Israeli aircraft were shot down (((
how many Soviet officers died (((
I talked with a direct participant in the fighting, a day over the territories of Syria it was interrupted by 20 Israeli aircraft ((((
what nonsense ---- "the complete defeat of the Syrian air defense, under the command of Soviet instructors" - complete rubbish <<<<

and yet, the cowardice of the Soviet leadership affected <<<<
having delivered to Syria and using operational-tactical missile systems (((
The 9K72 "Elbrus" with the 8K-14 missile is designed for command posts, airfields and other critical enemy targets ((((
destroying, or damaging most of the Israeli airfields (whose coordinates were well known in the USSR), the cardinal turned the tide (((
this is a political defeat, not a military one!!!!!

[Professor]

Quote: cosmos111

I talked with a direct participant in the fighting, a day over the territories of Syria it was interrupted by 20 Israeli aircraft ((((

I also had an interesting case while fishing ...

20 a day? Another 2 glasses and will be 200 per hour.

[MACCABI TLV]

some gentlemen, from not very developed countries (like India, Thailand) represent Israel as a country, the size and quantity of the population is akin to France ..... They, and 20 aircraft per day, are not huge numbers.
To me personally, it would be hard to imagine how you can lose 20 cars a day, and at the same time ... win.

[vyatom]

But the conflict itself was short. Maybe that's why adequate losses.

[MACCABI TLV]

pffff .... active phase from June 6 to September 29. and PLV officially ended in 2000, with the withdrawal of troops from Y. Lebanon.
But from June 6 to September 29 ... every day, 20 planes. I can not imagine how such losses can be adequate, and who?

[Do not care]

Professionals wrote and they all voiced. A specific aspect (EW) in a particular conflict is described briefly, comprehensively and objectively.

[de bouillon]

jacket

where are these tales from?

[Vovka levka]

Quote: cosmos111

article complete nonsense (((

No, this is reality, whether you like it or not, this is another question.
With such weapons and tactical conditions, the Syrians had no chance. Moreover, it should be noted that the Syrians are normal fighters and that we came up with a fairy tale that they are bad fighters. And this was done in order to avert doubts about the suitability of our military equipment. And the Israelis knew exactly the weaknesses, and we must give them their due, they used it to the fullest. That is why such a result.

[Ivan Petrovich]

everything is correct. Unfortunately.
And what cries we have on each channel about the Olympics, and as a result zilch. Although I understand that athletes are just loafers. entertainment for the public

[atalef]

Quote: cosmos111

article complete nonsense

Taking into account the author of the article, his title and scientific degrees - I would not be in a hurry to make such statements.

Quote: cosmos111

not specifically announced how many Israeli aircraft were shot down specifically

Well, if shot down in 30 years, then probably the facts would have come out. the remnants of the aircraft would probably be found (they were shot down, it seems, over the territory of Lebanon), if they had not evaporated in the air, where are the fragments of these 20 of yours per day?

Quote: cosmos111

what nonsense ---- "the complete defeat of the Syrian air defense, under the command of Soviet instructors"

What should I call it? And who commanded them? The Pentagon or something? For you, the latest bombing of Syria is not an indicator, even taking into account the fact that air defense systems that have no analogues in the world not only didn’t bring them down, they didn’t even detect them

Quote: cosmos111

and yet, the cowardice of the Soviet leadership <<<<<by placing in Syria and using operational-tactical missile systems (((9K72 Elbrus with an 8K-14 missile is intended for command posts, airfields and other important enemy targets ((((

Syria, as always, did not have enough weapons. - A familiar tale.

Quote: cosmos111

), the cardinal turned the tide (((this is a political defeat, not a military

Yes, they squeezed a tear of emotion from me, I will tell you more - this is definitely a victory for the Syrian army

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: atalef

Yes, they squeezed a tear of emotion from me, I will tell you more - this is definitely a victory for the Syrian army

The Syrians were ousted from Lebanon?

[Professor]

Quote: saturn.mmm

The Syrians were ousted from Lebanon?

Syrian troops are leaving Beirut under the control of Tsahal, and not vice versa.

[Pimply]

Quote: cosmos111

I talked with a direct participant in the fighting, a day over the territories of Syria it was interrupted by 20 Israeli aircraft ((((

What a trifle - a thousand

[Witold]

Complete nonsense? Then the article by Alexander Manachinsky, candidate of military sciences, is complete nonsense. But he is an officer, retired colonel of the Russian Federation.
http://kv-journal.info/tridczat_let_spustya.html

[Witold]

Complete nonsense? Then the article by Alexander Manachinsky, candidate of military sciences, is complete nonsense. But he is an officer, retired colonel of the Russian Federation.
http://kv-journal.info/tridczat_let_spustya.html

[vyatom]

Only the conclusions are not clear to me. Either our equipment was backward, or the Syrians do not know how to fight, or our military specialists did not catch mice?

[sivuch]

First of all, it’s the first reason, it’s only more correct to say that it is outdated (at that time, of course)
if anyone is interested, in the evening I will write more

[vyatom]

Quote: sivuch

First of all, it’s the first reason, it’s only more correct to say that it is outdated (at that time, of course)
if anyone is interested, in the evening I will write more

Write, very interesting

[Kus Imak]

Quote: vyatom

Only the conclusions are not clear to me. Either our equipment was backward, or the Syrians do not know how to fight, or our military specialists did not catch mice?

It's all about the command and control system in the army. The army is a complexly structured organization with both vertical and horizontal ties, and the more effectively the interaction between various structures in the army is manifested, the more successful it is. I think this is the secret of success. As for the fact that the Arabs do not know how to fight: there are several Bedouin regiments in the Israeli army, they are considered one of the most efficient. Just like the Jordanian army, it is considered very, very efficient. Regarding the backwardness of the Syrian air defense: Israeli Hoks and Makhvats did not differ much from the Syrian air defense systems and ZSU shilka. I think that in theory, if the Syrians and the Israelis had "exchanged" weapons, the result would have remained the same. As Stalin once said, "it is not the tank that wins, but the man."

