Military Review

Why in the struggle for operational principles Hitler won, and not the German military elite

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Why in the struggle for operational principles Hitler won, and not the German military elite

With each new round stories taking into account the current situation in the world, the need to comprehend the events of the Second World War again and again arises. It is in her - the roots of many phenomena observed in the modern world. And today it is interesting why the numerous military-political and operational mistakes that Hitler himself admitted in most cases caused a strong negative reaction from the main military specialists who saw their destructiveness. But despite this, Hitler was able to enforce his decisions and activities.


There are many very deep psychological and historical reasons for this. At the head of all the armed forces of Germany stood the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The only exception was at first the SS troops. However, when Hitler himself became commander-in-chief after the resignation of Field Marshal von Blomberg in February 1938, this inconvenience was eliminated.

The fact is that the officer corps of the German armed forces was divided into several large groups: the ground army, the navy, the air force and the SS troops, headed by their commanders in chief and who were independent and equal parts of the German armed forces.

Taking into account all the features, it is necessary to consider them as a whole, despite the fact that they treated Hitler differently. To this it should be added that within the officer corps of certain types of armed forces there were sharp disagreements that arose as early as the years of their construction and intensified in the first years of the war.

MILITARY ELITE

The traditions of the Prussian military school that previously existed among the old German generals, the officer corps, were apparently completely undermined in 1918.

Hitler for 12-year domination awarded the rank of Field Marshal to 25 senior officers (19 army and 6 aviation) 23 of them were awarded this title after the surrender of France in June 1940. Field marshals, the German elite, having behind them the centuries-old traditions of the Prussian military school, inspired respect, respect and fear. After the victory over Poland and France, an aura of invincibility was created around them and the German army as a whole. After the defeat at Stalingrad and the capture of Field Marshal Paulus, Hitler pledged not to assign the Field Marshal title to anyone else. But nevertheless, by the end of the war, he was forced by several generals to appropriate these higher military ranks. Of the 19 field marshals, by the end of the war only two remained in active service. Several people died, three committed suicide, others were executed for attempted assassination of Hitler or died in prison (four), when trials of war criminals began after the war. Of the Wehrmacht field marshals who started the war, essentially no one was left by the end of the war. Hitler dared all those who were objectionable.

In addition, the German armed forces numbered more than 1500 generals and admirals. During the war, casualties among German generals and admirals, including non-combatants, amounted to 963 people, of which 223 generals died in battle. 553 generals were captured. 64 generals committed suicide. At the same time, 20 generals were killed in battles in the German Air Force, navy - 18 admirals.

Despite this “elitism”, German field marshals and generals did not find the strength or the means to finally and definitively stop Hitler, who was on the path of military and political mistakes. With his mistakes, Hitler helped the German General Staff to make mistakes; he often prevented the General Staff from making more thoughtful, more correct decisions. In the 1941 year, after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, he removed field marshal Brauchitsch and Boc from posts, and 30 generals and senior officers, and he himself led the German ground forces. After that, both the German General Staff and the German army group commanders were linked to a much greater extent than before. Their initiative was constrained. Outgoing from Hitler as commander-in-chief of directives, ground forces became indisputable to a greater extent than was required in the interests of the cause.

It should be noted that in the period of the Reichswehr, along with officers who were taking a conservative position based on the traditions of the old Prussian officers, people came to the fore who sought to use the army to achieve their narrow party goals, which were contradictory to all its essence. Driven by ambition, underscored by expressly democratic views, they managed to occupy important posts in the army and disrupt the unity that existed among the top military commanders. But to exert a decisive influence on the position of the bulk of the officer corps, these people, among whom were many excellent experts in their field, failed to start the war. By their actions, they only achieved undermining the authority of the military leadership.

PRINCIPLE OF DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY

The thesis of sharing responsibility that Hitler used, and the desire that none of his assistants should concentrate too much power in their hands, increasingly undermined the efficiency of the central military authorities.

The commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces, who were directly subordinate to Hitler, often used their personal relations with him in order to satisfy their mercenary demands, regardless of what problems the war as a whole put forward. Due to the fact that between Hitler and the commander in chief of the air force Goering, and in the second half of the war, to some extent, the commander in chief of the Navy, Dönitz, had the closest relations, respectively, less friction and disagreement. But this was also explained by the fact that Hitler understood nothing about the maritime strategy and was very restrained with the sailors, thus giving almost no reasons for the emergence of opposition on business matters. On the contrary, the army commanders, deprived by Hitler of any freedom in dealing with operational and even tactical issues, who considered themselves expert in these matters, were constantly drawn into endless disputes and conflicts, which not only quickly undermined the atmosphere of trust in Hitler, but sometimes caused a negative reaction in German officers.

Even from this it becomes clear that the top military leadership of the Germans, if it decided on extreme measures (and only it was able to change the situation by force or good), could count on the obedience of the entire officer corps as little as on unity of action. leading generals and admirals. Even less could have been expected of this obedience from non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Considering the past events today, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the majority of the German people and the overwhelming majority of military personnel almost until the end of 1944 were completely devoted to Hitler and not inclined to take on faith the slogans of military leadership and follow them.

The assassination of Hitler 20 July 1944 of the year caused only a very slight reaction among the active forces. Obviously, the same thing would have happened if the attempt had been successful. These events leave no doubt that not only the SS troops, but also the connections of the air force and the navy, guided only by their “great” duty to the fatherland, on the evening of July 20 1944, for the most part, were ready weapons suppress any anti-government appearances. Presumably, most of the troops of the land army would not have followed the calls of the insurgent officers.

The German soldier, in his traditions and in his upbringing, was never a revolutionary. He always opposed the responsibility for questions that were not included in the circle of tasks assigned to him. He did not want to fight for the implementation of such tasks, as he considered them as the lot of political leaders. Even from a psychological point of view, he was not prepared for such a struggle. This was the great strength of the army, which was a wordless tool in the hands of the government. But as soon as the German government took the path that led to the defeat of the Hitler regime, and as soon as the political leadership began to lose its control over the army, this non-political nature of the army turned into its weakness.

On the participants of the conspiracy 20 July 1944, you can think how you want. One thing is clear that the German soldier could not understand those representatives of the resistance movement who, by changing their homeland, even for the most compelling reasons, put the lives of hundreds of thousands of colleagues at risk. Only a personal struggle for their operational-tactical, strategic and political views, based on the traditions of the German army, could be the most effective form of resistance. But for this, the German military leaders had to draw the most decisive conclusions for themselves.

If the disagreements that existed among the German officers did not prevent us from acting as a united front against Hitler at a time when the German people had not yet fought for their existence, then such united actions would probably have the desired results. If the generals vigorously used the facts that Hitler was deeply insulting the honor of the German officer corps, as was the case, for example, during the reprisal of officers involved in Rem’s conspiracy or in Fritch, then Hitler could probably still be stopped. If, then, everyone spoke together, relying on the still strong position of the armed forces in the state, then Hitler and his dictatorial manners would be curbed.

But this unity was not. The ground army, namely, it should be the first to speak about it, lacked a man who would be able to oppose Hitler and lead the generals, the troops and the young officer corps. But the attempt made by certain generals to put Hitler in a certain framework could not fail to turn into ineffectual isolated statements, which Hitler was able to easily suppress. Even before the war, it became clear that it was impossible to rally representatives of the German generals and lead them against the dictator. This was largely hampered by those external and domestic political successes, which were welcomed by all the people. Therefore, those persons who, against the background of these successes, tried to counteract the new regime, were eliminated without any difficulty.

Thus, if before the war, the prospects for changing the form of government, or at least the methods of government by attracting armies to their side, were extremely insignificant, by the beginning of the war they completely disappeared. In the early years of the war, the development of events on the fronts completely excluded any possibility of opposing Hitler’s policies and the methods of his leadership.

STRUGGLE AGAINST INACOMABILITY IN THE MEDIUM OF GENERALS

Milch, Brauchitsch, Raeder and Weichs at the parade in Nuremberg. September 1938 of the year. Photo from Wilhelm Keitel’s book “Reflections before execution”. M., 2012

The subsequent attempts by individual military leaders to change anything in the existing system led these generals either to resign or to arrest. Military education and soldiers' traditions, combined with the lack of the ability of the top military leaders to maintain close contact with each other due to the large length of the fronts, made such a general statement completely impracticable. And besides, it is difficult to say what action it would have had on Hitler.

All of the above, however, does not mean that all Hitler’s plans and decisions were taken by his closest collaborators, army commanders, army groups without objections. In extremely heated disputes, which often crossed at certain points the boundaries permitted by the head of state, the chief of the German general staff and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces, as well as representatives of the air force and fleet, who were often supported by the commanders of the army groups, air forces, and especially from the front, the generals and officers fought a sharp, sometimes sarcastic tendency to fight Hitler over his decisions of operational, organizational, military-economic and supply on the character. At the same time, they, without any embellishment, informed Hitler about the actual situation in the rear and at the fronts. He listened to this information, as a rule, very willingly, but, to everyone’s disappointment, it never led to a change in his decision. True, Hitler tried to eliminate some of the revealed shortcomings, but the conclusions that he drew from these discussions focused mainly on more personal questions than on the merits.

The control mechanism created by Hitler was a means for eliminating any dissent, and on the other hand, was the method of generation and selection of personally dedicated personnel nurtured in an atmosphere of propaganda. Every boss or commander who caused Hitler to doubt his ability to enforce his decisions disappeared, and instead of him was appointed a man to whom Hitler had more confidence.

Thus, the generation of senior military leaders — Fritsch, Beck, Brauchitsch, Halder, Vitsleben, Bock, Liszt, Leeb — grew up and gained combat experience in World War I and in the years preceding World War II, was gradually supplanted by a generation of new warlords, about which Hitler thought that they would carry out his operational plans with unshakable firmness and in the most unfavorable conditions, often in flagrant contradiction with all sorts of operational principles.

People like Model, Rommel, Schörner, more and more pushed to the fore. These were, of course, tried-and-true general military leaders, but they were only outstanding commanders, not commanders. In order to support the crumbling building of the fronts, they were driven from one site to another, to the place where the most dangerous situation took shape, until many of them finally broke down, unable to withstand any concerns physically or morally placed on their shoulders.

FROM IDEAL MANAGEMENT TO CHAOS - ONE STEP

I would especially like to mention the closest adviser to Hitler from the first to the last day during the entire period of rapidly evolving events. He was the chief of the headquarters of the armed forces, Colonel-General Jodl. He was undoubtedly the most sincere admirer of Hitler and highly appreciated his efficiency, energy, wealth of ideas and talent of the organizer. How deeply he understood Hitler will obviously remain a mystery. Yodel was a born generalist. His operational views were always distinguished by great clarity and clarity. But, being in captivity of ideas that bore a distinctly continental character, he was deprived of that versatility and breadth in understanding strategic issues that are always essential for a person holding such a post. Jodl understood this limitation of his abilities well and therefore he devoted himself to the development of purely operational questions, which in themselves were quite voluminous.

He more and more fenced off from other issues of leadership and soon almost completely transferred to the jurisdiction of Field Marshal Keitel all matters relating to cooperation with the allies and the military administration in the occupied areas. This one-sided interest in operational and even tactical problems was the reason that Jodl not only himself became involved in the particular issues of leading military operations at the front, but also supported Hitler’s disastrous desire to interfere in the affairs of lower and middle command. Personally interfering in the military leadership, Hitler is so bogged down with trivialities of a purely tactical order that he lost the ability for the head of state to allocate the main things and found no more peace or time to deal with the problems of internal government. The military leadership itself, of course, suffered from this method, as the specific operational issues caused by each specific change in the situation more and more obscured the prospects for overall strategic leadership.

