Whether in Gorbachev's perestroika, or at all in the Khrushchev thaw — I don’t even remember now, after years of prescription, I learned: the brave writer Pilnyak in Story of the Unsettled Moon exposed one of the innumerable many crimes of Stalin’s tyrrrrha ™ Stalin’s murder of a great red killing of the great red crime of Stalin’s murder of the great red Stalin’s murder of the great red Tatar, killing a great red crime Stalin’s Stalin’s murder of the great red moon Stalin’s death surgery - and for this revelation he himself was killed in the framework of illegal mass repressions. I read the story itself at the turn of the millennium: there are no direct accusations (it could not have appeared in Soviet times, when any published, but never proven suspicions were considered slander and punished more severely than today), but the hints are completely transparent and pretty convincing.
To my shame, only recently - years 5 – 7 ago - I thought: where did Boris Andreyevich Vogau come from (Pilnyak is a pseudonym: as Wikipedia suggests, he lived in a village mostly engaged in forestry - in local dialect of woodcutters they were called pilnyk, development pilnyankami) learned about the evil idea? Surely one of the surgeons shared with him the technical subtleties of no less villainous implementation? Or maybe the anesthesiologist, over a glass of tea, told how he selected the composition of the mixture of chloroform with ether (there were no other means of general anesthesia at that time), guaranteed to kill the hero of the civil war?
Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze really died 1925.10.31 after surgery for stomach ulcers. The official version - blood poisoning - is at least doubtful: the rules of surgical antiseptics were developed half a century earlier and strictly followed in almost all hospitals of the world, and even in places where government members were treated, even more so. It seems that the immediately spread rumor is true: the heart of the conqueror of the White Guard Crimea and the predatory Central Asia stopped from the effects of chloroform - the individual intolerance of drugs even now cannot recognize in advance and hope only to improve the methods of resuscitation, and then they had no idea about it at all.
The assumption of deliberate murder arose due to the fact that during the operation it turned out that the ulcer had already healed. Surgical intervention turned out to be unnecessary: the continuation of conservative measures like a diet would be enough. But the then medical technology was not yet so sensitive as to unequivocally distinguish the scar from the active — albeit temporarily silent — ulcers. Therefore, Frunze himself repeatedly wrote to his wife, Sophia Alekseevna Popova (she was in Yalta when he went to the hospital, and he found it impossible to return her from treatment - she died as early as next year) - about her desire to operate and close the question, and not wondering if the time bomb will work in the stomach.
It turns out that death is explained only by an inevitable accident in medicine, but the writer simply, as they say now, pinned something wrong?
Hardly. The story appeared in the ninth year of Soviet power, when everyone in the country already understood: one must either filter the market or be responsible for it. Vogau by that time had time to participate in many political disputes, abundant in the then writing world. He was repeatedly beaten with weighty arguments, and he himself answered in the same way. If we ventured to get into the games at the highest level (and Frunze 1924.06.02 became a candidate member of the political bureau of the Central Committee, that is, one of about a dozen most important people in the country: the accused Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili was a member of the same political bureau with 1919.03.25, that is, since its inception, and for the first time got into the politburo, temporarily created to lead an armed uprising, 1917.10.23), then just hoping for complete personal security. That is, speaking again in modern language, he had a reliable roof.
So, let us try to believe: if not the death of Frunze itself, then at least Vogau's story is part of some serious intention. And we will try to decipher it, relying on the precepts of the masters of the detective and conspiracy.
Among the key questions of these genres is the motive of the act. They also taught in Rome: id fecit cui prodest - he did it to whom it is profitable. Unreasonable maniacry happens incomparably less often of a mercenary plot.
True, from a difficult hand and a crooked language of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, non-habitual handshakes are supposed to be considered: Stalin’s tyrrrrran ™ Stalin was just a maniac, exterminating people just to taste and discretion, without any particular reason, not to mention the reason. But the successor himself called from his point of view a motive for the actions of the predecessor quite well-founded: that he was so afraid for his power that he destroyed anyone who could replace him even in the distant future.
