Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 4. Collapse of the Barbarossa, Kantokuen Plan and Directive No. 32

“Everything for the front! Everything is for victory! ”, The slogan of the Communist Party, formulated in the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR 29 from June 1941 ... and proclaimed 3 in July 1941 on the radio in a speech of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin. He expressed the essence of the program, which was developed by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government to transform the country into a single military camp.

World War II 1941 - 1945. Encyclopedia

According to the memories of A.I. Mikoyan 30 June 1941, colleagues I.V. According to Stalin’s party - Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria, without any participation, decided to create the State Defense Committee (GKO), to give him all the power in the country, to transfer to him the functions of the Government, the Supreme Council and the Central Committee of the party. Considering that “in Stalin’s name there is so much power in the minds, feelings and faith of the people” that it will facilitate their mobilization and leadership of all military actions, they agreed to put the former all this time in their near country house I.V. Stalin headed the State Defense Committee. And only after all this, I.V. Stalin returned to governing the country and its armed forces. The Soviet Union in all its full power was involved in the war with Germany. But not for the defeat of the Nazis in Germany, but to prevent their further breakthrough into the Soviet Union.

July 1 K.A. Umansky “met Welles again and gave him a request for the necessary military supplies from the United States, which consisted of 8 points and included fighters, bombers, anti-aircraft guns, and some equipment for aviation and other factories. " In Moscow, V. Molotov told the head of the British mission, MacFarlane, that "the present moment is the most suitable" for strengthening the activity of British aviation in West Germany, in the occupied territory of France and the landing of troops in the cities mentioned by Beaverbrook. "If, said Molotov, General MacFarlane cannot consider this issue, then it may be advisable to refer it to England, to the military cabinet."

“One of the most important acts of the Soviet government, which to a certain extent gave direction to changes in the state apparatus, was the resolution of July 1 of July 1941“ On the expansion of the rights of the people's commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions ”. Under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee of Food and Apparel Supplies of the Soviet Army and the main directorates for the supply of the national economy with coal, oil and timber were formed. In the process of reorganization of the state apparatus there was a sharp reduction in the staff of the people's commissariats, institutions and managerial units. Specialists from the institutions were sent to factories, to production. The work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the system of planning and supplying the economy were restructured. Arms, ammunition, shipbuilding, aircraft building and tank building departments were created in the State Planning Committee. On the basis of the tasks of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee, they developed plans for the release of military equipment, armaments, ammunition by enterprises regardless of their departmental subordination, controlled the state of material and technical support, and controlled the state of material and technical support of military production. ”

On June 30, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the mobilization national economic plan for the third quarter of 23, developed by the USSR State Planning Committee on the basis of the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of June 1941 — the first planning document aimed at transferring the national economy of the USSR to war ". As we recall June 24, 1941, in case of failure of the main version of the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky decided to create tank industry in the Volga region and in the Urals, as well as the evacuation council. With the beginning of the implementation of the fallback plan V.D. Sokolovsky, these decisions began to be implemented. On July 1, the GKO decided to transfer the Krasnoye Sormovo plant to the production of T-34 tanks, and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant to production of the KV-1. “Thus, a comprehensive base for the tank industry was created.” “On July 4, the State Defense Committee instructed the commission headed by Chairman of the USSR State Planning Commission N.A. Voznesensky "to develop a military-economic plan to ensure the country's defense, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises existing on the Volga, Western Siberia and the Urals, as well as resources and enterprises exported to these areas by evacuation." On July 16, 1941, the State Defense Committee reassigned itself an evacuation council.

3 July 1941 year I.V. Stalin personally appealed to the peoples of the USSR, however, no longer with a call to beat the enemy both on Soviet and on his own territory, but with a call to rally in a protracted fight with the enemy and beat him wherever he appeared. The Soviet troops left, which had become unnecessary overnight, the Lvov salient and in the country began the organization of long-term resistance to the enemy in the territory they occupied. I.V. Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the High Command Headquarters, and intermediate strategic management bodies were created — the main commands of the North-Western, Western and South-Western forces. 16 July 1941 issued an order of the State Defense Committee to shoot the former commander of the Western Front, Army General Pavlov, the former chief of staff of the Western Front, Major General Klimovsky, the former communications chief of the Western Front, Major General Grigoriev, and the former commander of the 4 Army of the Western Front, General-Major Grigoriev and the former Commander of the XNUMX Army of the Western Front, Major General Grigoriev. Korobkova.

In early July, the 1941 of the year the Soviet leadership went to meet the proposals to allow "the Poles, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs to create national committees in the USSR and form national units for the joint struggle with the USSR against German fascism ... and ... the restoration of the national states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." In particular, "5 July in London with the mediation of England began negotiations between" the Soviet and Polish government in exile. “July 30, after many fierce disputes, an agreement was reached between the Polish and Russian governments. Diplomatic relations were restored, and a Polish army subordinated to the Soviet High Command was to be established on Russian territory. Borders were not mentioned, with the exception of the general statement that the Soviet-German treaties from the 1939 on territorial changes in Poland "have lost their force" (Churchill W. World War II).

The restoration by the Red Army of the line of defense in the Western direction predetermined the collapse of the Barbarossa plan (part of 3, 2 scheme). “By July 1 (ie, in the first 8 days of the war), 5,3 million people were called up as a result of the hard work of party and state bodies” (PT Kunitsky. Restoration of a broken strategic defense front in the year 1941). July 14 1941 of the year, in full accordance with the May 1941 proposal of the year G.K. Zhukov on the construction of new fortified areas on the rear line of Ostashkov - Pochep (part of 2, 2 scheme), "together with the troops of the 24 and 28 armies advanced here a little earlier," the newly created 29, 30, 31- I and the 32 armies were united “in the front of the reserve armies with the task of taking the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk and prepare for a stubborn defense. Here, to the east of the main defensive line, passing along the rivers Western Dvina and Dnieper and already broken by the enemy, a second line of defense was created. 18 July The Stavka decided to deploy another front on the distant approaches to Moscow - the Mozhaisk line of defense - with the inclusion of 32, 33 and 34 armies in its structure ”(By the roads of trials and victories. The fighting path of the 31 army).

A guerrilla movement and sabotage was organized on the territory occupied by the enemy. Began the formation of divisions of the national militia. "June 27 Leninsky Party Committee [of Leningrad - approx. the author] turned to the High Command of the Red Army with a request to allow the formation of seven volunteer divisions from the city’s working people. Such permission has been obtained. On this basis, all areas of Leningrad 30 June began the formation of divisions, which soon became known as the militia.

