The role of the “anchor” holding Bessarabia from Romania moves from the PMR to the Gagauz and the Bulgarians: regional results-2013
In 2013, the Bessarabian, Transdniestria and Romania factors of regional scale were the Bessarabian political crisis, the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, the intensification of the Romanian-unionist tendencies on both banks of the Prut and the related centrifugal regionalist processes in Bessarabia, and the final loss of the app. Transnistrian conflict in the framework of the "territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova".Bessarabia: through a new crisis to external management
The first half of 2013 of the year passed in Bessarabia under the sign of the most acute domestic political crisis in recent years, as a result of which the Alliance for European Integration collapsed, and the matter almost reached the dissolution of parliament and early parliamentary elections. The reason for the new round of the political crisis was the scandal around the murder of carelessness on the bureaucratic hunt of the entrepreneur Sorin Pachu and the attempts of the officials to hide this crime.
These events provoked a sharp aggravation of relations within the framework of the ruling Alliance for European integration and its subsequent collapse. The scenario of early elections was avoided solely as a result of unprecedented external interference in the internal policy of Bessarabia by European officials, who in fact forced embarrassed former alliance partners to appease ambitions and mutual offenses and create a new ruling coalition.
At the same time, difficult negotiations on the re-establishment of a pro-European alliance provoked a split in the Liberal Party. The 7 of 12 Liberal Deputies, two ministers, several deputy ministers and some local leaders announced the creation of the Committee for the Reform of the Liberal Party and demanded that the party’s leader instead of Mihai Ghimpu be Chisinau Mayor Dorin Chirtoaca. All "liberal reformers" were immediately expelled from the party. However, it was they who subsequently entered (unlike the liberals who had passed into opposition, who remained under Ghimpu's control) into the new ruling coalition, and at the end of the year they established a new Liberal Reform Party.
On May 30, in Chisinau, the creation of a Coalition of pro-European government was announced, which included the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party and the group of "liberal reformers." On the same day, the representative of the Democratic Party, Igor Corman, was elected chairman of the parliament, and the Liberal Democrat and former Foreign Minister Yuri Leanca headed the government, in which the members of the Liberal Party were no longer included. The presented program of the new Cabinet of Ministers provides that in the remaining one and a half year period, the new government "should bring the integration of Moldova into the European Union to the point of no return." In fact, Bessarabia completely abandoned its own sovereignty and openly passed under external control.
The main event of the second half of the year for Bessarabian domestic and foreign policy was the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit held in late November. On it, the Bessarabian authorities initialed an agreement on association and creation of a free trade zone with the EU. The event was filed by the authorities as the most pivotal, key andhistorical“for Bessarabia, the accomplishment after the proclamation of the“ Republic of Moldova. ”According to the Bessarabian Prime Minister Jury Leanca, in Vilnius“ the Republic of Moldova got a chance to gain a foothold in the European space ”and“ prove to everyone that it deserves its big dream - political and economic integration into the European Union "
In the role of the nominal enemy of "European perspectives" of Bessarabia, Russia was finally consolidated last year. It is Moscow that the Bessarabian authorities accuse of all kinds of intrigues against the Bessarabian "European integration." As an exhaustive proof, the statements of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who visited Chisinau in early September, are about the "European integration" path of Chisinau, which, he said, could turn for him a "loss" of Transnistria, a loss of the Russian market, problems in the field of energy and labor migration, delays in NATO and perennial "humiliations" in the EU "waiting room". The official Chisinau unequivocally described it as “blackmail” in order to force him to abandon the course towards “European integration”.
Meanwhile, the only practical consequence of Rogozin’s statements so far has been that 10 of September stopped deliveries of Bessarabian alcohol to Russia due to its non-compliance with safety requirements. According to Chisinau, the lost profits of winemakers from the Russian embargo for the next 3 of the month exceeded $ 20 million. At the same time, the Bessarabian authorities claim that the embargo will be lifted very soon - at the beginning of 2014.
