Let's sum up. In recent years, it has been possible to identify a large group of interrelated documents, gradually reflecting the development of operational plans of the Red Army at the turn of the 30-40-s. All these plans are plans for an offensive (invasion of the territory of neighboring states). Since the summer of 1940, all variants of the Big Plan represent a single document, changing only from insignificant detail from month to month.
No one else found any plans. Considering that there were a lot of people who wanted to find a “strategic defense plan” or at least the notorious “counterattack in response to Hitler aggression, and they had all the archives of the country at their disposal, it’s possible in 99,99% to say that there was simply NO other plan .
No one else found any plans. Considering that there were a lot of people who wanted to find a “strategic defense plan” or at least the notorious “counterattack in response to Hitler aggression, and they had all the archives of the country at their disposal, it’s possible in 99,99% to say that there was simply NO other plan .
During the discussion in December 1940 of the year at a meeting of the commanders of the Red Army, the report of the commander of the Moscow Military District I.V. Tyuleneva, Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District, V.D. Sokolovsky suggested the need to revise the attitude to defense, which, in his opinion, like an offensive, was capable of solving not only secondary but also the main task of military actions — defeating the main enemy forces. For this V.D. Sokolovsky offered not to be afraid of short-term surrender to the enemy of part of the territory of the USSR, to miss his strike groups deep into the country, to crush on previously prepared lines, and only then proceed to the task of mastering the enemy’s territory.
I.V. Stalin highly appreciated the idea of V.D. Sokolovsky and in February 1941 of the year he appointed him to a specially created post of second deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. Thus, in February 1941, the first deputy G.K. Zhukov N.F. Vatutin began to develop a plan for delivering a preventive strike in Germany, and the second, his deputy, V.D. Sokolovsky - to develop a plan for defeating the enemy deep in the territory of the USSR. Probably the creation of Churchill of the threat to the interests of Germany in the Balkans was approved by I.V. Stalin needed a preventive strike on Germany, in connection with which 11 March 1941, he approved a plan for a preventive strike on Germany 12 June 1941 (part 1, 10 scheme).
However, Germany’s lightning defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941, as well as the second expulsion of the British from the continent and the extraordinary speed for the Red Army to prepare and implement the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece by Germany, prompted I.V. Stalin abandon the already approved plan for delivering a preemptive strike against Germany and accept V.D. Sokolovsky. In April 1941, the new plan began to be implemented - to the commander of the ZOV D.G. Pavlov was given the directive of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to develop a plan for the operational deployment of the district’s armies, changes were made to the mobilization plan - the composition of the Red Army was replenished with 314 to 308 divisions, 10 anti-tank brigades and 5 airborne command corps, 13, 23, 27, and later 19, 20, 21 and 22 armies, the concentration of the Red Army in the West began.
The plan envisaged that the troops of the North-Western and Western fronts would cover the directions to Siauliai-Riga, Kaunas-Daugavpils, Vilnius-Minsk, Lida-Baranavichy, Grodno-Volkovysk, Ostrolenka-Bialystok from one side and the offensive of the Western and South-Western fronts on the river line Narew and Warsaw, as well as a concentric strike on Lublin with a further exit to Radom from the other. Obviously, from the area of the Narew River and Warsaw in the future, coming to the coast of the Baltic Sea, it was necessary to surround the East Prussian group of Wehrmacht. To accomplish this task, border cover areas were created at the USSR-Germany border, and all mobile units were assembled in the 13 and 4 armies. The western front was to include the 61 division, including the 6 divisions of the RGC Army in the area of Lida-Slonim-Baranavichy.
The main difference between the April plan for covering the border from all previous strategic deployment plans is the creation of cover areas, occupation of the Narew and Warsaw river areas, as well as the surroundings of the East Prussian Wehrmacht group with access to the Baltic Sea coast from the Warsaw area, and not Krakow-Breslau. The anti-tank brigades were supposed to prevent the breakthrough of Wehrmacht units to Riga, Daugavpils, Minsk, Baranovichi and Volkovysk, stopping the German army’s motorized corps at Šauliai, Kaunas, Lida, Grodno and Bialystok, and the airborne corps thrown to the rear of Germany were supposed to help the ground forces The army liberate Europe from the German occupiers (1 scheme).