“At a meeting of secretaries of the Moscow regional, city and district committees of the capital’s party, convened by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) in the Kremlin on the night of 1 on July 2, party organizations were invited to lead the creation of volunteer divisions of the people's militia of Moscow. 3 July 1941, the resolution on the creation of the people's militia adopted the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova, July 6 - the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, July 7 - the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Council of People's Commissars and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. On the same days, the regional, regional, city and district party committees of the Russian Federation issued the relevant decisions. ”

"29 June SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) sent a directive to the leaders of the party and Soviet organizations in the frontline areas, which, along with the general tasks of the Soviet people in the fight against the German fascist aggressors, defined the tasks and duties of local party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations in the deployment of a nationwide partisan struggle in the rear of the German fascist army. ... 30 of June, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine formed an operative group to deploy the partisan struggle, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus adopted and sent to the directive number 1 "on the transition to the underground work of party organizations of the areas occupied by the enemy."

1 July 1941 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of Belarus approved the directive No. 2 on the deployment of guerrilla war in the enemy's rear, 4 of July the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of the Karelo-Finnish SSR decided similarly to the directive No. 1 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of Belarus, and 5 – XNUM July 14, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine "made a special decision to create armed detachments and organizations of the party underground in areas threatened by the fascist occupation." On July 6, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) introduced a special decision “on organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops”, which supplemented and specified the directive of June 18. In it, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) demanded from the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, from the regional and district party committees to improve the leadership of the Soviet people's struggle in the rear of the enemy, to give it "the widest scope and combat activity."

“In July 1941, the Military Council of the North-Western Front adopted a resolution on the creation of a department under the political administration, which was entrusted with the work of organizing partisan detachments and directing their combat activities. He received the name of the 10 department of the political department - by the date of the decision. ... subsequently, by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), such departments were created in the entire active army. " The chief of the 10 department of the political department of the North-Western Front, A.N. Asmolov was assigned the task: “to help speed up the creation of partisan forces in the front line, to engage in the selection and military training of commanders, to establish communication with those who are already fighting in the rear of the enemy. In a word ... to take into our hands the operational leadership of partisan actions "on the sector of the North-Western Front. His "conversation with the head of the political department of divisional commissar KG Ryabchim ... ended as follows:" Go to the personnel officers, Comrade Asmolov, select people to the department, and if necessary, to partisan detachments. "

"July 20 1941, the Military Council [North-West - approx. author] front endorsed the instructions for the organization and actions of partisan detachments and groups. It began with the words: “The guerrilla movement in the rear of the enemy is a popular movement. It is called upon to play a huge role in our Patriotic War. ” ... Printed in 500 copies, the instruction was sent to the committees of the party in the frontline areas that were part of the North-Western Front. Several dozen copies were sent to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, from where they were sent to other fronts. According to Soviet studies, this was the first instruction on the organization of partisan actions in the Great Patriotic War. She certainly played a role in summarizing the accumulated experience of guerrilla warfare against the fascist invaders.

In connection with the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 18 July 1941, "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops" and to address the emerging issues in the organization and leadership of the guerrilla forces, the Front Military Council held an extended meeting in the second half of July. commanders and political workers, as well as party activists of front-line city and district committees. ... at the meeting, the very important issue of uniting partisan detachments into larger units — partisan brigades — was resolved. ... A few days later, the Front Military Council approved the plan for the formation of the first partisan brigades. ... For the first time in stories The Great Patriotic War was found the most appropriate form of unification of the armed partisan forces, which allowed to successfully operate in the rear of the enemy in a modern war. ...

The intense July days of 1941, associated with the creation of partisan brigades and detachments, ended with the formation of significant partisan forces in the front line. It was possible to report to the Military Council of the front and the Leningrad Oblast Party that in the territory of the south-eastern districts of the Leningrad region an 43 partisan detachment was formed, numbering about 4 thousands of fighters and united into six partisan brigades. Part of the partisans had already been deployed across the front line and deployed partisan operations in the rear of the 16 German Army from Army Group North, which was operating against the forces of the Northwestern Front. ”

According to the memoirs of the chief of the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement, the secretary of the regional committee of the party, M.N. Nikitin "in July-August 1941 of the year switched to the illegal situation in the 32 district of the district committee of the party of the Leningrad region. Already in the occupation, the Pskov inter-district party body was created. The illegal committees headed the 86 secretaries of the district committees and city committees that headed them before the war. 68 authorized by the regional committee left for the districts ”. Guerrilla groups and sabotage groups were created in August and September 1941 in almost all the fascist-occupied areas of the Kalinin Oblast ”(Pskovshchina guerrilla. Collection).

In Belarus 13 July 1941, on the initiative of I. Starikov and PK, Ponomarenko, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Belarus, a partisan school was created - the Operational Training Center of the Western Front. Already in July-August, the first guerrilla units began their armed actions ..., and ... the first underground district committees began to lead the struggle in the rear of the enemy. "

“In the western regions of Ukraine, it was not possible until the capture of them by the fascist troops to finish all the work on the formation of partisan detachments and the party underground. ... In the second half of July, the formation of partisan detachments, sabotage groups and the party underground in all regions of Left-Bank Ukraine began. Here bases were created in advance. weapons and food. In particular, after the performance of I. Stalin 3 July 1941, S.A. Kovpak began the creation of partisan bases in the area of ​​Putivl. In addition to partisan detachments, the activities of party and Komsomol organizations were launched in Ukraine.

“July 7 1941 in the regional committee of the CP (b) U t. Burmistenko and the secretary of the Kiev regional committee of the CP (b) U t. Serdyuk held a meeting of the secretaries of the city and district committees of the CP (b) U, which gave exhaustive instructions on the evacuation of material values, people and the creation of underground Bolshevik organizations and partisan detachments to fight behind enemy lines. As a result, in most cities and districts of the region, during July and August 1941, underground KP (b) U district committees, underground sabotage groups and partisan detachments with a network of safe houses and material base were created. In the city of Kiev, the underground city committee of KP (b) U was left. ... In the districts of the city, 9 was created by the underground district committees of the CP (B) U and 3 of party, Komsomol organizations and sabotage groups. ... In the districts of the region of all, 21 was created an underground town committee and a KP (b) U district committee. ” “In total, 1941 regional and more than 13 district, city, district and other underground party bodies began work in Ukraine in 110. They routinely led the selfless struggle of the Soviet patriots against the invaders. "

However, in the summer of 1941, the partisan struggle in the occupied territory was still in its infancy. Only “by the spring of 1942, it encompassed a vast territory - from forests of Karelia to the Crimea and Moldova. By the end of 1943, there were over a million armed partisans and underground fighters. ” All this the Soviet political and military leadership was able to achieve as a result, in fact, brilliant improvisation, from scratch, almost from scratch.

According to I. Starinov’s recollection, “faithful to Lenin’s instructions, Mikhail Frunze and other Soviet commanders did a great deal to study the objective laws of partisan actions and to prepare for the guerrilla war in the event of an attack on the USSR by any aggressor. The participants in this training took an active part from 1925 to 1936 and then the People's Commissar of Defense, K.E. Voroshilov. During the period of repression against the military, partisan training was stopped. All the guerrilla bases prepared in advance were liquidated, a large number of explosive weapons were removed and transferred to the army from secret warehouses, and tens of thousands of foreign rifles and carbines, hundreds of foreign machine guns and millions of cartridges to them were simply destroyed in these warehouses.

