World War I on the seas and oceans
By the beginning of hostilities, the Entente naval forces were significantly superior to the naval forces of the Union of Central States.
In terms of spatial scope, number of participants and tensions of the armed struggle in the continental, ocean and sea theaters of military operations of the First World War, there were no analogues in the preceding stories.
The most intensive military operations were conducted: on the North Sea, in the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, on the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black, Barents and White seas. In addition, episodic military actions, especially in the initial period of the war, and then when single German cruisers entered the ocean, were deployed in the central and southern parts of the Atlantic Ocean, as well as in the Pacific and Indian oceans and (in the period of unlimited underwater war) off the Atlantic coast. North America.
In the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, between North America and Western Europe, the most important maritime routes passed, which were of great importance for the military economy of the Atlantic countries, especially for England, whose economy was completely dependent on maritime trade. The main node of these messages was the south-western approaches to England.
On the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, England and its allies had an extensive system of basing, while the few German cruisers deployed before the war in the Atlantic and intended to act on sea communications in the event of war, did not have such bases. Moreover, based on the short duration of the war, the outcome of which was to be decided in land battles and on the North Sea, Germany did not attach much importance to cruising on remote ocean routes. The English cruiser squadrons dedicated to the protection of ocean communications were to operate, each in its own zone, based on Halifax, Kingston and Gibraltar, etc. During the first three to four months of the war, single German cruisers operated on the Atlantic maritime communications, but they did not achieve significant success, but were diverted by the British cruising forces from the main naval theater, the North Sea.
After the defeat of the German squadron in the battle of the Falkland Islands, the action on the oceanic communications in the Atlantic almost ceased.
In 1915-1916, single German auxiliary cruisers, which broke through the British blockade in the North Sea, only occasionally appeared here. In the autumn of 1916, the first German submarines appeared on the coast of the United States. With the entry of the USA into the war (April 1917), during the period of unlimited submarine war, they extended the area of their operations to the central and western parts of the North Atlantic, up to the coast of the United States, committing to the region in 1917 - 1918. up xnum hikes. However, the main area of operations of the German submarines during the entire submarine war remained the western approaches to England, which included the northeast Atlantic, Bay of Biscay, the English Channel and the Irish Sea. Here, during the period of the most intensive unlimited submarine war, all the combat resources of the submarine forces of the German Navy based in the North Sea were concentrated up to 15 / 1, and up to six million tons of merchant tonnage were sunk (throughout the war). However, the enormous strength and means of the Allies, in the presence of numerous and well-equipped bases, made it possible to successfully deploy powerful anti-submarine defenses. Transportation on the most important maritime communications of the Entente in the Atlantic Ocean continued, albeit with great tension and considerable tonnage losses, throughout the war.
In the Pacific Ocean, especially with the entry of Japan into the war, the allied fleets had a developed basing system, which ensured the actions of any ship connections for the protection of maritime communications. Germany had here its only colonial naval base of Qingdao, where in peacetime the East Asian cruiser squadron was based, accounting for half of all the cruising forces of Germany, which she held before the war outside the waters of the metropolis. In view of the overwhelming superiority of the forces of the Allied fleets in the Pacific, the German command did not intend to use Qingdao as a base in wartime. The German cruiser squadron, after some operations of secondary importance in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, went to the shores of South America. Here, at Coronel, there was only one battle for the war in the Pacific Ocean between the German and English cruiser squadrons. After that, only in 1917, two German auxiliary cruisers operated for quite a long time on sea communications in the Pacific Ocean. At this time there were mine settings off the coast of New Zealand and Australia. These actions, in view of the relatively small military significance of Pacific communications, were predominantly demonstrative in nature and were designed to divert some of the forces of the allied fleets from the main theater of operations, the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.
The Indian Ocean, to the shores of which extended the vast colonial possessions of England, was considered, with respect to the basing system, the “English lake”.
