Ways to build the East Kazakhstan region
Once again about the possibilities of solving the problem of unified leadership by repelling aerospace aggression against our country
Another article by Yuri Krinitsky “Parry a quick global strike” continued a heated discussion about the further ways to implement the Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation. The main problem is that with the creation of the EKR Troops, unified leadership and joint responsibility for organizing and conducting armed struggle with all the forces and means of an aerospace attack (SVKN) of the enemy over the entire territory of Russia and its allies were not restored.
The discussion arose because of different ways to solve the problem. It turned out quite extensive. At the same time, with the many particulars and lengthy phrases with which the authors operate, it is not immediately possible to understand the essence and differences of the proposed ways of solving the named problem. If we discard all particulars, two fundamentally different paths emerge very clearly.
The essence of the first path (A. A. Travkin, A. V. Belomyttsev, M. G. Valeev, Yu. V. Krinitsky and others) comes down to centralizing the control of the actions of East Kazakhstan forces to defend the country's facilities and isolating them from the actions of all other troops (forces), including from the actions of troops (forces) of the Air Defense Forces and fleet. To do this, it is proposed:
to transform the EKR Troops from the type of troops into the form of the Armed Forces by transferring the EKB brigades (air defense divisions) from the air force and air defense units to it;
according to the new structure of the Armed Forces armies, the methods and forms of their application for the defense of the country's facilities should be separated from other actions of the Armed Forces both at the strategic and operational levels, that is, switch to defensive forms of hostilities: a strategic operation to repel enemy aerospace attack forces and anti-aircraft operation on the direction;
actions of the EKR Troops to conduct in a separate aerospace theater of operations in their specific aerospace and air directions;
groups of military districts and fleet forces to defend against air strikes of the enemy with their air defense forces (forces);
defeat the enemy’s aerospace attack weapons on land and sea to carry out, in their shock forms, military operations under the guidance of the commanders of military districts in their continental theaters;
abandon the territorial principle of constructing the AUC system.
The essence of the second path corresponds to the VKO Concept "... the basis of aerospace defense is a complex of state and military measures, as well as combat actions of multiple (heterogeneous) groups of troops (forces) conducted in a common system of armed struggle under a single leadership, according to a single plan and plan ... »And consists in centralizing control over the actions of all troops, forces and facilities of the aerospace defense and strike forces and means of types and combat arms of the Armed Forces, other troops in the fight against the aerospace enemy. For this purpose it is proposed:
to create a new type of Armed Forces based on the merger of the Air Force and the East Kazakhstani Army - the Aerospace Forces (VKS);
create a strategic aerospace command (SVKK), which will have the duties and the necessary rights to manage the use of troops (forces), leading the fight against the aerospace enemy, regardless of their belonging to the type or genus of the Armed Forces;
to preserve the existing methods and forms of struggle with the aerospace enemy with the participation of the defense forces (forces) of the East Kazakhstan region and the shock troops (forces) aviationOf the Missile Forces and Artillery and Fleet Forces: at the strategic level - the combined-arms strategic aerospace operation, at the operational level - the joint strategic air operation (theater of operations);
the actions of all troops (forces) in the fight against the aerospace enemy to carry on in the general axes (TMD);
implement the territorial principle of building the aerospace defense system in full.
In the above-mentioned article by Yuri Krinitsky, another attempt is made to discredit the second way of solving the problem of unified leadership in organizing and conducting combat against the forces and means of an aerospace attack of the enemy. In this regard, there is a need to analyze in more detail the positive and negative consequences of each path and each proposed activity.
The main consequences of the first solution to the problem
The main positive effect of creating the Armed Forces - Armed Forces armies, their transition to separate defensive forms of action and the rejection of the territorial principle of constructing the EKO system will simplify the planning of strategic and operational forms of military actions and command and control of troops in the EKR Troops. However, these measures will greatly complicate the general coordination of actions at the level of the Armed Forces as a whole, since it will be necessary to further coordinate the actions of the EKR Troops with the actions of the groups of troops (forces) of military districts and fleets. The proposed measures to isolate the use of the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region from other actions of the Armed Forces will not allow concentrating the efforts of all the Armed Forces troops and forces on the defense of the objects and groups of troops (forces) that have the highest priority in each period of military operations. Including it will be impossible to concentrate the efforts of the troops and forces of the air defense and missile defense of various types of armed forces on the defense of strategic nuclear forces from the disarming global strike of the enemy's SVKN.
Practically, the variant of transforming the EKR Troops from the type of troops into a type of air force by removing the EKR brigades (air defense divisions) from the Air Force and Air Defense commands and forming four of them (the three armies and corps) of the Air Force will return to the structure of the Russian Armed Forces 1998 year, that is, the Armed Forces armies will become former Air Defense Forces only in a modern composition with the inclusion of two launch connections and spacecraft control. Previously, the number of Air Defense Forces made them self-sufficient to solve the tasks of the defense of the country's facilities, including for the defense of SNF facilities. At present, in the proposed Armed Forces armies, "the 34 of the anti-aircraft missile regiment remains, of which a third is concentrated near Moscow" (Boris Cheltsov. "What will be the new look of the aerospace defense"). Previously, in some individual air defense armies of anti-aircraft missile units there were more than expected in the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region. It is quite obvious, even without modeling, that these forces cannot independently solve the tasks of defending the country's facilities, including the defense of the SNF facilities from the disarming global strike of the enemy's SVKN. At the same time, the number of troops (forces) of the air defense of military districts and fleets within the borders of some military districts is greater than in the East Kazakhstani brigades (air defense divisions). However, it will be impossible to attract some of them, at least for the defense of SNF facilities, since, according to the proposals, they must protect their groups of military districts and fleets from attacks by an air enemy.
If the territorial principle is abandoned and the forms of application of a new type of aircraft, the EKR Troops, are abandoned by the actions of the air defense troops (forces) of military districts and the fleet, the possibility of centralized control of air defense units (air defense-missile defense) of different types of air forces during their combat operations in common areas is excluded. In such conditions, the overall effectiveness of the action falls, the costs of combat and materiel increase. This is due to the general principles of target distribution, embedded in the automation systems of anti-aircraft missile formations of different types of aircraft. At the same time, different targets will be assigned the same targets for shelling, which will increase the total missile consumption by one and a half to two times. With a high impact density, part of the air attack means will remain unstressed and will be able to break through to the defended objects. In the absence of centralized control as a result of inconsistency of actions and low efficiency of the identification system in a complex air and jamming environment, part of their aircraft can be fired at with their anti-aircraft weapons.
When separating the actions of formations of the East Kazakhstani Armed Forces from the actions of strike aviation, missile forces and artillery, the fleet forces, it is extremely difficult to coordinate them for timely disorganization of control of the enemy’s aerospace attack forces and means and reduce their ability to deliver subsequent strikes.
When transferring air defense brigades (air defense divisions) and, accordingly, parts of radio engineering troops to the air defense troops, the air defense troops of the military districts and the formation of the air force will virtually remain without intelligence. This will make it difficult to organize a general reconnaissance of an air enemy within the boundaries of military districts, as well as providing radar information to formations, units and subunits of aviation, air defense troops (forces) of the Ground Forces and Navy.
