Why aren't cruisers built?
- I want to serve in the Navy!
- Do you even know how to swim?
- And what, you have no ships?
Discussion of the future of Russian fleet occurs according to the same scenario: the absence of shipyards is seen as a key problem. Then follow the lament that all shipyards, primarily for large-capacity shipbuilding, remained abroad - in Ukraine, in the city of Nikolaev. The discussion ends with a debate about the advisability of acquiring the cruiser Ukraina (formerly Admiral Lobov). The completely outdated rusty box of the “imperial cruiser,” which has stood at the construction wall of the 23 Communard factory for 61 years, has become the epicenter of Russian public sympathy.
The collapse of the USSR is a crime without a statute of limitations, but the causes of many contemporary problems are much closer than it may seem. The existing problems of the Navy are in no way connected with the absence of shipyards. Had Nikolaev been on the territory of Russia, nothing would have changed fundamentally: the once “tough” plant, left without orders from the Navy, would now continue to drag out its miserable existence. And the Russian Navy on 10 years would have remained without new ships.
However, first things first.
I am risking anger and bewilderment in the Ukrainian part of the audience, but even in the glorious times of the Soviet Union our navy depended little on the results of the work of shipyards in Ukraine. No doubt, the Slavic brothers completed a number of large projects, but on an absolute scale their significance was small.
Many will be surprised. Indeed, in Nikolaev, all 7 Soviet heavy aircraft carrier cruisers were built: the 4 TAKR of the Kiev type, our first classic aircraft carrier - the Admiral Kuznetsov TAKR, its Varyag sistership (now the Chinese Liaonin) and the Ulyanovsk nuclear TKR (disassembled on the stocks in 1993).
However, one should not forget that at the same time, at the plant of the Baltic plant named after him. S. Ordzhonikidze built nuclear missile cruisers pr 1144 (code "Orlan"). Four 250-meter bulkheads with a total displacement of 26 thousand tons - on board two nuclear reactors, two hundred missiles, a reservation, the most advanced means of detection and communication. In terms of its complexity and technical excellence, the Orlan did not yield to Admiral Kuznetsov in the least.
26 thousand tons - not the limit. The Baltic shipyard in Leningrad built ships of the measuring complex of 1914 pr. (“Marshal Nedelin”) - displacement 24 thousand tons, nuclear reconnaissance ship “Ural” (36 thousand tons), scientific ship to control spacecraft “Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin” displacement 45 thousand tons!
Together with the huge scouts and ships of the measuring complex, a series of linear nuclear-powered icebreakers of the “Arctic” type were built (6 units, the total displacement of each 23 thousand tons).
After such facts, complaints about the lack of capacity in Russia for large-capacity shipbuilding sound at least unfounded.
Domestic shipbuilding was not limited to Leningrad enterprises. On the shore of the White Sea, there was a complex of shipbuilding enterprises, now known as OJSC Northern Center of Shipbuilding and Ship Repair. The cradle of the nuclear submarine fleet of Russia.
It was here, at the facilities of the Sevmash software, that the first domestic K-3 PLA was created. From here went to sea K-162 (project "Anchar"), which set the world speed record in a submerged position (node 44,7).
Severodvinsk is the birthplace of K-278 Komsomolets. The deepest titanium hull submarine in the world, reaching record depths of 1027 meters.
It also built giant "Sharks" - heavy strategic submarine cruisers project 941. According to the figurative expression - "boats that did not fit in the ocean." The height of the floating cosmodrome was equal to the height of a nine-story building. 19 isolated compartments. 20 ballistic missiles with a launch weight of 90 tons. Surface displacement of 23 submarine thous. Tons. Underwater - 48 thousand tons!
Totally at the Sevmash production facilities 128 atomic submarines were built - The main striking force and the basis of the domestic fleet. The shipbuilding plant in Nikolaev with its five TAKRs is simply lost against the background of the achievements of St. Petersburg and Severodvinsk.
Of course, the Nikolaev CVD is known not only for “Kiev” and “Kuznetsov”. Three missile cruisers of the 1164 Ave. (GRKR Moskva, Marshal Ustinov and the flagship of the Pacific Fleet - RKR Varyag), large anti-submarine ships of the Ave 1134B, twenty TFR / BNK 61 project were built on the shores of Chernoy. At the Kerch shipbuilding plant, many of the patrol ships of 1135 Ave. (Burevestnik code) were built. It's a lot. Lots of. But in the shipyards in Severodvinsk, N. Novgorod (Gorky), Leningrad, Kaliningrad and the Far East more was built.
Shipbuilding enterprises of Leningrad built 12 missile cruisers (four of them are nuclear), a dozen and a half BOD and 17 missile-artillery destroyers of 956 ave. (Plus 4 for export).
The Kaliningrad SSZ “Yantar” did not lag behind the city on the Neva - the landing ships “Tapir” and “Ivan Rogov” were massively built, over thirty TFRs of the 1135 Avenue (“Petrel”) and ten large anti-submarine ships of the 1155 avenue were launched. and 1155.1.
The Krasnoye Sormovo plant (Gorky / N. Novgorod) was operating at full capacity - over the past half century, the industrial giant has launched 26 nuclear and almost 150 diesel-electric submarines. Among the masterpieces of Nizhny Novgorod - multi-purpose submarines pr 945 "Barracuda" and 945A "Condor" with a titanium case.
There was a shipbuilding center in the Far East - the Amur Shipbuilding Plant (Komsomolsk-on-Amur) built over 30 nuclear submarines, not counting other orders in the interests of the military and civilian fleet.
After the collapse of the USSR, all these shipyards remained in Russia!
Of all the above facts, an obvious conclusion emerges - the loss of shipyards in Kerch and Nikolaev, which became the property of Ukraine, is not a catastrophic loss or obstacle to the creation of a powerful ocean fleet.