The well-equipped ports of Cape Town, Aden, Bombay, Colombo, Singapore ensured the basing of all the forces necessary for the protection of maritime communications against the single German cruisers periodically operating here. In the initial period of the war in the Indian Ocean there were two Germanic light cruisers, against which the Entente, given the length and dispersion of the ocean routes, had to allocate quite significant forces. After the destruction of these к cruisers, the transport across the Indian Ocean, which had a serious significance for the economy of England, was carried out without hindrance. In 1917, during particularly intense German submarine operations in the Mediterranean, an important sea route leading from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean was temporarily (and not for all ships) moved and passed around the southern tip of Africa. At the same time, a German auxiliary cruiser operated on sea communications in the Indian Ocean, which laid mines off the southern coast of Africa and at Ceylon.
The most important sea routes of communication> passed through the English Channel (English Channel), as well as along the east coast of England and to the coast of Norway.
Through this sea, almost all of Germany’s external maritime trade was carried out. With the closure of the North Sea trade routes, Germany could only import from the Scandinavian countries through the Baltic Sea and its pouring zone. Marine communications of the North Sea were essential for England. This way imported food and timber from the Scandinavian countries, Swedish iron ore, coal was exported.
The main composition of the fleets of the strongest sea powers — England and Germany — was concentrated in the bases of the North Sea.
Table 1
The composition of the naval forces in the North Sea to the beginning of the war
The main naval base of Germany fleet Wilhelmshaven had sufficient repair facilities for ships of all classes and supplies. At the same time, approaches from the sea were covered by the Helgoland island fortress, which in turn was the base of light forces and hydroaviation.
Water space, protected by the fortifications of Helgoland, Fr. [Borkum] and adjacent to the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe, was called the Germanic bay or “wet triangle”. In preparation for the war, the German command paid great attention to the defense of the specified area. Coastal batteries were installed here, and barriers were set up at the base. During the war, the basing of the German fleet was expanded by equipping submarine bases in the Belgian ports of Brugge, [Zeebrugge] and Ostend.
It should be noted that the prewar basing of the English fleet did not meet the task assigned to it by the distant blockade of Germany and clearly lagged behind the construction of the fleet itself.
The lack of well-equipped bases in the northern part of the sea put the Grand Fleet in a difficult position at the beginning of the war, and only the presence of convenient sheltered anchorages allowed the fleet to be in this part of the sea. Before the war, the main base of the English fleet was Portsmouth, the base of the fleet was Plymouth (Devonport). These bases were strengthened from the sea and had docks, repair facilities and supplies of material and technical means.
The home points were Dover and Portland. On the south-east coast of England (the mouth of the Thames) was the Nor Sea naval area with the Chatham and Sheerness bases. On the east coast of England, in the depths of the Firth of Forth, the Rosite base was equipped, and in the Gulf of Mori-Firth, the construction of the Cromartie base began. However, the location of all these peacetime bases did not meet the main tasks of the English fleet, establish a distant blockade of Germany and did not allow the enemy to weaken the forces of the English fleet by the actions of the mine fleets and submarines. Therefore, immediately before the start of the war, the main forces of the English fleet were transferred to Scapa Flow, a vast sheltered bay of Orkney.
At the beginning of the war on the west coast of Scotland, Lokh Bay and Lough am Kiel were used temporarily as base points (up to the Scapa Flow equipment). In the Shetland Islands, the port of Lerwick (Lervik) was used to locate the light forces that had provided Scandinavian convoys with 1917.
An important frontier separating England from the continent was the English Channel (La Manche Strait) - a node of the most important sea routes. All cargo and military transportation from England to France was carried through the channel and passed from the Atlantic to the eastern ports of England. At the same time, the English Channel with the Dover Strait was the shortest route for German submarines to enter the western sea routes of England.
The main naval base of the French fleet, Brest, and Cherbourg, were also located on the coast of the English Channel. Due to the fact that the main forces of the fleet acted on the Mediterranean, these bases were of secondary importance
A developed network of aerodromes was created on the east coast of England, and coastal batteries were installed to protect the direct approaches to the ports.
Throughout the war, the North Sea remained the home area of the main forces of the navy of England and Germany. Together with the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, the English Channel and approaches to it from the west, it was the most important of the maritime theaters of war, although there were no decisive clashes between the fleets concentrated here.
