The unprecedented arrogance and pressure of the Western powers on Ukraine to draw it into the European Union has a long-standing history. The very geographical position contributed to the fact that from time immemorial, various tribes invaded here, seeking to plunder these lands and enslave their population.
Often these efforts were accompanied by attempts to find support among the locals. Even before the First World War, under the auspices of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was created from Ukrainians. Soyuz also appealed to the Ottoman Empire for help declaring the struggle for an independent Ukraine as the goal of the hostilities of the Turkish government. The Polish Legion, created by Germany and Austria-Hungary, led by Social Democrat J. Piłsudski, who later headed the new Polish state, also supported the central powers in subversive activities in Ukraine.
The signing of the 9 in February (27 in January) of the 1918 peace treaty in Brest by representatives of the Central Powers with the delegates of the Ukrainian Rada, which had been overthrown in Kiev by the Ukrainian Ukrainian troops, opened the way for the intervention of Germany and Austria-Hungary, which lasted until the end of 1918.
But the Entente powers had their own views on Ukraine. In accordance with the secret convention concluded by 23 of December 1917, French Prime Minister Jean Clemenceau with a representative of the British General Staff, Ukraine and the Crimea entered the zone of military-political actions of France. Immediately after the surrender of Germany in November 1918, the troops of Great Britain, France, Romania, Greece, Serbia began the occupation of Ukraine.
In the spring of 1920, Polish troops invaded the Ukrainian lands. The interventionists were accompanied by the army of S. Petlura.
In the future, Poland continued to make efforts to take revenge for the loss of Ukraine in the XVII-XVIII centuries and "restore" its borders from sea to sea.
This showed a lack of political realism and a penchant for adventurism, always characteristic of the ruling circles of Poland.
Fragile peace on the Polish-Soviet border
The end of the Polish-Soviet war on the basis of the Peace of Riga signed in 1921 did not lead to the establishment of good neighborly relations between the two countries. From Poland constantly carried out military attacks on Soviet lands. The Polish government more than once carried out foreign policy measures hostile to the USSR. One of them was the signing of the 17 March 1922 of the Warsaw Pact (33 year before the agreement of the same name that united the socialist countries of Europe). The 7-I article of the treaty obliged its participants (Poland, Finland, Latvia and Estonia) to act as a united front in the event of an attack on one of them from another state. In a secret memorandum of 22 on April 1922, it was stated that "the 7 article meant Russia". Latvian Foreign Minister Meyerowitz emphasized that this memorandum must remain secret, "so that the Russians have no reason to believe that the Warsaw Pact is directed against them." The fact that the treaty was not defensive, but offensive in nature was testified to by the words of the French envoy in Estonia, Gilberte, after the signing of the Warsaw Pact: "Now is the time for the guns to start talking ... Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland are strong enough to overthrow Bolshevik power in Russia. "
Proposals for mutual disarmament and the signing of a non-aggression treaty, which the Soviet Government introduced, were rejected by Poland from the very beginning. At the same time, the Polish government intensified tensions with our country. Poland’s provocative actions caused concern in a number of Baltic states. October 25 The newspaper Latvijas Sargs 1925 wrote: "To contact Poland is to go along with it to a future war."
In 1926, Poland made efforts to strengthen the military-political bloc with the Baltic countries, but they were supported only by Estonia. Tallinn and Warsaw exchanged visits of government delegations during which plans for an attack on the USSR were discussed.
The unwillingness of Latvia and Lithuania to support Poland was promoted by statements by Polish leaders about territorial claims against these states.
(In Warsaw, they did not consider it necessary to limit themselves to the seizure of Vilna and the Vilna region.) At the same time, the Western powers put pressure on these two Baltic countries to force them to join military cooperation with Poland. Latvian envoy to France Schumann reported 19 on November 1930 from Paris to Riga: "France would very much welcome the conclusion of a strong military bloc between Poland and the Baltic states."
