Since the creation of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) in 2007, the controversy over the effectiveness of the funds spent has been around. Certain hopes to change the situation for the better are laid on the creation of public councils for countering corruption and taking full account of the opinions of specialists, as was mentioned in the Address of President Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly. A former member of the board of the Chief Planning and Production Department of the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, Felix Ostashevich, in an interview with the military industrial complex, shared his reasoned opinion on how to save the shipbuilding industry in Russia.
- How do you rate the development of USC to 2030 year?
- The development of any strategy or program should be based on an analysis of the results. In the USC Strategy, this analysis is practically absent. It is noted that in 2012, the revenue from sales of enterprises of the corporation increased by almost 10 percent, while it accounted for more than 64 percent of the industry-wide. But there is no analysis of the revenue structure. I believe that revenue growth is largely associated with an increase in the volume of state defense orders.
One more example. In the 1.1.1 section. The strategy states: "The volume of production of shipboard machinery by USC enterprises is more than 80 percent of industry-wide." But nothing says that the share of deliveries of imported component equipment in civil shipbuilding is at least 80 percent. Thus, the imported equipment in the price of the vessel is more than 50 percent of the value of the vessel.
- The strategy correctly pointed out such problems as low quality of the products being produced, its high cost (in some cases 1,2 – 1,5 times higher than similar foreign ones), a long period of construction (one and a half to two times longer than foreign ones). Also named personnel complexity and the need for technical re-equipment.
- Everything is noted correctly, in other branches of the defense industrial complex there is a similar situation. However, problems have been noted for a decade and I would like to understand the reasons why they are not only not being solved, but, on the contrary, are becoming more and more acute, despite the increasing number of measures taken. I believe that the matter is not in the number of measures, but in quality. Without analyzing the causes of failures in the development of new documents, including the USC Strategy, you can again step on the old rake. The USC Strategy sets tasks, but this is not enough. It is necessary to prepare levers, a mechanism for their solution, as well as measures for implementation. There is an action plan for the implementation of the USC Strategy and a roadmap. But they, like the strategy itself, are prepared in overdraft.
“What's wrong with the roadmap?”
- Together with the plan of measures for the implementation of the USC Strategy, it is a limited set of correct appeals and slogans without specifying the performers and specific deadlines. The action plan does not indicate specific dates, but three stages - 2013 – 2015, 2016 – 2020 and 2021 – 2030. In order to increase the level of reasonableness of prices and cost, only one measure is envisaged - the creation of a corporate cost management system and pricing in 2013 – 2015.
Measures to reduce the time of construction are not planned. I believe that more serious attention should be paid to the work of the USC parent company. As part of improving the activities of the corporation's apparatus, four activities are envisaged: the formation of the staff structure in 2013 – 2015, the beginning of the formation of divisions in the main business areas, the organization of the matrix management system in 2016 – 2020 and the completion of the formation of the functional structure by product in 2021 – 2030. .
The roadmap in 2013 provided for three activities, including the formation of a staffing structure, and in 2014, seven activities, including the creation of a cost and pricing management system. There is nothing bad in the fact that the development of a new staffing structure is related to issues of strategic development. Moreover, at this stage it reflects the internal struggle of the old and the new compositions of the USC apparatus. The bad news is that this is the only concrete measure in the improvement of corporate governance.
I can hardly imagine why there are eight vice-presidents in its structure, that is, more than at the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the United Aircraft Building Corporation, where there are seven deputies each. What are the questions who decides who is responsible, for example, for work to reduce costs and labor intensity, for the growth of labor productivity? Excessive powers and functions in management lead to a delay in decision making. Compare with the Soviet period. The number of workers in the entire shipbuilding industry of the USSR was more than a million people. The Minsudprom consisted of more than 250 associations, enterprises and organizations. The minister had nine deputies. The number of staff then - less than 0,12 percent of the total number of employees in the industry. In the USC, this ratio is almost five times higher, and unlike the USSR Ministry of Industry Administration, not all managers are professional shipbuilders with work experience in factories.