The main consequences of the second way to solve the problem
In the second way of solving the problem, the advantages of the first way become disadvantages and, on the contrary, the disadvantages become advantages. The main negative consequence of the creation of a new type of aircraft, the Aerospace Forces and the strategic aerospace command, as well as the preservation of forms of fighting the enemy's squashes combining defensive and strike actions, complicates the planning of strategic and operational forms of fighting the enemy's squared forces and command and control in their course. In general, the management of a new type of aircraft will be quite complicated, but this problem is solved by the necessary composition of the main command of the aircraft type. If the principle of separation at the strategic level of administrative and operational management is maintained in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the chief command of the aerospace forces will perform only administrative functions for managing the air force type, and the SACS - the operational functions for planning the actions of all troops (forces) to combat enemy SVKN and for command and control ( forces) in the implementation of plans. This separation of functions will simplify the overall control of troops (forces).
Reducing the number of combat arms when combining the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region with the Air Force, as well as the formed strategic aerospace command, which will take over the functions of coordinating the actions of troops (forces) in the strategic aerospace operation and partly in other strategic actions, will simplify the overall coordination of actions at the level Sun in general.
The implementation of the territorial principle of constructing the aerospace defense system in full with the creation of infrastructure zones and districts of the aerospace defense will provide an opportunity to concentrate the efforts of all the armed forces and aerospace defense forces on the defense of objects and groups of troops (forces) that have the highest priority in each period of hostilities, including on the defense of strategic nuclear forces. Taking into account the fact that the groupings of the Ground Forces are not the targets of a primary strike, part of the formations of the military air defense can be maintained to enhance the defense of the strategic nuclear forces from the sudden disarming global strike of the enemy's SVKN. With other expected options for the development of the military-political situation, the formation of military air defense, having sufficiently high maneuverability, can quickly move to the defense of groups of troops. The feasibility of such measures is confirmed by the ongoing research in the course of command and staff exercises and games. For example, modeling carried out in the VA VKO showed that the attacking side (USA and NATO) already has the capabilities of the first massive air and missile attack in any direction to disable more than 80 – 90 percent of the airfields of the defending side and gain air superiority. Virtual maneuvers by anti-aircraft units, units and units of the Ground Forces to cover the nearest airfields reduced their losses by more than 50 – 60 percent. Studies have also shown that the centralized control of air defense units (air defense-missile defense) of various types of aircraft when they conduct combat operations in general areas increases the overall effectiveness of operations 1,4 – 1,6 times and increases the safety of all types of aviation.
Preserving the methods and forms of struggle with an aerospace enemy with the participation of the defense forces (forces) of the East Kazakhstan region and the attack forces (forces) of the aviation, missile forces and artillery and fleet forces ensures their coordination to disorganize the control of the enemy's SVKN and reduce their ability to deliver subsequent attacks.
The preservation of air defense brigades (air defense divisions) and, accordingly, parts of the radio engineering troops as part of the Air Force and Air Defense commands with the territorial principle of the Aircraft Control System will facilitate the organization of general reconnaissance of the enemy’s air within military districts, as well as providing radar information to aviation units and troops ) Air defense of the Ground Forces and Navy.
Analyzing ways to solve the problem, Yuri Krinitsky noted: “It’s sad that today we are preparing to fend off a lightning-knock-out knockout strike with five widespread troops, most of which are subordinate to different controls, has different tasks and a completely inadequate reaction time to the threat.” It is very sad, but it is Yuri Krinitsky who does not want to unite them under the general guidance, as is achieved when creating a videoconferencing system and an ICSS.
Anyone can independently choose the way to solve the problem of unified management of the organization and conduct of the fight against the enemy's SVKN based on a comparison of their strengths and weaknesses.
Yury Krinitsky’s publication “Defeating a Rapid Global Impact” continued the discussion on further ways to implement the Aerospace Defense Concept of Russia. The main problem is that with the creation of the EKR Troops, unified leadership and joint responsibility for organizing and conducting armed struggle with all the forces and means of an aerospace attack (SVKN) of the enemy over the entire territory of the Russian Federation and its allies were not restored. In the last issue in the first part of this article, it was told about how to solve this problem. Today we will try to answer the question: Does the EKR Troops need their own aerospace theater of military operations (VCD) in the presence of traditional continental, ocean and naval theater?
The answer to this question is given by the theory and practice of the use of this military-scientific category by military command bodies. Yuri Krinitsky asserts: "The usual land-sea TVDs with troops deployed on them ... become archaic." And in connection with this, he proposes to introduce and apply when planning actions of the Troops of the East Kazakhstan region of the VKD theater with their strategic aerospace and air directions, which should be cut independently of the combined strategic and operational directions. In his article, he argues that the space and time of the struggle in the air and space basically ceased to coincide with the space and time of the struggle on land and sea and that the past combination of air directions with strategic, as he calls, "land" directions led to a mismatch of the space of the planned reflection with a space of predictable aggression.
To confirm or refute the presented provisions let us turn to the theory. According to the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (WEC) 2007 of the Year (p. 903) TVD is a vast territory of a part of the continent with seas washing it or the ocean (sea) area with islands and the adjacent coast of continents, as well as the aerospace above them, within which they are deployed strategic groupings of the Armed Forces and military operations can be conducted on a strategic scale. The boundaries and composition of the theater are determined by the military-political leadership of the states. For example, the military-political leadership of the United States and NATO divided the territory of Western Europe into three land theaters: North-West European, Central European and South European NATO theaters. In peacetime, each of the theaters has created NATO command groups with a single command, their possible use has been planned, management systems, bases and supplies have been created.
Each theater has its own specific conditions for the conduct of hostilities (military-political, military-economic, military, physical-geographical, ethnographic), as well as operational equipment of the territory, affecting the preparation and conduct of operations of a strategic scale and war in general. Therefore, a comprehensive study of all these elements of the theater, including the command and control facilities of the armed forces, the deployment of air defense systems and air defense forces, areas for the deployment and deployment of ground forces and fleet groups, and their assessment is one of the tasks of the military authorities to prepare the armed forces to repel aggression.
In the Russian Federation, the boundaries and composition of the theater are officially determined during the period of danger This is quite logical, since if there is no war, then there is no its theater. Therefore, to ensure the study and analysis by military authorities of the above elements of the situation in peacetime, the elements of division of the geostrategic space define strategic directions - a part of the territory of the region with adjacent waters and airspace, within whose boundaries are important economic, military and administrative centers of strategic importance during a war, operational and strategic groups of the Armed Forces (WEC, p. 886) can be located and wage military actions. Strategic directions are divided into operational areas. In a threatened period, when the enemy was clearly defined and the expected space of hostilities, the boundaries and composition of the theater of operations was established. Strategic directions become its elements.
In turn, the aerospace direction is a strip of aerospace in which the strike assets of aviation and missile forces are derived by the shortest path from the bases (deployment) to the most important military facilities and industrial centers (WEC, p. 202). In reality, airplanes and cruise missiles will not necessarily fly the shortest path. Aerospace directions are divided into air directions. According to Krinitsky, a combination of aerospace directions and a strategic space zone form an aerospace theater of military operations. At the same time, he states: “In the aerospace sphere, part of the facilities were created in advance. These are airfields, rocket positions, command posts of the Air Force, orbital grouping ".
