Mikoyan A.I. It was
A few hours before the outbreak of hostilities by Directive No. 1, all units on the western border of the USSR were put on alert. Among other things, the directive stated that during 22 – 23 June, after provocative actions, the Germans were expected to attack the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO and were instructed “not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications”. Apparently, the Soviet leaders believed that the war would begin with the provocations of 22 – 23 in June and full-scale military operations in late June 1941, after the completion of the deployment of the Red Army units and formations in the West. Reality exceeded all their wildest expectations.
Germany began the war treacherously, without declaring war, with all the forces and means at its disposal already at dawn on June 22, 1941. A significant part of the Soviet divisions covering the state border was still just on the way to its defense lines, and therefore the border was abundant in areas practically devoid of troops (Figure 1). Not all Soviet units on the border managed to accept Directive No. 1, and those that accepted it were simply demoralized by the highest order not to succumb to provocations in the conditions of the Wehrmacht conducting full-scale military operations with aviationartillery tanks and motorized infantry.
With the beginning of the war began the systematic implementation of a set of measures to transfer the country to a war footing. 22 June 1941 of the year in the Soviet Union declared mobilization, which began on June 23 in all military districts except Central Asian, Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern, a state of emergency was introduced in several regions of the USSR, and military tribunals were established in areas of military operations. 23 June 1941 was established by the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the USSR, a mobilization plan for ammunition was adopted, and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution defining the tasks of party and Soviet bodies in wartime conditions.
24 June 1941 was decided to create a tank industry in the Volga region and in the Urals, evacuation council and the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformbyuro) were created. The orders of the SNK of the USSR “On measures to combat parachute assault forces and saboteurs of the enemy in the front line” and “On the protection of enterprises and institutions and the creation of fighter battalions” were adopted. During the war years, about 2 thousand fighter battalions (paramilitary volunteer formations) were created; they were led by the Central Headquarters, formed under the NKVD of the USSR. ”
25 June - “to centralize the management of propaganda and counter-propaganda among the enemy’s troops and population”, the Soviet bureau of military-political propaganda is being created, and in order to ensure the strictest order in the front line and organize a merciless fight against enemy sabotage groups, the Institute of Front and Army Chiefs of Guard of the Rear Services was introduced . In addition, on June 25 of June 1941, the USSR Directive confirmed the need to create a group of armies of the RGK at the Western Dvina – Dnieper border. On the same day, according to E. Driga, “the headquarters of the Central Asian military district ... received an order on the readiness of the 27-th mechanized corps by the 4 of July 1941 to begin redeployment to the west”, to subordinate the 28-th headquarters located in Kirov.
22 June 1941 of the year in the radio message British Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared his "determination to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime", readiness to provide "all the help to Russia and the Russian people" that they could and offered the USSR "any technical or economic help that is in our power and which will probably come in handy. ” The British leadership was ready to send a military or economic mission to the USSR at any time. According to Winston Churchill, the Soviet government did not respond to his “radio address to Russia and the whole world on the day of the German attack, except for the fact that excerpts from it were published in Pravda and other Russian government bodies and that we were asked to accept a Russian military mission. The silence in the higher realms was painful. The Soviet government did not object to "that ... two groups of British representatives be sent to Moscow," but made a reservation, "that the Soviet government will not want to accept the aid of England without compensation and it in turn will be ready to render aid to England." Thus, V. Molotov expressed readiness to reduce all relations between the USSR and England on an equal footing.
"In the morning of June 23, acting on the instructions of the president, S. Wallace announced an official statement in which the German attack on the Soviet Union qualified as a perfidy and emphasized that" any struggle against Hitlerism, from whatever source these forces would emanate, would accelerate the inevitable fall current German leaders and thus will contribute to our own defense and security. " The statement did not say a word about rendering support to the Soviet Union. The next day, Roosevelt himself said at a press conference: "Of course, we intend to give Russia all the help we can." However, he did not answer the question of what form this aid would take and whether the lend-lease law would apply to the Soviet Union. On the same day, Washington announced the lifting of the blocking of Soviet financial transactions, and a day later, the decision not to apply the restrictions prescribed by the law on neutrality to the USSR, which gave him the opportunity to buy military materials in the US and transport them on American merchant ships. ” .