I suppose, in the form in which the USC Strategy is posted on the website, it has no practical significance, but is a formal document approved by the USC Board of Directors. Nothing new is seen in it, the strategic image of the corporation is not visible, there is little concreteity, and what has been said long ago is repeated. The bell chimes monotonously and the song USK sadly spreads.
- What can replenish the strategy?
- Its authors repeat the same thing: give us orders and good prices and then we will ensure the development of the industry. But if the shipbuilders had the first and second, then the creation of a corporation would not be necessary. She, after all, was created to compete with government support, and the strategy seems to forget about it. It does not contain a critical assessment of its own role, or recognition of the fact that the parent company has become a bureaucratic office.
Failures in the construction of ships are largely due to the awkwardness of the apparatus. It was he who disrupted the construction of an ice-resistant stationary offshore platform - LSP-1 in the Caspian Sea, being built on the order of LUKOIL. Now the term of commissioning of a large deposit named Filanovsky can be postponed to a year later than the planned one, that is, to 2016. The oil company placed an order for the platform not just anywhere, but at USC Astrakhan enterprises on the orders of Vladimir Putin, who participated in the ceremony of starting the exploitation of another Caspian field - Korchaginsky.
Then LUKOIL signed a contract with the Astrakhan group "Caspian energy", after joining the USC renamed to "Rosshelf", and USC acted as the general contractor. However, Astrakhan Shipbuilding Production Association (AFS) failed to deliver the upper part of LSP-1 in time due to the fact that USC did not provide banks with timely security for financing equipment purchases from its suppliers. Now the debt of the AFS to the suppliers is about two billion rubles. But for the implementation of this kind of security work, the head company USC receives its share of the proceeds. It is interesting to whom penalties will be imposed if they are presented by LUKOIL and who from the management of USC will be responsible.
As already mentioned, the strategy is aimed at receiving orders at good prices. High hopes are associated not with their own actions, but with the help of the state in the manual control mode. But the high prices and labor-intensiveness of Russian shipbuilding in the future may lead to manual control and the financial condition of shipowners.
The USC requires after the conclusion of contracts to increase prices for the construction of ships. So it was in the case of LSP-1, so it was repeated when fulfilling the contract with Rosneft for the construction of the White Bear platform offshore drilling platform. The initial contract value in the 2010 year is defined in 710 million US dollars. Then the USC parent company constantly offered to increase the amount to almost two billion dollars at once, and Rosneft refused. Similarly, the corporation behaved during the modernization of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which became the Indian Vikramaditya.
Apparently, this behavior of the management of the corporation has led to the fact that in recent years, more than 90 percent of new ships, Russian shipowners have ordered and built in foreign shipyards. The amount of orders each year reaches a billion dollars.
- What else prevents to return the customer to domestic shipyards?
- The construction time of ships at our enterprises due to their technological backwardness in 2 – 2,5 is more times, therefore, costs increase, the complexity of construction increases by three to five times. So that the cost of work is much higher.
Sovcomflot places almost all main orders abroad. Due to the high prices of USC, the SVL group of companies (Malta) has signed contracts for the construction of three Volga-Don Max class tankers with the Kherson Shipyard in Ukraine with a total value of more than 50 million dollars. Kherson shipbuilders fulfilled their obligations under contracts concluded at the end of 2011 in 2013, although tankers were not built from 1992.
- How do you rate the personnel policy in the industry?
- Since the establishment of the USC, the sixth manager has been appointed. In my opinion, this indicates the need to establish work in the parent company. Personnel Leapfrog - this is the worst that can be.
Today, in the shops there are not enough workers in unique professions that cannot be borrowed from other industries. It is primarily about ship fitters, electricians, installers. In some cases, to prepare workers of such specialties is even more difficult than the engineer. It is advisable to attract specialists from factory universities to the corporate management staff. This is not a relic of the planning system, it is a normal policy of advanced public and private enterprises. I would like to know the share of USC personnel who have passed shipyards or at least have an appropriate education.