The most terrible thing was that in 1937-1938, well-trained guerrilla cadres were repressed, who were shot, who were exiled, and survived from the "guerrillas" only those who accidentally changed their place of residence or, fortunately, ended up in distant Spain, accepted participation in the fight with the fascist. The very idea of ​​the possibility of conducting a partisan war by us was buried. The new military doctrine ruled out a long strategic defense for the Red Army, prescribing in the shortest possible time to respond to the blow of the enemy with a more powerful one, to transfer hostilities to the territory of the aggressor. Naturally, in the cadre troops, neither the command, nor even the rank and file, already received knowledge that would enable them to act confidently behind enemy lines. ”

Meanwhile, the opponents of the USSR took the military failures of the Soviet Union very seriously. In Germany, 30 June 1941, the final version of Directive No. 32 was adopted. As mentioned above, Hitler’s strategists had already calculated since the fall of 1941, after the defeat of the USSR, to reduce the Wehrmacht from 209 divisions to 175, to allocate 65 divisions (of which 12 tank and 6 were motorized) as occupying troops in Russia, to increase the number of tropical divisions, aviation and fleet for the subsequent opposition of Great Britain and the United States of America. It was planned to begin the conquest of Egypt, the Suez Canal region, Palestine, Iraq and Iran. Subsequently, the fascist German leadership hoped, having annexed Spain and Portugal to Germany, to quickly capture Gibraltar, cut off England from its sources of raw materials and undertake the siege of the island.

3 July 1941 of the year at the Headquarters of the High Command of the Land Forces of Germany discussed further plans: the occupation after the forcing of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper industrial areas of the USSR and the Wehrmacht offensive in the Middle East. 15 July 1941, the requirements of the occupation and protection of Russian territory were detailed. It was assumed that “as soon as the Russian troops east of the Dnieper-Dvina line are overwhelmed, the operations will need to be continued, if possible, only by motorized formations, as well as those infantry formations that will finally remain on Russian territory. The main part of the infantry formations should begin a return march after reaching the Crimea – Moscow – Leningrad line in early August. ” The German Armed Forces should have been reduced from 209 divisions to 175 connections.

The European part of Russia was divided into four state formations - the Baltic States, Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus, for the occupation of which two army groups were allocated as part of 65 German formations, as well as one Italian and Spanish corps, one Finnish, one Slovak, one Romanian, and one Hungarian:
Baltic States - 1 security division, 8 front;
Western Russia (Central Russian industrial region and the northern Volga region) - 2 guard divisions, 7 PD, 3 etc., 1 md, one Italian corps;
Eastern Russia (North and South Urals) - 1 guard division, 2 PD, 4 TD, 2 md, one Finnish unit;
Western Ukraine - 1 guard division, 7 front; one Slovak and Romanian connection;
Eastern Ukraine (Donsko – Donetsk industrial region and the Southern Volga region) - 2 guard divisions, 6 PD, 3 etc., 2 md, 1 cd, one Hungarian unit;
Caucasus, Transcaucasia, the Caucasus-Iran group - 2 guard divisions, 4 PD, 3 gds, 2 etc., 1 md, one Spanish corps.

2 July in Japan at the imperial meeting adopted the "Program of the national policy of the Empire in accordance with changes in the situation", which included "the continuation of the war in China and the simultaneous completion of preparations for war against both the United States and Britain, and against the Soviet Union. From the transcript of the imperial meeting (Godzen Kaigi) 2 July 1941: ... Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. However, until we intervene in this conflict. We will secretly strengthen our military training against the Soviet Union, adhering to an independent position. At this time, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great caution. If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to our empire, we, having resorted to armed force, will solve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders. ...

By the decision of the imperial meeting, an armed attack on the USSR was approved as one of the main military and political goals of the empire. Having made this decision, the Japanese government essentially broke up the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed only two and a half months ago. In the adopted document, the Neutrality Pact was not even mentioned. ” Despite pressure and threats from Germany, “Japan was preparing to attack the USSR under the condition that the Soviet troops were clearly defeated in the war with Germany. War Minister Tojo stressed that the attack should occur when the Soviet Union "becomes like a ripe persimmon ready to fall to the ground." ...

In accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941, the General Headquarters of the Army and the Ministry of War of Japan developed a set of broad measures aimed at speeding up preparations for conducting offensive operations against the Soviet armed forces in the Far East and Siberia. In the Japanese secret documents, he received the coded name "Kantogun to Enshu" ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") - abbreviated "Kantokuen". 11 July 1941, the imperial headquarters sent a special directive No. 506 to the Kwantung Army and the Japanese armies in northern China, which confirmed that the purpose of the "maneuvers" was to increase readiness for action against the Soviet Union. " “Kantokuen” was based first on the operational-strategic plan of the war against the USSR, developed by the General Staff at 1940 year, and from the first half of July 1941 year - on the “Project of operations in current conditions” (Koshkin AA “Kantokuen” - “Barbarossa” in Japanese).

In accordance with the schedule for completing the preparation and conduct of the 5 war on July 1941, the Supreme Command of the Japanese Armed Forces "issued a directive ... to conduct the first mobilization phase ... After the second mobilization stage was ordered by order No. 102 of 16 on July 1941, the territory of Manchuria and Korea was concentrated 850 thousand soldiers and officers of the Japanese army "(Koshkin AA" Kantokuen "-" Barbarossa "in Japanese). 16 July Matsuoka resigned.

“On July 25, President Roosevelt responded to the Vichy Act by freezing Japanese funds in the United States, including the Philippine army led by its Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, into the US army and warning Peten that the US might consider it necessary to occupy French possessions in the Caribbean for self-defense . According to many, it was precisely the moment when the United States was to seize the French West Indies. However, the president, on the advice of the US Secretary of State, decided to refrain from such advice. His decision was justified by subsequent events, although at the time in the maritime ministry it was regrettable, and among some of the public this decision, assessed as “appeasement” of the Axis powers, was severely criticized ”(Morison S.E. American Navy in World War II : Battle of the Atlantic).

Perhaps it can be assumed that, contrary to popular belief, if conservative circles in England and America came to power, confrontation with Germany and Japan could quickly be transformed into a division of the world into spheres of influence. In any case, as Franz Halder notes in his diary, 30 June 1941, Hitler discussed the unity of Europe as a result of a joint war against Russia and the possibility of overthrowing Churchill in England by conservative circles. “Hitler’s confidence that the resolution of the issue with respect to Russia will be reached in September 1941 of the year has determined his cautious strategy in the war on the Atlantic Ocean. "Until mid-October there should be no incidents with the United States." However, Russia stubbornly held on ”(Morison, SE, US Navy in World War II: The Battle of the Atlantic).