In this sense, Frunze could hardly pose even the slightest threat to Dzhugashvili. Of course, he was a prominent party and military leader. He led, in particular, the crushing of Kolchak, Wrangel, the Emir of Bukhara, and after the Civil War - a deep reform of the armed forces. But Dzhugashvili himself also had enough military merit. Tsaritsyn’s defense, a key transportation hub for the supply of grain to the center of Russia from the North Caucasus, he managed almost a year, and very successfully: the city fell only a few months after being the only stories People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs (1917.11.08 – 1923.07.07) and the Second People's Commissar of State Control (1919.03.30 – 1920.02.07 - then he became the first People’s Commissar for Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection) and so forth, and so on and so forth ... transferred to another — at that moment no less important is the front of civil war. In the Polish 1920 campaign, he served as commissar of the Southwestern Front (under the front commander Alexander Ilyich Yegorov - colonel of the Russian imperial army, and later one of the first five marshals of the Soviet Union) and did not support the plan of the commander of the Western front, Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (in the imperial the second lieutenant’s time, also one of the first marshal’s fives, does not take into account the problems of troop supply (almost the entire World War I Tukhachevsky was in German captivity, so he did not nodded) and by virtue of this naturally ended in failure. On the part of the party, however, the merits of Dzhugashvili were incontestably higher than the merits of Frunze.
True, in the party of that time they were arguing, not paying special attention to the ranks, titles and experience. But not a single document, not a single memoir has preserved any traces of disputes between Dzhugashvili and Frunze. On the contrary: in the few cases where they participated in the same political discussion, both were on the same side. Of course, the bloody gebnya could eat all the evidence of contradictions. But even Khrushchev himself was not honored to write at least one plausible disagreement in his memoirs. Meanwhile, with many other members and candidate members of the politburo, Dzhugashvili often argued for a long time. Well, if you organize a medical murder, then some of them. Opportunities enough: they had the disease worse stomach ulcers.
So, Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili is hardly the organizer of the intrigues around Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze: he has no reason for this, or at least a reason. But in eliminating the second people's commissar for military and maritime affairs (with 1925.01.25) and the second chairman of the revolutionary military council (with 1925.01.26), the first owner of these posts, Leib Davidovich Bronstein, was hardly interested.
Strictly speaking, the chronology of his military career is multistage. RVS he headed with 1918.09.06. NKVMD - with 1923.07.06. Before that - 1918.03.14 - became the second - after Nikolai Ilyich Podvoisky - people's commissary for military affairs. The naval forces of the country before him had time to guide (on Wikipedia, with the conversion of Julian dates to Gregorian): Pavel Efimovich Dybenko 1917.11.08 – 1918.03.15; Modest Vasilyevich Ivanov 1917.11.21 – 1918.02.08; Vasily Mikhailovich Altfater 1918.04.10 – 1919.01.22; Evgeny Andreevich Berens 1919.04.24 – 1920.02.05; Alexander Vasilyevich Nemitts 1920.02.05 – 1921.11.22; Eduard Samuilovich Pantserzhansky 1921.11.22 – 1924.12.09.
But these details then hardly interested anyone. It was Bronstein, not Podvoisky, who organized the transformation of the scattered Red Guard units into the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. It was Bronstein who achieved army discipline by all means - from ardent speeches to the execution of every tenth, borrowed from the ancient Roman experience, in the ranks of a guilty military unit. It was Bronstein who attracted more than half of the officers and generals of the imperial period to the new armed forces and ensured the loyalty of most of them to the hostage-giving of relatives and friends.
By the way, Bronstein sharply scolded Dzhugashvili during the defense of Tsaritsyn just for the fact that a large conspiracy of military experts was uncovered in the city: they complained to Moscow that a considerable part of those arrested were not involved in intrigues. This was finally confirmed by the investigation carried out on the orders of Dzhugashvili as thoroughly as possible at the height of the war. But even before the majority of those arrested had returned to freedom, the conflict had time to spill out not only at the meeting table of the political bureau, but also at the rostrum of the party congress. From the end of 1980, anti-Soviet propagandists diligently advertise everything that Bronstein said about Dzhugashvili, and even fantasize about Tsaritsyn to the best of their own ignorance of military affairs and national history.