And how the corporation attracts out-of-town specialists can be seen on the example of one top manager from the Ryabinsk NPO Saturn. He was transferred to Moscow to the position of head of personnel management, gave six million rubles of lifting, and a year later he left the corporation. Very valuable frame, apparently. Despite the fact that it is still not possible to fully implement the program for providing housing for specialists in enterprises.
- How do you feel about the position of the state in relation to enterprises in the industry that are in a pre-bankrupt state?
- Many shipbuilding enterprises are not just unprofitable, but bankrupt. Of particular concern is the bankruptcy of the Amur Shipyard. And the excitement of new bankruptcies in the 2013 year continued. So, in January, 2013 introduced the procedure of external observation at the Sretensky Shipbuilding Plant in the Chita Region. At a number of enterprises bankruptcy entered the final stage (competitive management). We can recall KB "Horizon", Volgograd Shipbuilding Plant, "Amur ERA".
The worry is that bankruptcy is often associated with abuse. For example, in the fourth quarter of 2012, external surveillance was introduced in relation to the Petrovsky Electrotechnical Plant “Molot”, and in February of the 2013-th Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the former director, who forwarded orders from counterparties, was responsible for the PEMZ “Molot” problems. to another enterprise.
They are concerned about the bankruptcies of related enterprises. For example, the plant "Reid", where once collected control systems for the protection of nuclear reactors of naval vessels.
Bankruptcies of enterprises located in the regions of Siberia and the Far East are of concern, while they are recognized at the very top of our national priority for the entire XXI century. USC actions there are non-standard. After all, the St. Petersburg CB "Rubin" filed a lawsuit against the bankruptcy of the Amur shipbuilding enterprise, which followed the instructions of the USC. The further fate of the Amur and Khabarovsk shipyards has not been determined. Their loading orders is 12 – 15 percent, and the state defense order is not confirmed. 2014 started the year, and the corporation has still not decided what to occupy. What to say about the internal plans. There are problems of Cupid, but how they are overcome, showed last year's flood.
The USC Strategy outlined activities for working with assets, and I fear that they might be reduced to bankruptcy and the sale of factories. There are no measures to restore the solvency of enterprises. There is a lack of actions aimed at the efficient use of the budget funds submitted, as well as at accomplishing the tasks set in the May decrees of the President of the Russian Federation 2012.
According to the results of 2012, the loss on the corporation is about six billion rubles. For the six months 2013 of the year, a cumulative loss was also received. USC was not able to realize its own plans for the development of capacities, including the Far Eastern factory "Zvezda", the Admiralty shipyards. This year, at a number of enterprises, the vessels will be in the initial stage, individual enterprises may remain without orders. That is, the risks remain.
- How do you assess the state of the project for the construction of a new shipyard at JSC DVZ Zvezda?
- USC for the construction of new ships initially set out to create new production facilities. The shipyard on Zvezda was planned specifically for tankers, and at its laying in 2009, the then Vice-Premier, Chairman of the Board of Directors of USC, Igor Sechin, was present. However, the corporation was not able to cope with its own plans for four years. Sechin came to the rescue, together with Gazprombank in 2013, they agreed to create a joint venture - Modern Shipbuilding Technologies CJSC. This joint venture should receive 75 percent minus two shares of the Far Eastern Center for Shipbuilding and Ship Repair, and then it may buy the remaining share from the Federal Property Management Agency.
A corresponding draft presidential decree “On the Formation of a Shipbuilding Industrial Cluster in the Far East” has been prepared. In this cluster there will be almost all the Far Eastern companies of USC, which are now included in the Far Eastern Center of Shipbuilding and Ship Repair. The transaction will take place in several stages. The construction of the Zvezda plant will require investments, the amount of which, up to 2018, is estimated by experts at about 111 billion rubles.
It is planned to build platforms, gas carriers, supply vessels and other equipment for the shelf at the plant. The main customer will be Rosneft, which intends to order 2030 platforms and more 106 support vessels before 200. Perhaps, Sovcomflot will later join the consortium.
