Military Review

Commander of the Caucasian Front

104
Commander of the Caucasian FrontContemporaries called General N.N. Yudenich outstanding commander, "the genius of the offensive and maneuver"


The Caucasian front throughout the war was markedly different from other theaters of war. At any time of the year, it was not a trench positional war that was fought here, as in other places, but active fighting with detours, encirclements and decisive breakthroughs took place.

Russian commanders won a series of such victories on the Turkish front, which the commanders of other fronts could not have dreamed of for a long time. And, paradoxically, victories that our commanders envied on the Austrian and German fronts and allied commanders envied became possible, not least because they practically did not work in the Caucasus ... adopted in accordance with the Regulations on troop field control two-tier leadership system. In practice, the primacy of the Caucasian governors - first, Count I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkova, and then - who replaced him in the post of Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, was transformed into trivial, but therefore no less effective, separation of powers.

Noting the successes of the Caucasian army, the Russian monarchist propaganda, like the allied press, praised, above all, the nominal Commander-in-Chief. Although the main creator of victories in the Caucasus was, of course, General N.N. Yudenich, who in Russia is still remembered mainly as a commander-loser, who unsuccessfully tried to take Petrograd in 1919 year. Contemporaries, not without reason, called Yudenich an outstanding military leader, "the genius of the offensive and maneuver." Even the fact that it was he who fell then to head the march to the “red” Petrograd should be regarded as direct evidence of the recognition of the highest professional level of the “Suvorov school general”. This assessment of Yudenich sounded more than once in emigrant publications. As a worthy adversary, Soviet researchers also paid tribute to him. It is significant that no derogatory definition from Bolshevik propaganda, such as "Denikinism" or "Kolchak", did not receive a short period of leadership by Yudenich white armies in North-West Russia.

Nikolai Yudenich was born 18 on July 1862 of the year in Moscow in the family of a descendant of poor Minsk gentry, college adviser. But he did not follow in the footsteps of his father, and preferred a military career to a peaceful and peaceful life of an official. He graduated from the Third Alexander School, and then - the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. Commanding the 18 rifle regiment as part of the 5 th rifle brigade of the 6 th East-Siberian rifle division, he fought bravely in the Russian-Japanese war, was awarded the Golden weapons and the Orders of St. Vladimir, III degree with swords and St. Stanislav I of degree with swords.

Beginning of World War in August 1914, 52-year-old N.N. Yudenich met in the Caucasus with the rank of lieutenant general. The hastily formed Caucasian army was then headed, despite his advanced age (he was 76 years old), the cavalry general imperial governor in the Caucasus, Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov. Tsarist dignitary with great experience, he was better known not as a commander, but as a horse breeder and head of security of Alexander III. The chief merit of the count was considered the pacification of the Caucasus after 1905, when the governorship was restored there. It is Vorontsov-Dashkov who is credited with authorship in the creation of a political system in the south of Russia, which was called military-national control. In Soviet times, it was severely criticized, although the realities of the 20th century showed that the national policy of the CPSU (b) -CPSU in the same Caucasus was untenable.

But even Soviet researchers nevertheless did justice to the flexibility of the central authority of the Russian empire in the national question.
The search for a balance between the centripetal tendencies in this policy and taking into account national specifics at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries was not always unsuccessful. The system of military-national management was specific to the North Caucasus. Now it is recognized that she wore a relatively progressive, albeit relatively. So, among other things, at first, congresses of trusted representatives organized in the Caucasus allowed the population to feel completely protected from the arbitrariness of officials. However, all attempts by the governor to introduce Zemstvo administration in the Caucasus, which showed itself very well in European Russia, did not find understanding at the top: Nicholas II, in response to numerous letters from Count Vorontsov-Dashkova, referred to the intractability of the Duma and possible opposition from the Caucasian elite. However, the successor of Vorontsov-Dashkova as governor-general, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, although he held several meetings on this topic in Tiflis, did not even manage to introduce a zemstvo in the Caucasus.

Recalling the same year 1905, when the Caucasian governorship was restored, a contemporary wrote that at that moment “political strings in the Caucasus were stretched to the fullest. At the head of the Caucasus was to be a man of a balanced and remarkable mind, a man with a bold, independent character and a far-sighted gaze, and, finally, a man with a will and a kind heart, easily perceiving and understanding the soul of the Caucasus. ” Obviously, from the point of view of the royal court, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov was just such a man.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that by 1914, the situation in the Caucasus was indeed much calmer than in Petrograd, Moscow, or industrial areas, where only lazy people did not speak about revolution.

Turkey declared war on Russia 2 on November 1914 of the year, and took full advantage of the fact that it entered the war later than the Germans and the Austrians. By that time, two-thirds of the Russian troops from the Caucasus had already been sent to the European Theater of War. Turkish troops began hostilities with shelling from the sea of ​​Russian ports on the Black Sea. Let us turn once more to the testimony of a contemporary - the commander of the convoy of the Caucasian governor, Esaula N. Bigaev: “In the first days of the war, the count could not be known. He was twice younger, he was burning with the fire of a military feat, constantly worrying about whether camping tents, his riding horses, etc., are in order. ”And yet the war can hardly be considered a suitable occupation for an 76-year-old man like the Caucasian governor. Just a few months later, the illness put the count in bed and, according to the head of his convoy, "has not let him out of his iron arms since then." As a result, the assistant Vorontsov-Dashkova on the military unit, General A.Z. Myshlaevsky. Mikhail Bulgakov assigned his surname to one of the heroes of his novel “The White Guard” with a light hand, but the elderly general couldn’t serve as a prototype for the brave gunner. To direct the headquarters of the operatively formed Caucasian army they charged General N.N. Yudenich.

Having forces almost three times lower than the Turks, Caucasians organized a very flexible and active defense of the 720 front in kilometers - up to Lake Urmia.

There has been no talk of advances yet, since the lion’s share of resources — both human and material — still had to be directed to the European theater of operations. Disappointment reigned in Tiflis - there was talk even in coffeehouses about the threefold superiority of the Turks in forces. However, the Russians managed to strike several strong blows at the enemy back in October. And although then I had to retreat, but also to liquidate the Muslim uprising in the Chorokh region, which caused a real panic in Tiflis, by November the situation had stabilized. Tsar Nicholas II himself decided to come to the Caucasus in a timely manner, which sharply lifted the spirit of the troops and returned calm to the streets of Tiflis.

I must say that the city at that time really literally trembled with fear, turning into a tattered “anthill”. The Armenians, for the patronage of which, as will be said below, more than once criticized the count-governor and his wife, rushed from Tiflis. The wives of the staff officers, from whom their husbands could not hide the alarming telegrams from the front, packed up the property, and trucks crashed through the streets of the city. But the Tiflis Palace even before the arrival of the Sovereign kept complete peace of mind. Some representatives of the frightened population addressed the Countess Elizabeth Andreevna herself with questions: “Your Grace, Countess! Things are bad at the front, is it not better for you to leave here in advance? ” The wife of the governor answered in full accordance with her position: “Only the cowards run away. Instead of organizing the defense of their native land, hometown, part of the population, especially Armenians, shamefully flee, not sparing money for it. I'm not going anywhere. ” The countess didn’t even think of sparing “her own” Armenians or high-ranking officers of the headquarters.

The tranquility that finally reigned in Tiflis after the visit of Nicholas II turned out to be all the more important because in a few days the Turks did go over to the offensive. The most intense and dangerous section of the front was Erzerumsky, where the well-trained 3 Turkish army opposed the Russians. It was headed by one of the leaders of the "Young Turks" Enver Pasha, who not only plotted troops in Little Russia, but even dreamed of the "Turan kingdom" from Kazan to Suez. December 9 Turks went on the offensive and were in the rear of the Russian. The count-governor was in complete confusion, General Myshlaevsky took over command of the army, Yudenich led the II Turkestan Corps. They were already at the front of the 11 number, and Yudenich's corps so actively reflected the blows of two Turkish corps that they stopped at the approaches to Sarykamysh. Pulling up five divisions to the city, Enver-pasha could not even imagine that they were fighting with only two teams. Myshlaevsky lost heart and began to give orders one after another for a retreat. 15 December he threw troops altogether and, having lost contact with Tiflis, rode to the rear.

Yudenich, who led the Sarykamysh detachment, had to rectify the situation, and decided not to surrender the city under any circumstances.

December 16 Turks rushed into Sarıkamış, but the Russians knocked them out. After this, Yudenich found an opportunity for a swift maneuver: his detachment went on an unexpected counter-offensive, moreover, surrounded the main forces of the Turkish army and captured them. Enver Pasha left the troops defeated by Sarykamysh and tried to deliver a distraction blow near Kara-Kurgan, but the Russian 39-I division, which later received the name of the “iron”, shot down almost the entire 11 of the Turkish corps.

December 25 Yudenich, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Governor Count Vorontsov-Dashkova, took over the actual command of the Caucasian Army. So, the separation of powers — into the purely military behind Yudenich, with his headquarters, and the administrative-economic one in the rear behind the viceroy-commander-in-chief — took place de facto.

By January 5 1915, the enemy was thrown back to its original positions, having lost 90 thousands of bayonets with killed and captured 30. The Russians advanced into Turkish territory 40-24 kilometers, marking the beginning of an almost continuous offensive after this against the Turks. For the success in the operation under Sarykamysh, Nicholas II produced Yudenich to the generals from infantry and awarded him the Order of St. George IV degree, and on January XNUMX officially appointed the commander of the Caucasian army, separating the authority of the deputy and the front commander de jure. Quite quickly, Nikolai Nikolayevich managed to rally the units entrusted to him, further strengthen their morale. Co-worker Yudenich General Veselozerov later noted: “In the shortest possible time, he became close and comprehensible to Caucasians. He was widely hospitable, but in matters of service he was demanding both to himself and to others. ”

But it was at this time that Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, with whom Yudenich found mutual understanding, requested his Majesty's resignation. The count wrote to the sovereign that the time had come to “release him from the discharge of his overpowering duties and dismiss him in peace.” Having received no direct answer from Nicholas II, the governor submitted a second petition. The sovereign did not agree to the dismissal of Count Vorontsov-Dashkova from the post of Commander-in-Chief and the Governor of the Caucasus, writing in reply: “I cannot imagine the Caucasus without you ...”.

However, as it turned out, the change of high authorities in the Caucasus was only postponed.

By this time, the health of Count Vorontsov-Dashkov had recovered somewhat, but quite unexpectedly, they began to blame for the… swift advance into the depths of Turkish territory, specifically into Turkish Armenia. At the meetings of the Council of Ministers 30 July and 4 August 1915, chaired by I.L. Goremykin and with the participation of the Minister of War A.A. Polivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov and others, addressed to the aged deputy governor, sounded such words, which, if desired, could be taken even for accusations of high treason. It got to the point that the cabinet members called the lightning offensive of the Caucasian army harmful, criminal for the interests of Russia and the general economy of warfare. The contemporary testifies that “the ministers pointed out (and General Polivanov confirmed) that Count Vorontsov-de was interested only in the Armenian issue - the re-establishment of Greater Armenia, and that common interests are alien to him”.

It was at this time, after a series of defeats in the spring-summer company 1915, Nicholas II decided to take over the supreme command of the Russian army, removing from his post the commander-in-chief uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. He was sent by the governor to the Caucasus instead of the finally losing Count Vorontsov-Dashkova. And with leaving the Grand Duke high rank of Supreme Commander - but only in the Caucasus. Yudenich, who had almost single-handedly disposing on the Caucasian front for almost a year, could have been wary of direct intervention in his affairs by the Grand Duke, whose authority in the army, despite the veiled resignation, remained very high.

The new Caucasian governor, unlike most of the other Romanovs, was a professional soldier, but fought only in the 1877-1878 years - in the Balkans. As Supreme Commander, he gained enviable popularity.
This was the cause of the real Fronde, which Nicholas II staged not only Duma members and ministers, but also many members of the imperial family, when he decided to personally head the army. Some modern researchers are even ready to accuse the royal uncle of trying to organize a conspiracy against the emperor and reign as Nicholas III himself. But these accusations are primarily refuted by the fact that after the abdication, Nicholas II wanted to reappoint his commander as supreme commander, by the way, the head of the Romanov family council. General A.A. Brusilov described the Grand Duke as almost the ideal Chief Commander: "Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich was appointed the Supreme Commander. In my opinion, at that time it was impossible to find the best Supreme Commander. He was a man completely devoted to military affairs, and theoretically and practically knew and loved military craft. " Chief of Operations Division, General Headquarters, Yu.N. Danilov was not at all shy in his eulogy: "Great Prince Nikolai Nikolayevich! Who did not hear that name? The first Russian Supreme Commander in the period of Russia's participation in world war. The person who led the huge five millionth army; the man who had the responsibility to protect a huge state, which constituted one sixth of the entire land of the globe. Through the ranks of this army for the entire time of the command of its Grand Duke, at least as many millions more people gathered from all over Russia. nonnuyu his army, he was able to lead to victory; her dignity, he was able to save in the period of serious failures.

Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolayevich impressed everyone who saw him for the first time, above all with his outstanding regal appearance, which made an unprecedented impression.
Extremely tall, slender and flexible as a stalk, with long limbs and a proudly set head, he stood out sharply above the crowd that surrounded him, no matter how significant it was. Thin, precisely engraved, features of his open and noble face, framed by a small graying beard with a wedge, complemented his characteristic figure. "

But it seems that the consequences of a shift from the highest post in the army had a very strong impact on the Grand Duke. The separation of powers was preserved - for a long time Nikolay Nikolayevich in the Caucasus did not at all intervene in the disposition of his complete namesake Yudenich, although he began to show his legendary exactingness immediately. It must be admitted that such demands of the new governor were not out of place - the Turks recovered from the first defeats and were preparing to again invade the borders of the Russian Empire. When Enver Pasha made an attempt in the summer of 1915 to break through the Russian front in the Kara direction, it was disrupted by the solidarity of the Russian troops and the tactically competently constructed Alashkert operation. It is significant that on the Caucasian front, as compared with the European theater of war, the Russian troops did not have such acute problems with armaments and ammunition, although it was not possible to completely avoid shell hunger. However, the return artillery and machine-gun fire of the Russians was invariably extremely effective. And this is, first of all, the merit of General Yudenich, who managed very carefully to dispose of significant stocks of weapons made in the Caucasus before the war.

By this time, the situation in Persia (Iran) was causing increasing alarm among the Russian authorities. An extensive network of German agents operated in the country, which formed sabotage detachments and pushed Persia to war with Russia on the German side. In this situation, the Stavka, in agreement with the Grand Duke, the new governor of the Caucasus and the commander-in-chief, commissioned Yudenich's troops to conduct an operation called Hamadan. An expeditionary corps was formed. October 30 Russian units suddenly landed in the Iranian port of Enzeli, conducted several expeditions inland, taking the city of Qom, Hamadan on the outskirts of Tehran. In addition, attempts by enemy formations to penetrate into Eastern Persia and Afghanistan were blocked. In a letter to Nicholas II, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich did not say a word about his namesake, the commander, but noted, not without satisfaction, that "Persia was wary of entering the war on the side of the German bloc."