[muhomor]

The equipment was quite modern. But the combat use of these weapons was clearly not thought out. Plus, the weak special and combat training of the Syrian troops, (29 aircraft at a time), plus the indifference of top-level military specialists (As for spare OP, engineering equipment, multi-channel communication lines could be suggested) led to a sad result. Communicated with Pvoshnik, a participant in that performance. According to him, the role of military specialists was reduced mainly to technical issues: ensuring the operability of weapons. But the operational and tactical issues were handled by the Syrians, who studied in the Union, yes, you see losers.

[Pinochet000]

Quote: Ivan Petrovich

good article for our haters

Here the thing is .... who to believe ... the Jews have no faith)), but ours believe that:
June 7 - shot down two aircraft (both - F-16)
June 8 - Three planes shot down (one F-16, two A-4)
June 9 - six planes shot down (two F-15, two F-16, one F-4, one Kfir)
June 10 - downed ten aircraft (including at least three F-15 and one F-16; the types of the remaining aircraft are not reported)
June 11 - Three planes shot down (all three are F-4)
Information wars are now in full swing)) this must be understood. Everyone lies))

[atalef]

Quote: Pinochet000

Here the thing is .... who to believe ... the Jews have no faith)), and ours believe that: on June 7, two planes were shot down (both are F-16s) June 8th, three planes were shot down (one F-16, two A-4s) On June 9, six planes were shot down (two F-15s, two F-16s, one F-4s, one Kfir); June 10th, ten planes were shot down (including at least three F-15s and one F-16; types of other planes are not reported) June 11 - three planes were shot down (all three are F-4) Information wars are now in full swing)) this must be understood. Everyone lies

The wreckage of downed planes do not lie. Where are they? There are 25 aircraft on your list, where are the wrecks? Or they like a Chelyabinsk meteorite burned in the air.
I recall flying not over the sea or the territory of Israel, flying over the territory of Lebanon. Where, where, where did the debris go? Did the local population pan pan before the army arrived?

[Pinochet000]

Quote: atalef

I remind you did not fly over the sea

Come on? look at the map in the article ...

[Professor]

Quote: Pinochet000

Come on? look at the map in the article ...

We looked. What changed? They fought over Lebanon (land). Or do you think the Bekaa Valley is the sea?

[MACCABI TLV]

look at the map in general.
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B0_(%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%
D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F)

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: atalef

The wreckage of downed planes do not lie. Where are they?

Yes, of course, and in 2006 in Lebanon not a single tank was lost, there are no debris.

[MACCABI TLV]

tanks flew over the front line?

[atalef]

Quote: saturn.mmm

Quote: atalef

The wreckage of downed planes do not lie. Where are they?

Yes, of course, and in 2006 in Lebanon not a single tank was lost, there are no debris.

Why, are there photographs, the IDF recognizes, but on planes that is what to say or how?

[Pinochet000]

Quote: atalef

IDF recognizes

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: atalef

and on planes that is what to say or how?

And who is Agaron Akhyaz?

[Professor]

Quote: saturn.mmm

Yes, of course, and in 2006 in Lebanon not a single tank was lost, there are no debris.

5 (five) tanks were irretrievably lost. Lay out a list of all the fallen soldiers?

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: professor

5 (five) tanks were irretrievably lost. Lay out a list of all the fallen soldiers?

Do not bother.
If these five tanks are re-melted and new ones are made, it turns out that the Israelis did not lose a single one.
The Israelis entered Lebanon allegedly with the PLO to resolve the issue, the Syrians were not going to fight with Israel.
More about an unconditional victory.
The Syrians were squeezed out of Lebanon?

[Professor]

Quote: saturn.mmm

The Syrians were squeezed out of Lebanon?

Syrian troops are leaving Beirut under the control of Tsahal, and not vice versa.

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: professor

Syrian troops are leaving Beirut under the control of Tsahal, and not vice versa.

Thank you for the photo, an interesting picture. You know what these cards are.

[Professor]

Quote: saturn.mmm

Thank you for the photo, an interesting picture. You know what these cards are.

Of course I know. Here are 3 maps for you, look where the Syrian army was and where it turned out.

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: professor

Here are 3 maps for you, look where the Syrian army was and where it turned out.

The Israelis shared Lebanon with Syria, but I would not dare to call it a complete and unconditional victory.
In general, in the 90 years, while the Americans organized their war in the Middle East, the Israelis, under the guise, could try to expand their territory.

[Professor]

Quote: saturn.mmm

The Israelis shared Lebanon with Syria, but I would not dare to call it a complete and unconditional victory.

The task of defeating Syria was not standing. The task was to kick Arafat's ass.

Quote: saturn.mmm

In general, in the 90 years, while the Americans organized their war in the Middle East, the Israelis, under the guise, could try to expand their territory.

Israel does not need foreign territory, Sinai is an example of this.

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: professor

Israel does not need foreign territory, Sinai is an example of this.

Well, why someone else? You lived in Egypt, you have no less rights than Arabs. Before the Nile it would be just right.

[Professor]

Quote: saturn.mmm

Well, why someone else? You lived in Egypt, you have no less rights than Arabs. Before the Nile it would be just right.

Duck then in Egypt, and in Sinai Moses walked for only 40 years.

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: professor

Duck then in Egypt, and in Sinai Moses walked for only 40 years.

I’m not a big fan of the British, but the case of the murder of an English soldier was hooked for a living, yesterday they were sitting under a banana palm and today they are teaching the British how to live and what to do, and in the light of these events, Israel is getting an outpost in the Middle East.

[Victor-M]

Quote: atalef

The wreckage of downed planes do not lie. Where are they?

How where, do you have a lot of metal in Israel? So they went like secondary raw materials, thereby destroying the evidence and buying scrap metal is not necessary, one saving.