President Putin indicated that USC should remain in the consortium (gold share or blocking stake). All this means, in my opinion, that the corporation was not able to independently implement plans for the construction of new shipyards in the Far East. In addition, it is losing a potentially profitable sector. Indeed, the enterprises of the Southern Center for Shipbuilding and Ship Repair, first of all the Lotos plant, as well as the Astrakhan Red Barricades plant (not part of the USC) can be transferred to the joint venture being created. I believe that as a consolation prize, USC will receive the right to create a repair base for the Black Sea fleet RF on the basis of the Novorossiysk Shipyard, which is part of the Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port (NCSP). Now, USC owns a 30% stake in NCSP. Another package, which is managed by Transneft, may be transferred to the USC by order of the Federal Property Management Agency, and the third - by the Summa group - with the help of the same Rosneft, to redeem.
Rosneft, in turn, intended to acquire a part of the shares of the South Korean shipbuilding concern DSME (Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering) for the consortium being created, but was refused by the country's government because of the Koreans' fears of leakage of defense technologies and information abroad.
The deal with DSME would formally announce the early commencement of work by the Russian consortium, placing orders in South Korea. But it’s not up to international business when, due to lack of organization, as of the end of 2013, not a single organizational and regulatory document regulating the organization of work to create a shipbuilding technology cluster in the Far East has been adopted.
Another unrealized plan of USC is the relocation of the Admiralty shipyards from St. Petersburg to Kotlin Island. Because of this, the modernization of the plant was suspended, but now the move has been canceled, as there is no agreement of the city administration. The only result of the plans is to increase the cadastral value of the land plot on Fontanka with an area of 76 thousand square meters, occupied by Admiralty shipyards, to 315 million rubles.
Apparently, USC is used to someone to rearrange her legs. Previously, Sechin did it, now they expect the same from Rogozin.
- How do you assess the cooperation of USC with other domestic companies?
- Oilers need to enter international markets. This requires tankers to transport not only crude oil, but also refined petroleum products, liquefied gas. And most importantly - need a fleet for the development of the shelf. There will be a product (Rosneft, LUKOIL, Gazprom and others) - carriers will be required (Sovkomflot). This means that shipbuilders will also be loaded. Orientation to foreign technology is attractive only in the initial period, in general, it threatens with bondage.
Some oil companies are investing in shipbuilding, and this is a very positive moment. It is understood, looking at the situation, for example, with the White Bear platform and the Far Eastern shipyards, that it is not necessary to expect results from the USC in the near future. But, again, this can turn into subsistence farming and self-sufficiency, and by no means modern cooperation.
Something similar happens with the atomic icebreaking fleet. The active role here is played by the Rosatom Corporation, which includes Atomflot. He orders new nuclear-powered icebreakers, thereby loading not only shipbuilders, but also nuclear engineers. But at the end of 2013, Rosatom has not yet decided on a contractor for the construction of two production nuclear icebreakers of the 22220 project (LC-60) - the largest and most powerful in the world. The only domestic bidder for the execution of these works, that is, USC, cannot agree on a price with the customer. Rosatom held a tender with an initial price of 77,5 billion rubles, and the only bidder - “Baltic Plant - Shipbuilding”, included in USC, is not admitted to trading, as its application amounts to 86,1 billion rubles. Now a multi-billion dollar contract can go to foreign shipbuilders. But at the same time, the power plant will be supplied by Atomenergomash.
Unfortunately, the USC Strategy does not have a section on cooperation with related industries, although it has been noted that the supply of component equipment is not satisfactory.
- How to comment on military shipbuilding?
- Some improvement in the industry is associated with an increase in the volume of the state defense order. The credit for this regulatory legislation is minimal, and the USC apparatus is generally close to zero. I still hope that the corporation will finally complete the Igor Belousov GVK-450 deep-sea diving complex.
Since the crash of "Kursk" it took about 15 years. 118 his sailors died, not because there were no lifeguards, but because there was no equipment. Over the years, Moscow has overtaken other capitals by the number of billionaires, the Olympics in Sochi has been prepared, a draft World Cup project has been launched, a Universiade in Kazan, an ATS summit in Vladivostok, an increase in the salaries of officials of the presidential administration, government, deputies and senators. And the rescue complex is sinking in the bureaucratic sea.