Now turn to practice. In the preparation of operations and combat operations, officers of military units of command structures (combined arms, land, air force, air defense, fleet), based on the potential or real enemy and the possible weapons, regardless of the official division of the geostrategic space, they determine the common possible area (space) of the operation (combat actions). Along with other elements of the assessment of the situation, the physical-geographical conditions of the area of operation (combat) are assessed. Elements of operational equipment of the region’s territory are being mapped (control and communication points, positional areas of rocket forces, airfields, air defense and anti-missile defense facilities, naval bases), areas of deployment, advancement and deployment of ground forces and fleet groups, and other troops. On the basis of real basing and real or predictable deployment areas, as well as of tasks, including the location of the objects to be defended, and the capabilities of the weapons, determine the expected directions (space) of the actions of the enemy and ground and enemy groupings. Between themselves, these directions may or may not coincide. The directions (space) of the actions of their own and interacting groups of troops (forces) are determined in the same way. And only after that, to design ideas and decisions, write directives, combat orders and orders, as well as to organize interaction, they become attached to officially defined directions for all, regardless of their “cutting”. The main thing is that they should be understood by all authorities and officials.
Imagine that the proposal of Yuri Krinitsky accepted. The commanders of military districts, fleets, and air force associations planned actions along generally accepted common arms directions. In turn, in the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region, they cut their directions, naturally, not coinciding with the general arms, and planned the use of their troops on them. Really agreeing on these actions will be extremely difficult, since staff officers simply will not understand each other. It was for the possibility of coordinating the actions of groups of troops (forces) of air defense of all types and types of troops, all types of aviation, ground forces, naval forces and other troops (forces) were combined air directions with general arms strategic directions. In this case, it is enough just to name a directive in a directive, a combat order or instructions on interaction, so that subordinate or interacting authorities correctly identify it.
Thus, based on the actual planning of operations (combat operations), Krinitsky’s assertion that “now the action space of air attack forces and troops (forces) of land and sea groupings do not fundamentally coincide,” has no basis for practice. In addition, his example of delivering air strikes by multinational forces in 1991 on Iraq from directions that do not coincide with the direction of ground forces is not typical for Russia because of its global territory. For example, the enemy will not deliver air strikes from Western Europe when deploying the struggle for the islands of the Small Kuril Ridge, aircraft will not reach the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. Partial exclusion is only the northern direction. However, even here we can expect actions not only of strategic aviation with cruise missiles, but also of amphibious groups to seize or disable individual military or energy facilities.
Taking into account the results of the analysis of the theory and practice of using the category of theater, the answer to the question of whether the Airborne Troops need their own aerospace theater of military operations, everyone can independently.
Counterarguments for a number of private statements Krinitsky
In addition to the main issues, in the article under discussion, private issues are raised and a number of theses are given, which, it should be noted, are written very talentedly, but with which one cannot agree.
Thesis first. Yuri Krinitsky argues that “as long as there is no theater of operations, there can be no planning for joint operations in the theater of operations” and that “... no aggressive period will precede the enemy’s aggressive actions from aerospace. There will be no time for planning an operation to repel an attack on the eve or on a fait accompli. Therefore, an operation to repel aggression must be planned well in advance. ” It is not clear who the author opposes. Official guidance documents prescribe planning the use of the Armed Forces as a whole, as well as associations, formations and units to carry out in advance in peacetime and clarify plans during a period of threat or with the onset of sudden hostilities. In reality, such planning is carried out in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and is strictly controlled. Since strategic directions are defined in peacetime, air operations in the strategic direction (theater of operations) can be planned and planned well in advance in peacetime. Therefore, the name of this operation is twofold: for peacetime, an operation on a strategic direction, after a “cutting” of a theater of operations — an operation on a theater of operations.
Thesis of the second. Yuri Krinitsky writes that during the past decade and a half, during the exercises and in the preparation of real actions, the time of the beginning of the war “completely unjustifiably chooses the moment when the opposing operational-strategic groups of troops are already deployed, the theaters of military actions are marked, the front line is drawn on the workers' maps of commanders, troops conditionally buried in the trenches. Further or simultaneously with this process, the planning stage of the operation begins. ” The given thesis does not correspond to the existing realities, except for the situation being created in a number of command-and-staff exercises when working on specific issues. First, as indicated in the counterarguments on the first thesis, plans for the use of the Armed Forces as a whole and all military formations must be developed in advance. If there are no plans, then the troops cannot be deployed (it is not known where to deploy and for what tasks to solve). Secondly, official documents define various options for the commencement of hostilities: operations can begin in the face of a surprise attack by the enemy, with incomplete deployment of troops (forces) or with their full deployment and the creation of the planned grouping. Under the conditions of a sudden attack by the enemy, the attack of the enemy’s SVKN should be carried out by the air and missile defense attendants. Their actions are escalated by the air defense forces of the East Kazakhstani Air Force, Air Force, Land Forces and Fleet forces (in the field of deployment or on the routes of advance). Combat forces of aviation, missile forces and artillery, fleet must deliver a retaliatory strike on top-priority targets. At the same time, the main groups of troops and fleet forces must be dispersed, followed by exit and deployment in the areas of destination. These postulates are known to all military still from schools.
The third thesis Yuri Krinitsky is revealed in several places of the article: “The troops and forces of the aerospace defense (air defense, missile defense) from the structure that performed the most important independent task of the decisive initial period of the war turned into a secondary structure that provided subsequent, very unhurried actions of combined arms groups of troops not deployed within the boundaries of non-existent continental theaters ... There is a reality in the form of a lightning (disarming) global strike. His scenario is designed for six hours ... The grouping of the SNF needs to be protected by the aerospace defense forces not for a month or a day, but for these most important hours. ” It is not clear, on the basis of what initial data Krinitsky drew such conclusions.
First, the creation of the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region itself shows that the leadership of the state and the armed forces realized the importance of the role of the troops (forces) of the East Kazakhstan region in the armed struggle. To repel a possible sudden aerospace or air attack, air defense combat duty is organized, RKO formations continuously maintain combat duty and perform the tasks prescribed for them, the rest of the formations and air defense units of all types of the Armed Forces and the EKO Armies in peacetime are kept combat-ready with a minimum time to bring into combat readiness.
Secondly, the troops and forces of the aerospace defense (air defense, missile defense) never set themselves separate tasks, despite their importance, because only the defeat of the enemy's SVKN in flight due to the insufficient effectiveness of the air defense systems and the missile defense system cannot protect all the necessary objects. Even in the 80s of the last century, with the largest number of air defense forces and assets, the effectiveness of air defense in different regions, according to estimates, did not exceed 8 – 20 percent.
Thirdly, it is certainly necessary to protect the grouping of SNF from a sudden disarming strike. To solve this problem, Yuri Krinitsky, referring to Vladimir Slipchenko, proposes "to destroy up to 70 percent with anti-aircraft defense systems and up to 90 percent of enemy’s high-precision air and missile targets with anti-missile defense systems." What forces? Any specialist knows that to achieve such effectiveness of the aerospace defense system is impossible not only practically, but also theoretically (there will not be enough money, industrial capacity and people to produce and maintain the required quantity of weapons of the aerospace defense). The remaining forces, which may be in the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region after all the reductions, are fundamentally impossible to solve the problem of protecting the strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, it is proposed to concentrate efforts in the fight against the aerospace enemy not only of the EKR Troops, but also of the air defense forces of the Ground Forces and the air defense forces of the fleet and all the combat-ready attack forces of aviation, rocket forces and artillery and fleet.