[Pimply]

Quote: Pinochet000

Here the thing is .... who to believe ... the Jews have no faith)), but ours believe that:
June 7 - shot down two aircraft (both - F-16)
June 8 - Three planes shot down (one F-16, two A-4)
June 9 - six planes shot down (two F-15, two F-16, one F-4, one Kfir)
June 10 - downed ten aircraft (including at least three F-15 and one F-16; the types of the remaining aircraft are not reported)
June 11 - Three planes shot down (all three are F-4)
Information wars are now in full swing)) this must be understood. Everyone lies))

There was no confirmation of this data. Find, imagine? On Syrian aircraft with numbers of pilots and squadrons there. As in the Israeli losses of the wars of the Second Lebanon, Doomsday, Six Day and others.

[Kus Imak]

It is not clear what the picture of the American AWACS aircraft is. Here is a photo of an Israeli AWACS aircraft of the time:

[neri73-r]

What? Is it a shame for the power? (with)

[Nayhas]

Quote: Kus Imak

Here is a photo of an Israeli AWAC at that time

sorry for the nit-picking, but this is not a photo, this image ...

[Professor]

Quote: Nayhas

sorry for the nit-picking, but this is not a photo, this image ...

[SkiF_RnD]

How is it that our people don’t like yours
Well, somehow even ashamed, or something. Everyone knows that there are more Russians in VO. Under adequate posts why put the cons? Then it’s smarter to write a rebuttal, your return post, and let them point out the pros. The meaning will not change, but somehow more civilized or something ...

Of course, I don’t believe that losses = 0. In the book by David Nicolas "Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 in action" there is a photograph of the wreckage of the "Phantom" of the downed MiG-21 on 10 June. This is information from "Wiki", but I don't have this book. Maybe someone has such a volume?
According to researchers Steve Davis and Doug Dildy, Syria lost 88 aircraft. Israeli losses are estimated at 1 F-16, 1 F-4, 1 Kfir, 2 A-4 and several helicopters.
You can find different data, but I think that the truth will be approximately the same. Just a few cars. There are no wars without losses. By the way, didn't Israel admit the loss of one Skyhawk?
In principle, this does not seem important to me. Figuratively speaking, even 5-7 aircraft is the same as zero. In such cases, the Americans generally write all losses in "non-combat reasons", and this does not change the essence in any way. The Syrian losses of more than 80 combat aircraft, there is no doubt about that.
Fighters 4 generations + AWACS + EW + strategy and command. We must pay tribute to the Israeli Air Force, an urgent need is the best motivation for development.

[Victor-M]

Quote: SkiF_RnD

According to researchers Steve Davis and Doug DildySyria lost 88 aircraft.

The paper will endure everything, especially from the Americans and the Israelis but the evidence in person for every downed Syrian plane, even if it may have been shot down, no one can imagine (well, if only to embellish), as well as the fact that this is the true truth. So the gentlemen of America, you always need to speak the truth. , then maybe someone would believe in your mythical invulnerability and triumph .

[Black]

Quote: Victor-M

Paper can stand it

- I do not agree ...
- With Engels, or with Kautsky ???
-... with both !!!!

[SkiF_RnD]

About more than eighty Syrian shot down ... It's not just the Americans who say. In general, a popular point of view today, and in Russia too (I do not mean sofa experts). The Israelis are definitely right about one thing. Well, the battles were mainly over the territories where the Syrians were stationed. And why then you will not find evidence confirmed by the day with fire? "Zhydy" cleaned? Well this is not serious. Excuse me, if there are no Israeli planes smeared on the ground, then I will believe in dozens of shot down no more than in the successes of American Abrams that fought with sub-caliber aircraft against abandoned tanks. It looks like misinformation, if you please. The losses of the Syrians were, and were rather big. According to the Soviet version, where there are six dozen. There is no desire to check, but I do not need the exact number. 60 or 80 is, of course, not the same thing. But that doesn't make much of a difference. And these numbers really look like the loss of one of the parties, according to different versions of the sworn "friends". All the same, both sides usually underestimate-overestimate. But zero, and excuse me more than forty is already too much. This does not happen, if I see this, I understand that someone outplayed Texas poker at their leisure. It is possible to hide the loss of several cars, no matter what they say about it ... the citizens of Israel But successfully conceal the loss of forty aircraft? On the scale of Israel? Well, on ... You can't say otherwise. I still believe that the losses of the Syrians were several times greater. Given the strengths of the parties? This is not the jungle of Vietnam after all. Just five days, a fleeting "ruby", F-15 and F-16 in the attack, on their side of the electronic warfare and AWACS, Israel's pilots definitely do not want to give a head start. And against - MiG-21, MiG-23, Arabs in the cabins. I can believe it. And if this coincides with the opinion of the majority of military experts, including modern Russian ones, I will believe it. Something like this.

[sivuch]

How I like your Nick

[muhomor]

The same eggs, only in profile. Identification marks are different.

[scientist]

Many thanks to the author for the article. It was very pleasant to study at your department.
In fact, the conclusion here is one "how much halva do not say, but it will not be sweeter in your mouth"
I read something similar in the reports, though there was only a statement of facts. The conclusions are clear. The main one is that if an air strike on Syria is repeated now, the losses and consequences will be even worse. It is foolish to deny a crisis in the development of air defense. The suddenness of the strike, plus the clear superiority of the development of reconnaissance, electronic warfare and high-precision weapons, does not give any chances for the radar, air defense systems and fighter aircraft to repel the strike on defended objects. The only option is because of the gardens, which allows at least somehow saving air defense means, naturally at the expense of the security of the defended object.
For about 8 years at the VKO Academy, I wrote many scientific articles and even defended my dissertation on this topic, where I proposed, in principle, to change the approaches to the development of radar, to transfer it to new detection methods. He filed a patent for an invention, but even with the unanimous approval of the dissertation council, which is extremely rare in the Academy of the East Kazakhstan region, the idea seemed fantastic to the industrialists. For now, something similar, but still quite primitive, the idea of ​​creating a hidden jam-resistant radar field is being implemented by Western companies, for example radars: "Silent Sentry" by Lockheed Martin, "Homeland Aler-100" created by Thales under the Dark program, and recently even EADS presented its radar "Cassidian", which they say has no analogues in the world. But our analogous developments, which are still superior in technological solutions to the West for almost 10 years! A little more and will have to copy at best, at worst to count losses and losses.