Speaking of 5 in May of 1941, to the graduates and teachers of military academies, I. Stalin declared that he would not take a preemptive strike on Germany. In his opinion, the Wehrmacht is invincible only while leading the liberation struggle. Consequently, having attacked Germany, the USSR will inevitably be defeated by the invincible Wehrmacht leading the war of liberation, while allowing Germany to attack the USSR, the Soviet Union will turn the invincible Wehrmacht, forced to wage an aggressive, unjust war, into an ordinary mortal army, which will inevitably be defeated by the leading liberation, righteous war of the invincible Red Army.
Not the 6 of May 1941, the day after the Kremlin’s speech by I.V. Stalin, not the 14 – 15 of May 1941, the leadership of the Red Army ordered the border military districts to develop plans to cover the border exclusively with military districts, without any involvement of the RGK armies, and 13 of the 1941 of the year - to start concentrating the armies of the RGC at the Zapadnaya Dvina – Dnepr border. The KOVO leadership was instructed to adopt the operational group of the SKVO headquarters, the 34 th infantry corps, four rifle divisions and one mountain division. The arrival of units and connections was expected from 20 May to 3 June 1941. May 25 received an order of the General Staff to begin advancing to 1 on June 1941 in the area of Proskurov, Khmelniki of the 16 Army.
As we already know 15 May 1941, I.V. Stalin refused to implement the proposed G.K. Zhukov of a preemptive strike plan in Germany (part of 1, 12 scheme). However, in the same package with the proposal of a preemptive strike on Germany, in case of failure of the plan to defeat the enemy on the territory of the USSR, May 15, 1941, G.K. Zhukov proposed I.V. To Stalin to approve his proposal to start the construction of fortified areas on the rear line of Ostashkov - Pochep, and if Germany does not attack the Soviet Union, then to provide for the construction of new fortified areas in 1942 on the border with Hungary.
Meanwhile, on May 27, the command of border districts was ordered to immediately begin construction of field command posts (front-line and army) in the areas outlined by the plan and force the construction of fortified areas. In late May – early June, the call from 793,5 to 805,264 to thousands of military servicemen for Large Training Campus (BEAD) was carried out, which made it possible to complete the 21 division of border districts to the full state of wartime, as well as significantly replenish other units.
In addition, probably everything was ready for the formation of several new army directorates and dozens of divisions with the onset of hostilities. Already in June, the 1941 and 24 armies were created in July 28, and in July the Red Army was replenished with the offices of the 6 armies (29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34) ), 20 rifle (242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254 , 256, 257, 259, 262, 265, 268, 272, and 281, and 15 cavalry (25, 26, 28) 30 th, 33 th, 43 th, 44 th, 45 th, 47 th, 48 th, 49 th, 50 th, 52 th, 53 th, 55 th divisions . And this is in the conditions of disruption of mobilization in the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine. In addition to personnel in the first month of the war, divisions of the people's militia were also formed - 1, 2, 3, and 4, divisions of the Leningrad army of national militia (LANO), 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 18, 21 divisions of the Moscow national militia (MNO), a significant number of which was later reorganized into personnel rifle divisions. Most of the new parts and connections went to the front in mid-July - early August 1941 of the year. Moreover, in August 1941, the process of the formation of new armies and divisions not only did not end, but, on the contrary, increased substantially.
Plans to cover the borders with the border military districts, the task assigned to the Army Group RGK, created by 21 June 1941, and the proposal of G.K. Zhukov on the construction of a new fortified area on the rear line of Ostashkov - Pochep makes it possible to restore the plan of defeating the enemy on the territory of the USSR, which was conceived by the Soviet military command. It was necessary, firstly, to reliably cover the flanks of the Soviet troops in the Baltic States, Belostok and Lvov ledges, as well as Moldova, placing anti-tank brigades on tank-dangerous areas. Secondly, in the weak center, letting the enemy go to Smolensk and Kiev, interrupt the supply lines of the German units with a concentric strike by the troops of the Western and Southwestern fronts on the Lublin-Radom and crush the enemy on the previously prepared lines in the Western Dvina-Dnieper region.
