Military Review

Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the USSR

31
“Stalin was very depressed. When they left the People’s Commissariat, he said this phrase: “Lenin left us a great legacy, and we, his heirs, shook it all ...” We were struck by this statement by Stalin. It turns out that everything is irretrievably lost? ”
Mikoyan A.I. It was



Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the USSR


A few hours before the outbreak of hostilities by Directive No. 1, all units on the western border of the USSR were put on alert. Among other things, the directive stated that during 22 – 23 June, after provocative actions, the Germans were expected to attack the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO and were instructed “not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications”. Apparently, the Soviet leaders believed that the war would begin with the provocations of 22 – 23 in June and full-scale military operations in late June 1941, after the completion of the deployment of the Red Army units and formations in the West. Reality exceeded all their wildest expectations.

Germany began the war treacherously, without declaring war, with all the forces and means at its disposal already at dawn on June 22, 1941. A significant part of the Soviet divisions covering the state border was still just on the way to its defense lines, and therefore the border was abundant in areas practically devoid of troops (Figure 1). Not all Soviet units on the border managed to accept Directive No. 1, and those that accepted it were simply demoralized by the highest order not to succumb to provocations in the conditions of the Wehrmacht conducting full-scale military operations with aviationartillery tanks and motorized infantry.

With the beginning of the war began the systematic implementation of a set of measures to transfer the country to a war footing. 22 June 1941 of the year in the Soviet Union declared mobilization, which began on June 23 in all military districts except Central Asian, Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern, a state of emergency was introduced in several regions of the USSR, and military tribunals were established in areas of military operations. 23 June 1941 was established by the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the USSR, a mobilization plan for ammunition was adopted, and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution defining the tasks of party and Soviet bodies in wartime conditions.

24 June 1941 was decided to create a tank industry in the Volga region and in the Urals, evacuation council and the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformbyuro) were created. The orders of the SNK of the USSR “On measures to combat parachute assault forces and saboteurs of the enemy in the front line” and “On the protection of enterprises and institutions and the creation of fighter battalions” were adopted. During the war years, about 2 thousand fighter battalions (paramilitary volunteer formations) were created; they were led by the Central Headquarters, formed under the NKVD of the USSR. ”

25 June - “to centralize the management of propaganda and counter-propaganda among the enemy’s troops and population”, the Soviet bureau of military-political propaganda is being created, and in order to ensure the strictest order in the front line and organize a merciless fight against enemy sabotage groups, the Institute of Front and Army Chiefs of Guard of the Rear Services was introduced . In addition, on June 25 of June 1941, the USSR Directive confirmed the need to create a group of armies of the RGK at the Western Dvina – Dnieper border. On the same day, according to E. Driga, “the headquarters of the Central Asian military district ... received an order on the readiness of the 27-th mechanized corps by the 4 of July 1941 to begin redeployment to the west”, to subordinate the 28-th headquarters located in Kirov.

22 June 1941 of the year in the radio message British Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared his "determination to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime", readiness to provide "all the help to Russia and the Russian people" that they could and offered the USSR "any technical or economic help that is in our power and which will probably come in handy. ” The British leadership was ready to send a military or economic mission to the USSR at any time. According to Winston Churchill, the Soviet government did not respond to his “radio address to Russia and the whole world on the day of the German attack, except for the fact that excerpts from it were published in Pravda and other Russian government bodies and that we were asked to accept a Russian military mission. The silence in the higher realms was painful. The Soviet government did not object to "that ... two groups of British representatives be sent to Moscow," but made a reservation, "that the Soviet government will not want to accept the aid of England without compensation and it in turn will be ready to render aid to England." Thus, V. Molotov expressed readiness to reduce all relations between the USSR and England on an equal footing.

"In the morning of June 23, acting on the instructions of the president, S. Wallace announced an official statement in which the German attack on the Soviet Union qualified as a perfidy and emphasized that" any struggle against Hitlerism, from whatever source these forces would emanate, would accelerate the inevitable fall current German leaders and thus will contribute to our own defense and security. " The statement did not say a word about rendering support to the Soviet Union. The next day, Roosevelt himself said at a press conference: "Of course, we intend to give Russia all the help we can." However, he did not answer the question of what form this aid would take and whether the lend-lease law would apply to the Soviet Union. On the same day, Washington announced the lifting of the blocking of Soviet financial transactions, and a day later, the decision not to apply the restrictions prescribed by the law on neutrality to the USSR, which gave him the opportunity to buy military materials in the US and transport them on American merchant ships. ” .

24 Jun. Head of the Free France Movement, Sh. De Gaulle, declared his support for the Russian people by the French and his desire to establish military cooperation with Moscow. In turn, shortly after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union and the loss of Syria, "the Vichy government transferred military control of Indochina to Japan, which, thanks to this, received the forward base for an attack on Thailand, Singapore and Dutch India." According to the American historian S.E. Morison "had the impression that the Western and Eastern partners of the Axis powers intended to unite in India."

According to A.A. By 25 June, the Japanese General Staff developed and approved a timetable for the completion and preparation of the war, providing for the start of 28 July 1941 mobilization activities, the decision to start the August 10 war, the beginning of August 29 military action, and their completion mid-October 1941 of the year. ... As follows from this graph, the plan "Kantokuen" to a certain extent was similar to the German plan "Barbarossa" and also assumed a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR. "

On the evening of June 26, 1941, V. Molotov instructed the Ambassador of the USSR to the United States, K.A. Umansky “immediately go to Roosevelt or Hell, and in his absence, to Welles and, after reporting on the treacherous attack of Germany on the USSR, to ask what is the attitude of the American government to this war and to the USSR. The issue of "helping America with the various goods necessary for the Soviet Union" was now "ordered not to be raised." Wallace stated K.A. To Umansky, that “the American government considers the USSR a victim of unprovoked, unjustified aggression” and that the rebuff of this aggression undertaken by the Soviet people “corresponds historical US interests. ” Welles emphasized that the American government "is ready to provide all possible support to this struggle within the limits determined by the production capabilities of the USA and their most urgent needs."

Returning to Moscow 27 on June 1941, the British ambassador Stafford Cripps (he left Moscow 10 on June 1941) introduced Molotov to all who arrived and the entire diplomatic staff of his mission. “In the evening, Molotov again received Cripps and reported that after he reported to the Soviet government and personally I.V. To Stalin about the ambassador’s proposals, the question arose of what the scale and extent of assistance would be for the parties to each other. ” 25 June 1941, Germany demanded that Iran join the war on its side, but Iran refused on the very next day. Since the Iranian question was equally topical both for England and for the USSR V.M. Molotov, among other things, declared the desirability of a common political line with regard to Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. Cripps replied that both governments should really follow a common political line for all these countries.

On June 28, Supply Minister Beaverbrook “stated that the British government was ready to take all possible measures to ease the Germans' pressure on the USSR. In particular, as a “personal proposal”, Beaverbrook suggested that England could not only intensify the bombing of West Germany and Northern France, which is already being done to a large extent, but also send part of its fleet to the region of Murmansk and Petsamo for naval operations against the Germans. Beaverbrook also spoke about the possibility of major raids on the northern French coast, that is, the temporary capture of ports such as Cherbourg, Le Havre and the like. If the Soviet government would raise the question of closer military cooperation before the British government, the British government would readily discuss what could be done. ”

Like this. All routinely, routinely. It would seem that nothing portends neither a crisis nor a catastrophe. Moreover, it seems that the “moment of truth”, the apogee of tension and the culmination of events have not yet come, they are still ahead. Joseph Stalin, without losing composure and self-control, works in his Kremlin office. But meanwhile, he is not speaking to the citizens of the USSR, but V.M. Molotov, the Headquarters, not the High Command, is being created; the State Defense Committee is not being created; the total mobilization of forces and means is “All for the front! All for victory "is not, divisions of the national militia are not formed, the underground struggle against the enemy in the occupied territory of the USSR and guerrilla groups are not organized, the army from the internal military districts are in no hurry to help the armies that cannot withstand the onslaught of the enemy on the border, and not to fill the line of fortified areas on the old state border, and on the creation of a defense line in the deep rear of the warring armies at the Zapadnaya Dvina – Dnepr line.

Among other things, despite the proposal of W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt to support the Soviet Union I.V. Not only did Stalin not hurry to ask for help in the fight against the common enemy — Hitler’s Germany, but also linked the acceptance of aid by the Soviet Union from England to the acceptance of aid from England by the Soviet Union, i.e. tried to build equal relations with England and the United States.

Apparently, I.V. Stalin had to appeal to the citizens of the USSR and the leaders of Britain and the United States only at the climax — after the defeat of the Red Army of the Lublin enemy grouping by the troops before the decisive throw of the united and strengthened armies formed after the start of the war of the Western and South-Western fronts, as well as the defeat of the cut off from the supply lines of the German shock groups in the rear of the Soviet troops by the Army Group RGC. The headquarters of the High Command should probably have been established to coordinate the actions of the Red Army troops liberating Europe from German occupation. The RGK Army Group was assembled in the deep rear of the belligerent armies to defeat an enemy that had broken through to the USSR territory, and since its occupation was to be short-lived, there was no need to deploy a long guerrilla warfare. Assisting England brought the Soviet Union to the same rank with both England and the United States. Meanwhile, everything abruptly and irrevocably changed with the breakthrough of the German troops to Minsk, the encirclement and the defeat of the troops of the Western Front.