Fourthly, the statement of Yuri Krinitsky that the actions of combined arms groups of troops in comparison with the actions of air defense forces and assets are unhurried, contrived. Combined actions are therefore called combined arms, because they include the actions of all or most of the types and types of troops of the Armed Forces, that is, actions of aviation, ground forces, fleet, other troops, as well as air defense forces and assets. Forces and means of formations belonging to the general arms group are alerted at different times and operate at different speeds, not only in Krinitsky, who believes that Iskander or Granit missiles, airplanes fly at slower speeds than anti-aircraft missiles. guided missiles and fighter aircraft.
Fourth thesis Yuri Krinitsky that the only military threat to Russia - a lightning global disarming strike by the United States and NATO, and therefore the EKR Troops become the main military force of the state, runs through his entire article. It came to an assertion with reference to Vladimir Slipchenko: "It is completely obvious that in the future there will be no future ground groupings for the attacker who prepared for such a war." Here the author clearly went too far. Firstly, the Air Defense Forces have never been, and the East Kazakhstani Armed Forces will never become the main military force of the state, if only because by destroying the enemy’s ACS (in reality, a small part of them) even a small war cannot be won. Secondly, the United States and NATO with their developed CBSS are not the only potential opponents of Russia. The sudden lightning-global disarming strike is not the only option of a military threat. Of course, we have to prepare and, in accordance with the provisions of official documents, prepare to identify its preparation and weaken it by the EKR forces to ensure a counter attack and even a retaliatory strike that is unacceptable to the aggressor by all combat-ready forces, including the SNF. However, to repel any other aggression, as well as in internal conflicts, we need not only the troops of the East Kazakhstan region and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, but also the Ground and Airborne Forces, the fleet, and all other troops and forces. These troops and forces will also be needed to prevent the seizure of our resources, even in the hypothetical situation of the destruction of our strategic nuclear forces using nuclear weapons.
Fifth statement Yuri Krinitsky is that we have to sit and wait until the enemy’s launched SVKNs cross the state border of Russia, otherwise we, as in the war with Georgia, will be declared the aggressor. According to Krinitsky, all other states have the right to preventive actions, and Russia should not have such a right. In fact, we are not so miserable. Official documents prescribe: in order to eliminate military threats to Russia and the allies, we have the right and should bring the armed forces into alert and deliver, if necessary, preemptive strikes, especially strikes at the enemy’s critical targets. To eliminate the escalation of crisis situations and the outbreak of armed conflicts, a multivariate use of strategic nuclear forces from demonstrative launches of missiles and flights of aircraft to massive counter and retaliatory attacks is envisaged. Proceeding from this, the call of Yuri Krinitsky “In a probable future war, Russia needs its own concept of a lightning, crushing response. Strategic nuclear forces should not be used when there is nothing left of them and of the country's economy, but when they are still able to cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor, that is, in the early hours of the war, "obviously late.
Sixth statement Yuri Krinitsky: “The simple addition of the tasks of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces did not lead to the emergence of a new integrated strategic goal. It was an enlarged set of two important, but different and incompatible tasks for the halves of artificially created organizational structures. With minor modifications, the situation remains to this day ... In fact, it was not even a merger that occurred, but an absorption by the Air Force of the Air Defense Forces. All the commanders and commanders of the new type of armed forces were selected exclusively from aviators-drummers. Accordingly, the consequences were fatal for those who stood guard over the air lines of the Motherland ”. We ought to stop nostalgic for the event of the last century. The unification of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force was caused, firstly, by the fact that the troops and forces for the two types of the Armed Forces became not enough. Secondly, in the armed forces of the overwhelming majority of states, the aviation and air defense forces are in the same type of armed forces and no one doubts the feasibility of such a structure. Thirdly, the use of Air Defense Forces and Aviation in the general associations of the Air Force and Air Defense greatly facilitates the planning of air operations, including defensive and strike operations, the organization of interaction between air defense units and aviation, and also increases the security of their aircraft. A striking example of the new quality of the joint use of aviation and air defense forces is demonstrated by Israel, whose “Iron Dome” missile defense system reflects the attacks of the Palestinian missiles, and the aircraft immediately hits the identified launchers. Fourthly, at the crucial moment of the unification of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force, the first commander in chief of the new air force, the Air Force, for four years (1998 – 2002) was not the fighter pilot, but a representative of the Air Defense Forces, graduate of the Military Academy of Air Defense, Army General Anatoly Kornukov. In addition, representatives of the Air Defense Forces Viktor Sinitsyn (1998 – 2000) and Boris Cheltsov (2000 – 2007) were also the first and second chiefs of the Air Force headquarters. They did everything possible so that in the new form of the Armed Forces the anti-aircraft component would not suffer more than the aviation component. Fifth, the accusation of airmen-strikers of fatal consequences for representatives of the Air Defense Forces has no basis. Also, there are no grounds for accusing the combined arms, as Yury Krinitsky put it, of the “infantry” command and control bodies of incompetence with regard to air defense. Charging military commanders of incompetence in comparison with narrow specialists is tantamount to charging the conductor as a musician, because the conductor does not know how famously, like him, to knock on the drum. The combined arms commander unites with a common plan all the diversity of actions of various troops and forces to solve common tasks, and narrow specialists serve to consult, develop proposals on the use of their troops (forces), their detailed planning and organization of actions. Similarly, Air Force officials, including aviators and people from drummers, also work in relation to their troops (forces).
Seventh thesis Yuri Krinitsky is blaming science for looping on forms of military actions that are not needed at all: “The main thing here is the method of military actions ... Unfortunately, the last decades in Russian military science focuses on forms, and developing new, efficient technology, that is, Almost no one is engaged in combat operations, including in the East Kazakhstan region. This is the path to the degradation of military art. ” First of all, this statement discredits the VA EKR, in which, by the way, Yury Krinitsky works. In fact, the main scientific activity of the Academy is devoted to the development of ways to combat the enemy's SVKN. It was on the basis of the development of methods for dealing with hypersonic aircraft by academy scientists who advanced and then proved the need to integrate air defense and missile defense systems into the general aerospace defense system. For some reason, Yuri Krinitsky did not notice that the article, which he analyzes in such detail, is ultimately devoted to the technology of developing strategic, operational and tactical ways of dealing with the enemy's SVKN. Secondly, of course, the method bears the leading role, as it expresses the content of actions. But in order to describe any course of action, several pages of text are required, at the strategic level - several dozen pages. Therefore, without an external expression of the content, it is impossible even to name any document defining preparations for military actions. For example, a plan for what? (It is necessary to describe a method: “To concentrate efforts on such a direction ..., etc.”.) The name of the form allows you to briefly express the essential features of the way to achieve the goal (problem solving) of the forthcoming military actions. In particular, already in the title “Plan of operation” or “Plan of striking” each military person represents in a general way a method, that is, the content of actions. Thus, the forms of hostilities are the avian language of the military and must be preserved.