27 July 1941 of the year, in connection with the tightening of hostilities in the East in Germany, was considered a plan of operation against the industrial area of ​​the Urals, which provided for not so much occupation as an expedition to destroy the Urals industrial region. The operation was supposed to be “carried out by motorized forces using eight tank and four motorized divisions. Depending on the situation, separate infantry divisions are involved (for the protection of rear communications). ... The operation should be carried out with full observance of surprise with simultaneous performance of all four groups. Its goal is to reach the Ural industrial area as quickly as possible and either to hold, if the situation permits, seized, or to retreat again after the destruction of vital structures by specially equipped and trained troops. ”

“In the summer of 1941, the Kwantung Army deployed the battle formations of the six armies and a separate group of troops against the USSR, not counting the reserve. In accordance with the Kantokuen plan, three fronts were formed for conducting combat operations: the eastern part of the 4 armies and the reserve, the northern part of the 2 armies and the reserve, and the western part of the 2 armies. By early August, the grouping allocated for the invasion of the Soviet Union was basically prepared. Approaching the scheduled time to make a decision about the beginning of the war - August 10. However, the ruling circles of Japan were hesitant, awaiting the defeat of the Soviet Union in the West ”(Koshkin AA“ Kantokuen ”-“ Barbarossa ”in Japanese). 6 September 1941 of the year at the imperial meeting due to the failure of the German Barbarossa plan, as well as the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran 25 August 1941, the implementation of the Kantokuen plan in 1941 was canceled, which, however, did not mean abandoning the Kantokuen plan , but only postponed the deadline for its implementation ”(Koshkin AA“ Kantokuen ”-“ Barbarossa ”in Japanese).

“At the beginning of July 1941, the Soviet government proposed to England to conclude an agreement on an alliance in the struggle against fascist Germany and its accomplices. On this occasion, negotiations were held in Moscow with the British Ambassador S. Cripps. " Having handed over 8 on July 1941, I.V. To Stalin, "the text of Churchill Cripps' personal message noted that he considers the decision of the British Admiralty to take action in the Arctic as the most important part of the British message." In turn, I.V. Stalin raised the issue of Iran, pointing to the threat of both the Soviet oil fields in Baku and the British colony in India in connection with the large concentration of Germans in Iran and Afghanistan.

“On July 10, the Soviet leader again took over S. Cripps. The British ambassador said that he had telegraphed to London and asked to consider the issue of Iran immediately. After promising to consult with R. Bullard, S. Kripps suggested that "perhaps, it would be necessary to support diplomatic measures by the military." On the same day, the English commander-in-chief in India, General A. Wavell, warned his government about the German danger in Iran and the need to “stretch out your hands with the Russians through Iran.” ... 11 July 1941, the Cabinet instructed the chiefs of staff to consider the desirability of action in Persia together with the Russians if the Persian government refuses to send a German colony operating in this country ”(Orishev AB Struggle for intelligence services. 1936 – 1945)

As a result of negotiations I.V. Stalin and S. Cripps 12 July 1941, the Soviet-British agreement "On joint actions in the war against Germany." The agreement obliged the parties to render each other assistance and support of every kind in the war against Hitler Germany, and not to negotiate and conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except with mutual consent. ... Despite the fact that the agreement was of a general nature and it did not indicate specific mutual obligations, it indicated the interest of the parties in the establishment and development of allied relations. ” Raising the Iranian question I.V. Stalin wanted, as he did in March 1941, to link the security of India from the German invasion from Iran to the opening of a second front in Europe against Hitler Germany. By offering assistance to England in ensuring the security of India, I.V. Stalin called on the British government 18 July 1941 to create a front against Hitler in the West in Northern France and in the North in the Arctic.

However, the deplorable state of affairs on the Soviet-German front predetermined the failure of I.V. Stalin to link the entry of British and Soviet troops in Iran with the opening of a second front against Nazi Germany in Europe. Having proposed 19 on July 1941 of Moscow to carry out the entry of troops into Iran, W. Churchill, at the same time "in a message to Stalin received on 21 on July 1941 of the year ... wrote that the chiefs of British headquarters" do not see an opportunity to do anything in such proportions "that could bring the Soviet front "at least the smallest benefit" (Orishev, AB. Combat intelligence services. 1936 – 1945). As a result, I.V. Stalin had to accept the fact that the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran 25 August 1941 was linked by England with the military technical assistance of the USSR. He had to wait for a year to conclude an alliance treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union and England - until May 1942 of the year, and the opening of a second front in Northern France for three years - until May 1944 of the year.

As for American aid, the issues related to it were resolved in the USA for a long time either extremely slowly or were not resolved at all, and the matter was replaced by endless rumors. In contrast to the United States, the British War Cabinet on July 26, 1941 “unanimously decided to send 200 Tomahawk fighters to Russia as soon as possible. Therefore, it should not be surprising that “the first cargo of the Allies arriving in Arkhangelsk on August 31, 1941 with the Dervish convoy (7 transports and 6 guard ships) were English. ... It is interesting that although military supplies to our country from the United States began a few months after the start of the war, they came at a normal price, and officially the President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act for the USSR only on June 11, 1942 ”(Krasnov V ., Artemyev A. On Lend-Lease Supplies the fleet).

Summarize. With the beginning of the implementation of the backup plan V.D. Sokolovsky Soviet Union immediately began to turn into a single military camp to repel the invasion of Nazi Germany. A State Defense Committee, headed by I.V., was accumulating the full power in the country, the functions of the Government, the Supreme Council and the Central Committee of the Party. By Stalin. The rate of the High Command was transformed into the High Command Headquarters. 3 July 1941 year I.V. Stalin personally appeals to the peoples of the USSR to rally in a protracted struggle with the enemy and beat him wherever he appears.

The rights of the people's commissars of the USSR expanded under wartime conditions. Under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee of Food and Apparel Supplies of the Soviet Army and the main directorates for the supply of the national economy with coal, oil, and timber were formed. The work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the system of planning and supplying the economy were restructured. In the Volga region and in the Urals an integrated base of the tank-building industry was created. The State Defense Committee reassigned itself to the evacuation council and instructed a special commission “to work out a military economic plan for the defense of the country, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises existing on the Volga, Western Siberia and the Urals, as well as resources and enterprises exported areas in order to evacuate. "

The newly formed units created the rear line of Ostashkov - Pochep and the Mozhaisk line of defense. The organization of the partisan movement, underground activities and subversive struggle began on the territory occupied by the enemy. Began the formation of divisions of the national militia. After the first failures of the Red Army, Germany and Japan began to carry out activities to implement plans for the joint occupation of the Soviet Union. However, the restoration by the Red Army of the line of defense in the West direction predetermined the collapse of the Barbarossa plan, after which both Directive No. 32 and the plan Kanktoken were not implemented.