With the outbreak of hostilities in the Baltics, parts of the 41 of the German motorized army corps of the 4 tank group met under Shaulay resistance of the 125 rifle division and 9 of the anti-tank brigade, and also forced to restrain the counterattack of the 3 and 12 th units of the Soviet mechanized Corps moved to Riga slowly and uncertainly. At the same time, parts of the 56 of the German motorized army corps of the 4 tank group easily overcame a weak barrier at the border that was still being advanced to the border of the 48 Soviet rifle division. Having walked around Kaunas from the 8 th anti-tank brigade and the 3 th mechanized corps part of the 56 th German motorized army corps, they crossed the Dubissa River near the city of Aregala and launched a rapid rush to Daugavpils on the territory free from Soviet units.

South of 3, the German tank group, like the 56 of the German motorized army corps, easily overcame the weak barrier of the 128 rifle division and rifle battalions of the 23, 126 and 188 Soviet rifle divisions that had been scattered under Alytus, the 5 tank division rushed freely to Vilnius and then on to Minsk. The Baltic national rifle corps showed their extremely low combat capability and the command of the North-Western Front was afraid to use them to deliver a counterattack against the enemy. For this reason, the North-Western Front essentially lost its front-line reserve and was unable to stop the breakthrough of the 56 motorized army corps of the 4 tank group to Daugavpils in the direction of Pskov and further to Leningrad, as well as the entire 3 tank group to Vilnius and further to Minsk. In turn, the counter attack led by I.V. The Boldin cavalry-mechanized group of the Western Front on Grodno was directed against the German army’s 3 tank group covering 9 and, therefore, could not even prevent the 3 tank group from advancing to Vilnius and Minsk. A breakthrough to Minsk from the south of the 2 tank group led to encirclement, and then to the defeat of the troops of the Western Front.

On the South-Western Front, the enemy also achieved success, although perhaps not so significant. This was due to the later concentration and deployment of parts of the 1 of the German tank group, complete cover of the border with parts of the South-Western Front, its superiority in tanks and aircraft over the German Army Group South. In addition, contrary to the plan of covering the border, the 1 anti-tank brigade did not give way to the 3 motorized army corps of the 1 tank group to Kiev, as was the case with the 41 Soviet tank division, and significantly slowed down the promotion of German units. to Kiev. Unfortunately, the command of the South-Western Front could not fully realize its advantage, and the poorly planned and organized uncoordinated counter-attack of the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front in the region of Lutsk – Dubno – Rovno could not stop the advance of the enemy deep into Soviet Ukraine.

On the Northern Front 25 and 26 June 1941, Soviet aircraft bombed Finland. Without causing significant damage to the infrastructure and German forces deployed in Finland, Soviet air strikes gave the Finnish government an excuse to invade the USSR. Which it, despite the entreaties of England, which had very good relations with Finland, immediately took advantage, greatly aggravating the position of the Soviet troops in the Baltic and near Leningrad. At the insistence of the Soviet government, England in December 1941 was forced to declare war on Finland. To this day, the question remains: what was the 25 airstrike of June 1941 of the year - stupidity or aggression?

Meanwhile, after learning from the bitter experience of the unsuccessful initial actions of the Red Army in the winter of 1939, against the Finnish forces, the Soviet leadership did not dare to fight more with Finland without a threefold superiority in forces. This is clearly shown by the C-Z.20 plan, which envisaged the defeat of Finland by forces of more than sixty divisions and then subject to German neutrality favorable to the USSR (part 1, scheme 5). It is hard to imagine that the Soviet Union could decide on aggression against Finland by the forces of the 21 division (i.e., when the ratio of forces with the enemy 1 to 1), especially in conditions of German aggression, without having an elementary plan of military operations.

The catastrophe of the Western Front crossed out the basic version of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky and, baring the direction of Smolensk and Moscow, turned into a crisis for the entire Red Army and the entire Soviet Union (see Military and political crisis of the Soviet Union 1941). The extremely unfavorable situation was overcome by implementing a backup version of the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky in case of a breakthrough by the Germans of the Western Dvina – Dnepr line. The Western Front was restored by the RGK armies (2 scheme), and the Ostashkov – Pochep defensive line (part of 24, 28 scheme) was formed by the 2 and 2 armies of the RGK and the newly formed units. The fierce battle of Smolensk, the defense of Leningrad and Kiev finally buried the original plan for Germany and Japan to conduct joint military operations, the complete defeat of the Red Army troops and the destruction of the USSR.

The Barbarossa plan closely matched the Kantokuen plan and envisioned the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of the Red Army to the Western Dvina-Dnepr line in the Baltic States, Belarus, and Ukraine. The Wehrmacht was given eight weeks to defeat the Soviet Union. Then began joint actions with Japan. In early July, a mobilization announcement was planned in Japan, in the middle - by the Wehrmacht of Smolensk, at the end - the beginning of the concentration of the imperial army. In early August, after the defeat of the remnants of the Russian troops east of the Dnieper-Dvina line and the achievements of the Crimea-Moscow-Leningrad line, the German armed forces were to be reduced from 209 divisions to 175 formations, and the bulk of infantry formations returned to Germany.

By fair remark, A.B. Orishev was part of the plan "Barbarossa" was "an attack on the Middle East, and then on the" pearl "of the British Empire - India." After the defeat of the USSR, Germany intended to concentrate a powerful grouping for a concentric attack on Iran. The invasion was planned to be carried out from Libya through Egypt - by 2 td, from Bulgaria via Turkey - 5 pd, 4 td, 2 md, and 3 gsd, from Transcaucasia through Iran - by the group "Caucasus - Iran" comprising 2 td, 1 md, 2 State Duma of the occupation forces in Russia.

Instead of the divisions being reduced by Germany 34, the imperial army of Japan was to be part of the 20 – 30 divisions against the USSR. Japan in early August was just to make a decision on the start of hostilities. In Russia, for the occupation of the whole of its western part to the Urals, inclusive, two armies were to remain as part of the 65 German divisions (34 PD, 9 okhran. Div., 3 gds, 12 td, 6 md, 1 cd), one Italian and Spanish corps, one Finnish, Slovak, Romanian and Hungarian connections. In the middle of August, the Wehrmacht should have captured Moscow, and in the end of August, the forces of the occupying armies would launch an offensive towards the imperial army of Japan, which was serving after the fall of Moscow. It was planned to complete the operation in mid-October 1941.

According to A.A. Koshkin “as a result of the war against the USSR, not only its Far Eastern territories, but the entire eastern part of the Soviet Union, including Lake Baikal, were to be part of the Japanese empire. This was explicitly stated in a Japanese government decree of 7 on December 1940. ... The document "Administrative Management Plan of the Great Eastern Asia" dated December 1941 stated: "The future of the Soviet territories should be determined on the basis of the Japanese-German agreement ... However, the Primorsk region will be annexed to the territory of the empire, and the areas bordering the Manchurian empire should be under her influence. The management of the Siberian railway will be completely subordinated to Japan and Germany. The point of demarcation of control zones is planned to be Omsk. ”

Faced with such deplorable prospects, I.V. Stalin suffered extremely hard failure of the basic version of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky. The catastrophe of the Western Front had a depressing effect on him. In accordance with the pre-war plan, 27 and 23 of the mechanized corps were included in the 26 th division of the 24 army in the Siberian military district. However, with the approach of German tanks to Minsk, the situation became increasingly aggravated and out of control of the Soviet military command. And now the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR accepts "a special decree on the deployment of the aviation industry and the accelerated construction of new aircraft factories, the 16-I reserve army of the High Command in the South-Western direction received an order to load the army units and transfer them to the Smolensk region, and Stalin gives the order to remove Pavlov from the command of the troops of the Western Front and under the guard to send him to Moscow.

However, according to V. Goncharov, Voroshilov, having previously talked with Shaposhnikov, suggested “not arresting Commander Pavlov, but only removing him from the leadership of the front and appointing him as commander of a tank group formed from outgoing units in the Gomel and Rogachev areas. This proposal was probably the most sensible in the current conditions. ” Meanwhile, on June 28, German tanks burst into Minsk and early on in the morning of June 29 "Stalin demanded the immediate arrest of his former pet."

29 June 1941 of the Year “SNK and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) sent a directive to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line areas to mobilize all forces and means to defeat the Nazi invaders. The directive defined the main program of action to organize repulse of fascist Germany, to transform the country into a single military camp under the slogan “Everything for the front! All for the victory ", to mobilize all the forces and means to defeat the enemy." 29 June 1941 changed the tone of not only the internal political, but also the foreign policy statements of the Soviet government. In particular, 29 June V.M. Molotov telegraphed K.A. Umansky about the need to meet with Roosevelt, Hull or Wallace, and raise the question of the possibility of supplying the Soviet Union with help. In addition, in Moscow itself V.M. On the same day, Molotov met with US Ambassador L. Steinhard and discussed ways of bringing American equipment and materials to the USSR.

29 June in the evening at Stalin in the Kremlin gathered Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria. According to A. Mikoyan, “detailed data on the situation in Belarus was not yet received. It was only known that there was no connection with the troops of the Belarusian Front. Stalin called the People’s Commissariat of Defense Tymoshenko. But he couldn’t say anything good about the situation in the West. Alarmed by this course of action, Stalin suggested that we all go to the Defense Commissariat and deal with the situation on the spot. Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin were in the Commissariat. Stalin kept calm, asked where the command of the Belarusian military district, what is the connection. Zhukov reported that the connection was lost and could not restore it all day. Then Stalin asked other questions: why did the Germans break through, what measures were taken to establish a connection, etc. Zhukov said what measures had been taken, said that they had sent people, but no one knows how long it will take to establish a connection.