The eighth thesis Yuri Krinitsky: “The practical experience of planning joint anti-aircraft operations in the theater of operations, obtained at various exercises, is also a fiction. Military science is different in that its postulates cannot be objectively verified in practice in peacetime, since practice is war. While there is none, the credibility of the scientific statements is verified in the exercises. But they often resemble the game of chess with itself. " Why the fiction of planning concerns only anti-aircraft operations in theaters? Then this is a common fiction of planning all forms of military operations. It also applies to the planning of actions of the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region.
Questions about the use of fighter aircraft and the effectiveness of aerospace defense are very complex and require not unambiguous arguments, but extensive evidence. Therefore, they are not within the scope of this article. The author hopes that he will be given the opportunity to return to these issues in the following publications.
Another article by Yuri Krinitsky “Parry a quick global strike” continued a heated discussion about the further ways to implement the Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation. The main problem is that with the creation of the EKR Troops, unified leadership and joint responsibility for organizing and conducting armed struggle with all the forces and means of an aerospace attack (SVKN) of the enemy over the entire territory of Russia and its allies were not restored.
The discussion arose because of different ways to solve the problem. It turned out quite extensive. At the same time, with the many particulars and lengthy phrases with which the authors operate, it is not immediately possible to understand the essence and differences of the proposed ways of solving the named problem. If we discard all particulars, two fundamentally different paths emerge very clearly.
The essence of the first path (A. A. Travkin, A. V. Belomyttsev, M. G. Valeev, Yu. V. Krinitsky and others) comes down to centralizing the control of the actions of East Kazakhstan forces to defend the country's facilities and isolating them from the actions of all other troops (forces), including from the actions of troops (forces) of the Air Defense Forces and fleet. To do this, it is proposed:The essence of the second path corresponds to the VKO Concept "... the basis of aerospace defense is a complex of state and military measures, as well as combat actions of multiple (heterogeneous) groups of troops (forces) conducted in a common system of armed struggle under a single leadership, according to a single plan and plan ... »And consists in centralizing control over the actions of all troops, forces and facilities of the aerospace defense and strike forces and means of types and combat arms of the Armed Forces, other troops in the fight against the aerospace enemy. For this purpose it is proposed:
In the above-mentioned article by Yuri Krinitsky, another attempt is made to discredit the second way of solving the problem of unified leadership in organizing and conducting combat against the forces and means of an aerospace attack of the enemy. In this regard, there is a need to analyze in more detail the positive and negative consequences of each path and each proposed activity.
The main consequences of the first solution to the problem
The main positive effect of creating the Armed Forces - Armed Forces armies, their transition to separate defensive forms of action and the rejection of the territorial principle of constructing the EKO system will simplify the planning of strategic and operational forms of military actions and command and control of troops in the EKR Troops. However, these measures will greatly complicate the general coordination of actions at the level of the Armed Forces as a whole, since it will be necessary to further coordinate the actions of the EKR Troops with the actions of the groups of troops (forces) of military districts and fleets. The proposed measures to isolate the use of the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region from other actions of the Armed Forces will not allow concentrating the efforts of all the Armed Forces troops and forces on the defense of the objects and groups of troops (forces) that have the highest priority in each period of military operations. Including it will be impossible to concentrate the efforts of the troops and forces of the air defense and missile defense of various types of armed forces on the defense of strategic nuclear forces from the disarming global strike of the enemy's SVKN.
Practically, the variant of transforming the EKR Troops from the type of troops into a type of air force by removing the EKR brigades (air defense divisions) from the Air Force and Air Defense commands and forming four of them (the three armies and corps) of the Air Force will return to the structure of the Russian Armed Forces 1998 year, that is, the Armed Forces armies will become former Air Defense Forces only in a modern composition with the inclusion of two launch connections and spacecraft control. Previously, the number of Air Defense Forces made them self-sufficient to solve the tasks of the defense of the country's facilities, including for the defense of SNF facilities. At present, in the proposed Armed Forces armies, "the 34 of the anti-aircraft missile regiment remains, of which a third is concentrated near Moscow" (Boris Cheltsov. "What will be the new look of the aerospace defense"). Previously, in some individual air defense armies of anti-aircraft missile units there were more than expected in the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region. It is quite obvious, even without modeling, that these forces cannot independently solve the tasks of defending the country's facilities, including the defense of the SNF facilities from the disarming global strike of the enemy's SVKN. At the same time, the number of troops (forces) of the air defense of military districts and fleets within the borders of some military districts is greater than in the East Kazakhstani brigades (air defense divisions). However, it will be impossible to attract some of them, at least for the defense of SNF facilities, since, according to the proposals, they must protect their groups of military districts and fleets from attacks by an air enemy.
If the territorial principle is abandoned and the forms of application of a new type of aircraft, the EKR Troops, are abandoned by the actions of the air defense troops (forces) of military districts and the fleet, the possibility of centralized control of air defense units (air defense-missile defense) of different types of air forces during their combat operations in common areas is excluded. In such conditions, the overall effectiveness of the action falls, the costs of combat and materiel increase. This is due to the general principles of target distribution, embedded in the automation systems of anti-aircraft missile formations of different types of aircraft. At the same time, different targets will be assigned the same targets for shelling, which will increase the total missile consumption by one and a half to two times. With a high impact density, part of the air attack means will remain unstressed and will be able to break through to the defended objects. In the absence of centralized control as a result of inconsistency of actions and low efficiency of the identification system in a complex air and jamming environment, part of their aircraft can be fired at with their anti-aircraft weapons.
When separating the actions of formations of the East Kazakhstani Armed Forces from the actions of strike aviation, missile forces and artillery, the fleet forces, it is extremely difficult to coordinate them for timely disorganization of control of the enemy’s aerospace attack forces and means and reduce their ability to deliver subsequent strikes.
When transferring air defense brigades (air defense divisions) and, accordingly, parts of radio engineering troops to the air defense troops, the air defense troops of the military districts and the formation of the air force will virtually remain without intelligence. This will make it difficult to organize a general reconnaissance of an air enemy within the boundaries of military districts, as well as providing radar information to formations, units and subunits of aviation, air defense troops (forces) of the Ground Forces and Navy.
The main consequences of the second way to solve the problem
In the second way of solving the problem, the advantages of the first way become disadvantages and, on the contrary, the disadvantages become advantages. The main negative consequence of the creation of a new type of aircraft, the Aerospace Forces and the strategic aerospace command, as well as the preservation of forms of fighting the enemy's squashes combining defensive and strike actions, complicates the planning of strategic and operational forms of fighting the enemy's squared forces and command and control in their course. In general, the management of a new type of aircraft will be quite complicated, but this problem is solved by the necessary composition of the main command of the aircraft type. If the principle of separation at the strategic level of administrative and operational management is maintained in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the chief command of the aerospace forces will perform only administrative functions for managing the air force type, and the SACS - the operational functions for planning the actions of all troops (forces) to combat enemy SVKN and for command and control ( forces) in the implementation of plans. This separation of functions will simplify the overall control of troops (forces).