24 Jun. Head of the Free France Movement, Sh. De Gaulle, declared his support for the Russian people by the French and his desire to establish military cooperation with Moscow. In turn, shortly after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union and the loss of Syria, "the Vichy government transferred military control of Indochina to Japan, which, thanks to this, received the forward base for an attack on Thailand, Singapore and Dutch India." According to the American historian S.E. Morison "had the impression that the Western and Eastern partners of the Axis powers intended to unite in India."
According to A.A. By 25 June, the Japanese General Staff developed and approved a timetable for the completion and preparation of the war, providing for the start of 28 July 1941 mobilization activities, the decision to start the August 10 war, the beginning of August 29 military action, and their completion mid-October 1941 of the year. ... As follows from this graph, the plan "Kantokuen" to a certain extent was similar to the German plan "Barbarossa" and also assumed a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR. "
On the evening of June 26, 1941, V. Molotov instructed the Ambassador of the USSR to the United States, K.A. Umansky “immediately go to Roosevelt or Hell, and in his absence, to Welles and, after reporting on the treacherous attack of Germany on the USSR, to ask what is the attitude of the American government to this war and to the USSR. The issue of "helping America with the various goods necessary for the Soviet Union" was now "ordered not to be raised." Wallace stated K.A. To Umansky, that “the American government considers the USSR a victim of unprovoked, unjustified aggression” and that the rebuff of this aggression undertaken by the Soviet people “corresponds historical US interests. ” Welles emphasized that the American government "is ready to provide all possible support to this struggle within the limits determined by the production capabilities of the USA and their most urgent needs."
Returning to Moscow 27 on June 1941, the British ambassador Stafford Cripps (he left Moscow 10 on June 1941) introduced Molotov to all who arrived and the entire diplomatic staff of his mission. “In the evening, Molotov again received Cripps and reported that after he reported to the Soviet government and personally I.V. To Stalin about the ambassador’s proposals, the question arose of what the scale and extent of assistance would be for the parties to each other. ” 25 June 1941, Germany demanded that Iran join the war on its side, but Iran refused on the very next day. Since the Iranian question was equally topical both for England and for the USSR V.M. Molotov, among other things, declared the desirability of a common political line with regard to Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. Cripps replied that both governments should really follow a common political line for all these countries.
On June 28, Supply Minister Beaverbrook “stated that the British government was ready to take all possible measures to ease the Germans' pressure on the USSR. In particular, as a “personal proposal”, Beaverbrook suggested that England could not only intensify the bombing of West Germany and Northern France, which is already being done to a large extent, but also send part of its fleet to the region of Murmansk and Petsamo for naval operations against the Germans. Beaverbrook also spoke about the possibility of major raids on the northern French coast, that is, the temporary capture of ports such as Cherbourg, Le Havre and the like. If the Soviet government would raise the question of closer military cooperation before the British government, the British government would readily discuss what could be done. ”
Like this. All routinely, routinely. It would seem that nothing portends neither a crisis nor a catastrophe. Moreover, it seems that the “moment of truth”, the apogee of tension and the culmination of events have not yet come, they are still ahead. Joseph Stalin, without losing composure and self-control, works in his Kremlin office. But meanwhile, he is not speaking to the citizens of the USSR, but V.M. Molotov, the Headquarters, not the High Command, is being created; the State Defense Committee is not being created; the total mobilization of forces and means is “All for the front! All for victory "is not, divisions of the national militia are not formed, the underground struggle against the enemy in the occupied territory of the USSR and guerrilla groups are not organized, the army from the internal military districts are in no hurry to help the armies that cannot withstand the onslaught of the enemy on the border, and not to fill the line of fortified areas on the old state border, and on the creation of a defense line in the deep rear of the warring armies at the Zapadnaya Dvina – Dnepr line.