About half an hour talked, quite calmly. Then Stalin exploded: that for the General Staff, that for the chief of staff, who was so confused, had no connection with the troops, did not represent anyone and did not command anyone. There was complete helplessness in the headquarters. Once there is no connection, the headquarters is powerless to lead. Zhukov, of course, no less than Stalin experienced the state of affairs, and such an cry of Stalin was offensive to him. And this courageous man burst into tears like a woman and ran into another room. Molotov followed him. We were all in a depressed condition.

Minutes through 5-10, Molotov brought out the seemingly calm Zhukov, but his eyes were still wet. It was agreed that Kulik would go to contact the Belarusian Military District (this was Stalin’s suggestion), then other people would be sent. This task was given then Voroshilov. He was accompanied by an energetic, brave, and efficient commander Gai Tumanyan. I made a suggestion for an attendant. The main thing then was to restore the connection. Cases at Konev, who commanded the army in Ukraine, continued to develop successfully in the area of ​​Przemysl. But the troops of the Belarusian Front were then without centralized command. Stalin was very depressed. When they came out of the People's Commissariat, he said the following phrase: Lenin left us a great legacy, we — his heirs — all this ... We were amazed at this statement from Stalin. It turns out that we have lost everything permanently? They considered that he said this in the heat of passion. ”

After the incident I.V. Stalin went to his neighbor cottage. To the leadership of the country and its armed forces, according to the recollections of the same A.I. Mikoyan, he returned on the evening of June 30, when members of the Politburo came to him, and in his working Kremlin office - July 1 of the year 1941. About the tense atmosphere in the People's Commissariat of Defense 29 June 1941 of the year G.K. writes in his memoirs. Zhukov. In the register of persons taken by I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office and residence on Kirov Street (Myasnitskaya), 33 for 29 and 30 June records are missing. Obviously, since many of those present at this scene were amazed by Stalin’s words, considering that he expressed his opinion “in the heat of passion”, the essence of the events taking place in the country was understandable to an extremely narrow circle of persons privy to the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky - to Stalin, Molotov, Zhukov and Tymoshenko.

And from the rut of Soviet political and military leaders, the news was not about the fall of Minsk, and not about the French government breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but about the failure of the strategic plan of defeating the Wehrmacht troops in the Soviet Union, liberating Europe from the Nazis and concluding equal treaties of the Soviet Union with Great Britain and the United States of America.

The reasons for the failure of the main version of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky is largely rooted in one very large mistake of the Soviet General Staff multiplied by the mass of smaller ones. In all Soviet plans for strategic deployment of the 1940, a strike by the Wehrmacht on the Soviet troops in the Belostok projection was planned in the form of concentric strikes from its foundation to Minsk (part 1, 3 - 4). During the first strategic game, held at the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941, GK Zhukov, fending off Pavlov’s blow at East Prussia, delivered two short converging blows to his advancing armies (part 1, 8 scheme). After this game and the appointment of G.K. Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff, began building all of the Soviet 1941 strategic plans on the assumption that the Wehrmacht would strike the Soviet troops in the Belostok projection in the form of concentric strikes from its base on Volkovysk and Baranovichi (part 1, 10, 12; part 2, 1 – XNUM)

To prevent the breakthrough of the 3 tank group on Grodno-Volkovysk and Lida-Baranovichi, 8-I headquarters, 17-th micron and 21-sk (allocated from Vitebsk, Polotsk and Lepel) under Lida and 47-sk under Baranovichi were distinguished (derived from Bobruisk - Gomel), 7-I ptabr and 11-th micron near Grodno, 6-I ptabr and 6-th micron between Bialystok and Baranovichi. 44-s sk was displayed under the Minsk from Smolensk, Dorogobuzh and Vyazma. The trouble is that, in reality, the 3-I tank group was advancing from Suwalki ledge all the same to Minsk through Alytus, Vilnius and Molodechno. Successively encountered 3s on their way to Minsk, random 128-I, 5-I, 184-I and 24-I were completely unable to stop the tank avalanche one by one and became its light victims. While the forces specifically designed to fight tanks instead of providing resistance were surrounded, they were defeated and destroyed (3 scheme).

Stay in the Soviet plans thesis about the likelihood of the encirclement of the Soviet troops near Minsk and both 1941 plans of the year would contain a plan for the defense of the Suwalki-Vilnius-Minsk road. And in June, the 1941 of the 3-th tank group would be met not by four random divisions, but by the anti-tank line of defense, filled with parts of the full-fledged 13-th army: 188-I, 126-I, 128-I, 23-I, 85-I 7-I and 8-I pabr, 21-CK (17-I, 37-I, 50-I cd) and 11 MK (29-I, 33-I, 204-md ) under Alytus and Varena, 6-i ptabr, 47-th ck (121-i, 143-i sd) and 17-th micron (27-i, 36-i td, 209 md) in Vilnius, 24-i, 155-I sd in Vileyno and Molodechno near Minsk. The 5-th TD and the 29-th Lithuanian National Rifle Corps (179-I, 184-I SD) released at the same time, PribOVO, would have strengthened the Kaunas direction and prevented the rapid breakthrough of 56-m E. Manstein to Daugavpils. That would allow the armies of the RGK to meet and crush the tank groups 1 and 2 divided by the Pripyat marshes, and the troops from the Lvov and Bialystok bulge first to cut off the supply lines of the 1 and 2 tank groups, and then go to the Baltic coast, surround and destroy the entire German grouping in East Prussia.

The Barbarossa plan was built on the promise of crushing the main forces of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina-Dnepr line. Soviet plan V.D. Sokolovsky opposing "Barbarose" significant forces at the turn of the Western Dvina - Dnepr leveled one misfortune. However, its developers, having wrongly determined the direction of one of the fundamental blows of the enemy and, after failing to parry him, fell into another misfortune. As a result, both the German and Soviet blitzkrieg were thwarted. The Wehrmacht began military actions with a completely clean slate, and the Red Army - with the implementation of a fallback.

The mistake in choosing the direction of the main attack of the 3 tank group was systemic in nature and acted on the plan of a preemptive strike even more destructively. 2 August 1965, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky in his interview on the eve of the war stated that, in his opinion, the task of defeating the enemy on the border with Germany in the summer of 1941 could be feasible only for the main forces of the Red Army, "with the obligatory condition of bringing them to full combat readiness and complete deployment of along our borders before the start of the perfidious attack on us by fascist Germany. " The phrase “with their complete deployment along our borders before the beginning of the perfidious attack on us by fascist Germany” applies exclusively to the plan of N.F. Vatutin (see part 1 for 10 and part 2 for 2).

Disagreeing with A.M. Vasilevsky 6 December 1965 of the year "on the first page of the document G.K. Zhukov wrote the following: “A.M. Vasilevsky is not completely true. I think that the Soviet Union would have been rather defeated if we had deployed our forces on the border to the German troops on the eve of the war, had in mind precisely according to our plans at the beginning of the war to destroy them in the region of the state border. It’s good that this did not happen, and if our forces were defeated in the areas of the state border, then the Nazi troops would be able to wage a successful war, and Moscow and Leningrad would be busy in the 1941 year. ”

In the correspondence dispute between the two military leaders who took direct part in the elaboration of Soviet strategic plans on the eve of World War II, one should probably take the side of GK Zhukov.

Summarize. The beginning of the war, Stalin met in cold blood, without losing performance. On the battlefield, the implementation of the first part of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky - a breakthrough into the Soviet Union 1-th and 2-th tank groups. Since the culmination moment had not yet come, V.M. Molotov and not I.V. Stalin, the Headquarters was created, not the High Command. The war promised to be short-lived, victory was achieved with a little blood, and military actions were soon to be transferred to the territory of the enemy. Therefore, the total mobilization of all forces and means - “All for the front! All for victory "at the beginning of hostilities was not.

The State Defense Committee was not created. The divisions of the national militia were not formed, the underground struggle against the enemy in the occupied territory of the USSR and the guerrilla groups were not organized. Armies from the internal military districts did not rush to help armies that could not withstand the onslaught of the enemy on the border, and not to fill the line of fortified areas on the old state border, but to create a defense line in the deep rear of the warring armies at the turn of the Western Dvina – Dnepr. The Soviet Union, to the utter surprise of W. Churchill, did not ask for help from England and the USA.

Stalin had to appeal to the peoples of the USSR at the beginning of the implementation of the second part of the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky - the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the enemy. To coordinate the actions of the Soviet armies liberating Europe from the fascist plague, the Supreme Command Headquarters was to be created.

Meanwhile, after the catastrophe of the Western Front, the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky in his version of the transfer of war to the territory of the enemy was failed. I.V. Stalin extremely difficult to endure this event. Brought G.K. Zhukov to tears, behaved as if we had lost everything irretrievably, for the whole day left the country without his leadership. Thus, an unknown and short-lived war of little blood in a foreign territory instantly turned into a well-known World War II with a total mobilization of all forces and means.

The reason for the failure of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky in its first version, which put the country on the brink of disaster, became a systemic mistake of the Soviet General Staff under the leadership of G.K. Zhukov in determining the direction of the strike 3 of the German tank group. The Red Army eventually managed to overcome this crisis. While the consequences of an error in determining the direction of the strike of the 3 of the German tank group in the case of the implementation of the plan of preventive war N.F. Vatutin would be truly catastrophic for the fate of both the Red Army and the entire Soviet Union.