But the situation on the Russian-Turkish front was still troubled. True, winter was approaching, and the Turks believed that large Russian forces would not go to the mountains in order not to die from the cold and not get stuck in the snow. And N.N. Yudenich believed that such a mistake could be in the hands of the Caucasian army and, not having had time to secure the approval of his proposals from the Grand Duke, insisted before Bid on the mountain offensive by the end of December. Moreover, the offensive was large-scale, it was proposed to break through the defense of the Turks in three directions at once: Erzurum, Oltinsky and Bitlis. The rate, and in fact - personally the chief of staff, General M.V. Alekseev, in the end, gave the go-ahead, and the main blow Caudents Yudenich, overcoming mountain passes, inflicted in the direction of Kepri-Kay. They crushed the enemy, who was confused by surprise, seized the Erzerum fortress and drove another hundred kilometers into the interior of the Turks. Half of the Turkish army was destroyed, the other - demoralized. Russian troops opened the way to Anatolia - the central region of Turkey.

The December victory of the army of Yudenich’s contemporaries was immediately put on a par with the assault of Ismail A.V. Suvorov in 1790 year.

The commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army for this campaign was awarded the Order of St. George of the II degree. Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolayevich received his George. But after all, the victory under Erzurum Yudenich won in fact in a difficult struggle with his own superiors. As the military historian Anton Kersnovsky writes, after taking the Keprikei position, the Grand Duke "ordered the army to be withdrawn from Erzerum and become winter apartments", believing "the storming of the strongest fortress into the cruel cold on the chest in the snow and without siege artillery" is impossible. But Yudenich did not in the least doubt success, for he saw every hour how high the fighting spirit of the Caucasians warriors was, and he took the liberty of directly communicating with the august commander-in-chief. The stake, this time personally Nicholas II, though not without the pressure of the general from the infantry, Mikhail Alekseev, gave the go-ahead. “Suvorov defeated Moltke,” A. Kersnovsky stated, not without some pathos, “The Grand Duke conceded, declaring that he was no longer responsible for everything that could happen.”

After the Russians captured Erzerum, the Western public, which for a long time regarded the Caucasian front as secondary, and looked down on the Turks, as if on some unworthy opponents, was simply shocked. Here is what the French ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paleologue, wrote in his report during the winter Russian-Turkish battle: “This success is all the more commendable because the offensive of our allies began in a mountainous country as lofty as the Alps, rugged by abysses and passes. There is a terrible cold, constant snowstorms. Moreover - no roads, and the whole region is devastated. The Caucasian Russian army performs amazing feats there every day. ” The December victory in general abruptly turned the attitude towards Russia from the side of the Western allies. Shortly before that, they were finally forced to put up with a serious failure in the Dardanelles, where, by the way, they were successfully opposed by those “unworthy” opponents - the Turks. Just a month after the capture of Erzerum, namely 4 in March 1916, an Anglo-French-Russian agreement was reached on the goals of the Entente war in Asia Minor. Russia was promised Constantinople, the Black Sea Straits and the northern part of Turkish Armenia. "While in our Western theater of war Russian commanders, even the best, tried to act first" according to Moltke "and then" according to Geoffroy, "A. Kersnovsky wrote about Yudenich, in the Caucasus there was a Russian commander who wished to act in Russian, "according to Suvorov".

As we see, on the Caucasian front, Yudenich had to fight under the authority of two governors, but at the same time being the commander-in-chief.

And such “leading solitaire” was as if “destined” to him by fate itself. Not long ago, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation declassified one of the reports of the Foreign Department of the GPU about a meeting of the top commanders of the Russian army, which Wrangel evacuated from the Crimea to the Gallipoli camp in Turkey. It took place in March 1922 of the year in Belgrade, and it made decisions about the new intervention in Bolshevik Russia. Among other things, the meeting said: “There are plans to invade Russia of three groups: the Wrangel group from the south, the Salvation of the Homeland group of troops and the Western group under the command of Krasnov. All three groups will be united under a single command ... The following command personnel are planned for the upcoming operations: The supreme commander and temporary supreme ruler is Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, his assistant is General Gurko, chief of staff is General Miller, commander in chief is General Yudenich, chief of cavalry is General Wrangel ... "

Count Governor Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov died shortly after being displaced and scattered at the Council of Ministers - already 28-th (15-th according to Art. Style) January 1916, in the famous Vorontsov Palace in the Crimean Alupka. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, after the Provisional Government did not actually allow him to return to the post of Supreme Commander of the Russian army, no longer took an active part in subsequent tragic events in Russia. He passed away in Antibes 5 on January 1929 of the year. General Yudenich, whom the Provisional Government of 7 of May 1917 of the year removed from the command of the Caucasian front, still managed to grapple with the Reds near Petrograd without success. He emigrated to France and died on October 5 1933 of Nice.
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  1. Skobelev
    Skobelev 30 December 2013 11: 47
    +4
    It would be interesting to read a reasoned article about the unsuccessful offensive of parts of N.N. Yudenich, who tried to take Petrograd in 1919.
  2. Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 30 December 2013 13: 55
    +7
    N.N. Yudenich remained an underestimated commander. But under his leadership, the Russian army won a number of brilliant victories over the Turkish troops. Sarykamysh operation, the capture of Erzurum, Trebizond operation. The latter is somehow not mentioned at all by the authors. But these military operations were different from each other. The capture of Erzurum in the design and execution of one of the best operations in the 1st World War. And the Trebizond operation with the landing of Russian troops? Is she not worth mentioning? Instead of analyzing military operations carried out under the command of Yudenich, we read about ... who, what, who told whom. And how hard it was to fight with dignitaries.
    Plus, I would like to read more
    Skobelev "about the unsuccessful offensive of NN Yudenich's units, who tried to take Petrograd in 1919."
    1. xan
      xan 30 December 2013 14: 09
      +12
      I must also add that the Russians had just dealt with the divisions of the Turks, which, under the command of the old man Von Der Goltz, defeated the British in Mesopotamia and a year later repelled the English-French landing, i.e. actually the most combat-ready formations of the Turkish army. After the Trebizond operation, the Turks actually had one militia left.
  3. Motors1991
    Motors1991 30 December 2013 15: 17
    +3
    And the task asks why they did not capture the Bosphorus? It was necessary not to arrange the Brusilov breakthroughs, but to throw all their strength into the capture of Constantinople and Russia fulfilled its tasks in the First World War. Why didn’t they do that? I don’t understand.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Vadim2013
      Vadim2013 30 December 2013 15: 46
      +1
      Agreements were with the allies.
      1. cdrt
        cdrt 2 January 2014 00: 45
        +2
        Quote: Vadim2013
        Agreements were with the allies.


        By the way, in addition to the outstanding company of Yulenich, in the WWI, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was, as I understand it, the only fleet that conducted not a series of unrelated battles, but an integrated, focused company, as a result of which it gained undeniable superiority at sea, conducted successful naval landings, and effectively interacted with the land the army.
        Actually, the superiority at sea won by the Black Sea Fleet made it possible to plan the Bosphorus MDO at the end of the war
  4. T-12
    T-12 30 December 2013 17: 15
    +3
    To the topic. My grandfather's uncle died near Erzorum in 15g.
    1. 4fedor1
      4fedor1 1 January 2014 20: 49
      +1
      eternal glory. remember the young man.
  5. RUSS
    RUSS 30 December 2013 17: 28
    +3
    Interestingly, in the new textbook on the History of Russia, Yudenich is a hero who distinguished himself in the 1st World War for his general talent or "contra", the leader of the White Guards, a loser commander. I lean towards the first!
  6. barbiturate
    barbiturate 30 December 2013 19: 28
    -5
    our troops always fought against the Turks not very badly, the general low level of command and great hope for the soldier, where our fighters had no equal, affected. The best units fought against the Germans and achieved nothing but enormous losses and complete disbelief in command; the Germans themselves very disparagingly spoke about the Russian army in the war. From this we conclude against whom success has been achieved and there is no need to so praise Yudenich and his ilk. Germany was the main enemy and the outcome of military operations is known
    1. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 30 December 2013 20: 29
      +7
      barbiturat "The best units fought against the Germans and achieved nothing but huge losses and complete disbelief in the command, the Germans themselves spoke very dismissively of the Russian army in the war."
      An example in the studio pliz ... otherwise we are all much more likely to chat.
      barbiturate "From this we conclude against whom the successes were achieved and there is no need to praise Yudenich and others like him so much"
      And against whom? The weak Turkish army successfully fought back on all fronts. And the steep Anglo-French allies at Gallipoli defeated. Or was this not?
      barbiturate "The main enemy was Germany and the result of military operations is known"
      It is known that the Germans also failed to conduct operations with the ease with which they were planned. This is to say that despite the victory of the German army over ours, in a number of battles, a merry march to the east did not work out for them.
      And you are apparently determined to praise the Germans if you don’t want to ...
      1. barbiturate
        barbiturate 31 December 2013 18: 30
        -2
        there are a lot of examples, you just read the memoirs of officers, read Ludendorff and Falkenhain, for example, there they write directly (I quote from memory, too lazy to look) "Against the Russian army, we can afford such actions that we would never allow ourselves against an EQUAL enemy", etc. .d. If you are interested, look on the Internet, there are a lot of materials.
        The Turkish army fought back against the landing operation of the Anglo French and did not have a land front with them, and what forces were used against them? The whole army of France held the Germans.
        The Germans never planned a merry march east, you don’t even know their military plans) 7 personnel armies and the entire guard were against France and one army (eighth) of the landver brigades basically consistently defeated the color of the Russian army (1 and 2 armies) + then the second East Prussian operation with the same result for us, etc. Yes, and the march did not work say? And after the Gorlitsky breakthrough, when our troops were draping and giving up a bunch of territories, when the strongest fortresses were built with almost no battle? much more fun

        And I do not praise the Germans, although there is a reason. You just need to see your mistakes and understand why the enemy is winning and learning for yourself, from your own mistakes. And if you lure your own eyes, then everything can happen again ...
        1. Nagaibak
          Nagaibak 1 January 2014 17: 05
          +1
          barbiturate "The Turkish army fought against the landing operation of the Anglo French and did not have a land front with them at all, and what forces were involved against them?"
          -Didn't have a land front? They fought in the air? Or on the water? And in Palestine and Iraq, too, in the air?
          Anglo-French troops in the modest Gallipoli landing operation lost 74 thousand people. 174 thousand wounded. No matter how you call it the Turkish victory over the enemy of equal Germans.
          barbiturate "there are a lot of examples, you just read the memoirs of officers, read Ludendorff and Falkenhain for example, there they write directly (I quote from memory, too lazy to look)" Against the Russian army, we can afford such actions that we would never allow ourselves against an EQUAL enemy " etc. If you are interested, look on the Internet, there are a lot of materials. "
          -You if you affirm something, then reinforce with quotes. And then there are a lot of examples ... hehe ... And I’ll figure it out without you looking through it and reading it.
          Although I can, like you ... read the statements of German military leaders about the Siberian corps. Respectfully know whether they spoke out.
          barbiturate "The Germans never planned a merry march to the east, you don't even know their military plans)"
          -I see you are dedicated to their military plans ... And how do you know that the British fought with the Turks in addition to Gallipoli? Otherwise, they would not have frozen about the land front.
          barbiturate"
          "And after the turtle-dove breakthrough, when our troops skidded and gave up a bunch of territories, when the strongest fortresses were built almost without a fight? Much more fun"
          -If they would have given up more territories ... The name "Great retreat" is closer to me, which it really was. Read Denikin, he describes how they retreated without ammunition ... maybe your respect for ours will increase.
          1. barbiturate
            barbiturate 2 January 2014 10: 13
            -1
            Quote: Nagaibak
            Anglo-French troops in the modest Gallipoli landing operation lost 74 thousand people. 174 thousand wounded. No matter how you call it the Turkish victory over the enemy of equal Germans.


            yes, this is the victory of the Turks, but the victory is precisely against the landing operation, when many factors play against the advancing one. For such an operation, not enough troops were involved, and second-rate ones. In general, you can talk for a long time.


            Quote: Nagaibak
            -You if you affirm something, then reinforce with quotes. And then there are plenty of examples ... hehe ... And I’ll figure it out without you looking through it. Although I can, like you ... I read the statements of German military leaders about the Siberian corps. Respectfully know whether they spoke out.


            I’ve practically given a quote to you, do you think that you’ll have something to prove, will I sit here digging around in my own and other people's notes?) Or show an example, dig in and quote, refute it reasonably, then I will not be too lazy) And if you read something , you would be surprised at the negligence with which the Germans spoke about the Russian command in particular and about the army in general. For example, take a number from prisoners and be surprised, but in general you can take and give a lot of numbers, but it is only done in a personal dispute, but not here because I’ll get tired of clave drumming and how do I know who I’m arguing with?)

            Quote: Nagaibak
            -I see you are dedicated to their military plans ... And how do you know that the British fought with the Turks in addition to Gallipoli? Otherwise, they would not have frozen about the land front.

            bring it, I gave you all the confirmed figures on the priority of the Germans in the WWI in 1914 and from whom the best Russian armies + the entire guards cavalry were defeated. Tell me where and how fiercely the British strained in the fight against the Turks?)

            Quote: Nagaibak
            -If they would have given up more territories ... The name "Great retreat" is closer to me, which it really was. Read Denikin, he describes how they retreated without ammunition ... maybe your respect for ours will increase.

            How do you know if they would give more or less?)) It was they who draped practically without pressure and surrendered the fortresses. I read Denikin and more. Who is to blame for their departure without ammunition? What was not shells? That the command was crap all the way and people even had no rifles? What was not nichrome and even pomegranate?
            I have respect for my troops, but you need not only respect in the fight against the enemy, but also skill, but it wasn’t nichrome
            1. barbiturate
              barbiturate 2 January 2014 10: 43
              0
              So, for a seagull and nothing to do, I add some quotes for you, I won’t dig for a long time, so during tea breaks) Here is an example quote response to your assumption

              Quote: Nagaibak
              -If they would have given up more territories ... The name "Great retreat" is closer to me, which it really was


              Close to the tsar, the gendarme general A.I. Spiridovich in his book "The Great War and the February Revolution of 1914-1917" recalled these tragic days and the so-called "Great Retreat":
              “In half of July, the Germans crossed the Vistula. 22 we left Warsaw, and 23 Ivangorod. Attacks of Osovts began. General Alekseev was completely at a loss. His panic mood was so corrupting to those around him that the staff officers had the idea to kill General Alekseev for the sake of saving the front. The Grand Duke Andrei Vladimirovich had to persuade the officers for a long time not to do this, so as not to make more mess.
              On August 4, the Kovno fortress fell. The commandant escaped. The surrender of Kovno raised rumors of treason.
              Novogeorgievsk surrendered on August 6. On that day, Polivanov said in the Council of Ministers: "Military conditions have worsened and become more complicated. In the current situation at the front and in the army's rear, one can expect an irreparable catastrophe every minute. The army is no longer retreating, but simply running. The headquarters has finally lost its head ..."
              On August 10, Osovets fell. Evacuate Brest-Litovsk. The headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief passed from Baranavichy to Mogilev. When retreating, civilians break away from their places and chase inland. ”

              As you can see, according to the official report of the Russian Minister of War, the Russian army then "did not retreat, but simply fled."
              1. barbiturate
                barbiturate 2 January 2014 11: 11
                0
                Yes, just start to read and remember what I read so I can fill you up with quotes, only I don't see the point, but if you please, we also quote abundantly about the "slip" and about the combat capability, including of the Siberian corps.