Otherwise, the concerns of Chisinau regarding the "pressure of Russia" have so far proved to be groundless. At the end of December, Gazprom not only extended the contract for the supply of gas to the Republic of Moldova that expired on January 1 on January 2012, but also made some reduction in the price of "blue fuel" according to the current calculation formula. No special actions were taken against Bessarabian migrant workers in Russia, despite the fact that according to the FMS of the Russian Federation, more than half of the only 550 thousand citizens of the Republic of Moldova officially residing in Russia are illegally there. According to unofficial estimates, about 750 thousand of Moldovan citizens work in Russia, thus, about 200 thousand people can safely be added to the official figure of illegal migrants from Bessarabia.
In September 2013 of the Year, the Communist Party (PCRM) once again proclaimed the beginning of the “velvet revolution”, the purpose of which is “to force the authorities to surrender”. As part of this campaign, the Communists picketed the parliament building and other authorities, and also blocked the republican routes for several minutes. The final point of the “velvet revolution” program was a “march on Chisinau”, in which about 10 thousand people took part, who after several hours of chanting anti-government slogans in the center of Chisinau went home to the call of the communists themselves. In the final media ratings, the velvet revolution from the PCRM was unanimously named the main political bluff of 2013 of the year.
Another bluff of the year can be considered the construction of the gas pipeline Iasi - Ungeny. A formal start to the construction was given on 27 August 2013 of the year - on the "Day of Independence of the Republic of Moldova". Romanian Prime Minister Viktor Ponta, his Bessarabian colleague Yuri Leanca and EU Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger took part in the launch ceremony. The launch of the pipeline was scheduled for the end of December. Then, however, it turned out that the "start of construction" turned out to be a sham, and after the solemn ceremony of launching the construction, the work was immediately stopped, and the construction equipment and materials, including pipes, were removed. At the same time, Romanian President Traian Basescu, who arrived at the proposed construction site, expressed the opinion that the project will be completed no earlier than the spring of 2014. Later, in addition, it turned out that Bucharest and Chisinau had forgotten to design a section of the gas pipeline that should pass under the Prut River and, accordingly, combine the two parts of the pipeline.
The rush to build the Bessarabian-Romanian gas pipeline is more symbolic and political than practical. Through the Iasi-Ungheni gas pipeline, Chisinau is counting on "diversifying gas supplies." At the same time, at present, Romania itself does not cover its gas needs from its own sources and imports from Russia from 22% to 42% of the volume of gas consumed by it. The potential deposits of gas found on the Black Sea shelf, which was settled in Romania’s 2009 year at Ukraine, are currently being investigated for the profitability of their production, which, if successfully completed this process, can begin only by the end of the decade. Thus, the hypothetical "Romanian gas" on the border with Bessarabia can appear no earlier than 2020 of the year.
In the military-political sphere in 2013, the impetus of the army of the “neutral” RM in military cooperation with NATO continued. 11 April 2013, the Bessarabian Parliament, despite the constitutional status of neutrality, ratified an agreement with the European Union on the participation of its military personnel in "EU crisis management operations." In June, the parliament ratified an agreement on military cooperation with NATO member Romania, which also contains secret provisions on mutual military assistance.
In the fall, on October 2, the Bessarabian government approved the decision to send a contingent of troops from 33 to participate in a NATO operation in Kosovo. 1 November this decision was approved by Parliament. And on December 20, at the meeting of the collegiate council of the defense department, where the year’s results were summed up, the main “achievements” for 2013 were the decision to send military contingent to participate in the NATO operation in Kosovo, as well as the full implementation of all the tasks and partnership commitments set for the reporting year as part of the Operational Individual Partnership Plan with NATO (IPAP) and the Analysis and Planning Process Program (PARP).
Against this background, the statement of the State Security Committee of Transnistria that Chisinau, Washington and Brussels reached an agreement on the prospect of Moldova’s refusal of neutral status and subsequent accession to NATO sounded quite logical in the last days of the outgoing year. At the same time, they state in the Transnistrian special service, "the only problem for which the Moldovan leadership can use the armed forces is the elimination of the Transdniestrian statehood by force, in violation of all previously reached agreements and in violation of the existing norms of international law."
Toward the close of the year, the Bessarabian Constitutional Court noted with another sensational decision. December 5 COP decided that the state language in the country, contrary to the text of the constitution, is "Romanian." The Constitutional Court ruled that the “Romanian” and Moldavian languages can be considered identical, and the text of the “Declaration of Independence of Moldova”, which refers to the “Romanian language” (in the declaration of independence, the “Romanian language” syntagma is mentioned as part of the reference to the 1989 laws of the year proclaiming Moldovan of the state language and the “return” to him of the Latin script, while in these documents themselves the language, as well as in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova adopted in 1994, is called Moldovan), prevails over the text of the Constitution, where it is called Moldovan.