Attempt I.V. Stalin to link the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran with the opening of a second front in Europe failed. The troops entered Iran, but the Soviet Union in response received only military-technical assistance. The second front was opened by Allied troops in 1944 year - after the consistent failure of the Soviet and German Blitzkrieg, the war became extremely difficult and protracted.

The Soviet Union still had its great victories at Stalingrad and Kursk, in Belarus and in Ukraine, in Berlin. However, all of them became possible due to the first imperceptible and not famous victory in the hot summer of 1941 - the failure of the Barbarossa plan and the prevention of the joint occupation of the Soviet Union by Germany and Japan. And this victory is inextricably linked with the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky, who was evident first because of his secrecy, and then from the reluctance to raise the topic of the disaster of the Western Front and the crisis of the Red Army unpleasant for the Soviet political and military leadership in the summer of 1941, remained unknown.

Comments

[avt]

,, According to the memoirs of A.I. Mikoyan on June 30, 1941, I.V. Stalin's party - Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria, without any of his participation decided to create the State Defense Committee (GKO), give him full power in the country, transfer him the functions of the Government, the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee of the party. Considering that “there is so much power in the name of Stalin in the consciousness, feelings and faith of the people” that this would facilitate their mobilization and leadership of all military actions, they agreed to put the former all this time at their nearest dacha I.V. Stalin at the head of the State Defense Committee. And only after all this I.V. Stalin returned to running the country and its armed forces again. "------ It looks like before the" memories "Mikoyan of Pushkin re-read -" Boris Godunov ", here is a new reading of the wedding to the kingdom and appeared. It is strange that later Radzinsky, taking this as a basis, did not develop or add a scene with the people and a crying baby. Well, this is not the main thing, the main thing is to hammer into the brain a documentarily refuted artistic plot. To create a new "Turkish gambit", in vain or something, "burdened with evil" - Akunin has already moved to the "historians". This one will also write worse than Miller and Karamzin will rest, even shut up Radzinsky. And in fact they will refer to him as an authoritative researcher!

[vladimirZ]

The author should not refer to Mikoyan's memoirs, his "information" is the same as Khrushchev's. Their goal is to denigrate I.V. Stalin, presenting him as a narrow-minded politician and weakling, which is not true.
Mikoyan and Khrushchev are political liars.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

The GRU gave Stalin twice the number of tanks in Germany in September 1939, after the defeat of Poland - not less than 3500 in fact, and more than 7300. In 1940-41. The GRU regularly reported that the Germans had 10 airborne divisions, while they did not have a single (!), There was only a regiment of saboteurs "Brandenburg". Since 1940, in the reports of the GRU, Stalin had been sniffing about 10 Wehrmacht divisions in Bulgaria, while there were up to 10000 Germans in total throughout the war. In 1941, in the reports of the GRU, more than 10 enemy submarines scoured the Black Sea, while there was only one faulty Romanian submarine under repair in their port. There were also reports of 37 transports with an assault force to the Crimea, allegedly leaving the ports of Romania and Bulgaria. In Romania, there were 35 divisions in total, while the military maximum from there was 17,5. Instead of 3 German divisions in Norway and Finland, the GRU drew 7, instead of 3 Hungarian divisions, they scared the 7th, for Slovakia and Italy they also persistently overestimated the figures by two or three times. If you have such a RI, what plans could the future marshals Vatutin and Sokolovsky draw in our General Staff, having a party order for a war "with little blood on foreign territory" ?! One drew a counterattack on the border, and the other - a counterattack little in the depths. The result was the defeat of June 1941 as a result of the "conspiracy of generals and marshals of 1938". That year, by the way, there was also a poor harvest and famine in a number of regions of the USSR. What kind of "preventive war" and who could think in the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941? Only those who wanted the USSR to be defeated on foreign territory, and the most crushing defeat. Zhukov wrote these proposals in his secret notebook in the office of the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Tymoshenko, literally under his dictation. One dictated, the other wrote, and knew for sure that if he didn’t write a dictation, he would be devoured with giblets on the “party affair” of 1938. That's the whole alignment of “professional strategic planning” in the General Staff of the Red Army.

[vladimirZ]

What kind of "preventive war" and who could think in the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941? - Mikhail Zubkov

"Zhukov and K" could think of such a "preventive war" in the General Staff.
Are you not aware of the General Staff plan of May 15, 1941, developed at that time by Major General Vasilevsky (now stored in the archive of the Russian Federation), and rejected by I.V. Stalin, how adventurous?
And nevertheless, this "idea", pushed by Timoshenko and Zhukov, in the version of a "simultaneous counter strike" on Lublin from the Lvov ledge in the OKiyevsky military district, for which the largest military group of the Red Army was gathered there.
By the way, and mediocrely carried out by unprepared troops, without reconnaissance of the advancing enemy, under the leadership of Zhukov in the first days of the war. This "idea" of a counter strike by the Red Army has been developed since the days of Marshal Tukhachevsky, who was also that "military leader".

Unfortunately, the General Staff of the spacecraft before the war turned out to be oversaturated with leaders - natives of the Kiev military district, actively pushing the "main blow" on Ukraine, as opposed to the one developed and approved by I.V. Stalin and the Government in October 1940 to the Plan - "Considerations on the Foundations of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR", developed by Marshal Shaposhnikov, which provided for the main strike in the Belorussian direction, above the Pripyat swamps, and as an auxiliary strike against Ukraine.
The Kiev military grouping in the General Staff reoriented "Considerations on the Basics of the Strategic Deployment of Troops" to Ukraine, deploying the main forces of the Red Army there, in accordance with the "fix idea" of the pre-war generals of the Red Army - "a simultaneous counter strike on the advancing, not yet fully deployed, enemy "available in the available border troops of the Red Army.

As a result, as one of the main reasons, the Red Army was defeated in the initial period of the war in the OB-Byelorussian Military District, where the Germans inflicted their main blow on the unprepared troops, especially in the Brest direction, which in fact turned out to be open, as well as in the OKievsky district at " a simultaneous counter strike by the Red Army on the advancing enemy troops.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

I'm just writing about this adventure - look at the MANUSCRIPT of Zhukov, dictated to him by Timoshenko in his office of the People's Commissar by the middle of May 1941. Vasilevsky's group was only "drawing up" and making the necessary calculations. The deployment of troops in KOVO and ZOVO was, in principle, subordinated to this adventurous plan, not approved by anyone. In his memoirs, Zhukov denies the authorship of this plan, which was actually launched by Directive No. 2 at 15.00 on 22.6.41., Signed by Tymoshenko, etc. and Zhukov in his absence (in the morning I flew to Kiev and Ternopil), allegedly at the initiative of Stalin and Vatutin (by the time the memoirs of the dead were written). The 6th MK 10 A ZF, in principle, according to this plan, initially went to Brest at dawn, but in the afternoon it was deployed in the direction of Suwalki, and during the offensive of the "Boldin group", in violation of Moscow's directives, Pavlov sent him to Grodno. Grodno, which the Germans had already passed with a breakthrough group, leaving quickly set minefields and artillery barriers, they recaptured on 23.6., But not for long, 24.6. they were driven out with heavy losses and from 25.6. the Germans were already finishing them off, surrounded by artillery and aircraft. As a result, they did not go to Brest, and they were late to Grodno, and they did not disturb Suwalki. They set them up with the personal participation of Marshal Kulik, who intensified the disorganization at the headquarters of 10 A and the "Boldin group" - and left to flee the encirclement.