An important strategic position during the First World War was occupied by the Mediterranean theater of military operations, where sea routes to Europe from India and the Far East, as well as sea communications of France and Italy with their North African colonies, passed.
With the entry of Italy into the war, superiority in the forces of the Mediterranean turned out to be on the side of the Entente. England could not allocate significant forces for action in the Mediterranean. However, the main forces of the French fleet were concentrated here, which made it possible to block the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic Sea.
Table 2
Battleships
Considering the problem of basing fleets, it should be noted that the main naval base of the English fleet on the Mediterranean was La Valletta on the island of Malta, which was well fortified. The base of the fleet was Gibraltar, and the time base was Alexandria.
Assessing the overall system of the basing of the English fleet in the Mediterranean, it should be recognized that it provided for its combat activity, but during the Dardanelles operation the absence of bases in the Aegean Sea area affected.
The main naval base of the French fleet was Toulon. At the same time, the base had all the ship repair facilities and large stocks of material and technical means. Bizerte served as the base for all classes of ships, Algeria was used mainly for the basing of destroyers, and Oran was the basing point.
The existing basing system as a whole provided for the operations of the French fleet in the western part of the Mediterranean. For operations in the Adriatic, the French fleet was based on La Valletta.
The main base of the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean was La Spezia. At the same time Taranto was the main base of the Italian fleet on the Adriatic Sea. Naples was also used as a fleet base. Temporary bases were ports on the east coast of Italy: Brindisi, Ancona, Venice.
As for the basing systems of the Italian fleet, it provided combat operations in the middle part of the Mediterranean, but was not sufficiently developed in the Adriatic Sea.
Of particular interest is the basing system in the Mediterranean Sea of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. his main naval base, Paul, had sheltered parking for ships of all classes, several docks and repair shops. The base station with limited repair facilities was Kotor. The close proximity to the Montenegrin border allowed the possibility of shelling this base with artillery before 1916. From the sea, approaches to the Bay of Kotor were protected by coastal artillery. During the war, the equipment of Kotor base was improved. Here was based most of the German submarines operating in the Mediterranean.
By the beginning of the war, the German ships “Göben” and “Breslau” on the Mediterranean Sea passed through the straits to Constantinople and acted on the Black Sea during the war.
During the entire war in the Mediterranean, there were no major operations and military clashes of surface forces. At the same time, the actions of German submarines acquired the greatest development on the sea communications of the Entente. And for three years, since the autumn of 1915, about 4 million tons of merchant tonnage have been sunk here, i.e. 1 / 3 of all trade tonnage sunk by German submarines in 1915-1918 In the course of the entire war, the Entente carried out major troop movements across the Mediterranean to the West European and Balkan theaters of operations.
Since the beginning of the First World War, the ports of the Baltic and Black Seas were cut off from the ocean, acquired particular importance, as the only route of communication between Russia and its allies (except for the route through the Pacific Ocean and Siberia), the Northern Russian Maritime Theater of Operations.
As is known, the Barents and the White seas, due to the harsh climatic conditions in winter, are covered in large parts by floating ice. At this time, only the Barents Sea near the western part of the Kola coast does not freeze and is available for navigation all year round.
It should be emphasized that the plans of the warriors of Russia did not provide for military actions in the Northern Theater. The Barents and the White seas had only some commercial value. Ports of the White Sea were used for forest removal. There were no ports on the ice-free coast of the Barents Sea. Only Arkhangelsk was connected with the center of the country by railway. From a military point of view, the theater of military operations was not equipped, there were no defenses. All observation of the coast was carried out by the messenger ship "Bakan", annually coming from the Baltic Sea to protect the industries.
The current situation required the rapid development of the equipment of the existing ports and the creation of new, as well as the deployment of measures to protect maritime communications. It was necessary first of all to build a railway to the coast of the non-freezing Kola Bay, and to extend navigation on the White Sea to use icebreakers. The first arrangements for equipping the theater were limited to the construction of observation posts on the approaches to Arkhangelsk. Coastal batteries were installed on the Mudyug Island and a sentinel service was organized. In January, 1915 G completed the installation of a submarine telegraph cable from England to Aleksandrovsk. At the same time, a battery and booms were installed to protect the cable exit at Aleksandrovsk. A radio station and several observation posts were also built here.