The decision of the Constitutional Court on the predominance of the “declaration of independence” over the constitution is borne by other obvious legal and political consequences that have not yet been claimed, but can be legally executed at the right moment. Thus, the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova, adopted by the Chisinau Parliament 27 of August 1991, declares the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the USSR Law "On the formation of the Union Moldavian SSR" (by joining Bessarabia to Transnistria), and also annuls "acts of dismemberment of the national territory 1775" 1812's, "as a result of which the Moldavian principality lost Bukovina, one part of which today is the territory of the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine, and the other - the territory of Romania, and Bessarabia, the pain The second part of which is the territory of modern "Republic of Moldova" in its actual borders, while the southern part is included in the Odessa region of Ukraine. Thus, the Kishinev "Declaration of Independence", which now prevails over the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, annuls de jure the presence of Transnistria in Moldova, as well as cancels the modern Moldovan-Romanian and Moldovan-Ukrainian borders.
Gagauzia and Taraclia: Budjak Republic against "European Integration"
In 2013, another “hot spot” with autonomist sentiments was marked in Bessarabia - the Tarakli district, mostly populated by Bulgarians. On April 9, the Taraclia regional council unanimously adopted an appeal to the Bessarabian authorities to endow the area with national-cultural autonomy. The draft law “On the special status of the Taraclia national-cultural region of the Republic of Moldova” submitted by the regional authorities suggests that the region with a compact residence of the Bulgarian population the status of administrative autonomy and the center of national-cultural autonomy of the Bulgarian community of Bessarabia, where in official areas of communication along with the state (Moldovan) are used Bulgarian and Russian. So far, there has been no reaction from the Bessarabian authorities to the submitted draft document.
In the confrontation with Chisinau, the Taraclia authorities naturally found allies in the face of neighboring Gagauzia. The mayor of Taraclia, Sergei Filipov, has repeatedly stated that the Taraclia region and the Gagauz autonomy have a unified position on the issue of the country's foreign policy, which is the need to integrate into the Customs Union of Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan. According to him, the Taraclia region and the Gagauz autonomy have “enormous prospects for cultural, social and economic integration and cooperation.”
And after the authorities of Gagauzia, contrary to Chisinau, decided to hold 2 February in Gagauzia a referendum on the attitude towards the foreign policy vector of the Republic of Moldova (integration into the EU or the Customs Union), and about the deferred independent status of Gagauzia, the authorities of Taraclia district decided to hold on the same day at the same time in all localities of the district "public consultations with citizens" on similar issues.
The Gagauz-Bulgarian rapprochement, mutual support and joint opposition to Chisinau’s foreign policy were so intense that the regional political discourse revived the idea of uniting the two territories, the ATU Gagauz Yeri and the Taraclia region, which was conditionally called the Budzhak Republic, which revolves around the south.
Gagauzia itself, meanwhile, was shaken for most of the year by internal political scandals and civil strife between Bashkan Mihail Formuzal and his majority in the National Assembly, controlled by the Bessarabian Democratic Party. Democrats tried several times to impeach the head of autonomy. In mid-November, the Democrats succeeded in dismissing the Autonomy Executive Committee (Government) headed by Formuzal. However, for the resignation of the Bashkan they did not have enough votes.
Temporary truces between political opponents occurred only during periods of exacerbation of Comrat’s confrontation with Chisinau. However, the number of conflicts between the authorities of the autonomy and the Bessarabian leadership in the past year has increased significantly. In April, for example, the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia unanimously approved the draft law “On ensuring the principles of equality, fairness and objectivity”, prohibiting the propaganda of “homosexual lifestyle”. The document was approved in contrast to the 25 adopted by the Bessarabian Parliament under pressure from the EU and contrary to the position of the “Law on Ensuring Equality” by the majority of the population and the church protecting the rights of sexual minorities. And although the law was later "repealed" by the Comrat court at the request of the Chisinau State Chancellery, this allowed at least temporarily unite the opposing Gagauz political clans.