Among other things, despite the proposal of W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt to support the Soviet Union I.V. Not only did Stalin not hurry to ask for help in the fight against the common enemy — Hitler’s Germany, but also linked the acceptance of aid by the Soviet Union from England to the acceptance of aid from England by the Soviet Union, i.e. tried to build equal relations with England and the United States.
Apparently, I.V. Stalin had to appeal to the citizens of the USSR and the leaders of Britain and the United States only at the climax — after the defeat of the Red Army of the Lublin enemy grouping by the troops before the decisive throw of the united and strengthened armies formed after the start of the war of the Western and South-Western fronts, as well as the defeat of the cut off from the supply lines of the German shock groups in the rear of the Soviet troops by the Army Group RGC. The headquarters of the High Command should probably have been established to coordinate the actions of the Red Army troops liberating Europe from German occupation. The RGK Army Group was assembled in the deep rear of the belligerent armies to defeat an enemy that had broken through to the USSR territory, and since its occupation was to be short-lived, there was no need to deploy a long guerrilla warfare. Assisting England brought the Soviet Union to the same rank with both England and the United States. Meanwhile, everything abruptly and irrevocably changed with the breakthrough of the German troops to Minsk, the encirclement and the defeat of the troops of the Western Front.
With the outbreak of hostilities in the Baltics, parts of the 41 of the German motorized army corps of the 4 tank group met under Shaulay resistance of the 125 rifle division and 9 of the anti-tank brigade, and also forced to restrain the counterattack of the 3 and 12 th units of the Soviet mechanized Corps moved to Riga slowly and uncertainly. At the same time, parts of the 56 of the German motorized army corps of the 4 tank group easily overcame a weak barrier at the border that was still being advanced to the border of the 48 Soviet rifle division. Having walked around Kaunas from the 8 th anti-tank brigade and the 3 th mechanized corps part of the 56 th German motorized army corps, they crossed the Dubissa River near the city of Aregala and launched a rapid rush to Daugavpils on the territory free from Soviet units.
South of 3, the German tank group, like the 56 of the German motorized army corps, easily overcame the weak barrier of the 128 rifle division and rifle battalions of the 23, 126 and 188 Soviet rifle divisions that had been scattered under Alytus, the 5 tank division rushed freely to Vilnius and then on to Minsk. The Baltic national rifle corps showed their extremely low combat capability and the command of the North-Western Front was afraid to use them to deliver a counterattack against the enemy. For this reason, the North-Western Front essentially lost its front-line reserve and was unable to stop the breakthrough of the 56 motorized army corps of the 4 tank group to Daugavpils in the direction of Pskov and further to Leningrad, as well as the entire 3 tank group to Vilnius and further to Minsk. In turn, the counter attack led by I.V. The Boldin cavalry-mechanized group of the Western Front on Grodno was directed against the German army’s 3 tank group covering 9 and, therefore, could not even prevent the 3 tank group from advancing to Vilnius and Minsk. A breakthrough to Minsk from the south of the 2 tank group led to encirclement, and then to the defeat of the troops of the Western Front.
On the South-Western Front, the enemy also achieved success, although perhaps not so significant. This was due to the later concentration and deployment of parts of the 1 of the German tank group, complete cover of the border with parts of the South-Western Front, its superiority in tanks and aircraft over the German Army Group South. In addition, contrary to the plan of covering the border, the 1 anti-tank brigade did not give way to the 3 motorized army corps of the 1 tank group to Kiev, as was the case with the 41 Soviet tank division, and significantly slowed down the promotion of German units. to Kiev. Unfortunately, the command of the South-Western Front could not fully realize its advantage, and the poorly planned and organized uncoordinated counter-attack of the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front in the region of Lutsk – Dubno – Rovno could not stop the advance of the enemy deep into Soviet Ukraine.