                Our famous general A.A. Brusilov in early summer 1915 signed the following document:
                "Order of the Commander of the VIII Army, General Brusilov A.A. dated June 5, 1915:
                “In addition, you need to have especially reliable people and machine guns in the back, so that, if necessary, force the weak-minded to go forward. One should not think before the mass execution of whole units for an attempt to turn back or, even worse, surrender to the enemy. Anyone who sees that an entire unit (company or more) is surrendering must open fire on those surrendering and completely destroy them. "
                "Rifle, machine-gun and cannon fire should be directed at those who surrender .... At least even with a ceasefire at the enemy, at those retreating or fleeing to act in the same way, and if necessary, do not stop before the mass execution."
                (MK Lemke. "250 days in the tsar’s headquarters." Minsk. Harvest. 2003)

                As you can see, Brusilov’s requirements are the most severe:
                “You should not think about the HEADLINE Shot of the WHOLE PARTS (!!!) for the ATTEMPT (!!!) to turn back or, even worse, surrender to the enemy.”
                The legendary Brusilov demands to DESTROY (!!!) the units and units of his troops that voluntarily surrender to the enemy, using ALL types of fire, including guns!

                Speak stumbling?

                And here's another
                1. barbiturate
                  barbiturate 2 January 2014 11: 18
                  0
                  Let's see what the commander of the North-Western Front, General M.V., wrote on July 6, 1915 to his wife. Alekseev:
                  "My heart is so hard, so difficult that I want to share with you, without waiting for the courier to come to you, but I am sending this letter by courier ...
                  from time to time such sad results are obtained, signs of such cowardice, cowardice and panic appear that they immediately cause irreparable damage to the common cause and the loss of battles.
                  Of course, there are reasons: few officers, lack of indigenous strong officers, poor mass training, its complete lack of cohesion in the army ...
                  All this demoralizes, accompanied by shameful flight, mass cases of surrender and the loss of their guns.
                  On June 30, the battle began in the 1st Army on the Prasnysha line.
                  Not much fear for the fate of the attack. I thought that it was a well-fortified position on which I had been sitting for four months, a slight comparative superiority in forces in this direction would give me time to bring reserves by rail and myself, by going on the offensive, to throw the Germans back.
                  But in the evening I received a disguised report that the position of the 11th Siberian Division had been broken through and "the division is no longer a combat force" - read that the division is no longer there. I still don't know everything, but it is clear that the division fled from one artillery fire, without waiting for the attack, and who did, raised their hands up.

                  (The country should know both its heroes and its skinners: the 11th Siberian Division under the command of General Zorako-Zorakovsky was part of the 1st Turkestan Corps and consisted of 230 officers, 14 bayonets, 397 machine guns, 26 guns. These are the good guys and fled from the enemy’s artillery fire alone, and the rest “raised their hands up”).
                  1. barbiturate
                    barbiturate 2 January 2014 11: 19
                    0
                    Alekseev quite self-critically evaluates his actions:
                    “Of course, I did not manage to show the high gift inherent in the commander, but I didn’t dare to vague signs to start transporting the reserve from a dangerous place two days earlier. If you had a fresh division at hand then, perhaps, if you hadn’t detained the fugitives, you could have closed the gap, but the division was just on the move, because I didn’t allow myself to think that within a few hours what would be done as a result of a many-day struggle.
                    Further, the stupidity and confusion of the chiefs did their job, and the entire army of Litvinov jumped 40-50 versts in four or five days, that is, to such a space that could be fought for a month under the most difficult conditions. "
                    General Palitsyn writes about these days as follows: “July 1. By telegram from General Litvinov, on June 30, at 9 pm, the 1st Siberian corps yielded its advanced positions and retreated to the next ... We counted on weeks, held out for a day, and the corps was one of the best and The rapid retreat of the 1st Siberian Corps had its effect in the headquarters mainly by the transience of the battle. They believed that, as it happened before, one could hold out for a long time. This illusion was undermined. "

                    And that is - NOT ALL.

                    “Plehve also had two divisions disgracefully scattered and, it seems, from a ghost mirage, which did not prevent the loss of almost half of the men and rifles. This was also not included in my calculations.

                    (Here M.V. Alekseev refers to the initial episodes of the Riga-Shavel operation, which lasted from July 1 (14) to August 7 (20). Against the 5th Army of General P. A. Pleve (four infantry, six cavalry divisions , three infantry and two cavalry brigades - a total of 117 thousand people, 365 guns) attacked the German Neman army (six infantry, five cavalry divisions, two infantry and two cavalry brigades, two separate detachments - a total of 115-120 thousand people, 600 guns).

                    These examples are not given by any current engaged historian, but by one of the most deserved and authoritative commanders of the Russian imperial army. Pay attention to the terms with which Alekseev describes the behavior of part of his troops: "they shamefully fled ... from a mirage-ghost, having lost from it" half of the people and rifles. "
                    But these are not some half-decomposed militia brigades, but the famous Siberian divisions ...

                    Here's a manenko for you about the "slip", and I'll find you a quote to which you clung, as time will allow the sedan.
                    1. barbiturate
                      barbiturate 2 January 2014 12: 03
                      0
                      By the way, I apologize, I wrote that it was said either by Ludendorf or Falkengine, but my memory failed me because they also had a lot of all that, here is a quote that you asked me to bring :)
                      Describing the armies of its future adversaries, the German General Staff noticed the low quality of our large units. "In the fight against the Russian troops," concluded his annual report in 1913, "we will be able to afford actions that we would not have dared to take with an equal enemy ..."

                      as you can see, the assessment is unambiguous and fully confirmed, except for Gumbinnen, our army did not inflict any defeat on the Germans, only defeat and an attempt to somehow hold on until the complete collapse of the army

                      If you want, ask some other quotes, you can talk about the guards and prisoners and about the supply and about the commanders and discipline in the Russian army and all with quotes from contemporaries) He rummaged through a bunch of them, both German and ours
                      1. Marat
                        Marat 4 January 2014 17: 14
                        +1
                        Drawing a conclusion from your conclusions, I don’t understand why then the Germans did not throw part of their best armies from the West and did not lead Russia out of the war (the attempt in 15 failed, despite our enormous losses)? After all, the Germans, unlike our then government, understood that the Anglo-Saxons will not go to the rescue of their eastern ally. And if the army survives at least until March 17, and Russia, for all its problems, has not capitulated, does this mean something?
                      2. barbiturate
                        barbiturate 5 January 2014 08: 05
                        -1
                        so you answered your question) in the year 17 you made second-rate units, read Ludendorff, he directly writes that instead of one army in 1914 and instead of 2 -4 armies in 15, you could make a sharp backup and would do

                        I’m just rooting for our Rodina and I’m going to die like an officer tanker, you just need to see how and what, then we will become stronger, I’m already teaching people in tanks to fight and hit the target, and it turns out
                      3. Nagaibak
                        Nagaibak 9 January 2014 20: 58
                        +1
                        Thus, I summarize what you and I have said. Regarding the statements of the German commanders in haughty style about the Russian army.
                        1.Reading Ludendorff, I did not notice this. He writes about the superiority of the German units. About their best tactical literacy, etc. 2. In addition, he spoke well of the Turkish expeditionary force that fought in Galicia.
                        3. On the German offensive in the Baltic region.
                        We quote Ludendorff. "They were brought to Kovna, and from here
                        distributed on the left wing of the 10th and on the right of the 8th army.
                        Meanwhile, the 10th Army was very heavily attacked by
                        Are strong. The enemy threw part of the forces from Poland to the north. In mind
                        the desire to win the flank of both the 10th army and the enemy intensified in the north, in the Vilkomir direction; on the north coast of Vilia fights
                        developed especially fiercely.
                        Extremely busy days came again. I would gladly
                        accelerated the start of operations, but from the railway Verzhbolovo  Kovna is impossible
                        was to extract more than she could give in an unfinished form. Everything was worth
                        infinitely long time, the roads were also bad and the troops were no longer
                        fresh. "
                        The conclusion of E. Ludendorff for 1915.
                        "The summer campaign against Russia was over. The Russians were defeated
                        and frontally pushed back. The operation in the coven direction did not
                        great results, because it was started too late. In that
                        lies the main reason. The enemy managed to prevent
                        threatening his reach on Vilia. If at that moment he were on
                        several transitions further to the west, then he would not be able to do this
                        1 Inflow of the Neman. Editors Note. Make.
                        For the entire war, both in the east and in the west, we have never succeeded
                        bring to the end the major strategic breakthrough. Breakthrough
                        between Vilna and Dvinsky he went further than all the others. He shows that
                        strategic breakthrough leads to full results only through
                        through the tactical reach that evolved from it. "
                    2. barbiturate
                      barbiturate 5 January 2014 12: 57
                      0
                      the Germans were captive of their illusions and tried to make everything poplana, but they struck and our commanders fled with a lot of defeats, read Ludendorff and Falkenhayn, they call it a mistake, if you left the screen against the French and hit 5-6 armies, then the Russian Empire I couldn’t resist what to do. Read Gerua, an imperial to the core and even so, I can quote if you wish
                    3. Marat
                      Marat 5 January 2014 18: 49
                      +2
                      That is, do you believe that Russia held out until February 17 only "thanks" to the German command?
                    4. barbiturate
                      barbiturate 8 January 2014 09: 34
                      -1
                      The conclusion may be bold, but it does so, the blatant mediocrity of the command and simply insane unpreparedness for war, coupled with technical backwardness (and much has been written about this), could quickly lead to the defeat of Russia in the war if the Germans turned attention to his eastern adversary. But what happened is what happened. For example

                      About how, in reality, the tsarist army was then ready to fight, wrote the Russian military historian A. Kersnovsky:
                      “In the fall of 1915, in the rear units, one rifle fell on ten soldiers, and on the front - for two. The situation on the Northern and Western fronts was especially bad, as they suffered the most severe losses during the retreat. In the IX Army Corps of the 3rd Army, for example, rifles had only the first battalions of regiments. In January 1916, according to Headquarters, in the armies of the Western Front, out of 754 combatant 000 — more than a third of all soldiers — were unarmed. We can safely assume that out of a total of 268 fighters, only about 000 were armed. ”

                      And the words of this historian are many confirmations from other sources.
                      So the king the priest himself was to blame for the troubles of his country, you won’t believe it, but orders on the same rifle before the war:

                      Chief Head Art. Gene control. Manikovsky in his book "Combat Supply of the Russian Army in the War of 1914-1918"

                      “The insignificant outfits of recent years have almost completely drowned out weapons production; not only people, but also machines, tools, patterns and, most importantly,“ skills ”were dispersed and sprayed.
                      Since 1908, the value of orders for factories has decreased sharply, so for the last three years before the war, orders for years were equal:
                      - for the Tula plant from 1% to 4,5%. their maximum performance.
                      - Izhevsk from 12% to 38%
                      - Sestroretsky from 0 to 5%

                      In 1914 it was even worse, so the Tula Plant could produce only 1 to 5 rifles per month. (!!!!) "