At the end of June, the initiative group gathered more than 5 thousands of signatures in Gagauzia under a document proposing as a response to the Chisinau authorities' constant violation of the law on the special status of Gagauzia to hold a referendum on withdrawing from the Republic of Moldova and returning to the framework of the independent Gagauz Republic, proclaimed 19 in August 1990 of the year and also on the entry of Gagauzia into the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, or into the European Union. The initiative provoked a very strong reaction from Chisinau, but also contributed to the consolidation of the Gagauz political class.
The initiatives put forward later on the prohibition of the use of the unconstitutional terms “Romanian language”, “Romanian literature”, “Romanian history” in relation to the Moldavian language, literature and history, as well as the creation of its own analogue of the Constitutional Court - the Tribunal had a similar effect. Code. Both of these initiatives also provoked a sharply negative reaction from the Bessarabian authorities.
The standoff between Chisinau and Comrat reached a peak after the autonomy parliament appointed the holding of referendums on the attitude to the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova and the deferred status of independence in February 2, according to which, in case of loss of the RM sovereignty, Gagauzia will automatically become an independent republic. Already at the beginning of January 2014, the Comrat district court, at the request of the state office of the Chisinau government and in violation of both the Law on the special legal status of Gagauzia and Utah Gagauzia, "recognized as illegal" the decision of the Gagauz People's Assembly to hold these plebiscites, and the Bessarabian Prosecutor General's Office started 2014 in January criminal prosecution under the article "arbitrariness" on this fact. Nevertheless, the Gagauz authorities declared that the referendums would be held despite any bans from Chisinau.
Bessarabian-Transdniestrian settlement: divorce - civilized and civilizational
On the one hand, the disastrous presidency of Ukraine in the OSCE, and on the other hand, the choice between two myths made by Chisinau, the “reintegration” of Transdniestria and the “European integration”, was in favor of the latter. At the request of the EU, Chisinau established stationary border-migration points along the Dniester, thus completing the design of a full-fledged state border between Bessarabia and Transdniestria. At the same time, Transnistria did not participate in the negotiations on the association agreement of the Republic of Moldova with the EU and refused to join the free trade zone created by them.
Chisinau, in turn, continued the practice of regularly provoking incidents in the Security Zone of the Bessarabian-Transdniestrian conflict, thus trying to discredit the existing peacekeeping mechanism under the auspices of Russia. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that for half a year Kishinev side blocked the work of the Joint Control Commission - the only body authorized to resolve controversial and conflict situations in the Security Zone.
The accumulating contradictions, aggravated by the permanent political crisis in Chisinau, put the 5 + 2 negotiations in jeopardy (Moldova, Transnistria - parties to the conflict, Russia, Ukraine - guarantors and mediators, OSCE - mediator, European Union and observers). At the same time, the Ukrainian chairmanship in the OSCE coordinating the negotiation process was immediately noted by a number of diplomatic failures, which only exacerbated the already difficult situation in the negotiation process.
The very first visit of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara to the 21-22 region of January turned into a scandal. At the final briefing at Chisinau’s international airport before flying to Kiev, Kozhara unexpectedly said: “I think that Mr. Shevchuk and I found mutual understanding: he confirmed that Transnistria is ready to discuss the political status of this region within the Republic of Moldova.” This statement was immediately refuted first by the PMR President Yevgeny Shevchuk, and then by the PMR Foreign Minister Nina Shtanski.
The results of the 5 rounds of negotiations during the year in the 5 + 2 format under the Ukrainian chairmanship were the unimplemented agreement to dismantle the emergency cableway through the Dniester, as well as several other technical agreements. Ukraine has also recorded “the resumption of a direct dialogue between the leaders of the parties”. President of the PMR Yevgeny Shevchuk and the new Bessarabian Prime Minister Yuri Leanca actually held two meetings in the fall, however, despite Kiev’s efforts, none of them went through Ukraine. The only result of the first of these, held in Tiraspol, was the formal extension of the protocol on freight rail traffic signed a year and a half ago through Transnistria. And the main event of the second - in German Bavaria - was the statement by Yevgeny Shevchuk that the only viable and advantageous option for all parties to resolve the conflict is a “civilized divorce”.
