From the author. Just as no political action can be considered in isolation from the surrounding political and economic situation, it cannot be considered outside historical framework. To understand the meaning and essence of the actions of a state, statesman, politician, in order to be able to correctly assess the events taking place, it is necessary to at least briefly trace all the previous events related to this historical fact. This is the first thing. And secondly, it is impossible to evaluate the events that took place in the past (albeit not distant), based on modern criteria, modern morality, modern legislative acts. Otherwise, the entire history of all mankind will appear before us as a continuous chain of bloody crimes of everyone and everything. Moreover, the crimes are terrible and senseless.
In politics, nothing is accomplished under the influence of momentary moods, humanism, or anti-humanism of this or that ruler, although outwardly sometimes it looks that way. In reality, any ruler is the spokesman and implementer of the interests of certain social or ethnic groups. The power of any statesman is in complete and absolute dependence on the opinions and aspirations of those social, ethnic groups whose interests he defends. As soon as his actions diverge from the ideas of those who entrusted him to the throne, his power ends and he rolls down with a crash, be it a king, dictator, president, secretary general, leader, or chairman.
Namely, these postulates are trying to keep out of the framework of their stories, articles, those journalists who are faced with the task of glorifying or vice versa to debunk this or that social system, this or that country, statesman.
The author, in particular, has in mind the events of February 1944 of the year in the North Caucasus, namely the deportation of Chechens and a number of other ethnic groups. The events of those days are presented in complete isolation from the political situation of the time, from the history of inter-ethnic conflict. In such coverage, the deportation of Chechens appears as a consequence of the evil will of either one person - I.Stalin, or as a completely meaningless, unjustified crime of political extremists - Bolsheviks.
The purpose of such articles is to stir up anti-Russian sentiments, to endeavor to present the history of Russia of the 1917-91 period in a negative way and to prove that Russia was and remains an "evil empire", that this state has no place on the planet, and Russians as a nation should quietly and quietly lime.
Meanwhile, the conflict between Russia and a number of Caucasian nationalities has a very long history. The causes of the conflict are rooted in antiquity and this centuries-old enmity has been and is an ordinary struggle of countries and peoples for their place in the sun. Of such conflicts, wars and consists of the whole history of mankind. So the events of the 44 winter in the Caucasus are only one of many pages in world history.
The author of two articles ("Chechnya 1920-41goddy" and "Chechnya 1941-44 years") is trying to dispel a little bit of the silence of history, enveloping the conflict of Russians and Caucasians. As far as it was possible - to judge the reader.
The history of the Russian-Chechen confrontation dates back to the end of the XVII - beginning of the XVIII century, when Russia waged numerous long and persistent wars with Turkey, Persia, and the Crimean Khan. These countries were constantly disturbed and attacked the Russian lands, drawing new slaves, food and other material resources from them.
The Caucasus range was a natural barrier between Russia and Turkey, Persia. Naturally, the possession of the Caucasus region gave one or another side a clear and significant advantage.
For Persia and Turkey, the possession of the Caucasus provided an opportunity to seize the fertile lands of the south of Russia, opened the shortest way to the capitals, and made it possible to exert political and military pressure on Russia.
For Russia, possession of the Caucasus provided protection of the southern borders, elimination of the danger of a new loss of the Azov and Black Seas, the Crimea, inclusion in agricultural turnover and commodity circulation of rich southern lands (Novorossia), which, although they belonged to Russia, could not be used.
The peoples of the Caucasus, depending on their ethnic and religious affiliation, tended in part to Russia, partly to Persia and Turkey. However, the expansionist policies of Persia and Turkey, accompanied by partial or complete genocide of the Caucasian peoples on the one hand and Russia's tolerance, its non-interference in the internal life of the peoples on the other side increasingly pushed the Caucasian states first towards an alliance with Russia. and then to the entry into the Russian Empire (Georgia, Armenia, Ossetia).
These processes disturbed Russia's neighbors and forced them to step up actions to seize the Caucasus, relying on ethnic groups professing Islam (Dagestanis, Chechens, Circassians, etc.).