In turn, the USSR made efforts to thwart the creation of such a bloc. Despite long delays, the USSR achieved in 1932 the signing of non-aggression treaties with the Baltic states and Poland.
In alliance with Hitler
The coming to power in Germany of Hitler, who had long proclaimed expansion to the East as the central foreign policy task, first alarmed Warsaw. Therefore, in July 1933, Poland signed a convention on the definition of aggression with the Soviet Union. 13 December 1933 in Warsaw supported the proposal of the USSR to publish a joint Polish-Soviet declaration, which would indicate that both countries are determined to protect the peace and inviolability of the Baltic states. However, Poland soon considered the publication of the Soviet-Polish declaration unnecessary.
The signing of 26 in January 1934 of the Polish-German Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression opened a new stage in Warsaw’s foreign policy. During his meetings with the Polish ambassador in Berlin, former Kaiser’s officer Józef Lipski, Adolf Hitler assured that the resolution of questions about the Polish-German border should be postponed for the future. According to the ambassador, Hitler said to him: "Poland is the last barrier of civilization in the East." In response, Lipsky said that Poland "often played the role of a shield for European culture", citing as an example the battle of Warsaw in 1920.
And soon there was talk of a joint expansion of the two countries to the east of Poland.
Hitler's Minister of Economy J. Schacht said to Tanneri, the governor of the national bank of France: "Sooner or later, Germany and Poland will divide Ukraine together, while we will be satisfied with the capture of the Baltic states."
These plans were frankly stated by Hermann Goering during his hunt in Belovezhskaya Pushcha in January-February 1935. According to the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland Count Shembek, Goering "offered us an anti-Russian alliance and a joint campaign against Moscow. At the same time, he expressed the opinion that Ukraine would become a zone of influence of Poland, and the north-west of Russia - a zone of Germany. "
But soon the question of the participation of Poland in aggression against Czechoslovakia became more relevant. In the course of the talks in February 1938, Polish Foreign Minister J. Beck in Berlin and G. Goering in Warsaw reached agreement on joint actions of the two countries on the division of Czechoslovakia.
Then Polish diplomats in Czechoslovakia received instructions from Warsaw to establish cooperation with the Sudeten Germans and at the same time actively come out in defense of the rights of the Polish minority. In March, 1938 of Warsaw demanded that anti-Polish propaganda be stopped there in Czechoslovakia. With the help of Polish agents, the Union of Poles was created in the Czechoslovak city of Tesine. In the city and the surrounding area, an area of 862 square. km., lived 80 thousands of Poles and 120 thousands of Czechs and Slovaks. Although the Polish population was a minority in the Cieszyn region, members of the Union demanded that they be granted the same political rights to national autonomy, which the Germans had already received in the Sudetenland. 4 May the Czechoslovak government agreed to meet these demands.
Meanwhile, the threat of a German attack on Czechoslovakia increased. 12 May The Soviet government declared its readiness to fulfill its obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1935 and come to the aid of Czechoslovakia on the condition that Poland and Romania let Soviet troops pass through their lands. Warsaw and Bucharest immediately responded with a sharp refusal
Soon it became known about the intention of Poland to seize Teshin and the territory adjacent to it in case Germany would divide Czechoslovakia. In Poland, anti-Czech propaganda unfolded. At the same time, Warsaw informed Berlin that it would not let the Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and demanded "the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian border," which would have been possible only if the Czechoslovak Republic was divided. On September 15, the Polish government officially demanded a plebescite in Tesin, but six days later it announced that Czechoslovakia should immediately transfer Teshin to Poland.
The Soviet Union tried to stop the Polish aggression. 23 September the Soviet government warned the Polish ambassador that the invasion of Polish troops in Czechoslovakia would force the USSR to denounce the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty. But Poland rejected the warnings of Moscow. A "Volunteer Corps for the Liberation of Teshin" began to take shape there.