On the Northern Front 25 and 26 June 1941, Soviet aircraft bombed Finland. Without causing significant damage to the infrastructure and German forces deployed in Finland, Soviet air strikes gave the Finnish government an excuse to invade the USSR. Which it, despite the entreaties of England, which had very good relations with Finland, immediately took advantage, greatly aggravating the position of the Soviet troops in the Baltic and near Leningrad. At the insistence of the Soviet government, England in December 1941 was forced to declare war on Finland. To this day, the question remains: what was the 25 airstrike of June 1941 of the year - stupidity or aggression?
Meanwhile, after learning from the bitter experience of the unsuccessful initial actions of the Red Army in the winter of 1939, against the Finnish forces, the Soviet leadership did not dare to fight more with Finland without a threefold superiority in forces. This is clearly shown by the C-Z.20 plan, which envisaged the defeat of Finland by forces of more than sixty divisions and then subject to German neutrality favorable to the USSR (part 1, scheme 5). It is hard to imagine that the Soviet Union could decide on aggression against Finland by the forces of the 21 division (i.e., when the ratio of forces with the enemy 1 to 1), especially in conditions of German aggression, without having an elementary plan of military operations.
The catastrophe of the Western Front crossed out the basic version of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky and, baring the direction of Smolensk and Moscow, turned into a crisis for the entire Red Army and the entire Soviet Union (see Military and political crisis of the Soviet Union 1941). The extremely unfavorable situation was overcome by implementing a backup version of the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky in case of a breakthrough by the Germans of the Western Dvina – Dnepr line. The Western Front was restored by the RGK armies (2 scheme), and the Ostashkov – Pochep defensive line (part of 24, 28 scheme) was formed by the 2 and 2 armies of the RGK and the newly formed units. The fierce battle of Smolensk, the defense of Leningrad and Kiev finally buried the original plan for Germany and Japan to conduct joint military operations, the complete defeat of the Red Army troops and the destruction of the USSR.
The Barbarossa plan closely matched the Kantokuen plan and envisioned the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of the Red Army to the Western Dvina-Dnepr line in the Baltic States, Belarus, and Ukraine. The Wehrmacht was given eight weeks to defeat the Soviet Union. Then began joint actions with Japan. In early July, a mobilization announcement was planned in Japan, in the middle - by the Wehrmacht of Smolensk, at the end - the beginning of the concentration of the imperial army. In early August, after the defeat of the remnants of the Russian troops east of the Dnieper-Dvina line and the achievements of the Crimea-Moscow-Leningrad line, the German armed forces were to be reduced from 209 divisions to 175 formations, and the bulk of infantry formations returned to Germany.
By fair remark, A.B. Orishev was part of the plan "Barbarossa" was "an attack on the Middle East, and then on the" pearl "of the British Empire - India." After the defeat of the USSR, Germany intended to concentrate a powerful grouping for a concentric attack on Iran. The invasion was planned to be carried out from Libya through Egypt - by 2 td, from Bulgaria via Turkey - 5 pd, 4 td, 2 md, and 3 gsd, from Transcaucasia through Iran - by the group "Caucasus - Iran" comprising 2 td, 1 md, 2 State Duma of the occupation forces in Russia.
Instead of the divisions being reduced by Germany 34, the imperial army of Japan was to be part of the 20 – 30 divisions against the USSR. Japan in early August was just to make a decision on the start of hostilities. In Russia, for the occupation of the whole of its western part to the Urals, inclusive, two armies were to remain as part of the 65 German divisions (34 PD, 9 okhran. Div., 3 gds, 12 td, 6 md, 1 cd), one Italian and Spanish corps, one Finnish, Slovak, Romanian and Hungarian connections. In the middle of August, the Wehrmacht should have captured Moscow, and in the end of August, the forces of the occupying armies would launch an offensive towards the imperial army of Japan, which was serving after the fall of Moscow. It was planned to complete the operation in mid-October 1941.
