The harsh accusations against Rennenkampf, advanced in 1914 – 1915, were repeated word for word by “liberal” investigators, detached by the Provisional Government to investigate its omissions and “crimes”, and then the Soviet “experts” stories First World. Perhaps it was revenge for the suppression of anti-government riots in Transbaikalia in 1906, when the military expedition of PK Rennenkampf pacified the revolutionary element, fulfilling the will of the supreme power? But it is indisputable that Pavel Karlovich, beginning in the fall of 1914, was also constantly reminded of his German name, seeing in this circumstance beyond the control of the general’s will the main reason for his “suspicious” behavior (in other editions, outright betrayal) in the complex Eastern twists and turns - Prussian and Lodz operations ...
The Rennenkampf family of Estland faithfully served Russia from the 16th century - even before the present-day Estonia joined Russia by Peter I.
Since the victories over the Swedes in the Northern War 1700 - 1721. this surname now and then flashes in the premium lists of Russian officers. It is not for nothing that the silver pipes of the Kegsgolmsky regiment, granted by Empress Elizabeth Petrovna for the capture of Berlin, are stamped: “1760 of the year 28 of September, as a sign of the capture of Berlin, under the leadership of His Excellency Lieutenant-General and cavalier Peter Ivanovich Panin, in the command of P.) Colonel Rennenkampf. "
Kegsgolmtsy under the command of the "German" Colonel Rennenkampf over 150 more than years before the Great War 1914 – 1918. bravely fought with the vaunted troops of the Prussian king Frederick II and defeated them, which immortalized a memorable inscription on the regimental insignia ...
At all times until 1914, until with the beginning of the armed clash with Germany, Russia was not seduced by petty imps of general Germanophobia and espionage (maliciously warmed up by liberal circles with the aim of “rocking the boat” of government in the empire), the similarity with the German name was no cause for accusations in treason or something like that.
Suffice it to recall that the “German” surnames had such distinguished figures of previous times as the creator of the Separate corps of gendarmes, General of the Cavalry A.Kh. Benkendorf or the hero of World War 1812 of the year and 1813 – 1814 Overseas campaigns. Field Marshal P.H. Wittgenstein.
And in the 20th century, only uneducated people or personalities pursuing any goals of their own could unreasonably throw insulting accusations against an honored general for his “German” surname.
Especially this general, who by the beginning of the Great War (and he had already passed over sixty!) Earned a reputation as a worthy successor of the best traditions of the Russian army - the traditions of the Suvorov school.
The record of Pavel Karlovich von Rennenkampf, born 29 on April 1854 in Pankul castle near Revel, was in the family of Russian nobleman Karl Gustav Rennenkampf (1813 — 1871) and graduated from 1873 in the year of Helsingfors infantry school graduates, and he was graduated in 1998, when he graduated from Helsingfors infantry junior schoolchild, and he graduated in 1998. in the Lithuanian Ulan regiment, brilliant studies at the Nikolaevsky (General Staff) military academy (graduated from it in 1881 on the first category), four years of command of the Akhtyrsky Dragoon regiment (from 1895 to 1899), and this regiment became alone m of the best regiments of the Russian cavalry, returning former glory) ... By the way, earlier, in 1870-s, in the same regiment served as the cornet and the future "partner" of Rennenkampf in the East Prussian operation, General A.V. Samsonov.
In the fight against the hurricane that has flown on the Manchu branch of the CER and the Far East by the Boxing Uprising in China (1900 – 1901) PK Rennenkampf, being the chief of staff of the troops of the Trans-Baikal region, declares himself as a brave and energetic military leader.
In that difficult campaign, numerous forces merciless towards all foreigners of the Chinese Ihetians threatened even the Russian Blagoveshchensk. Amur Governor-General N.I. Grodekov appointed Rennenkampf as the commander of a rather small detachment, who set out on a campaign in July 1900. A whirlwind of the Chinese who had accumulated at Aigun, Pavel Karlovich scatters them and immediately rushes to Tsitsikar. He takes this city with one throw and successively attacks enemy agglomerations, ten times superior to his unit, first from Jilin, then from Thelin. In these battles Rennenkampf, very much inferior to the enemy in numbers, managed to crush three Chinese armies, for which Grodekov hands him, removing from his chest, the Order of St. George 4-st, received from the late Skobelev ... By the way, the emperor Nicholas II found this prestigious award still insufficient for such an outstanding military leader, as Major General Rennenkampf recommended himself, and granted him with a higher order of St. George 3 st.
