By the way, his political career clearly demonstrates that ethnic Russians in Soviet Russia, and in the first years of its existence, were not at all some kind of powerless "mass" suppressed by "foreigners." Alexey Ivanovich Rykov, the son of a poor peasant from the Kukarka settlement in the Vyatka province, was a short time Commissar of Internal Affairs after October, then for a very long time headed the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNH), while also serving as deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK). And after the death of V.I. Lenin, he, in general, became the head of the Soviet government (only 19 of December 1930 was sent to resign him). In his views, the second Soviet prime minister was a moderate Bolshevik, who favored a broad social and political compromise. It is indicative that he resigned from his post as Commissar of Internal Affairs in disagreement with the position of Lenin, who is skeptical about the coalition with the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Rykov spoke against forced collectivization, believing that the Russian village should go through an evolutionary path of development. In this, his position seemed to coincide with Bukharin’s, but one must take into account that the motivation of the two figures was different. If Rykov proceeded from considerations of pragmatism, then Bukharin, who not so long ago was the main ideologue of the Left deviation (1918 year), simply did not believe in the possibility of the Russian peasantry.
The “right deviation” itself was not overcome immediately and demanded considerable efforts from Stalin’s group. Behind Bukharin there were very, very many who were ready to go. So, they sympathized with the deputy chairman of the OGPU G. G. Yagoda. But what can we say if he even doubted such a loyal Stalinist as K. Ye. Voroshilov. (He also doubted M. I. Kalinin, who was loyal to the leader).
Throughout 1928, the Stalinists and Bukharinites engaged in restrained discussions about how to industrialize. Bukharin opposed high growth rates and preferred the development of light industry. Stalin, on the other hand, was inclined to take a high rate, focusing on heavy industry. During perestroika, the Bukharin position was exalted in every possible way. It was argued that a moderate pace would not have led to the upheavals of the early 1930s, known as the Great Turning Point. However, later many historians came to the conclusion that Bukharin's program was correct only in the cabinet sense. And it would work in the event that the USSR was somewhere on the moon - away from its geopolitical opponents. And in the then specifichistorical conditions, the country urgently needed to develop industry - in order to be ready for a new, big war.
In fact, Bukharin advocated the continuation of the NEP. But at the end of 1920, it was already a blissful utopia leading to a dead end. NEP fully developed its resource, restoring the pre-war level of production, which was a very relative achievement. (After all, the world has gone far ahead in the post-war decade. Production of marketable grain was less than half the 1913 level of the year.) And in 1927, production growth stopped altogether. “In industry, enterprises, which for some reason were also transferred to cost accounting, were left without working capital. In order to at least pay the wages to the workers, they had to urgently sell off finished products, naturally, at bargain prices, competing with each other, - writes M. Antonov. - In the Donbass famine began among the miners who were fired due to lack of money for wages. The government demanded to separate from the enterprises that which is not related to production, i.e., “reset social programs”. The distribution of free food rations to workers was stopped, their cost was included in the salary, as a result of which the standard of living decreased. Unemployment grew rapidly. The army of the unemployed at the height of NEP numbered more than 600 thousand people - this is about one fifth of the total number of factory workers before the revolution. ” ("Capitalism in Russia will not happen!")
This is what the NEP has led to, which we still admire by some historians and politicians. And here was the prolongation of which Bukharin spoke. So the historical truth was undoubtedly behind Stalin, while Bukharin approached the matter as a strictly theoretical theorist and an office dreamer.
But in the 1928 year (and later) it was by no means obvious to everyone. Therefore, the July plenum abolished emergency measures to seize bread, on which Stalin insisted. But only with the help of them it was possible to get bread for industrial breakthrough.
We have decided to be horrified by the "anti-peasant pressure" and Stalin's policy towards the village. And, indeed, there is little good. But we must also understand the situation in which the country finds itself. The industry was poorly developed, and only she could give goods that the peasants would willingly take in exchange for the surplus of bread. But these goods were not. Therefore, there was no bread. And without bread there was no development of the industry. It turned out a vicious circle from which Stalin wanted to leave at the expense of the village.