Throughout the war, the Baltic Naval Theater of Warfare was important for Russia, from where the enemy, possessing a strong fleet, could threaten the entire Russian Baltic coast, including the area of St. Petersburg.
In addition, the northern flank of the Russian-German front rested against the sea.
Difficult navigation and hydrometeorological conditions and prolonged ice formation made it difficult to conduct military operations and limited the use of naval forces. At the same time, the small size of the sea allowed for a relatively short time to deploy forces for operations, and also facilitated the interaction of various classes of ships.
Of great strategic importance was the Gulf of Finland, on the east coast of which was the capital of Russia. The main support base of the fleet before the war was Kronstadt, but basing on Kronstadt was difficult because of the long freeze-up. Of particular importance for the defense of the Gulf of Finland were the narrow place of the bay between the island Napgen and the Porkkala-Udd peninsula, as well as the Abo-Aland and Moonsund regions, which occupied the flank position at the entrance to the bay and provided the fleet for operations on the high seas. The Abo-Alandeky skerry area was used for the basing of light forces, and the Moonsund region, which had no means for the basing of the war, covered the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.
The main base of the Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea was Helsingfors with a raid and fortress Sveaborg. However, Helsingfors was not sufficiently strengthened and equipped for fleet basing. The inner raid was inconvenient for large ships, so the battleships were forced to stand on an unprotected outer raid. As for the ship repair facilities, they were insignificant: the only dry dock on the Baltic Sea for battleships was in Kronstadt. Revel also had limited repair capabilities: the construction and equipment of the main, well-defended base of the Baltic Fleet (Peter the Great Fortress) outlined here was just begun before the war.
The Baltic Port, Rogonyuly (from 1915) and Ust-Dvinsk were used as the bases of the light forces of the Russian fleet. The anchorage sites were the raids of Porkkala-Uddsky [Lapvik], Erö, Utö, Werder [Kuivast].
According to the plan, the forward bases and strong points of Libau and Vindava were left by the Russian fleet, and in 1915 they were occupied by the enemy.
For Germany, the value of the Baltic theater increased due to the fact that, with an almost circular blockade, the Baltic Sea with its pouring zone remained the only way to transport iron ore and other raw materials from Sweden, in which Germany was in dire need.
The German fleet had a deployed basing system on the Baltic Sea with sufficient repair facilities. In this case, the main base was Kiel. Due to the presence of the Kiel Canal, this base as a repair and rear area was of great importance for the North Sea. The bases used were Danzig with a well-covered raid Putzig, the Pillau base, and from the middle of 1915, the city of Libau. It should be emphasized that the ratio of the permanent fleet forces on the Baltic Sea was in favor of the Russian fleet.
Table 3
The composition of the naval forces on the Baltic Sea to the beginning of the war
However, the German command had the opportunity, if necessary, to transfer significant forces of the Open Sea fleet through the Kiel Canal and create, thus, a great advantage in forces. So, in 1915, the ships were transferred from the North Sea for a breakthrough to the Gulf of Riga, and in 1917, for the Moonsund operation.
Considering the possibility of rapid concentration on the Baltic Sea of the main forces of the German fleet, the Russian command proceeded from the general balance of fleet forces and set defensive tasks for its fleet, the most important of which was to defend the coast and cover the approaches to the capital from the sea.
It should be noted that the equipment of the Baltic Theater at the beginning of the war was insufficient and clearly did not meet the tasks assigned to the Russian fleet.
The basis of the defense of the Gulf of Finland at the beginning of the war was the Central Mine and Artillery Position - a minefield exposed to the narrowness of the bay and covered with batteries on the sharp Nargen and at Porkkala Udda. Directly adjacent to it was a flanking-shkhernaya position west of Porkkala-Udda, where mines and batteries were installed in the early days of the war. The coastal defenses of the central position did not provide a solid cover for the flanks. The defense of the position was assigned to the fleet, the main forces of which were deployed in the rear of the position in anticipation of a battle with the German fleet during its breakthrough into the Gulf of Finland.