Since the beginning of the 18th century, Russia has stepped up its actions to master the Caucasus, which could not but affect the anti-Russian actions of the mountain peoples. One of the documented facts of the attack on Russian troops is the attack of the Chechens in 1732 on the Russian battalion, which made the transition from Dagestan to the Stavropol region and its complete destruction.
The 1785-1791 years are characterized by the active actions of Chechen detachments under the leadership of the leader of one of the Chechen teips Ushurma against Russian tillers who had mastered the areas of the present Stavropol region. The whole territory is empty.
After the wars with Napoleon, the Russian Tsar, concerned about the sharply increased influence of Iran and Turkey on the Caucasus and the scale of mountain banditry in southern Russia (constant robberies, looting, massive hijacking of livestock, slave trade, attacks on military garrisons) in the year 1817 began a series of Caucasian wars that lasted up to 1864 of the year.
The greatest scale of these wars is from 1834, when Imam Shamil became the head of the rebel highlanders.
In all, from 1801 to 1864, Russia in the Caucasian wars lost an 801 officer and 24143 soldier who was killed, an 3 154 officer and an 61971 soldier who were killed by 91 killed. 5915 officer and 200 soldiers were taken prisoner. The troop group of the Russian army in the Caucasus in some periods reached XNUMX thousand people.
With the capture of Shamil, the destruction of a number of rebellious imams, as well as with the transition, under Field Marshal Paskevich, to the "scorched earth" tactics, when the rebel villages were completely destroyed and the population was completely destroyed, the organized resistance of the highlanders was suppressed.
However, until the revolution and the beginning of the civil war in Chechnya, numerous small gangs and separate bandits ("abreks") continued to exist. The tsarist government was able to maintain relative calm in Chechnya and Dagestan due to actual non-interference in the internal life of the highlanders, bribing the tribal nobility, free distribution of flour, fabrics, leather, clothing to the poor highlanders; the appointment of officials of local authoritative elders, leaders of teips and tribes. The garrisons of the Russian army, the Cossack villages, were located mainly along the Terek River, thus separating Chechnya from the rest of Russia.
During the period of revolution and civil war, Chechnya was left to itself. It is known that, due to the famine, the population fell by almost a third, the rest of the population survived due to raids on the Cossack villages north of Terek, Stavropol Territory, Georgia. Attempts to attract the Highlanders to participate in the civil war on the side of the Reds or Whites ended without success. Chechens and Dagestanis hated both.
As the civil war collapsed, the new government tried to establish itself in the mountains of the Caucasus. However, with the formation of the Mountain ASSR as part of the RSFSR, the struggle of the mountainous tribal nobility for the preservation of their power and privileges began to appear clearly. This struggle immediately takes the form of armed struggle under the slogans of national independence, the protection of Islam and autonomy.
Chechnya in the twenties and thirties
In September, 1920, Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky and the grandson of Imam Shamil Said-Bey, started a mutiny in the mountainous regions of Chechnya and the northern part of Dagestan. The few Red Army units are very quickly destroyed, and the local population is exterminated from among the Russians. By November 1920, Said Bey's forces already have 2800 foot fighters and 600 cavalrymen with twenty machine guns and four guns. At the same time, the appearance of Turkish and English instructors in the insurgent detachments was noted.
The Soviet command sent the regiment 14 of the rifle division of the Red Army and the Model Revolutionary Discipline regiment to suppress the rebellion. A total of about 8 thousand infantry, 1 thousand cavalry with 40 machine guns and 18 guns. The Red Army divisions, which were advancing in several directions at once, were immediately blocked, stopped and suffered heavy losses. In one battle, 14 fighters were killed in the village of Moksokh for an hour, and in the village of Khadzhal-Mahi, the Red Army soldiers lost 98 people killed and wounded.
Exemplary Rev.Discipline regiment 9 December made from Vedeno and weekly fought his way to Botlikh. The battalion of this regiment, speaking in the direction of the Andean Koisu 20 December 1920. in Orata-Kolo was completely destroyed. December 24 Chechens surrounded the main forces of the regiment in Botlikh. During the talks, an agreement was reached that the regiment would freely leave for Vedeno, leaving Botlikh weapon. But as soon as the unarmed column emerged from Botlikh, it was attacked and completely cut out with daggers and swords (more than 700 people). The rebels got 645 rifles and 9 machine guns. During December, parts of the Red Army in Chechen lost 1372 people killed.