“From the first appearance on the battlefields,” writes the historian S.P. Andulenko in the émigré magazine Vozrozhdenie was already in 1970, in an article that refutes the false opinion of Rennenkampf as a worthless general and traitor - he goes down in history as a bold, enterprising and happy boss ... "
In the Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905 Pavel Karlovich is in command of the 2-th Trans-Baikal Cossack Division. Under his leadership, Transbaikalian Cossacks show wonders of courage.
The personal courage of a middle-aged general and the skillful command of a division entail in his regiments the color of cavalry officers, among whom he mastered the science of winning and the notorious “black baron” P.N. Wrangell.
In one of the battles with the samurai near Liaoyan, Rennenkampf is seriously wounded in the leg. But, having got on a hospital bed, he achieves from doctors that he was not sent for treatment to European Russia. Soon, without even recovering from his wounds, he returned to the ranks and, at the head of the VIIth Siberian Army Corps, participated in the Mukden battle in February of 1905. This, above all, the remarkable resilience of his regiments made it possible to stop the offensive of Marshal Kawamura's army near Mukden. It is not by chance that Kawamura and another Japanese marshal, Oiam, speak of Rennenkampf (for Mukden promoted to lieutenant general) with great respect, as a very worthy opponent ...
By the way, the conflict between Rennenkampf and the future general A.V. also belongs to the Mukden period. Samsonov, arising on personal grounds. Some authors considered this clash at the Mukden station a key motive, “explaining” the reason why, almost ten years later, Rennenkampf, commander of the First (Neman) Army of the North-Western Front, did not come to the rescue of Samsonov, who commanded 1914- in the East Prussian operation 2 th (Narevskoy) army, trapped in the German "ticks".
Immediately, we note that an attempt to write off the inconsistency of the actions of the two commanders only on their tensions is too primitive an explanation of the reasons for the defeat of the Second Army in the battle of the Masurian lakes.
“The general from his youth was distinguished by boiling energy, strong, independent character and great exactingness in the service,” historian Andulenko wrote about Rennenkampf in the already mentioned publication in the magazine “Renaissance”. - Sharp, persistent, not stinging on caustic reviews, he made himself many enemies. Not so among his subordinates, many of whom he was not only loved, but at times he was directly idolized, but among chiefs and neighbors ... ”
This is confirmed by another author, Yuri Galich: “Liberal circles did not tolerate him, considering him a reliable guardian of the regime. Peers envied the success and easy Chinese laurels. The higher authorities did not like for independence, sharpness, obstinacy, wide popularity among the troops. ”
Perhaps the fatal role in the fate of Rennenkampf was played by the tragic events of the First Russian Revolution. At the beginning of 1906, being commander of the VII Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Rennenkampf took command of a military train, which, having started movement from Harbin, restored the message of the Manchurian army with Western Siberia, disturbed by the raging revolutionary movement in Eastern Siberia. (In Soviet historiography this orgy of anti-state unrest initiated by the capture of weapons from military warehouses, loudly called the "Chita Republic"). Having defeated the forces of the rebels in the Manchurian railway, Rennenkampf entered Chita and brought the most insane to the field court. Four were sentenced to hang-ups, replaced by execution, the rest of the death penalty was replaced with hard labor. The names of the leaders of the insurgency and today are seven streets of Chita, at the foot of the Titovskaya hill, they erected a monument. The name of the militant general, who restored the legitimate authority and order, is still betrayed by desecration ...
Against the background of indecision and confusion, which has embraced almost the whole empire under the pressure of a new turmoil, the Siberian Commander shows unshakable will and active loyalty to the sovereign, whom he has sworn.
“In a short time, he pacifies and puts vast areas in order,” notes S. Andulenko. - Naturally, he becomes the enemy of the entire "revolutionary public." Subsequently, the so-called za. liberal circles will try to get rid of the dangerous general for them ... ".