[edeligor]

The article is a definite plus. It is necessary to draw the correct conclusions from the mistakes made. Only these errors were not excluded not in Iraq and not in Yugoslavia. The Israelis (read the Americans) made the right conclusions from the Vietnamese campaign. Learned how to deal with our air defense. Our turn has come, comrades.

[ultra]

Quote: edeligor

Learned how to deal with our air defense.

Relying on one air defense is immediately to give the initiative to the enemy! This is the path to defeat!

[muhomor]

You cannot win a war alone, but without it you will certainly lose. You just need to work professionally on technology. And there should be one-man management. Whoever teaches people who exploits equipment is responsible for the battle, and does not rely on advisers. Advisor-for all the soul hurts, is not responsible for anything.

[ran nearby]

Looks like, taking into account the experience, including the Syrian, we were persecuted in the GSVG in full. Once a month, and sometimes more often, they were blown up and deployed by the Air Defense Forces of the Group upon alarm. including with changes in the areas of dislocations.
In the second year, the services were sleepy, tired, and even dead :) - everything that was required for the work of the ZKP was done automatically.

[AK-47]

Peter Moiseenko Colonel, Head of the Tactics and Armament Department of the Radio Engineering Forces of the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense, Candidate of Military Sciences
Valentin TARASOV Major General, Associate Professor of the Department of Tactics and Arms of Radio Engineering Troops of the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor

Analysts worked well, but late. But whether the strategists took these shortcomings into account is a question. I would like to think that, yes.

[Professor]

Official Tel Aviv decided that in this situation he can no longer remain indifferent.

There is no official Tel Aviv, all officials are in Jerusalem.

[RoTTor]

A common misconception as a result of years of anti-Israeli propaganda.
Thanks to him, he somehow won a bet on a couple of bottles of good cognac.

[Aeneas]

Israel used advanced equipment of its own and foreign production, and the Syrians had a park (mostly) from the time of the Egyptian (Arab) wars with Israel, especially the outdated air defense systems. In Egypt, Soviet-Arab air defense worked well, especially against the backdrop of the Air Force. But geographically, Egypt and Syria (Lebanon) are slightly different theaters, and the air defense tactics that worked in Egypt were not effective on a rather narrow front, with the presence of mountainous terrain. The tactics of the Israelis were more effective and they were better armed ... The article indicates the fleet of radio equipment Syrians (radar), but does not indicate the means of electronic warfare. It seems to me that the Syrians were weakly armed with electronic warfare stations, which would be very effective in a fairly limited theater of operations, even in conditions of air defense defeat, they work quite effectively in object mode, are very mobile, and much cheaper and easier to operate than radars.

[Kuvabatake]

It was not, but the fact of defeat on the face.

[Aeneas]

for one broken, two not broken give.

[Beck]

Quote: Aeneas

for one beaten, two not beaten give

The Arab military, at least ten beating, all the same, one adequate will not work.

[Aeneas]

Quote: Beck

Quote: Aeneas

for one beaten, two not beaten give

The Arab military, at least ten beating, all the same, one adequate will not work.

don't underestimate the Arabs. In addition, they are mostly not Arabs, but Arabized and mentally different between the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula proper and the Arabized Muslims of the Levant. Egyptians, Syrians, and even Iraqis fought Israel very hard in land battles in the Sinai and Golan. It's just that the general level of technical knowledge and education in general of the "Arab" population has historically been significantly lower than that of the Jews. And in "technical sports" the slightest gap in the mate and knowledge, and all - defeat with a crushing score !!! Courage, perseverance, physical condition are leveled. Bridging such a gap will be very difficult, especially for the politically fragmented Arabs.

[Aaron Zawi]

Tankers from 3t / d SAR and special forces showed themselves very worthy in battles.

[atalef]

Quote: Beck

Quote: Aeneas

for one beaten, two not beaten give

The Arab military, at least ten beating, all the same, one adequate will not work.

In general (according to popular rumor) this happens right in the hospital, a newborn Arab is thrown against the wall, if glued, it will be a plasterer, it will crash onto the floor - a tiler

[Victor-M]

Quote: atalef

crashing to the floor - tiler

Rather, a concrete worker.

[Black]

Quote: atalef

Arab are thrown against the wall

Eka you about the brother that !!!

[atalef]

Quote: Chen

Quote: atalef

Arab are thrown against the wall

Eka you about the brother that !!!

About your brother?

[atalef]

Quote: Aeneas

for one broken, two not broken give.

And for two broken? More precisely for 5 times beaten (+ the last few times) --- how much will they give?

[Mairos]

- Unacceptably high lower limit of the radar field
- Nobody fought ground-based jamming stations, even stationary ones - laughter and sin
- For some reason, the S-75 and S-125 did not hide behind short-range air defense, which were supposed to work on drones

- Aircraft AWACS to control air battles - generally a novelty for that time, they also did not take into account
In general, it should be noted that the Israeli army very often used original tactical developments during the Arab-Israeli wars, which brought it success.

Conclusion - you need to think, analyze and improvise! In general, our advisers who were there at that time noted that the Syrians rather ineptly used the available forces and means and, often, ignored the instructions given to them. I won't go into details here, but "they are here"

[atalef]

Quote: Mairos

The lower boundary of the radar field is unacceptably high — no one fought against ground-based interference stations, even stationary ones — laughter and sin — for some reason the S-75 and S-125 did not hide behind short-range air defense, which should also work on unmanned aerial vehicles — DRLO aircraft for control of air battles - generally a novelty for that time, they were not taken into account either

Yes, to the instructors of the Syrian army and the Higher School of Higher Education where they studied (Syrian officers) --- there are many questions

Quote: Mairos

In general, it should be noted that the Israeli army very often used original tactical developments during the Arab-Israeli wars, which brought it success.