Thirdly, to occupy the area of the Narew River and Warsaw. Fourthly, having finished the formation of new armies by blow from the area of the Narew and Warsaw rivers to the Baltic coast, to encircle and destroy German troops in East Prussia. Fifth, by throwing the airborne corps ahead of the ground forces of the Red Army, free Europe from the Nazi yoke. In the event of a breakthrough of German troops through the screening of the armies of the second strategic echelon, the creation of a fortified area at the Ostashkov-Pochep line was planned (2 scheme).
This scheme is not only not something alien to Soviet military planning, but having its own direct analogues in it, it fits perfectly into it. In particular, during the Kursk battle of 1943, the idea of defeating the enemy with a counter-offensive by the Red Army, which had been preliminarily exhausted by the enemy’s defensive actions, was brilliantly implemented. It should be particularly noted that in the Battle of Kursk V.D. Sokolovsky, apparently in tribute to his 1941 defensive plan of the year, carried out Operation Kutuzov, while N.F. Vatutin, in tribute to his offensive plan 1941 of the year, carried out Operation Rumyantsev. The blow to the Baltic coast from the Bialystok salient was worked out in the first strategic game of the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941 (part of 1, 8 scheme). The encirclement of the East Prussian grouping of German troops from the Narew – Warsaw area to the Baltic coast was brought to life in May 1945.
From the end of May - the beginning of June 1941, the advancement of the armies of the GDK to the West began with a concentration time the end of June - the beginning of July 1941, on the Western Dvina – Dnepr line. The 19 Army (the 34, the 67 of the rifle, the 25 of the mechanized corps) were transferred from the North Caucasus Military District to the Cherkasy region, Bila Tserkva. The 20 Army (20, 61, 69, 41 and ICNMX) were advanced to the area of Smolensk, Mogilev, Orsha, Krichev, Chausy and Dorogobuzh, 7-I Army (21) , 66 th, 63 th, 45 th, 30 th rifle corps) concentrated in the area of Chernigov, Gomel, Konotop, 33 th army (22 th and 62 th rifle corps) advanced to the Idritsa, Sebezh, Vitebsk. 51-I army threw 16 May - 22 June in the area of Proskurov, Khmelnik. In addition, the Kharkiv Military District received the task of pushing the 1 th infantry corps to the Lubny area to 13 in June to the operational submission of the commander of the 25 army. At the same time, the troops of the 19 and 24 armies were preparing for redeployment.
June 6, 1941 G.K. Zhukov agreed with the proposal of the leadership of the OdVO secretly, at night, to withdraw to the border the administration of the 48th Infantry Corps and its 74th Infantry Division, as well as the 30th Infantry Division to strengthen the 176th Division, whose forces were clearly not enough to cover the front 120 kilometers. On the night of June 8, all of these connections reached the area of Beltsk. On June 12, 1941, NCO issued a directive on the nomination of divisions and districts located inland closer to the state border. On the same day, the command of the KOVO was notified of the arrival in the district from June 15 to July 10, 1941 of the 16th army army as part of the army command with service units, the 5th mechanized corps (13th, 17th tank and 109th Motorized Divisions), 57th Separate Panzer Division, 32nd Rifle Corps (46th, 152nd Rifle Divisions), and ZAPOVO command - on arrival in the district from June 17 to July 2, 1941, the 51st and the 63rd Rifle Corps.
13 June 1941 of the People's Commissar of Defense SK Tymoshenko and the Chief of General Staff G.K. Zhukov asked I.V. Stalin led the troops of the border military districts to combat readiness and deploy the first echelons according to the plan of a preventive attack on Germany, by redirecting parts of the second strategic echelon to the border with Germany (part 1, 13 scheme). Stalin took time to think, the fruit of which was the TASS message transmitted to the German Ambassador 13 on June 1941 of the year and published the next day. The report refuted the rumors about the presentation of the USSR of any claims and the conclusion of a new, closer agreement on the preparations of Germany and the USSR for a war against each other.
14 June 1941, I.V. Stalin, fearing the escalation of open mobilization into the war, from the implementation of the deployment plan from 13 June 1941, S.К. Tymoshenko and G.K. Zhukov finally refused and echelons 16-th army, according to the testimony of Lieutenant-General K.L. Sorokin, who was baptized in 1941 in the year by the Brigadier Commissar as Head of the Political Propaganda Department of the 16 Army, accelerated his movement towards his plan, V.D. Sokolovsky deployment line:
“Echelons rush westward past stations like ordinary freight trains, freight trains. Stops only on deaf stations and traveling. ...