To this was added the abnormal position that every authoritative administration in Germany began and ended with Hitler. In the work of subordinates and institutions, he instigated such a practice, when, as a result of an unclear delineation of responsibilities, the same tasks were often performed by the most diverse institutions. He expected that the resulting rivalry would force people to work with maximum exertion. But instead, a lot of energy, as a rule, was spent on a useless struggle that went on between the authorities responsible for a particular task, and often did a lot of empty and irresponsible work, as several authorities, without even informing each other, planned to use people and technology to achieve the same goal.

The consequence of this organizational chaos, the presence of Hitler’s dislike for experts and the chaos in troop management was that almost all the important issues that, with a clear organization without any difficulty could be resolved by the relevant ministers, had to be reported to be solved by Hitler himself. As a result, Hitler was again over-loaded with a solution to problems of secondary importance, but with this he wanted to prove to his employees that he alone was able to control the mechanism of the state apparatus. And finally, only the so-called "order of the Führer" could be seriously considered and executed by the appropriate authorities.

Concentration of all issues of state leadership in the hands of one person eventually led to the fact that in the military leadership, as in other important areas, he began to prevail over a way of thinking that was increasingly moving away from the real strategic and operational environment. Hitler did not pay attention to all the proposals of his responsible advisers and believed that he could follow his unreasonable plans and dreams without taking into account the actual development of the situation. He was increasingly abandoned by a sense of proportion that forces even the strongest will to obey the facts.

DIFFERENCES WITH THE GENERAL STAFF

Jodl indirectly contributed to the fact that Hitler, who had resolved issues that could not be understood at all, being at the rate of the Supreme High Command, began to give absolutely impossible orders for the front and leading to defeat orders. Jodl with striking sharpness and firmness sometimes defended his views before Hitler and sought to carry out his decisions. So, the first major disagreement arose in the summer of 1941. The reason was that the campaign to seize the USSR did not develop as planned, and it was necessary to urgently coordinate its progress. Hitler believed that Leningrad and the southern regions should have been captured first, and for this, he ordered to transfer part of the troops of the “Center” group to the north and south. Yodel insisted on seizing Moscow in the first place.

The following major discrepancies between General Jodl and Hitler came in the summer of 1942. The general suggested that instead of an offensive in the Caucasus, take Leningrad by storm. But Hitler demanded to continue the attack on the Caucasus. Hitler even wanted to replace Jodl Paulus, but the defeat of the Germans near Stalingrad did not allow this replacement. Jodl continued to serve in Hitler's headquarters.

Despite some successes, which some military leaders sometimes managed to achieve, there can be no doubt that, in general, the directives on the conduct of the operation, and in part even on tactical questions, were determined only by Hitler. Up until the very last moment, Hitler succeeded (this was largely due to the separation of powers in all areas of leadership) to prevent any serious opposition from arising. 20 July 1944 of the year proved that any resistance movement that goes beyond the traditional principles of action of the military opposition (regardless of whether the attempt on Hitler was successful or unsuccessful) has no chance of success, since the entire system of state governance and existing conditions not only excluded the possibility of concentration of significant military forces anywhere in the rear, but also made it impossible to use any means necessary to influence the masses and to prepare the public Nia.

The events of 20 July 1944 of the year showed that the attempt to carry out a coup d'etat undertaken even by the smartest, tried and tested by all the military, could not be supported either by the German people or by the majority of the troops of the active army. They simply would not have the strength to isolate the main leaders for at least a few hours or to protect themselves. Thus, this attempt inevitably should have led to the death of the most valuable people. It was again proved that, without having a people and a large part of the armed forces, it is impossible to overthrow the skillfully guarded authoritarian regime even in the most unfavorable military situation. No opposition, guided by even the most advanced views, will be able to gain the upper hand if the head of state can split it by means of skillful propaganda, in word and deed to keep the masses on its side. Numerous management crises in Eastern European and other theaters of war and their outcome convincingly prove this statement.

There was, however, another opportunity to influence at least some of Hitler’s operational decisions. But this possibility from a military point of view was not completely flawless and contained a certain risk for command. It consisted in the close cooperation of the lower levels of command, that is, in the cooperation of the chiefs of staff, officers of the general staff, the headquarters of the active troops with the corresponding officials of the highest operational headquarters. Formulating operational and intelligence reports in a certain way and drawing up operational maps on this basis, they could present the general situation in such a way that the supreme commander would have no choice but to make the only possible decision under these conditions, which was exactly what the local command needed. This path was used in the interests of the most expedient conduct of hostilities and in some cases led to success.

Proceeding from an incorrect assessment of morale, human resources, and also the material base of the Red Army, Hitler set tasks for his armed forces that they could not cope with and could not cope with. And even when Hitler realized his military, political and operational mistakes, he refused to recognize them and draw the necessary conclusions from this.

Help "NVO"

Rem Ernst, being the Reich minister and chief of staff of the security service, was plotting against Hitler. 30 July 1934, the day on which the conspirators' speeches were appointed, was arrested and executed without trial on the personal instructions of Hitler.

Werner Fritsch from 1935, was the commander in chief of the Wehrmacht land forces. 4 February 1938 was denounced from office, arrested and handed over to the military tribunal, which during the trial was forced, despite Hitler's order, to acquit him.
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  1. dv-v
    dv-v 18 January 2014 11: 08
    +12
    it makes little sense to read an article, as, incidentally, is a purely amateur war memoir, in particular of German military commanders - Hitler is to blame. it is very necessary to filter. Undoubtedly, part of the fault of some failures or miscalculations lies with him, as, in our turn, with Stalin, but the WWII was not the period of the Napoleonic wars, Hitler’s personality is somewhat more convex than they are trying to portray. best of all, such articles should be summarized by the well-known proverb about the many fathers of victory, but one of defeat. and this material is directly in places involuntarily emphasizing this.
    1. Uncle Vitya
      Uncle Vitya 19 January 2014 04: 45
      +1
      I agree with you completely! After the war, when Hitler's would-be warriors began to write their would-be memoirs ... so corporal Adolf is to blame for everything ... but if you go deeper ... they were great strategists, half-breathing, took Poland, France, Norway, The Balkans ... But in the history of these commanders, I am personally finished off by one small moment, or rather one of the directives of the Wehrmacht High Command (I don’t remember the exact number now, but that’s not the point ..), as they had before the Barbarossa plan began. , that is, before the attack on the USSR, a plan was already prepared for how they would pass through the USSR to India ...
      PS and V. Suvorov is right in the fact that the plans of these unfortunate commanders come down to the fact that a bunch of drunks got together and, in a drunken delirium, drew arrows in a drunken delirium on a blank sheet ...
  2. Standard Oil
    Standard Oil 18 January 2014 12: 01
    +2
    Yes, it’s very convenient to blame everything on the dead, they will not be indignant, they will not object, but they will only tacitly agree. Very often, in the memoirs of the German military leaders, it slips that I knew that there would be a catastrophe, but this Hitler absolutely did not listen to me and did in our own way, that’s why we lost. But if there weren’t Hitler, I would have shown how to fight.
    1. Uncle Vitya
      Uncle Vitya 19 January 2014 04: 57
      0
      Well, you will notice that they wrote it in the majority after the prisons or right there, and for some reason they wiser all in hindsight ...
      Like I was a cool captain, I know that there are icebergs and mines in front .. but I drive my boat where I ordered ... right on the icebergs and mines .. and I know that there are icebergs and mines ... and I know all this, but I I drive everything where I was ordered .. but I’m not to blame for this ... after all, I was only field marshal ... and I have a great corporal .. but he is smarter than me ...
      The memoirs of Manstein, Guderian and others ... this is typical nonsense !!! When they defeated someone, they are heroes, and when they really and very hard pressed on the snout (and they could have really quartered), they are innocent victims ... Prostitutes !!!
  3. Simple
    Simple 18 January 2014 12: 16
    0
    .................................

    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 18 January 2014 15: 05
      0
      Quote: Simple
      ................................. Our mothers, our fathers ...

      Why there? Reply to 1,5 hours?
      I watched three parts on 1,5 hours.
    2. sds555
      sds555 19 January 2014 17: 54
      0
      The film is a complete bottom, it is contraindicated for those who can think
  4. falcon
    falcon 18 January 2014 14: 42
    0
    Obviously, the author has well studied and is strongly impressed by the memoirs of the beaten
    German generals. But any team plays as the enemy allows it to do. And not
    it is necessary to rethink the events of 2MV. They have long and repeatedly been comprehended.
  5. Bigriver
    Bigriver 18 January 2014 14: 57
    +6
    The headline baffled me smile
    Already "Barbarossa" is a plan drawn up by the "elite" contrary to all operational principles.
    The successes of the first year of the war are a consequence of the operational surprise and tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht.
    Then there was the struggle of Hitler and his generals for the correct "drain" of the war. The generals wanted to retreat rationally, and their comrade Eloizovich saw in all troop movements in the East the political effect and economic consequences for the Reich economy.
    "My generals don't understand anything about the military economy" (A. Hitler).
    This whole mess was burdened by the racial theory, according to which the Untermans were not people. Therefore, if the Wehrmacht, for example, is now difficult, then subhuman is doubly harder.
    Traces of this chimera are spread out to even layers on all general memoirs.
    The author believes that the war was correct, calculated, planned, only somewhere something did not grow together. And they say, if the military elite with its correct operational principles prevailed, the war would go with greater success. So, I get it?
    This is nonsense. Watch the beginning of the post.
  6. 11111mail.ru
    11111mail.ru 18 January 2014 15: 15
    +1
    The meaning of the article is clear, although, "despite" the conspiracy, the betrayal of Canaris, etc. ... The NSDAP led Germany for another 10 months. Consequently, Hitler's leadership was still effective. And if the German atomic bomb succeeded, the end of the war could be ambiguous.
  7. Simple
    Simple 18 January 2014 15: 45
    0
    Quote: BigRiver
    Why there? Reply to 1,5 hours?
    I watched three parts on 1,5 hours.



    Everything is known in comparison.
    Or did you expect to find in the film a universal answer to all your questions?
  8. _KM_
    _KM_ 18 January 2014 16: 10
    +1
    In the article, it seems to me, a logical attempt was made to explain the situation in the Reich and understand why the tops could not, but the lower classes did not want. In my opinion, the attempt is quite successful. As for the attempts of the German generals to blame Hitler, are they really divorced from reality and could the generals resist the party leadership? I'm afraid not. And this must be understood. For example, how many of us can resist the bosses at work, even when the affairs of the company deteriorate?
  9. spirit
    spirit 18 January 2014 16: 13
    +2
    Aha !! Oral Manstein most of all! ! especially about Stalingrad. That I was smart for a long time proposed to break the blockade (this is me about Paulus) and Hitler was pulling everything))) but about the Kursk Bulge, even he does not really write about the Kursk Bulge, how he is there Obos *** I, there is also Hitler to blame))) The greatest respect for me deserves the current Model, did not write memoirs, Did all the dirty work where others did it and finally shot himself with dignity, unlike some Memoir "heroes"
    1. Snoop
      Snoop 18 January 2014 17: 17
      +10
      I agree, their greatest liar is Manstein. I read it, in the end I got the impression that he alone defeated everyone))
      I will subscribe to the words of the former Wehrmacht corporal Helmut Klausman (111th Infantry Division): “Therefore, when they ask me how I feel about German generals, which of them I value as a German commander, I always answer that they were probably good strategists, but I have absolutely nothing to respect them. As a result, they laid seven million German soldiers in the ground, lost the war, and now they are writing memoirs about how great they fought and how gloriously they won "...
      “I was evacuated from Chersonesos on the evening of May 10, after Sevastopol fell. I cannot tell you what was happening on this narrow strip of land. It was hell! People cried, prayed, shot themselves, went crazy, fought to the death for a place in boats. ”When I read the memoirs of some chattering general, who told me that we left Chersonesos in perfect order and discipline and that almost all units of the 17th Army were evacuated from Sevastopol, I wanted to laugh. I found myself alone in my company in Constanta! And less than a hundred men escaped from our regiment! My entire division lay down in Sevastopol. It's a fact! "
  10. alicante11
    alicante11 18 January 2014 17: 19
    +4
    In fact, many have already said that German generals blamed their miscalculations and failures on Hitler. Indeed, in the Barbaors plan, it was the German generals, not Hitler, who underestimated the military potential of the USSR. Therefore, a little specifics.
    Hitler's accusations of incompetence are supported mainly by the following examples.

