Without the fleet there is no victory either in the air or on land
The root cause of such proposals is a rather difficult financial and economic situation, in which many experts have a well-founded assumption that in the current realities of GPV-2020 it becomes vulnerable and even not entirely feasible for the deficit budget of Russia. Simply put - not enough money for all. And since there isn’t enough for everyone - you need to find those at whose expense you can sequestrate defense spending. And here they immediately “remember” about navy.
But why, precisely, at the expense of naval construction programs, individual experts most often suggest reducing domestic military spending? Argument one - supposedly the continental status of Russia. Say, Russia is a land power, and for her the fleet is a luxury that she cannot afford in the conditions of financial, economic and military-political uncertainty.
In particular, back in March last year in the Independent Military Review, the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Ruslan Pukhov in the article “National Defense: Savings are possible” (see “NVO” No. 8 from 16 – 22 in March 2012) in the light of how once the objective need for some reduction in defense spending indicated: "The most unobvious element of military power in the current Russian conditions is the ocean fleet." In his opinion, the geographical position and military history of Russia also speak in favor of the secondary role of the fleet. Moreover, if at that time he believed that “in the extreme case, one can limit oneself only to groups of naval strategic submarine missile carriers in the North and Kamchatka, and also to ensure the strategic stability of the strategists”, today in his other publications his position on fleet costs has become even tougher .
“The nature of the most likely threat makes it possible and obliges us to raise the question of the expediency of the exorbitant planned expenditures on the fleet,” the expert wrote the other day. - As you know, from 19,5 trillion rubles provided for purchases in the interests of the Ministry of Defense, 4,4 trillion is reserved for naval armament and equipment. Such expenses would be fully justified in conditions of a favorable economic situation and low military-political risks. But with a shortage of resources and in an environment of intensified Salafi Mordor, the implementation of long, expensive and extremely inertial naval programs can be postponed until better times. Moreover, the creation of truly new systems of naval armaments is stalling. The possibility of restricting purchases of naval equipment can be envisaged even with regard to naval nuclear deterrence forces, which are much inferior to the Strategic Missile Forces in terms of combat stability and combat readiness, and the air component in terms of flexibility of use. ”
Well, let's try to sort this out.
RUSSIA - LAND POWER?
The author of this material has repeatedly repeated - no doubt, Russia needs a powerful and mobile army, as well as a modern and sufficient in numbers aviationbut this doesn’t mean at all that the fleet should become a stepson: if I want it, I will give money for it, if I want it, I will not. And with the thesis about the "purely land" nature of the country, it is not so simple - just cast a glance at the map. Russia not only has the largest territory in the world with an area of 17 million 98,2 thousand square meters. km, but also with huge sea borders - with a length of more than 37 thousand km (despite the fact that the length of land borders is less than 21 thousand km), and even located from all over the world. Plus, do not forget about the area of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone, as well as the “fertile” shelf.
It is necessary to take into account the fact that the sea borders from the north and east are exits to the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, which in the 21st century will be the scene of major events in world politics and economics, and with the Arctic region the Russian military and political leadership sense connects the prosperous future of Russia. In particular, on December held 10 this year. The expanded board of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the leadership of the ministry in the coming year "to pay special attention to the deployment of infrastructure and military units in the Arctic direction." As the head of state stressed, “Russia is increasingly developing this promising region, is returning to it and should have all the levers here to protect its security and national interests.” In the current year, we recall, the military base on the New Siberian Islands resumed its activities, and the restoration of the Arctic airfields of Temp, Tiksi, Naryan-Mar, Alykel, Anadyr, Rogachevo and Nagurskaya was launched. Other work was carried out in the Russian Arctic.
The world's oceans occupy three quarters of the planet’s surface, which makes it possible to use it as an important transport corridor, allowing for a very reasonable price to transfer cargo from one part of the world to another. And often sea transport is the only way to transport certain goods. In fact, you will not carry grain from the south of Russia overseas on airplanes. This is not the grain will be, and gold. Our country has already left once - after the collapse of the USSR - from the oceans, which immediately affected its economic development. For example, the turnover of domestic sea transport in 1992 – 2005 decreased from 405 billion ton-kilometers to 60, and only in 2010 did it again exceed the milestone of 100 billion.
In recent years, Russia is returning to the oceans, both politically and economically. Thus, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as of 1 in January of 2012, Russia occupied the 17 position in the ranking of countries in terms of the total deadweight of merchant ships, 1787, in 20 deadweight, 368 207 t. The global shipping market was only 1,46% with such data, but we were already ahead of the UK, Holland and France in this indicator. However, even India (1,53%) and Turkey (1,69%) were a little inferior, not to mention China (8,91%), Germany (9,03%), Japan (15,64%) and Greece (16,1%).
Finally, we should not forget about the extraction of marine biological resources. For example, according to the forecast of the President of the All-Russian Association of Fisheries Enterprises, Entrepreneurs and Exporters (VARPE) Alexander Fomin, according to the 2013 results, the total catch of Russian fishermen may exceed 4,3 million tons, which will be the best result of the industry over the last 15 years.
So it turns out that Russia is not such a land one and has very significant interests at sea that are important for its continued existence. But these interests, as well as all of the above and many other achievements in the field of Russia's maritime activities, must be protected. And without a modern ocean navy to do it is simply unthinkable. Is that hire an armada of elves. On the other hand, this does not mean that we should start atomic aircraft carriers or universal landing ships like some “hotheads” right now to start “bake like pies”. Everything must be approached systematically and wisely.