The defeat of the Red Army inspired the Chechens. By the beginning of 1921, the mountaineer's forces already counted 7200 foot fighters, 2490 equestrian with 40 machine guns and 12 guns. The frequency of raids on areas of Stavropol, Georgia has increased dramatically. The insurgents burned Cossack villages north of the Terek, cutting out the local population, stealing cattle and exporting grain.
However, there was no other livelihood in Chechnya. There is no arable land in mountainous Chechnya, pastures allow only a very limited number of sheep to graze, mountainous areas and climate do not allow keeping cattle and poultry, there are no gardens and vineyards.
Assessing the scale of the catastrophe that threatens the republic, the Soviet command creates the Terek-Dagestan Group of Forces consisting of 14, 32, 33 rifle divisions, 18 cavalry division, a separate Moscow brigade of cadets, two armored squads and reconnaissance air detachment. Total 20 infantry, 3400 cavalry with 67 guns, 8 armored vehicles and 6 aircraft.
In early January, 1921. 32 units of the division attacked the Chechens and captured the aul of Khadzhal-Mahi, destroying the militants around 100 and taking 140 prisoner. Division losses were 24 people killed and 71 injured. However, as soon as units of the division were involved in the mountains, they immediately lost about 290 people in a fleeting battle.
An attempt by the 32 division to resume the January 22 offensive failed due to severe weather conditions. In one day, 12 people were killed, 10 people were frozen to death, 49 injured and more than 150 people. frostbitten.
February 19 during the pursuit of the departing detachment of the rebels division battalion, stopping for the night in the village of Ruguja was cut out by local residents of Dagestanis (about 125 people).
Total for January-February 1921. 32 division lost 1387 people. (650 killed, 10 frozen, 468 injured, 259 frostbitten).
More successful were the actions of the 14 division. Consistently occupying auls and ousting the rebels from them with the simultaneous deportation of the remaining residents of the division by the end of March 1921. fully mastered all the fortresses and the majority of large villages. Said Bey's units suffered heavy losses (mostly due to desertion resulting from unsuccessful actions against the Red Army). Under the command of the leaders, no more than 1000 people were left with 4 machine guns. They went into remote mountains upstream of Aivar Koysu.
The last pockets of resistance due to the use of extremely tough measures (hostage taking, execution of elders, destruction of villages, destruction of communication lines) by October 1921 were able to extinguish. Total Red Army in the battles 1920-21 lost killed about 3500 people, wounded around 1500 people. The rebel leader, Said Bey, returned to Turkey, greatly improving his financial situation (he later went to England). Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky for several years was hiding in the mountains, engaged in abduction of cattle with a group of abreks. He will be arrested only in September 1925.
The inept policy of the Soviet government, based on the ideas of national self-determination divorced from life, combined with real measures of leveling national characteristics, as well as the inability of the authorities to provide the mountaineers with livelihoods in combination with tough measures to curb Gorsky robbery (robbery, cattle thefts, removal of slaves) led to discontent of the population of Chechnya and the mountainous regions of Dagestan.
Already in 1923, Sheikh Ali-Mitayev proclaims jihad against infidels for the creation of an independent Sharia republic. In a short time, under his banner, he collects more than 12 thousand murids. At a rapid pace throughout Chechnya and Ingushetia, the destruction of the organs of Soviet power is under way, and the remaining power structures become the structures of Ali-Mitayev. Ali-Mitayev’s timely and wise policy, which filled the police and GPU bodies with his own people, led to the fact that the police and GPU departments in Chechnya were centers for gathering murids, sources of weapons and ammunition, and trained personnel. The Russian employees of these bodies were quickly destroyed or discredited at the right time, accused of having links with bandits.
