The war with Russia becomes half open
In particular, my father is not only a world-class scientist, but also the wisest of people I have ever talked to - he said: amid these massacres, the reunion of Ukraine I wanted with the rest of Russia seemed extremely unlikely. I agree with him: one of the goals of such crimes is to scare Ukraine and other parts of Russia from its core, the Russian Federation. Moreover, I have no doubt at all: immediately after reunification, a wave of terrorist crimes will subside, because the failure of the enemy offensive will force the enemy not only to regroup, but also to rethink the strategy. But it is difficult to convince any authority of Ukraine of the necessity and inevitability of reunification even after the brilliant successes on the Ukrainian direction of the policy of the Russian Federation in November – December 2013: as it is known from time immemorial, Ukraine is the result of Western strategy of division and mutual opposition of parts of Russia, and therefore any leadership forced to resist any integration steps so far and so far, so far and as long as it wants at least formal independence. Now, after three explosions in Stalingrad, public opinion (even those Ukrainian citizens, who, like my father, are fully aware of the vital need for reunification) is pretty scared: few people want to go to war voluntarily, raging even in the neighborhood, but seemingly abroad.
Ukraine is not really blowing up yet. But for an obvious reason: they do not fight in the occupied territory - they simply rob her, and only those few who try to prevent too overt looting are killed. The fates of Georgiy Nikolaevich Kirpa, Yuri Fedorovich Kravchenko, Evgeny Petrovich Kushnarev are a reminder and a threat to anyone who is not ready to give up their homeland to foreigners and their puppets. Yes, and now Igor Olegovich Markov - a fighter for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space and an opponent of putting Ukraine on food to the European Union - was arrested on charges, seven years ago - in the midst of anti-Russian domination - declared insolvent in three judicial instances of Ukraine. Recently, his arrest has been extended, although the Ukrainian authorities have already taken the path indicated by him (and I hope he will not leave him). Truly, "let those who speak the same as we, before us, be cursed."
Clearly, Ukraine is far from the only target of fuses. And not even the main one. The shots of the self-guided two-legged shells are aimed at the foreign policy of the Russian Federation as a whole. Domestic policies, mostly relegated to the economic bloc of the government (where else Yeltsin's — and even Late Gorbachev's — time are recruited exclusively by faithful libertarians, that is, people who believe in the non-existence of society as an independent entity, from which the inadmissibility of state participation in whatever nor was it a socially useful activity), it is developing so far in accordance with the foreign wishes of the earliest disappearance of our country from the maps of economic geography: gross domestic odukt in 2013-m rose by less than 1.5%, that is actually fell (as rightly pointed Mikhail Leonidovich Khazin, compiling reports elegant technology can show 3% annual growth at an absolute standstill). But in foreign policy, since time immemorial, directly under the head of state, success is obvious.
Suffice it to recall: Iran is unblocked (whose nuclear program - despite the tales of our strategic competitors - so far fits into the peaceful framework established by international agreements, and the situation in the region makes the country - despite past frequent anti-Soviet and anti-Russian declarations - our natural ally for the foreseeable future) ; the repeatedly promised open invasion of any regular troops to Syria has not taken place to this day (and instead, the presence of Russian military structures in the country is growing in coordination with the legal authority); Four post-Soviet republics — Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine — out of the six planned ones dropped out of the program of the European partnership, albeit with different formulations. So far, Georgia and Moldova have only initialed association agreements with the European Union: the direct participants in the negotiations confirmed that they no longer intend to amend the documents under discussion, and their further research will take place in the appropriately authorized state bodies - governments and parliaments. Ukraine initialed the agreement back in 2012. And in November, 2013 announced: in its current form, it is unacceptable to it. Who knows what surprises are soon possible in Georgia, where the government has recently been reformed, and Moldova, where the parliamentary majority is formed by a very shaky coalition, and elections are not far off?
Spicy detail. According to relatively recent rumors, Saudi Arabia has offered the Russian Federation 15 billions of dollars for refusing to support Syria. Now the same 15 billions of RF has invested in support of Ukraine. Moreover, the money extracted from the National Wealth Fund, and not less than 4 / 10 of its funds should be invested in securities of the highest reliability. International rating agencies attribute this degree of reliability to the securities of the United States of America. That is, we gave Ukraine the money already accounted by the MUH in their financial plans as being in their possession. It is not surprising that they are ready to take revenge on us by any means. And the cheapest and most effective way to revenge is terror.