The government of Czechoslovakia stated that it was ready to resolve the "Teshino question" within two months. But in its note of September 30, the Polish government demanded to accept his demand before October 1 noon. It was said that Polish troops will enter the October XIUMX Tesin.
Germany supported Poland. Goering personally told the Polish ambassador in Berlin that "in the event of a complication with Russia, Poland can count on the most effective assistance from Germany."
Tesin was captured by Polish troops. And on November 29 Poland demanded to transfer part of Carpathian Rus to it (about 200 sq. Km.)
Preparation of the Polish-German campaign
A month before the Munich deal, Goering returned to plans for a joint Polish-German campaign against Ukraine. The Polish ambassador in Berlin reported to Warsaw that, according to Goering, “after solving the Czech problem, the Russian problem will become topical. He returned to his thought that in the event of a Soviet-Polish conflict Germany could not remain neutral without providing assistance to Poland .. Poland, in his opinion, may have well-known interests directly in Russia, for example, in Ukraine. "
Polish ruling circles reacted positively to these proposals. In September, Soviet intelligence received a recording of a conversation between the Counselor of the German Embassy in Warsaw, R. von Shelia, and the Vice-Director of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland Kobylyansky. Discussing the question of the consequences of the upcoming partition of Czechoslovakia, Kobylyansky said: "The minister cannot speak as openly as I can. The question of Carpathian Russia is crucial for us ... If Karpatskaya Rus goes to Hungary, then Poland will later agree to speak at Germany’s side in the march to Soviet Ukraine. "
On October 24, during the meeting of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany I. von Ribbentrop with the Ambassador of Poland J. Lipsky, the question of a common policy of the two countries towards the USSR was discussed. Ribbentrop proposed Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact as a prerequisite for joint actions against the USSR.
Knowing the intentions of Germany and Poland to undertake a campaign against Ukraine, Great Britain sought to support him. 24 November 1938 British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain asked French leaders whether the Franco-Soviet agreement would be activated, "if Russia turns to France on the grounds that the separatist movement in Ukraine was provoked by Germany." Chamberlain advised the French to denounce the treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union 1935, since "the future is still not clear."
But for nothing, Chamberlain was worried about the fact that France would remain faithful to its foreign policy obligations. According to the testimony of Hitler’s (and then historian) translator Paul Schmidt during Ribbentrop’s talks with French Foreign Minister J. Bonn in December 1938 in response to a request from Hitler’s Reich Minister Bonn, he said that France’s “disinterestedness in the fate of the East”. These days, the French newspaper Epoque wrote: “Hinting at the preparation of the march to Ukraine, Ribbentrop wanted to get at least tacit consent from France. And Mr. Georges Bonnet gave this consent. Both interlocutors understood each other perfectly and agreed perfectly.”
The winter of 1938 - 1939 of the year was marked by the preparation of a Polish-German attack on the USSR in order to seize Ukraine.
At the same time, the Carpathian Rus (or Transcarpathian Ukraine), separated from Czechoslovakia, was chosen as a springboard for the attack. The French ambassador in Berlin, R. Coulondre, wrote in December 1938 of the year: “As for Ukraine, all the National Socialists have been talking about it for the past ten days ... It seems that the ways and means have not yet been determined, but the goal seems to be , it is precisely established - to create the Great Ukraine, which will become the granary of Germany. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to subjugate Romania, convince Poland, to seize land from the USSR. German dynamism does not stop before any of these difficulties, and in military circles they are talking about going on Caucasus and Baku. "
The issue of organizing the German-Polish campaign in Ukraine was discussed in January by 1939 at Hitler’s talks with Polish Foreign Minister Beck (see photo). Hitler demanded that for his
seizures in Ukraine after the victorious campaign Poland made some concessions to Germany. Hitler demanded the consent of Poland to the transfer to the Third Reich of the "free city of Danzig" populated by the Germans, which was under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. In addition, Hitler raised the question of creating an extra-territorial road between Pomerania and East Prussia through the “Danzig Corridor”.