On the way, we learned about the TASS message from 14 Jun. It disproved the rumors spread by foreign news agencies about the concentration of German troops on the western frontiers of our Motherland and preparing them for an attack on the USSR. The report emphasized that the German and Soviet sides strictly adhere to the non-aggression pact. Meanwhile, our echelons suddenly accelerated their movement, and now the area of the future stationing of the army — Shepetovka and Starokonstantinov — has become apparent. “Is this a simple coincidence: the TASS report and the courier speed of movement of our trains to the old western border of the country?” I thought.
15 June 1941, the leadership of the border military districts received an order for the withdrawal of the deep corps to the border with June 17. According to the testimony of I.Kh. Bagramyan in KOVO The 31 rifle corps had to approach June 28 to the border near Kovel, the 36 rifle corps was to occupy the Dubno border area, Kozin, Kremenets by the morning of June 27, the 37 rifle corps needed by June 25 was to concentrate in the area of Przemysl; The 55 th rifle corps (without one division that remained in place) was ordered to reach the border of June 26, 49 –– to June 30.
In the ZAPOVO, the 21th sk was nominated in the Lida region, the 47th sk - in Minsk, the 44-sk - Baranovichi. In Pribovo from 17 on June 1941, on the orders of the district headquarters, the 11-th sd of the 65-th sk. Following from the district of Narva by rail in the morning of 21.06.1941, she concentrated in the area of Seduva. On 22 of June 1941 of the year, most of it was still on the way. The management of the 65-th sk and the 16-sd had the task of arriving by rail in the area of Keblya (10 km north of Shauliai) and Prenaya, respectively, but because of the lack of wagons they did not break into loading. The national Baltic rifle corps remained in their places of permanent deployment.
On June 14, the Odessa Military District was allowed to allocate army control and 21 June 1941 g to withdraw it to Tiraspol, that is, to transfer the control of the 9 Army to the field command center, and the commander of the Kiev Special Military District was ordered to withdraw the control of the Southwestern Front to 25 June Vinnitsa. 18 June 1941 this deadline at the direction of the General Staff was postponed to June 22. The Directorate of the General Staff of June 18 was allowed to take 23 to the field command posts by June 1941 by the order of the General Staff from June and by the North-West (PribOVO) front. 20 June 1941 of the year began the withdrawal to the field command posts of the offices of the 9 Army, the North-Western and South-Western fronts. The control of the Western Front was not withdrawn from the Minsk field command center.
On June 18, Commander PribOVO gave an oral order to the 8 Army's first echelons to reach the state border field defense forces, to the 8 Army headquarters - to be deployed in the Bubyan region by June 19 (12 - 15 km south-west of Saulayai), and 3 th and 12 mu mk - on the transition to the border area. On the morning of June 19, parts of the 10 and 90 units of the 10 units and 125 units and 11 units began to go into their districts and turned around to cover areas during the day. 48-th SDN 11-th SK on the orders of the 17 district command on June 1941 began its marching order from Jelgava to Nemakshchay district, before 22: 00 21.06.1941 was in the forest in the south of Siaulia and continuing dark after nightfall. 23-sd from June 17, by order of the district command, made the transition from Daugavpils to its border guard area, where its two rifle battalions were located. On the night of June 22, the division marched from the Pageliydzhay district (20 km south-west of Ukmerge) to the Andrushkantsi area for further movement to the specified area. 126-I on the night of June 22 made from Ziezmoreyi to Prienai district. 183 sd 24 th cd went to the Riga camp and before nightfall 21 June was located in the area of Soseni, Sobari in 50 km west of Gulbene. In KOVO, from the summer camp to its place of cover of the border, the 164-th subdivision departed, and the 135-I detachment began to relocate to its camp.