The results of the creation of the Vulkan satellite, designed to prevent earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, are also unknown. Roscosmos started the program back in 1996, a year after the terrible earthquake on Sakhalin, when the whole city of Neftegorsk disappeared from the face of the earth and 1841 died. According to my information, somewhere in 2009, the work on Vulcan, together with the volume of unfinished R & D, was transferred to another company, and the satellite was given a new name. Most likely, the project is terminated, the costs are written off.
Former Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov was unable to organize the effective work of the customer of the GVK-450 Igor Belousov, but he showed his managerial abilities when purchasing Mistral. Then they said a lot that these ships would receive Russian helicopters, weapons, landing gear. But today it turns out that such equipment could take place only when ordering the third and fourth helicopter carriers. Since Russia acquires only two, they will have to put French landing craft, and possibly other means.
It is still not clear what kind of technology we will get along with the ships, where to use them and for what. In my opinion, the most unpleasant thing is that in the American directory “World Military Fleets” the cost of “Mistral” for the French Navy contains 236 million dollars, and Russia bought everyone for 600 million euros. I believe that someone's effective lobbying for a deal that has disgraced us to the whole world should receive a legal assessment.
On the website of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation it was reported that the ZVEZD DVZ, as of 14 in July, 2013 did not fulfill any of the 10 government contracts for which the deadlines had expired. Other tasks of the state defense order are also not performed. For example, from November 2013 on the 2014, the deadlines for the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, which is being built at the Northern Shipyard from 2006, are postponed, the delay with the large landing ship Ivan Gren, which cannot complete the Baltic plant “ Amber".
Russia is now unable to create aircraft carriers, but China is embarking on this. Today, he has one aircraft carrier, created on the basis of the TAKR Kiev, which, I recall, began to be built in the Black Sea Shipyard in 80, and then abandoned. PLA operates the Chengdu J-10, Shenyang J-11, Xian JH-7, Shenyang J-8 and Russian Su-30МК2 airplanes. It is not known which vehicles Beijing will select for new aircraft carriers, maybe not ours.
The new long-term shipbuilding program, which should be prepared in 2014, may include the construction of aircraft carriers and other marine equipment. For example, unmanned underwater vehicles, tests of which have already begun in the world. Thus, the Turkish company GATE Elektronik in the near future will hold in Baku testing and presentation of unmanned underwater vehicles manufactured by the order of Azerbaijan, including those intended for mine clearance. For us, this technique has significant potential on the sea shelf and during rescue operations in the Arctic.
- What are the prospects for cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian shipbuilders?
- At the Ukrainian plant named after 61 of the Communard in Nikolaev there is an unfinished 1164 missile cruiser of the project, until 1998 of the year - “Admiral of the Lobov fleet”. It was laid in 1984 and was to become the fourth ship of the 1164 Atlant project. In 1990, it was launched, and in 1996, the construction was suspended due to lack of funding. According to the plant, the ship’s readiness rate is 95 percent.
Ukraine cannot finish its construction, since it is necessary to acquire models of armaments for which Kiev has accepted international obligations on limitation. The country spends a lot of money for the maintenance of this unfinished cruiser. Russia needs to decide on its acquisition. True, the experience of upgrading the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov for India showed how the price increases in this case. The first vice-president of the Association of Shipbuilders of Ukraine (Ukrsudprom), Viktor Lissitzky, still in 2010, offered to rename the cruiser “St. Petersburg” and simply donate to Russia. He believes that Ukraine does not lose anything, but only gains in strengthening the ties of the shipbuilders of two fraternal countries.
It is a pity, but the USC Strategy does not pay any attention to cooperation with Ukraine. In the media it was reported that in January 2014, simultaneously with the provision of a loan in the amount of 15 billions of dollars to Kiev, a document on cooperation in the field of shipbuilding was signed. I hope the 1164 cruiser is not forgotten in it. You can also consider our acquisition of shares of Ukrainian enterprises that were engaged in the construction of large tankers. For example, in the “Ocean” and “Zaliv” factories, in this case, Russian orders can be placed, and at the Black Sea shipbuilding plant - to build a new Russian aircraft carrier at all. After all, domestic enterprises need to create new capacities, which is extremely expensive, and it is advisable only if there is a serial construction program.