Thus, the territory of Poland would have grown "from sea to sea", but the German highway would pass through the Polish route to the Baltic Sea.
However, the Polish leaders did not intend to sacrifice something for future takeovers in Ukraine. Beck first declared that he should consider this proposal, and then rejected it.
The Polish minister did not know that, without waiting for his consent, Hitler had already 24 on November 1938. He had signed a secret order to prepare for the "counter-revolutionary seizure of Danzig" by the armed forces of Germany. True, the order emphasized that the seizure should be carried out in a "politically favorable situation, and not as a result of the war against Poland."
The gap between accomplices planned campaign
Poland’s refusal to agree to the seizure of Danzig and the creation of an extraterritorial road caused irritation in Berlin. 21 March 1939 Mr. Ribbentrop summoned the Polish Ambassador Lipsky. The Reich Minister blamed the ambassador for "anti-German" student demonstrations in Poland and "unfriendly" speeches against the Reich in the Polish press. Ribbentrop stated that Hitler was displeased that Poland had not given a positive response to his proposal. According to the ambassador, Ribbentrop said: "The Führer has always sought to settle relations and mutual understanding with Poland. And now he continues to desire it. However, he is more and more surprised by the position of Poland." According to Lipsky, Ribbentrop stressed that cooperation between Germany and Poland "must have a certain anti-Soviet orientation." The Reich Minister expressed his desire for Beck to come to negotiations with Hitler.
Although there had been no cooling in relations between Poland and Ukraine either in Berlin or in Warsaw, before Ribbentrop and Lipsky met in Moscow, it became clear that the Polish-German campaign against Ukraine would not take place. Soviet leaders noted that the Western powers did not hide their disappointment with this circumstance. On this occasion, in the report of the Central Committee at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) I.V. Stalin said: “The noise raised by the Anglo-French and North American press about Soviet Ukraine is typical. The figures of this press hoarsely shouted that the Germans were going to Soviet Ukraine, that they now have in their hands the so-called Carpathian Ukraine numbering around 700 thousands of people, that the Germans will no longer be able to join Soviet Ukraine, which has more than 30 millions, to the so-called Carpathian Ukraine, this spring. It seems that this suspicious noise was intended to raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Ge to poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason ... It is even more characteristic that some politicians and press figures in Europe and the United States, having lost patience in anticipation of a “campaign against Soviet Ukraine,” themselves begin to expose the real motive of the policy of non-intervention. They directly say and write in black and white that the Germans cruelly “disappointed” them, because instead of moving further east, against the Soviet Union, they, you see, turned west and demanded colonies. You would think that the Germans were given areas of Czechoslovakia as a price for the obligation to start a war against the Soviet Union, and the Germans now refuse to pay a bill of exchange, sending them somewhere far away. "
In Moscow, they knew that the campaign to Ukraine together with Germany was going to Poland. This was evidenced by a speech at the same 13 congress in March 1939 of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine N.S. Khrushchev.
He said from the rostrum of the congress: "From history we know of trips to Ukraine ... Polish moguls. But history shows what a shameful collapse these adventures ended in." The fact that in the past these campaigns were successful, that for several centuries Ukraine was under the rule of Lithuania and other states, that almost all Ukrainian lands were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for a century, the speaker apparently did not suspect.
However, this historical excursion, which testified to Khrushchev's weak knowledge of the past of Ukraine, he needed only to build a bridge to modernity. Khrushchev declared: “Fascist barbarians in a dream see the riches of the Ukrainian people and do not stop dreaming about going to Ukraine. In preparing their bloody intrigues, they sent and send us their scouts, they recruit traitors, they try to penetrate our factories, collective farms and state farms.” Khrushchev blamed these foreign agents for many troubles, including attempts to undermine Ukraine’s agriculture. He stated that "Polish intelligence and bourgeois nationalists did everything to destroy livestock and, first and foremost, destroy horse livestock." This emotional performance ended with a promise to give "in the face to the one who puts his pork snout in our Soviet garden".