[vladimirZ]

I'm just writing about this adventure - look at the MANUSCRIPT of Zhukov, dictated to him by Timoshenko in his office of the People's Commissar by the middle of May 1941. Vasilevsky's group was only "drawing up" and making the necessary calculations. - Mikhail Zubkov

Can you tell me where to "look" at the authorship of this Plan by Timoshenko-Zhukov? Everywhere it passes like "Vasilevsky's development" not signed by anyone. Thanks in advance.
By the way, are you familiar with the research of the pre-war events of April-June 1941 by Oleg Kozinkin, including his last "Before June 22, 41. Chronology of events of a" programmed "catastrophe. Inconvenient facts ..."? Interesting work, revealing a number of little-known additional facts, like his previously published books.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Kozinkin lies too much and writes gag, he is banned here and in other forums for continuous personal insults to the authors. And the manuscript of "Vasilevsky" without a date is Zhukov's manuscript from his secret notebook, a photocopy was published. This is what HE PERSONALLY wrote under the dictation of Timoshenko, and reported to Stalin, and Stalin left notes there. And then he scolded both of them as provocateurs, and made political commissions in the districts with checks so that the soldiers would not provoke the war. And he did the right thing, but Mehlis and others ruined the task with propaganda "to expose the provocateurs of the war" and that "there will be no war, the working class of Germany will not allow this." They began to take cases against the "provocateurs".

[vladimirZ]

And the manuscript of "Vasilevsky" without a date is Zhukov's manuscript from his secret notebook, a photocopy was published. This is what HE PERSONALLY wrote under the dictation of Timoshenko, and reported to Stalin, and Stalin left notes there. - Mikhail Zubkov

Where is it in the documents that you can see what exactly Zhukov-Timoshenko's "creativity" is? Where was this photocopy of Zhukov's secret notebook published?
That Kozinkin is not restrained and pours insults at those who argue with him, this is so, for which he is banned, but his opponents are not distinguished by restraint in disputes.
This is not the case. It is possible to disagree with O. Kozinkin with something, but the essence of his statements is true:
- the fact that the USSR, the Red Army knew about the impending attack of fascist Germany and prepared in advance for this attack;
- The General Staff sent orders and directives on the preparation of troops and bringing them into a state of combat readiness, taking into account the strictest instructions of I.V. Stalin did not succumb to provocations, after which the USSR could be declared worldwide the initiator of the war with Germany - the aggressor, with all the ensuing consequences of uniting the entire capitalist world against him on the side of Germany;
- as well as the disclosure by Kozinkin of the General Staff (Zhukov-Timoshenko) Plan of the General Staff (Zhukov-Timoshenko), which is destructive for the Red Army and the USSR, with a simultaneous (with the Germans) oncoming offensive of the Red Army, on the Germans attacking the USSR, from Lvov (the main counter strike on Lublin and beyond) and Belostok (auxiliary strike in the direction of V. Prussia) protrusions, as they believed in the last World War I, against the still undeployed German troops - "with little blood on foreign territory."

[Mikhail Zubkov]

In the search engine in general and on this site you can find. According to Kozinkin, I recommend the publication "Unexpected War", 26 articles in the cycle, the author under the nickname "AkTor", very good. informative comments including mine. The bottom line is that the ALSO DETAILED intelligence materials on the Wehrmacht deployment were half disinformation. Until 21.6.41. and even later, his main tank groupings and ANY headquarters of the tank division were not identified. As a result, two Wehrmacht shock groups suddenly went against PribOVO, the weakest of our districts, while against ZAPOVO and KOVO - one at a time. Up to 40% of all German troops pulled up to the Soviet border were directed against the NWF, while our General Staff considered the main attack of the Germans on the KOVO and sent 40% of our forces there, which he "maneuvered" with, up to the launch of mechanized corps in a circle, to wear out people and technology. And at the NWF the mechanized corps and artillery regiments stalled after 3 days without fuel and the BC, brought into the woods near Siauliai in one fist "for a counterattack" on Taurage-Tilsit, exposing the entire coast from Palanga to Riga, including the main bases of the USSR Navy Libava and Vindavu. Pts. I recommend reading the comments to these articles, and the articles themselves. You will learn that if 50% of the troops fought in the zones of the main attacks of the Germans in the North-West Front, then only 15% in the West-West Front and South-West Front. The remaining 85% were "assigned in advance" to the bags prepared by the German General Staff, starting from Bialystok, where they were mainly surrounded, destroyed and taken prisoner in a matter of days. For me personally, it is clear that this is a betrayal of the Ukrainian marshals Tymoshenko and Kulik.

[vladimirZ]

In the search engine in general and on this site you can find. - Mikhail Zubkov

I have been interested in the history of the beginning of the Second World War for several decades, but nowhere and never even read that you write that a photocopy of Zhukov's secret notebook has been published somewhere, or links to it, which indicate the "authorship" of Zhukov-Timoshenko of the "preventive war" variant USSR against Germany. If it doesn't bother you, then indicate at least one site where this is displayed.
As for the publication of "Unexpected War", the author under the nickname "AkTor", I read them and also commented. I collected them into a single material, copied myself into an electronic book, as a source of staff maps, someone of factual material on the topic of the beginning of the war that interests me.
Essentially the articles "Unexpected War". The author of "AkTor" is under the influence of a delusion in the interpretation of the beginning of the war, in that the leadership of the USSR and the Red Army did not know about the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941 and did not prepare for it, which contradicts the known factual historical materials published in many historical studies, especially in the last decade.
Failure to fully prepare for the start of the war on June 22, 1941 of individual military formations, especially in the OZapVO, for which the local command from the districts to the army corps is responsible, cannot be completely transferred to the top leadership of the Red Army.
Zhukov-Tymoshenko has his own fault for the unsuccessful start of the Second World War, the main of which is the wrong strategy for starting the war, the reassessment of the forces of the Red Army.
This is especially pronounced in the study of materials of ships over the command, incl. OzapVO in 1941, and in the answers of the spacecraft generals to the questions of Colonel General Pokrovsky, who led the study of the causes of the defeat of the outbreak of war in the postwar period.
Now about the ignorance of the intelligence agencies of the USSR and the Red Army tank groups of Germans in the western districts of the USSR before the outbreak of war, which you write about. It was objectively difficult to determine in advance in the border zone of Germany (occupied Poland), since they were not there. German tank groups were introduced into the border zone just before the German attack on the USSR, literally in a day or two. Hence the discrepancy between our intelligence and their actual location among the Germans.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