                      And they were preparing to fight the German Empire and the best army in the world (then)
                    5. barbiturate
                      barbiturate 8 January 2014 09: 39
                      0
                      and examples of such, huge herds, you can quote and quote. People need to know and understand the reason for their failures in order to win, and twist into their ears that everything is generally good, a beautiful marquise, they overlooked it there, it didn’t get there, but everything works out - it's a brain fog.
                    6. Nagaibak
                      Nagaibak 9 January 2014 21: 11
                      +1
                      barbiturate "The conclusion may be bold, but in fact it is, the blatant mediocrity of the command and just insane unpreparedness for war, coupled with technical backwardness"
                      I do not argue with this statement, but even the decomposed revolutionary propaganda of the Russian army acted on German nerves. And in the summer of 1917, she tried to advance, and Ludendorf testifies ...
                      "The Russian offensive in Eastern Galicia was accompanied by a large
                      consumption of military supplies; attacks were carried out in dense masses. Where were
                      Austro-Hungarian troops are located, the Russians were successful, against
                      German and Turkish troops  no. July 1, great Russian forces
                      broke through the Austro-Hungarian front between Zborov and Brzezany. Austro-
                      Hungarian troops were transferred to the enemy in masses. Commander-in-Chief
                      in the east was to enter into battle significant reserves so that on July 20
                      delay the onslaught. Further Russian attacks failed. Against south
                      Army offensive began on July 4. Hot fight going on
                      a few days ended in complete success in a defensive battle of the army
                      General Count von Botmer, which consisted almost exclusively of
                      German troops.
                      On July 6 and 7, the Russian offensive against the 3rd Austro-Hungarian army south of the Dniester was a complete success. Austro-Hungarian troops
                      leaned back; freshly arrived fresh German division tried
                      stop the retreat, but was carried away by the general stream. Russians
                      advanced to Lomnica and occupied Kalush. Commander-in-Chief
                      the east was critical. He focused on Tarnopol
                      intended for counterattack between Zborov and Seret
                      troops, and there were in the way of the division from the west. Like a year ago, first
                      had to support the front of Archduke Charles, and then only
                      unfold against romania and now the commander in chief east
                      first had to strengthen the Austro-Hungarian forces, mainly the 3rd
                      Austro-Hungarian army, and then only fulfill what is necessary for
                      counterattack deployment. If he did strike north of Zborov,
                      despite the instability of the front south of the Dniester and strong attacks,
                      started in the north, and without looking back had an operation, then this is necessary
                      be regarded as a high achievement. "
                2. Nagaibak
                  Nagaibak 9 January 2014 21: 02
                  0
                  barbiturat "the Germans were captive to their illusions and tried to do everything to the plan, but they struck a blow and our commanders fled with a bunch of defeats, read Ludendorff and Falkenhain"
                  I read Ludendorff and did not find anything like it. Nobody ran anywhere. Maybe Falkengine wrote about the great Russian flight. Well, and read it.
            2. Nagaibak
              Nagaibak 9 January 2014 20: 39
              0
              barbiturate "Describing the armies of its future opponents, the German General Staff noticed the low quality of our large units." In the fight against the Russian troops, - his annual report concluded in 1913, - we will be able to afford actions that we would not dare with an equal opponent .. "
              So then it is. That's just the German General Staff planned and implemented the actions of the German armies in two world wars. Result? The German General Staff both wars profiled.
            3. Thunderbolt
              Thunderbolt 9 January 2014 20: 59
              0
              Quote: Nagaibak
              The German General Staff both wars profiled.
              So they fought both wars on two fronts, and this is a deliberately losing position for Germany. On June 22, 1941, the most thoughtful German generals understood that this was the beginning of the end. But, unfortunately, they did their duty to the end. Therefore, the "German agony" lasted until the spring of 45- wow.
        2. Nagaibak
          Nagaibak 9 January 2014 20: 46
          0
          The following chapter also writes about the capture of Novogeorgievsk, Ludendorf also ...
          "The capture of Novo-Georgievsk did not directly affect the further
          development of the operation. It was a self-sufficient enterprise in the rear of the armies,
          advancing east. General von Bezeler, conqueror of Antwerp, and his
          exceptionally able-bodied chief of staff colonel von-
          Sauberzweig made sure that there was no thought of a so-called siege
          with all its accessories. One taxation could already lead to a fall
          Novo-Georgievsk. The garrison of this fortress of 80.000 people could not long
          hold on. It's amazing why the grand duke left the garrison
          defend Novo-Georgievsk, while later Brest-Litovsk and Kovna
          were thrown. He had to realize that the fortress cannot be held,
          and that the condition of the fortifications is not at such a height that
          withstand heavy overhead fire. "
          In general, Ludendorff was of a high opinion of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Lukav. He speaks respectfully of his leadership talents. What can not be said about me.
          okay. And again about Novogeorgievsk.
          "Novo-Georgievsk was, perhaps, the last fortress with a belt of forts, which was taken after a full taxation. I am not saying this
          because I believe in disarmament. The world will soon wake up from this
          misconceptions, but humanity can regret it, never
          disarm. But the time of fortresses with a belt of forts has passed. They can not
          to counter anything of equal value to modern artillery and its
          huge stocks of shells and must disappear. "
      2. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 9 January 2014 20: 28
        0
        barbiturate "Of course, there are reasons: few officers, lack of indigenous strong officers, poor training of the masses, their complete lack of cohesion in the army ..."
        They were not enough before the war. I mean officers.
    2. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 9 January 2014 20: 26
      0
      barbiturate "Yes, just start to read and remember what I read so I can fill you up with quotes, I just don't see the point, but if you please, we also quote abundantly about the" slip "and about the combat capability, including of the Siberian corps."
      About the Siberian corps ... different at different times. In 1914, they stood near Warsaw to death ...
      According to Brusilov ... And we were told, in perestroika, that the detachments came up with Trotsky hehe ...
      About the retreat of 1915 from the book of our dear E. Ludendorff "My Memories of the War of 1914-1918" Summer Capmania on the Russian Front in 1915 Chapter III.
      "The Russian armies had to leave their positions between the Carpathians and
      A pilgrim, with which they suffered heavy losses. But the allies could
      to develop their success in general only frontally, although they tried very hard
      achieve local coverage, mainly of the western flank of Russians
      troops departing from the Carpathians. Attempt at right wing Austro
      Hungarian armies in Bukovina failed. It was not strong enough. AT
      as a result, the operation here ended with the departure of the Austro-Hungarians under
      the pressure of the enemy. "
      This is a drape, I understand ...
      "The frontal repression of the Russians in Galicia, no matter how it was for them
      sensitive, not critical to war. They are in battle
      retreated as far as the rear posts allowed us
      move forward. The Russians have not yet fought on their own land, and before it
      could still give way to significant space. Moreover, with these
      frontal battles our losses were not unimportant. "
      Comrade Ludendorff calmly discusses the Russian front. Arrogance is not felt.
      1. barbiturate
        barbiturate 11 January 2014 07: 21
        0
        Calmly, that's just about the Russian-Austrian front. I have already quoted you quotes that our military leaders and our leaders thought.
  7. Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 9 January 2014 20: 08
    0
    barbiturate "So, over tea and nothing to do, I add some quotes for you"
    With the seagull on holidays, you need to be more careful ... although I agree that quotes can be pulled both in relation to the flight of our troops and in regard to their courage.
  8. Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 9 January 2014 20: 35
    0
    barbiturat "On August 4, the fortress of Kovno fell. The commandant fled. The surrender of Kovno raised rumors of treason.
    Novogeorgievsk surrendered on August 6 "
    Here I cite quotations from the book of Mr. Ludendorff, "precious" to our heart, about the flight of the Russian army in 1915.
    "But, as then on Sana'a, and now on Narew, in advance came
    pause. On July 23, Pultusk and Rozhany were taken by storm. August 4th 
    Ostroleka, and thereby captured the crossing through the Narew on a wide
    front. Other units headed to Serock and Zegrze with the aim of capturing
    the fortifications there, overtake Novo-Georgievsk from the northeast.
    Following the 12th and 8th army, after stubborn battles, it also entered Narew
    between Shkva and Pissa, but on the southern shore of Narew, near the mouth of Shkva,
    crossed only weak forces.
    The Russians everywhere showed stubborn resistance and carried heavy
    losses."
    "The operations of the allied armies in Poland east of the Vistula led, as I
    expected this to frontally follow the Russians with continuous
    fights. True, attempts were made to capture the Russians, but they remained
    always futile. Although the Russian army was not allowed to linger, but to leave
    she did it. Russians often launched fierce counterattacks
    large forces, and numerous sections of marshy rivers and streams
    once again presented them with the opportunity to settle down and successfully render
    further resistance. Continuous movement for several
    weeks on bad roads and mostly in inclement weather,
    demanded a lot of stress from our troops. "
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 9 January 2014 17: 42
    0
    I was away and could not answer your comments. Holidays you know ...
    barbiturate "Yes, this is a victory for the Turks, but the victory is precisely against the landing operation, when many factors play against the attacker. Not enough troops were involved for such an operation, and second-rate ones. In general, we can talk for a long time."
    Yeah, you have all second-rate besides the Germans. Kolenkovsky A.K. in his book "Dardanelles operation" gives the following data on the troops of the allies which had to evacuate 145 thousand troops and 400 guns of different calibers. Hmm ... of course rather weak.
    Another 100 thousandth group of allies was on the Palestinian front and about 60 thousand on the Baghdad front. Well, that's the way ...
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 9 January 2014 19: 41
      0
      but you were not interested in how much effort and means were expended to at least land? how many losses did the allies suffer during the landing and evacuation (without direct battle of troops in the field), which are naturally included in the total losses of the allies? And how many Turks were against them?
      Maybe here you can look for the root of Russia's victories over the Turks? Although I repeat, ours almost always fought with the Turks successfully.
      1. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 9 January 2014 19: 55
        0
        You were not interested in the barbiturate, how much effort and means were expended to at least land? how many losses did the allies suffer during the landing and evacuation (without direct battle of troops in the field), which are naturally included in the total losses of the allies?
        To the losses that I mentioned earlier, it is necessary to add 120000 thousand patients according to the same Kolenkovsky.
        "And how many Turks were there against them?"
        The Turks with ammunition were a little tight at times, so they practiced bayonet attacks. 5 per day, or even more.
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 9 January 2014 18: 03
    +1
    barbiturat "How do you know, would have given more or less?)) It was they skedaddle with practically no pressure and surrendered the fortresses. I read Denikin and not only. Who is to blame that they retreated without ammunition? That there were no shells? That the command was shitty to the point and people didn't even have rifles? That didn't even have nichrome and even grenades? "
    There is no need to prove that the country was not ready for the country. But you generalize ... when you say that you skidded and so on. You are wrong about the Germans. Not all of them spoke of Russians in a dismissive tone. Here are the views on the Russian army of General Blumentritt outlined by Basil L. Garth in his book "German Generals Tell."
    “In 1914-1918 with the rank of lieutenant, after short-term battles with the French and Belgians in Namur in August 1914, I then fought against the Russians for two whole years. In the very first offensive on the Eastern Front, we quickly realized that we had faced qualitatively different soldiers, than the French and Belgians, who skillfully buried themselves in the defense, decisive and courageous. We suffered heavy losses. Even in 1914-1918, more severe conditions in the East affected our troops. The soldiers preferred to fight on the western front, not on the eastern. In the West, it was a war of military equipment and massive artillery fire, for example, Verdun, Somme, etc. These factors were of decisive importance, and although it was hard, at least we fought with an enemy of the Western European warehouse. In the East, the density of artillery fire was less, but the battles were more stubborn, since we were opposed by more persistent and stronger soldiers. Night battles, hand-to-hand combat, battles in the forests were especially practiced by the Russians mi. In that last war, there was a saying among German soldiers: "In the East, a brave army is fighting, and in the West, the fire brigade is on watch." Where Russians meet in the history of war, military action is stubborn and merciless and involves heavy casualties. Where a Russian takes a position or defends himself, it is difficult to defeat him, and it costs you a lot of blood. "
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 9 January 2014 19: 50
      0
      Why is it that such stories appeared after the Second World War, does this bother you? I have a ton of other data, moreover, written directly after the First World War. Blumentrit writes bluntly, short battles in the West and then two years on the Russian front, so he did not know the battles in the West he was talking about.
      Moreover, I never denied the courage of our soldiers, especially the cadre army and guard, it’s another matter that this was far from always + mediocre command, and if you have a bad head, will you admire a man? So is the Russian army.
      Above, I gave you specific quotes from eyewitnesses of the events, generals and ministers, and how they assessed what was happening, the German lieutenant speaks of the stubbornness of Russian soldiers (not in 1917, for example). There are many examples of respectful comments about the enemy from the enemy, but we are not talking about the company level. . For example

      In the summer of 1915, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Yanushkevich, will telegraph to the Minister of War of the Empire Sukhomlinov: “The 3rd and 8th Army have melted away ... The personnel are melting, and the replenishment receiving rifles on the day of the battle (!!!) will vying with each other ...
      There are no rifles, and 150 thousand people are standing without rifles. Hour by hour is not easier ... ".

      A. Kersnovsky writes: “As a result of all these setbacks, the Stavka has lost its spirit. Confused, she began to make decisions that were clearly inconsistent. One of them - the ill-conceived evacuation of the population of the western regions into the interior of Russia - cost the country hundreds of thousands of lives and turned a military failure into a severe national disaster.
      The headquarters hoped by this event “to create the atmosphere of 1812”, but achieved exactly the opposite results. On the roads of Lithuania and Polesie stretched endless rows of tills torn from their homes, driven to despair of people. They cluttered and clogged the roads that are rare here, mixed with the troops, demoralizing them and making a mess. The headquarters did not realize that, having raised all this four millionth mass of women, children and the elderly, it had to take care of their food.
      Red Cross organizations and zemstvo-city unions saved hundreds of thousands of these unfortunate people from certain starvation. Many, especially children, died from cholera and typhoid. The survivors, turned into a declassified proletariat, were taken deep into Russia.
      One of the sources of replenishment of the future Red Guard was ready.

      The former persistence - “Not one step back!” - It was replaced somehow at once by another extreme - to retreat where the eyes look. The Grand Duke no longer hoped to stop the enemy west of the Dnieper.
      The rate prescribed to build positions beyond Tula and Kursk ...
      1. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 9 January 2014 21: 29
        0
        barbiturat "In the summer of 1915, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Yanushkevich, will telegraph the Minister of War of the Empire Sukhomlinov:" The 3rd and 8th Army has melted ... The personnel are melting, and the reinforcements that receive rifles on the day of the battle (!!!) are vying with each other ...
        Someone was running, and someone was advancing. Keller for example ...
        "During the army offensive at the end of April 1915, he played an outstanding role in the Battle of Transnistria on April 26-28 (May 9-11). On April 27 (May 10), he conducted a famous horse attack at Balamutovka and Rzhaventsy with a force of 90 hundred and squadrons in equestrian order , knocking the enemy out of a triple row of trenches with wire entanglements near the village of Gremeshti on the banks of the Dniester, broke through to the rear of the Austrians and captured the heights of the right bank of the Onut stream, while capturing 23 officers, 2000 lower ranks, 6 guns, 34 charge boxes. "
        It was me from Vicki who pulled just for example ... A beautiful attack was ... The 7th Austro-Hungarian army Pflanzer-Baltina was defeated and she was thrown back for the Prut. There also received the Polish legions of Pilsudski. Prisoners range from 2000 to 4000 thousand.
        1. barbiturate
          barbiturate 10 January 2014 17: 55
          0
          Again the Austrians. eh, if it happened with the Germans)

          In 1919, “Centrifugal”, an organization involved in the return of prisoners to Russia, took into account the following number of captured Russian military personnel according to their personal lists and registration cards:
          In Germany, 2.
          In Austria, 1.
          In Turkey, 19.
          In Bulgaria - 2.
          Total - 3 911 100.
          Add here and 200 thousand dead in captivity and get the figure of more than 4 million people.

          The numbers of prisoners that were captured during the WWII by the Russian army are also interesting.
          They are also very impressive.
          During the years of the First World War, 2 104 146 soldiers and officers of Austro-Hungary and 167 082 soldiers of the German army were in Russian captivity. (Siberian Soviet Encyclopedia (SSE). T. 1.Stb. 51.
          The difference in the number of prisoners of the German and Austro-Hungarian army is striking.
          There were 12 times fewer Germans in captivity than Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war!
          “Feel the difference” in the degree of combat readiness and resilience of these troops !!!


          I told you all the time about the German army and that in the battle with this army the fate of Russia was decided, in the struggle with this army it overcame !!
          1. Nagaibak
            Nagaibak 10 January 2014 21: 05
            0
            barbiturate "Again the Austrians. Eh, if only the Germans would work that way)"
            Yes, according to the Austrians, but during the Gorlitsky breakthrough.
            1. barbiturate
              barbiturate 11 January 2014 07: 06
              0
              Quote: Nagaibak
              Yes, according to the Austrians, but during the Gorlitsky breakthrough.


              Duck it was necessary to carry out such attacks on the Germans and now we would write about them, and then against the Germans defeat after defeat, but for examples of beauty we give successful attacks on the Austrians (and there were defeats from the same Austrians)

              And how do you comment on the number of prisoners? Here is the same Keller, a really talented cavalry commander, who fought the whole war against the Austrians and prisoners and took weapons, but only the Austrians all took trophies and prisoners, their number speaks for itself (more than two million)! But to send him to the German front! Would he show himself? What do you think?
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 9 January 2014 18: 19
    0
    barbiturate "I have respect for my troops, but I need not only respect in the fight against the enemy, but also skill, but he didn't have a nichrome"
    But about the cavalry and about skill and inability.
    "The Russian cavalry was a worthy enemy," wrote the German general O. von Prozek in his book "German cavalry in Lithuania and Courland" ..- Its patrols and patrols appeared everywhere and knew how to be well applied to the terrain. The Russian cavalry knew how to hide well. for the enemy to leave the battle and disguise their retreat ...
    The Russian cavalry never avoided either foot or horse battle. The Russians often rushed to attack our guns and machine guns, even when this attack was doomed to failure in advance, they did not reckon with either the power of our fire, nor those losses, nor those losses that they suffered ... Russians often and with they fired with great success from horses. Subsequently, our cavalry adopted this method of shooting ... "P.244 Begunova A.I. Sabers are sharp, horses are fast ...: From the history of the Russian cavalry.-M .: Molodaya gvardiya. 1992.
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 9 January 2014 19: 51
      0
      Something is not clear quote) who is talking about the German cavalry as their own? Publisher Young Guard?)
      1. barbiturate
        barbiturate 9 January 2014 20: 31
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        And finally, I just ask you to understand that I am not comparing the Russian and German soldiers and cavalrymen, I am comparing the actions of the army as a whole and trying to understand the results of defeats and defeats, which went on in a continuous succession in battles with the Germans. I have no doubt at all that the Cossacks skillfully applied to the area and accurately shot from their horses, as in a huge number of captured Russian soldiers (I wonder where the Vedbas fought so well)), I’m interested in something else, why ours were so poorly equipped and armed, so mediocre prepared for the battle and had such commanders, why did the German landver squeeze the Russian guard, and our secondary divisions were so poorly organized and vied with each other? Above, I brought you a LOT of QUOTATION of military leaders and ministers.
        But about the cavalry, let's address, for example, all the brilliant Russian guards cavalry entered East Prussia in August 1914, let's see how its actions were evaluated by the commander of the 1st army gene. Rennenkampfom?