According to A.A. Koshkin “as a result of the war against the USSR, not only its Far Eastern territories, but the entire eastern part of the Soviet Union, including Lake Baikal, were to be part of the Japanese empire. This was explicitly stated in a Japanese government decree of 7 on December 1940. ... The document "Administrative Management Plan of the Great Eastern Asia" dated December 1941 stated: "The future of the Soviet territories should be determined on the basis of the Japanese-German agreement ... However, the Primorsk region will be annexed to the territory of the empire, and the areas bordering the Manchurian empire should be under her influence. The management of the Siberian railway will be completely subordinated to Japan and Germany. The point of demarcation of control zones is planned to be Omsk. ”
Faced with such deplorable prospects, I.V. Stalin suffered extremely hard failure of the basic version of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky. The catastrophe of the Western Front had a depressing effect on him. In accordance with the pre-war plan, 27 and 23 of the mechanized corps were included in the 26 th division of the 24 army in the Siberian military district. However, with the approach of German tanks to Minsk, the situation became increasingly aggravated and out of control of the Soviet military command. And now the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR accepts "a special decree on the deployment of the aviation industry and the accelerated construction of new aircraft factories, the 16-I reserve army of the High Command in the South-Western direction received an order to load the army units and transfer them to the Smolensk region, and Stalin gives the order to remove Pavlov from the command of the troops of the Western Front and under the guard to send him to Moscow.
However, according to V. Goncharov, Voroshilov, having previously talked with Shaposhnikov, suggested “not arresting Commander Pavlov, but only removing him from the leadership of the front and appointing him as commander of a tank group formed from outgoing units in the Gomel and Rogachev areas. This proposal was probably the most sensible in the current conditions. ” Meanwhile, on June 28, German tanks burst into Minsk and early on in the morning of June 29 "Stalin demanded the immediate arrest of his former pet."
29 June 1941 of the Year “SNK and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) sent a directive to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line areas to mobilize all forces and means to defeat the Nazi invaders. The directive defined the main program of action to organize repulse of fascist Germany, to transform the country into a single military camp under the slogan “Everything for the front! All for the victory ", to mobilize all the forces and means to defeat the enemy." 29 June 1941 changed the tone of not only the internal political, but also the foreign policy statements of the Soviet government. In particular, 29 June V.M. Molotov telegraphed K.A. Umansky about the need to meet with Roosevelt, Hull or Wallace, and raise the question of the possibility of supplying the Soviet Union with help. In addition, in Moscow itself V.M. On the same day, Molotov met with US Ambassador L. Steinhard and discussed ways of bringing American equipment and materials to the USSR.
29 June in the evening at Stalin in the Kremlin gathered Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria. According to A. Mikoyan, “detailed data on the situation in Belarus was not yet received. It was only known that there was no connection with the troops of the Belarusian Front. Stalin called the People’s Commissariat of Defense Tymoshenko. But he couldn’t say anything good about the situation in the West. Alarmed by this course of action, Stalin suggested that we all go to the Defense Commissariat and deal with the situation on the spot. Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin were in the Commissariat. Stalin kept calm, asked where the command of the Belarusian military district, what is the connection. Zhukov reported that the connection was lost and could not restore it all day. Then Stalin asked other questions: why did the Germans break through, what measures were taken to establish a connection, etc. Zhukov said what measures had been taken, said that they had sent people, but no one knows how long it will take to establish a connection.
About half an hour talked, quite calmly. Then Stalin exploded: that for the General Staff, that for the chief of staff, who was so confused, had no connection with the troops, did not represent anyone and did not command anyone. There was complete helplessness in the headquarters. Once there is no connection, the headquarters is powerless to lead. Zhukov, of course, no less than Stalin experienced the state of affairs, and such an cry of Stalin was offensive to him. And this courageous man burst into tears like a woman and ran into another room. Molotov followed him. We were all in a depressed condition.