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic: the first "Day of Europe" against the background of "Eurasian integration"
Last year, the confrontation between President Yevgeny Shevchuk and the oppositional Supreme Council continued in the internal politics of Transnistria. To open conflicts, however, it almost did not reach. The greatest disagreement was caused by the initiative of the President that appeared in May to transfer the Supreme Council to Bendery. The parliament resisted the move and by a majority vote adopted a resolution “On the location of representative bodies of state power in the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika”, which fixed the location of the Transnistrian parliament in the capital Tiraspol.
The criticism of deputies was also caused by the blocking by the authorities in May of a number of Internet sites, known for their criticism of public authorities. The deputy protest, however, was limited to a series of critical statements by a number of opposition parliamentarians, a round table and a rally in Tiraspol.
On July 10, Transnistria’s President Yevgeny Shevchuk replaced the head of government: Tatiana Turanskaya was appointed instead of Pyotr Stepanov. During the year, the head of state also conducted a number of personnel changes that most affected the security agencies. And at the end of December, a representative of the President of the PMR in Russia, Mikhail Bergman, was dismissed. He was involved in a number of political scandals in Transnistria over the last year, provoked by his statements about the future of Transnistria as an autonomy within the Republic of Moldova.
Also in December, the Supreme Council adopted the first three-year budget in the history of the republic - for 2014-1016 years. At the same time, deputies made a number of fundamental amendments to the document, which President Shevchuk opposed. As a result, the president vetoed a part of the amendments adopted by the deputies, and in 2014 the year Transnistria again entered without a full-fledged main financial document. However, for Transnistria, this situation is not news: because of the contradictions between the president and the parliament, the whole 2013 year the republic lived without an adopted law on the state budget.
2013 was a very eventful year in Transnistrian-Russian relations. In April, the launch of a large-scale humanitarian project in Russia, which will be implemented through the non-profit organization "Eurasian Integration", was announced in the PMR. During the 2013-2015. It is planned to allocate more than 3 billion Russian rubles for the implementation of social projects in the PMR through the ANO "Eurasian Integration". These funds are supposed to be spent on the construction of a pediatric hospital "Mother and Child Center" and a radiation therapy building in Tiraspol, tuberculosis dispensaries in Bendery and Rybnitsa, the medical faculty of Shevchenko PSU in Tiraspol, as well as 5 kindergartens and 3 secondary schools in various localities PMR.
September 7-9 The Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill visited Transnistria for the first time. September 9 on A.V. Square Suvorov in Tiraspol, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church addressed the inhabitants of the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika. "God keeps Transdniestria. And it is a wonderful example of how people of different nationalities live together and, perhaps, therefore, absolutely rigid Transnistrian is any harsh nationalism, chauvinism and national superiority. You are a people of Transnistria who can live in peace with each other. And keep it as a great achievement of your ancestors and as a wonderful result of your own efforts, "said Patriarch Kirill.
As a result of the meeting of Transnistrian President Yevgeny Shevchuk in October with the Deputy Chairman of the Government and Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on Transnistrian Moldavian Republic Dmitry Rogozin, a joint protocol was signed on October 9 in Moscow. The “Rogozin-Shevchuk Protocol” implies new opportunities for direct interagency cooperation, the participation of Transnistrian enterprises in the Russian defense order and the system of state orders and public procurement, as well as the inclusion of Transnistria in the national programs of the Russian Federation.
December 4 Yevgeny Shevchuk submitted to the Supreme Council of the PMR a draft constitutional law to be applied in the territory of Transnistria of Russian federal legislation, while the legislation of the PMR in the hierarchy is given to the federal level. On December 25 the Parliament of Transnistria approved the presidential initiative in the first reading. The incorporation of the Russian legislation into the Transnistrian legal system is planned to be carried out in three stages: first, the norms that do not need cardinal processing will be implemented, then it is proposed to unify the norms in the economic sphere. The third stage involves the restructuring, in accordance with Russian legislation, of the system of government in Transnistria.