        July 24 (Aug. 6) dated dispatch of the commander of the 1st Army to the gene. Khan of Nakhichevan.
        “Already in the first battle on July 22, it was necessary to find out the forces of the enemy. Having a cavalry mass with horse artillery, it was easy to cover the flanks, rear, to find out everything. Report more fully and in a timely manner.
        Rennenkampf ".
        The commander indicates to Khan Nakhichevan on the need to maneuver, cover the flanks of enemy units with the help of a huge mass of Russian cavalry, and on unsatisfactory intelligence information coming from it.

        Events developed rapidly. “At 15 hours on July 25 (Aug. 7) the last echelon of the guards cavalry arrived in the concentration area. T.O. by the evening of this day, the cavalry of the 1st Army was located as follows: in the area of ​​Pilvishki, Volkovishki - 1st, 2nd Guards., 2nd, 3rd Cavalry. divisions; Suwalki - 1st Cavalry. division; Scadville - 1st Division Cav. the brigade. Information about the enemy was rather vague ....

        July 30 (Aug 12) gene. Rennenkampf again criticized the gene. Khan Nakhichevan (for his actions on July 28 (Aug. 10)).
        "Volkovyshki. To General Khan of Nakhichevan.
        Your report on the July 28 case again proved that the cavalry entrusted to you is more interested in battles at the front than action in the enemy flanks and rear, where its real place is.
        In your situation, there is no need to rush cavalry to stubbornly delay enemy infantry in frontal battles. If the enemy infantry moves forward, the easier it will be to cover it, to go to the rear.
        I find that if the guards cavalry of the 28th were thrown to the rear, then of the five Prussian battalions that were attacking you, it would probably have gone a little back.
        I demand to convey which particular enemy units were found in the ongoing battles. Where was the guards cavalry on July 28, what did she do?
        Rennenkampf ".
        As you can see, little has changed: attacks on the Prussian Lander’s units continue on the forehead, the lack of maneuver and flank coverage on our part, the LACK of intelligence information about the enemy (which was the main task of the cavalry).
        1. barbiturate
          barbiturate 9 January 2014 20: 41
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          Next, we look at the famous battle of the Guards cavalry during the attack on Causen (more than that, they didn’t particularly fight anywhere).

          “The army headquarters was generally dissatisfied with the work of the equestrian group gene. Khan Nakhichevan, because he did not have reliable data on the grouping of enemy forces on the army front. Aug 1 (14) gene. Khan Nakhichevan again criticized the gene. Rennenkampfom.
          "August 1 (August 14) 1914
          "Again, a complete lack of maneuver. The task was not fulfilled - to bypass the flank and to the rear, only one frontal action; and as a result - obscurity and unnecessary sacrifices."
          Major General Bayov.

          The fact that this reprimand did not change anything is also evidenced by the results of the battle at Caushen on August 6 (19), 1914.
          Here is how A. Likhotvorik describes it:
          OK. 13 h. 6 (19) Aug. the main forces of the 2nd Guards entered the battle. Cav. divisions. At Shupinen batteries of the guards have developed. horse artillery, which silenced the German batteries at Tuteln and Kaushen with their fire. This enabled squadrons of the 2nd Guards. Cav. divisions launch an offensive on Causen. However, decisive success was not achieved. German 2nd Landv. the brigade had 5 infantry battalions, 10 machine guns and 12 guns in the Kraupishken, Kaushen area.
          OK. 15 h. 6 (19) Aug. the two remaining divisions of the horse corps approached. Cavalier Guard Regiment 1st Guards Cav. divisions launched an equestrian attack on the German position at Caushen. The 4th squadron of the regiment, in an equestrian formation, overcame the field dividing the opponents, but just before the village came across a hedge of barbed wire, which was impossible to overcome by jumping. Almost the entire squadron was shot by gun and machine gun fire at this obstacle. After this squadrons of the 1st Guards. Cav. divisions on foot with the support of their artillery launched an attack on Tuteln north of the section of the 2nd Guards. Cav. divisions ...
          Gene. Khan of Nakhichevan apparently believed, having connected the enemy in battle with the guards cavalry, to bypass him with the regiments of the Consolidated Cavalry. divisions. K 15 hours 6 (19) Aug. relates his field note No. 125 to the gene. Belgardu.
          "1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions. They are waging a very stubborn battle from the front near the villages of Tuteln and Kaushen; we are holding on; the matter depends on the success of your division from the flank."
          At 16 hours the chief of staff of the equestrian group of the regiment. Chesnokov, in turn, addressed the gene. Belgarde field note No. 15.
          "The chief of the cavalry ordered not to retreat and to hold on as stubbornly as possible, not allowing a detour. If you have to retreat, then at least not to Kobiev, but to Orupenen. Other divisions will retreat to Dragupenen."
          Thus, parts of the divisions of the equestrian group, with the support of equestrian artillery, fought an intense fire battle with the enemy. Coverage of the enemy position of the combined cav. the division did not exert a visible influence on the course of the battle and its outcome remained unresolved. "

          It takes a little comment on what was happening (the comment is not mine, but one very good researcher of the WWI and the participation of the Russian Army Sergey Drozdov on Proza.ru, take a look at your leisure):
          - THREE Russian cavalry divisions (1st and 2nd Guards and Consolidated Cavalry divisions, which are 12 full-blooded cavalry regiments) In the forehead, they attack the German landver brigade. Bumping into the wire and the dagger rifle - machine-gun fire, incurring meaningless losses in this case ...
          “We have complete superiority in artillery and absolute superiority in cavalry (ALL German cavalry of the 8th army numbered ONE division).”
          - Our guards cavalrymen THERE courage and readiness to die heroically in battle THERE - more than enough (see the fate of the 4th squadron of the Cavalier Guard regiment), but the ABILITY to fight, to cover the enemy’s flanks, go to his rear, use artillery to suppress machine-gun points - no.
          - Instead, our bosses discuss WAYS OF WASTE (!!!) and urge each other to "stick as hard as possible" ...
          1. barbiturate
            barbiturate 9 January 2014 20: 48
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            Sorry, a lot of things just do not fit in size, you have to cut and remove a lot of interesting things, but here you can’t argue and write a lot.
            Once again, I will recommend you the author on Prose.ru Sergey Drozdov, there it is intelligible, with figures and facts, full of quotes. Here we just get tired of arguing)

            finally, I’ll finish about the cavalry:

            “The regiments of Cavalierguard and Equestrian lost more than half of their officers. The consumption of fire stocks was very high. So, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. division, which operated as part of the Consolidated Cav. of the division and did not take an active part in the battle, it consumed 29000 rounds of ammunition (along with the machine gun team), and its 4th battery of horse artillery - 510 shells, while the battery consumption of the guard divisions was even greater. German 2nd Landv. the team lost 66 people. killed, 122 people wounded and 30 people. prisoners, as well as 2 guns and 4 charging boxes. ”

            WERE THESE TWO CAPTURED TOOLS SUCH A LOSS ?! Especially when you consider that a month later, our 1st Army was forced to abandon more than 150 of its guns in East Prussia ...
            But on the morale of our cavalry, these losses dealt a severe blow. Its units for a long time lost their offensive fuse and faith in themselves. On the MOST responsible day of the battle of Gumbinnen, our cavalry did nothing at all. (!!!)

            Those. in fact, our three cavalry divisions there attacked 2 German landver battalions “in the forehead”, and after a heavy battle, forced them to leave the river ...

            But the only German cavalry division, oddly enough, acted there quite effectively.
            A. Likhotvorik tells about it this way:
            “As for the actions of the German 1st Cav. division, then she, pushing the cavalry gene. Oranovsky, to 15 hours 7 (20) aug. infiltrated the Pilkalen area, and then acted in the direction of Stallupenen, where she made a big mess in the rear units of the 1st Army. The small cavalry units of the Germans worked unhindered on the withdrawal routes of the 28th infantry units. divisions, sowing confusion and panic. In particular, the 28th infantry combined detachment was dispersed in the area of ​​Scheelingen. division, which was located on vacation.
            However, at Stallupenen, the Germans were recaptured by the staged battalion, which arrived to open the head stage. After that, the German cavalry returned to Pilkalen, having traveled a total of up to 50 km in a day and having military clashes. This raid made a big mess in the management of the corps by the headquarters of the 1st Army.

            Here you have the cavalry)
            1. Our
              Our 9 January 2014 20: 54
              +1
              only Caucasian equestrian formations successfully acted. and that is a fact.
            2. Nagaibak
              Nagaibak 10 January 2014 09: 04
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              Our] only the Caucasian equestrian native formations operated successfully. and that's a fact. "
              Not only. I gave an example.
          2. barbiturate
            barbiturate 9 January 2014 20: 55
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            and finally:
            About how, in reality, the tsarist army was then ready to fight, wrote the Russian military historian A. Kersnovsky:
            “In the fall of 1915, in the rear units, one rifle fell on ten soldiers, and on the front - for two. The situation on the Northern and Western fronts was especially bad, as they suffered the most severe losses during the retreat. In the IX Army Corps of the 3rd Army, for example, rifles had only the first battalions of regiments. In January 1916, according to Headquarters, in the armies of the Western Front, out of 754 combatant 000 — more than a third of all soldiers — were unarmed. We can safely assume that out of a total of 268 fighters, only about 000 were armed. ”

            Please note that the Northern and Western fronts that suffered the “most severe losses” fought precisely against the German forces.
            Against the Austrian army, which was extremely heterogeneous in the degree of combat capability of its national (German, Hungarian and Slavic) regiments, our army fought well.
            But against the German corps and armies-MUCH worse.
            “At the beginning of each artillery shootout,” wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, recalling his command of a company in the 409th Novokhopersky Infantry Regiment on the border of Bessarabia and Bukovina in the spring of 1916, “we glanced at the color of the gap and, seeing the familiar pink the haze given by the Austrian shells sighed with relief ”: it means that the Austro-Hungarian units in this section have not yet been replaced by a“ German ”.
            “The white and red smoke of the breaks is better than the white German one,” the soldiers of the 1915th Sevsky Infantry Regiment, who were defending in Western Galicia on the Dunajec River, said bluntly in April 34, in front of the front of which, instead of gray-blue overcoats and caps, black ones appeared overcoats and pointed helmets - Bavarians ...
            “The Germans immediately forced them to be more careful and vigilant both in the trenches and in the guard service, thanks to their activity,” noted Captain D. N. Tikhobrazov, who recorded the words of the Sevets, from the headquarters of the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front. Comments by other soldiers of the same army, recorded a month later in the 366th field hospital by the doctor of the 70th park artillery brigade L. N. Voitolovsky, are characteristic:
            “- Is it so difficult to fight with the Germans?”
            “Difficult,” the chorus of voices answers.
            - Strong people.
            - Heather hurts.
            - Trickier than the cunning. You can’t get him down ...
            “Is it easier to fight the Austrian?”
            - Yes, it’s easier with him. He is shy. Now surrenders ...
            - ... German is that fierce. Cunning. Strong. No harm with him. ”

            Here, perhaps, the main distinguishing feature of the army of William II is noted - assertiveness, perseverance, tireless activity, "iron spirit of attack." Hence the astonishing Russians already in August 1914 “the extraordinary mobility of the German troops, their constant desire to attack, their ability to take constant risks, their stubbornness in achieving their goals, the ability of units to remain in order even in the most difficult situations.” (Rogvold V. Russian cavalry before the war and during the war // Cavalry men in the memoirs of contemporaries. 1900-1920. Issue 3. M. 2001. P. 121.)
          3. barbiturate
            barbiturate 9 January 2014 20: 56
            0
            As for the purely military results of the 1916 campaign on the Eastern Front, their assessment was given by the chief of the field general staff of the German army Erich von Falkenhayn:
            “At the front of the 7th Austro-Hungarian army, the Russians tried to gain access to the Carpathian passes and in the first third of August they moved south to the Dniester to Stanislavov. Here, like Botmer and the 2nd Austro-Hungarian army, the attacks subsided only around mid-August, while on the Hindenburg front they practically stopped already in mid-July, and at Wojrs and Lingsingen by the end of this month.
            According to all reports, the losses of the Russians should have been directly monstrous. Their artillery, now firing badly, compared to its actions in the first period, the soldiers could not prepare enough attacks, their infantry, launched forward in heavy heavy massive systems, could not usually overcome the zone of the defender's machine guns.
            The results achieved therefore remained negligible compared to the costs incurred.
            In purely German areas, they were generally zero. ”

            The assessment of the Brussilovsky breakthrough and the death of the Russian Guard so hard restored, from here the final fall of the tsarist regime has already begun
          4. Nagaibak
            Nagaibak 10 January 2014 09: 29
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            barbiturat "According to all reports, the losses of the Russians should have been downright monstrous. Their artillery, now firing badly, compared with its actions in the first period, the warriors could not sufficiently prepare attacks, their infantry, launched forward in heavy massive formations, could not, as a rule, overcome the defender's machine gun zones.
            The results achieved therefore remained marginal in relation to the costs incurred. "
            This is called a positional crisis. It happened after the breakthrough. The breakthrough itself was successful. The positional meat grinder under Kovel was unsuccessful. Didn't you know about this? And in the West they fought differently? How is the Verdun meat grinder? Another myth? There were no senseless attacks by the "best" German army in the world on machine guns? They somehow fought differently then? They will come to the tactics of assault groups only in 1918. And before that, like everyone else, they were breaking into the forehead. BYPASSES say? Look for them near Verdun and any other battle other than the initial maneuvering period of the war.
            Well, and to top it off ... our army continued to yield to the German in 1941-1942 in the field of tactics and in World War II. It was later learned how to fight competently. But this has all been going on since the First World War. In this matter I did not argue.
          5. barbiturate
            barbiturate 10 January 2014 15: 46
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            Quote: Nagaibak
            This is called a positional crisis. It happened after the breakthrough. The breakthrough itself was successful. The positional meat grinder under Kovel was unsuccessful. Didn't you know about this? And in the West they fought differently? How is the Verdun meat grinder? Another myth? There were no senseless attacks by the "best" German army in the world on machine guns? They somehow fought differently then? They will come to the tactics of assault groups only in 1918. And before that, like everyone else, they were breaking into the forehead. BYPASSES say? Look for them near Verdun and any other battle other than the initial maneuvering period of the war.


            but I don’t argue with this, only the armies of England, France, Germany tried to overcome this positional crisis and pulled together a huge amount of heavy artillery and hollowed out for days, tried to use assault groups (before 1918), tried to use gases, invented tanks and armored cars, used flamethrowers and mortars, where was it all in the Russian army? The Germans or anyone else threw their troops after art training, and ours threw without, hence the huge losses and bitterness at the command. I can give you a bunch of examples with quotes from other works of the authors that I read, unlike you.
          6. barbiturate
            barbiturate 10 January 2014 16: 56
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            But as in 1916 !!!! year (when no one else acted like that !!), the best Russian units, from whom they expected a miracle, tore the Germans' defenses, not to read the faint of heart.