October 30 1906 makes an attempt to assassinate a Social Revolutionary terrorist N. V. Korshun. He tracked down and trapped Rennenkampf when he was walking down the street with the aide-de-camp staff captain Berg and the orderly lieutenant Gaizler, and threw a “explosive projectile” at their feet. Fortunately, the terrorist "alchemists" did not calculate the power of the bomb, it was not enough to kill; the general, the adjutant and the orderly were only stunned by the explosion ...
From 1907 to 1913, commanding the 3rd Army Corps on the western borders of Russia, Rennenkampf vigorously and rationally prepares him for war. The hull under his leadership becomes exemplary.
And in spite of the view of Nicholas II, which had been established in Soviet times, as a mountain-sovereign, who did not fatally understand people and always appointed “not those” figures to leading posts, the emperor appreciated the entire amount of merit of PK. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, Rennenkampf appointed the commander of the Vilna military district with the rank of adjutant general (earlier, in the 1910 year, he received the rank of general from cavalry).
It was Rennenkampf who turned out to be the only general of the Russian army who was able to gain well-trained and surpassed in many respects by German troops the only unconditional victory in the whole war.
She gave a reason to say that after three months of such battles Berlin will fall ...
It was the famous Gumbinnen-Goldap battle of 7 (20) in August 1914, on the third day after the entry of the 1 Army of the North-Western Front under the command of Rennenkampf in East Prussia. To describe the whole course of the battle, we will not - talked about him enough. But here it is necessary to emphasize a number of important circumstances. First, the troops of the 1 army entered the battle almost immediately, being thoroughly exhausted by a six-day, short-day, foot march. Meanwhile, the enemy moved through its territory in the most comfortable way, widely using a dense network of railways.
Secondly, for objective reasons, the mobilization of the Rennenkampf unit could be completed only on the 36 day, and they marched already on the 12, entered the enemy’s territory on the 15 day, having completely otmobilized and numerically superior troops 8- Germanic army under the command of the tested General M. von Pritvitsa. The onslaught by incomplete and unprepared troops was the result of the well-known agreements with France, which feared the entry of the Kaiser hordes into Paris and urged the Russian General Headquarters to pull as many enemy corps as possible from the western front to the east. Immediately, we note: the outcome of the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle and the entry of Samsonov’s 2 Army into East Prussia forced the German General Staff to transfer to the Russian front a total of up to 6 corps, including reserves destined for the capture of Paris.
Third, Russian troops marched across enemy territory, when our soldiers were threatened from everywhere, and any movement of the Russian regiments to the headquarters of the German troops was reported by telephone calls from any manor, any farm ... Add to this operational reports from pilots of Kaiser airplanes and intercepted unencrypted radiograms from the Russian headquarters, and it will become clear that literally every step of the troops of both the Second and First Army along this land was for the Germans in full view. While in the Russian infantry divisions there was almost no cavalry needed to conduct tactical reconnaissance on its way ...
Fourth, the Germans had substantial superiority in the Gumbinnen and Goldap directions both in manpower (a total of 8 German divisions against the 6 Russians), and in artillery, especially heavy ones. They violently fired on and attacked our battle formations, and only the virtuosic fire of batteries, accurate shooting of infantry and its excellent ability to apply to the terrain (primarily in the parts of the III army corps, which was commanded by Rennenkampf for many years) allowed the troops of the 1 army to gain the upper hand over 8 Germanic.
We emphasize that the Germans, having experienced the destructive power of the Russian fire, launched a crime against humanity: advancing, they drove Russian captives in front of them.
An eyewitness to this atrocity of the “enlightened” Teutons A.A. Ouspensky wrote: “In a battle near Gumbinnen, the brave Germans disgraced themselves with an inhumanly brutal crime: during one of the attacks, they put a handful of unhappy Russian prisoners, unarmed, in the first rows of their attackers, and forced them to go ahead of themselves ... until they were all shot ! "...