Reducing the number of combat arms when combining the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region with the Air Force, as well as the formed strategic aerospace command, which will take over the functions of coordinating the actions of troops (forces) in the strategic aerospace operation and partly in other strategic actions, will simplify the overall coordination of actions at the level Sun in general.
The implementation of the territorial principle of constructing the aerospace defense system in full with the creation of infrastructure zones and districts of the aerospace defense will provide an opportunity to concentrate the efforts of all the armed forces and aerospace defense forces on the defense of objects and groups of troops (forces) that have the highest priority in each period of hostilities, including on the defense of strategic nuclear forces. Taking into account the fact that the groupings of the Ground Forces are not the targets of a primary strike, part of the formations of the military air defense can be maintained to enhance the defense of the strategic nuclear forces from the sudden disarming global strike of the enemy's SVKN. With other expected options for the development of the military-political situation, the formation of military air defense, having sufficiently high maneuverability, can quickly move to the defense of groups of troops. The feasibility of such measures is confirmed by the ongoing research in the course of command and staff exercises and games. For example, modeling carried out in the VA VKO showed that the attacking side (USA and NATO) already has the capabilities of the first massive air and missile attack in any direction to disable more than 80 – 90 percent of the airfields of the defending side and gain air superiority. Virtual maneuvers by anti-aircraft units, units and units of the Ground Forces to cover the nearest airfields reduced their losses by more than 50 – 60 percent. Studies have also shown that the centralized control of air defense units (air defense-missile defense) of various types of aircraft when they conduct combat operations in general areas increases the overall effectiveness of operations 1,4 – 1,6 times and increases the safety of all types of aviation.
Preserving the methods and forms of struggle with an aerospace enemy with the participation of the defense forces (forces) of the East Kazakhstan region and the attack forces (forces) of the aviation, missile forces and artillery and fleet forces ensures their coordination to disorganize the control of the enemy's SVKN and reduce their ability to deliver subsequent attacks.
The preservation of air defense brigades (air defense divisions) and, accordingly, parts of the radio engineering troops as part of the Air Force and Air Defense commands with the territorial principle of the Aircraft Control System will facilitate the organization of general reconnaissance of the enemy’s air within military districts, as well as providing radar information to aviation units and troops ) Air defense of the Ground Forces and Navy.
Analyzing ways to solve the problem, Yuri Krinitsky noted: “It’s sad that today we are preparing to fend off a lightning-knock-out knockout strike with five widespread troops, most of which are subordinate to different controls, has different tasks and a completely inadequate reaction time to the threat.” It is very sad, but it is Yuri Krinitsky who does not want to unite them under the general guidance, as is achieved when creating a videoconferencing system and an ICSS.
Anyone can independently choose the way to solve the problem of unified management of the organization and conduct of the fight against the enemy's SVKN based on a comparison of their strengths and weaknesses.
***
Yury Krinitsky’s publication “Defeating a Rapid Global Impact” continued the discussion on further ways to implement the Aerospace Defense Concept of Russia. The main problem is that with the creation of the EKR Troops, unified leadership and joint responsibility for organizing and conducting armed struggle with all the forces and means of an aerospace attack (SVKN) of the enemy over the entire territory of the Russian Federation and its allies were not restored. In the last issue in the first part of this article, it was told about how to solve this problem. Today we will try to answer the question: Does the EKR Troops need their own aerospace theater of military operations (VCD) in the presence of traditional continental, ocean and naval theater?
The answer to this question is given by the theory and practice of the use of this military-scientific category by military command bodies. Yuri Krinitsky asserts: "The usual land-sea TVDs with troops deployed on them ... become archaic." And in connection with this, he proposes to introduce and apply when planning actions of the Troops of the East Kazakhstan region of the VKD theater with their strategic aerospace and air directions, which should be cut independently of the combined strategic and operational directions. In his article, he argues that the space and time of the struggle in the air and space basically ceased to coincide with the space and time of the struggle on land and sea and that the past combination of air directions with strategic, as he calls, "land" directions led to a mismatch of the space of the planned reflection with a space of predictable aggression.
To confirm or refute the presented provisions let us turn to the theory. According to the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (WEC) 2007 of the Year (p. 903) TVD is a vast territory of a part of the continent with seas washing it or the ocean (sea) area with islands and the adjacent coast of continents, as well as the aerospace above them, within which they are deployed strategic groupings of the Armed Forces and military operations can be conducted on a strategic scale. The boundaries and composition of the theater are determined by the military-political leadership of the states. For example, the military-political leadership of the United States and NATO divided the territory of Western Europe into three land theaters: North-West European, Central European and South European NATO theaters. In peacetime, each of the theaters has created NATO command groups with a single command, their possible use has been planned, management systems, bases and supplies have been created.
Each theater has its own specific conditions for the conduct of hostilities (military-political, military-economic, military, physical-geographical, ethnographic), as well as operational equipment of the territory, affecting the preparation and conduct of operations of a strategic scale and war in general. Therefore, a comprehensive study of all these elements of the theater, including the command and control facilities of the armed forces, the deployment of air defense systems and air defense forces, areas for the deployment and deployment of ground forces and fleet groups, and their assessment is one of the tasks of the military authorities to prepare the armed forces to repel aggression.
In the Russian Federation, the boundaries and composition of the theater are officially determined during the period of danger This is quite logical, since if there is no war, then there is no its theater. Therefore, to ensure the study and analysis by military authorities of the above elements of the situation in peacetime, the elements of division of the geostrategic space define strategic directions - a part of the territory of the region with adjacent waters and airspace, within whose boundaries are important economic, military and administrative centers of strategic importance during a war, operational and strategic groups of the Armed Forces (WEC, p. 886) can be located and wage military actions. Strategic directions are divided into operational areas. In a threatened period, when the enemy was clearly defined and the expected space of hostilities, the boundaries and composition of the theater of operations was established. Strategic directions become its elements.
In turn, the aerospace direction is a strip of aerospace in which the strike assets of aviation and missile forces are derived by the shortest path from the bases (deployment) to the most important military facilities and industrial centers (WEC, p. 202). In reality, airplanes and cruise missiles will not necessarily fly the shortest path. Aerospace directions are divided into air directions. According to Krinitsky, a combination of aerospace directions and a strategic space zone form an aerospace theater of military operations. At the same time, he states: “In the aerospace sphere, part of the facilities were created in advance. These are airfields, rocket positions, command posts of the Air Force, orbital grouping ".
Now turn to practice. In the preparation of operations and combat operations, officers of military units of command structures (combined arms, land, air force, air defense, fleet), based on the potential or real enemy and the possible weapons, regardless of the official division of the geostrategic space, they determine the common possible area (space) of the operation (combat actions). Along with other elements of the assessment of the situation, the physical-geographical conditions of the area of operation (combat) are assessed. Elements of operational equipment of the region’s territory are being mapped (control and communication points, positional areas of rocket forces, airfields, air defense and anti-missile defense facilities, naval bases), areas of deployment, advancement and deployment of ground forces and fleet groups, and other troops. On the basis of real basing and real or predictable deployment areas, as well as of tasks, including the location of the objects to be defended, and the capabilities of the weapons, determine the expected directions (space) of the actions of the enemy and ground and enemy groupings. Between themselves, these directions may or may not coincide. The directions (space) of the actions of their own and interacting groups of troops (forces) are determined in the same way. And only after that, to design ideas and decisions, write directives, combat orders and orders, as well as to organize interaction, they become attached to officially defined directions for all, regardless of their “cutting”. The main thing is that they should be understood by all authorities and officials.