1 schema. Grouping of troops of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army by the 22 of June 1941 of the year. Strategic deployment of the Red Army in the West. Compiled from: Drig E. Mechanized Corps of the Red Army in battle: History of the Red Army armored forces in the 1940 – 1941 years. - M., 2005; Egorov D.N. June 1941. The defeat of the Western Front. - M, 2008; Irinarkhov R.S. Special Western ... - Minsk, 2002; Irinarkhov R.S. Baltic special ... - Minsk, 2004; Irinarkhov R.S. Kiev special ... - M .; Minsk, 2006; Irinarkhov R.S. At the Dnieper steep ... - M .; Minsk, 2006; Irinarkhov R.S. RKVMF before a formidable test. - Minsk, 2008; Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M., 2004; Kalashnikov K.A., Feskov V.I., Chmykhalo A.Yu., Golikov V.I. Red Army in June 1941 of the year (statistical compilation). - Novosibirsk, 2003; Kolomiets M., Makarov M. Prelude to “Barbarossa” // Front-line illustration. - 2001. - No. 4; Semetko V.A. Sources of future defeats Western Special Military District by 22 June 1941 g. // www.militera.lib.ru; Semetko V.A. The origins of the defeat in Belarus. (Western Special Military District by 22 June 1941) // Military History Journal. - 1989. - No. 4; Statyuk I. Defense of the Baltic states. 1941: Strategic Defensive Operation in the Baltic States (22 June – 9 July 1941). - M., 2005; Statyuk I. Defense of Belarus. 1941: Strategic defensive operation in Belarus (22 June – 9 July 1941). - M., 2005; Statyuk I. Defense of Western Ukraine. 1941: Strategic defensive operation in Western Ukraine (22 June – 6 July 1941). - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Defense of the Arctic. 1941: Strategic defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia (29 June – 11 October 1941). - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Defense of Leningrad. 1941: Leningrad strategic defensive operation of 10 of July – 30 of September of 1941 - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Defense of Kiev. 1941: Kiev strategic defensive operation 7 July – 26 September 1941 g. - M., 2006; Statyuk I. Smolensk battle. 1941: 10 of July –10 of September 1941 - M., 2006.


2 schema. Fighting in the West from June 22 to July 9 1941


3 schema. Expected by the Soviet command and the real direction of attack 3-y tank group. Compiled by the scheme 1.
Author:
Articles from this series:
Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 1. Counterattack and preemptive strike
Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 2. Wehrmacht defeat plan in the USSR
Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the USSR
Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 4. Collapse of the Barbarossa, Kantokuen Plan and Directive No. 32
Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 5. Battle of Bulgaria
31 comment
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. klimpopov
    klimpopov 14 January 2014 10: 13
    +1
    Thus, V. Molotov expressed his readiness to reduce all relations between the USSR and England on an equal footing.

    However, even in this situation, the leadership of the USSR acted progmatically, thinking ahead. "Free" aid to Britain, we all know where this leads. If so, in the West it is considered that they won.
    On June 24, the head of the Free France Movement, S. de Gaulle, announced his support for the Russian people by the French and his desire to establish military cooperation with Moscow.

    Well, I'll keep silent about these ...
    In the evening of June 26, 1941, V. Molotov gave instructions to the USSR Ambassador to the USA K.A. Umansky “immediately went to Roosevelt or Hull, and in his absence to Welles and, reporting on Germany’s treacherous attack on the USSR, inquire about the attitude of the American government towards this war and towards the USSR. The question of "helping America with various commodities needed by the Soviet Union" is now "ordered not to be posed." Wallace said K.A. Umansky, that "the American government considers the USSR to be a victim of unprovoked, unjustified aggression" and that the repulse of this aggression undertaken by the Soviet people "corresponds to the historical interests of the United States." Welles stressed that the US government "is ready to provide this struggle with all possible support within the limits determined by the US production capabilities and their most pressing needs."

    He is like ... However, this must be printed on posters and banners on banners and hung on the streets. And then after all, now they have turned everything upside down. Again, the question of support mat was not raised. Tobish they clung to victory in the 1943 year. Okay, even though Hitler was not helped during the war. Although they armed him before her. Well, more precisely, with their connivance ...
    About half an hour talked, quite calmly. Then Stalin exploded: that for the General Staff, that for the chief of staff, who was so confused, had no connection with the troops, did not represent anyone and did not command anyone. There was complete helplessness in the headquarters. Once there is no connection, the headquarters is powerless to lead. Zhukov, of course, no less than Stalin experienced the state of affairs, and such an cry of Stalin was offensive to him. And this courageous man burst into tears like a woman and ran into another room. Molotov followed him. We were all in a depressed condition.

    But however, he was right.
    The reason for the failure of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky in its first version, putting the country on the brink of disaster, was a systemic error of the Soviet General Staff under the leadership of G.K. Zhukov in determining the direction of impact of the 3-th German tank group. The Red Army ultimately managed to overcome this crisis.

    But at what cost.
    1. Mikhail Zubkov
      Mikhail Zubkov 11 December 2018 19: 24
      0
      The GRU gave Stalin twice the number of tanks in Germany in September 1939, after the defeat of Poland - not less than 3500 in fact, and more than 7300. In 1940-41. The GRU regularly reported that the Germans had 10 airborne divisions, while they did not have a single (!), There was only a regiment of saboteurs "Brandenburg". Since 1940, in the reports of the GRU, Stalin had been sniffing about 10 Wehrmacht divisions in Bulgaria, while there were up to 10000 Germans in total throughout the war. In 1941, in the reports of the GRU, more than 10 enemy submarines scoured the Black Sea, while there was only one faulty Romanian submarine under repair in their port. There were also reports of 37 transports with an assault force to the Crimea, allegedly leaving the ports of Romania and Bulgaria. In Romania, there were 35 divisions in total, while the military maximum from there was 17,5. Instead of 3 German divisions in Norway and Finland, the GRU drew 7, instead of 3 Hungarian divisions, they scared the 7th, for Slovakia and Italy they also persistently overestimated the figures by two or three times. If you have such a RI, what plans could the future marshals Vatutin and Sokolovsky draw in our General Staff, having a party order for a war "with little blood on foreign territory" ?! One drew a counterattack on the border, and the other - a counterattack little in the depths. The result was the defeat of June 1941 as a result of the "conspiracy of generals and marshals of 1938". That year, by the way, there was also a poor harvest and famine in a number of regions of the USSR. What kind of "preventive war" and who could think in the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941? Only those who wanted the USSR to be defeated on foreign territory, and the most crushing defeat. Zhukov wrote these proposals in his secret notebook in the office of the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Tymoshenko, literally under his dictation. One dictated, the other wrote, and knew for sure that if he didn’t write a dictation, he would be devoured with giblets on the “party affair” of 1938. That's the whole alignment of “professional strategic planning” in the General Staff of the Red Army.
  2. avt
    avt 14 January 2014 10: 30
    +3
    “Meanwhile, after the catastrophe of the Western Front, V.D. Sokolovsky in his version of transferring the war to enemy territory was a failure. I.V. Stalin endured this event extremely hard. Brought G.K. Zhukov to tears, behaved as if we had lost everything irrevocably, left the country without his leadership for a whole day. "---------- Well," seclusion and confusion "came down to one day! laughing Of course, the insidious tyrant "had no right to emotions, both in relation to Zhukov and Pavlov. Or maybe he was not a demigod, but quite a man with all the emotions inherent in man ?? Of course, having such power affects everything in business and But to be honest - who at that moment and under those circumstances would have done better, who could? Maybe the same Mikoyan, whose memoirs are given in the article? It's good to write in a song, but the soldiers of the revolution have clean hands, heart, cold head. "But go, try to live according to such commandments, well, if a believer - according to Christ's 10. Well, and if you imagine {God forbid!} In his place EBN - ,, I'm leaving. Forgive me. "Or that trenchant - Gorbachev ... request It is good to discuss the solution of the problem and laugh at the "stupidity", to be horrified at the "bloodthirstiness" when he himself has already looked at the answer at the end of the problem book.
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 14 January 2014 16: 22
      +6
      One remark: Believe the accomplice of Khrushchev in the denigration of Stalin, the very one who organized the shooting of a demonstration of workers in Novocherkassk, not a gram.
      No one except Mykita and Mikoyan noted that Stalin was depressed and inactive. On the contrary, judging by the number of decisions made these days, he was very energetic.
      Also, no one except Khrushchev and Mikoyan confirms Stalin's words that ... "Lenin left, and we asked ... whether."
      All the time I am occupied with one question - why the current authorities stubbornly hush up the fact of the existence of the directive of June 18 and why Zhukov did not act as commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov.
      Already having a signed directive at 23-00, he did not call the commanders of the districts and did not order to raise troops, specifying that the directive would be received by them a little later. This could save many lives.
      1. Motors1991
        Motors1991 14 January 2014 17: 58
        +2
        I can add that just before the war, Major General K.Senko took command of the 1st anti-tank brigade, so the marshal recalls that when visiting the brigade, the commander of the 5th army Potapov ordered the henka to leave the town a week before the war and withdraw the brigade in the forest on June 22, the Germans bombed the town, naturally without damaging anything. Later, the combat-ready 1st PTaBr was the basis on which the retreating units of the 5th army relied. By the way, the 5th Soviet army, in my opinion the only one that Hitler personally demanded to destroy.
        1. shevron
          shevron 18 January 2014 00: 23
          0
          A very interesting fact. Even having been defeated and captured, General Potapov continued to serve in the SA after the war in the same rank. Well, about the 5th army - a tragic incident. already near Chernigov it was without tanks and a very long defense
      2. avt
        avt 14 January 2014 17: 59
        +4
        Quote: Ulan
        Also, no one except Khrushchev and Mikoyan confirms Stalin's words that ... "Lenin left, and we asked ... whether."