Nowadays, few people remember that Pavel G. Gorinstein in the chorus of the song “The White Army, the Black Baron” to the music of Samuel Yakovlevich Pokrass did not originally write
So let the Red
your callous bayonet
and we all should
go to the last mortal combat!
So let the Red
your bayonet with a callused hand!
With squad naval
lead us to the final battle.
This fame was well deserved. Of course, an extensive historical experience is convincing: if Leib Davidovich was in the right place at the right time, the revolution would most likely have other military leaders, not worse (and perhaps even better - not to check now). But this one did fine.
Alas, no past merits redeem future sins. The creator of the victorious army was removed from its leadership three years after the end of the Civil War, not at all because the other members of the Politbureau envied his glory. It was just that in peacetime, difficulties came to the fore that had no special significance in the face of a common formidable enemy.
Long before the revolution, Leib Davidovich became famous for throwing around the whole wide range of variations on the theme of social democracy. His constant opponent Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, who was reputed to be a swagger among revolutionaries (as Mendel Crick of Babel was known as a bastard among the bindyuzhnik), called him a political prostitute precisely for the scope of these throwings.
What is funny is that no matter where Bronstein throws, he was able to substantiate another turn in brilliantly revolutionary texts, proving that just the chosen direction allows achieving the victory of the proletarian cause in the shortest possible time. Therefore, those who wanted everything were always accumulated around him at once and at any cost (as I have already said more than once, any price is always paid from someone else’s pocket). Even after its elimination of 1940.08.21, his ideas still attract people of just such a warehouse. In particular, the new conservatives, who determined the policies of the United States of America under both Bush’s presidents and who were capable of acting exclusively in sorts, were convinced Trotskyists in their youth.
I note that it was necessary to kill Leib Davidovich because with the start of the Second World War he became a natural candidate for the post of head of government in exile — an indispensable tool of political pressure (during the war for distancing the Finnish border from Leningrad, the formation of a government in Terioki Of the Finnish Democratic Republic under the leadership of Otto Wilhelmovich Kuusinen). He was first warned. 1940.05.24, a group of veterans of the Spanish Civil War (where the Trotskyists tried several times to seize power in the course of hostilities, which infuriated the rest of the Republicans pretty badly), led by then-renowned artist José de Jesus (he signed “David”), Alfaro Siqueiros Aliparo Siqueiros broke the job Bronstein House in Coyoacan - a suburb of Mexico City. Experienced fighters rushed into the bedroom, riddled the machine guns with walls and cabinets, but didn’t shoot a single bullet under the bed where Bronstein and his wife Natalia Ivanovna Sedova and one of their grandchildren hid. He did not seem to heed the warning: intrigues with his participation continued until his death.
If Leib Davidovich was so popular and influential through 11 years after his expulsion from the USSR, one can imagine what his weight was right after the Civil War, and especially in the armed forces. Each word of the highest military leader of the country was perceived as a direct guide to action. And the words from it were about the same as in the midst of the war itself.
At the dawn of Soviet power, all the predictions of Karl Heinrikhovich Marx and Friedrich Friedrichovich Engels were taken very seriously. In particular, they sincerely believed: in a globalized (even then, this concept was fashionable) world, conditions for revolution ripen everywhere at the same time. The revolutionary outbreak in backward Russia was perceived as the first spark of a global fire. The warriors went into battle under the slogans of the unity of the proletariat and the inevitability of universal happiness. But the war ended, and the world revolution never happened. I had to decide what to do next.
According to Marxist theory, the socialist revolution cannot win only in one country: the world of capital will unite against it and sooner or later crush it. This prediction seems to have come true in the era of perestroika. But then there was a very unfavorable confluence of many external and internal circumstances for us. His detailed analysis has been going on for many years, and it seems that even then it was possible to save both the country and socialism. The theory points to a serious threat, but not an imminent collapse.