Minutes through 5-10, Molotov brought out the seemingly calm Zhukov, but his eyes were still wet. It was agreed that Kulik would go to contact the Belarusian Military District (this was Stalin’s suggestion), then other people would be sent. This task was given then Voroshilov. He was accompanied by an energetic, brave, and efficient commander Gai Tumanyan. I made a suggestion for an attendant. The main thing then was to restore the connection. Cases at Konev, who commanded the army in Ukraine, continued to develop successfully in the area of Przemysl. But the troops of the Belarusian Front were then without centralized command. Stalin was very depressed. When they came out of the People's Commissariat, he said the following phrase: Lenin left us a great legacy, we — his heirs — all this ... We were amazed at this statement from Stalin. It turns out that we have lost everything permanently? They considered that he said this in the heat of passion. ”
After the incident I.V. Stalin went to his neighbor cottage. To the leadership of the country and its armed forces, according to the recollections of the same A.I. Mikoyan, he returned on the evening of June 30, when members of the Politburo came to him, and in his working Kremlin office - July 1 of the year 1941. About the tense atmosphere in the People's Commissariat of Defense 29 June 1941 of the year G.K. writes in his memoirs. Zhukov. In the register of persons taken by I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office and residence on Kirov Street (Myasnitskaya), 33 for 29 and 30 June records are missing. Obviously, since many of those present at this scene were amazed by Stalin’s words, considering that he expressed his opinion “in the heat of passion”, the essence of the events taking place in the country was understandable to an extremely narrow circle of persons privy to the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky - to Stalin, Molotov, Zhukov and Tymoshenko.
And from the rut of Soviet political and military leaders, the news was not about the fall of Minsk, and not about the French government breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but about the failure of the strategic plan of defeating the Wehrmacht troops in the Soviet Union, liberating Europe from the Nazis and concluding equal treaties of the Soviet Union with Great Britain and the United States of America.
The reasons for the failure of the main version of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky is largely rooted in one very large mistake of the Soviet General Staff multiplied by the mass of smaller ones. In all Soviet plans for strategic deployment of the 1940, a strike by the Wehrmacht on the Soviet troops in the Belostok projection was planned in the form of concentric strikes from its foundation to Minsk (part 1, 3 - 4). During the first strategic game, held at the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941, GK Zhukov, fending off Pavlov’s blow at East Prussia, delivered two short converging blows to his advancing armies (part 1, 8 scheme). After this game and the appointment of G.K. Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff, began building all of the Soviet 1941 strategic plans on the assumption that the Wehrmacht would strike the Soviet troops in the Belostok projection in the form of concentric strikes from its base on Volkovysk and Baranovichi (part 1, 10, 12; part 2, 1 – XNUM)
To prevent the breakthrough of the 3 tank group on Grodno-Volkovysk and Lida-Baranovichi, 8-I headquarters, 17-th micron and 21-sk (allocated from Vitebsk, Polotsk and Lepel) under Lida and 47-sk under Baranovichi were distinguished (derived from Bobruisk - Gomel), 7-I ptabr and 11-th micron near Grodno, 6-I ptabr and 6-th micron between Bialystok and Baranovichi. 44-s sk was displayed under the Minsk from Smolensk, Dorogobuzh and Vyazma. The trouble is that, in reality, the 3-I tank group was advancing from Suwalki ledge all the same to Minsk through Alytus, Vilnius and Molodechno. Successively encountered 3s on their way to Minsk, random 128-I, 5-I, 184-I and 24-I were completely unable to stop the tank avalanche one by one and became its light victims. While the forces specifically designed to fight tanks instead of providing resistance were surrounded, they were defeated and destroyed (3 scheme).