He can be blamed for this for a long time, however, this is how industrialization took place in many other countries. In England, in general, the whole peasantry was driven out of the land. The peasants were forcibly turned into proletarians, who were forced to work hard at manufactories for 16 hours a day for pennies. In principle, the industry is always developing at the expense of the agricultural sector. The whole question is - what is the size of this bill that history sets. Alas, in Russia, which went through a revolution and a monstrous civil war, this score was very substantial. (Although smaller than in the same England.)
Meanwhile, the party leaders continued to incline towards Bukharin. The Central Committee adopted a resolution that left the industry at the same rate of growth. It is quite possible that Bukharin would soon have won a decisive victory over Stalin. But he made a few mistakes. First, for a long time Bukharin did not dare openly oppose Stalin, which would mean an application for the elimination of the latter from power. He got off with mediated criticism. Bukharin could have dumped Stalin already at the July plenum, but he did not dare to do so. Secondly, Bukharin "slipped" on the fact that he entered into secret negotiations with L. B. Kamenev, one of the leaders of the left, "Trotsky-Zinoviev" opposition. To do this to him was absolutely no reason. Bukharin’s supporters were already enough, and together with the hesitant, they could form a very real majority.
The negotiations between the two old Bolsheviks soon became known. And stone rushed to confess everything to Stalin, which greatly helped him. When the party members learned about Bukharin’s talks with the left-wing who were extremely unpopular then their indignation knew no bounds. And the defeat of Bukharin was already only a matter of time, which Stalin accelerated with his powerful party apparatus.
Already at the beginning of 1929, the Bukharinites were defeated in the struggle for power and admitted their mistakes. But this did not mean that they ceased to be politically dangerous. They rushed sympathy nonparty sections of the intelligentsia. Their relations with the power of the Soviets were always rather tense, but in the “right-wing” communists they saw the most liberal and, therefore, acceptable force. In the 1929-1930 year, the OGPU revealed a number of opposition groups, whose support consisted of “specialists” from the scientific, technical, humanitarian and military intelligentsia. We are talking about the Industrial Party (the leader is deputy chairman of the production department L. Ramzin), the Labor Peasant Party (economists A. V. Chayanov and N. D. Kondratiev), the Menshevik Union Bureau of the RSDLP (N. Sukhanov and member of the State Planning Committee V. Groman) . In addition, authorities discovered the existence of an opposition group in an academic environment and seriously undertook military experts.
The perestroika of the above organizations was declared a “KGB invention” and the fruit of “Stalin's falsification”. But a number of circumstances can seriously doubt this. A. V. Shubin, one of the most objective anti-Stalinist historians, points to these circumstances. Here, for example: "... The accused V. Ikov really was in connection with the foreign delegation of the RSDLP, corresponded and headed the Moscow Bureau of the RSDLP, but did not tell anything about his true connections." That is, it turns out that the secret Menshevik organization really existed, and the investigation did not even manage to find out all about it.
But the main thing - the data obtained in the study of correspondence between the Soviet leaders. It follows from them that Stalin really knew about the presence of a large-scale anti-Soviet underground, relying on "specialists." And about any falsification of speech did not go. So, in 1930, Stalin writes Menzhinsky the following: “Ramzin’s testimony is very interesting. In my opinion, the most interesting thing in his testimony is the question of intervention, in general, and especially, the question of the duration of the intervention. It turns out that it was planned in 1930 year, but was postponed to 1931 or even to 1932 year. This is likely and important. ” It turns out that the leader was "convinced that Ramzin was a carrier of real information, and it was unlikely that the OGPU would decide to mystify him on such an important occasion." ("Leaders and conspirators")
From the testimony of Ramzin it followed that the "Industrial Party" was in contact with the Bukharin group. And in September 1932 of the year, Stalin wrote to Molotov: “About bringing the communists to the answer, who helped the Kondratyan gossipers. I agree, but what about Rykov (who undoubtedly helped them) and Kalinin ... ”
Most likely, it was Rykov’s contacts with opposition-minded specialists that caused him to be removed from his post as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In general, we think about the situation. Bukharinites (and Rykov himself) have long been crushed and repented - but one of their leaders continues to head the government! It turns out that Stalin and the Politburo considered it possible to use his organizational skills at the very top of the Soviet party-state pyramid.