    1. U-turn in the summer of 1941 of the year of the tank groups to the north and south, respectively, and the cessation of the attack on Moscow.
    There are two aspects to this. The first - during the border and Smolensk battles, German tank groups suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. And they needed replenishment. Therefore, their immediate offensive against Moscow against fresh units assembled by the Soviet command from all fronts and from the internal districts was indeed dangerous. Whereas an attack against the weakened NWF and SWF, in which the combat strength of the divisions at times reached 1000 people, was a safer matter. Therefore, the operational pause in the central sector was beneficial to the Germans, because we seriously undermined the combat effectiveness of our troops with constant attacks against the Center GA. Whereas the German tank units received the necessary replenishment.
    The second aspect is purely strategic. Neither GA Yug nor GA Sever were able to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. At the same time, an offensive on Moscow in the conditions of maintaining combat-ready groupings on the flanks of the shock GA "Center" could lead this strike group to disaster when organizing a counteroffensive, say, by forces that were allocated to the Bryansk front and from the Luga bridgehead. So Hitler was absolutely right in this case. Moreover, I will note that the General Staff headed by Halder was not against such a decision. Whereas the responsibility for the fact that, in principle, this decision had to be made, lies with the generals who planned Barbarossa.

    2. Order "not a step back" in the Moscow battle. Which allegedly fettered the initiative of the German troops and led to heavy losses. Give free rein to the German generals beaten near Moscow, they would have run to Berlin. There was a psychological breakdown. While it was necessary to take into account that the Russian troops did not yet have sufficient forces for a strategic offensive, nor did they have sufficient experience of such offensives. Therefore, the generals needed a good shout in order to stop running around and engage in systematic defensive operations.

    3. Division of Army Group "South" into Army Groups "A" and "B" with a blow to the Caucasus and Stalingrad.
    By and large, it was also a necessary measure. The concentration of forces in the Caucasian direction would substitute this group for a north attack from Voronezh and Stalingrad, which could lead to disaster for the entire army group. Then concentrating on the Stalingrad direction left two flanks open. Moreover, with the achievement of Stalingrad alone, the Germans could not solve the problem of stopping oil supplies, since a temporary railway was laid in parallel with the Volga. How would not solve their problems with fuel.

    4. Refusal to give Paulus an order to break out of the environment.
    The 6th Army, which had settled in Stalingrad, held back significant of our forces, which otherwise could have been thrown into the offensive in order to cut off Army Group A, which could not have escaped the encirclement, simply would not have had time.

    5. But in the case of the Battle of Kursk, Hitler just listened to his generals, sinking his last trump cards.
    1. i.xxx-1971
      i.xxx-1971 20 January 2014 19: 13
      +1
      It would be a mistake to believe that the tank groups suffered losses. Infantry formations, which cleaned the "cauldrons", suffered losses. Tank groups, having broken through the front and, having formed an outer ring of encirclement, were essentially excluded from the process of conducting hostilities. This was the flaw in the very essence of the "blitzkrieg", which Hitler, incidentally, understood. The most efficient formations were forced to be in the role of extras. Although great historians do not write about this, our casualties in 1941 were 1,5 - 2 times less than those of the Germans. This was inevitable, because they were advancing and we were defending ourselves. And the Germans did not receive such a war as in the West. There was only one way out - to take prisoners, and at least thus increase our irrecoverable losses. It was for this reason that Hitler demanded from his commanders to take as many prisoners as possible, and Halder, instead of ten-day reports on the course of hostilities, now reported to him weekly. The Germans, having adopted the "blitzkrieg" theory, became its
      hostages. From now on, the German army, like a shark, was doomed to non-stop movement. If the Germans began to defend themselves, then their irrecoverable losses immediately increased. When they fought a mobile war, they got the opportunity to take prisoners and the chance to win. From the very first hours of the war, our command acted correctly: non-stop counterattacks at the base of the German wedges. Anything, anything that moves and shoots. The main thing is to prevent the enemy from maneuvering and imposing his initiative. By the way, in these battles the Germans burned down their reserve army - 1 people, and already in December 200 they were forced to drive out marching reinforcements from conscripts. On the question of their ridiculous losses. Army Groups "North" and "South" could not fulfill their tasks for the reason that they were opposed by the Soviet command, which did not support the traitor Pavlov and the company, who were shot, in my opinion, quite justifiably and completely unreasonably reabelitized. If not for this, the Germans would not have gone further than Smolensk in 000. True, it is not known how our sworn friends, the Anglo-Saxons, would behave in this situation. Let it be blasphemy, but I believe that after the invasion, when it became clear that Hitler would go to the end, Stalin made a decision at any cost to keep the "allies" from the possible conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. After all, Hess did not become a paraschutist by accident. We were capable of fighting against Germany alone, but we could hardly resist the entire "civilized world". The fact that the price was so high was not his fault, but he had no other choice. It was necessary to convince everyone that the USSR was about to die, then England, faithful to its geopolitical (as she believes) mission - to be a European arbiter, would be afraid of the strengthening of Germany. And with it the United States. By the way, it is a deep delusion that England is dragging its feet in the wake of the United States. Even today, world politics is done in London, not in Washington, because the typewriter was invented in London. It's just that her registration has changed, and the owner is the same. The story of the death of the 1941th German army is very similar to the story of the death of the army of Darius. Both Comrade Stalin and the Scythians used the same tactics - luring the enemy. It is unlikely that the Germans would have suffered defeat if events took place, for example, near Rostov.
    2. i.xxx-1971
      i.xxx-1971 20 January 2014 19: 53
      0
      The defeat of the 6th Army became possible because the Germans received too long a front line, respectively, not covered flanks, a lack of mobile reserves, which is like death for the German military genius, too long and vulnerable lines of communication - the entire army with attached allied forces was supplied one by one railway line. Well, the Germans were not lucky with the commander. If Reichenau had not died in due time and remained in command, perhaps he would have led the army out of the ring. So, luring the Germans into the Don bend and further is very similar to the tactics of the Scythians. Judging by Halder's notes, there was absolutely nothing with the prisoners of the Germans during this period. Knowing about the superiority of the Red Army over VERMACHT in the effectiveness of "traditional" warfare, I believe Comrade Stalin decided that Hitler would not find Darius in him. As for the Battle of Kursk, I am deeply convinced that this is the most mysterious event of the Second World War. The Germans, knowing that we are preparing a super-defense, have already dug up the entire Kursk region and have placed millions of mines, perhaps we even know the start date of Operation Citadel, they are starting it all the same. If the Zulus were opposed to them, I would understand everything. But the 1943 model of the Red Army deserves respect, especially since it has already killed 5 Germans. I do not understand. I believe that, not being a bunch of idiots, the German command planned and used some very effective weapon. Tactical nuclear weapons, I believe. The calculation was simple - the more our troops will be in the Kursk salient, the better. After the destruction of the Soviet wunderwolf armies, mobile units were introduced into the resulting gap, widened the breakthrough and received an operational initiative. What was Hitler going to introduce into this gap if he no longer had reserves - two-thirds of the mobile units, the most combat-ready, were assembled near Kursk.
      If they planned traditional hostilities, what would be left of them by the end of the battle, even if it was victorious for the Germans? Pyrrhic victory. The fact that no one says or writes about the use of new weapons by the Germans is not a fact that they were not used. You never know what they are not talking or writing about yet. An American astronaut did not step on the moon in 1969. So what? Everyone knows what she did. In my opinion, either nuclear weapons turned out not to be effective enough, so to speak "raw", they still went on in 1943. In Los Alamos, nothing happened at all; or it turned out to be quite effective, but it could not stop the Soviet soldier. Perhaps it was used exclusively for mobile units, and therefore our losses in tanks were five times greater than the German ones. And whoever is supposed to have understood everything correctly and comrade Stalin informed him that he had speeded up the work on the creation of our Bomb. I have not yet studied this issue, but I admit that it was in 1943 that our physicists achieved the greatest results and received unlimited funding. Any hypothesis has a constitutional right to exist.
      1. dv-v
        dv-v 21 January 2014 07: 04
        0
        your hypotheses are somewhat strange ... I will note only one - the German nuclear program is still as accessible in terms of information as nuclear physics regarding a nuclear bomb. the main problem, because of which these weapons are not owned by everyone, anyone - as before, serious difficulties in obtaining the required amount of the required isotope. high-volume and high-tech production. By the way, due to their weight and other difficulties, uranium was quickly abandoned in favor of plutonium, but a different economic and technological stage has already begun there. if we admit the hypothesis by July 43, what kind of bomb can we talk about when the first reactors in the states and germany were launched in 42, and the first ones, albeit 10 months later, had much better conditions, personnel, funding ?! only about "dirty". meaning? among other things, it was precisely the numerous difficulties with failures during the implementation of the project, including sabotage, which means the absence of clear prospects for the military-political leadership in the event of failure on all fronts, that essentially put an end to the program.
  11. chenia
    chenia 18 January 2014 17: 45
    +4
    The Barbarossa plan was already a mistake, only our miscalculations and incredible luck for the Germans allowed us to penetrate our territory so deeply.

    The main strategic direction should be - Ukraine (where we expected). And they flooded into Moscow (they thought it would be like in France).

    And only Pavlov’s stupidity and Zhukov’s inflexibility led to the fact that in the forests, coppices and swamps of Belarus we didn’t knock out all the tanks of the German strike force (in Ukraine, tank associations have room to accelerate).

    Further, a delayed departure from Kiev (the worst decision, and by the way Kirpanos did not want to - I realized that he was late. And the departure is the most difficult event in defense).
    Even if they were surrounded without stepping down from battle formations, the Germans would be very expensive to liquidate the 4 armies in a strong defensive position, with powerful material and technical and mobilization resources.

    The Germans would have fumbled with this boiler for several months (with the involvement of considerable forces), while having horseradish flanks. And an attack on Moscow would definitely not work.
    It’s clear that all geniuses have a backward mind, but it seems that at the beginning of the war (in the bustle) we made the worst decisions.
    1. alicante11
      alicante11 19 January 2014 19: 20
      0
      only our miscalculations and incredible luck for the Germans allowed us to penetrate our territory so deeply.


      What kind of miscalculations are you talking about?

      And only Pavlov’s stupidity and Zhukov’s inflexibility led to the fact that in the forests, coppices and swamps of Belarus we didn’t knock out all the tanks of the German strike force (in Ukraine, tank associations have room to accelerate).


      In WWII, the war did not go in forests and swamps, but along highways. How do you propose to knock out the tanks of two tank groups covered from the air by two air fleets?