            V.V. Vishnevsky recalls the battles near the Pigs as follows:
            “The extermination of the Guard! Attacks September 3 and 7! There was no artillery preparation !!!!! (my signs were waxed). Before us are dense rows of German wire fences, through which it is inconceivable to pass. Hundreds of corpses of huntsmen hung on the wire. Under hurricane gun and machine-gun fire, we went out of the trenches several times and, with a cry of "Hurray," rushed to the wire. The dead and wounded fell. Drowning in liquid autumn mud ...
            I did not see a more brutal, more meaningless battle, neither before nor after the battles at the Pig. What could be worse than an army without leadership! ”
            However, Grand Duke Pavel Alexandrovich remained at the post of commander of the 1st Guards Corps. ” Vishnevsky V.V. Sobr. Op. In 5 vols .-- M., 1954.Vol. 2.P. 747.

            The following factors can be cited as the outcome of the battles of the SWF troops in the summer and autumn of 1916.
            “The main loss of the Kovel strike was the death of the guards themselves - the pillars of the Russian throne and the monarch himself. The officer corps of the guard units were mainly destroyed in the battles of 1914-1915. So, if by the summer of 1914 about sixty thousand soldiers and two and a half thousand officers were serving in the Guard, then by the end of the year the guardsmen had lost over twenty thousand people only killed and seriously wounded. By the summer of 1916, the guard regiments were again replenished to one hundred and ten thousand bayonets and sabers. Now all those nobles who always constituted the support of the imperial throne were finished off. And in this case, Emperor Nicholas II himself was to blame for a lot, who did not replace General Bezobrazov in a timely manner, although the emperor was informed of the military insolvency of this general for such a high post as commander, ”MV emphasizes. Oskin in the "Brusilov breakthrough."

            It is difficult to disagree with this assessment.

            As already noted, on July 26–28, the Guard again unsuccessfully tried again to break through to Kovel.
            A Special Army was formed under the command of General V.I. Gurko.
            Having suffered enormous losses near the Kukharsky forest and near Vitonezh, the Russian troops were forced to withdraw and cease their attacks.
            The researcher writes about these continuous attacks that lasted for two days: "Grand Duke Pavel Alexandrovich tried to achieve success at all costs, ordering not to stop the attacks until the enemy was completely defeated, but almost all subsequent attacks of the guards were successfully repelled by the Germans." (Goncharenko O. G. Three centuries of the imperial guard. - M., 2006. S. 195.)
            From September 3, 1916, during the week, Russian troops of the South-Western Front attacked in many areas. All attacks were repelled


            Here is the solution to the positional issue, on the part of the Russian commanders and the tsar’s tsar, they dug a hole for themselves
          7. barbiturate
            barbiturate 10 January 2014 17: 01
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            And as a result of such vain and simply huge sacrifices (we haven’t talked about the losses of other Russian armies yet)

            “These battles were another step on the road to undermining the moral stability of the troops, the manifestations of individual incidents of disobedience to military orders, and the rooting of the psychology of defeatism. The first phenomenon, as mentioned above, was the curse on the commanders of the hopelessly attacking Kovel guards. In September, a new stage in the moral decay of soldiers and officers, who clearly saw that it was impossible to advance forward with a blow to the forehead, but were forced to rush into attacks again and again, pushed by orders from the higher headquarters. Comcor-8 gene. A. I. Denikin recalled with horror: “... by the fall, after the arrival of large German reinforcements, some kind of equilibrium was established. The 8th Army attacked in the general direction from Lutsk to Lvov - at Zaturtsy, Shelvov, Korytnitsa, brought into battle a large number of guns and large forces, incurred very heavy losses and could not overcome the enemy's resistance.
            It was obvious that it was not so much the flaws in command and morale of the troops that played the role, but the fact that the limit of human possibility had come. The front, oversaturated with deadly technology and a huge amount of manpower, became completely insurmountable for us and for the Germans. It was necessary to abandon him and begin, without wasting time, to a new operation, starting the transfer of forces to a new direction ...
            In early September, I still somehow believed in the possibility of success. But soon, not only among the officers, but also among the mass of soldiers, doubts arose about the expediency of our victims ... "(Denikin A. I. Essays on the Russian Troubles. The Struggle of General Kornilov. August 1917 - April 1918 - M., 1991. S . 164.)
          8. Nagaibak
            Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 22
            0
            barbitura "This is the solution to the positional issue, on the part of the Russian military commanders and the tsar father, they dug a hole for themselves"
            Do you discuss with yourself? Funny ...
          9. barbiturate
            barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 41
            0
            Quote: Nagaibak
            This is called a positional crisis.


            no, with you, but I already understand that in vain. really funny, you coughed about the positional crisis and I gave you an example of its solution in the Russian army, but you already forgot what you wrote about)) Really funny)
      2. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 21
        0
        barbiturate "I can give you a bunch of examples with quotes from other works of authors whom I read, unlike you."
        The sense of the fact that you read a lot. And then they forgot, Ludendorff is an example of this. And you referred to him ... What is the use of your quotes. The development of the Russian Empire did not mean you know the great prom. production. Or are you up to date? All high technology was purchased abroad. You don’t give it to me. I told you that it is impossible to generalize. And not all German military leaders spoke of the Russian army in a dismissive spirit.
      3. barbiturate
        barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 53
        0
        Quote: Nagaibak
        The sense of the fact that you read a lot. And then they forgot, Ludendorff is an example of this. And you referred to him ... What is the use of your quotes. The development of the Russian Empire did not mean you know the great prom. production. Or are you up to date? All high technology was purchased abroad. You don’t give it to me. I told you that it is impossible to generalize. And not all German military leaders spoke of the Russian army in a dismissive spirit.


        Well, then finally it all became clear to me)) I’ll behave like you, I’m quoting a couple of quotes, and you are so, I have ONLY OWN statements and requirements for quotes.
        Where did I forget Ludendorff or quote him incorrectly? Give a quote or my post. Who and where stated that the development of Russia did not imply the development of industrial. production? Give a quote on this your gag and nonsense
        I don’t give you anything, I need you)
        Give me quotes from the German military commanders of the First World War, where they would respectfully speak about the command of the Russian army, its supply or organization and with examples, they say they changed our minds and defeated us.
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 09: 16
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    barbiturate "Against the Austrian army, which was extremely heterogeneous in the degree of combat capability of its national (German, Hungarian and Slavic) regiments, our army fought well.
    But against the German corps and armies - MUCH worse. "
    Clear business of the weaker is easier to beat. The Germans were forced to transfer their troops to the aid of the Austro-Hungarians. Thus weakening their troops in other directions. I do not argue about the unpreparedness for the war of the Russian army. I am against generalization when you make a rule for everyone from one or two examples. I hope I proved it. This is how Ludendorff describes the battle of Ivangorod in 1914.
    "The Ivangorod taxation fell on the guards reserve corps: over
    Moreover, the corps wanted to discard the enemy, which was held on the left bank of the
    Kozenitsy. For this, he was strengthened by order of the army headquarters of one
    brigade of the XI army corps.
    The fight at Kozenitsy will forever remain in my memory. Only four brigades were moved to the narrow bend of the Vistula, which from heavy rains
    turned into a swamp. The brigade that stood at Ivangorod was dropped
    a strong Russian outing. I was afraid that the Russians would develop their own
    attack on the flank by these four brigades, defense
    which was extremely constrained by the lack of space for
    deployment. I did not close my eyes all night. Next morning
    Ivangorod was drawn less stressful. Fights in the swamp at Kozienice
    continued as the Russians went on the offensive. All the troops
    those who took part in these battles remember them with horror. "
    SPEAK ALL RUNNING, GIVED UP AND DID NOT KNOW ABOUT WAR?
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 10 January 2014 15: 58
    0
    It was about Ivangorod that I gave an example as one of the few competent operations of the Russian army !!! For example, here I answered the person in this thread, you can make sure
    Quote: barbiturate
    Thank you) there was a heroic defense, but the fortress was surrendered, there were still many surrenders and very shameful, but I would advise you to pay attention to the defense of Ivangorod. Successes against Austria-Hungary really were much more than against the Germans, I absolutely admit it and spoke specifically about the German army. About the salvation of France - this is a myth and has long been debunked. The collapse of the country occurred in the head)

    But Ivangorod was already an absolutely secondary fortress, even almost unarmed in anticipation of the fighting, and only the enormous pressure and talent of the new commander General von Schwartz (Dada, German) made it possible to repel the assault and the Austrians and Germans. Here is the testimony of the commandant and the hero of defense, be sure to read about this general, unfortunately, this is a ray of light in the dark kingdom, there were such generals on the fingers of one hand, I quote:
    The mood in the fortress, by the time A.V. arrived at it Schwartz was decadent. “So many people crowded at the station, most of them Jews, that I hardly made my way to the exit. On a nearby (second) railway track there was a train made up of freight platforms, and the soldiers loaded huge metal doors on them. The officer explained to me that the day before, an order had been received to remove all armored doors and other metal parts from the casemates of the Ivangorod forts and send them to Brest, which was done ”- in fact, preparations were underway for the fortress to be delivered, and the most valuable property was removed from it.
    Having barely arrived at the fortress and not even waiting for the official presentation to the Commandant, Schwartz went to inspect the fortifications: “... when I went up to the parapet of Fort No. 5, I was horrified, because I realized that it’s enough to appear under the fortress not only to the infantry detachment, but even to the cavalry regiment, and she will inevitably be taken.
    One glance was enough to draw such a conclusion, as this fort and other fortifications were in a state of complete neglect. The mounds collapsed from time to time, and the ditches and surfaces were overgrown with such powerful vegetation that dozens of people could freely get through it without being seen at the closest distance. Standing on the parapet of the fort, I did not see its voice. I found almost the same thing at Fort Vannovsky. ”
    The reason for such a deplorable state of one of the most important Russian fortresses in the West was the unusually brainless policy of the tsarist government in the prewar years.
    “In 1909, there was an order to abolish, among our fortresses of Privislin, also Ivangorod and to destroy its fortifications. Then all serf administrations were abolished, such as the Artillery, Engineering, etc., and then the post of commandant. For the explosion of the forts, a loan was needed, and for this an estimate was made, which calculated the expense of 4 million rubles, but, apparently, they were not in a hurry with the release of this money, and therefore the forts survived. Then they were abandoned and provided by themselves
    themselves, remained for almost four years without repair and even without supervision. Time, of course, had a destructive effect on the fortifications, and the absence of the gendarmerie team made it possible for the Austrian and German spies to perfectly study the fortress and draw up its most accurate plan. ” As we see, ALL the fortifications of Ivangorod ON THE EVE of the World War, it was decided to EXPLODE !!! This decision was not executed only by a miracle: the tsarist Ministry of Finance did not allocate the necessary funds for this. Therefore, the fortress was simply “abandoned”.

    So do not attribute to me nonsense, as if I said that EVERYONE ran and gave up, but the score, as they say, on the scoreboard
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 10 January 2014 16: 39
    0
    Quote: Nagaibak
    I am against generalization when you make a rule for all of one, two examples


    This is exactly what I am NOT drawing conclusions from ONE-TWO examples. Just examples of our successful actions against the Germans are ONE-TWO, and the rest is a chain of setbacks and outright rout and flight, I gave you examples, as well as estimates of the German campaigns.
    You brought the successful defense of Ivangorod and I willingly admit it (I think I'm not a fan of our army?), But this is one of a couple of examples of successful actions not at the company-regimental level, but already something more serious and affecting the course of the war (at least a little)
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 27
    0
    [quote = barbitura "ONE-TWO, and everything else is a chain of failures and outright defeat and flight, I gave you examples, as well as the evaluations of the campaigns by the Germans."
    And here the nonsense has gone. Read Ludendorff and it will be easier for you.
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 38
    0
    Well, I understand you, it’s already climbed out of you)) you also read, you will also feel relief
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 25
    0
    barbiturate "The reason for such a deplorable state of one of the most important fortresses of Russia in the West was the unusually mindless policy of the tsarist government in the pre-war years."
    I gave you a quote from Ludendorff. It says that the time of the fortresses has passed ...
    About nonsense, re-read your comments again ...
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 11 January 2014 07: 17
    0
    Quote: Nagaibak
    I gave you a quote from Ludendorff. It says that the time of the fortresses has passed ... As for the nonsense, re-read your comments again ...


    Where is this quote? I don’t see something. The time of fortresses has passed ... here the French are hooked on Verdun, the fortress is much weaker than the same Novogeorgievsk and it turned out. Fortresses were also built after the WWII, realizing that when interacting with the army, this is not at all bad. Bad, it is separately when the fortress is not supported by its army.

    Well, my comments are thoroughly saturated and sometimes entirely consist of quotes from contemporaries) So, most likely your comments are nonsense.

    Ops, finally saw the quote and bring it
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 11 January 2014 07: 25
    0
    Quote: Nagaibak
    But the time of fortresses with a belt of forts has passed. They can not oppose anything equivalent to modern artillery and its huge stocks of shells and should disappear. "


    so maybe he really made a mistake here? no one is sinless, I already wrote about Verdun, you also know about the defense of Ivangorod (if the troops had better competed in it and had not surrendered by order, but not as a result of the assault).