But the most obvious cooperation with Ukraine is the involvement of its skilled workers: welders, ship assemblers, electricians.
- How do you assess the measures of state support of shipbuilding?
- In 2011, the corresponding federal law 305-ФЗ was passed. However, I believe that its regulatory influence is practically absent. The ideologists of the law said that after its entry into force, Russian shipbuilding enterprises would work in equal economic conditions with foreign companies and compete in the world market. The law provides that they will receive tax benefits if they enter a special economic zone. The cost of building ships, according to USC leaders, will decrease by 15 – 25 percent. But when some plants made a calculation of the economic efficiency of entering the SEZ, they shed a tear. It turned out that 305-FZ does not provide any economic support. One factory director told me that he did not see the point of working in the SEZ, since the costs incurred did not pay off. Look: now not a single shipbuilding plant of Russia has entered the economic zone and, accordingly, has not used state support. It says something about something.
Unfortunately, in the USC Strategy there is no analysis of the results of the use of 305-FZ by shipbuilding enterprises. The same Ukraine in 2000 passed the law “On measures for state support of the shipbuilding industry in Ukraine”. According to Viktor Lissitzky, its implementation contributed to the fact that from 2000 to 2004, the volume of sales increased by 3,5 by a factor of almost two times, and the number of contracts for the construction of ships increased. Ukraine is among the top ten countries in terms of tonnage of built ships. But in 2005, the law was suspended, which led to a collapse in the industry. Even threw her in the development of a dozen years.
I note this detail. In Ukraine, shipbuilding regulation was based on a liberal approach and world management experience. Russia should also create a competitive shipbuilding regulatory system against South Korea, Japan or China, which will serve as a signal to foreign customers. Russia joined the WTO, however, the positive consequences of this step are not visible as a whole for the country's economy, and for shipbuilding. Moreover, there was a fall in growth rates in 2013.
There are a number of documents providing for shipbuilding support and state control. Among the well-known presidential decrees of May 2012, there is also an instruction to the government to ensure, by March 1, 2013, the analysis of the effectiveness of the work of state-consolidated companies, including UAC, USC and Russian Technologies, in order to prepare proposals for improving their management, ensuring consistency of development strategies with state programs development of relevant sectors of the economy, gaining leading positions in certain segments of world markets aviation, shipbuilding, information and communication and space technology.
I do not know how this assignment ended. Apparently, nothing. In May, 2013, President Vladimir Putin held a meeting, giving USC a number of instructions, including one — to conduct an audit of technical re-equipment programs for key enterprises of the corporation by the autumn of the same year and approve the USC Development Strategy. Then, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev approved an action plan aimed at increasing the growth rate of the Russian economy. The 22 paragraph of the plan is once again instructed to prepare proposals for creating conditions for ensuring successful growth of the KLA and the USC. The results of the assignment are again unknown. From year to year they talk about the same thing, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the USC are reporting something, but there are no results.
- How can we correct the policy of good intentions and achieve the implementation of specific results?
- It is advisable to rework the USC Strategy. Again, it is necessary to present the results of the analysis of what the USC has achieved and where it is located. It is important to critically analyze the work of the parent company, including the synergistic effect of the merger of shipbuilding enterprises under the roof of USC. Take into account that the effect is not only positive, but also negative, which are associated with the sluggishness of the apparatus and slowness in decision-making. Formally, the activities carried out do not give the expected result, so it is required to evaluate the effectiveness of management decisions. I would also recommend analyzing the impact of the 305-FZ law on the work of shipbuilding enterprises and, maybe, even creating an anti-crisis committee.
It is necessary to critically examine the causes of failures and the lack of a proper synergistic effect from creating a USC, not to create a sea of papers. After all, it is possible to increase the volume of state orders and finance at the expense of the budget technical re-equipment without a corporation.