      Further, a delayed departure from Kiev (the worst decision, and by the way Kirpanos did not want to - I realized that he was late. And the departure is the most difficult event in defense).


      But don’t it seem to you that an earlier withdrawal from Kiev, saving the SWF, which had already been worn out by the Germans, whose army divisions had practically lost their combat strength, would have allowed the Germans to launch an attack on Msk earlier, and if the full-blooded Siberian divisions near Msk had time? Question. The catastrophe of the SWF is greatly exaggerated. Many combat units left the encirclement, read Baghramyan. The Germans in Kiev took several hundred thousand mobilized, and all men of draft age were rowed - this, and the rear units of the armies, while Kirponos sent the front lines to the east in advance (although it would have been better if they had sent the mobilized ones). And the situation is best illustrated by the fact that it was in the south that the winter counterattack began, so the losses were not so critical.
      Also, let's not forget that the Bryansk Front was created to cover the flank of the SWF, which, unfortunately, could not cope with its task.

      Even if they were surrounded without stepping down from battle formations, the Germans would be very expensive to liquidate the 4 armies in a strong defensive position, with powerful material and technical and mobilization resources.


      So they were surrounded in defense. Most in the Kiev ur. The problem is not in the position, but in the supply. In Vyazma, the Germans destroyed a half-million group in boilers for 10 days. Moreover, this group was prepared defensive positions, reinforced by naval guns.
  12. chenia
    chenia 18 January 2014 18: 32
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    In fact, many have already said that German generals blamed their miscalculations and failures on Hitler. Indeed, in the Barbaors plan, it was the German generals, not Hitler, who underestimated the military potential of the USSR. Therefore, a little specifics.


    You are a plus! Ahead. Do not hell them in the mirror (Hitler) to blame, if the erysipelas curve.
  13. Flatter
    Flatter 18 January 2014 22: 35
    0
    The French Armed Forces, at least, were not inferior to the German Armed Forces, however, the Germans had a month to win. The assessment of the capabilities of the USSR, when developing the plan, was determined by the estimates of Tsarist Russia, with a corresponding, of course, adjustment. As noted in due time, first of all, in the Western press, the USSR surpassed Germany in the art of management.
    1. dv-v
      dv-v 19 January 2014 07: 15
      0
      no, they did not believe the numbers, they also believed that if there was a certain number of transformations, then the technical was definitely on their side. plus the Finnish company convinced them even more of better organization and preparation.

      it is no less likely that Hitler, like the generals, summed up the scale - no Europe was suitable to evaluate the USSR in practice. the control system, or rather the organization of the economy with a population for a total war, is important, but one of.
    2. i.xxx-1971
      i.xxx-1971 20 January 2014 20: 13
      +1
      The Germans lost the war the day the ink dried up on a decree establishing a second industrial area beyond the Ural Range. A control shot in a blunt German head was the approval by the Soviet government of a plan for the evacuation of industrial enterprises to the east of the country, which allowed for the specified evacuation, in the conditions of the total domination of the Luftwaffe and the chaos of 1941. Superiority in the art of control is the construction of two thousand tanks a month in a country where ten years ago, men thought that the earth was flat.
  14. _KM_
    _KM_ 19 January 2014 01: 24
    0
    The barbarossa plan is a separate story. It was composed by staff officers, but they carried out the will of the military-political leadership. Therefore, it is not worth mentioning it.
    1. alicante11
      alicante11 19 January 2014 19: 36
      0
      It's worth it. How many times was the offensive postponed before the French campaign? And they explained to the "stupid corporal" everything that was needed for this. And here they could not, you know ...
  15. Simple
    Simple 19 January 2014 23: 13
    0
    Quote: sds555
    The film is a complete bottom, it is contraindicated for those who can think



    And you try to ignore emotions ....

    Indeed, according to the script of the film, the Germans in its bulk were naive, executed orders and waged war in the framework of the Geneva Conventions. The warring parties (especially the soldiers of the Soviet army) are shown ....
    However, the German soldier in Soviet military films fit into the same images.
    By the way, here no one mentioned the fact that this film is banned for showing in Russia.
    Why, then, let the people figure it out, what's what?
    Who remembers the end of the eighties, the beginning of the nineties, how do we- all “understood” together?
    Here, many are wondering, what exactly happened in Germany in the late twenties and all subsequent
    the thirties during which the country, which was not able to pay even reparations, rose almost to the millennial Reich ... after all, the German people will figure out what's what?
    1. i.xxx-1971
      i.xxx-1971 20 January 2014 20: 21
      0
      Aliens visited Germany. Disregard common sense and you will understand the weight. By the way, in the late eighties - early nineties you figured it out so much that the country was fucked up. And the film was correctly banned for viewing. I like "If tomorrow is war".
      1. Simple
        Simple 21 January 2014 01: 36
        0
        Quote: i.xxx-1971
        I like "If tomorrow is war".

        Patriotism and pride in their country are always welcome.

        And with aliens, that's cool ....
        And if these same aliens visit Russia (God forbid), (but fascism is hiding under many guises).
        Personally, you (this is under the condition that you are able to distinguish black from white) will have few options:
        Live like everyone else.
        Fight (with the option of being in camps)
        Emigrate.
        And do not rush to answer (even to yourself) - reality is always more real than any conclusions.
        1. i.xxx-1971
          i.xxx-1971 26 January 2014 12: 19
          0
          It was sarcasm, in fact I like the films of Yuri German
        2. i.xxx-1971
          i.xxx-1971 26 January 2014 12: 19
          0
          It was sarcasm, in fact I like the films of Yuri German
  16. luka095
    luka095 19 January 2014 23: 44
    0
    The article is peculiar. Although it goes over the section of history, it can be called historical with a stretch - there are many own arguments, and global conclusions are drawn on their basis. And the generals in the memoirs, of course, would have won the war if they had not been disturbed by someone or something. It is very similar to our every possible reformers (in their presentation) - they did not heed their wise advice therefore nothing happened ...
  17. chenia
    chenia 20 January 2014 01: 10
    +2
    Quote: alicante11
    What specific miscalculations are you talking about?


    Well, the main miscalculation is the timing of the start of the war (mobilize well at least two weeks before the war, create an operational front-line construction, the materiel would be raised and minor malfunctions of equipment would be revealed and eliminated during the march - and there wouldn’t be a lot of roadsides tanks with clogged pipelines and loose bolts and nuts, and the combat and logistical support units would start working) and the Germans would have been really not fun.

    The second is a cover plan (striking TCs, it was planned as a stopping measure to end the provocation).

    If Pavlov went upstairs and reported a calm border for certain reasons, then he probably saw what was being done. And the authorities had something to prepare for - to postpone the collection of artillery at the end of summer, to conduct reconnaissance of the terrain and extension routes in the relevant areas, even with elements of engineering equipment, to keep (interchangeably) mixed combat engineer-artillery-infantry tank teams ( an analogue of OPULAB) with a BC, deploy CP units and units, well, at least until mid-August.

    Pavlov could not declare a full BG (this was only possible in our time), but he could conduct a host of other events simply.

    And during the war, the General Staff of the General Staff ruled where Pavlov merged belated, and sometimes incorrect information.


    Quote: alicante11
    In WWII, the war did not go in forests and swamps, but along highways. How do you propose to knock out the tanks of two tank groups covered from the air by two air fleets?


    And the highway near the forest or swamps do not pass, and there you can not only hide the battalion but also the division. It’s just that in such conditions it’s easier to plan the possibility of strikes, and their maneuver is limited, it’s easier to hide their positions (and from air reconnaissance too. But ambushes, God himself ordered.

    Well, purely along the highway, the Germans are forced to fight already near Moscow.

    Quote: alicante11
    But don’t it seem to you that an earlier withdrawal from Kiev, saving the SWF, which had already been worn out by the Germans, whose army divisions had practically lost their combat strength, would allow the Germans to launch an attack on Msk earlier


    Well 400-500 thousand with equipment - and this is an exaggeration.

    Quote: alicante11
    So they were surrounded in defense. Most in the Kiev ur.


    The Germans gouged the SWF during the withdrawal, and took the UR when there was only cover left.
    1. alicante11
      alicante11 20 January 2014 07: 10
      0
      Well, the main miscalculation is the timing of the start of the war (mobilize well, at least two weeks before the war


      Mobilization is war. We were not going to attack Germany. Therefore, it was necessary to guess when to conduct a general mobilization. Warheads and so mobilized with the help of bus. In 2 weeks there was no accurate information when the Germans would attack. And to keep the army under arms, and pulling out a bunch of equipment from the narkhoz ... this is an economic catastrophe. At the same time, the Germans could calmly transfer the attack to the 42 year, as they did in France (active offensive). And all this time the Red Army would have stood under arms?

      If Pavlov went upstairs and reported a calm border for certain reasons, then he probably saw what was being done.


      You understand. At the border, the Germans held infantry divisions. They drove the tank units immediately before the strike. It was impossible to open their advance in advance. Yes, they saw the preparation. And they themselves prepared. A cover plan was developed and activities were carried out within its framework. URs were built and on alarm they were busy. The problem is that the Germans achieved precisely tactical surprise. Which is easier to achieve than strategic.

      And during the war, the General Staff of the General Staff ruled where Pavlov merged belated, and sometimes incorrect information.


      He himself had one. Because he lost control of the front. There are subjective, and there are objective reasons for this. When the troops of your front are dismembered by strikes by tank units and suppressed by aircraft, communications are broken, it’s very, very difficult to lead. I do not think that even Suvorov or Napoleon would have guided much better in this situation. It’s impossible to fight without information.

      The second is a cover plan (striking TCs, it was planned as a stopping measure to end the provocation).


      And what other option do you propose for the TC?
      They did everything right. When there is not enough information, you need to act in accordance with the plans, because they are known to all. Plus - they tried to seize the initiative, again, in order to impose their strategy on the enemy and level communication problems. But it did not grow together, there was not enough strength.
    2. alicante11
      alicante11 20 January 2014 07: 11
      0
      And the highway near the forest or swamps do not pass, and there you can not only hide the battalion but also the division.


      Oh, yo. A division is not a platoon for you to fire at an enemy column from the edge. The division needs room to maneuver both frontally and away from the front. How are you going to debush her from this forest? How to supply in the forest? Transfer reserves. Will you build roads? Is it that fast? And they do not reveal your location? And how do you determine where to "hide" it. What if the enemy bypasses on a different road? How long will it take to get a division with carts and equipment out of this forest. Yes, she's already been surrounded 10 times. Once again, I tell you, according to your method, they defended at Vyazma - only 10 days. The most disastrous defensive operation of the entire war.

      Well, purely along the highway, the Germans are forced to fight already near Moscow.


      You tell Potapov, the commander of 5, who for some reason fought with the Germans over the roads. And quite successfully, frankly. And even without tanks.

      Well 400-500 thousand with equipment - and this is an exaggeration.


      There are a lot of rear shushary. Which, of course, is very useful, but it won’t do the weather in battle. Even at the front of the regiment, you can throw in the attack or put on the defenses of cooks and clerks. And if we consider the divisions and armies ... Plus, I repeat, there are many civilian and mobilized prisoners. Which also did not hold weapons in their hands.
      You can read about the condition of the armies of the South-South Front in the description of the combat operations of the 5 army of this front, by the way - the best.

      The Germans gouged the SWF during the withdrawal, and took the UR when there was only cover left.