Imagine that the proposal of Yuri Krinitsky accepted. The commanders of military districts, fleets, and air force associations planned actions along generally accepted common arms directions. In turn, in the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region, they cut their directions, naturally, not coinciding with the general arms, and planned the use of their troops on them. Really agreeing on these actions will be extremely difficult, since staff officers simply will not understand each other. It was for the possibility of coordinating the actions of groups of troops (forces) of air defense of all types and types of troops, all types of aviation, ground forces, naval forces and other troops (forces) were combined air directions with general arms strategic directions. In this case, it is enough just to name a directive in a directive, a combat order or instructions on interaction, so that subordinate or interacting authorities correctly identify it.
Thus, based on the actual planning of operations (combat operations), Krinitsky’s assertion that “now the action space of air attack forces and troops (forces) of land and sea groupings do not fundamentally coincide,” has no basis for practice. In addition, his example of delivering air strikes by multinational forces in 1991 on Iraq from directions that do not coincide with the direction of ground forces is not typical for Russia because of its global territory. For example, the enemy will not deliver air strikes from Western Europe when deploying the struggle for the islands of the Small Kuril Ridge, aircraft will not reach the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. Partial exclusion is only the northern direction. However, even here we can expect actions not only of strategic aviation with cruise missiles, but also of amphibious groups to seize or disable individual military or energy facilities.
Taking into account the results of the analysis of the theory and practice of using the category of theater, the answer to the question of whether the Airborne Troops need their own aerospace theater of military operations, everyone can independently.
Counterarguments for a number of private statements Krinitsky
In addition to the main issues, in the article under discussion, private issues are raised and a number of theses are given, which, it should be noted, are written very talentedly, but with which one cannot agree.
Thesis first. Yuri Krinitsky argues that “as long as there is no theater of operations, there can be no planning for joint operations in the theater of operations” and that “... no aggressive period will precede the enemy’s aggressive actions from aerospace. There will be no time for planning an operation to repel an attack on the eve or on a fait accompli. Therefore, an operation to repel aggression must be planned well in advance. ” It is not clear who the author opposes. Official guidance documents prescribe planning the use of the Armed Forces as a whole, as well as associations, formations and units to carry out in advance in peacetime and clarify plans during a period of threat or with the onset of sudden hostilities. In reality, such planning is carried out in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and is strictly controlled. Since strategic directions are defined in peacetime, air operations in the strategic direction (theater of operations) can be planned and planned well in advance in peacetime. Therefore, the name of this operation is twofold: for peacetime, an operation on a strategic direction, after a “cutting” of a theater of operations — an operation on a theater of operations.
Thesis of the second. Yuri Krinitsky writes that during the past decade and a half, during the exercises and in the preparation of real actions, the time of the beginning of the war “completely unjustifiably chooses the moment when the opposing operational-strategic groups of troops are already deployed, the theaters of military actions are marked, the front line is drawn on the workers' maps of commanders, troops conditionally buried in the trenches. Further or simultaneously with this process, the planning stage of the operation begins. ” The given thesis does not correspond to the existing realities, except for the situation being created in a number of command-and-staff exercises when working on specific issues. First, as indicated in the counterarguments on the first thesis, plans for the use of the Armed Forces as a whole and all military formations must be developed in advance. If there are no plans, then the troops cannot be deployed (it is not known where to deploy and for what tasks to solve). Secondly, official documents define various options for the commencement of hostilities: operations can begin in the face of a surprise attack by the enemy, with incomplete deployment of troops (forces) or with their full deployment and the creation of the planned grouping. Under the conditions of a sudden attack by the enemy, the attack of the enemy’s SVKN should be carried out by the air and missile defense attendants. Their actions are escalated by the air defense forces of the East Kazakhstani Air Force, Air Force, Land Forces and Fleet forces (in the field of deployment or on the routes of advance). Combat forces of aviation, missile forces and artillery, fleet must deliver a retaliatory strike on top-priority targets. At the same time, the main groups of troops and fleet forces must be dispersed, followed by exit and deployment in the areas of destination. These postulates are known to all military still from schools.
The third thesis Yuri Krinitsky is revealed in several places of the article: “The troops and forces of the aerospace defense (air defense, missile defense) from the structure that performed the most important independent task of the decisive initial period of the war turned into a secondary structure that provided subsequent, very unhurried actions of combined arms groups of troops not deployed within the boundaries of non-existent continental theaters ... There is a reality in the form of a lightning (disarming) global strike. His scenario is designed for six hours ... The grouping of the SNF needs to be protected by the aerospace defense forces not for a month or a day, but for these most important hours. ” It is not clear, on the basis of what initial data Krinitsky drew such conclusions.
First, the creation of the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region itself shows that the leadership of the state and the armed forces realized the importance of the role of the troops (forces) of the East Kazakhstan region in the armed struggle. To repel a possible sudden aerospace or air attack, air defense combat duty is organized, RKO formations continuously maintain combat duty and perform the tasks prescribed for them, the rest of the formations and air defense units of all types of the Armed Forces and the EKO Armies in peacetime are kept combat-ready with a minimum time to bring into combat readiness.
Secondly, the troops and forces of the aerospace defense (air defense, missile defense) never set themselves separate tasks, despite their importance, because only the defeat of the enemy's SVKN in flight due to the insufficient effectiveness of the air defense systems and the missile defense system cannot protect all the necessary objects. Even in the 80s of the last century, with the largest number of air defense forces and assets, the effectiveness of air defense in different regions, according to estimates, did not exceed 8 – 20 percent.
Thirdly, it is certainly necessary to protect the grouping of SNF from a sudden disarming strike. To solve this problem, Yuri Krinitsky, referring to Vladimir Slipchenko, proposes "to destroy up to 70 percent with anti-aircraft defense systems and up to 90 percent of enemy’s high-precision air and missile targets with anti-missile defense systems." What forces? Any specialist knows that to achieve such effectiveness of the aerospace defense system is impossible not only practically, but also theoretically (there will not be enough money, industrial capacity and people to produce and maintain the required quantity of weapons of the aerospace defense). The remaining forces, which may be in the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region after all the reductions, are fundamentally impossible to solve the problem of protecting the strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, it is proposed to concentrate efforts in the fight against the aerospace enemy not only of the EKR Troops, but also of the air defense forces of the Ground Forces and the air defense forces of the fleet and all the combat-ready attack forces of aviation, rocket forces and artillery and fleet.
Fourthly, the statement of Yuri Krinitsky that the actions of combined arms groups of troops in comparison with the actions of air defense forces and assets are unhurried, contrived. Combined actions are therefore called combined arms, because they include the actions of all or most of the types and types of troops of the Armed Forces, that is, actions of aviation, ground forces, fleet, other troops, as well as air defense forces and assets. Forces and means of formations belonging to the general arms group are alerted at different times and operate at different speeds, not only in Krinitsky, who believes that Iskander or Granit missiles, airplanes fly at slower speeds than anti-aircraft missiles. guided missiles and fighter aircraft.