        Well, it’s in vain that there were jokes about him - "from Ilyich to Ilyich without stroke and paralysis" and, Comrade Mikoyan, it's raining outside, take an umbrella. It's okay, I'm between the streams. "
        Quote: Ulan
        All the time I am occupied with one question - why the current authorities stubbornly hush up the fact of the existence of the directive of June 18 and why Zhukov did not act as commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov.
        Already having a signed directive in hand at 23-00, he did not call the commanders of the districts and did not order the troops to be raised, specifying that the directive would be received by them a little later.

        And the level of communication? It’s one thing to call the commander of the district, another thing is to call the Komflot. Estimate the level of fleet concentration in the base and how long it takes to raise units scattered throughout the territory of the district. It’s not for nothing that the Great Berg, who managed to explain to Stalin the need to concentrate all efforts on radar in a kind of interdepartmental ministry, made attempts to make a breakthrough in this area after the war, but he did not find understanding in the Khrushchev thaw among the political leadership and business executives who did not want to share the budget and material funds, when trying to create a similar structure. So it turned out that even in the days of the Vietnam War, the president, in principle, could contact the platoon, but in our case the trouble with communication continues. Even the GLONAS is notorious, because the old people, Chertok, in particular, and his comrades, suggested hunchbacking a GPS analogue when he talked about the unprofitability of space and the Americans still had no thoughts.
        1. Ulan
          Ulan 14 January 2014 18: 18
          +1
          I absolutely agree about the level of communication. Thanks to Comrade Tukhachevsky, Deputy Commissar of Defense, for armaments.
          However, the HF that connected the district headquarters with the General Staff acted in good order.
          Pavlov during the investigation said that at 24-00 Tymoshenko contacted him on the HF and asked how the situation was at the border, and ordered everyone to be in the field. But didn’t he say a word about the existing directive? Or did Pavlov mislead him ?.
          So the question remains. Of course, it was impossible to avoid what happened, but it was possible to smooth out a little, because there would be almost 4 hours in reserve. We could have saved aviation from the pogrom.
          I am silent about Gorbachev, in my deep conviction, this character (I can not call him a man, he brought so many troubles), quite deserves not the highest award of the country "for outstanding services to the state," which Medvedev presented to him, but a court sentencing to the highest measure of social protection.
        2. Aleksys2
          Aleksys2 14 January 2014 18: 34
          +1
          Quote: avt
          Even the GLONAS is notorious, because the old people, Chertok, in particular, and his comrades, suggested hunchbacking a GPS analogue when he talked about the unprofitability of space and the Americans still had no thoughts.

          In 1973, the DNSS program was initiated, later renamed to Navstar-GPS, and then to GPS. The first test satellite was put into orbit on 14 on July 1974, and the last of all 24 satellites needed to fully cover the earth's surface was put into orbit in 1993, so GPS was put into service. It has become possible to use GPS to accurately direct missiles at stationary, and then at moving objects in the air and on the ground.
          Initially, GPS was a global positioning system, developed as a purely military project. But after the plane of Korean Airlines with 1983 passengers on board was allegedly shot into the airspace of the Soviet Union in 269, allegedly due to a disorientation of the crew in space, US President Ronald Reagan allowed partial use of the navigation system in order to prevent similar tragedies in the future for civilian purposes. In order to avoid the use of the system for military needs, the accuracy was reduced by a special algorithm.
          Officially, the start of work on the creation of GLONASS was laid in December 1976 by a special resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This project was a continuation of the development of the domestic navigation satellite system launched by the Cyclone program.
          The Cyclone project was the first combined navigation and communications satellite complex in the world. The system provided the determination of the planned coordinates of the location and was equipped with an airborne repeater for the radio-telegraph communication of the Navy ships and submarines with the coastal control posts and with each other. Communication between subscribers was carried out both in areas of direct radio visibility and globally, with a time delay (2-3 hours) of information transfer by the satellite. An additional radio signal was emitted at a frequency of 10 GHz, which was used to correct the ship's heading system.
          Deployment of the system began in the year 1971, when it was put into trial operation under the name "Gulf". In 1976, the system was adopted by six Sail spacecraft orbiting in near-polar orbits 1000 km high.
          In 1976, a civilian version of the navigation system was developed for the needs of the merchant marine fleet, called the “Cicada”.
    2. Khrushchev
      Khrushchev 15 January 2014 03: 17
      0
      Quote: avt
      Brought G.K. Zhukov to tears

      nonsense tipchikov ... early on for a portrait of Stalin.
      Quote: avt
      But to be honest - who at that time and under those circumstances would have done better, who could?

      Yes, the same Zhukov. In the spring, Zhukov was offering Durk Dzhugashvili to hit the Reich (Thunder Plan), all the more so the moment was perfect. The most combat-ready armored formations of the Wehrmacht were deployed from Poland to suppress the rebellion of Yugoslavia. But Dzhugashvili too loved his ally to stick a knife in his back. The result if the memory is bent off I can recall.
      1. Ulan
        Ulan 15 January 2014 08: 46
        0
        No need, YOU have already heaped enough nonsense.
  3. Vadim2013
    Vadim2013 14 January 2014 13: 07
    +2
    Informative article, read with interest. By 1941, the top commanding staff of the Red Army did not have the experience and knowledge to repulse the massive full-scale military operations of the German troops in the attack on the USSR.
    1. invisibility
      invisibility 14 January 2014 19: 36
      -2
      The article mixed facts and nonsense. It is necessary to begin, in my opinion, with the fact that the enemy was hellishly strong, that all the power of Europe fell upon a sleeping country. And the experience was, and the Germans in separate areas were discarded, and the heroism of soldiers and commanders. There was not any disaster of 1941 of the year, there were heavy battles, terrifying losses, but the front stood up! And near Moscow, the catastrophe began, ending in May 1945. For Germany.
      1. Khrushchev
        Khrushchev 15 January 2014 03: 27
        +3
        Yeah, there was nothing, neither 22 yuins nor almost 3 million prisoners during the first 3 months nor the surrender of vast territories within 3 months, which were then conquered for 3 (THREE) years.
        1. invisibility
          invisibility 15 January 2014 05: 01
          -1
          These are your thoughts, I didn’t say that. I said: that the enemy was hellishly strong, that all the power of Europe fell upon a sleeping country.
          1. shevron
            shevron 18 January 2014 00: 34
            +1
            Quote: invisible
            was hellishly strong

            This is enough for you. The Red Army had something to answer and combat experience was abundant but no one expected such a turn of events
  4. dmb
    dmb 14 January 2014 14: 16
    +6
    The article is interesting one point. On June 24, a decision was made and issued on the creation of a tank industry in the Urals and in the Volga region and mass evacuation. This completely crosses out all other arguments about the intention to defeat the Germans in border battles. Apparently despite the inexperience of our strategists in conducting the war at the initial stage, the same General Staff and intelligence did not work so badly. Assessment of the strength of the Germans after the attack was given on time and correctly. It’s scary to imagine what would happen if we only listened to goats like Mehlis. It was he who was one of the initiators of the formation of front reserves near the border, as a result of which the Germans successfully got them.
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 14 January 2014 16: 27
      +3
      I recently read that during the second five-year period, overestimated figures were deliberately laid down when creating a new industrial region in the Urals and Siberia. As a result, the foundation was laid for ready foundations for enterprises with communications.
      This was one of the reasons that it was possible to quickly mount the equipment of the evacuated factories, at the ready sites and start to produce products. The walls were already completed when the plants gave the products.
      That is, enterprises were not evacuated chaotically but to areas already known in advance.
    2. shevron
      shevron 18 January 2014 00: 37
      0
      But was Mehlis responsible for the actions of the General Staff? Signed papers then Zhukov
  5. krpmlws
    krpmlws 14 January 2014 16: 08
    +1
    The main strategic miscalculation of the Red Army command was that the start of hostilities with the Wehrmacht was supposed to be according to the scenario of World War I, that is, when the enemy throws only personnel divisions into battle, and the main forces after about a couple of weeks, after general mobilization. Thus, the Red Army troops covering the border were extremely weak to carry out their combat mission. Wehrmacht easily broke through their defenses, and then smashed hastily thrown reserves, destroying the Red Army troops in parts. Incorrect assessment of the direction of the main attack from Suvalkins whose protrusion, on which the author of the article focuses, is only a private moment, although, of course, it is important.
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 14 January 2014 17: 17
      +1
      Zhukov admitted that it was a miscalculation of the General Staff and NPOs. He also admitted that at that beginning of the war they convinced the country's leadership. As a result, the Red Army did not have these two weeks to deploy and concentrate.
      1. Vadim2013
        Vadim2013 14 January 2014 18: 53
        +1
        G.K.Zhukov also admitted that the location of military depots near the border was a big mistake of the General Staff.
        1. shevron
          shevron 18 January 2014 00: 42
          0
          And why does it refer to the General Staff and not to itself as the chief of the General Staff?
      2. The comment was deleted.
    2. EvilLion
      EvilLion 14 January 2014 17: 23
      +1
      When it reaches you already, wars almost always begin with some kind of pretension, the saturation of armies for a border battle takes place precisely during this period, and it may not end in a war. Germany did not make any claims to the USSR, therefore, TASS reported that the USSR had no complaints to Germany, which means that in which case, the USSR is not an aggressor. That is, the Soviet government did not have any motives for organizing mobilization. The smearing of German divisions at the border without fur. parts are not very dangerous, they can’t get far, fur. units appeared before the war itself. That's the whole secret of German success in the first months, well, if Pavlov’s obvious betrayal is discarded. At the same time, Hitler completely lost diplomatically.
      1. invisibility
        invisibility 14 January 2014 19: 49
        -1
        Great koment! I want to add that even if suddenly Pavlov was not a traitor, then with such a defeat of the troops entrusted to him, he himself had to ... either shoot himself or die, capturing as many enemies as possible. Do not know how to command, die with at least honor.
        1. Ulan
          Ulan 15 January 2014 08: 54
          0
          Those. to act as General Kopets, the aviation commander of the okrug, took over when he learned about the pogora that the Germans of the okrug aviation arranged.
      2. krpmlws
        krpmlws 14 January 2014 20: 59
        +3
        Quote: EvilLion
        When it reaches you already, wars almost always begin with some kind of pretension, the saturation of armies for a border battle takes place precisely during this period, and it may not end in a war. Germany did not make any claims to the USSR, therefore, TASS reported that the USSR had no complaints to Germany, which means that in which case, the USSR is not an aggressor. That is, the Soviet government did not have any motives for organizing mobilization. The smearing of German divisions at the border without fur. parts are not very dangerous, they can’t get far, fur. units appeared before the war itself. That's the whole secret of German success in the first months, well, if Pavlov’s obvious betrayal is discarded. At the same time, Hitler completely lost diplomatically.