Similar atrocities marked the entire combat path through the Russian territory of the Kaiser troops, brought up in the spirit of confidence in the "superiority of the German nation" and contempt for universal morality. In fact, they were the direct predecessors of the Nazi barbarians from the Wehrmacht and the SS. The Polish city of Kalisz, destroyed by heavy guns, a Christian shrine that suffered from the same fire — the Czestochowa Monastery, the Russian soldiers who were mutilated or severely starved in German captivity — it all happened. And all this strongly fueled in Russian society hostility to everything that was somehow connected with Germany and representatives of the German people, regardless of whether they were subjects of the Kaiser or Emperor Nicholas II. It is not by chance that in Moscow and Petrograd already in the first months of the war, as a result of the spontaneous unrest of the residents, almost all the shops owned by ethnic Germans were destroyed and closed ... The mass anti-German psychosis turned out to be a destructive environment that caused almost universal suspicion of the military leaders who had " Swabian "surnames ...
It should be borne in mind that the rapidly unfolding hostilities in East Prussia were watched with bated breath by the whole of Europe. In this first major battle, the military reputation of both Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf and the entire Russian army, which had entered the hardest war, was at stake. How the results of the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle, at least by our allies, were assessed can be judged from the fact that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was already in the next world war in correspondence with I.V. Stalin, wanting to make him happy, recalled the "brilliant victory of the Russian troops at Gumbinnen."
And this victory was undoubtedly the result of both the will and endurance of the army commander Rennenkampf, and the heroism and skills of the troops trained and trained by him ...
But how did the general, to whom at first the applause not only all of Russia — the entire Entente, suddenly turned into an outcast, the main culprit for the heavy defeat of the 2 army, the captivity or death of 110 of its thousands of soldiers and suicide of General Samsonov?
The main reproaches addressed (and still addressed) by PK Following the results of Gumbinenn, Rennenkampfu - why he did not organize the immediate pursuit of the retreating troops of the 8 Army von Pritvitz and did not develop success, having at its disposal the corps of General Khan Nakhichevansky’s elite Guards Cavalry, allowing the enemy to retreat and recover from the defeat. Why he led a further attack on Konigsberg, and not on the connection with Samsonov's 2 army. As for the Khan's corps, it was thoroughly battered in the Causensky battle of 6 (19) in August, when the troopers, dismounted by the orders of Nakhichevan, marched in frontal attacks on the German batteries. In addition, Khan's entire corps was on the left flank of the 1 Army, and it was impossible to quickly transfer it to the right flank to send in pursuit of the retreating German divisions ... Of course, Rennenkampf could order to go after the departing enemy and those troops that were in direct contact with him. But, firstly, due to the lack of any reconnaissance means, the withdrawal made by the enemy was discovered only a day late, and secondly, the physical forces and nerves of the warriors who endured the hardest battle turned out to be very exhausted and the commander found it necessary to allow them so desired rest (lasted, according to some sources, about one and a half, according to others - about two days).
Koenigsberg, however, was seen by Zhilinsky, commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front, who led the entire East Prussian operation and supported him at that time as the main strategic goal of the Rennenkampf offensive, and was not even considered the option of turning the 1 army into the 2 army. The Supreme Commander, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich and his staff were so sure that for some reason Gumbinnen should be followed by the complete withdrawal of the German 8 Army from East Prussia beyond the Vistula, which even began a hasty formation in the Grodno and Avgustov area of the new, 10- th army, intended directly for the capture of Berlin ...
Thus, the high command itself incorrectly assessed the situation, and stubbornly forced Rennenkampf to follow the previously outlined route, repeating the typical mistake of those who did not smell gunpowder, but were accustomed to draw impressive staff of arrows on the maps.
By the way, noticed by Leo Tolstoy in the first volume of “War and Peace”, in the description of the preparation of the unfortunate for us Austerlitz battle of 1805 of the year. Remember how a foreign general - the author of a battle plan far from reality - at the meeting on the eve monotonously reiterates his points: "the first column stands, the second column stands ..."
Rennenkampf, in spite of the reproaches that fell soon after (after the defeat of the 2 Army) reproaches, did not show malicious indifference to the fate of Samsonov and his troops. 12 (25) of August, he prescribes a telegram to General Gurko: "Get in touch with the 2 army, the right flank of which 12 is expected in Senseburg". It was the only mention of the attempt to timely organize communication with Samsonov, and it came from Rennenkampf.