Stay in the Soviet plans thesis about the likelihood of the encirclement of the Soviet troops near Minsk and both 1941 plans of the year would contain a plan for the defense of the Suwalki-Vilnius-Minsk road. And in June, the 1941 of the 3-th tank group would be met not by four random divisions, but by the anti-tank line of defense, filled with parts of the full-fledged 13-th army: 188-I, 126-I, 128-I, 23-I, 85-I 7-I and 8-I pabr, 21-CK (17-I, 37-I, 50-I cd) and 11 MK (29-I, 33-I, 204-md ) under Alytus and Varena, 6-i ptabr, 47-th ck (121-i, 143-i sd) and 17-th micron (27-i, 36-i td, 209 md) in Vilnius, 24-i, 155-I sd in Vileyno and Molodechno near Minsk. The 5-th TD and the 29-th Lithuanian National Rifle Corps (179-I, 184-I SD) released at the same time, PribOVO, would have strengthened the Kaunas direction and prevented the rapid breakthrough of 56-m E. Manstein to Daugavpils. That would allow the armies of the RGK to meet and crush the tank groups 1 and 2 divided by the Pripyat marshes, and the troops from the Lvov and Bialystok bulge first to cut off the supply lines of the 1 and 2 tank groups, and then go to the Baltic coast, surround and destroy the entire German grouping in East Prussia.
The Barbarossa plan was built on the promise of crushing the main forces of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina-Dnepr line. Soviet plan V.D. Sokolovsky opposing "Barbarose" significant forces at the turn of the Western Dvina - Dnepr leveled one misfortune. However, its developers, having wrongly determined the direction of one of the fundamental blows of the enemy and, after failing to parry him, fell into another misfortune. As a result, both the German and Soviet blitzkrieg were thwarted. The Wehrmacht began military actions with a completely clean slate, and the Red Army - with the implementation of a fallback.
The mistake in choosing the direction of the main attack of the 3 tank group was systemic in nature and acted on the plan of a preemptive strike even more destructively. 2 August 1965, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky in his interview on the eve of the war stated that, in his opinion, the task of defeating the enemy on the border with Germany in the summer of 1941 could be feasible only for the main forces of the Red Army, "with the obligatory condition of bringing them to full combat readiness and complete deployment of along our borders before the start of the perfidious attack on us by fascist Germany. " The phrase “with their complete deployment along our borders before the beginning of the perfidious attack on us by fascist Germany” applies exclusively to the plan of N.F. Vatutin (see part 1 for 10 and part 2 for 2).
Disagreeing with A.M. Vasilevsky 6 December 1965 of the year "on the first page of the document G.K. Zhukov wrote the following: “A.M. Vasilevsky is not completely true. I think that the Soviet Union would have been rather defeated if we had deployed our forces on the border to the German troops on the eve of the war, had in mind precisely according to our plans at the beginning of the war to destroy them in the region of the state border. It’s good that this did not happen, and if our forces were defeated in the areas of the state border, then the Nazi troops would be able to wage a successful war, and Moscow and Leningrad would be busy in the 1941 year. ”
In the correspondence dispute between the two military leaders who took direct part in the elaboration of Soviet strategic plans on the eve of World War II, one should probably take the side of GK Zhukov.
Summarize. The beginning of the war, Stalin met in cold blood, without losing performance. On the battlefield, the implementation of the first part of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky - a breakthrough into the Soviet Union 1-th and 2-th tank groups. Since the culmination moment had not yet come, V.M. Molotov and not I.V. Stalin, the Headquarters was created, not the High Command. The war promised to be short-lived, victory was achieved with a little blood, and military actions were soon to be transferred to the territory of the enemy. Therefore, the total mobilization of all forces and means - “All for the front! All for victory "at the beginning of hostilities was not.