        Even before the Second World War, military theorists claimed that the future war would begin without a declaration of war. The fact that the Germans would start aggression without declaring war, without provocation, was clear to the top leadership of the Red Army. This is firstly. Secondly, the motives for the partial mobilization of the USSR there were also sufficient ones: the concentration of a significant number of fully mobilized divisions of the Wehrmacht near the borders. This was reported by Zhukov to Stalin. It was necessary to completely bring up the infantry divisions of the western districts to their full strength. Thus, you have too much at least somehow. As for Pavlov, of course, he was not a traitor, but there was sloppiness, cowardice (before Stalin). I don’t think that anyone else could have changed the course of events then.
        1. invisibility
          invisibility 14 January 2014 21: 14
          -1
          Imagine for a second that Hitler managed to expose the USSR as an aggressor? It is only in stupid articles that the USA and England supported us exclusively disinterestedly, for the sake of love for the Soviet, Russian people.
          1. krpmlws
            krpmlws 15 January 2014 08: 09
            0
            Quote: invisible
            Imagine for a second that Hitler managed to expose the USSR as an aggressor? It is only in stupid articles that the USA and England supported us exclusively disinterestedly, for the sake of love for the Soviet, Russian people.

            The aggressor of the USSR would only become if it were the first to start hostilities. Forced mobilization in the USSR, in response to the concentration of fully mobilized German troops, is quite an adequate measure, justified and necessary, and therefore can not be regarded as an act of aggression. As far as I can imagine, mobilization in The USSR would then comply with generally accepted norms of international relations.
            1. Ulan
              Ulan 15 January 2014 09: 59
              0
              This is how you imagine. However, it matters how the governments of the countries of Europe and America of that time represented.
              The fact that there was a strong group of politicians in the USA that was sharply opposed to US participation in the war is not a secret. There was a group of politicians sympathizing with Germany. So Roosevelt had great difficulty convincing Congress.
              The Soviet leadership knew perfectly well that Hitler hoped to conclude a truce with England. And in England there were forces that could do this.
              Data has already been provided here when Molotov requested an assessment of American representatives about the outbreak of war. Think it is just that?
              And what sounded in response? The fact that the USSR was subjected to UNPROVED aggression and that the United States is ready to provide assistance.
              And if the opposite would happen?
              After all, Goebbels tried to blame the beginning of the war on the USSR, which was voiced in the statement of the German government.
              However, Germany’s aggression was so obvious that no one took it seriously. And if there were even the slightest doubt, were there many Soviet allies at that time? Except for Mongolia, no one.
              According to the idea of ​​that time, the beginning of general mobilization was regarded as aggression.
              This is exactly what happened in 1914, when the Tsar announced universal mobilization, and Germany presented an ultimatum demanding to stop it. After the ultimatum was rejected, Germany accused Russia of aggression and declared war. But then the situation of Russia was somewhat different - Russia already there were allies in the Entente, but in the 41st there were no allies, and no one could predict how things would turn out.
              So that we can assume and fantasize anything, but we must proceed from the conditions and conditions of that time.
              And then who could prove that the mobilization was forced?
              Do not forget what a massive disinformation propaganda campaign Germany carried out. Until mid-June, the German attack was not at all obvious. The second half of the troops by Germany was transferred to the borders of the USSR almost instantly, and mechanized formations without which it is impossible to start a war appeared on the USSR border literally in the last days about which they already wrote about it.
              So the Soviet leadership had to carry out covert mobilization and conduct all activities very carefully and stretched out over time.
              I think Stalin and his team were no more stupid than us.
              The only thing is that they could not know all that we know today. It is easy to give advice, I know how events developed, but Stalin did not have a time machine and he could not look into the future.
              And lastly, the mobilization of Poland was in line with international norms of TOGO since the political aggravation, claims, denunciation of the non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland, mobilization in Germany began.
              There was nothing similar between the USSR and Germany in June 41st, so the USSR had no reason to declare mobilization according to international standards.
              Germany did not threaten the USSR, did not put forward claims, did not threaten the allies of the USSR (Mongolia) either.
              1. krpmlws
                krpmlws 15 January 2014 20: 23
                +1
                Ulanu Understand one thing: the German army was completely mobilized and concentrated near the border with the USSR - this is already sufficient reason for a response, albeit not general, but partial mobilization so that the rifle divisions of the western districts were manned according to the wartime staff. mobilization in the USSR was carried out (apparently there were reasons for that) but it was of insufficient scale. An order was given by the General Staff to bring the troops of the 1st echelon to full combat readiness (only strange, it was not carried out everywhere). As a private step, it was possible to put forward an ultimatum to Germany demanding to withdraw troops from the western border of the USSR, in the event of a natural refusal, we would have every right to openly carry out a partial mobilization. It was also possible to discuss the situation with the West and thus explain to them the need for mobilization in the USSR. And it is not necessary to argue that mobilization itself is an act of aggression if it is carried out in response to mobilization against On the other hand, it is a justified and inevitable step. And vice versa, if such mobilization is not carried out, then this can be regarded as criminal negligence. Many say that: "but how the West would look ..." - but he would not look anywhere became, because after the capture of France by Germany, England became a mortal enemy of Nazism and the choice of side in the event of a war between Germany and the USSR was unequivocally in favor of the USSR. You see, the USSR remained in the field of diplomatic dialogue, Germany left it, using diplomacy only as a screen for its direct , aggressive expansion.
              2. shevron
                shevron 18 January 2014 00: 55
                0
                Quote: Ulan
                So the USSR had no reason to declare mobilization according to international standards.

                I looked at the growth of the Red Army in 1938, and at the beginning of 1941, interesting numbers.
              3. The comment was deleted.
            2. shevron
              shevron 18 January 2014 00: 48
              0
              Quote: krpmlws
              The aggressor of the USSR would only become if it were the first to start hostilities.

              What do you say about the Finnish company?
        2. Ulan
          Ulan 15 January 2014 08: 59
          0
          Why so? The command of the Odessa district has changed. General Kuznetsov, the commander of PribVo, began to put the troops of the district on alert on June 18-19, about which there are published orders for the district. For some reason, Stalin was not afraid.
          And Zhukov knew and did not forbid Kuznetsov’s orders. The only thing that Zhukov forbade Kuznetsov was to obscure the cities, considering it premature.
          I don’t know what military theorists knew, but the General Staff and NGOs thought differently and the Second World and French campaigns did not start at all suddenly.
          1. krpmlws
            krpmlws 16 January 2014 06: 23
            +1
            Ulan, and how did this change, somehow detained the Germans? By lunchtime on June 22, the troops of the second echelon-5td entered the battle, having discovered the Germans in front of them. Zhukov wrote that bringing the troops into full combat readiness would not solve the issue of detaining the Germans with the troops of the first echelon. And he is right. He wrote that it was necessary to strengthen the 1st echelon, to create a defense in depth. The field charter of the Red Army 39g defines the front of the division's defense in the main direction at 6km, but in reality the front was 30km. Even taking into account the presence of ur, the front is too wide. the district’s capabilities, without attracting forces from other districts, it was already possible to double the number of divisions of the first echelon by two times, reducing the front by half to 1 km, which would give a qualitative increase in combat stability by more than twofold. In the second echelon, it was necessary to leave only MK, Airborne, anti-tank brigades, cavalry corps.
      3. Ulan
        Ulan 15 January 2014 08: 53
        0
        To whom "before you"? Molotov wrote that in the Soviet leadership, both political and military, the prevailing point of view was that the war would begin according to the Polish scenario with the aggravation of political relations, the presentation of claims, the breaking of the non-aggression pact (the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact), etc. Those. the Red Army will have time to concentrate and deploy. So for anyone who is interested in history, what you wrote is no secret. It is also no secret that after the rapid defeat of France in the summer of the 4th, the Red Army could under no circumstances outstrip the Wehrmacht in strategic deployment.
        That is why Stalin shouted at Zhukov (according to the memoirs of Zhukov himself) when he presented a draft plan of May 15, 41, providing for a preemptive strike.
  6. Dimon-chik-79
    Dimon-chik-79 14 January 2014 16: 53
    +4
    In Europe, war broke out for several years, even the day of the attack was known, and from various sources ... but still they were not ready for military action. And the main blame for this catastrophe, which almost led to the destruction of the USSR, lies with the country's leadership and the General Staff.
    1. avt
      avt 14 January 2014 18: 14
      +2
      Quote: Dimon-chik-79
      In Europe, war broke out for several years, even the day of the attack was known, moreover, from various sources ...