      Well, at least you should read Baghramyan.
      It is clear the day that UR was taken after the withdrawal of the troops, but even some units managed to break out of the encirclement even from this cover. Do you propose to sit in a cauldron until the supply is completely over, and the enemy is firmly surrounded by a double ring, and then together in a march step into the camps of the Smrtniks? This is called a breakthrough from the environment. And he also rivets the enemy troops. Moreover, unlike sitting in the boiler, when only infantry is riveted, when breaking through, the enemy is forced to use tank units to counter breakthroughs.

      In general, compare the cross-border battle and the Vyazma defense operation. You will understand a lot of interesting things. Especially if we consider the actions of the NWF and SWF in the border battle, the WF is not quite an indicator, since the Germans had too much advantage.
    3. i.xxx-1971
      i.xxx-1971 20 January 2014 20: 25
      0
      Pavlov with his accomplices betrayed and sold his soldiers. He is a Judas who received what he deserved. It is difficult to call a miscalculation an order to drain fuel and lubricants and seize ammunition on the eve of the invasion.
      1. alicante11
        alicante11 21 January 2014 02: 59
        0
        I will not argue. Opinions about this side of the issue did not constitute. Simply, even from an objective point of view, the failure of the ZF is logical.
  18. chenia
    chenia 20 January 2014 15: 40
    +1
    Quote: alicante11
    Mobilization is war. We were not going to attack Germany.

    Quote: alicante11
    it is an economic catastrophic.


    Well, you’re right about this, I’ve just given an example of how much the effectiveness of defense would increase if mobilization was carried out two or more weeks before the war. And so I had to throw the newly made compounds like firewood under my feet, the Germans more often bypassed them, having an incredible pace of attack.
    And our divisions, sometimes having minimal losses from frontal attacks, were destroyed upon withdrawal.

    Will a centralized economy collapse? Stalin would say that “the Motherland is in danger,” and in the mobilized version, we completed the five-year plan not in three, but in two. Only 44 Germans approached this level, and this year was a record year for the production of military products (despite problems with the raw material base and the Allied bombing).


    Quote: alicante11
    And what other option do you propose for the TC?
    They did everything right. When there is not enough information, you need to act in accordance with the plans, because they are known to all.


    I talked about Zhukov’s rigidity. Based on the experience of Halkin-Gol, when he reassured the Japanese, he thought that a similar option would pass with the Germans. Choose a defensive option followed by an offensive (the offensive would probably not have happened, but they saved a bunch of equipment that would have crushed the Germans significantly in defensive battles).

    Quote: alicante11
    Oh yo A division is not a platoon for you,


    Well, firstly, I'm figuratively. And secondly, if the division. or a part will be supported by one flank in a forest or swamp, already for the enemy there are fewer opportunities for maneuver. Fight in a wooded area, mountains, a city always creates an advantage for defense - this is already the rule.

    Quote: alicante11
    Do you propose to sit in a cauldron until the supply is completely over, and the enemy is firmly surrounded by a double ring, and then together in a march step into the camps of the Smrtniks?


    Well, firstly, almost all of these people died so (some in battle, some in captivity).

    Now count. To break through the early occupied defense to the platoon (GP), you need a carriage of shells (hits ADN). Hastily occupied (also engineering equipment, but a fire system was not built), the consumption is three times less. Openly located infantry (this is when the unit is deployed in a power supply unit) infantry, the cost is 10 times less.

    And now the marching column (with the complete superiority of the enemy in the air, and higher mobility of his formations) - continue?

    That is what a waste is. Here, even when the enemy hangs on you (without surroundings), this is a very difficult event, and when you are already a hundred kilometers behind him, there are no words.

    As for material resources, in Kiev was enough for 2-3 months of defense. The defense is an inverted front when the rear (aka the former front) is covered by a fairly wide river. Moreover, with a breakthrough, the density of defense increases (there will be no operational open spaces).

    The Germans held at the end of the war (in a similar situation) for several months.

    And on the outer ring, the Bryansk Front and two armies of the South-Western Front mentioned by you, and there the rate will throw something. Not even an hour, they could have unlocked.
    Well, at least the Germans would be well bogged down.
  19. alicante11
    alicante11 21 January 2014 09: 29
    0
    Will a centralized economy collapse? Stalin would say that “the Motherland is in danger,” and in the mobilized version, we completed the five-year plan not in three, but in two.


    How do you imagine that? Workers and peasants are mobilized into the army and stand along the border under arms, old men, women and children come to factories and fields, working 10-12 hours a day in order to at least maintain production, and this is in "peacetime". Trucks and tractors, and horses with carts, are also largely mobilized. Transport problems give rise to shortages of food and consumer goods. How long do you think both the army and the population would revolt? In the late 80s, a year of cards was enough for a completely prosperous country to be surrendered by its people. And the USSR in the late 30s, early 40s was not at all successful. If you want to imagine the situation, take the Projector "War in Europe", the part about the campaign in France, how the French army decomposed during the "Strange War". But even though war was declared there, in our country in peacetime.

    I talked about Zhukov’s rigidity. Based on the experience of Halkin-Gol, when he reassured the Japanese, he thought that a similar option would pass with the Germans. Choose a defensive option followed by an offensive (the offensive would probably not have happened, but they saved a bunch of equipment that would have crushed the Germans significantly in defensive battles).


    Once again, I say, try to steer the troops in the absence of communications and intelligence information. I had to do it, though not in real life, but in KSHU. I will not wish on the enemy. What kind of flexibility can we talk about here? To carry out a complex maneuver, you need to know where the enemy is advancing, with what forces, in what condition our troops are. And for half of July our air reconnaissance reported on the German offensive from the Pinsk swamps, bypassing the flank of the 5th Army. And this is in the more or less successful SWF, and what can we say about the ZF, where the Germans had complete domination in the air? And what kind of defense can we talk about when the front is cut by enemy tanks? Or "pan" or "lost". For "Pan" there was not enough strength in counterattacks, after all 3.4 million "bayonets" versus 5,2 million "bayonets" is serious. Specifically at the Polar Division, the ratio was even worse.

    Well, firstly, I'm figuratively. And secondly, if the division. or a part will be supported by one flank in a forest or swamp, already for the enemy there are fewer opportunities for maneuver. Fight in a wooded area, mountains, a city always creates an advantage for defense - this is already the rule.


    Well, such rules, of course, were taken into account. And even Pavlov. Read the ZF orders at the start of the war. The tasks are set to retreat and gain a foothold "at the turn of such and such a river." That is, the terrain conditions were fully taken into account. But then the 10th Army came out on that river, I don't remember the name anymore, and Guderian's tanks are already east of them, and even Guderian's headquarters is already on the river. The headquarters of the tank group. You can, of course, say that these comfortable seats should have been taken in advance. But here's the problem, the attacker can always create superiority in the direction of the main attack. And break through any defenses. Again, I refer to the Vyazma operation. So they will still break through, even at the swamp, at least on the river. And the only salvation is the reserves, which must start a counterattack and maneuver. And that was done. But I didn't have enough strength, for various reasons ...

    Well, firstly, almost all of these people died so (some in battle, some in captivity).


    Just not, the military composition of many units came out.
  20. alicante11
    alicante11 21 January 2014 09: 29
    0
    Now count. To break through the early occupied defense to the platoon (GP), you need a carriage of shells (hits ADN). Hastily occupied (also engineering equipment, but a fire system was not built), the consumption is three times less. Openly located infantry (this is when the unit is deployed in a power supply unit) infantry, the cost is 10 times less.


    Why count? You'd better read how the Germans organized the boilers. Two encirclement fronts were created. External - tank units, which cut the supply, which already weakened the grouping in the boiler. And then the infantry closed up the inner one and calmly gouged with artillery, if necessary, dismembered large cauldrons into several smaller ones. And at this time, the tanks were already moving forward again and did not allow the creation of a new front. In such a situation, it was the attempts to break through that made it possible to pin down the German "Panzer" and create a new front behind the "cauldron".

    And now the marching column (with the complete superiority of the enemy in the air, and higher mobility of his formations) - continue?


    Continue. Although you still think at the platoon-company level, it’s not the point, it’s too long to explain. But this is not the point. If you sit still, at least in Ur, at least in the field, even in the forest. You will die anyway. Ammunition and food will run out and that’s all ... you are captured. And so at least part of the troops will break through, but at the same time the enemy will be connected with attacks.

    As for material resources, in Kiev there was enough for the 2-3 month of defense.


    Which ones? Food? And b / p? Still, UR differs from the fortress in that it has an open front face. And supplies are imported into it from the rear.

    The Germans held at the end of the war (in a similar situation) for several months.


    And the 6-I army in Stalingrad also held on. What's the point? How did it end?

    And on the outer ring, the Bryansk Front and two armies of the South-Western Front mentioned by you, and there the rate will throw something. Not even an hour, they could have unlocked.
    Well, at least the Germans would be well bogged down.


    Two armies of the SWF will retreat with the maximum exertion of forces in order to have time to overtake the tank groups of the Germans, which was real. And for infantry formations against tank formations this is quite problematic. Fortunately, the Germans began to deploy Guderian to Moscow, and the troops breaking out of the boiler restrained the development of the breakthrough of the 1th TG. So they could retreat in perfect order. The Bryansk Front could not cope with the task BEFORE the circle, why should it cope with the task AFTER the environment. He already failed. It is clear the day that the Headquarters will throw something to restore the front. But where does it stabilize? And when will the retreating units be ready for a counteroffensive? And how will the weakening of other directions affect where the Headquarters will take reserves?
  21. chenia
    chenia 21 January 2014 12: 17
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    How do you imagine that? Workers and peasants are mobilized into the army and stand along the border under arms, old men, women and children come to factories and fields, working 10-12 hours a day in order to at least maintain production, and this is in "peacetime"


    Partial mobilization until the fall (hell would the Germans trample on the winter).

    Quote: alicante11
    What kind of flexibility can we talk about? To carry out a complex maneuver, you need to know where the enemy is advancing, by what forces, in what condition are our troops


    And in the absence of information to strike TCs (there the Kursk Bulk fades by the number of tanks) is normal? Konrudars of such power were unable to determine and evaluate the enemy’s strength or location, only because the cover plan so prescribed. Isn't it better to stand in a defensive position?
    Quote: alicante11
    You better read how the Germans organized the boilers. Two fronts of the environment were created. External - tank units, which cut the supply, which already weakened the group in the boiler.


    What did you forget. I affirm that if the departure was already late, it would be better not to let Kiev pass. Let them cut it, let them hammer it with artillery. The grouping is huge and would have fettered significant enemy forces.

    Now your statements are -
    1. there was no need to withdraw troops in a timely manner. They are so battered.
    2. The most powerful effect can be obtained when the withdrawal is carried out with full surroundings.

    Quote: alicante11
    And the 6-I army in Stalingrad also held on. What's the point? How did it end?

    The fact that we did not lock the Caucasian group

    Quote: alicante11
    Continue. Although you still think at the platoon-company level, it’s not the point, it’s too long to explain. But this is not the point. If you sit still, at least in Ur, at least in the field, even in the forest. You will die anyway. Ammunition and food will run out and that’s all ... you are captured.


    The fact that your military knowledge at the level of a lover of memoirs, I also understood. And then read Konev, how he did not like to make boilers
    Although, this has long been the operational norm, it is better to step on the shoulders of the enemy.
  22. alicante11
    alicante11 22 January 2014 03: 01
    0
    Partial mobilization until the fall (hell would the Germans trample on the winter).


    Firstly, partial and so was carried out - BUS. But if you remember the beginning of the WWII, then the moron generals Niki said that partial mobilization disrupts the general plans. Well, the deployment of troops on the eve of the Second World War also confirmed this.