June 21 The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Decided to create the Southern Front as part of the 1941 and 9 armies. The control of the Southern Front was assigned to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, and the 18 Army was assigned to the Kharkov Military District. The same decree G.K. Zhukov was entrusted with the leadership of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts, and KA Meretskov was entrusted with the Northwestern Front, and the 18-I, 19-I, 20-I and 21-I armies, concentrated in the reserve of the Main Command, were united into the heading C .M. Budyden group of reserve armies. The headquarters of the group was to be located in Bryansk. The formation of the group ended by the end of 22 June 25. According to M.V. To 1941 June 21, the main forces of the 1941 Army, except the 19 Mechanized Corps, which followed the railroad, and eight rifle divisions of the 25 Army (other 21 divisions were still on the way) were already in the designated areas of concentration. The 6 and 20 armies continued to advance into new areas. “The Army Group was tasked with: reproaching and starting to prepare the defensive line of the main line of the line along the Sushchevo, Nevel, Vitebsk, Mogilyov, Zhlobin, Gomel, Chernihiv, Desna rivers, the Dnieper River to Kremenchug. ... The group of troops was to be prepared by the special instructions of the High Command to go over to the offensive "(part 22, 3 scheme).
Ultimately, from the 303 divisions, the 63 divisions were deployed on the northern and southern borders, as well as in the forces of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, while the 240 divisions were concentrated in the West, with the Northern Front being assigned the 3 army and the 21 division, the North-West and The Western fronts are 7 armies and 69 divisions, and the Southwestern front are 7 armies and 86 divisions. Another 4 army and 51 division unfolded as part of the front armies of the RGC, and the 2 army and 13 divisions were to concentrate in the area of Moscow with the outbreak of hostilities. Depending on the situation, the armies in the Moscow region were intended either to strengthen the troops north or south of the Pripyat marshes, in case of success of the plan to defeat the enemy at the Western Dvina-Dnieper border, or to cover Moscow at the rear of Ostashkov-Pochep, whose construction was G.K. Zhukov proposed starting 15 in May 1941, in case of failure of the plan to defeat the enemy at the turn of the Western Dvina - Dnieper. The 31 division was assigned to the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, the 30 divisions were part of the forces of the Transcaucasian, Central Asian and North Caucasian military districts, and with favorable circumstances, with the start of the war, the 15 divisions, mainly of the North Caucasus military district go to the West.
If we compare the real deployment scheme of the Red Army on the eve of World War II and the scheme envisaged by the Red Army’s strategic deployment plan from 13 June 1941, then both the similarity and the difference between the two deployment schemes becomes immediately apparent. The similarity is that in both cases the 303 divisions were assigned to the West from the 240 divisions of the Red Army, the 31 division of the Transcaucasian, Central Asian and North Caucasian military districts - 30 divisions were assigned to the forces of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts 15 divisions were decreasing from these districts to the West. The difference is in the different structure of the deployment of troops focused on the West - if in terms of 13 June 1941, the bulk of the troops concentrated at the border and in the front GDF, then in real deployment at the expense of the troops of the frontier group at the boundary of the Western Dvina-Dnepr the front of the GDR armies was created.
As we can see, both the concentration and the deployment of the Red Army to the West before the start of the Great Patriotic War were carried out in full accordance with the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky, not N.F. Vatutina — the units of the armies of the border military districts advanced to the border, and the internal ones — to the Western Dvina-Dnepr line. There are many parameters that would seem to unequivocally confirm the implementation of the VD plan. Sokolovsky. Note some of them. First, the RGK armies began their advancement to the West on 13 in May of 1941, after abandoning the March plan for a preemptive strike on Germany and before the proposal of G.K. Zhukov I. Stalin new plan 15 May 1941 of the year. Secondly, both proposed by G.K. Zhukov plans of a preemptive strike on Germany were I. Stalin rejected. Thirdly, the army group of the RGK at the turn of the Western Dvina – Dnepr was created at the expense of the grouping of the South-Western Front intended for delivering a preventive strike against Germany. Fourthly, for the reserve, intended to strengthen the border grouping of the Red Army, the RGK armies were withdrawn too far from the border, deployed not compactly, at railway junctions, for ease of transportation, but at a broad defensive line. Fifth, if the RGK armies were intended to reinforce the border grouping of the Red Army, they would not be united into a front, they would not create a front headquarters, and would not set the task of reconnaissance of the terrain with the aim of creating a defensive line.