The State Defense Committee was not created. The divisions of the national militia were not formed, the underground struggle against the enemy in the occupied territory of the USSR and the guerrilla groups were not organized. Armies from the internal military districts did not rush to help armies that could not withstand the onslaught of the enemy on the border, and not to fill the line of fortified areas on the old state border, but to create a defense line in the deep rear of the warring armies at the turn of the Western Dvina – Dnepr. The Soviet Union, to the utter surprise of W. Churchill, did not ask for help from England and the USA.
Stalin had to appeal to the peoples of the USSR at the beginning of the implementation of the second part of the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky - the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the enemy. To coordinate the actions of the Soviet armies liberating Europe from the fascist plague, the Supreme Command Headquarters was to be created.
Meanwhile, after the catastrophe of the Western Front, the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky in his version of the transfer of war to the territory of the enemy was failed. I.V. Stalin extremely difficult to endure this event. Brought G.K. Zhukov to tears, behaved as if we had lost everything irretrievably, for the whole day left the country without his leadership. Thus, an unknown and short-lived war of little blood in a foreign territory instantly turned into a well-known World War II with a total mobilization of all forces and means.
The reason for the failure of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky in its first version, which put the country on the brink of disaster, became a systemic mistake of the Soviet General Staff under the leadership of G.K. Zhukov in determining the direction of the strike 3 of the German tank group. The Red Army eventually managed to overcome this crisis. While the consequences of an error in determining the direction of the strike of the 3 of the German tank group in the case of the implementation of the plan of preventive war N.F. Vatutin would be truly catastrophic for the fate of both the Red Army and the entire Soviet Union.
1 schema. Grouping of troops of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army by the 22 of June 1941 of the year. Strategic deployment of the Red Army in the West. Compiled from: Drig E. Mechanized Corps of the Red Army in battle: History of the Red Army armored forces in the 1940 – 1941 years. - M., 2005; Egorov D.N. June 1941. The defeat of the Western Front. - M, 2008; Irinarkhov R.S. Special Western ... - Minsk, 2002; Irinarkhov R.S. Baltic special ... - Minsk, 2004; Irinarkhov R.S. Kiev special ... - M .; Minsk, 2006; Irinarkhov R.S. At the Dnieper steep ... - M .; Minsk, 2006; Irinarkhov R.S. RKVMF before a formidable test. - Minsk, 2008; Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M., 2004; Kalashnikov K.A., Feskov V.I., Chmykhalo A.Yu., Golikov V.I. Red Army in June 1941 of the year (statistical compilation). - Novosibirsk, 2003; Kolomiets M., Makarov M. Prelude to “Barbarossa” // Front-line illustration. - 2001. - No. 4; Semetko V.A. Sources of future defeats Western Special Military District by 22 June 1941 g. // www.militera.lib.ru; Semetko V.A. The origins of the defeat in Belarus. (Western Special Military District by 22 June 1941) // Military History Journal. - 1989. - No. 4; Statyuk I. Defense of the Baltic states. 1941: Strategic Defensive Operation in the Baltic States (22 June – 9 July 1941). - M., 2005; Statyuk I. Defense of Belarus. 1941: Strategic defensive operation in Belarus (22 June – 9 July 1941). - M., 2005; Statyuk I. Defense of Western Ukraine. 1941: Strategic defensive operation in Western Ukraine (22 June – 6 July 1941). - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Defense of the Arctic. 1941: Strategic defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia (29 June – 11 October 1941). - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Defense of Leningrad. 1941: Leningrad strategic defensive operation of 10 of July – 30 of September of 1941 - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Defense of Kiev. 1941: Kiev strategic defensive operation 7 July – 26 September 1941 g. - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Smolensk battle. 1941: 10 of July –10 of September 1941 - M., 2006.
2 schema. Fighting in the West from June 22 to July 9 1941
3 schema. Expected by the Soviet command and the real direction of attack 3-y tank group. Compiled by the scheme 1.