Fourth thesis Yuri Krinitsky that the only military threat to Russia - a lightning global disarming strike by the United States and NATO, and therefore the EKR Troops become the main military force of the state, runs through his entire article. It came to an assertion with reference to Vladimir Slipchenko: "It is completely obvious that in the future there will be no future ground groupings for the attacker who prepared for such a war." Here the author clearly went too far. Firstly, the Air Defense Forces have never been, and the East Kazakhstani Armed Forces will never become the main military force of the state, if only because by destroying the enemy’s ACS (in reality, a small part of them) even a small war cannot be won. Secondly, the United States and NATO with their developed CBSS are not the only potential opponents of Russia. The sudden lightning-global disarming strike is not the only option of a military threat. Of course, we have to prepare and, in accordance with the provisions of official documents, prepare to identify its preparation and weaken it by the EKR forces to ensure a counter attack and even a retaliatory strike that is unacceptable to the aggressor by all combat-ready forces, including the SNF. However, to repel any other aggression, as well as in internal conflicts, we need not only the troops of the East Kazakhstan region and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, but also the Ground and Airborne Forces, the fleet, and all other troops and forces. These troops and forces will also be needed to prevent the seizure of our resources, even in the hypothetical situation of the destruction of our strategic nuclear forces using nuclear weapons.
Fifth statement Yuri Krinitsky is that we have to sit and wait until the enemy’s launched SVKNs cross the state border of Russia, otherwise we, as in the war with Georgia, will be declared the aggressor. According to Krinitsky, all other states have the right to preventive actions, and Russia should not have such a right. In fact, we are not so miserable. Official documents prescribe: in order to eliminate military threats to Russia and the allies, we have the right and should bring the armed forces into alert and deliver, if necessary, preemptive strikes, especially strikes at the enemy’s critical targets. To eliminate the escalation of crisis situations and the outbreak of armed conflicts, a multivariate use of strategic nuclear forces from demonstrative launches of missiles and flights of aircraft to massive counter and retaliatory attacks is envisaged. Proceeding from this, the call of Yuri Krinitsky “In a probable future war, Russia needs its own concept of a lightning, crushing response. Strategic nuclear forces should not be used when there is nothing left of them and of the country's economy, but when they are still able to cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor, that is, in the early hours of the war, "obviously late.
Sixth statement Yuri Krinitsky: “The simple addition of the tasks of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces did not lead to the emergence of a new integrated strategic goal. It was an enlarged set of two important, but different and incompatible tasks for the halves of artificially created organizational structures. With minor modifications, the situation remains to this day ... In fact, it was not even a merger that occurred, but an absorption by the Air Force of the Air Defense Forces. All the commanders and commanders of the new type of armed forces were selected exclusively from aviators-drummers. Accordingly, the consequences were fatal for those who stood guard over the air lines of the Motherland ”. We ought to stop nostalgic for the event of the last century. The unification of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force was caused, firstly, by the fact that the troops and forces for the two types of the Armed Forces became not enough. Secondly, in the armed forces of the overwhelming majority of states, the aviation and air defense forces are in the same type of armed forces and no one doubts the feasibility of such a structure. Thirdly, the use of Air Defense Forces and Aviation in the general associations of the Air Force and Air Defense greatly facilitates the planning of air operations, including defensive and strike operations, the organization of interaction between air defense units and aviation, and also increases the security of their aircraft. A striking example of the new quality of the joint use of aviation and air defense forces is demonstrated by Israel, whose “Iron Dome” missile defense system reflects the attacks of the Palestinian missiles, and the aircraft immediately hits the identified launchers. Fourthly, at the crucial moment of the unification of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force, the first commander in chief of the new air force, the Air Force, for four years (1998 – 2002) was not the fighter pilot, but a representative of the Air Defense Forces, graduate of the Military Academy of Air Defense, Army General Anatoly Kornukov. In addition, representatives of the Air Defense Forces Viktor Sinitsyn (1998 – 2000) and Boris Cheltsov (2000 – 2007) were also the first and second chiefs of the Air Force headquarters. They did everything possible so that in the new form of the Armed Forces the anti-aircraft component would not suffer more than the aviation component. Fifth, the accusation of airmen-strikers of fatal consequences for representatives of the Air Defense Forces has no basis. Also, there are no grounds for accusing the combined arms, as Yury Krinitsky put it, of the “infantry” command and control bodies of incompetence with regard to air defense. Charging military commanders of incompetence in comparison with narrow specialists is tantamount to charging the conductor as a musician, because the conductor does not know how famously, like him, to knock on the drum. The combined arms commander unites with a common plan all the diversity of actions of various troops and forces to solve common tasks, and narrow specialists serve to consult, develop proposals on the use of their troops (forces), their detailed planning and organization of actions. Similarly, Air Force officials, including aviators and people from drummers, also work in relation to their troops (forces).
Seventh thesis Yuri Krinitsky is blaming science for looping on forms of military actions that are not needed at all: “The main thing here is the method of military actions ... Unfortunately, the last decades in Russian military science focuses on forms, and developing new, efficient technology, that is, Almost no one is engaged in combat operations, including in the East Kazakhstan region. This is the path to the degradation of military art. ” First of all, this statement discredits the VA EKR, in which, by the way, Yury Krinitsky works. In fact, the main scientific activity of the Academy is devoted to the development of ways to combat the enemy's SVKN. It was on the basis of the development of methods for dealing with hypersonic aircraft by academy scientists who advanced and then proved the need to integrate air defense and missile defense systems into the general aerospace defense system. For some reason, Yuri Krinitsky did not notice that the article, which he analyzes in such detail, is ultimately devoted to the technology of developing strategic, operational and tactical ways of dealing with the enemy's SVKN. Secondly, of course, the method bears the leading role, as it expresses the content of actions. But in order to describe any course of action, several pages of text are required, at the strategic level - several dozen pages. Therefore, without an external expression of the content, it is impossible even to name any document defining preparations for military actions. For example, a plan for what? (It is necessary to describe a method: “To concentrate efforts on such a direction ..., etc.”.) The name of the form allows you to briefly express the essential features of the way to achieve the goal (problem solving) of the forthcoming military actions. In particular, already in the title “Plan of operation” or “Plan of striking” each military person represents in a general way a method, that is, the content of actions. Thus, the forms of hostilities are the avian language of the military and must be preserved.
The eighth thesis Yuri Krinitsky: “The practical experience of planning joint anti-aircraft operations in the theater of operations, obtained at various exercises, is also a fiction. Military science is different in that its postulates cannot be objectively verified in practice in peacetime, since practice is war. While there is none, the credibility of the scientific statements is verified in the exercises. But they often resemble the game of chess with itself. " Why the fiction of planning concerns only anti-aircraft operations in theaters? Then this is a common fiction of planning all forms of military operations. It also applies to the planning of actions of the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region.
Questions about the use of fighter aircraft and the effectiveness of aerospace defense are very complex and require not unambiguous arguments, but extensive evidence. Therefore, they are not within the scope of this article. The author hopes that he will be given the opportunity to return to these issues in the following publications.
Information