Generally easier to write - always won

Quote: Mairos

Conclusion - you need to think, analyze and improvise

Recent improvisations have been especially strong. to drop all the bombings, promise to answer, after that get 4 more bouquets in the face and keep silent again - I like such improvisations

Quote: Mairos

In general, those of our advisers who were there at that time noted that the Syrians rather ineptly used the available forces and means and, often, ignored the instructions given to them.

I don’t believe it, I'm sorry - I don’t believe it. Or explain the meaning of their ignoring the suggestions of advisers - in order to lose? I do not believe . advisers were at all headquarters from the battalion and above

[Starina_hank]

Something is not very much I like this malicious cat from the promised land!

[atalef]

Starina_Hank Today, 19:50 ↑
Something is not very much I like this malicious cat from the promised land!

Two cannibals meet
One says
- I do not like Jews
Second answers
- You just don’t know how to cook them

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: atalef

Generally easier to write - always won

Why early in the morning of June 10
Habib arrived in Damascus, and after lunch, Secretary of State Schulz?
And why did the NATO fleet stand at your side and the American marines landed ashore?

[atalef]

Quote: saturn.mmm

Quote: atalef

Generally easier to write - always won

Why early in the morning of June 10
Habib arrived in Damascus, and after lunch, Secretary of State Schulz?
And why did the NATO fleet stand at your side and the American marines landed ashore?

And for what?

[saturn.mmm]

Quote: atalef

And for what?

What for? If the Israeli victorious army smashed the Syrians right and left.
Probably expressed their sympathy.

[Mairos]

"The last improvisations were especially strong. To miss all the bombing, promise to answer, then get a bouquet in the face 4 more times and keep silent again - I like such improvisations" - what are you talking about ??

"In general, it's easier to write - I've always won" - oh, yes, I ask you .. Bragging is a sign of a dull mind. Don't do that!

"I don't believe, I'm sorry - I don't believe" - ​​your right, I say what I heard from eyewitnesses. Moreover, this is not from the "20 planes per day" cycle. The people highly appreciated the fighting efficiency of the Israeli army and the very low quality of the Arab armies. When the commanders simply did not follow the instructions for changing positions and camouflaging. And this is not only about air defense. It was about the same in Angola - the Cubans fought cool, and the locals often somehow. But about the Vietnamese, the air defense specialists spoke very respectfully - the guys were creative in their work.

[creak]

[quote = Aeneas] In Egypt, Soviet-Arab air defense worked well, especially against the backdrop of the Air Force. But geographically, Egypt and Syria (Lebanon) are slightly different theaters, and the air defense tactics that worked in Egypt were not effective on a rather narrow front, with the presence of mountainous terrain.

I would like to note that in Egypt, the Soviet anti-aircraft missile launchers from the air defense division transferred to Egypt in the framework of Operation Kavkaz in 1970 worked quite effectively. There is no need to talk seriously about the Egyptian air defense since it was actually suppressed with the beginning of the war of attrition. declared by G. Naser, the Israeli Air Force during this period almost every day inflicted bomb-assault strikes both on Egyptian troops in the Suez Canal zone, and on objects of the rear infrastructure ... In fairness, it should be noted that the S-75 complexes were not already at that time could effectively resist Israeli aviation ... This, in particular, explains the transfer of Soviet air defense units to Egypt, armed with more modern complexes. This experience, in particular, electronic warfare, and had to be used in the training of personnel of the Syrian air defense, but it seems to have not been properly taken into account ... At one time I happened to be a participant in these events in the Suez Canal zone ...

[atalef]

Quote: ranger

I would like to note that in Egypt, Soviet anti-aircraft missile launchers from the air defense division transferred to Egypt in the framework of Operation Kavkaz in 1970 worked quite effectively.

Yes, they worked well, while Israel for some reason never made secrets as to the number of aircraft shot down. so about the names of the dead pilots. The phthographies of the debris also exist and there are few of them. Although note all these fragments remained on the occupied Sinai Peninsula of Israel. seemingly could have quietly removed and classified But for some reason they told. and in Lebanon they shot down 20 planes a day, no debris (in Lebanon), nothing - but still it’s impossible to calm down, keep believing in your fairy tales It's ridiculous.

[SkiF_RnD]

I don’t know who believes in fairy tales. I am sure that several aircraft were lost, such tales are a convinced assessment of most independent experts. Of course, there were no four dozen.
There are no wars without losses. Generally. If there were battles, the score is never "dry". You hid these few cars. Apparently from the temptation to troll the Arabs with a crushing score of 0-XX. Lebanese patriots (? Terrorists? Rebels? Militias? I xs who is this anyway) reported about the captured F-4 pilot, according to the "wiki" so in general Israel itself admitted the loss of one Skyhawk (how did they recognize it or not?). In general, judging by the scale of the collisions, I would not have believed in "zero" even without statements. That there were "stealths" flying or what? There is nothing difficult in shooting down the F-16, they did fly into the zone of action of the air defense missile system, they met with fighters. Zero loss is fantastic. Have you seen the ad?

[Tourist Breakfast]

I don’t know who believes in fairy tales. I am sure that several aircraft were lost, such tales are a convinced assessment of most independent experts. Of course, there were no four dozen.

Israel does not deny the loss of several aircraft during the Lebanon war from air defense fire. The thing is that there were no losses in air battles.

Read more here:

http://www.waronline.org/IDF/Articles/lebanon-losses.htm#general-analysis

[RomanN]

In 82g, the 75 complex was already hopelessly outdated in all respects, and masking it in the desert was generally hopeless — bulky booths of cabins pp, src, friend or stranger requestor, plus control cabins, automation, communications, diesel, and recharging launchers in conditions of short-term combat, he has no mobility. And suppressing active and passive interference by RS operators in case of tracking the target is practically useless (passive still there). Everything else is said above. It's sad if now we have the same garbage in troops.