It takes me a long time to list the facts testifying to the CONSCIOUS betrayal of the UKRAINIAN marshals Tymoshenko and Kulik, the People's Commissar of Defense and his CHIEF Deputy. I don’t suspect GKZh of this, although Uborevich and other conspirators favored him. I suspect the SCJ of a CONSCIOUS AND CONSIDERED lie in the memoirs about the first half of 1941 and especially in the first half of June 1941. At the same time, I understand that his memoirs were harshly "edited by the authorities", military and political. I don't know much about a computer, and it is difficult for me to search, copy and forward documents. Therefore, alas, I cannot help you with finding a photocopy, but I assure you that it was published HERE and I saw it. I am surprised that you did not come across it, you are clearly more immersed in the theme of 1941 than I am. I'm in this thread because my father started the war at dawn on 22.6.41. in Alytus, being there as a delegate to the 11th Army headquarters of the NWF (brought the order at 5 td), and left the encirclement as an officer of the army headquarters from the evening of 22.6. together with the headquarters of this division, and then the army. We went to Polotsk on July 3 with a wounded train, having been declared dead or captured by the NWF headquarters, and excluded for searching for communications, receiving radio requests. My father went through the whole war, his last fight was 7.5.45. near Rostock.

[vladimirZ]

She published HERE and I saw her. I’m surprised that you didn’t come across it, - Mikhail Zubkov

Most likely you are confusing "a photocopy of Zhukov's secret notebook" with the Plan - Considerations for the strategic deployment of troops on May 15, 1941, drawn up by General (at that time) Vasilevsky (his handwriting), at the end of which are the details of the signers Timoshenko and Zhukov, but they themselves no signature, and which is sometimes called the "Zhukov Plan". At the beginning of this "Plan" the addressee I.V. Stalin.
There was an article on VO about this Plan - "On the Zhukov Plan of May 15, 1941", in 2013 (https://topwar.ru/1684-o-plane-zhukova-ot-15-maya-1941-g .html), where similar statements are made.
Also, for example, the article "PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON GERMANY IN MAY 1941" - "DID STALIN PLAN IN MAY 1941 A PREVENTIVE ATTACK ON GERMANY?" - See the original material on the Top Secret website: https://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/4717
In a broad discussion, this development, unsigned by anyone, is called the Vasilevsky Plan of May 15, 1941, and it was stored until 1948, before being archived, in Vasilevsky’s safe.
There are no notes that this "Plan" was reported to Stalin, otherwise the signatures of Timoshenko and Zhukov would have to be.
Zhukov and Timoshenko, most likely, were familiar with this "Plan" of a preventive strike by the USSR, since some memoirs mention Zhukov's conversations about this topic, for example, with the historian Anfilov, who claimed that "the Marshal said that before presenting the document to I. V. Stalin, SK Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov decided to first check his reaction to the idea of ​​a preemptive strike, and when they very carefully brought it up, they "received an unambiguous answer in rather harsh terms."
It is possible that Vasilevsky was developing this "Plan" on behalf of Zhukov-Timoshenko, but there is no documentary evidence confirming this yet. In history, this document remains as one of the many options for the start of the war, developed by the General Staff of the spacecraft.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

See V.G. Krasnov. Unknown Zhukov. M. 2001. p. 164-166. Vasilevsky was ordered by Timoshenko and Zhukov to prepare "Considerations" together with Vatutin (made calculations) on the basis of Golikov's intelligence as of May 5, 1941. Yes, I believe this document was written by Zhukov. In any case, he is responsible for the order to prepare him as Marshal-People's Commissar Tymoshenko.

[vladimirZ]

See V.G. Krasnov. Unknown Zhukov. M. 2001. p. 164-166. Vasilevsky was ordered by Timoshenko and Zhukov to prepare "Considerations" - Mikhail Zubkov

Thanks for the link. I am not a fan of G.K. Zhukov's talent, and I do not admire him, and therefore I have not read so many books about him. In my opinion, it is enough to read his "Memories and Reflections" to determine your opinion on it. I read quite a lot of memoirs of other marshals and generals about him. By the way, I recommend, if you have not read it, to read the memoirs of the Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov A.E. "Long-range bomber ...", as well as the book by Felix Chuev "SOLDIERS OF THE EMPIRE
CONVERSATIONS. MEMORIES. DOCUMENTS ". Very informative and interesting, including about Zhukov.
Now about the book, or rather an excerpt from V.G. Krasnov's book. "Unknown Zhukov". The book is a kind of panegyric - praising Zhukov, an artistic version of the presentation of historical events. Krasnov's thesis in the above passage about the Plan of May 15, 1941 (p. 166) that

Stalin accused Tymoshenko and Zhukov of striving to provoke Hitler to attack, believing that the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops could be considered as a reason for aggression. Then get the upper point of view of the leadership of the People’s Commissariat and the General Staff, how many victims could be avoided ...

shows that Krasnov V.G. still did not understand that it would be a suicidal Plan for the defeat of the Red Army, and possibly the USSR, in the war.
By the way, after the war, Zhukov admitted that he and Tymoshenko were wrong with their "warning strike", and with his reincarnated version of "simultaneous counter strike", and I.V. Stalin for rejecting their "warning blow".
The wrong Zhukov-Timoshenko was expressed in the fact that the top military men of the Red Army at that time were profane in politics and diplomacy, and did not understand what I.V. Stalin - the "warning strike" of the spacecraft would essentially turn out to be an aggression of the USSR against Germany and would attract US assistance to the side of Germany, and would also give Japan a reason, under an agreement with her, to open military operations against the USSR in the Far East, which actually meant inevitable defeat at that time USSR in the war.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

For these "Considerations of 1941" in PribOVO, in particular, already 18.6.41. it was ordered to prepare a counterstrike tank fist. Focused by 20.6.41. (according to Vasilevsky-Vatutin's plan ?! or Timoshenko-Zhukov ?!) of the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps in the woods (night crossings!) in a square of 90 km along the front and 50 km in depth, with the rear in the former PPD near Libava and Riga (where the approaches were exposed!) And spare parts warehouses in Dvinsk, almost 300 km away. At the same time, 23 rifle divisions were also taken away from Dvinsk. strategically exposed the crossings across the West. Dvina. Counterattack with a "tank fist" 23.6.41. (!) ordered on the front 90 km and to a depth of 180 km (!) in the direction of Taurage-Tilsit. As a result, the Germans 23.6. took Shauliai, 24.6. Kaunas, 25.6. Vilnius, 26.6. blocked Libau, 27.6. took Dvinsk, 29.6. Riga. All tank and air formations of the NWF by 30.6. were defeated. For details on tank vehicles, see here:
Report of the headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps about the fighting of the corps in the period from June 22 to August 1, 1941
site analysis Joomla
transfer site to joomla 2.5
DB for August 1941
Views: 2136

[vladimirZ]