The deployment of inactive operations in the middle and southern parts of the sea in 1914 required the strengthening of theater equipment in order to ensure the defense of the Gulf of Finland. Batteries were built in the areas of the island of Nargen and Revel, two batteries on the island of Worms and a battery on the Porkkala Udd peninsula.
In order to expand the basing of light forces and submarines in the areas of the Abo-Aland skerries and the Moonsund archipelago, intensive work began at the end of 1914, which continued into subsequent years.
Assessing the state of defense of the coast of Germany at the beginning of the war, it should be recognized as stable. During the war on the coast, a wide network of local airfields, radio stations and radio direction finding stations was created. Defensive minefields were placed mainly in the pouring zone and on the approaches to their bases, active minefields in the northern part of the Baltic Sea in order to block the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland.
Turning to the consideration of the Black Sea theater of military operations, it should be noted that if the equipment of the Baltic Sea Theater of Military Operations (theater of operations) before the First World War was given more or less sufficient attention, then this cannot be said of the Black Sea theater. The attitude of the top military leadership of Russia to the latter, as a secondary theater of military operations, adversely affected not only the construction of ships, but also the organization of the basing system.
Meanwhile, the limited size of the Black Sea and, consequently, relatively short distances to the most important enemy targets (from Sevastopol to the Bosporus 280 miles) made it possible to quickly deploy forces in any area.
The main base of the Black Sea Fleet was Sevastopol, the basing points were Odessa and Batum, the rear repair base was Nikolaev. In this case, only the main base of the fleet was relatively equipped. However, from the sea, Sevastopol was weakly fortified. Therefore, the security of the ships in Sevastopol in wartime was not guaranteed. The port itself was not sufficiently equipped. The rest of the bases were in a very unsatisfactory condition. The military department, to which they submitted before 1910, repeatedly demanded the elimination of the fortifications in Batumi (Batumi) and Ochakovo, and only a decisive action by the Naval Ministry against such a rash decision allowed them to be retained as possible fleet bases during the war.
Batum was important not only as a fleet stationing base, but also as a transport and transfer point for supplying the Caucasian army. Strengthened defensive work to strengthen Batum began only during the war. The coastal defense was reinforced by field guns, an observation post and on the approaches to the port - by minefields. The hydroaviation base was equipped, and the Batumi fortress artillery, which had insufficient firing range, at the end of 1914 received new weapons for reinforcement.
In addition to the listed fortified points, coastal batteries were installed near Odessa, on the Tendrovsky spit, near the Ak-Mosque, Evpatoria, Yalta, Theodosia, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi, Gagra, Sukhumi, Poti.
By the beginning of the war in Russia there were several radio stations, a number of new stations were built during the war.
The network of observation and communication posts was widely developed, all coastal points were connected by telegraph and telephone communication. The airfield network was developed.
The most serious shortcoming of the fleet basing system on the Black Sea theater of operations was the lack of a well-equipped and protected naval base on the Caucasian coast.
The main opponent of Russia on the Black Sea theater was Turkey.
By the beginning of the war, Turkey had the only fleet base in the theater of operations - Constantinople, and from 1915, when Bulgaria came out on the side of the Central Powers, Varna was used for temporary deployment (in particular, by submarines).
The sea traffic on the Black Sea was of great importance for Turkey, since the road network on the Anatolian coast was very poorly developed. Its most important inland sea route ran along the Anatolian coast from Constantinople to Trabzon. This route was used to supply the armies of the Caucasian Front, and also brought coal to the capital from the Zonguldak and Ereглиli area. The lack of convenient anchorage protected from the sea made it difficult for the Turks to organize the protection of maritime communications. During the war, this path compared with peacetime has undergone some changes. At the same time, the ships proceeded closer to the coast in relatively shallow depths, which significantly complicated the operations of Russian submarines.
Table 4
The composition of the naval forces in the Black Sea to the beginning of the war with Turkey
By the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet did not have new battleships (the Dreadnought 3 was built in Nikolaev), however, the Russian battleships were stronger than the Turkish ones. However, the arrival in August of 1914 from the Mediterranean to Constantinople of the German cruiser “Göben” nullified the advantage of the Russian fleet.