But here, Rykov removed. It is clear that this required some completely new circumstances. The premiere was indeed exposed in connection with anti-Soviet structures - this is the reason for his resignation. At the same time, the masses were not informed about this true reason - not wanting to tell the truth about the Fronde, which continued at the very top.
This front was still very dangerous. But no less dangerous was the front in the army. And here in the foreground is the figure of M. N. Tukhachevsky, commander of the Leningrad Military District. This leader had his own vision of “Marxism. He wanted to militarize the camp, rigidly subordinating all spheres of her life to the interests of the army. Back in December 1927, Tukhachevsky suggested that Stalin create next year 50-100 thousand new tanks. Any thinking person will immediately understand the absurdity of this plan. After all, the country has not even really embarked on industrialization, and 50 thousand is the amount that the Soviet tank industry allowed itself for the entire post-war period (meaning, of course, the Great Patriotic War).
In the same unrealistic plan was proposed by Tukhachevsky in 1930 year. According to him, the USSR needed to urgently produce 40 thousands of aircraft. This is not an isolated fact, this is a trend. Tukhachevsky led the business to ensure that translate the entire country on a war footing. The entire national economy was supposed to work on the production of armaments, and the entire male population of draft age should master them. Approximately the same order existed in 1941-1945 in our years, but then the war, unprecedented in the history of mankind, was raging. And then industrialization took place.
Tukhachevsky and close to him, the army team followed the internal political struggle with special interest. The military expert, former Colonel N. Kakurin reported that senior army leaders often gather and discuss how to intervene in the struggle of the Stalinists and Bukharinites. According to him, their goal was "military dictatorship, coming to power through the right deviation." And as a military leader, the army team saw Tukhachevsky. Maybe this is - falsification of organs? Yes, no: “Kakurin’s testimony was especially valuable because, firstly, he was an admirer and comrade of Tukhachevsky ... and, secondly, they were not obtained under pressure - he initially shared his revelations with an OGPU informant, his relative.” ("Leaders and conspirators")
In September 1930, alarmed Stalin, advised on this issue with Ordzhonikidze: “Therefore, Tukhachevsky was captured by anti-Soviet elements and was also specially processed by anti-Soviet elements from the ranks of the right. So goes on materials. Is it possible? Of course, perhaps, since it is possible. Apparently, the right are even prepared to go to a military dictatorship just to get rid of the Central Committee, the collective and state farms, the Bolshevik pace of development of the industry ... These gentlemen obviously wanted to supply the military people to the Kondratieff-Grohman-Sukhanovs. Kondratieff-Sukhanovskaya Bukharin-party - this balance. Gee ... "
What was to do? Arrest conspirators? But the trouble is to make it very difficult. The chairman of the OGPU, V. R. Menzhinsky, wrote to Stalin: “To arrest the members of the group one by one is risky. There can be two ways out: either immediately arrest the most active members of the group, or wait for your arrival, while taking intelligence measures so as not to be caught off guard. I consider it necessary to note that now all the rebel groups are ripening very quickly and the last decision represents a certain risk. ”
But the commander of the Leningrad Military District Tukhachevsky was in very good relations with the Leningrad leader Kirov. Affection also connected him with Ordzhonikidze and Kuibyshev. In turn, these three Politburo members constituted an elite clan that enjoyed a certain autonomy. Try, touch Tukhachevsky - and the consequences can be the most unpredictable.