I believe that even the most beautiful-minded elf will hardly be able to frankly deny the involvement of the SGA and their satellites - primarily Saudi Arabia - in terrorism in general and anti-Russian aggression in particular. It is clear that such a powerful force will be successful for the time being. Unless professional defenders of their human rights can declare the Stalingrad explosions as evidence of the professional failure and / or malicious intent of domestic anti-terrorists: only a military machine, organized no worse and better equipped, can fight an organized military machine. So in the Great Patriotic War, we were able to defeat the enemy only when we took into account the pre-war shortcomings of the organization of the armed forces - say, following the Germans, we switched from building fighters in triplets to flying in pairs - and supplied the troops with military equipment that was not inferior to the enemy (and in many directions - for example, in tanks and artillery - superior to it) in terms of the effectiveness of a single copy and significantly superior to it quantitatively, that is, in terms of the total effectiveness of the entire available armament park. Contrary to popular legends, we overwhelmed the enemy not with our bodies, but with our shells.
So, we are at war. And it has long been known: a la guerre comme a la guerre - in the military, as in the military. We must act in accordance with the laws of this new — almost secret — war and crush the enemy in such a way that he will henceforth have neither temptation nor the ability to renew it.
Even after the explosion at the Domodedovo airport, as soon as the then president - and the current prime minister - Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev ordered to introduce general control at the entrances to railway stations and other important public places, I immediately predicted that from now on, the targets of the terrorists would be queues to the inspection posts. And so it turned out: at the Stalingrad station, an explosion occurred just in such a queue. The control apologists immediately stated: the inspection still helped - if the two-legged bomb had worked in the waiting room, where the passengers of several detained trains had gathered, there would have been more victims. This is technically wrong: in a large hall, the blast wave would have gone into the open space under the high ceiling, and the ready-made attack elements are absorbed by the nearest neighbors of the explosion, regardless of the number of neighbors away. Judging by the comparison of the results of the Domodedovo and Stalingrad bombings, the effect of the inspection at the entrance is far from being as great as it should have been to justify this system. Moreover, the minutes lost by millions of passengers in queues at the entrance to airports (not to mention the railway stations: their capacity is so high that the inspection can only be formal), in sum, correspond to far more lives lost than Domodedovo and Stalingrad bombings combined. Nevertheless, adherents of the faith in the omnipotence of passive protection immediately began to compose means of identifying intruders at the distant approaches to the station. To which I replied: if you create such systems, the buses will become the target of terrorists. Alas, the very next day the explosion occurred in a regular trolleybus in the same Stalingrad. I do not try to brag about my insight here and I don’t even provide references to the relevant comments in my LiveJournal: everything I said is obvious to anyone interested in terror and fighting with it. Moreover, from general theoretical considerations it is clear: the proper concentration of the means of attack breaks through any passive defense sooner or later. As I noted 2010.06.21 in the article “From Kursk to Seelow”, the rule is not only in football: victory is always at the opposite gate.
In addition passive protection limits our own capabilities. Mass spending of time on inspection, distraction of many thousands of security guards and state security officers on duty at metal detectors and baggage scanning devices is half the trouble. More importantly, all this fuss can significantly limit the carrying capacity of the transport system. After the Domodedovo bombing, one of the participants in the discussion in my LiveJournal said proudly: at the central bus station in Tel Aviv - the largest in Israel - inspect all passengers, and this in no way interferes with passenger traffic. I asked in response how many entrances in this building - and how many people pass through it per day. I received equally proud answers: 22, about 80 thousands. And he explained: approximately as many people pass through 2 (or, if you look right in the underpasses - 4) through the entrance of an ordinary Moscow metro station on the outskirts; in the center of the city, each station passes 100 – 150 thousands of people per day, and the entrance is often the only one. It is not for nothing that the frames of metal detectors, which were hastily mounted at many central stations as an experiment, stand apart from the passenger traffic. If they are seriously tried to use - the metro will choke. And then the terrorists will be able to celebrate the victory: they practically without the expense of their own forces paralyze the life of the metropolitan metropolis.
So, we need to defend actively. What does this mean?
The historian Arnold Joseph Harri-Volpich Toynbee is best known for his concept: the main distinguishing feature of every civilization is its habitual, repetitive pattern of answering an external challenge. In particular, the Russian civilization, in his opinion, when a threat appears, first decreases sharply, as if moving away from the source of the threat, and then also expands dramatically, taking this source into itself and turning it into one of its sources of strength. Thus, in the imperial time, the North Caucasus became a source of warriors of various denominations, but invariably excellent personal fighting qualities.
Toynbee's scheme is not fully applicable at all. I do not hope that the United States of America or at least their accomplices - the Arab oil tanks - will become part of the Russian Empire in the foreseeable future. But this scheme has a more modest - purely military - version. Our country was almost always not ready to use against us new weapons and / or a new method of using weapons. But invariably quickly mastered it and applied against its developers.