      What!? The notorious Sorge telegram from Japan about the war in Europe !? But there was nothing else before her, and all with the exact date of the attack. Encryption from Philby? The agent with whom he was terminated after his curator Orlov - Feldin had fled to the USA and who himself initiated new work with Moscow, and to answer test questions - to name at least some agents working in the USSR or even at the time of Civil, answered that there is none. This is when exposing Lockhart and Reilly-Rosenblum. It is easy to speak, knowing the date of the attack and the outcome of the war. But Sudoplatov, in his memoirs, for some reason took the blame on himself, in the minds of intelligence agencies, saying that they did not clearly and reasonably report to the leadership and note - the person who was in favor at that time with the leadership, and not some disgraced agent of the Comintern like Sorge, who is military intelligence entered through Germany, where its communist past was not a secret behind seven seals, so it was exactly according to the legend of a double agent.
      1. Ulan
        Ulan 15 January 2014 10: 04
        0
        The most interesting thing is that this notorious telegram Sorge did not exist. It has long been removed from historical documents as a fake, which was concocted in the time of Khrushchev. The exact date of the attack was unknown. There were various dates that were reported to the country's leadership.
        The merits of Sorge are great, but in another, he accurately predicted that Japan would not attack the USSR, which allowed the transfer of some troops from Siberia and the Far East to the Soviet-German front.
  7. Dimon-chik-79
    Dimon-chik-79 14 January 2014 17: 10
    +2
    Quote: krpmlws
    Thus, the Red Army troops covering the border were extremely weak to carry out their combat mission. The Wehrmacht easily broke through their defenses, and then smashed the hastily thrown reserves, destroying the Red Army troops in parts.

    An incorrect assessment of the direction of the main attack, this is understandable, but besides this, why were the troops of the Red Army extremely weak? why were the parts unable to fully deploy? why was command and control lost? After all, it was clear that the war would not pass, even the date was known. And still, they were not ready. There was a plan, but they could not even begin to implement it. What is the reason?
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 14 January 2014 17: 20
      0
      In fact, all these questions are answered. The same Isaev and Martirosyan. And who told you that the date of the attack was known in advance?
      Just do not refer to the telegram Sorge, today it is already clear that this is a fake concocted by Khrushchev’s accomplices. This telegram is not included in the collection of documents about the work of Sorge.
    2. avt
      avt 14 January 2014 18: 23
      +2
      Quote: Dimon-chik-79
      why were the troops of the Red Army extremely weak? why were the parts unable to fully deploy? why was command and control lost?
      And because the army was at the stage of deployment into a multimillion-dollar one and rearmament was underway, there were not enough trained personnel from ordinary to senior command staff and repression did not play a dominant role here. Up to 30000 officers were returned to the army, both from imprisonment and from under house arrest and reinstated in the party. New equipment arrived, but did not have time to properly train. But the Germans were mobilized, equipped and deployed in wartime states, and Zhukov wrote about this, read it, and reported to Stalin. Moreover, the Germans have real combat experience and courage is not childish from victories. But all the same - as a well-fed France for 40 days did not lie down.
      1. invisibility
        invisibility 14 January 2014 19: 54
        -1
        And banal betrayal!
      2. shevron
        shevron 18 January 2014 01: 16
        +1
        Quote: avt
        . Moreover, the Germans have real combat experience and courage is not childish from victories.

        Hassan Halkin-goal, and before that, Spain and, finally, Finnish - isn't it a combat experience? And far from childhood victories. Japanese Americans washed their blood and if it had not been for the previous victory of the Red Army in the Far East over Japan ..... In general, we need to see who had the combat experience to learn from
        Quote: avt
        But all the same - as a well-fed France for 40 days did not lie down.

        For Belarus, there was less and more disgrace. Well, trophies cannot be compared with the French. The happiness of Russia is its vastness. The Germans here did not calculate
    3. krpmlws
      krpmlws 14 January 2014 21: 24
      +1
      Quote: Dimon-chik-79
      Quote: krpmlws
      Thus, the Red Army troops covering the border were extremely weak to carry out their combat mission. The Wehrmacht easily broke through their defenses, and then smashed the hastily thrown reserves, destroying the Red Army troops in parts.

      An incorrect assessment of the direction of the main attack, this is understandable, but besides this, why were the troops of the Red Army extremely weak? why were the parts unable to fully deploy? why was command and control lost? After all, it was clear that the war would not pass, even the date was known. And still, they were not ready. There was a plan, but they could not even begin to implement it. What is the reason?

      I wrote above that the leadership of the Red Army adhered to the outdated experience of World War I, so the troops of the first echelon were extremely weak and were not able to detain the enemy until the deployment and concentration of the second echelon. Management: communication between the front headquarters and the army headquarters was carried out by telegraph poles. .. Zhukov, assuming the post of chief of staff in February 1, reported to Tymoshenko about a egregious fact, but Tymoshenko said that the situation could be corrected only by August 2. What prevented me from solving this most important problem in a timely manner It was said by someone on the forum that there was no necessary cable. However, if so, the issue of timely resolution of the problem does not solve the problem. Using radio communications was considered unsafe because of the possibility of radio interception. In addition, the rapid defeat of the troops of the first echelon led to that by the afternoon of June 41, the headquarters of the armies of the Western Front were without troops and without, of course, no contact with them. As for the plan, it was and even started to implement it, tried to seize the initiative, but in the end nothing came of it.
  8. EvilLion
    EvilLion 14 January 2014 17: 15
    +2
    On the Northern Front 25 and 26 June 1941, Soviet aircraft bombed Finland. Without causing significant damage to the infrastructure and German forces deployed in Finland, Soviet air strikes gave the Finnish government an excuse to invade the USSR. Which it, despite the entreaties of England, which had very good relations with Finland, immediately took advantage, greatly aggravating the position of the Soviet troops in the Baltic and near Leningrad. At the insistence of the Soviet government, England in December 1941 was forced to declare war on Finland. To this day, the question remains: what was the 25 airstrike of June 1941 of the year - stupidity or aggression?


    The author is finished, Finland has already provided its airfields for the German Air Force, that is, it was already a belligerent and it should have been bombed solely on the basis of military necessity. That is, do not bomb only when there are more important things to do.
    1. invisibility
      invisibility 14 January 2014 19: 52
      -1
      Yeah. England is behind us as a wall ... I agree with the author, something is not right
  9. demotivator
    demotivator 15 January 2014 09: 04
    +2
    Quote: Ulan
    All the time I am occupied with one question - why the current authorities stubbornly hush up the fact of the existence of the directive of June 18 and why Zhukov did not act as commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov.
    Already having a signed directive at 23-00, he did not call the commanders of the districts and did not order to raise troops, specifying that the directive would be received by them a little later. This could save many lives.

    That such a directive dated 18.06.1945/XNUMX/XNUMX. there were, as well as several other orders to bring troops to the highest degrees of the BG, is no longer in doubt. The difficulty is that a number of copies of orders and directives from Moscow to the okrugs, apparently under Khrushchev and later, were simply destroyed in the archives. But all cannot be destroyed - there were orders and directives of districts and armies, there were reports made by the General Staff even before the “exposure of the personality cult”, the logic of events remained.
    As a result of this analysis, the following sequence emerges without any doubt: in mid-May 1941, a directive was received from the NPO and the General Staff in the okrug to prepare plans for repelling German attacks; by mid-June, the okrugs completed work on these plans and approved them in Moscow; On June 14, 1941, the TASS peace-loving statement was published, and under its cover, orders began to come from Moscow to the troops stationed at the border into combat readiness; maximum of June 18, 1941, four days before the outbreak of war, all districts received such commands.
    In terms of their execution, the divisions removed equipment and weapons from conservation, loaded with ammunition, and left the places of constant deployment to the places of concentration - to the defense lines allocated to them. This happened in the border districts - Odessa, Kiev, Baltic, Leningrad. The exception was the Western Military District, commanded by General Pavlov.
    Here, contrary to telegrams from the General Staff, the troops were not only not put on alert, but were not even taken out of the winter apartments to the camps. And Pavlov was obliged to do this without a directive from the General Staff, simply according to his own plan of combat training. He was obliged, but for some reason (!?) Did not. But then Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov did not control the execution of their order in this district.
    1. shevron
      shevron 18 January 2014 01: 30
      0
      Quote: demotivator
      But then Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov did not control the execution of their order in this district.