    In our argument, there is a BIG PROBLEM! A HUGE ALREADY NUMBER OF POSTS AND WHAT YOU HAVE STARTED TO RESPOND IN MANY DAYS AND I JUST DIDN'T SEE THEM, NOW WENT ALREADY CHAKHARDA, MY SUGGESTION ABOUT IT BELOW.
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 11 January 2014 10: 16
    0
    barbiturate "There is a BIG PROBLEM in this dispute of ours! A HUGE NUMBER OF POSTS AND THAT YOU STARTED ANSWERING FOR MANY DAYS AND I JUST DIDN'T SEE THEM, NOW THERE WAS THERE IS SOMETHING PREVIOUS. "
    At the bottom answered your offer.
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 09: 03
    0
    barbiturate "So much for the cavalry)"
    It is not good with one example to groan the entire cavalry. The German cavalry did not contact ours at all.
    “In the spring of 1915, local battles were going on all the time in Lithuania and Latvia. Relatively small detachments with a large number of cavalry were operating on a wide front on both sides. The Germans mainly operated with a carbine, the Russians attacked with swords. horse affairs operated the Ussuriysk brigade of General Krymov, and in it the Primorsky dragoon regiment.For example, on July 1, near Popelyany, the Primorye crossed the Venta, attacked 5 versts in a "field" gallop, sequentially scattering the 9th and 13th Life-hussar and 1th hussar regiments. Then the dragoons overcame the barbed wire and hacked the battalion of rangers. Russian losses amounted to 2 officers, 12 dragoons and 5 horses. The Alexandrian hussars captured the German field battery, Pavlograd hussar regiment took the headquarters of the 160 German division. Page 117 Nenakhov Yu.Yu. Cavalry on the battlefields of the 76th century: 296-20 / Yu.Yu. Nenakhov.- Minsk: Harvest, 1900.
    TALK SPEAK?
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 10 January 2014 16: 16
    0
    You are again talking about private successes in relatively minor skirmishes, you took a battery there, scattered a couple of regiments (you didn’t destroy it, but you didn’t accept the battle and scattered, and then you probably reconnected)). This is a completely different level, I myself can bring you a lot of examples, for example, the excellent rifle training of the troops of the 1st Rennenkampf army allowed me to defeat the Germans (namely in the battle of large masses of troops) at Gumbinnen. They shot perfectly, when examining German corpses, the vast majority of injuries - in the head! It was fixed, BUT !!! This did not stop the Germans from making the Russian Army THREE !! East Prussian disaster and defeat the 2nd Army of Samsonov, 1st Rennenkampf and 10th Sievers. Do you understand what I mean? What does a taken battery cost in some kind of local regimental attack, if only the 1st Army left them with a retreat of more than 150 (not batteries, of course, but guns)? Or is the cut-down battalion of rangers of the German army worth the death of the colors of the Russian personnel army?
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 10 January 2014 16: 49
    0
    Well, if I already stumbled on cavalry a bit, then I’ll bring it before, I talked about the action of the cavalry in 1914 and its apparent futility, except for a couple of dashing attacks with huge losses, here is another estimate in 1916. And the assessment is not even cavalry, but its commanders and commanders. The cavalry was excellent, but what is the use of the three queens on the board if you don’t know how to play chess (naturally about our generals)

    Another problem was the inept use of Russian cavalry.
    “Just between Kovel and Brody there is a 120-verst“ corridor ”suitable for attack by large maneuverable masses. First of all, to forward the cavalry after breaking through the defense. To the north of Kovel is an impenetrable marshland, to the south of Brod is already the Carpathians. Oddly enough, weaker Russian armies — the 11th and 7th — were located in this “corridor”, and on the flanks, where it was required to overcome not only the enemy’s resistance, but also the terrain convenient for defensive operations — the shock armies — the 8th and 9th ... ..
    The Glavkoyuz had to transfer the gene group under the command of L.V. Lesha. J. F. Gillenchmidt, in order to hit Kovel on both banks of the Pripyat River: now in the 3rd Army twenty-five thousand drafts were concentrated — the whole Horse Army ...
    ... on the right flank of the Southwestern Front the mass of cavalry again accumulated: the 4th cavalry corps of General Gillenchmidt and the four cavalry divisions that were part of the 3rd Army. And again the gene. A. A. Brusilov left them here, where the cavalry could hardly be used as a maneuvering kind of troops. And again the front headquarters was supported in this by the commanders. ”
    General B.V. Gerua in his memoirs criticizes General Bezobrazov for his "cavalry ideas":
    “... about the use of the Guards Cavalry Corps in mass to strike the enemy at the decisive moment of the battle. This sermon was strange in 1916, Murat’s cavalry tactics of 1812.
    But it was impossible to get this thought out of Bezobrazov’s head and the guards cavalry during the Stokhod battles in the summer of 1916 was careful not to rush into the mossy and swampy gorges there under the enemy’s machine guns! ”


    These are the things that were with our cavalry ...
    But Brusilov, we emphasize once again, was certainly the best Russian commander of the front of the WWI ...
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 37
    0
    [barbiturate] But Brusilov, we emphasize once again, was certainly the best Russian commander of the front of the WWI ...
    About Brusilov and machine guns. Fire in their own way was used by the Austrians in the year 14. This is me for reference. So that you would not have the opinion that only our command would issue such orders.
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 33
    0
    Thank you for recalling, are there links to the source? Although I told you all the time about the German army, the Russian army overcame in the fight against it, and not against the Austrians.
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 11 January 2014 09: 57
    0
    barbiturate "Thanks for reminding me, are there any links to the original sources?"
    Regarding the orders given by the Austrians, if anything, shoot at your own?
    This is mentioned in his book by V.V. Cheslavsky of 67 battles of the 10th Hussar Ingermanland Regiment during the World War 1914-1917. Chicago 1937.
    Although what am I talking about? You all read, well, you just forgot.
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 33
    0
    barbiturate "I can bring you a lot of such examples myself,"
    Well, bring it .. And as for the disasters, there’s nothing to say. Do you think the revolution has come about in vain? It stemmed from everything that happened in previous years.
    barbiturate of "regiments (they did not destroy, namely, did not accept the battle and dispersed, and then, for sure, reunited))."
    Let's go without thinking. If there is a fact that they are connected, then lay out. No, no, no.
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 31
    0
    Quote: Nagaibak
    Well, bring it .. And as for the disasters, there’s nothing to say. Do you think the revolution has come about in vain? It stemmed from everything that happened in previous years.


    Wow, what are the short answers, I won't be an upahivatsa here either, I need it, this time. Then, use the "answer" button, and as if "he himself will find the post I answered and let him convince me further" - it will not work. Revolution is another matter. And I will talk about cactastrophes, because the defeat of entire armies and fronts is a catastrophe and a catalyst for revolution, this is my opinion

    Quote: Nagaibak
    Let's go without thinking. If there is a fact that they are connected, then lay out. No, no, no.


    And let's think it over? And it’s such an uncompromising type, and he himself thinks of being healthy. A small example from the cavalry, the Cossacks never accepted the closed attacks of the enemy cavalry and DISSECTED !, but you understand that since they were NOT DESTROYED, they scattered and gathered in another place. So there is no fact that they united, so poor fellows and scattered troops wandered around Germany and Austria, and Cossacks across Russia.))
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 08: 34
    0
    barbiturate "Next, let's look at the famous battle of the guards cavalry in the attack on Kaushen (we have never fought anywhere else)."
    I think you mean the Russian cavalry guards?
    So they had poor combat training. Some show off. Nobody argues with this. But the 10th cavalry division of Keller was perfectly prepared. The truth was at war with the Austrians. And in battles she proved her skills. The famous battle near Yaroslavitsa and the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian cavalry division is their merit and division commander Keller. Not all cavalry commanders of the Russian army were stupid. Or will you argue?
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 10 January 2014 16: 05
      0
      You kind of joking about the poor preparation of the guards cavalry? Which of the memoirs of Russian guard officers did you read? Everywhere I saw references only to the fact that there were continuous trainings, dressage of horses, and that the police officers and officers were very well trained, they only commanded them illiterate.
      The Austrians could have fought much better, I quoted to you what the soldiers thought about the difference between the German and Austrian forces, not without reason the Brussil breakthrough was against the Austrians as soon as the German units approached ...
      The fact that not everyone was stupid is indisputable! But there were an absolute majority of those who were not stupid, but simply completely unprepared and unable to use cavalry in the new realities.

      And I always tell you about the German army
    2. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 48
      0
      barbiturat "Are you kind of joking about the poor training of the guards cavalry? Which of the memoirs of the Russian guards officers have you read?"
      And you like luminary ... You ask questions ... And at least Ignatiev A.A. Fifty years in service ..- M .: Military Publishing, 1988- will arrange?
      barbiturate "The Austrians could have been fought much better"
      Absolutely interferes with "it was possible".
    3. barbiturate
      barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 16
      0
      Quote: Nagaibak
      And you like luminary ... You ask questions ... And at least Ignatiev A.A. Fifty years in service ..- M .: Military Publishing, 1988- will arrange?


      Do I see you as a luminary?) Otherwise, just like that, immediately declare that the guards cavalry had poor training? Well, bring a quote from Ignatiev, where he would say that the guard was poorly prepared for war, but such a regiment of the army, not the guard — it was better to shoot, it had better horsemen, it had better maneuvering, it had better commanders, it was better equipped and in the appendage was braver than the guards soldiers and officers?)

      Quote: Nagaibak
      Absolutely interferes with "it was possible"


      I wrote that it was possible to fight with the Austrians much better (understandably than with the Germans), what's stopping you? You don’t understand what was meant once it was possible AND WERE MUCH BETTER WITH THEM BETTER? To that same phrase should be brought in its entirety, otherwise it was taken out of context, such as you yourself will find where.
    4. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 11 January 2014 10: 02
      0
      barbiturate "I see you a luminary too?"
      I don’t, unlike you, I don’t ask stupid questions how much and what I read.
      And unlike you, I’m not saying that I read more than you. Therefore, of the two of us, luminaries are just you. Well, this is a joke. I know you came out of that age, which would be measured by peeps.
      barbiturate "well, give a quote from Ignatiev"
      I brought the book, you will find read ... although what I read about you ...
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 10 January 2014 08: 28
    0
    barbiturate "And finally, I just ask you to understand that I am not comparing the Russian and German soldiers and cavalrymen, I am comparing the actions of the army as a whole and I am trying to understand the results of the routings and defeats, which in the battles with the Germans went on continuously."
    I’m glad that we don’t refuse courage to our soldiers. But about the defeats in one turn, you again generalize. Our poorly and unsuccessfully acted against the Germans is a fact. But they compensated for their defeats by victories over the Austro-Hungarians and Turks.
    "The main mass of Russian troops was located even east of the river
    Sana'a, having small parts west of him. On the upper Narew and on the Neman River there were troops defeated in East Prussia. Siberian
    army corps have not yet arrived completely on the western Russian border,
    some of them were still en route. They were especially good and delivered us a lot.
    "Not all our troops were bad ... you can do by reading Ludendorff who he even singles out. By the way, he still speaks about the Russian flight. But only in relation to the Russian armies that fought at Tannenberg and the Mazury Lakes region."
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 10 January 2014 16: 26
      0
      I never refused courage to our soldiers, just along with many cases of heroism, a lot of frankly cowardly and shameful behavior.
      I’m also glad that you recognized (although you probably already knew for a long time) that all the successes of the Russian army (for an extremely small number of episodes, for example Gumbinnen and the defense of Ivangorod) were not against the Germans, but if there was any success against the German army, then It was extremely local.

      So I and you acknowledge the courage of the defenders of Ivangorod, I already wrote something about it above, generally it could be copiously copied further, the researcher's material (I gave you his last name) is interesting, but how does this relate to these facts ??

      Novogeorgievskaya fortress, considered the strongest fortress in Russia, ingloriously surrendered in 1915 at the first onslaught of the German army.
      A close associate and biographer of General Alekseev MV, then Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army) Borisov wrote: “Novogeorgievsk was not defended for a year, not half a year, but only 4 days after the Germans opened fire, or 10 days from the date of taxation: 27 July 9 (Aug. 1915) 6 was taxed and August 19/XNUMX fell. This made a very strong impression on Alekseev. We were already in Volkovysk. Alekseev entered my room, threw the telegram on the table, sank into a chair with the words "Novogeorgievsk surrendered." For a few moments we silently looked at each other, then I said: "It hurts and offensive, but nothing changes at the theater." Alekseev replied: "It is very painful for the Emperor and for the people").
      The details of this surrender are simply shameful. “On August 6, the fortress’s commandant, the despicable General Bobyr, ran to the enemy and, already in German captivity, ordered the surrender of the fortress that had been held on. In the huge garrison there was neither General Kondratenka, nor Major Shtokvich, nor Captain Liko ... And in the morning of August 7, the Prussian landver drove the human herd into inglorious captivity. The number of the garrison of Novogeorgievsk was 86000 people. About 3000 were killed, and 83000 (of which 7000 were wounded) surrendered, including 23 generals and 2100 officers. The banners of the garrison were safely delivered to the army by pilots. 1096 serf and 108 field guns were lost in the fortress, a total of 1204. In a hurry to capitulate, they forgot to render most of the guns unusable. The Germans equipped their Alsatian-Lorraine Front with these guns, and the French, winning the war, put these Russian guns in Paris, on the Esplanade of the disabled, to scold their former brothers in arms "- this is the description of this inglorious and shameful surrender in" History of the Russian Army "A .AND. Kersnovsky ...
  • Nagaibak
    Nagaibak 9 January 2014 21: 15
    0
    barbiturat "Something is incomprehensible quote) who is this talking about the German cavalry as his own? Molodaya gvardiya publishing house?)"
    An aunt named Begunova quoted a German general in her book on the history of Russian cavalry.
  • xan
    xan 30 December 2013 21: 35
    +8
    Quote: barbiturate
    Germans themselves spoke very disparagingly of the Russian army in the war. From this we conclude against whom success has been achieved and there is no need to so praise Yudenich and his ilk. Germany was the main enemy and the outcome of military operations is known

    If you look at the conduct of the war by the Germans against the Russians, then we can draw the following conclusions about the genius and combat effectiveness of the Germans and their military art
    - the massive use of artillery along with its almost complete absence among Russians,
    - the effectiveness of reconnaissance up to the complete absence of uncertainty about the plans of the Russian command.
    Everything else is the problems of the Russian command, the main of which is the wrong personnel policy among the highest generals, and the technical backwardness of Russian industry.
    Germany’s loudest victory over Russia in East Prussia is 80% stupidity of the Russian command, plus 10% on the effectiveness of German intelligence. For such a defeat on the verge of victory, the entire Russian front headquarters, led by Sharkun Zhilinsky, had to be shot along with organizational measures - with this approach (made in Stalin) the Russians would have won the war, which was demonstrated in the Second World War.
  • standby
    standby 5 January 2014 18: 47
    +1
    The best units fought against the Germans and achieved nothing but enormous losses and complete disbelief in command; the Germans themselves very disparagingly spoke about the Russian army in the war. From here we conclude against whom success was achieved.


    Thanks to Barbiturate for the facts! They, of course, are stubborn, but .... like the heroic defense of Osovets, the salvation of France, successes against Austria-Hungary, and there were a lot of feats, I think ?! Yes, and Germany eventually ran out of steam ...! And we had forces, and the army is not small ... The systemic crisis of governance,, and he led the country to what it led ...
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 9 January 2014 20: 54
      0
      Thank you) there was a heroic defense, but the fortress was surrendered, there were still many surrenders and very shameful, but I would advise you to pay attention to the defense of Ivangorod. Successes against Austria-Hungary really were much more than against the Germans, I absolutely admit it and spoke specifically about the German army. About the salvation of France - this is a myth and has long been debunked. The collapse of the country occurred in the head)
  • Marat
    Marat 10 January 2014 15: 38
    0
    I’ve read that Ludendorff waited with horror for 17 years, realizing that Germany was suffocating, fighting on two fronts and the joint allied offensive in April 17 could end in disaster for the Germans, if not for the well-known events in Russia.
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 10 January 2014 16: 30
      0
      Russia already simply could not advance in 1917, tried and could not, the soldiers simply refused to fight "and there are guns and the soldiers are beaten" Rmiya has already turned into a herd of uncontrollable people, they write a lot about this, with quotes and examples, both ours and ours, read all is online.
      The Germans still resisted in 1918 and the whole ma was not bad, but there was no strength left even after the US entered the war.
  • Marat
    Marat 10 January 2014 15: 40
    0
    Moreover, the main blow was waiting for the Austrians, who, as noted above, even suffered a defeat from the most revolutionary army in the world in the summer of 1917.
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 10 January 2014 17: 25
      0
      I don’t understand what kind of defeats we are talking about, the army in Russia in 1917 was no longer there, remember what month of 1917 the tsar abdicated. Want a little about the army of 1917 (although I’m very tired already proving and arguing something to someone)

      A.I. Denikin in his Essays on Russian Troubles writes about the state of the Russian army after February 1917:

      “... by the spring operations, the old divisions were torn apart, and the new ones appeared in a miserable state, both in terms of combat equipment (machine guns, etc.) and technical and economic equipment; many of them did not have time to get the proper internal cohesion - a circumstance that was extremely serious in the face of the outbreak of the revolution. The situation was so acute that the General Headquarters was forced in May to give permission to the fronts to disband those of the third divisions that would be of little combat capability, turning them into replenishment of personnel; this measure, however, was hardly applied, having met strong opposition in the units already touched by the revolutionary movement. "

      “The Baltic Fleet, retaining to a certain extent the external forms of official subordination, completely abandoned obedience. The fleet commander, Admiral Maximov, was entirely in the hands of the central sailor committee; no operational order could be carried out without the approval of this committee. Not to mention the combat missions, even the installation and correction of minefields - the main means of defense of the Baltic Sea - were met with opposition from sailor organizations and teams ...
      Along with this, the troops of 42 det. Corps located along the Finnish coast and on the Moonsund Islands, due to long idleness and scattered location, quickly decomposed with the beginning of the revolution, and some of them were completely crowded physically and morally. No change or movement was possible. I remember how in May 1917, I long and unsuccessfully sought to send an infantry brigade to the Moonsund Islands. Suffice it to say that the corps commander did not dare to go round and get acquainted with his units, a circumstance characteristic of both the troops and the personality of the chief. ”

      How do you like SUCH corps commanders and SUCH troops described by Denikin as "completely deserted crowds" ?!