[atalef]

Quote: RomanN

In 82g, the 75 complex was already hopelessly outdated in all respects, and masking it in the desert was generally hopeless — bulky booths of cabins pp, src, friend or stranger requestor, plus control cabins, automation, communications, diesel, and recharging launchers in conditions of short-term battle problem

I don’t really understand you, but why did you find this hopeless junk in Lebanon, and even with the Soviet military inside? Was the USSR specially delivering junk to Syria? Just don’t say that Syria didn’t have money to buy a new one — it didn’t pay for weapons at all, but if they delivered bullshit. then why did the advisers be sent there - for death or something?
It doesn’t fit like that, by all logic it turns out or the junk was not there, or the USSR Armed Forces purposefully risked the lives of Soviet troops - which option suits you best?

[Hug]

Re .: RomanN
In 82, the 75 complex was already hopelessly outdated in all respects ...

Are you kidding me? How about the 75 Volkhov 3M? Not the most backward "hardware", quite combat-ready, having the ability to withstand not only "shrike", but "standart ARM" and active jamming. Not worse than "MIM-23 HAWK" and certainly not worse than "Nike-Hercules"
Now I don’t know what the situation is in the ZRV, but in those years it was a good technique. Yes, not mobile. But with the proper level of training - a serious weapon.

[sivuch]

So after all Volkhov-3M was delivered after.
11 SAM S-75M3 "Volga" (6 - 1983, 5 - 1987)
In addition, for Lebanese conditions, they still have a number of fatal flaws - low mobility, disgusting fuel, well, you yourself know
And the question is off topic.
You didn’t have to work with the Circle? There are a number of questions, I hope, now it’s not a secret

[Hug]

There is no experience with the "Circle", but in 3 I served on "Volkhov 1977M"
In addition, yes - then it was still "saturating" our air defense missile systems and was not supplied to the BV theater.

[sivuch]

The fact is that at one of the forums I wrote that there were no Kroogi in Vietnam and, perhaps, they would have proved themselves there quite well. To which I received a response from a former air defense officer who operated the S-75, and later the S-300, which the later Volkhovs would have come up better. Here I would like to compare. The advantages of the Circle are known, and as the advantages of Volkhov, he, that is, an officer, pointed out that the S-75 has the possibility of manual auto tracking and the presence of a wide beam
The S-75, in addition to a narrow beam (5x5 degrees), has a wide beam (20x20 degrees), which gives excellent situational awareness and simply radically reduces the time to search for a target. The target is accompanied "on the aisle", that is, the targeting officer sees all the time everything that happens in the given sector of 20x20 degrees, including his own missiles, other aircraft, and missiles launches.

[Magyar]

It is difficult, of course, to judge those events; comments by direct participants are needed; please, if there are any men on the site, please kindly drop a couple of lines, although in general, if you proceed from this article, the analysis is very well presented. But the saddest thing is not that we do not learn from the mistakes paid for by blood. The example was the War in South Ossetia in 2008, when the Georgians managed to bring down several aircraft in such a short period, including the TU-22 strategist, where there was reconnaissance and EW !!! Now imagine for a second if there was a conflict, let’s say with one of the NATO countries I don’t want to talk about it, but the losses were catastrophic. That's the whole Urya patriotism. In the United States, Israel and NATO countries, great importance is given to EW forces and new methods of combating air defense systems. I would like to think that our General Staff takes this into account and prepares adequate measures, and not just talking in tongue about unmatched equipment and about super air defense, otherwise it's all next time will lead to tragedy.

[Mairos]

There was stupidity in Georgia. Why was there a need for a Tu-22 reconnaissance aircraft at all, with the air defense not canceled. As the losses went, they "immediately" realized - they raised the Su-34 and without entering the zone of action of the BUKs with an anti-radar missile they killed the Georgian radar 36D6-M near the village of Shavshvebi near Gori. It's a shame that we begin to work competently only after mistakes and losses.

[atalef]

Quote: Mairos

There was stupidity in Georgia

and in Lebanon? And why not foolishness to explain the elementary not the ability to fight?

Quote: Mairos

How the losses went, they "immediately" realized - they raised the Su-34 and, without entering the zone of action of the BUKs, killed the Georgian radar 36D6 with an anti-radar missile

Strange, in Syria, Buki a long time ago, but the result is the same as in Lebanon in the 82nd

[Mairos]

Lord, what air defense is now in Syria, there is a civil war, settlements and territories are constantly changing hands. Everything died there except the land. The Air Force is only doing what hits the ground, there is a BARDAK, and in everything you boast that once every few months your Air Force "fired" a couple of missiles or bombs somewhere. The Syrians are now at least TORs, at least give the Armor - to no avail. Air defense is a system, without control over the territory of a country's air defense cannot be built. And about the ability to fight spirits, ask, the USSR left Afgan when the order came, and the loss of Afghans is not comparable more than that of the USSR Armed Forces. So there is no need for skill, there is an army, but there is politics. Can you remember how Israel "successfully" started the war in Sinai? Yes, then there was a fracture. So with Georgia, sorry, everything went right. Do not show off, having one advisor per air defense battalion is not "Soviet servicemen inside." And then, Israel fought with the Arabs for survival, and this is very stimulating. And then, learn to respect your opponent and the facts.

I’m just trying to convey to you the fact that the availability of good technology and advisers can by no means change the consciousness of people and their slovenliness.

[predator.3]

Quote: Mairos

There was stupidity in Georgia. Why was there a need for a Tu-22 reconnaissance aircraft at all, with the air defense not canceled. As the losses went, they "immediately" realized - they raised the Su-34 and without entering the zone of action of the BUKs with an anti-radar missile they killed the Georgian radar 36D6-M near the village of Shavshvebi near Gori. It's a shame that we begin to work competently only after mistakes and losses.

In the journal “Russian Military Review” (No. 12 for 2008), in the biographies of the military commanders, three were awarded the Order of St. George, II degree: Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Army General N. E. Makarov, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Army General V. A Boldyrev, Air Force Commander Colonel General A. N. Zelin. The Order marked their participation in hostilities in South Ossetia in August 2008.