      Pavlov was shot and these "superiors" were not even reprimanded, although they were no less guilty. After all, they were responsible for the location of the district armies
  10. demotivator
    demotivator 15 January 2014 09: 11
    +2
    But many commanders of armies, commanders of formations, having completed all the measures to bring the troops into a full battlefield, reported "upward" on the work done. And there are such reports in the archives.
    Colonel General P.P. Poluboyarov (during the war - the illustrious commander of the 4th Kantemirov Tank Corps, who was the head of the PribOVO armored forces before the war):
    “On June 16, at 23 o’clock the command of the 12th mechanized corps received a directive on putting the formations on alert ... On June 18, the corps commander raised the formations and units on alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. This was done on June 19 and 20 ... On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd mechanized corps was also put on alert ... which concentrated in the indicated area at the same time. ”
    Army General M.A. Purkaev (former Chief of Staff of the KOVO):
    “On June 13 or 14, I made a proposal to withdraw infantry divisions to the border of the Vladimir-Volyn fortified area, which did not have weapons in the defenses. The military council of the district accepted these considerations and gave appropriate instructions to the commander of the 5th army ... However, the next morning, Colonel General MP P. Kirponos, in the presence of a member of the military council, accused me of wanting to provoke a war. Immediately from the office I called the chief of the General Staff ... G.K. Zhukov ordered the troops to be withdrawn to the border of the UR, observing camouflage measures. ”
    Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th KOVO Army):
    “On June 20, 1941 I received the following encryption of the General Staff:“ All units and units of your unit located on the border itself should be taken back several kilometers, that is, to the line of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from the German units until they violate the state border. All parts of the division must be put on alert. The performance shall be reported at 24 o’clock on June 21, 1941. " Just at the indicated time, I reported by telegraph about the execution of the order. ”
    True, a completely different situation was in the Western Special Military District, commanded by General Pavlov. At the trial, the chief of communications of the district, General Grigoryev, in the presence of generals Pavlov who did not object to him and the chief of staff of the district Klimovsky, made excuses:
    “Leaving Minsk, the commander of the communications regiment reported to me that the chemical forces department did not allow him to take gas masks from the NZ. The district artillery department did not allow him to take cartridges from the NZ, and the regiment had only a guard norm of 15 pieces of ammunition per soldier, and the transfer and clothing department did not allow to take field kitchens from the NZ. Thus, even in the afternoon of June 18, the contention departments of the headquarters were not oriented that the war was near. And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff on June 18, the troops were not put on alert. ”
    And how can this fact - a reference to Zhukov’s direct order to put the troops on combat alert given on June 18, - be "misinterpreted"?
    1. krpmlws
      krpmlws 15 January 2014 20: 47
      +1
      Demotivator, I have doubts that Kirpanos gave the order to bring the troops into combat readiness. I read the memoirs of Baghramyan and there he writes that the 6th Army at his own risk and risk gave the order to bring the army troops into combat readiness. Also, that the divisions of the 5th army entered the battle from the march, getting involved in the oncoming battle, instead of defensive.
  11. Dimon-chik-79
    Dimon-chik-79 15 January 2014 16: 51
    +1
    All of Europe, and not only, was aware that Germany would attack the USSR, but only in our country this was rejected and perceived as misinformation. There were plenty of sources without Sorge and through the deep line, including, from the beginning of June, groups of German saboteurs who provided unambiguous information about the imminent start of hostilities, and there were defectors. But if all this was neglected, then the concentration of 180 divisions on the border of German troops, it is impossible not to notice and not take into account, this is still 5 million people. And how the movement of such a mass of people and technology remained unnoticed is not clear.
  12. Vadim2013
    Vadim2013 15 January 2014 21: 36
    0
    Quote: krpmlws
    As a private step, it was possible to put forward an ultimatum to Germany with a demand to withdraw troops from the western border of the USSR, in the event of a logical refusal, we would have every right to openly conduct partial mobilization.

    The leadership of the USSR avoided any conflict with Germany, realizing that at the moment:
    - the German army is fully mobilized, well-armed and has successful combat experience,
    - and the Red Army was not ready to confront the Wehrmacht. The Finnish war has clearly demonstrated this.
    1. shevron
      shevron 18 January 2014 01: 42
      0
      For twenty years they were preparing and did not prepare wondering what hindered. And that did not stop Hitler in 6 years from creating an army from scratch and conquering Europe. Well, now Russia is not ready either. Wait Americans with the Chinese. Here we re-equip the army, mobilize then and attack but not earlier. wink The fact that such a tragedy occurred for the army and the country is only to blame for its leaders and senior military commanders. They must be condemned for millions of vain victims and not monuments to them
  13. Dimon-chik-79
    Dimon-chik-79 16 January 2014 14: 18
    +2
    Most likely, the leadership of the USSR simply slammed the redeployment of German troops to the border, and when everything was discovered it was too late to transfer the West openly and quickly, because of this they had to do it secretly on the eve (otherwise, it would be possible to get a preemptive strike by the German army as it turned out on the border). That did not allow for the redeployment of troops of the necessary strength for the shortest possible time. Therefore, it was so important to delay the beginning of the German invasion. And there was no longer any time for warehouses and airdromes with planes crowding over them (the same is not clear how and why they ended up at the border itself, which leads to a definite thought).
    It seems to me that all the same, the repressions of the late 30s played their main detrimental role here. The resulting "personnel crisis" did not allow the intelligence to work effectively at first, and then the army to more successfully repel the Nazis' aggression, without gigantic losses in people and equipment, without "boilers" and mass captures (without burned planes and ammunition depots). And the personnel issue had to be resolved on accelerated courses of the war, for the next two years.
    By the way, it is probably no accident that the repressions of 37-38 years in the USSR took place right on the eve of the Second World War.
    1. shevron
      shevron 18 January 2014 01: 53
      0
      Quote: Dimon-chik-79
      and when everything showed up, it was too late to transfer Soviet troops to the west openly and quickly, so they had to do it secretly on the eve (otherwise, it would be possible to get a preemptive strike from the German army as if it were on the border).

      Although the war is obvious and a strike cannot be avoided, but we will be preparing for it HIDDEN so as not to guess wink
      Quote: Dimon-chik-79
      that the repressions of 37-38 years in the USSR took place right on the eve of World War II

      The repressions affected not only the army, but this did not prevent the creation of first-class weapons
  14. bumerang1256
    bumerang1256 18 January 2014 01: 54
    +1
    [quote = Dimon-chik-79] Most likely, the leadership of the USSR simply slammed the redeployment of German troops to the border, and when everything turned out it was too late to deploy the Soviet troops openly and quickly to the west, so they had to do it secretly on the eve (otherwise, it was unknown to receive a preemptive strike by the German army as it appeared on the border).

    The plot is famously twisted ... For example:

    Intelligence report
    Headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District
    from 18 June 1941
    on the grouping of enemy forces against district troops
    June 17, 1941


    OWL. SECRET
    .
    Army commanders, corps commanders, divisions
    and brigades

    On 17.6.41 against the Baltic Special Military District in the strip: on the left - Suwalki, Likk, Allenstein and in depth - Koenigsberg, Allenstein: army headquarters - 2, army corps headquarters - 6, infantry divisions - 12, motorized divisions - 5 , armored divisions - 1, tank regiments - 5 and up to nine separate tank battalions - no less than a tank division, cavalry regiments - 6-7, combat engineer battalions - 17, aircraft - over 500.
    Grouping and deployment of parts (map 100 000) 1:
    in the Memel region - the headquarters of the 291st infantry division, the 401st and 610th infantry regiments, two battalions of the 337th infantry regiment, the training battalion of the 213rd infantry regiment, 33, 61, the 63rd artillery divisions, up to two tank battalions, battalion of heavy machine guns, 48th, 541st combat engineer battalions, 7th regiment of the Marine Corps, diving school;
    to Mellnereggen (7804) 2 - anti-aircraft artillery division;
    in Bachmann (7610) - to the artillery division;
    in Schweppeln (7212) - a tank battalion;
    in Roken (6420) - a battalion of the 660th Infantry Regiment;
    in Šilute - the headquarters of the 5th Infantry Division, the headquarters of the 161st Motorized Division, the headquarters of the 660th, 22nd Infantry Regiments, one infantry regiment, the anti-tank guns division, the 208th construction battalion;
    in Matziken (3432) - the artillery division of the 206th artillery regiment;
    in Laujen (3638) - the 520th combat engineer battalion;
    in Rus (3024) - a battalion of the 14th infantry regiment, a combat engineer company;
    in Villeiken (3030) - a battalion of the 660th Infantry Regiment;
    in Uzhleknen (2632) - a battalion of the 660th Infantry Regiment;
    in Kloken (1834) - a battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment, a combat engineer company;
    in Kaukemen (1634) - the headquarters and battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment, a combat engineer company;
    in Tilsit - the headquarters of the 7th Army Corps, 1st Infantry Division, 290th Infantry Division, 8th Motorized Division, 1st Cavalry Brigade; 43, 45, 216, 213, 94, 501, 502, 503rd infantry regiments; headquarters of the 469th infantry regiment, battalion of the mountain rifle regiment, 202, 204, ... [text “smeared” - VT] ... 7th, 206th and 210th motorized regiments, battalion of the 272th motorized regiment, 1st and 2nd Cavalry regiments, 22nd heavy artillery regiment, 21st light artillery regiment, 290th artillery regiment, 61st artillery regiment, artillery division of the 1st cavalry brigade, 212nd tank battalion, 101st tank battalion , communications battalion of the 7th army corps, 610th separate communications battalion, 52nd pontoon battalion, 552nd and 557th motorized convoy battalions; ....
    And so on, on and on.

    Signed
    Head of Intelligence Department
    [headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District]
    Colonel Safronov
    F. 334, op. 6435cc, d. 8, pp. 9-11.

    And more:
    Compilation
    Hitler’s secrets on Stalin’s table.
    Intelligence and counterintelligence on the preparation of German aggression against the USSR. March-June 1941

    Website "Military literature": militera.lib.ru
    Edition: Secrets of Hitler on Stalin's desk. - M .: Mosgorarkhiv, 1995
    Book on the website: http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/secrets_hitler/index.html
  15. yehat
    yehat 3 February 2014 10: 44
    0
    I don’t understand something.
    the Red Army had approximately equal numbers of troops of the Wehrmacht + Finland + Hungary + Italy
    But it was known in advance that the Wehrmacht was much more combat-ready and mobilized,
    and its parts due to mass equipping with cars and specials. transport is much more mobile.
    This was further aggravated by the difference in preparation and equipment of communications, as well as a number of other factors.
    On what basis was the conclusion made in Sokolovsky’s plan that the Red Army would be able to defeat Germany in a short time? There was no qualitative superiority either in tanks, or in airplanes, or in artillery.
    Further, the events of Finland, Hassan, and Kholkin-Gola showed that in all offensive operations the command of the Red Army made significant tactical and strategic mistakes, and in some places repeated, which reduced the planned effect, and the lack of communication, transportation, and technical support inevitably created a series of delays in the implementation of plans and orders. Why is this not taken into account?