Sixth, if in January 1941, I.S. Konev, receiving the troops of the SKVO, received from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, SK Tymoshenko’s admonition that he is heading one of the armies of the group intended for delivering a preemptive strike on Germany, then “at the beginning of ... June, the People's Commissar, setting the task for the commander of the 19 Army, spoke already about the counterstrike:“ in the event of a German offensive in the South-Western theater of military operations, on Kiev, to deliver a frontal strike — to drive the Germans into the Pripyat swamps. ” Seventh, all the armies of the RGK were reinforced by mechanized corps. Everything except the 21 Army, although there was a possibility for this, because the 23 Mechanic Corps remained behind it in the area of its permanent deployment. And it is clear why - if the 19-I army was supposed to drive the Germans into the Pripyat marshes, then the 21-I army should have destroyed the Germans in the Pripyat marshes, and there was absolutely nothing to do with the mechanized corps, unless it was bogged down. Eighth, after the start of the war, the RGK armies continued their deployment at the Zapadnaya Dvina – Dnepr border, and on June 25, with the directive of the USSR Butter Union, the need for the front of the GDH armies was confirmed. Ninth, only after the encirclement of the troops of the Western Front was abandoned, it became overnight unnecessary, Lviv ledge and the organization of the struggle in the territory occupied by the enemy began.
Tenth, I. Stalin reacted extremely sharply and negatively to the catastrophe of the Western Front: he yelled at the head of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov, pulled away for some time from the leadership of the country, and subsequently shot almost the entire leadership of the Western Front. Nothing like this has ever happened again. It is understandable, because I. Stalin did not lose his temper in defeating the front, near Kiev and Vyazma in the 1941 year, the Red Army suffered defeats and worse, and disrupting the strategic plan for defeating the enemy and liberating the whole of Europe from him. Eleventh, the Lepel counterattack exactly repeats the plan planned by the Soviet command for the defeat of the Wehrmacht troops that broke through in the Smolensk direction. As well as the creation in July 1941 of the year of the front of reserve armies at the Ostashkov-Pochep line: Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk. Twelfth, the plan of the Soviet command implied a short-term occupation of Soviet territory and therefore did not provide for a detailed guerrilla movement, which began to be created only in the month of July with the realization of the failure of the plan to quickly defeat the enemy and start a long war. Moreover, with the conduct of hostilities on Soviet territory.
Thus, before the war in the Soviet Union, a plan was developed to crush the Wehrmacht in the event of a German attack on the USSR, and its implementation began. Unfortunately, both the plan and its implementation had a number of drawbacks. The plan did not take into account the possibility of Germany entering the battle from the very first hours of its main armed forces, and therefore provided for a long time to mobilize the Red Army. If the lack of adequate cover by anti-tank brigades and mechanized corps of the Brest-Minsk and Vladimir-Volynsky-Kiev directions was planned, then the Kaunas-Daugavpils and Alytus-Vilnius-Minsk directions remained mistakenly open. Simply, the leadership of the General Staff of the Red Army could not have foreseen the strike of the Wehrmacht on Kaunas, bypassing the positions of the 10 anti-tank brigade and the 3 mechanized corps from East Prussia, as well as in Vilnius through Alytus. The decision of the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer anti-tank defenses from Vilnius – Minsk to Lida – Baranovichi and Grodno – Volkovysk directions was fatal for the fate of the Western Front. Striking a blow at Minsk through Vilnius, the enemy, firstly - three anti-tank brigades went round at once, and secondly - the counter-attack of the group I.V. Boldin in the direction of Grodno, even in principle, could not reach the shock group of the Wehrmacht, rushing through Alytus to Vilnius and further to Minsk, and at least somehow influence the fate of the Western Front.
In terms of deployment, it should be noted that the border was well covered in the strip of the Southwestern Front. As for covering the border in the strip of the North-Western and Western fronts, it should be considered unsatisfactory. In the Alitu direction, on the way of the 3-th German tank group, there was one 128 rifle division, while the 23-I, 126-I and 188-I rifle divisions were only advanced to the border by the 22 of June 1941. In addition, distrusting the three national Baltic rifle corps, the command of the North-Western Front was afraid to send them to organize a second echelon of troops on the border, deciding to use the 65 rifle corps for this purpose, which, however, due to the lack of rail transport, was on time were never delivered to the border.