In parallel with the intensification of Transnistrian-Russian cooperation, more and more active efforts to promote "European values" in the republic, with the permission of its authorities, are deploying diplomatic missions and EU structures. In May, 2013, for the first time, celebrations were held in Tiraspol on Europe Day. In October, the opening of the first "European Club", created with the support of the EU delegation in Chisinau and designed to promote "European values" among Transnistrian youth, took place in Transnistria. And in early December, the first European Union Information Center opened in Tiraspol. It is worth noting that such events and information centers are already being held and functioning in the cities of Bessarabia, and the head of the EU diplomatic mission in Chisinau, Pirkka Tapiola, explicitly stated that one of the goals of these steps, besides promoting "European values", is that on the two banks of the Dniester. "
Bessarabia joins Romania: “Ask and receive”
The main content of the internal political agenda of Romania was related to the ongoing confrontation between President Traian Basescu and the government coalition opposing him, which is in the hands of both the executive and legislative branches of government. At the same time last year, regular conflicts within the ruling coalition itself were added to this confrontation, because of which it was on the verge of collapse several times.
In March, 2013, President Traian Basescu announced a break with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which he headed before being elected president in 2004, and which supported him for the next eight and a half years. After that, the supporters of Basescu created a new political party - the Popular Movement. And about. Party leader became a member of the Romanian Parliament Eugen Tomak. The stated main goals of the "People's Movement" are related to supporting the current president and getting a good result in the elections to the European Parliament in 2014. And the main ideological task of the party was to proclaim Bessarabia’s “European future”, for which Basescu himself and his former adviser on relations with the diaspora, Tomak, a native of Bessarabia, consistently advocate joining Romania. At the same time, according to the law, Basescu himself cannot take part in the activities of the party while he is the head of state, however he made it clear that he will join the movement immediately after the completion of the second presidential mandate.
Traian Basescu’s second presidential mandate ends at the end of 2014, and his further political actions are one of the main political intrigues. Basescu himself said in December that after the completion of his mandate, he intends to come to grips with the project of uniting Bessarabia with Romania. All his latest actions and statements fit into this logic. After the creation of the party, whose goal is the "European perspective of Bessarabia," and led by Tomak, who came from Bessarabia, Basescu visited Chisinau, where he stated at a meeting with young people that only the will of Chisinau was necessary for Bessarabia to unite with Romania. Answering the question of one of the participants of the meeting about whether it is possible to unite the two states for the earliest "integration" of the RM into the EU, the head of the Romanian state said: "Ask and receive."
In turn, the mayor of Chisinau, Dorin Chirtoaca, offered Basescu, from whom the second presidential mandate expires in 2014, to obtain the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova and continue his political career in Chisinau. “I am sure that having received Moldovan citizenship, Traian Basescu could take any position. He will accelerate the process of European integration,” either in jest, or the mayor of Chisinau seriously said. This statement was actively picked up and supported by Basescu himself, as well as by Romanian politicians and media, who considered it quite realistic.
And 27 November 2013, Traian Basescu proclaimed that the accession of Bessarabia is a new "fundamental national project" of Romania after already implemented - joining NATO and the EU. According to the Romanian leader, the union will not happen now, but "someday we will unite, because blood is not water." This statement caused a negative reaction from the authorities in Chisinau, who said that it was in the hands of only the Communists and the Kremlin. In addition, the statement of Băsescu was condemned as "untimely" by Romanian Prime Minister Viktor Ponta and Romanian Foreign Minister Titus Korlecian, as well as representatives of the European Commission.
Repeatedly during the year, relations between Romania and Hungary sharpened. Traditionally, the apple of contention was Transylvania and the unrecognized Bucharest Sekuy region. In February, a “war of flags” broke out between Bucharest and Budapest. The reason for the scandal was the incident that took place at the inauguration ceremony of the new prefect of the Romanian county Covasna, when the Hungarians were not allowed to place the secular flag in the conference hall in which the event took place. State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary Zsolt Nemeth stated that the Hungarians from Transylvania were subject to "symbolic aggression" by the Romanian authorities, since they were unable to use the flag of the Secuy region, and called on the mayors of all the settlements of Hungary to hoist the flag of the Secuy region in their settlements. The next day, the Hungarian Ambassador to Bucharest Oscar Fuzesh was urgently summoned to the Romanian Foreign Ministry, who was told that "the Romanian authorities do not accept and will not accept such an annoying interference, which contradicts the constitutional and legal basis of Romania." In turn, Romanian Prime Minister Viktor Ponta said that Bucharest would not tolerate such “audacity” from anyone from abroad.