From the commander of the front Zhilinsky, as established by the Special Government Commission formed by the sovereign to clarify the causes of the catastrophe in the Mazury lakes, Pavel Karlovich did not even receive a single message about the condition of the Samsonov troops to surround the 2 army corps. and should they not come to the rescue. And it is not by chance that the same commission, which analyzed the activities of Rennenkampf in this operation in the most captious way, bearing in mind the possible imposition on him of responsibility for the troubles that had befallen the North-Western Front, found absolutely no guilt, and the general was left at his post . Meanwhile, as the ill-fated Jacob Zhilinsky (by the way, when he was chief of the General Staff and entered into a bonded agreement with the French about the timing of the beginning of the Russian offensive against Germany), he was finally biased ...
After the defeated Samsonov's 2 Army rolled back into the Russian borders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff again attacked the power of their 8 army, reinforced with reinforcements from the Western Front and again greatly superior to Rennenkampf’s troops, on its 1 Army. To the credit of the Russian general, he did not allow these prominent representatives of the Prussian school to “pay off” with him, as they did with Samsonov, and in perfect order, delivering sensitive retaliatory blows to the enemy (although he also suffered heavy losses), he took his regiments to departure lines.
Nevertheless, the countless detractors of the general did everything to vilify him. Then a legend was born about the “inaction” of Rennenkampf, who allegedly settled accounts with Samsonov for the incident at the Mukden station in 1905, and even more shameful explanations.
“Public opinion”, which was formed in the country under the tune of a far-reaching anti-national liberal community’s plans, was eagerly looking for a “traitor”. The German name Rennenkampf seemed the most appropriate ...
Rear Admiral A.D. Bubnov, who was already involved in the conspiracy of the liberal opposition against the sovereign, wrote in his memoirs: “Public opinion called general criminal inaction of General Rennenkampf criminal and even saw signs of betrayal, because the Germans managed to inflict such a heavy defeat on the Samson army. The share of guilt that fell on General илиilinskiy did not, however, release General Rennenkampf from responsibility for failure to show initiative, passivity, inability to assess the situation and insufficient desire to establish operational communication with Samsonov. ”
Perhaps personal initiative in the East Prussian operation, Rennenkampf, in fact, showed insufficiently, not seeing in the cessation of the German attacks a sign of weakening and withdrawing of the enemy and not organizing the persecution of the retreating, even at any cost. By the way, this is also mentioned in the article about the Gumbinnen battle in the 1994 year published in the 2-th volume of the Military Encyclopedia authoritative in the Armed Forces. However, let us not forget that, both in the subsequent, already Soviet, and in the sunset period of the Russian Empire, the initiative of military leaders was not very welcome, the main valor of the warrior was considered the unconditional and precise execution of the order of the senior commander ...
Be that as it may, the sovereign neither rewarded nor scolded his adjutant general. But his greatest mistake was that he nevertheless dismissed Rennenkampf from the post of commander and 6 in October 1915 dismissed him from the army (albeit with the right to wear his uniform and a well-deserved pension) after the Lodz operation 1914 ended the year. The emperor took the word to his uncle, Supreme Commander Nikolai Nikolayevich that a detachment of German General Scheffer erupted from the “bag” prepared by the Stavka and the front command solely through the fault of the commander of the 1 army of Rennenkampf. In fact, Pavel Karlovich did not have sufficient strength and, alas, again did not have the necessary information to prevent this breakthrough. Even the Soviet historian Korolkov doesn’t call Rennenkampf, but his direct head, Commander General of Infantry N.V., the genuine culprit of the plan for encircling and destroying several German corps in the одód operation of several German corps. Ruzsky. And the number of Germans who escaped from the encirclement was relatively small: if at the beginning of active hostilities, the Schaeffer strike group (3 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) numbered 40 thousand fighters, then only about 6 thousand went to their ...
History, as is known, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. But if Rennenkampf took the post of front commander or at least remained commander-in-chief, it can be said with great certainty that the sovereign had at least one prominent commander who would give him support in a fatal moment for him.
He definitely would not have been led by the liberal opposition in February-March 1917 ...