However, the rebellion is carried out by rather secretive methods, and only by the spring of 1924 of the year does it manifest itself openly in the form of boycotting elections, accompanied by pogroms of polling stations. The authorities of the country's hcp use their own division to carry out a number of operations to suppress the open speeches of Chechens and Ingushs, during which they succeed in removing 2900 rifles (partially foreign samples and English-made), 384 revolvers, a large amount of ammunition, 22 field phones, 3 switch and about 15 km . English telephone cable production.
However, instead of umirovtoreniya this action has caused an open armed uprising in August 1925 years in Chechnya sent under the command of the commander of the North Caucasus Military District I.Uborevicha troop grouping 4480 total number of infantry, cavalry at 2017 137 102 easel and light machine guns, and mountain 14 10 light guns. In addition, an armored train, 16 aircraft, 341 people were involved in the operation. from the Caucasian Red Banner Army (Mountain nationalities) and 307 people from the GPU.
The operation to disarm the local population continued from August 22 to September 13 on 1925. 25299 rifles, 4319 revolvers, 1 machine gun, 730556 rifle cartridges, 10678 revolver cartridges, wireless telegraph, several telephone sets were seized, and around 120 km. Of telephone lines were found and destroyed. Arrested 309, have provided armed resistance to the Murids. Of these, 11 executives, including N. Gotsinsky.
From among the detainees, the 105 people were shot to death, the rest were released under an oath on the Quran.
The troop group lost killed 5 people, wounded 8. Of the civilians killed (both sides) 6 people. and injured 30.
The success of the operation and the loss of most of the weapons by murids ensured relative calm in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia up to the 1929 year. However, all this time the tribal nobility, with the support of Turkey, led anti-Soviet propaganda, accumulated weapons, trained militants in Turkey and England. Not less than 20 Chechens and Dagestanis were trained in officer schools in England and France.
In the 1929 year, taking advantage of the gross mistakes of the Soviet authorities, who were trying to hold grain procurements in the plains of Dagestan and Ingushetia, the heads of a number of Chechen and Ingush teips openly called for the breakdown of grain procurements, defeated a number of dump points, took out the collected grams and put out thematum of thematum and put them out of their way to put them up. from the Mountain ASSR, armed detachments of grain procurers, to cancel the tax in kind, to replace the elected bodies of Soviet power by the elders of the Chechen tapes.
By order of the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, the operational group of troops and units of the OGPU in December 8-28 conducted a military operation in the course of which armed gangs were destroyed in Goyty, Shali, Sambi, Benoy, Contor and several others. At the same time, 1929 murids were killed, 26 arrested. The troop group lost 296 killed, 11 dead from wounds, wounded 7 people.
However, the leaders of the armed resistance of the Highlanders took into account their mistakes 1925 year. Red Army soldiers managed to remove only 25 rifles, and then, mostly from those killed. All the leaders of the Chechen and Ingush groups managed to escape and moreover, retain their management structure and influence over the local population.
Therefore, in March 1930 of the year, the North Caucasus Regional Committee of the CPSU (B.) Decided to carry out a military-censorial operation to curb mountain political banditry. A military volunteer group consisting of 4 infantry, 3 cavalry, 2 guerrilla (read special forces, in modern language) detachments from among the representatives of the Caucasian nationalities (mainly Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians, partly Azerbaijanis, by the People’s Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, are created by order of the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs and Maritime Affairs.) Dagestanis) suffered greatly from robberies and robberies, terror from the Chechens and Ingush. These detachments were reinforced by two personnel rifle battalions of the Red Army and the air line (3 aircraft), a sapper company and a communications company. Total group consisted of 3700 people., 19 guns and 28 machine guns ..
Good knowledge of the terrain and mountain conditions, the desire of the Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians and others loyal to the Soviet power to get rid of the mountain terror predetermined the success of the operation, which lasted from March 14 to April 12. 19 gangsters were killed, 122 active participants in gangster raids on peaceful villages of neighboring republics, including 9 senior insurgent leaders, were arrested. 1500 firearms (of which Li-Enfield British rifles with optical sights of 127-1926 production), 28 cold weapons were seized. Ordinary gang members after the oath on the Koran and disarmament were sent home. Troop group lost killed 280 people. and wounded 14 people.