The next day, the Hungarian Ambassador to Romania himself added fuel to the flaming up conflict. In an interview with Romanian television, the diplomat said that Hungary fully supported the requirements of the Hungarians of Transylvania for autonomy. A day later, Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi confirmed that the statement of the Ambassador of Hungary to the Romanian Foreign Ministry and his statements on the issue of autonomy fully correspond to the position of the Hungarian government. Meanwhile, Romanian Foreign Minister Titus Korletsyan threatened to expel the Hungarian ambassador. In response, Zsolt Nemeth threatened with “diplomatic measures” if Romania did not end the “flag war” in Transylvania. The conflict gradually disappeared after the meeting of the President of Romania Traian Basescu with the Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban at the summit of EU leaders in Brussels.
However, in July a new diplomatic conflict broke out between the two countries. Within the framework of the traditional annual Hungarian summer school held in the Transylvanian city of Baile Tushnad, one of the political leaders of the Hungarians of Transylvania, Romanian MEP Laszlo Tokes, turned to the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to take Transylvania under the Hungarian protectorate. According to the politician, Transylvania under its own flag and protectorate of Budapest will be "a step towards autonomy of the seues." Within the framework of the same event, Hungarian Foreign Minister Zolt Nemeth stated that Budapest could not but support the struggle of the Romanian Hungarians for their democratic rights, which include the right to education in their native language, to use their own symbolism and to legitimize the unrecognized Bucharest Secuy region. Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Shemien made even tougher statements at the forum, saying that Hungary has the same right to support the Hungarian community in Romanian Transylvania, like Romania itself, which "intervenes for the Romanians in the Republic of Moldova, the Vlachs in Serbia and all Romanians from the diaspora. " The statements of the Hungarian high-ranking officials were responded by the Romanian Foreign Ministry, which accused Budapest of interfering in the internal affairs of the Romanian state, contrary to political, legal and diplomatic norms. In turn, Romanian Prime Minister Viktor Ponta said that appeals to the protectorate of Hungary over Transylvania are “criminalized” because they “encroach on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Romania.”
In August, the leader of the Hungarian nationalist party Jobbik Gabor Von noted with even more sharp statements during another Hungarian-language summer school in Harghita, who stated, in order to protect the interests of Hungarians of Transylvania and their rights to autonomy, the Jobbik party was ready to take responsibility for the conflict with Romania. He also supported the initiative of one of the leaders of the Trans-Hungarian Hungarians, the Romanian euro-parliamentarian Laszlo Tokes, on establishing a protectorate of Hungary over Transylvania. The Romanian Foreign Ministry reacted to the statements of the Hungarian politician, demanding that the Hungarian government distance itself from the "extremist" declarations of the leader Jobbik. In a response statement, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry stressed that Jobbik is an opposition party, which "is not involved in the activities of the Hungarian government and does not share its responsibility."
After that, a harsh statement on the Hungarian topic was marked by silenced President Traian Basescu until then. He said that Hungary "has become a source of instability," and Bucharest will take the lead in the campaign to rein in Budapest "to put it in place." The Romanian leader added that 2013 will be the last year for Hungarian politicians to move around Romania in such a relaxed way. “This year they crossed the line, after which we have to tell them“ enough! ”Said the President of Romania. This time, the head of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Titus Korlecian, smoothed the accents, who called the Basescu anti-Hungarian statement a“ very dangerous step in international relations. ”
Throughout the year, protests against the development and production of shale gas by the American company Chevron continued in Romania. Protests under the general slogan "Chevron, go home!" were organized with the filing of environmental movements, who believe that the negative effects of shale gas production have not been studied. In turn, Romanian Prime Minister Viktor Ponta said that the country does not want to import Russian gas at the current price, and shale gas may be the way out. In mid-October, environmentalists, with the support of local residents, made Chevron suspend exploration of shale gas near the village of Pungesht, Vaslui County, by mid-October. The local council decided to hold a consultative referendum on the attitude of the population towards the exploration and production of shale gas in the region, but the plebiscite was canceled by the central authorities of the country.
Romanian President Traian Basescu said that Gazprom and Russia as a whole are the main subjects interested in disrupting the development of gas deposits on the Black Sea shelf in Romania, and especially shale gas deposits. Commenting on mass protests against shale gas production in the country, Basescu expressed the opinion that Russia fears that otherwise Romania will become an exporter of gas and will deprive Gazprom of part of the European market. Meanwhile, already a week later, information appeared that Gazprom was starting geological exploration work to search for shale gas deposits in the Bihor district in Romania.