      The Germans, meanwhile, felt the "power" of the revolutionary army:
      “There was one more vulnerable spot - this is a tete-de-pon at Stokhod, near the Wormish-Golenin station, occupied by one of the corps of General Lesh's army. On March 21, the Germans, after a strong artillery preparation and a gas attack, attacked our corps and smashed it completely. Our troops suffered heavy losses, and the remnants of the corps were withdrawn behind Stokhod. The headquarters did not receive an exact subdivision of the number of losses, due to the impossibility of finding out how many killed and wounded were hidden in the "missing" column. The German official report gave a number of prisoners of 150 officers and about 10.000 soldiers ...
      The battle at Stokhod was undertaken on the private initiative of General Linsingen, and frightened the German government, which believed that German attacks "at a time when fraternization was in full swing" could revive in us Russians the fading spirit of patriotism and postpone the fall of Russia. The Chancellor asked the headquarters "to make as little noise as possible about this success," and the latter forbade any further offensive operations "so as not to frustrate the hopes for peace that were close to being realized."
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 10 January 2014 17: 32
    0
    And here is how the offensive (last) of 1917, which you are talking about, of the revolutionary Russian army, took place.

    Here is what the assistant M.V. writes about the PROSPECTS of the Russian offensive Alekseeva General Borisov:
    As you know, in December 1916, Alekseev signed and submitted to the Sovereign the plan of operations for 1917. This plan provided for the main blow to the Austrians near Tarnopol. This plan was accepted for preparation, but Alekseev, deeply understanding the state of the army excited by the revolution, delayed the start of this strike.
    He knew that this breakthrough, like the ones in 1915 and 1916, could not be successful, but would cause only a huge shock to the army. This reluctance of Alekseev to switch to an active operation now led to his replacement by Brusilov.
    In May 1917, Alekseev was expelled to the provisional government and settled in Smolensk.
    Our attack on June 18 of the "revolutionary regiments with revolutionary banners" failed, and provoked a German counterstrike on July 6, which turned the "revolutionary army into an ugly and dangerous crowd for the state."
    Kornilov replaced Brusilov as the Supreme Commander. Such a quick change of commanders did not promise anything good for the restless army ...
    The ministers of war of the interim government - first Guchkov, then Kerensky - began to interfere in the affairs of the Stavka, considering it subordinate to themselves (contrary to the Regulation on Field Administration, which had not yet been canceled) ”
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 10 January 2014 17: 39
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    Although I understand what you are Marat), let’s quote further, an excerpt from Denikin about the progress and results of the operation itself, SUCCESSFUL, I NEED TO RECOGNIZE BUT AGAIN AGAINST AUSTRO HUNGARIANS, BUT SEE:

    "On June 16, on the front of the shock corps of the 7th and 11th armies, artillery cannonade began. After two days of continuous artillery preparation, which destroyed the enemy's strong fortifications, the Russian regiments moved into the attack ....
    The 19th attacks were repeated on the 60th front, between the upper Strypa and Narayuvka. For two days of hard and glorious battle, Russian troops captured 300 officers, 18.000 soldiers, 29 guns and penetrated the enemy’s position at 2-5 versts ...
    Kerensky informed the Provisional Government: "Today is a great triumph of the revolution. On June 18, the Russian revolutionary army, with great enthusiasm, went on the offensive, and proved to Russia and the whole world its selfless devotion to the revolution, and love for freedom and homeland ... Russian soldiers affirm a new one, based on a sense of civic duty, discipline ... Today has put an end to the malicious slanderous attacks on the organization of the Russian army, built on democratic principles "...
    After three days of calm, a hot battle resumed on the front of the 11th Army ... By this time, the approach from the reserve to the threatened areas of the German units had begun, and the battle assumed a stubborn, fierce character. The 11th Army took possession of a number of fortified lines, bearing, however, heavy losses; in places the trenches, after hot battles, passed from hand to hand; it took a lot of new tension to break the stubbornness of a growing and recovering enemy ...
    This battle, in essence, ended the offensive operation of the 7th and 11th armies. The gust disappeared, a tedious standing in the position began, enlivened only by local battles, counterattacks by the Austro-Germans and "alternating voltage" artillery fire.


    On June 23, preparations began for the offensive in the Kornilov army. On June 25, his troops west of Stanislavov broke through Kirchbach’s position and entered the Jesuit-Lysets line; On the 26th, after a stubborn bloody battle, the troops of Kirchbach, completely defeated, turned, carrying away, in their swift flight, and the German division, which had arrived in time to help. On the 27th, the right column of General Cheremisov took control of Galich, transferring part of the forces across the Dniester, and on the 28th, the left column, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Austro-Germans, took Kalush from the battle. In the next two to three days, the 8th army was arranged with battles on the Lomnice River and ahead of it.
    In this brilliant operation, Kornilov’s army, breaking through the front of the 3rd Austrian army for 30 miles, captured 150 officers, 10.000 soldiers and about a hundred guns ... General Böhm-Ermoli, at that time, was drawing all his reserves to the Zlochevsky direction. The German divisions, which were being transferred from the Western European Front, also moved there. However, I had to transfer part of the reserves over the Dniester, against the 8th Russian army. They arrived in time for July 2, brought some stability to the frustrated ranks of the 3rd Austrian army, and from that day on Lomnitsa, positional battles began, sometimes reaching great stress, with varying success.
    The concentration of the German strike group ended on July 5. ”
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate 10 January 2014 17: 45
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      The Germans were well aware of our preparations for the offensive and were ready for it. No surprise was reached by the Russian army. At first, our armies had tactical successes, and the Kornilov army even managed to break through the front of the Austrians, but the Germans slowly pulled up their reserves to problem areas and managed to stabilize the situation, preparing for their counterattack ... We quote

      “On July 6, after a strong artillery preparation, the German shock group attacked the 11th Army, broke through its front, and began a non-stop movement to Kamenets-Podolsk, pursuing the corps of the 11th Army, which were in panic flight. The headquarters of the army, behind it the Headquarters and the press, disdaining the prospect, fell upon the Mlynov regiment, considering him to be the culprit of the disaster. The corrupted, nasty regiment left its position without permission, opening the front. The phenomenon is very unfortunate, but it would be too elementary to consider it even a reason. For already on the 9th, the committees and commissars of the 11th Army telegraphed to the Provisional Government "the whole truth about the events that have taken place":
      “The German offensive on the 6th Army front, which began on July 11, is growing into an immeasurable calamity, possibly threatening the death of revolutionary Russia. The mood of the units recently pushed forward by the heroic efforts of the minority has marked a sharp and fatal turn. The offensive impulse was quickly exhausted. is in a state of ever-increasing decay. There is no longer any talk of power and obedience, persuasions and convictions have lost their force - they are answered with threats, and sometimes with executions. There were cases that the order given to hurriedly support was discussed for hours at rallies, why support was late for Some units will leave their positions without permission, without even waiting for the enemy's approach ... For hundreds of miles to the rear, lines of fugitives, with and without rifles, healthy, vigorous, feeling completely unpunished, are pulling away. .. The situation requires the most extreme measures ... Today, the commander-in-chief, with the consent of the commissars and mitts, an order was given to shoot at the runners. Let the whole country know the truth ... shudder and find in itself the determination to ruthlessly attack everyone who ruins and sells Russia and the revolution with cowardice. "
      The 11th Army "with a tremendous superiority of forces and equipment, withdrew nonstop." On the 8th, she was already on Seret, passing without delay the strong fortified positions west of this river, which served as the starting position for our glorious offensive in 1916 ...
      On the 11th, the Germans occupied Tarnopol, abandoned without a fight by the 1st Guards Corps, and the next day broke through our positions on the Gniezno River and on Seret, south of Trembovli, developing their offensive to the east and southeast ...
      On July 12, in view of the complete hopelessness of the situation, the commander-in-chief ordered the retreat from Seret, and by the 21st Army of the South-Western Front, having cleared all of Galicia and Bukovina, they retreated to the Russian state border.
      Their path was marked by fires, violence, killings and robberies. But among them were a few units, valiantly fighting the enemy, and with their breasts, covering with their lives the crazed crowds of fugitives. Among them was the Russian officers, with their corpses, mostly covering the battlefields.
      The armies retreated in complete disarray ...
      Commissars Savinkov and Filonenko telegraphed the Provisional Government: "There is no choice: death penalty for traitors ... death penalty for those who refuse to sacrifice their lives for the Motherland" ...
      1. barbiturate
        barbiturate 10 January 2014 17: 48
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        I could go on, there are terrible pictures of the decomposition of the Russian army, but I already gave a huge number of quotes, left a bunch of posts in this topic and am tired, because everything is already clear to any person that the German army was and that the rest of the army in the east
        1. Nagaibak
          Nagaibak 10 January 2014 20: 56
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          barbiturate "I could continue to continue, there are terrible pictures of the decomposition of the Russian army, but I already cited a huge number of quotes, left a bunch of posts in this topic and was already tired, because everything is already clear to any person what the German army and that the rest of the army is in the east. "
          You have post-war omniscience. Ie you know who attacked where, who retreated where. The Germans certainly considered their army the best, but they could not imagine what happened next. It was possible and it was possible it is not a conversation. What we have is what we have. And when the Russian Empire and its army perished in the abyss of revolution, they pulled along with them Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. So that justice ultimately triumphed.
          1. barbiturate
            barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 00
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            Quote: Nagaibak
            You have post-war omniscience. Ie you know who attacked where, who retreated where. The Germans certainly considered their army the best, but they could not imagine what happened next. It was possible and it was possible it is not a conversation. What we have is what we have. And when the Russian Empire and its army perished in the abyss of revolution, they pulled along with them Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. So that justice ultimately triumphed.


            I don’t see where the post-war omniscience is here) In my posts there are a lot of quotes from military commanders, both German and ours, so everyone knew. The Germans directly write about the offensive that the Russian NIRAZU troops failed to deliver strikes that the results of these strikes would not have known and prepared for them, German statements confirm. That, it was possible and necessary to do and is preparing for a war differently !!! - THIS IS JUST A TALK. You need to be able to learn from the enemy, and the readiness of the Germans for war and the preparation of their army for war, especially the principle of preparing secondary divisions and a landver, simply amazed the Russian generals. As a result, Russia emerged from the war in Karachik and paid indemnities to the Germans, who were already in Kiev and near St. Petersburg. Then, together they crushed them, but Russia did not take any part in this.
        2. Marat
          Marat 10 January 2014 22: 36
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          The fact that the summer offensive of 17 ended in complete disaster could not have been known to everyone otherwise. But that’s not the point ... I just gave an example that even the “Kerensky offensive” turned out to be a problem for the Austrians. And now we can only guess , how would the company end for the Central Powers, if the tsarist army would remain and strike the allies from the east and west.
          1. barbiturate
            barbiturate 11 January 2014 06: 05
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            Yes, Marat wouldn’t have ended) In previous years, every Russian offensive was coordinated with the Allies and the army was still better than the half-decomposed protesting crowds and there was no success. The Germans in the spring of 1917 were still very strong and would have ended the same
            1. Marat
              Marat 11 January 2014 15: 10
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              As far as I remember, the Allies did not inflict a single simultaneous strike - there were only constant requests from the Anglo-Saxons for revenue from Russia. Russia, however, carried out its attacks independently.
              1. barbiturate
                barbiturate 11 January 2014 15: 47
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                Marat, here you are wrong, our offensives have always been attached to the actions of the allies, and not just attached, but the allies simply demanded! offensive and ours started it. Tied hand and foot with French loans and almost openly bought by them, our courtiers forced the army to advance. There are many testimonies of this, both ours and German, I remember them, but it's just too lazy to look for links and quotes, just believe me if you want)
  • barbiturate
    barbiturate 11 January 2014 07: 39
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    Due to the fact that I personally can no longer understand where you, Nagaybak, answered, and where not, I propose to start from here in mode one question, one answer, otherwise there is so much time already needed to figure out what, when and in what context to answer that it’s just a pity time and there is no desire. In order to understand and understand here in the morning. when and who wrote and find what you already wrote, as you say, it took me 1,5 hours and I don’t need to. If you want, from the bottom of all the comments, one post, otherwise I’m just not interested and very time-consuming, I have my own convictions, you are yours, let it remain so. I will not answer your comments at the beginning, in the middle there. Such disputes need to be conducted in person, or in very orderly writing, and above in the posts there is already a mess.
    1. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 11 January 2014 10: 12
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      barbiturate "Due to the fact that personally I can no longer understand where you, Nagaybak, answered and where not, I propose to start from here in one question, one answer, otherwise it takes so much time to figure out what , when and in what context to answer that it’s just a pity for the time and there is no desire. So that in the morning I’ll figure it out and understand what and who wrote when and find what you already wrote, as you say, it took me 1,5 hours and I don't need it. "
      I agree with you. But I already answered your posts. And those or not who knows him.
      quote = barbiturate]
      "Such disputes need to be conducted personally, or in a very orderly written manner, and higher posts are already a mess."
      I agree.
      barbiturate. "I will not answer your comments at the beginning, in the middle there."
      I agree, and our discussion is becoming boring in terms of the fact that questions arise who read more or who are smarter. I don't like that. I think we will meet again on this site and discuss. So, until new exciting meetings.
      1. barbiturate
        barbiturate 11 January 2014 10: 54
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        Quote: Nagaibak
        barbiturate "Due to the fact that personally I can no longer understand where you, Nagaybak, answered and where not, I propose to start from here in one question, one answer mode, otherwise it takes so much time to figure out what , when and in what context to answer that it’s just a pity for the time and there is no desire. So that in the morning there would be to understand and understand what and who wrote when and to find what you already wrote, as you say, it took me 1,5 hours and I don't need it. "I agree with you. But I have already answered your posts. And whether or not who knows him. Quote = barbiturate] "Such disputes need to be conducted personally, or in a very orderly written manner, and higher posts are already a mess." I agree. Barbiturat. “I will not answer your comments at the beginning, in the middle there.” I agree, and our discussion is becoming boring in terms of the question of who has read more or who is smarter. I don't like that. I think we will meet again on this site and discuss. So, until new exciting meetings.


        I agree, I read your new comments from above, but no matter how I would like, I will not answer). Of course, we will also meet and discuss with you, so I can end with your words - "until new exciting meetings"!