At the same time, the danger of a worldwide attack was regarded as highly relevant. Not to mention anything else, several Soviet republics in Germany were crushed by the central government (then Defense Minister Social Democrat Gustav Karlovich Noske went down in history with the words "Perhaps someone should be a bloody dog! I’m not afraid of responsibility") and the Hungarian Soviet Republic was crushed by the joint intervention of its neighbors, Romania and Czechoslovakia, by decision of the Entente Council.
Bronstein suggested the simplest way out. The Soviet republics in neighboring countries were crushed because we could not support them on time. So, we must rather break through there - and the people will once again rebel against the oppressors. The revolution, supported by the troops, will be truly global. And so that the Entente could not intervene - it is necessary to hit its weak places. India is not far away, relations with Afghanistan are not bad (the British invaded there more than once, so the local tribes will help anyone against Britain) - we must begin with a campaign there.
Colleagues looked at the case more realistically. The combat power of the USSR was shown by the failure of the Polish campaign (despite the fact that the previous victory of the Poles over the Russians happened in the 17th century), the unpunished capture of Bessarabia by Romania and the regular invasions of Finns into Karelia. Our weakness, by the way, persisted for a long time: until the end of the 1920s, Poland was considered a serious threat to the USSR, and until the middle of the 1930s all interested parties were considered to be a dangerous alliance between Poland and Romania for us. This means that military exploits should be postponed for the distant future, but for now look for other options. Even the chairman of the executive committee of the Communist International Ovsey Gershon Aronovich Radomyslsky - Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev - did not consider it possible to export the revolution on bayonets: he preferred to cultivate the communist parties, and if necessary, support the uprisings prepared by them, but not intervene openly, in order not to bring to obvious conflicts.
The world, exhausted by the First World War, was not eager to start new battles - therefore, during the Civil War, foreign contingents on our territory turned out to be very small and left at the very first signs of disobedience. But Bronstein's appeals for expansion could change public opinion: even those who strongly oppose an attack on others are ready to defend themselves from an external threat. He became dangerous for the country.
Meanwhile, in the command of the armed forces the words of the head of these forces found a very sympathetic response. Winners generally tend to overestimate their capabilities. In this case, the commanders were also convinced of the magic power of progressive ideas. As the French, inspired by the promise of freedom, equality and fraternity, smashed the whole of Europe at the turn of the 18th –19th centuries, so were the Red Army men, inspired by the upcoming work for themselves, without exploiters, easily crushed by the non-opposition members opposing them device of the country only through the constituent assembly and did not recognize anyone the right to predetermine its result). The commanders viewed the misfire in Poland as an annoying coincidence caused by the inexperience of the leader of the Western Front. And they were sure: now there is enough experience. And they often underestimated the role of economic resources. Even those who went through 1915's year-long famine believed that now, after the development of the military industry in 1916, everything needed to be found for victory.
In 1937 – 8, high-ranking military officers under investigation were most often accused of Trotskyism. Formally, it was right: almost all of them made a key part of his career under the command of Bronstein, he picked them up and threw them, executed and pardoned them.
Execution, by the way, is often literally. Thus, the creator and commander of the Second Cavalry Army, Philip Kuzmich Mironov, was killed by the sentry in the courtyard of Butyrka prison, where he was obviously accused of a false accusation, and many historians believe that it was Bronstein who ordered the extrajudicial execution.
But the words about the Trotskyism of the military are true and to the point. The desire to get everything at once and at any cost is natural in combat conditions. Therefore, the USSR military command inevitably caused Trotsky-style solutions — even when Leib Davidovich Bronstein himself did not support these decisions at all. At the same time, the specific situation does not always contribute to such a desire, and often the attempt to implement it turns out to be disastrous. Therefore, Trotskyism is dangerous for the country as a whole and its armed forces in particular.