For these "Considerations of 1941" in PribOVO, in particular, already 18.6.41. it was ordered to prepare a counterstrike tank fist. Focused by 20.6.41. (according to Vasilevsky-Vatutin's plan ?! or Timoshenko-Zhukov ?!) - Mikhail Zubkov

These "tank fists" - mechanized corps in the OZapVO, OKVO and PribVO were formed and intended for a reborn "preemptive strike" of the spacecraft in a "simultaneous counter strike against the attacking enemy", according to the Zhukov-Timoshenko Plan.
Moreover, I wrote about this above, the main blow, and accordingly most of the Red Army troops were concentrated in the Lviv ledge with the aim of striking the weakest German group in Krakow, Lublin and beyond, to cut off the Balkan states from their German ally, and thereby withdraw them from the war, and further north to encircle the central grouping of German troops in Poland together with the OzapVO troops — an auxiliary strike from the Bialystok ledge, and the PribVO troops in the direction of V. Prussia.
Later, Zhukov, in his memoirs, falsified these "Zhukov-Timoshenko Plans" for the beginning of the war by the fact that Stalin expected the main blow of the Germans to Ukraine, and they were forced to keep the main group of troops there. Tymoshenko turned out to be more conscientious than Zhukov, realizing his guilt for the defeat of the beginning of the war, he simply did not write his memoirs about it.
By and large, of course, the "Considerations" of May 15, 1941, of the "warning strike" of the spacecraft on the German troops that had not yet deployed, with the initiative to unleash hostilities first from the USSR - this is the Zhukov-Timoshenko Plan, documented by General Vasilevsky.
According to this Plan, they concentrated spacecraft troops in the western districts, and when they received a categorical refusal to approve their actions from I.V. Stalin, they reshaped it into the Plan of "simultaneous counter strike" on the attacking German troops, not understanding, probably the main thing - the weakness of the Red Army, its unpreparedness due to its fighting qualities, to fight on equal terms with the Germans in the initial period of the war.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Plan a counterblow (!) MEETING operation from 18.6.41. until 23.30 22.6.41. along the front 90 and to a depth of 180 km, concentrating (!?) armored vehicles cut off from the rear by 100-200-300 km IN FORESTS (!) on an area of ​​90 along the front and 50 km in depth, in conditions of bombing and sabotage war on the roads and in the cities in the rear, this is not the illiteracy of the "variant developers" for the peace date of May 15, 1941 (according to RM, for May 5), when the Wehrmacht troops in East Prussia were considered (!) undeployed. In fact, this is not a mistake, but an EXPRESS CHANGE of Tymoshenko and FORCED subordination of Zhukov to him. At the same time, at the Main Military Council, Budyonny and others absolutely correctly suggested that the main line of defense in the Baltic should be built along the Western Dvina! in Belarus - along the old border, along the "Stalin Line" from Lutsk and Minsk to Polotsk. And 23.6. it was still REALLY to have time to do with the troops available in the theater of operations, which were still quite combat-ready and had lost in 22.6. no more than 5% of equipment and l / s. Only aviation equipment was lost at that time about 10-20%, moreover, more old and faulty than new. Crushed and surrounded in the Baltics were only 4-5 rifle divisions, with defense zones of 30-50 km in the first line on the state border. 126th SDF, for example, left the series of EIGHT encirclements to Polotsk (ZF) and then fought in the battle for Moscow until the end of 1941.

[vladimirZ]

This is not a mistake in fact, but an EXPRESS treason of Tymoshenko and the FORCED subjugation of Zhukov to him. - Mikhail Zubkov

Some scholars of the history of the Great Patriotic War have such a version that in the high command of the spacecraft there was treason at the beginning of the war, left over from the military conspiracy of 1937, and aimed at removing him from the leadership of Stalin. But no serious facts yet unconfirmed. Who was Tymoshenko, Meretskov, or who else is not clear?
But there are facts reflected, for example, by O. Kozinkin, that Tymoshenko on the night of June 21-22, 1941, after sending the Directive on putting the troops on combat alert from 22.00 hours on June 21.06, in conversation with the General Commandant General Command General Pavlov, somewhere around 00- 01 hours 22.06, reassured him not to panic, and if something happens then collect the leadership of the military district in the morning to take action.
By the way, in the materials of the trial over the command of the OZapVO 1941, General Pavlov insisted on a confrontation with the leadership of the spacecraft Tymoshenko, Zhukov without whom he refused to testify.
Can these facts be considered as a fact of treason or as reassurance of the district command to prevent retaliatory actions against provocations? Hard to say.
But the most important thing, of course, which inclines to the version of betrayal in the top military leadership of the KA, is stupid, one can probably even admit to that the treacherous military planning of the beginning of the war. Which is unlikely, but as a version is possible to consider.
In 1941, the start of the war was condemned for the defeat, and some were shot, the leadership of not only the OZapVO, but also individual leaders of other Western military districts (except Odessa Military District), the top leadership of the Air Force, military communications and several other leaders of the spacecraft.
In addition, during the war years, too many KA generals were in German captivity, and some of them turned out to be traitors who went over to the Germans and served them to the very end, which also cannot be discounted.
On this I think you and I can end the discussion on this topic. Thank you, Michael, for the comments.

[smersh70]

got ahead)))) Mikoyan is lying, let him look at the book of Stalin’s visitors. Everything is scheduled by the minute and by the second. During the week, Stalin was at his place and didn’t go away anywhere. Everyone knows that the bosses have a rest room behind the office. Even there they were received by Zhukov when he had the flu (this is also the case in the book and in the films) Stalin left for a day only after the speech. Truly, we are between the streams of rain (as in a joke)

[avt]

Quote: smersh70

Mikoyan is lying, let him look at the book of Stalin’s visitors. Everything is written out in minutes and seconds. During the week, Stalin was at home and didn’t go away anywhere. Everyone knows that the bosses have a rest room behind the office. Even there they received Zhukov

There was not even a bomb shelter at Blizhnyaya, but in Moscow, an underground KP was equipped next to the Kirovskaya station, now Chistye Prudy, next to the current mansion is the old reception house of the Moscow Region, there was a ground entrance there. When the metro line was extended to Izmailovo, another command post was made, Akkurat where Cherkizon was located, there is still an underground parking for 200 vehicles of armored vehicles for a tank division.

[saruman]

I was always surprised. How? Having no plans (since the USSR was allegedly preparing to defeat the enemy on its territory in a lightning war) to evacuate industrial enterprises, was this evacuation carried out? There are no analogues in world history, such a large-scale and organized transfer of industrial potential over long distances, in the conditions of the fiercest opposition of the enemy! These were the same detailed evacuation plans! So, the USSR, led by Stalin, provided for the worst options for war!

[Lignitz]

As soon as I read about "Mikoyan's memoirs," I immediately stopped reading further, I think the material of the article is very bad, one heresy.

[Urus]

Heroes are not us ... Low bow !!!