    Secondly, well, they mobilized before the fall, and then they mobilized until the spring, and then they mobilized again? And how many times is that? Imagine the economic loss? And the psychological state of the population and the army ...

    And in the absence of information to strike TCs (there the Kursk Bulk fades by the number of tanks) is normal? Konrudars of such power were unable to determine and evaluate the enemy’s strength or location, only because the cover plan so prescribed. Isn't it better to stand in a defensive position?


    HOW to stand in a defensive position? German tanks broke through the front, went to the rear of the combined arms armies, which need to be given the opportunity to withdraw. If it was impossible to gather forces in time for a counterattack, then was it possible to maneuver with sufficient forces to create a stable defense in the emerging breakthrough areas?

    What did you forget. I affirm that if the departure was already late, it would be better not to let Kiev pass. Let them cut it, let them hammer it with artillery. The grouping is huge and would have fettered significant enemy forces.

    Now your statements are -
    1. there was no need to withdraw troops in a timely manner. They are so battered.
    2. The most powerful effect can be obtained when the withdrawal is carried out with full surroundings.


    You either misunderstood or distort the specialist.
    I talked about the fact that the timely withdrawal of the South-West Front troops was not desirable, on the basis of strategic necessity, that is, forcing the Guderian TG as long as possible from an attack on Moscow, since the Bryansk Front could not stop it. But with the passive expectation of death in the boiler, the SWF would fetter Guderian much less time than with a breakthrough. Since he would simply be blocked by combined arms armies, and the TG would be sent as intended. And during breakthroughs, the Germans were forced to patch holes in the inner ring of the environment with mechanized parts from the outside, delaying, i.e. TG from replenishment and attack on Moscow. Well, and as a small bonus - the combat composition of many parts of the South-Western Front broke through from the environment to their own.
    1. Nikoha.2010
      Nikoha.2010 26 January 2014 16: 45
      0
      Partial mobilization before the fall (hell would the Germans trample on the winter) laughing
  23. alicante11
    alicante11 22 January 2014 03: 01
    0
    The fact that we did not lock the Caucasian group


    And who had to save the SWF, sitting in Kiev? Keep in mind that the Germans sent Paulus Manstein to help, and who could we send to help the Southwest Front? The Bryansk Front, as I already said, could not cope with the task before, what can we get that it can now defeat Guderian and break through to Kiev? There was no strategic need to turn Kiev into a besieged fortress, on the contrary, it was necessary to squeeze out everything that they could give from the remnants of the Southwest Front. Well, save at least part of the troops.

    The fact that your military knowledge at the level of a lover of memoirs, I also understood. And then read Konev, how he did not like to make boilers
    Although, this has long been the operational norm, it is better to step on the shoulders of the enemy.


    Well, maybe I will read Konev. But my, as you put it, "knowledge" is based on the study of not only memoirs. Although the memories of Baghramyan, Kuropatkin, Halder's War Diary (generally a reference book for a military operative, IMHO), Guderian, Bock help a lot to understand. But there is also military research. The same Proektor, Isserson, the 5th author of the hostilities. But I don't remember, in the collection of the WWII Catastrophe there is also a collective of authors, archival materials on the RYA, is it enough? Or should I list all the literature that I re-read on various military wars?
    Well, plus, it helps a lot to understand military art - KSHI. If you participate, you won’t say many nonsense.
  24. chenia
    chenia 23 January 2014 00: 54
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    that partial mobilization frustrates plans for the general. Well, the deployment of troops on the eve of the Second World War also confirmed this.

    Secondly, well, they mobilized before the fall, and then they mobilized until the spring, and then they mobilized again? And how many times is that? Imagine


    To be honest, I didn’t understand the fuck. Is it, for me, as a unit commander, it will be a bigger problem to deploy two more regiments, instead of four (when, even before the general mobilization, have a partially operational formation)? Or is it harder for Vosovets to send 20 letters than 50, or is it harder for a military commander to send 15 teams instead of 30?
    If in the first place (preliminary) deployment (you need to be at this event and see their lost eyes and the bustle of the rear — it only takes two weeks) to expose not the battle group, but the rear and part of the combat (communications) support, techies and military men, it's better.

    Quote: alicante11
    But with the passive expectation of death in the boiler, the SWF would fetter Guderian much less time than with a breakthrough. Since he would simply be blocked by combined arms armies, and the TG would be sent as intended. And during breakthroughs, the Germans were forced to patch holes in the inner ring of the environment with mechanized parts from the outside, delaying, i.e. TG from replenishment and attack on Moscow. Well, and as a small bonus - the combat composition of many parts of the South-Western Front broke through from the environment to their own.


    You compare the dates. 20.08.41 Hitler's order –– turn south.
    24 - 29 .08.41 2a and 2 tg begin to work.
    2-4.09.41.Kremenchug. 1 tg 17 a. - a blow from the south.
    9.09. Budyonny- a request for the withdrawal of troops. And the beginning of the operation to surround 1tg and 2 tg.
    15.09.41 the ring is closed.
    19.09.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. Kirponos order to withdraw troops.
    26.09.41/40/38. the remnants of the SWF reach XNUMX A and XNUMX A.
    So from 19 to 26 disappeared (7 days), 400 tons (according to German data, 650 tons). Is that what detained Guderian?
    So 15 .10. the beginning of the offensive on Moscow.
    Now, the option I spoke about is from 19.09.41/6/17. troops of the front switched to all-round defense. About Kiev UR, as early as mid-August, 6A then broke its teeth, and. there was no desire on the forehead. So, they will tear from the East. So that 3A and 4A got bogged down (and they still need to regroup for XNUMX-XNUMX days. And before that time Guderianchik would not budge. Well, they would have shaken him a little less, and that’s all).
    But the Germans have a significant problem. Here you are not up to the Kuban and Crimea.
    For 2 -2,5 months, ours could hold out (well, that we were worse than uncharacteristically in Stalingrad, those conditions were even worse). There were enterprises in the city — repair and manufacturing of equipment was ensured; the Dnieper was an excellent route — the transfer of forces and equipment was provided (at least at night). And the mobilization resource has not been exhausted.
    And you ignored one moment - during a breakthrough, the density of defense does not fall.
    And our attempts to unlock? And if (well, this is at the end of despair) strike the West, there is, after all, most likely there will be military guard and try to leave for Polesie.
    And so, only 7 days, into eternity, and enemies were dragged a little behind.

    Quote: alicante11
    Well, plus, it helps a lot to understand military art - KSHI. If you participate, you won’t say many nonsense.


    Played these games over 20 years ago. And you, in order to understand it would be necessary to climb along ravines, otherwise everything is smooth on paper.
  25. alicante11
    alicante11 24 January 2014 03: 01
    0
    To be honest, I didn’t understand the fuck. Is it, for me, as a unit commander, it will be a bigger problem to deploy two more regiments, instead of four (when, even before the general mobilization, have a partially operational formation)?


    What does the connection commander have to do with it? The issue is in the economy and morale of the population. Imagine that you personally will be kept under arms for half a year a year ... In addition, mobilization is a powerful blow to the economy. Not to mention the reduction in the number of employees. For understaffing, transport is taken away, the railroads switch to military transportation and disrupt the schedule for the transportation of civilian goods. Imagine that within six months in your city the number of buses and trucks will decrease by half. And if it’s okay with the buses, although instead of every rush hour there will be a collapse of public transport, but when in the shops, and especially in the hypermarkets, interruptions in food and consumer goods will begin due to the fact that the trucks left in the city cannot cope with transportation .. Will you be very pleased? If you have a car, you can prepare for a wonderful pastime in line for gasoline, because the army begins to consume much more fuel during mobilization and begins to actively replenish its supplies. In general, mobilization is a fun time from all sides.

    You compare the dates. 20.08.41 Hitler's order –– turn south.


    And what is the contradiction?
    At first you said that it was necessary, in principle, to move away without allowing us to surround the Southwest Front. We look. Let's say with 9.09 allow retreat. And parts of the SWF depart. It is unlikely that Guderian will be tasked with a deeper blow, most likely, the operation will be curtailed, and somewhere by the 15-20 number, the withdrawal of 2TG units to the bridgeheads for the offensive will begin.
    Then you said that you need to leave the SWF in the boiler and bury it there after 1,5-2,5 months. I will not speak in time. Since Kiev UR is open from the rear, but God be with him. But a couple of days after the end of the environment, the TG will be freed and set off on their business. Say yourself that OVA needs 2-3 days. That is, the gain here is not large in time, but in losses it is much higher, since NOBODY WILL ALREADY break through the ring in 1,5-2 months.

    Played these games over 20 years ago. And you, in order to understand it would be necessary to climb along ravines, otherwise everything is smooth on paper.


    Yeah, trench truth, rear rats. That's why I see that your division is sitting in ambush in the forest: (I will not measure myself with anything. But no matter how hard the comfrey tries, they will not correct strategic mistakes ... However, of course, if the comfrey is bad for their tasks execute, then any strategy will go to hell. ”An example of the destruction of the strategy by the" comfrey "is the Sarikamysh operation, if there were not the Turks, but the Germans, our cranks would have been complete after such lapses.
  26. rubin6286
    rubin6286 24 January 2014 11: 21
    0
    In my opinion, it could not be otherwise, because in the new, national-socialist Germany, the military elite was also new, carefully nurtured by German militarism. She took an oath of allegiance to Hitler and remained faithful to her until the end. The elite shared these principles and disagreements were often only of a private nature. Hitler's will dominated, as did the will of Stalin, and it could not have been otherwise in a totalitarian state. Our countries, in this sense, are very similar to each other. Did Hitler trust his generals? Probably trusted, but, of course, not completely, not to everyone and not to everything, understanding the difference in education, level of military knowledge, social background and feeling it even in personal contact with them.
  27. chenia
    chenia 24 January 2014 22: 01
    +1
    Quote: alicante11
    The issue is in the economy and morale of the population. Imagine that you personally will be kept under arms for half a year a year ... In addition, mobilization is a powerful blow to the economy.



    Here in Germany you can. Gouged France. Demobilized (partially natural) and to the labor front. The Führer said it was necessary, again mobilized in Yugoslavia, and in Russia, and all this to applause. Well, there is a dictator, and Stalin is a democrat and a liberal. And he cannot allow inconvenience to the population.

    1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict, units and 2 formations 17AK deployed, 32 Army also (KSAVO), formations ZABVO and DalVO similarly. Where is Vietnam, and where is the Dzungarian Gate? And this despite the fact that even a company of disabled people did not reach the border from Urumqi. And a month later (the conflict subsided) again in a cropped-neutered state. If you lived then, did you notice a severe deterioration in life?

    Railway transport will not especially feel the changes, but you are not moving into the regions. And if they advanced, then part of the formation, with periodic rotation (only l / s. - BC equipment and weapons are not necessary). Auto and horse-drawn vehicles (these are mainly services of the rear, armaments and techies) have already been reduced to units, they can fulfill the role of transport teams that fulfill the national economic needs (all the same, until the general mobilization, when they need to raise the entire material from the warehouses, they are especially not involved, but already at hand, and with an accurate plan of action) and even participate in harvesting - probably familiar. And all this without vodka and women (although I got excited about vodka, about women too - let's say, with a restriction).

    The combat group is training infantry - there, spawning (naturally for that time) transport is only in the household department, in artillery on horseback (moving - rolling guns (setting the sun manually)), tanks yes, but mainly military training equipment. Full use at vocational schools, along with the slack will be removed, because of clogged pipelines and loose nuts on the floor Mech. Hulls on the sidelines stood.
    And I’ll repeat it again until Autumn.
  28. chenia
    chenia 24 January 2014 22: 05
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    And what is the contradiction?
    At first you said that it was necessary, in principle, to move away without allowing us to surround the Southwest Front.