And despite the fact that there was another frondial grouping in the Red Army — anti-Soviet military experts. Today it is difficult to judge how serious their organization was. (The investigation materials are still classified.) But from the reports of the OGPU, it follows that the former special officers did indeed meet for secret meetings, which were a cross between the gatherings of old comrades and the frontier circles. It was reported and the growth of Bonapartist and monarchical sentiment in the military environment. In addition, white emigration openly pinned hopes on military experts, from whom they expected an armed overthrow of Soviet power. So, back in March 1928 of the year, the White-Immigrant newspaper “Renaissance” published a letter from General A. I. Denikin to a certain “red commander”. The former leader of the white South to justify the transition of military experts to serve in the Red Army. Denikin reasonable notice that a strong army can be used to overthrow the Bolsheviks.
The situation was complicated by the fact that the loyal leaders of a sufficiently high level began to move to anti-Stalinist positions yesterday. Thus, in 1930, the first secretary of the Krasnopresnensky District Committee of Moscow, M. N. Ryutin, began to actively recruit supporters among party functionaries. He was arrested, however, the OGPU board released this newly-minted oppositionist to freedom, where he composed his famous “Platform” and organized the underground “Union of Marxist-Leninists”. It turns out that Ryutin had high patrons at the very top.
At the same time, the “left-right” bloc of N. Syrtsov (Chairman of the SNK of the RSFSR) and V. Lominadze (Persek of the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee) emerged. And the latter enjoyed the special patronage of Ordzhonikidze himself, which leads to some thoughts.
And this whole tangle (“right” - “nauchspetsy” - “army men” - with the possible connection of “military experts”, “new oppositionists”, Kalinin, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov and Kuibyshev) was tied against the background of acute social discontent caused by collectivization. The country was surrounded by peasant uprisings. In January-April, 1930, 6117 mass demonstrations took place, in which about 800 thousands of people took part. In fact, a peasant war broke out in the country. In addition, the peasants began to slaughter cattle on a massive scale, not wanting to give it to collective farms. By March 1930, the 15 of millions of cattle was slaughtered. Under the knife was a third of the livestock of pigs and a quarter of the sheep.
The case, as they say, smelled fried, and yesterday's victor Stalin was facing the threat of a coup.
Joseph Vissarionovich unraveled this opposition ball with the grace of an experienced politician. He decided not to touch Tukhachevskogo - in order to avoid a serious conflict with the participation of the army. Moreover, Stalin provided him a new round of career. In 1931, Tukhachevsky becomes the Deputy Commissar of Defense. At the same time, he left Leningrad - away from the mighty Kirov. In 1930, Stalin criticized Tukhachevsky for excessive militarism, but in 1932, he wrote a letter to this military commander, in which he admitted his criticism was not entirely correct. Thus, the fronde Tukhachevsky was temporarily calmed down.
Stalin also refused any repression against the "right", because it could cause a wave of chaos in the party. (Such a wave, and not just one, swept across the country in the 1937-1938 years.) He limited himself to Rykov’s resignation. But "Bukharchik" was thrown sugar bone - in 1931, he was again allowed to attend Politbureau meetings. (Naturally, without the restoration of membership in this collegiate body.) Thus, Stalin drove a wedge between two colleagues in the opposition — one was punished and the other was encouraged.
But on the specialists was struck a crushing blow. All the leaders of the opposition groups came under investigation and trial. But here, there was no continuous prosecution. Some specialists (Groman) were hidden behind bars, others (Ramzin) were mercifully forgiven.
Most suffered military experts. 10 thousands of former officers were cleaned out of the Red Army - 31 was shot from them. Stalin (like other members of the PB) was seriously afraid of a White Guard assault attack, with the support of Britain and France. Operation Vesna even touched B. M. Shaposhnikov, who was demoted from the post of chief of staff to commander of the Volga Military District. (However, after a while, Stalin would bring him back. The leader’s confidence in this military expert was huge and almost limitless.)
Well, and everything else, Stalin was concerned about creating his own social base, so necessary in the conditions of mass unrest. He introduced a new card distribution system. Now better supply has been granted "Drummer production", managers and workers in the capital.
In December, 1930 Rykov fell from the political Olympus, leaving the Politburo. And only then it was possible to talk about overcoming the “right” (Bukharin-Rykovka) threat.