Pavel Karlovich after his dismissal from the army, in spite of his advanced years, was very much compelled by inaction, to which he was doomed by the ill will of ill-wishers. And his enemies were very powerful. From the correspondence of the War Minister V. A. Sukhomlinov with the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander N.N. Yanushkevich follows that the minister all the time convinced Yanushkevich of the need to remove Rennenkampf. In the end, Yanushkevich and Sukhomlinov, agreeing among themselves and relying on the opinion of the commander’s front, and writing a devastating report submitted by the Grand Duke to the emperor: “The lack of control of the 20 army, which is clearly revealed, makes it hard for the general Lodz operation, to replace the gen. . Rennenkampf General Litvinov, elected General Ruzskim.
Pavel Karlovich asked in vain to indicate to him at least the reasons for his dismissal, he just as unsuccessfully asked to go to the front, even if he was a squadron commander. All his appeals remained unanswered ...
After the February Revolution, 1917 of Rennenkampf was arrested and placed in the Peter and Paul Fortress. His case was conducted by the Emergency Investigation Commission established by the Provisional Government. However, the October Revolution soon broke out, after which Pavel Karlovich, together with several other generals, was released and allowed to leave Petrograd.
Rennenkampf, without delay, went to Taganrog.
We know with great certainty about the last months of life and the circumstances of the tragic death of Pavel Karlovich from the “Investigation Act about the killing of the General from cavalry Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf by the Bolsheviks”.
It was compiled by 11 in May of 1919 in Ekaterinodar and signed by the chairman of the Special Commission of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia by Justice of the Peace G. Meinghard. As stated in this document, PK Rennenkampf lived at the beginning of 1918 in Taganrog "alone away from military and political activities." 20 January of the same year, after entering the city of the Red Guard troops, he found it necessary to go to the illegal situation. Hiding under the surname of the Greek subject Mansudaki and with a passport in his name, the general settled in the house of another Greek, the worker Langusen, at Commercial Street, 1. However, the KGB tracked down Rennenkampf. On March 3, he was arrested and imprisoned at the headquarters of the Taganrog Commissar Rodionov, as confirmed by the WRC himself, “by order from Petrograd”.
“During the detention of General Rennenkampf, the Bolsheviks three times asked him to take command of their army,” the act says, “but he always categorically refused the offer ...”
At the end of March 1918, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops of the South of Russia V.A. arrived in Taganrog. Antonov-Ovseenko. In a conversation with him, Commissioner Rodionov asked what he should do with prisoner Rennenkampf. The commander-in-chief, glorified by Soviet “historians”, expressed surprise at why the tsarist general was still alive, and ordered him to be shot immediately, which was already performed on April 1. The commandant of Taganrog station Evdokimov (a former shipyard worker, then a sailor) with two assistants took Pavel Karlovich by car to the city and there he was martyred ...
The Bolshevik authorities, as they could, hid this villainous murder. The widow Vera Nikolaevna 1 of April, on the day of her husband’s murder, was even given a certificate signed by Commissioner Rodionov and stamped by the WRC that her husband “was sent to Moscow under the authority of the Council of People’s Commissars” by order of Commander Antonov, ...
18 May 1918, after the White Guard troops entered Taganrog, an alliance of officers through the police officials, in the presence of prosecutors, opened the graves of the martyrs of the victims of revolutionary terror. In a hole at the site of the general’s murder, “two bodies were found and dug in underwear alone, with gunshot wounds to the head. In one of these corpses, V.N. Rennenkampf unmistakably identified the corpse of her deceased husband, cavalry general Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf ... ”
His ashes were reburied in the old cemetery of Taganrog.
And in the local history museum of this southern city, there is still a collection of rarities of Chinese art, collected by Rennenkampf during his stay in the Far East.
“For some, he is the most capable of the Russian generals 1914, the winner of the Germans and the savior of Paris, for others he is incompetent, almost a traitor ...” writes Andulenko. “Although General Golovin, in his time, dealt in detail with all the accusations that were thrown at Rennenkampf and, in a substantial way, it would seem, he finally rebuilt him, but one must think that his works remained unknown. Persecution of General Rennenkampf continues ... "
I would like to believe that in the near future, in particular, with the publication of the six-volume fundamental work on the Great War 1914 – 1918, the work on which was already begun by a team of authors, the place and role of PK Rennenkampf will be finally clarified, the truth will prevail. And, perhaps, the Gumbinnen winner will take his rightful place in the pantheon of Russian commanders, if not without flaws and miscalculations, but still leading their troops by the roads of honor and glory.