    At first I said that of the three solutions-
    1) carry out the withdrawal of troops to the environment
    2) withdraw troops after encirclement (or rather withdraw troops from encirclement)
    3. after the environment to stay in their positions
    -the worst is chosen.

    I have already justified the third option, than it is better than the second.
    And now the first one.

    The withdrawal of 9.09.41 troops was not without problems (the 1 TG and part of 17 A. Guderian could have resisted (on the flank of the Bryansk Front, and behind the rear of 40 A and 38 A there were a lot of our troops. You yourself noted this.

    From here to 15-16. 09. we would have gone (albeit well-wrinkled) to previously prepared (relatively) positions (Kirponos was preparing the departure ahead of time).
    Gudarian would not be able to attack the troops either (in real life, he gouged it with 29.09 to 6.10 and then he managed to shoot it, he ripened everywhere), until 6A was fettered on the flanks of the Southwest Front and later in the South Front.
    6A (the majority) while flowing around the Kiev UR (which covered the withdrawal) to cross the Dnieper, will be able to approach the new positions of the Southwest Front by September 20-22.09.
    A day or two for coordination, coordination and interaction and -24-25 Guderian’s advance on Br.F.
    But having a neighbor, albeit a rumpled, but still not two weary armies (and in this case they would not have been so battered) and expecting a strike only from the front (in reality, position 2 of the TG was farther south, and Br. F was hit even on the open flank), the resistance of the front would be higher. And hence the resistance longer.
    We leave from here for the same terms, and if it was lucky, it would drag on to 15-18. 10 - rains, mudslide (it’s mud to the knees near Moscow, and waist-deep on chernozems. There was a case (October, November), only K-700 saved, the rest of the equipment was sucked out of hard-surfaced roads).

    But the existence of the SWF would also allow the SW to kick Manstein (the operation was being prepared, but in connection with the collapse of the SWF, it was canceled), and remind him that the holiday season in Crimea is over.
    And they would have saved Crimea, they would have saved Odessa, and they would have had problems in case of a breakthrough to the Caucasus - fear for the flanks
    Now justify what is the advantage of what was in real life ..
    1. alicante11
      alicante11 25 January 2014 04: 01
      0
      I have already justified the third option, than it is better than the second.


      You have not substantiated anything. The German troops will link the troops no longer, or even slightly less. But we will lose all the troops completely.

      The withdrawal of 9.09.41 troops was not without problems (the 1 TG and part of 17 A. Guderian could have resisted (on the flank of the Bryansk Front, and behind the rear of 40 A and 38 A there were a lot of our troops. You yourself noted this.


      So the fact of the matter is that NOT USEFUL. And immediately turned on the Moscow direction. That is, the offensive on Moscow will begin earlier. Even during the departure of the Southwest Front.

      From here to 15-16. 09. we would have gone (albeit well-wrinkled) to previously prepared (relatively) positions (Kirponos was preparing the departure ahead of time).


      Damn, I'm sick of it. They are NOT rumpled, but suffered very large losses. Well, read about the state of the Southwest Front troops, finally. They should have been replenished, and this is not one day. Those most combat-ready units that were defending in the UR had an insufficient number of vehicles, which means low maneuverability. Those. they cannot be used in the offensive. At the same time, on the scruff of the neck, or even on the flank, hangs the 1-I TG, which has not gone anywhere and is advancing on the heels of the OVA. Nothing but defense in such a configuration is possible.

      Gudarian would not be able to attack the troops either (in real life, he gouged it with 29.09 to 6.10 and then he managed to shoot it, he ripened everywhere), until 6A was fettered on the flanks of the Southwest Front and later in the South Front.


      And later - this is when? For some reason, it seems to me that the German OVA will pursue our units "on the heels". And the 1st TG is even faster.

      Now justify what is the advantage of what was in real life ..


      I have already substantiated this for you. Sorry, you do not want to listen.

      about the existence of the SWF, would allow the SW to kick Manstein (the operation was being prepared, but in connection with the collapse of the SWF, it was canceled), and remind him that the holiday season in Crimea is over.


      Nothing changes on the southern flank. The Germans will also release the 1 th TG.
  29. alicante11
    alicante11 25 January 2014 03: 47
    0
    Here in Germany you can. Gouged France. Demobilized (partially natural) and to the labor front.


    And who told you that the Germans were demobilized? In the course of the war, they simply increased the number of divisions.

    1979 Sino-Vietnam conflict


    So partial mobilization. And in the western districts, most of the troops were deployed. And everyone else would have to be deployed too. After all, the Japanese are threatening. And the Turks can suddenly attack. So you can constantly mobilize every year.

    Railway transport will not especially feel the changes, but you are not moving into the regions.


    What is it like? In the event of mobilization, troops are deployed according to the border cover plan. Otherwise, they will be defeated piece by piece. But the railway transport will "feel" mobilization also because it is necessary to transfer reservists and equipment. Which are concentrated in large cities. but the parts they replenish are not necessarily side by side.

    Auto and horse-drawn vehicles (these are mainly services of the rear, armaments and techies) have already been reduced to units, they can fulfill the role of transport teams that fulfill the national economic needs


    Well, yes, and then they will rinse you like Pavlova, who brought the artillery regiments of the divisions to the training grounds before the war. Before the war, they have nothing to do with the arrangement of units, and if they engage in national economic work, then again they will not arrive on time in replenished units.

    Combat group training infantry - there, spawning (for that time naturally) transport only in the economic department


    I don’t understand what the training and battle group have to do with it. You deploy full connections. See how many vehicles the Red Army SD had in the state.
  30. chenia
    chenia 26 January 2014 00: 16
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    But we will lose all the troops completely.


    What troops, everything is gouged. 400 tons (and according to German data 650) were taken prisoner, and how many equipment. Clear business Kirponos from Kiev pulled a significant amount and mob.resource. people who, after some training, would become fighters - and in your expression it’s a “rear riffraff.” And this is in seven days.
    And what damage has been done to Guderian, in a week he will spread Eremenko in 6 days to Moscow.
    In mid-December 1942, after an attempt to release (the Germans were already almost a MONTH surrounded, the conditions were an order of magnitude worse), for some reason we did not withdraw the troops. This despite the fact that Paulus had to catch up with the outgoing front which was already at a distance of 250 km. And he didn’t pass even without our opposition (in the bare steppes then). And we kept the whole front until February.

    I can’t take it anymore, your arguments are pure demagogy.

    Quote: alicante11
    And immediately turned on the Moscow direction. That is, the offensive on Moscow will begin earlier. Even during the departure of the Southwest Front.


    No, you can’t leave Br.F on the flank until he was gouged out.

    Quote: alicante11
    What is it like? In case of mobilization, the troops are deployed according to the plan for covering the border


    Quote: alicante11
    But the railway transport will "feel" mobilization also because it is necessary to transfer reservists and equipment. Which are concentrated in large cities. but the parts they replenish are not necessarily side by side.

    You generally threw everything in a heap (mobilization, formation, deployment, operational construction of the front) and do not understand this issue.

    The formation of most of the compounds is complete, the places of permanent deployment of their units (taking into account the cover plan) are selected, equipment, weapons, software in parks and warehouses. Office connections (parts) and command units in stock. But the part is not operational. In an association (compound), one or two divisions (part) can have military units in peacetime (70%), and is combat ready (there were more mobilized associations, but there were also unsecured not only military units, but also completely equipment )

    What’s the idea, parts of the frame — these are the so-called parts with materiel and l / s to commanders of the company, including the storage base of math. Parts available, and l / s to ns.battalions, to PARTY deploy a combat group, from combat support to First of all, communication, well, technical and rear services. No steamboats, planes and trains are needed here.

    Life-tents, next to the part. The battle group engaged in BP without much fuel, except for tankers. And that's all until AUTUMN. Later, the Germans did not climb, SIGNIFICANTLY.
  31. samoletil18
    samoletil18 26 January 2014 12: 43
    0
    I also have a home library. I, too, can look there for memoirs of German, up to heaps of Italian military leaders. To pull over the ears convenient information from there. To mention the "ambiguous" position of the authors after the war, which they lost (after having unleashed it). And tell the world about "the greatest geniuses of politics and military affairs, Hitler and Mussolini." The article is tired. I didn’t read it.
    Since I decided not to put cons for the articles, I will not.
  32. alicante11
    alicante11 26 January 2014 13: 45
    0
    What troops, everything is gouged. 400 t. (And according to German 650 data) captured, but how much equipment.


    21-I army.

    Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, having overcome all obstacles, nevertheless withdrew a group of his troops from the enemy ring. This was facilitated by the strike of the 2 Cavalry Corps of General P. A. Belov, reinforced by tank brigades of the Stavka reserve. Cavalrymen and tankers swiftly attacked Romny, where Guderian’s headquarters were located. Guderian recalls that he saw attackers from the top floor of the highest [346] city building with his own eyes - they were only 800 meters away from him. The nazis of the fascist general could not stand it, and he, along with the headquarters, fled to Konotop.


    26-I army.

    In early October, the commander of the 26 Army with the remnants of his troops left the enemy ring in the combat zone of the 5 Cavalry Corps. For a long time after that, the stragglers and army commanders continued in small groups, or even alone, to seep through the front line. The brigade commissar D. E. Kolesnikov, the head of the political department of the regimental commissar I. V. Zakovorotny, and many other commanders and political workers, safely left the encirclement.
  33. alicante11
    alicante11 26 January 2014 13: 46
    0
    37-th Army

    It turned out that the main forces of the 37 Army were cut in two in the Baryshevka area. Most of the forces were stopped by the Yagotinsky grouping of the enemy on the Supoy river, and the rest of the formations - to the west of Baryshevka, on the Trubezh river. Our troops attack the enemy. But the Nazis on the eastern banks of both rivers buried tanks. Breaking through such a defense without enough artillery is not easy. Again and again, our troops attacked. With heavy fighting, one of the troops of the 37 Army managed to force the Trubezh River on the night of September 22 and break the enemy’s ring. This decisive attack was led by Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR T. A. Strokach. He with several generals and officers at the decisive moment went in the forward chains. The deaths of heroes fell Colonels Sokolov, Kosarev and many other commanders. But the task was completed, the enemy screen was crushed. Most of this group of troops went to their own. The commander of the 56-th regiment from the 4-th division of the NKVD Lieutenant Colonel Mazurenko with his soldiers joined the partisans of Kovpak.


    And the main forces of the army, surrounded in the vicinity of the Berezan station and the forests south of it, continued heavy fighting. The command was taken over by the chief of staff of the army, General K. L. Dobroserdov. The Nazis invited surrounded [354] to lay down their arms. Our fighters and commanders responded with new attacks.
    Combining the most combat-ready units, Colonel M.F. Orlov, Major V. S. Blazhievsky and other commanders broke through the ring with a sudden blow on the night of September 23 and headed not to the east, as the enemy expected, but to the south. A few more groups managed to break through. However, a significant part of our forces, which spent almost all of their ammunition in stubborn attacks, had to hide in the depths of the forests. Several times the Nazis tried to snoop here, but with great losses were thrown back.


    By the end of September, the map of the German General Staff ceased to indicate the area of ​​encirclement of the main forces of the 37 Army: apparently, they believed that everyone there had died out of starvation. Most of the troops blocking the forest were thrown into the offensive to the east. Surrounded by people, they took advantage of the sharp weakening of the enemy ring and began to make their way in separate groups, some east, across the front line, and some into the surrounding forests, later becoming the core of numerous partisan detachments.