The management structure of the USC is advisable to supplement, for example, with a permanent meeting of the heads of organizations. It is not necessary to include everyone at once, it is enough for 15 – 20 people in case of turnover of staff, including to include the chairman of the branch council of trade unions.
It is necessary to make a transparent source of financing the costs of maintaining the apparatus. This should not be the provision of any nominal services to enterprises, the receipt of trade allowances for the supply of equipment to customers. The budget of the staff of the corporation should be considered at such a permanent meeting. It is important that the USC does not turn into a leech on the body of the industry.
The strategy should be supplemented with a clear plan of measures for its implementation and a “road map”. That road, which is planned by the existing document, refers to the second Russian disaster. As for the first misfortune, it is necessary to analyze the suitability of all heads of USC units in education and work experience in the shipbuilding industry. Approve a cost reduction program, including in terms of energy efficiency, appoint a vice president responsible for this section. Create a budget and cost reduction committee with the board of directors.
To supplement the Strategy with sections on the implementation of the May 2012 of the presidential decrees, including the creation of high-performance jobs and productivity growth. I want to note that in shipbuilding, the proportion of manual labor is high and it is desirable to analyze this during the certification of workplaces.
To inscribe into the strategy sections on reaching the break-even level, preventing bankruptcy, strengthening interaction with related industries and Ukrainian shipbuilders. Explore best practices and distribute it. For example, the Serpukhov Instrument-Making Plant (part of the RATEP company) from the 2009 year of the re-equipment and modernization program starts with the indicators of productivity growth.
All of this is the main state documents. 29 September 2013, the Russian president gave a number of instructions to the government to ensure the achievement of the target indicators of the country's socio-economic development. There is such a task - to approve a plan of measures to ensure the increase in labor productivity, the creation and modernization of high-performance jobs in the parameters defined by the May presidential decree "On long-term state economic policy." Pay special attention to the need for state corporations, companies with state participation in which the Russian Federation owns more than 50 percent of shares, organizations controlled by these companies, productivity growth indicators and modernized jobs, as well as taking into account the achievement of these targets when evaluating the performance of their managers. .
The USC can now start developing a system of remuneration for work in conjunction with key performance indicators (KPI) set for each top manager, including the growth of labor productivity and the creation of high-performance jobs.
On the websites of all large corporations and development institutions there must be data not only on the growth of labor productivity in percent, but also on the volume of national and sectoral GDP produced by them. The calculation of labor productivity growth is based on GDP. In matters of training, whenever possible, encourage the creation of young technicians' stations, ship-model circles, sections of radio amateurs and other forms of organizing children's creativity related to equipment at enterprises.
Unfortunately, in Russia there is no responsibility for the fulfillment of forecasts, there is not even published an analysis of the causes of failures. For example, in 2013, the GDP growth forecast was revised downwards several times. During the planning period of economic development, the rule “plan - law” was in force. Also in the USC it is desirable to establish this kind of order. Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin said in an interview: “I understood what the Russian industry needs. Not investment, not money. The organization of the case is necessary. You just need to organize all the people, systematically set a task for them, distribute the powers, delegate them, and you will see how suddenly, it would seem, the dead situation becomes livelier. ” I agree with Rogozin and I want to emphasize that, if necessary, veterans of the USSR Ministry of Industry and Industry are ready to make proposals for optimizing the work of the industry.
Ostashevich Felix Ivanovich was born on January 24 1928 of the year in the city of Barnaul. In 1951, he graduated from the Faculty of Engineering and Economics of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute with a degree in Engineering and Economist. From 1951 to 1965, he worked at the Baltic Shipbuilding Plant (Leningrad) as the head of the planning and distribution bureau of the building berth, deputy head of the building berth for production, and the head of the planning and economic department of the plant. In 1965, he was transferred to the central office of the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. From 1976 to 1992 year - Head of the Main Planning and Production Directorate, member of the board of the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. At the same time he was the editor-in-chief of the magazine “Economics of the Shipbuilding Industry”. After the reorganization of the USSR Ministry of Industry and Industry worked in various organizations of the shipbuilding industry. He was awarded the Order of the October Revolution, the Red Banner of Labor, the "Badge of Honor" and medals.