It was for this downed Tu-22 and several other planes that Zelena was "awarded" the St. George Cross, and even the 2nd degree!

[Mairos]

Fall ... Duc bosses are always awarded. What objectivity do you want. Not a child, after all.

[creak]

"Cities are surrendered by soldiers, and generals are taking them ..." Tvardovsky.

[Prutkov]

And the electronic warfare is still there ... There is also the opposition of the enemy’s electronic warfare.

[Mairos]

EWs are now far from there, their own AWACS are being modernized, the lower level of the radar field is about 5-10 meters. And radar noise immunity is now a priority for developers.

[RoTTor]

Interesting, informative, accurate and, most importantly, truly PROFESSIONAL.
Unlike frequent 3.14 amateurs.

Despite the Soviet-Israeli relations, the combat experience of the Israeli Air Force was constantly studied and really positively in the academies.

How much was it used in combat training? It is unlikely to be properly, as well as their own experience in military operations in Afghanistan.

[misantrop22]

How so? I wanted to popcorn already, anticipating the next holivar on my favorite topic about 82 years. But no, patriotism at the Olympics or something they all spent.
Well then, can someone throw an article about another favorite topic - an air battle of 70 years between Soviet and Israeli pilots. And somehow boring without holivar

[sivuch]

not worth it. already sucked on all forums

[Apollo]

Quote: sivuch

not worth it. already sucked in all forums

Replace with another word, did not try ?!
Why litter and crap, Russian language. This forum is read in many countries of the world. Or do you want to show your coolness ?!

[Kus Imak]

Quote: mizantrop22

How so? I wanted to popcorn already, anticipating the next holivar on my favorite topic about 82 years. But no, patriotism at the Olympics or something they all spent.
Well then, can someone throw an article about another favorite topic - an air battle of 70 years between Soviet and Israeli pilots. And somehow boring without holivar

Here you have about the 82 year war, Begin and others. Crocodile:

[sivuch]

firstly, my opinion about the article is mostly positive. Of course, the authors clearly wrote about the air battles from other people's words, but in this case this is not the main thing. Of course, the photograph of the ICO 5N84 radar has nothing to do with the events of 82 years, but this, probably an editorial mistake. It is unclear whether the P-18 radars were not listed in Syria, but is mentioned later. For example, in Iraq, these radars were not there in 1991, they cost the more ancient P-12s.
The question was asked above - what was the reason for the 3 main ones - the backwardness of the materiel, the curvature of the operators and the wrong advice. In my opinion, all three reasons worked. That is, I’m sure that Israel would have won anyway, but it could to be a difficult victory, as in 1973, and not an indicative flogging.
According to point 1, yes, the equipment was outdated, if you take aviation, the most modern machine was the Mig-21Bis and Mig-23MF. The last was already 24 pieces. In fact, Assad-dad asked for 50 Mig-23ML, but he was sent .All this kitchen is painted in some detail here
http://alerozin.narod.ru/Syria81.htm
In the Syrian and Lebanese direction 1981-1984.
Of the missiles, there were R-60 (not M), and not all vehicles, R-3C and R-23, of course, there were no AWACS aircraft, although Tu-126s began to be removed from service after a couple of years, -12PP of the Soviet Air Force and with the Soviet crews, NNA, were not used far from sin. There were no EW helicopters.
There was no ground equipment for Lazouri, NNP, either. However, I doubt that the Syrians could use it.
In short, with such a materiel in the air, the Syrians did not shine.
As for the air defense technology, the picture was a bit different. That is, it was also old, but very much. The density of air defense systems was very high, which could not be said about effectiveness.
It is clear that no one was going to sell the S-300 to the Syrians, in the sense of giving for nothing. Although since 1980 industry had been producing 40 divisions per year, it was still far from completely saturating its air forces. Even the Allied air forces received the first 300 matches in the late 80s, and even then in a cropped form. About export deliveries of air defense equipment of the USSR (not military air defense) are here
http://bmpd.livejournal.com/257111.html
Deliveries of the Soviet air defense systems of the country abroad
But the older equipment - S-200, Cabs, Vectors, EW helicopters, Points, 23-22, etc., Syria received after the fight. However, EW helicopters were serviced by Soviet HP.
The situation was similar with military air defense equipment: Bukov (in the series since 1980) or Kubov-M4, that is, no one would have trusted the Syrians with a mixture of Kubov and beech. But there were no simpler Arrow-10, only Arrow-1
Of course, a similar picture was with the radar, however, this was mentioned in the article. With automation, it was completely oppa. It is generally not clear how the Syrians and their advisers were going to use such a group as Fed. The fact is that in the Air Defense Union of the country and Air defense systems were two separate states with their own equipment, organization and their own automatic control systems. Moreover, there was no integration with regard to automatic control systems. The military air defense systems had only a very primitive automatic control system Krab, which Polyana began to replace only since 1980, and at the tactical level it was PU-12 (which the Syrians, again, didn’t have). In the country's air defense, the automation tools were more advanced, but before 82, only a couple of ASURKs were delivered to Syria.

[sivuch]