The fact is that the high-speed Göben, as well as the German light cruiser Breslau, could have escaped from any superior Russian forces and, in turn, had the opportunity to impose battle on the weaker of the enemy ships.
A few words should be said about the Black Sea straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles, connecting the Black and Mediterranean seas through the Sea of Marmara. Bosphorus length 16 miles, width up to two miles; Depths along the axis of the strait 28-100 m. Both coasts at the entrance to the strait from the Black Sea to the beginning of the war were strongly fortified.
On the Asian coast of the strait, from the entrance to the Black Sea, there were eight forts and coastal batteries - a total of up to 50 caliber guns from 150 to 80 mm; There are also eight forts and batteries on the European coast - in total over 20 caliber guns from 150 to 350 mm.
The mine defense of the Bosporus was organized before the outbreak of war. Three rows of landmine-controlled mines were placed across the strait in narrowness between Rumeli-Kavak and Agadolu-Kwwak. At the same time, the passage was left on the east side. Several rows of mines were placed north of Anadolu Kawak, and several individual mine cans were placed along the Asian coast. A barrier across the strait was placed directly at the entrance. Mines were also delivered near Killos.
The length of the Dardanelles strait 35 miles, width two or three miles, the depth along the axis of the strait 50 - 100 m; Chanakkale's narrowness is eight cables wide.
The fortifications of the Dardanelles consisted of a series of batteries, which were located near the coast and were divided into external and internal. Intermediate batteries, located at heights, had guns (mostly field and mortars) of a caliber not exceeding 150 mm.
By the outbreak of hostilities, the defense of the strait included a number of old open forts built in 1877-1878, armed with obsolete cannons, and several batteries. The firing range of the guns did not exceed nine km. The total number of guns reached 100. During the war, equipment was updated and expanded, especially in connection with the Dardanelles landing operation of the Anglo-French fleet.
When approaching the strait from the side of the Aegean Sea, the enemy ships first of all got into the zone of fire of forts and external batteries Kumkale and Seddulbahir, installed at the very entrance to the strait. In service of these forts and batteries were 26 guns, including 16 - caliber 240 - 280 mm.
Approaching the traverse of the Seddulbahir batteries, the ships came out from under the shelling of the Kumkale battery, but remained in the fire zone of the batteries and the Seddulbahir fort. Such a system of location of guns allowed firing both across and along the strait, into the stern of ships breaking through into the strait.
Further along the Asian and European shores were intermediate batteries (85 120 caliber guns - 210 mm. Among them was the Dardanos battery on a high hill of the Asian coast near Kepez-Limany Bay, which shelled the strait in both directions to the maximum range of fire.
The main defense of the strait was a strong internal battery, located on both sides of the narrow part of the strait to Canakkale. On the Asian coast were the coastal batteries of Hamidiye I and Chimenlik, on the European coast - Rumeli, Hamidiye II, Namazgiah. In addition, north of Chanakkale on the Asian coast to Nar’s narrowness there were three forts that were also part of the general defense system of the narrowness of the strait.
All internal forts and batteries had 88 guns, including 12 guns of 280 caliber - 355 mm, 57 guns from 210 to 260 mm. Especially strongly fortified were the batteries of the newest construction - Hamidie I on the Asian coast and Hamidiye II against it - on the European side. The battery fire control, like the entire leadership of the sea defense of the strait, was carried out by German officers.
Assessing the balance of forces of the parties to the sea by the beginning of the First World War, it should be noted that the combined naval forces of the Entente (England, France and Russia) significantly surpassed the naval forces of the Union of Central States as a whole, there and in most maritime theaters.
Taking into account the ships that were under construction, the fleets of the Entente states surpassed the naval forces of Germany and its allies in the new battleships twice, in the battle cruisers 2,5 times, in the squadron destroyers - in 2,5 times, in submarines - three times .
In addition, the fleets of the Entente had a more developed basing system and a better strategic position in most maritime theaters of operations.
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