And yet, despite the fact that the Soviet leaders openly declared the Polish-German campaign against Ukraine and the desire of the Western powers to provoke an attack by Germany and Poland on the USSR, the Soviet government, as the crisis in Polish-German relations intensified, appealed to the British Government to convene a conference of representatives of six countries (USSR, France, England, Poland, Romania, Turkey) in order to discuss issues of collective security in Europe.
However, the West did not want to create an effective system of collective security with the participation of the USSR. In his personal letter, N. Chamberlain wrote on March 26: "I must confess my deep distrust of Russia. I absolutely do not believe in its ability to ensure an effective offensive, even if she wanted to."
Not willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union and Poland. In a memo written by the USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov described the position of Ambassador of Poland to the USSR V. Grzybowski, which he outlined in an interview with 11 in May of 1939 in May: "Poland does not consider it possible to conclude a mutual aid pact with the USSR because of the practical impossibility of rendering assistance to the Soviet Union from Poland."
Molotov wrote further: “At the same time, the ambassador, answering my question, said that Poland cannot be against the conclusion of a mutual aid pact between the USSR, Britain and France, believing that this is the business of these states themselves. My question is whether Poland is interested in such a pact, the ambassador responded evasively, re-reading the instructions received. When I asked whether Poland was interested in guaranteeing European states bordering the USSR, the ambassador replied that this should not apply to Poland. "
Meanwhile, already 3 April 1939 in Berlin was prepared by a directive on the preparation of an attack on Poland ("Weiss plan"). Attentive observers noted the hopelessness of the situation in Poland in the event of a war.
The British military attache in Warsaw, Sóuord, noticed that Poland was surrounded by Germany from three sides and was unlikely to survive. The attache emphasized that Poland had only 600 aircraft that could not be compared with German ones. He pointed out that the Polish land army was poorly equipped technically. Sword wrote that the Poles would not be able to protect the Danzig Corridor and would be forced to retreat to the Vistula. He stressed that "friendly Russia is vital for Poland."
However, as often happened in the history of Poland, its ruling circles preferred to live with illusions, ignoring the harsh reality. While in August 1939 in Moscow, there were tense negotiations on taking measures against the German aggression, the ambassadors of England and France in Warsaw appealed to the Polish government to obtain from him consent to the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory. However, this proposal was arrogantly rejected by Foreign Minister Beck of Poland. 19 August, the English ambassador to Warsaw, at the insistence of British Foreign Minister E. Halifax, again appealed to J. Beck with a request to give consent to the passage of Soviet troops, noting that Poland was disrupting the talks in Moscow. 20 August Beck again refused, saying: "I do not admit that there may be any discussion about any use of our territory by foreign troops. We do not have a military agreement with the USSR. We do not want it."
Explaining this position of Poland, the Soviet historian I.D. Ovsyanny wrote that the Polish government "pushed away the only real help the country could receive. This meant that the Pilsudzhk clique did not abandon its adventurous anti-Soviet designs and continued to rely on Germany's aggression against the USSR. They were amused by the hope that Hitler would not want weaken the Reich war with Poland and even attract it to the "march to the East."
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The events of recent weeks in Vilnius, Kiev and around Ukraine indicate that, as in former times, the West seeks to seize Ukraine. As before, the Western powers find allies in Ukraine. Many of them dream of "milk rivers in honey shores", on which they will settle "after moving to Europe."
As before, the Polish ruling circles are in the vanguard of Western efforts to enslave Ukraine, showing a century-old and indestructible penchant for arrogance and adventurism.
Therefore, it is not surprising that in recent days, leading political figures of this country often appeared in Kiev in the midst of tumultuous events and even marched through the center of the city at the head of anti-government demonstrations. It seems that the sad pages of history for Poland did not teach her leaders anything.