In the cover zone of the border by the troops of the Western Front, the 6 and 42 infantry divisions should be left in the barracks of the Brest Fortress. When the war began, they were locked up in the fortress and could not fulfill their task of preventing the enemy from fortifying the fortifications of the Brest Fortress. According to LM. Sandalov “the main drawback of the district and army plans was their unreality. A significant portion of the troops provided for the execution of cover tasks did not yet exist. ... The most negative impact on the organization of the defense of the 4 Army was made by the inclusion in its strip of half of the cover area No. 3. ” However, “before the war, RP-3 did not have time to create. ... The command of the 13 Army did not arrive in the Bielsk area. ... All this had grave consequences, since on the first day of the war neither the 49-th and 113-th divisions, nor the 13-th mechanized corps received any tasks from anyone, they were not controlled by anyone, and under the blows of the enemy retreated to the north -East, into the band of the 10 Army. ” The control of the 13 Army was used to strengthen the defense of the Lida direction, however, since parts of the German 3 tank group broke through to Minsk through Alytus and Vilnius to prevent the catastrophe of the Western Front, this decision could not.
Let us dwell on the relation of the plan V.D. Sokolovsky with the Iranian question. Since March 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, under the guise of command-and-staff exercises in the Transcaucasian and Central Asian military districts, began to develop a plan for the deployment of Soviet troops in Northern Iran. As we recall, in England in March 1941, the development of a plan for the entry of British troops into southern Iran also began. In April 1941, the year of development of the exercises was approved by N.F. Vatutin and in May 1941 years were spent in Zakvo, and in June 1941 of the year - in SAVO. The study of the entry of Soviet troops into Iran is indicated by the study by the General Staff staff of the border only with Iran from Kizyl-Artek to Serakhs - it is indicative that the border with Afghanistan, and this, incidentally, was the shortest route to India, did not interest anyone in the Soviet General Staff.
In March, the 1941 divisions were allocated to the border with Iran on the border with Iran - first, it was necessary to assemble a grouping of 13 divisions in the South-Western Front, and secondly, to collect the necessary number of troops on the border with Japan. The ambiguity of the USSR’s relations with Japan required a steady build-up of Soviet troops in the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts — 144 divisions in terms of 30 August 19, 1940 divisions in terms of 34 September 18, 1940 divisions in 36, October 14, and 1940, and 40 of 11, and 1941, XNUMX divisions in the plan from XNUMX, October, XNUMX, and XNUMX. plan from XNUMX March XNUMX of the year.
In April 1941, the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Japan, which was immediately used to increase the troops on the border with Iran at the expense of the forces of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts. In particular, if the 11 March 1941 of the Transcaucasian, Central Asian and North Caucasian military districts counted 13 divisions, then the 15 plan of May 1941 of the year is 15 divisions, and in the plan of 13 June 1941 of the year and the real concentration of the Red Army in May – June 1941 of the year - 30 divisions. All this testifies to the readiness of the USSR and England to enter their troops in Iran as early as June 1941.
Thus, we found that at the beginning of 1941, the development of two plans for the deployment of Red Army units began in parallel. At first, the plan of N.F. Vatutin, however, after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece by Germany, the plan of V.D. began to be implemented consistently and purposefully. Sokolovsky.
Plan nf Vatutina envisaged the creation of a grouping of more than 140 divisions in the South-Western Front for a preemptive strike on Germany, while the plan of V.D. Sokolovsky - the defeat of the Wehrmacht strike forces at the Zapadnaya Dvina-Dnieper border, where a powerful army group of the High Command Reserve was created. The new plan, possessing a number of unique qualities, at the same time contained a number of serious mistakes, which did not allow to realize it fully and condemned to long oblivion.
1 schema. The actions of the troops of the Western Front in accordance with the April directive of the USSR Butt and the NGS KA to the Commander of the troops of the New World Defense Forces 1941. Compiled by the directive of the USSR Butt and the Space Forces Combat Command vehicle to the commander of the ZOVO troops. April 1941 of the Year // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 2 / Document No. 224 // www.militera.lib.ru
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