Understandably, Brontein’s resignation caused discontent among top military leaders not only because Frunze took his place, which seemed to them not to be supreme, but only equal: with all his well-known successes during the Civil War, some other commanders made no less. It was also important that the style of activity of Frunze, already known for his tenure as Deputy Bronstein (with 1924.03.14) and part-time Chief of Staff of the Red Army and the Military Academy (since April 1924), was much less consistent with the wishes of his subordinates. Yes, and the military reform of Frunze, which included a tenfold reduction of the army (from five million, unbearable in peacetime, to half a million) and the transfer of a significant part of it to the militia format (with a three-month draft and subsequent monthly retraining every few years), infringed the interests of most of the command composition.
I can not unequivocally say that at least one of the heroes of the Civil War wanted the new people's Commissar to die. And it’s even more difficult to imagine that someone from the military - with all their weight in the society at that time - achieved treason from the doctors in the Hippocratic oath in order to bring this death closer. But when it happened, it was natural to intend to use it in the interests of the army - as many heroes understood these interests.
Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze was replaced by 1925.11.06 Clement Yefremovich Voroshilov - later also one of the first five marshals, but at the time of the appointment, according to many of his subordinates, he was not a commander at all, but a commissar. True, Alexander Nikolaevich Linovsky (Pomorsky) in the "Far Eastern Song" to the music of Boris Andreevich Shikhov wrote:
We do not forget the steel and formidable power,
when the earth breathed destruction,
when Lugansk mechanic Voroshilov
drove the shelves over sloping fields.
And this is largely true. In March, 1918-th Voroshilov created volunteers from among the workers and led the First Lugansk Socialist Detachment, which defended Kharkov from the Germans. Then he commanded the Tsaritsyn Group of Forces (where he first collaborated with Dzhugashvili). I also visited other command posts. But still, the most famous part of his activities in the Civil War is associated with the First Cavalry Army: Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny commanded it, and Voroshilov was a member of its Revolutionary Military Council.
In Russia - in contrast to many other great powers - the highest military leader was almost always a professional soldier. Even those who had been a student before the revolution, like Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir, or a turner, like Juozas Mikhailovich Vareikis, were considered to be subordinate to a political appointee. Naturally, one of the honored commanders could decide: if you compromise those who chose Voroshilov from all possible candidates, there will be hope for the return of the beloved by the military Bronstein.
To this day, the Russian intellectuals, finding at the first meeting between themselves mutual friends, usually joke: “not the world is small, but the stratum is narrow”. At the time of the events described, this stratum was still incomparably thinner. Boris Andreyevich Vogau undoubtedly repeatedly found himself in the same company with many warlords. So now it’s already impossible to guess which of them could prompt the popular writer with the idea of the “Tale of the Moon that has not been extinguished.” But he himself could well not only be carried away by the desire to describe a plan comparable to medieval intrigues, but also believe a hint: if politicians are offended, the military will cover up. Yes, and really covered up: although the book was withdrawn from sale in a couple of days, the writer got off stormy arguments.
I do not exclude at all that the author found the experienced experience of interaction with the military to be pleasant, useful and worth repeating. Or maybe he was again used in 1930 in the dark again - without explaining to him the goals of another intrigue to which he was involved. But judging by the appearance of the story, the arrest of 1937.10.28 could have some grounds under it. And the fact that 1938.04.21, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, sentenced him to death (and enforced the verdict then enforced the sentence on the same day) on charges not of conspiracy, but of spying for Japan, where he managed to go (and even wrote a book about the country “The Roots of the Japanese Sun”), can be explained by the reluctance of the authorities to show the full scope of contradictions between groups that hold different views on the expedient path of the country's movement: it’s much easier to talk about the evil plans of external enemies than to explain the reasons turning conscientious like-minded people into internal enemies.
All of the above, of course, just assumptions. But in my opinion, they are much more plausible than assumptions about the omnipotent intrigue, impassively sending to death a person who is not dangerous to him and innocent of anything, simply from the desire to destroy everyone who is no worse than himself.