    The army’s rearguard, cut off from its main forces in the Borispol region, stubbornly made its way.


    Hand-to-hand fights started everywhere. The ring of enemy troops was torn. Then they decided to move in small units, trying not to get involved in battles, since the shells and cartridges were running out. The path was long and hard. Many died. But most of the soldiers and commanders made their way through all the barriers.


    All these people just had to be buried in the Kiev ur?
  34. alicante11
    alicante11 26 January 2014 13: 55
    0
    In mid-December, after trying to release 1942 (the Germans are already almost a MONTH surrounded, the conditions are much worse), for some reason we did not withdraw the troops.
    I can’t take it anymore, your arguments are pure demagogy.


    Actually, the head was given to people in order to think that large forces with a large number of tanks went to help Paulus. Whereas only 2 cavalry corps and several tank brigades were able to throw help to the SWF, which did not require the 2 TG to be detained, the forces of the 1 TG and 2 rearguards were enough. And our mobile units acted against Manstein, and did not sit around the 6 army.

    No, you can’t leave Br.F on the flank until he was gouged out.


    So the operation against the Bryansk Front was already taking place during the beginning of the attack on Moscow. Simultaneously with the organization of the Vyazemsky boiler. You do not know?

    You generally threw everything in a heap (mobilization, formation, deployment, operational construction of the front) and do not understand this issue.


    I’m afraid that you don’t understand what you’re talking about. Frame dragged. What does the frame and mobilization? Even the combat units of many formations were deployed in wartime states, which did not mean mobilization. There was no equipment that needed to be taken from the Narkhoz for mobilization.

    The formation of most of the compounds is complete, the places of permanent deployment of their units (taking into account the cover plan) are selected, equipment, weapons, software in parks and warehouses. Office connections (parts) and command units in stock. But the part is not operational.
  35. polkovnik manuch
    polkovnik manuch 26 January 2014 14: 36
    0
    I learned a lot of interesting things from what I read, I disagree with the constant underestimation of the actions of Paulus. Although we want or do not want to admit (the enemy is all the same), Paulus fulfilled his task in the boiler, he clearly realized that even if the inner ring of the encirclement was broken, the army would encircle the outer ring, in its then state, it just won’t reach, therefore, he stayed in Stalingrad, holding down the combat-ready units of the Red Army, making it possible to orderly withdraw from the foothills to the Crimea and Ukraine.
  36. alicante11
    alicante11 26 January 2014 16: 30
    0
    What are you talking about? The formation is completed, the places of permanent deployment have been selected. Even the combat strength of the divisions is completed (there were 12 divisions). The formation is combat-ready, but it does not have the necessary mobility, since it does not have sufficient transport to transport the rear and supplies. And some MSDs were forced to stomp with the infantry, since there were no trucks. Tanks could not deliver fuel, because the TPZ was not mobilized. The problem is the lack of transport, even artillery tractors, communications, etc. Much of this did not "lay in warehouses", but had to be taken from the national economy. And all this must be transported.

    Life-tents, next to the part. The battle group engaged in BP without much fuel, except for tankers.


    THIS ALL WAS DONE! Read the literature, not just Wikipedia.

    Later, the Germans did not climb, SIGNIFICANTLY.


    They can "climb" in 42nd. And we had plans to improve the mechanized corps on the 43rd. so the Germans had enough time.
  37. chenia
    chenia 26 January 2014 20: 45
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    Actually, the head was given to people in order to think that large forces with a large number of tanks went to help Paulus.


    I understand that Sunday you can relax and be inattentive (and pour all kinds of drinks into your head).

    You match the dates, to 20.12.42. Large forces both came, and already left, under our kicks.
    And where is Paulus, and where is Manstein (200-250 km).

    Hence the question of what the hell Rokossovsky was sticking out in Stalingrad (and will be until February 43), where Paulus had been sunbathing for almost a month in complete isolation.

    And why would it be worse near Kiev? Particularly pleased with the assertion about the insecurity of UR from the rear. But what have we forgotten how to build field fortifications, is engineering equipment a position new to commanders of all ranks? And Kiev itself is not a super UR (Stalingrad, Koenigsberg, Warsaw, Berlin).

    Quote: alicante11
    I’m afraid that you don’t understand what you’re talking about. Frame dragged.


    Quote: alicante11
    THIS ALL WAS DONE!


    When? 2 formations of the operational echelon, reserve of border districts, and even part of the units of the second echelon of the cover armies - 6-thousand-strong (this is the frame). They were deployed (peacetime staff - 60%) somewhere with 10.06, and with 15.06. 41 second tier (KOVO) began to advance to the areas.

    The question is, what is the combat effectiveness of such troops? Without combat coordination (only the SDK was filled, given out weapons and engaged in loading - of course, then they thought they would catch up.)
    A. I said that the same thing needs to be done, but from May-April to August.
  38. alicante11
    alicante11 27 January 2014 12: 20
    0
    You match the dates, to 20.12.42. Large forces both came, and already left, under our kicks.
    And where is Paulus, and where is Manstein (200-250 km).


    But what, were there all the tank forces that surrounded the 6 Army? Until the end of her siege? This is where demagoguery is.

    And why would it be worse near Kiev? Particularly pleased with the assertion about the insecurity of UR from the rear. But what have we forgotten how to build field fortifications, is engineering equipment a position new to commanders of all ranks? And Kiev itself is not a super UR (Stalingrad, Koenigsberg, Warsaw, Berlin).


    And who said worse? It would also end.
    At the expense of field fortifications - they are not identical to UR - absolutely.

    When? 2 formations of the operational echelon, reserve of border districts, and even part of the units of the second echelon of the cover armies - 6-thousand-strong (this is the frame). They were deployed (peacetime staff - 60%) somewhere with 10.06, and with 15.06. 41 second tier (KOVO) began to advance to the areas.


    So then he and the second echelon, to deploy after the start of mobilization / war. You do not want to understand that there were no complaints about the preparation of our troops. Claims were to their small maneuverability. Which came from the non-mobilization of technology, rear and communications.

    The question is, what is the combat effectiveness of such troops? Without combat coordination (only the SDK was filled, given out weapons and engaged in loading - of course, then they thought they would catch up.)


    As the fighting showed, the combat readiness is normal.

    A. I said that the same thing needs to be done, but from May-April to August.


    Who cares? The troops, as were without equipment, remained. And the Germans will also replay them in a maneuver.
  39. chenia
    chenia 27 January 2014 23: 39
    +1
    Quote: alicante11
    But what, were there all the tank forces that surrounded the 6th Army?


    Well, more than 200 tanks and more than 200 tons of people at Rokossovsky. and until February. And Paulus already in mid-December had fuel no more than 100 km away, and the Volga steppes were not in the suburbs, in miserable settlements, and not a tree or a bush. They would not have reached without fighting.

    And I used this as an example. How long did the 300 group (that it naturally dried out all the time) fettered our troops.
    And Kiev is the largest transportation hub, like a bone in the throat of the Germans.

    Quote: alicante11
    At the expense of field fortifications - they are not identical to UR - absolutely.

    So 95% of the field fortifications, And on the Kursk, what were the caponiers standing? And near Moscow, URs are wooden - earthy. By the way, the concrete goods factories in Kiev worked and the reinforced concrete bunkers could produce.
    Our SD in Charyn (KSAVO 80 years) was just built - a pillbox for the department, KP and KNP and a collection point for the wounded in concrete, and that’s all. There were no three-story caponiers.


    Quote: alicante11
    You do not want to understand that there were no complaints about the preparation of our troops. Claims were to their small maneuverability. Which came from the non-mobilization of technology, rear and communications.


    But what I mean, the desire not to succumb to provocation and react according to the situation, did not take into account the incredible speed of the deployment of German strike forces on the border. And everything was done correctly, did not have time for 10 days. The events were expected to be completed before 1.07.41.

    True, the construction of the second operational echelon Kirponos (KOVO) and Zakharov (OdVO) at their own risk and fear did.

    Well, as for the rear and transport and communications, too, for an hour I spoke about the need for their priority deployment. And at the same time, the implementation of economic transport measures in the national economy.

    Remember, virgin battalions - we take people from HH, form army team teams and carry out HH events. (though there they gave their (army) equipment).
    And we’ll get it. these units carry out (receiving applications) they are the same civil duties. But already in uniform and under the command of military commanders. Here you can even spend the night at home, except for a certain on-duty team - already a military unit.
  40. alicante11
    alicante11 28 January 2014 09: 33
    0
    Well, more than 200 tanks and more than 200 tons of people at Rokossovsky. and until February. And Paulus already in mid-December had fuel no more than 100 km away, and the Volga steppes were not in the suburbs, in miserable settlements, and not a tree or a bush. They would not have reached without fighting.


    200 tanks and 200 bayonets. TOTAL. But the Germans were captured only about 100. And how much did it begin to advance? in short, this is already uniform nonsense.

    And I used this as an example. How long did the 300 group (that it naturally dried out all the time) fettered our troops.


    They had not fettered anyone by this time already. They simply could not break through and sat stupidly, waiting for permission to surrender. And by that time the main forces of the fronts had thrown back the Manshetin and were engaged in their further affairs.

    So 95% of the field fortifications, And on the Kursk, what were the caponiers standing? And near Moscow, URs are wooden - earthy. By the way, the concrete goods factories in Kiev worked and the reinforced concrete bunkers could produce.


    Well, wooden URs are already nonsense. On Kursk there was a long-term layered defense, and not UR. Well, there’s nothing to talk about. Do you even know the terms for building URs? He would have been caught 10 times already. Where to get supplies to the troops? I say - nonsense.

    But what I mean, the desire not to succumb to provocation and react according to the situation, did not take into account the incredible speed of the deployment of German strike forces on the border. And everything was done correctly, did not have time for 10 days. The events were expected to be completed before 1.07.41.


    Yes, you say stupidity. Accounting / not accounting. But the Germans would not attack in the 41 and our economy would remain without transport. And they wouldn’t attack 100% if we mobilized.

    Well, as for the rear and transport and communications, too, for an hour I spoke about the need for their priority deployment. And at the same time, the implementation of economic transport measures in the national economy.


    Yes, they can not perform economic and transport tasks. Because then they will not be at the disposal of their parts. And on alarm, the units will perform without them. But the mobilized people will sit in the barracks. Rave.

    Remember, virgin battalions - we take people from HH, form army team teams and carry out HH events. (though there they gave their (army) equipment).


    So they did not have to fight. And it was not necessary to provide troops. They both had to work and worked.
  41. chenia
    chenia 29 January 2014 11: 17
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    They had not fettered anyone by this time already.


    By this time, we had been sticking out for a month, and why wouldn’t the remnants of Goth and the Italians immediately (from 24.11.)
    The superiority in forces and means is significant, because in your opinion 6 A did not hold anyone in check.
  42. chenia
    chenia 29 January 2014 11: 34
    0
    Quote: alicante11
    Well, wooden URs are already nonsense. The Kursk was a long-term layered defense, not UR


    Open your eyes, where about the URs on the Kursk Bulge I have?
    And the bunkers in Mozhaisk UR did not stand? Well, we didn’t have time (from July we started) to create a missile defense, and we molded everything that was made of concrete, reinforced concrete beams, blocks, reinforced concrete caps, and a significant amount of log houses (and before mid-42 they did it after the Moscow battle) .

    Quote: alicante11
    Yes, you say stupidity. Accounting / not accounting. But the Germans would not have attacked in the 41st and our economy would have remained without transport.


    Well, firstly, until the fall. And secondly, this is only for the troops of the first strategic echelon.