For example, in 1941, the Germans used deep breakthroughs of well-balanced against us - including tanks, self-propelled and towed guns, infantry on armored personnel carriers and trucks in proportion as verified by previous battles - mechanized troops. Our unbalanced tanks, consisting almost exclusively of tanks, could not resist them effectively. But already in November, 1942-th at that very Stalingrad, where the power of the enemy fell upon us now, Soviet troops with a structure noticeably close to the ideal went into a deep breakthrough - and for the first time in the whole war they completely destroyed the surrounded German grouping. And since the second half of 1943, the Germans have repeatedly been the victim of Soviet breakthroughs or retreated under their threat.
Obviously, the necessary — though far from the only — part of our coming counteroffensive will be the hunt for sponsors and coordinators of terror, regardless of their geographical location or political affiliation. Some experience on this part is. For example, 2004.02.13 in Doha - the capital of Qatar's emirate - exploded a car where the former chairman of the Committee for the Promotion of Fiction Literature of the USSR Writers Union Zelimkhan Abdulmuslimovich Yandarbiyev was sitting. From 1996.04.21 to 1997.02.12, he served as President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In 2002, he supported the taking of 2002.10.23 – 26 hostages at the Palace of Culture of the 1 State Bearing Plant and resigned from all alleged posts of a long-non-existing republic when its nominal president, Aslan Alievich Maskhadov, publicly condemned this crime (in order to formally depict his non-participation to terror). I will not retell the details of the further fate of those who in Qatar were considered to be involved in the event: those who are interested can look at the Wikipedia article on Yandarbiyev. But judging by many indirect signs, after the explosion, Qatari support for Caucasian terror significantly decreased.
There are other effective ways to admonish the enemy. Russian monetary resources are still insufficient to counter the entire financial power of the MUH, in particular, because we earn money, and they print as needed. But our capabilities are already enough to ruin almost any particular entrepreneur - including the one in whose business the capital of the politician we are interested in is invested. This technique is also good because the conquered commercial structure will become a support for further advancement into the enemy rear. True, we are unlikely to allow us to buy a large enterprise: at least, let us recall how General Motors received a considerable loan from state hands at the last moment in order not to sell Russian Opel. But there are also Western weapons to that effect, already well mastered by our merchants. Even the capabilities of the legendary American financial intelligence are hardly enough to trace the origin of the firm, whose roots sprouted through a dozen offshores. And whose interests are represented by the originally Cypriot or impeccably Luxembourg lawyer, who, under local law, heads the company - and even more so an autopsy will show. A trophy weapon in capable hands shoots no worse than a native.
I think the experts will prompt a lot more counter-offensive means. The main thing is to make a political decision about its necessity and inevitability. But it is - already the case of the supreme commander.
And a little more about choosing the place and time of a recent crime.
Stalingrad convenient for terrorists because several important traffic flows converge in it. But for the same reason, he was in the 1918 th key objective of the White Guard attacks, and the 1942 th target of the German strike. And with its stubborn defense (and in 1942, also a brilliant counteroffensive), it became a symbol of our military power and glory. Now they are trying to transform it into a symbol of our powerlessness in the face of a new - sophisticatedly criminal - enemy. Let us leave the stabs in the back with impunity - sooner or later we will forget about our exploits and conquer someone else's crimes.
By the way, since the enemy beats on our consciousness, it is necessary to respond on this front. It is high time to forget that which was invented by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev — a bucket of mud in his coffin! - ridiculous euphemism “Volgograd” and call the former Tsaritsyn from the Sary Su river, that is, Yellow Water is the name chosen by the citizens themselves in 1925 in gratitude to those who for about a year headed the defense of the city in the Civil War: Tsaritsyn fell only when Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili a few months was in other - no less vital - places of Russia.
Not a random date. On the eve of the New Year - a nationwide family holiday - we are immersed in mourning, forced to forget that the wish “Happy New Year!” Continues with the words “Happy New Happiness!” The best answer to this part of the enemy’s challenge is to continue building new happiness.
True, it is hardly possible to build it, guided by the old libertarian recipes, long forgotten in their homeland. From libertarianism there remained only the duty of the state to condone the arbitrariness of the business. But the duty of the same state to support business, when free impulses carry it into another deadlock, is not at all libertarian. And the forced withdrawal from our economy of a large part of export revenues, based on the fact that they are replaced by foreign investment, also does not fit into libertarian dogmas or imputed economic theories. In a word, the economic bloc of our government must be replaced entirely - not only the ministers, but also the entire apparatus of the relevant departments. Well, getting rid of the accomplices of the enemy (albeit conscious, although acting through foolishness) is a necessary part of a winning strategy.
So, happy New Year! With new happiness! And let 2014 year become for each of us not only the best of all previous, but also worse than all subsequent ones.
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