Yes, it was sensitive damage - we lost an important shipbuilding center. But it should be understood that modern Russia is not the Soviet Union. We physically do not have such a large amount of funds for the construction and maintenance of hundreds of warships. Moreover, many priorities have shifted these days - we cannot afford to build hybrids of obscure purpose or boats with hulls made of very expensive titanium. In exchange, modern technology represents much broader opportunities - one modern destroyer in its combat power and situational awareness surpasses the entire squadron of missile cruisers and BOD built in the 70s.
If we build ships using advanced achievements of science and technology, we simply do not need such a number of ships, as was the case in the USSR.
But these are dreams and plans for the future. The reality is much more serious ...
Even if the Nikolaev CVD were in the structure of the USC, then its power would be idle without work. Just look at the Russian shipyards of the United Shipbuilding Corporation - where previously submarines were launched annually on 2-3, they are now slowly collecting one that will be completed to some 20 ... of the 15th year. Where large-scale construction of amphibious and patrol ships was carried out, the only Ivan Gren (BDK ave. 10) has been building for more than 11711 years. And once in a couple of years they are handed over to the customer by the 1 frigate (as a rule, for export) - as you already guessed, this is a Baltic “Yantar”.
The Nikolaev factory is proud of its past achievements in the field of large-capacity shipbuilding. Often there is the opinion that CVD them. 61 Kommunar has a monopoly on the construction of aircraft carriers.
Alas, this is not entirely true. The Admiralty shipyards in St. Petersburg have a slipway that allows launching vessels with a deadweight of up to 100000 tons. In 2008-09 two unique icebreaking tankers of the Ave P-70046 class ("Mikhail Ulyanov" and "Kirill Lavrov") were launched here. 260 length meters. The width of the 34 meter. Deadweight 70000 tons. This is already serious - their dimensions correspond to the dimensions of Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers.
But when it came to the real restructuring of the Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy, it turned out that there was enough power in Severodvinsk for this. Deep modernization with a complete change in the appearance of the ship, the removal of the entire bow and the construction of a springboard in its place, the redesign of the interior, the replacement of the GEM and the entire radio-electronic "stuffing" ... The epic stretched for 10 years, but nonetheless the Indians got their "Vikramadityu." Russian industry has coped with an unusual project.
We can do everything. But do not do anything?
Good question. Why is nothing built on domestic shipyards, except for frigates and coast guard zones?
Sometimes you can hear an explanation of the fact that we lack capacity and that domestic shipyards are already overloaded with orders. This is nothing more than slyness: the stocks and extension walls are overloaded with long-lived ships. If you build a boat for 20 years, and corvettes and frigates - eight years each, then there will not be enough slipways. Why lay the bottom section of the new ships, if the plant can not solve the issue with the projects of previous years? And the culprit here is often not shipbuilders, but numerous contractors and contractors - primarily suppliers of the most sophisticated electronic equipment and weapon systems.
Indicative of story with the lead frigate pr. 22350 "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov." The ship's hull was assembled in a fairly short time by Russian standards - for 4 of the year. But then a deadlock arose - from the 2010 of the year “Gorshkov” quietly rusting near the construction site of the “Severnaya Verf”, not being able to go to sea trials. According to one data, the delay is caused by failures and mutual conflicts of the systems included in the control system of the Polymen-Redut anti-aircraft complex. According to other data, the main problems are delivered by universal artillery. There may be many explanations, but there is one fact - the sailors have been waiting for the “Gorshkov” for the eighth year.
(Photos from the archive sevstud1986, http://forums.airbase.ru).
The situation with the "Gorshkov" gives a completely clear answer to the question about the promising Russian destroyer (cruiser, battleship?). Building a ship of such a ship is not a problem, but there will be nothing to install on it.
Of course, the matter does not stand still, and in some ways our “defense specialists” have succeeded quite well. For example, the universal ship-shooting complex (USCS) existing in reality with a family of Caliber missiles. According to the presented characteristics and the concept of their combat use, "Gauges" promise to surpass the best world analogues.
But what else is there besides the Caliber?
Marine anti-aircraft systems - there is total darkness. The only sample of the new “Poliment-Redut” air defense system aboard the Gorshkov frigate is still “the cat in the bag”. What is this complex, what will it be in practice, are there adequate capacities for its mass production? Answers to these questions are known only to "proxies." And, judging by the prolonged silence, the essence of these answers will not be very impressive.
Among other zonal air defense systems, the most justified is the installation of an air defense system, unified with the legendary C-400 (or even C-500)! But, as you know, the C-400 maritime version does not yet exist, and it is unlikely that it will even appear at all — no work in this direction has been heard. The last time such a set — the previous generation C-300FM naval anti-aircraft system with revolving launchers and phased 4Р48 fire control radar — was exported to the Chinese Navy more than 10 years ago.
No less questions with detection tools. For example, to set up another modification of the good old Frigate M as a survey radar would be an overly primitive decision. But other options have not yet appeared.
Universal artillery ... At first glance, it is all right. Arsenal design bureau developed a new 130 mm A-192 gun. But in fact: no one saw the current model A-192 on a warship.
These are the problems of domestic shipbuilding. The endless complaints about the loss of the Ukrainian GCC and the dreams of buying the decrepit wreck of the cruiser Admiral Lob have nothing to do with the real state of affairs. All problems should be sought much closer - within the walls of the Arsenal design bureau, Salyut NPO and the Almaz-Antey defense concern. It is these companies that are crucial and are the main “brake” in the creation of promising Russian ships. They are responsible for the development of new types of sea-borne air defense missile systems and means of detection, without which talking about a prospective cruiser or destroyer does not make sense.
We can do everything. But we do nothing ...
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