However, the inflexible, crude policy of the Soviet government to collectivize agriculture in Chechnya and Ingushetia, which, due to local conditions, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, led to extreme bitterness of the population. At the beginning of 1932, a large-scale uprising broke out, in which not only Chechens, Ingushs and Dagestanis of mountainous regions took part, but also a significant part of the Russian population of nadterechny Cossack villages.
All disguise has been dropped. In auls, co-operatives, aul councils smashed, destroyed Soviet money. Gangs of 500-800 people attacked and besieged most of the military garrisons. The fights were distinguished by unprecedented bitterness, religious fanaticism, participation in the attacks of unarmed women and children. It should be noted the high degree of organization and control of the rebellion.
However, the NKVD and military units were in full readiness to repel armed attacks. Despite the huge losses. The rebels did not succeed in crushing any garrison, and the NKVD regional department staff managed to hide in garrisons in time for their families. Troops operational in the period 15-20 March 1932g. they managed to divide and isolate the gangster groups, block them in remote mountainous areas, which turned from places of reliable shelter into the Murids' traps and consistently destroyed them. The rebels lost a dead 333 man, 150 wounded. The Red Army and the NKVD lost 27 killed and wounded 30.
The ensuing arrests of the leaders of the rebellion, participants of past armed uprisings, harsh court sentences, deportation of entire villages outside the North Caucasus, population got tired of years of war, disappointment of the mountaineers in the possibility of eliminating the Soviet power by armed means led to a sharp decrease in the activity of armed confrontation.
However, the very active and bloody, although local (within one or three areas) insurrections continued until the 1936 year, and in the mountainous areas until the 1938 year. Individual gangs of up to 100 people continued to alarm Chechnya until the very beginning of World War II.
In total, 1920 to 1941 of the year alone in the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia occurred 12 of major armed uprisings (involving from 500 to 5 thousands of militants) and more than 50 less significant. The military units of the Red Army and the NKVD from 1920 to 1939 years lost killed 3564 and wounded 1589 people.
In 1941, from 1 in January to 22 in June, 31 insurgent insurgent manifestations were registered, and from 22 in June to 3 in September, over 40.
Then there was war. Gangs only of the “Special Party of Caucasian Brothers” and only in 20 auls of Chechnya numbered 1943 by February more than 6540 people, and other armed groups registered around 240 (numbering from 2-3). Is it possible to consider completely unfounded resolution of the GKO USSR № 15 from 20 January 5073g. about the liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkarians from their places of permanent residence?
What is the political regime, which state will be tolerant towards people who are massively disloyal to the authorities? Leading against him an armed struggle in the period for the state of the most difficult and dangerous war with an external enemy? Where, when and which state did not lead a stubborn struggle against the separatists, did they not use armed force against them?
So the USSR, the Bolsheviks, Stalin is no better and no worse than all other states, political regimes, including those that boast their democracy and the strictest observance of the rights of peoples and people (USA - Grenada, Panama, Lebanon, Vietnam), (United Kingdom - India, Northern Ireland), (France-Indokity, Algeria), .... Continue?
In total, between February and March 1944, Chechens and Ingushs 496460 people, Karachai 68327, Balkarians 37406 people were deported.
The Chechen question did not exist from February 1944 to January 1957, when the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a resolution restoring the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and allowed the repressed peoples to return to their historic homeland.
The flywheel of bloody hostility began to spin again. So far, the author has no information about events in the North Caucasus during the 1957-91 period, about how much and how much blood was shed there. But the fact that it flowed, there is no doubt. So which Soviet decree was wiser than 44 or 57 of the year? Has it become better for ordinary people to live in Dudayev Chechnya in 91-94, 96-99?
Sources and literature:
1. I.Ye.Dunyushkin. The ideological and military aspect of the struggle against the Vainakh national-clerical separatism in the North Caucasus in 1941. Presentation at the December 9 Scientific Conference 2001. Collection of reports "Peace and War: 1941 year." Humanities University Press. Yekaterinburg. 2001
2.SG.Volkonsky. Notes. Irkutsk. East Siberian Book Publishing. 1991g.
3.G.F. Krivosheev and others. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. OLMA PRESS. Moscow. 2001