The second reason is the Arab curvature. So yes, it also happened. In principle, everyone who monitors the current civil war in Syria must have read vicious comments about the actions of both sides.
But from the air base:
Now a little about the opinions of people related to Soviet-Arab cooperation in this area ...
Somehow I talked about the application of SDR-2A in BV with the participants of those (again - not exactly those that are discussed in the topic!) Events (my former school teacher),
He talked about the features of work in those conditions.
If in a nutshell: the problems were not so much technical as organizational ones, and these problems greatly affected the results of the work.
And over time (when I gained practical experience) I understood everything that he had in mind and I did not have the slightest doubt in his story.
Brief (without explanation of reasons) conclusions:
The concept of the Arabs about radio discipline, the analysis of REO, the protection of their own RES - were simply none ....
The illiterate use of technology, the abuse of radio communications and the work of RTS on radiation, naive and clumsy measures to counter enemy reconnaissance - according to him, this was widespread.
A few memorable phrases, almost verbatim:
"There is a lot of enthusiasm, but there are 0 pointless skills." , "when we leave, everything will be turned down." about radio discipline: "at least a count of them on their head".
In general, in his opinion, the Syrians (he was in Syria, but I don’t remember which year) were not ready to use this technique (I repeat - these are simple and reliable samples) neither psychologically nor technically.
By the way, he also mentioned a certain gouging of the Israelis in this matter, however, noting that, compared with the Arabs, their radio discipline (in the broad sense) was even better.
However, such "carelessness" and some "naivety" are probably characteristic (perhaps to varying degrees) for all armies of the world - "infantry" is still "infantry".
About the actions of his colleagues from Israeli radio / radio intelligence - he was of the highest opinion.
Some phrases were heard about Israeli intelligence - "depressingly effective", "smart guys", etc. however, he noted that in the mess that was going on among the Arabs, the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence was not particularly surprising.
http://forums.airbase.ru/2006/03/t37615,7--dolina-bekaa-1982.html
Bekaa Valley 1982
Well, with the Soviet specialists, headed by Yashkin, it’s also clear what they counted on? Apparently, by chance, that during their stay will carry

[Mairos]

Thank you for the competent posts! And then I'm trying to convey these three reasons to the "bat", and he stubbornly repeats - "Yes, you generally do not know how to fight!"

[voliador]

The Arabs have never been friends with technology, even as simple and reliable as ours were quickly ruined. More or less normal were those who unlearned in the union. But all could not be taught, even officers.

[Victor-M]

Another 20 or 25 years will pass, and the world will learn that the liberation of "Auschwitz" is actually the work of the Israeli Massad and the Tsahal, the then unrecognized state of Israel. This commentary refers to the degree of confidence in contemporary "chroniclers".

[Black]

Quote: Victor-M

It will take another 20 years or 25

It will take less, and it will be necessary (God forbid) to take into account the errors in the combat use of the above. Here's a nose would not bully, in their troubles not to remember the "forever guilty", but to remember and learn.
Above colleagues very timely remembered 080808.

[Magadan]

Firstly, the scientific degrees of the authors do not prove a damn. I have a friend who is also a candidate in some sciences, and he spoke in Moscow with homies. The issue price is several liters of caviar. Unfortunately, liberals and even traitors are found in our Army (remember the 1st Chechen).
Without detracting from the merits of the Israeli Army, everything was far from so sad for the Syrians as it was written in the article. Yes, the air battles ended in favor of Israel, because our MIG-21s were really inferior to their planes. As a result, ours quickly switched to MIG-29.
But, judge for yourself - who has real control over Lebanon? Israel, or what? If they fought as hard as these "specialists" write - then Lebanon would now be the territory of Israel. No control - no victory, that's the point. And everything else is a fit of numbers and frank verbal diarrhea.
I repeat: Jews are undoubtedly one of the best warriors in the world. And even it would be a bastard to compare them with some "army built on the European model". They are much cooler than both European and American models. But, even the Jews themselves do not say that that war with Syria was such an easy walk for them as the authors of this article write.

[Aaron Zawi]

Quote: Magadan

. But, even the Jews themselves do not say that that war with Syria was for them such an easy walk as the authors of this article write.

Not at all easy. One Sultan-Yakub is worth. Porosto then AOI managed to beat the Syrians in all respects. Regarding control. Well, it’s not for me to tell you that it is easier to occupy the territory of a foreign country than to keep it. Gerily.: - ((

[Mairos]

"Well, it's not for me to tell you that it is easier to occupy the territory of a foreign country than to keep it" - 100500 .. An alternative to endless guerrilla warfare, as it was in Afghanistan, can only be a war of destruction. In theory, no problem. And in life - does someone need it? For destruction?

[akv0571]

I studied 2K12 (Cube) at the institute at the military department.
Several teachers fought in Syria. So one of them said that the air defenses with the Syrians were ahead, and they (the Russians) were standing after. So the Syrians didn’t even turn on the high (radar), they knew that the Russians were behind, and they won’t miss the Israeli planes. So the Russians didn’t let in, and shot down.

[Aaron Zawi]

Perhaps it was about the 1973 war of the year? Then the losses of the Air Force AOI were very heavy. 102 cars were lost in the air, and 8 were recognized as not repairable. 64 pilot and navigator died.
By the way, none of this makes secrets.

[sivuch]

Yes, I would also like to add - I added an article from East Kazakhstan oblast, and not a preface to it. In the latter - complete nonsense

[scientist]

Many thanks to the author for the article. It was very pleasant to study at your department.
In fact, the conclusion here is one "how much halva do not say, but it will not be sweeter in your mouth"
I read something similar in the reports, though there was only a statement of facts. The conclusions are clear. The main one is that if an air strike on Syria is repeated now, the losses and consequences will be even worse. It is foolish to deny a crisis in the development of air defense. The suddenness of the strike, plus the clear superiority of the development of reconnaissance, electronic warfare and high-precision weapons, does not give any chances for the radar, air defense systems and fighter aircraft to repel the strike on defended objects. The only option is because of the gardens, which allows at least somehow saving air defense means, naturally at the expense of the security of the defended object.
For about 8 years at the VKO Academy, I wrote many scientific articles and even defended my dissertation on this topic, where I proposed, in principle, to change the approaches to the development of radar, to transfer it to new detection methods. He filed a patent for an invention, but even with the unanimous approval of the dissertation council, which is extremely rare in the Academy of the East Kazakhstan region, the idea seemed fantastic to the industrialists. For now, something similar, but still quite primitive, the idea of ​​creating a hidden jam-resistant radar field is being implemented by Western companies, for example radars: "Silent Sentry" by Lockheed Martin, "Homeland Aler-100" created by Thales under the Dark program, and recently even EADS presented its radar "Cassidian", which they say has no analogues in the world. But our analogous developments, which are still superior in technological solutions to the West for almost 10 years! A little more and will have to copy at best, at worst to count losses and losses.