Agenda and Predictions - 2014
For Bessarabia, the 2014 year will be marked by the campaign for parliamentary elections to be held in November. Before the elections, the country's authorities will most likely sign the Association Agreement with the EU initialed in Vilnius, and the European Union will provide the Moldovan citizens with the promised visa-free regime for short-term trips to the EU. These "achievements" will be the main and only argument of the pro-European parties during the election campaign.
Considering that these arguments are clearly not enough to win the elections, it is possible that the Bessarabian authorities will go to the introduction of a mixed electoral system and try to make maximum use of administrative and financial resources during the elections in single-member districts.
The emergence of new political figures closer to the elections in the Bessarabian political arena is very likely. Ex-Prime Minister Ion Sturza, who is eyeing the new Liberal Reform Party, and the current head of the Constitutional Court, Alexander Tanase, who can lead one of the new political projects, may return to big politics, in particular. The likelihood of the current Romanian President Traian Basescu’s coming to Bessarabian politics, who can directly or indirectly support the Liberal Party in elections, thereby returning to the Romanian union, cannot be ruled out.
In turn, all hopes of the opposition Communist Party are associated with Russia's support, as well as the health of their 72-year-old leader Vladimir Voronin, for whom this election is probably the last chance to personally lead the party to power.
The election year 2014 is also for Gagauzia. At the end of the year, at about the same time as the Bessarabian parliamentary elections, the Bashkan will hold elections in autonomy. Bashkan Mihail Formuzal, who is completing his second term, will not be able to take part in them. Mayor of Comrat Nikolai Dudoglo, deputy of the Bessarabian parliament from the Communist Party Irina Vlah and the first citizen of Valery Janioglo are still considered the main potential candidates for this position. However, the emergence of new figures closer to the elections, including from outside Gagauzia, is not excluded.
The election campaigns of all candidates will most likely be built on Gagauz patriotism, protecting and strengthening autonomy from the encroachments of Chisinau and criticizing the foreign policy of the central authorities. The referendum on the country's foreign policy and the postponed status of independence, scheduled for 2 in February, will also be a test of the local political class for strength and maturity. In any case, the opposition to Chisinau was and remains the main unifying factor for both the political class of Gagauzia and the whole for the whole south of Bessarabia, which turns into a new “anchor” for keeping Bessarabia in place of Transnistria liberated from this function.
For Bessarabia’s relations with Transnistria 2013, the year became a point of no return, when it became obvious even to the most obstinate Chisinau and Kremlin dreamers that the geopolitical and civilizational ways of the two states diverged completely, and there is no other solution to the conflict except for “civilized divorce” and in the foreseeable future . As the favorite, so disastrous, Russian “strategy” of retaining Bessarabia at the cost of Transnistria finally failed.
However, the new Russian strategy on the Transnistrian direction has not yet been presented. Unless, of course, we consider such loud, but fruitless statements by the special representative of the Russian president for Transnistria, Dmitry Rogozin, still focused mostly on his "fan clubs" in Chisinau and Tiraspol, as well as Russian humanitarian projects, now carried out exclusively through NGOs, so that, God forbid, do not upset Chisinau. In 2014, Tiraspol and Moscow will have to clarify the new framework of bilateral relations and fill the content with the exclusively declarative "Rogozin-Shevchuk protocol" for the time being.
At the same time, the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika is the only country in the region where electoral events are not expected next year, and therefore the republic will continue to be a factor in relative political stability.
In Romania’s domestic policy for the 2014 year, it is very likely to predict an increase in contradictions between the parties of the ruling Social-Liberal Union, with the possibility of its collapse and independent exit of constituent parties to the European Parliament and subsequent presidential elections.
The outgoing presidency, Traian Basescu, will probably continue to push into the national agenda the topic of joining Bessarabia - the only ideological field where he can beat his more pragmatic political opponents on the “ridge” of populism. The “Popular Movement” party created by him is seen as a prototype of a unified Pan-Romanian unionist political project that will operate simultaneously in Bessarabia and Romania, which is why Basescu’s actions already cause noticeable irritation not only among opponents in Bucharest, but also among recent “partners” in Chisinau .
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