At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the important fact that, thanks to the rapid development of naval weapons and equipment, one of the most important, perhaps the most important qualities of a modern navy is its ability to solve equally diverse tasks in a practically equally effective way. Therefore, the main task today is to provide the Russian Navy with this very versatility, which can only be done by creating a balanced fleet. And for this, it will be necessary to implement long-term and “inertial” programs of naval construction, since the cycle of creation and launching of a main-class warship is probably the longest among all types of weapons and military equipment, except strategic ones.
MARINE COMPONENT OF NUCLEAR RESTRUCTURING FORCES
“I will note the good organization of command and staff exercises for the use of strategic nuclear forces,” Vladimir Putin stressed at the expanded board of the Russian Defense Ministry. - In the modern history of Russia, it was the second time. Land, sea and air complexes successfully launched missiles, confirmed the reliability of Russia's nuclear shield. "
However, the high reliability of this shield in our case can be fully ensured only with proper maintenance of all three of its components - ground, sea and air - in combat readiness. And the first two components - let the pilots not be offended by this statement - are decisive. At the same time, neither land nor sea SNFs can be transferred to the “second category”, concentrating on another component, since they harmoniously complement each other.
Yes, the creation and maintenance of strategic submarine missile-carriers and their missile systems in combat readiness is a much more complex and multifaceted task than the same actions with respect to the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces. But in response, naval "strategists" give the nuclear shield of Russia such qualities as high secrecy and combat stability (go and look for an underwater bomber in the dark depths of the World Ocean or even under the powerful ice cap of the Arctic, and then destroy it in the "right time" : you touch it earlier - and you yourself will start a nuclear war), as well as the ability to guarantee retaliation of retaliation, which is the main deterrent for the likely aggressor.
You think why London and Paris relied on nuclear submarines on nuclear-powered submarine missile strategists, and not on land-based ICBMs and strategic bombers, although the last two options would be much simpler in terms of technology and would be cheaper for these countries (in France however, the air component of operational-strategic / strategic importance remains). Not because the ground and air components of their main ally - the United States. The main thing here is the high combat stability and secrecy of the actions of underwater "strategists". In addition, Russian missile carriers have another advantage - with “flat” missile firing, the possibility of overcoming the enemy’s missile defense system by them is greatly increased, and the flight time is reduced. This is a kind of nuclear pistol at the head of the aggressor, slightly jerked - and "Alles Kaput."
Yes, the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces has its drawbacks: the high vulnerability of submarine rocket carriers in the basing points and the rather low reliability of bringing to them orders of centralized command and control in a submerged position. However, these shortcomings are compensated by the presence of a powerful ground-based component of the SNF, which, on the contrary, has as its main advantages high readiness for an almost immediate missile launch and the ability of the command and control system to control the missile weapons directly from the center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. But the ground component, in turn, also has a drawback: due to the previously known locations of mining and home-based areas and combat patrols of mobile launchers, as well as due to the significantly increased satellite reconnaissance capabilities of identifying mobile poplars along the route (Yarses) These means are too vulnerable in the event that the adversary is the first to use precision and nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is only in the balance between the sea and land components that the Russian strategic nuclear forces can guarantee their main task - strategic deterrence of any aggressor.
As for the “flexibility” of the air component of the SNF, firstly, with the advent of powerful non-nuclear high-precision weapons capable of using the strategic range, and the presence of numerous and diverse types of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia, the strategic bombers with cruise missiles in the nuclear the gear was largely leveled; and secondly, it is useful to recall that only recently the Tu-160 aircraft — the main strike fist of the SNF air component — have begun to modernize in order to enable them to use high-precision non-nuclear aircraft equipment (the same ABM and CAB).
In confirmation of the importance of the NSNS for ensuring the national security of Russia, one can cite the words of the head of state Vladimir Putin, said at the meeting on the development of the Russian Navy, held on 27 this November. in Sochi: “I think it’s not necessary to talk a lot about how important the maritime unit is for us in the triad of nuclear strategic deterrence. Our Armed Forces, including the forces of nuclear strategic deterrence, must be balanced, so we intend and will continue to give appropriate attention to the Navy in general and its strategic part in particular. "
The Supreme Commander understands the importance of the naval component of the SNF and intends to develop it, but some people do not understand it. It’s another thing that, thanks to the actions of certain senior managers and individual enterprises, the Russian NNSF faced a dangerous situation, when the strategic armament carrier, the submarine carrier, exists, and not one, but its main weapon, the missiles, no! It’s good that “now we don’t have 37 year”, otherwise it would be possible to find out on quite legitimate reasons - who, how and why brought the naval part of Russia's nuclear triad to such a state.
As a result, today we really faced the problem that by the year 2020 it might not be possible to put into operation all eight strategic rocket carriers of the 955 “Borey” family, while the missile carriers of the 667BDR project will inevitably be written off and only six 667BDRM ships will remain in stock (and then maybe not all). Plus, as a result of the degradation and collapse of the general-purpose naval forces and naval aviation, the combat stability of underwater "strategists" has been reduced to a certain extent.
These are the problems that need to be discussed today, and not that the NSNF is inferior to its “land” and “air” colleagues. There is a direct feeling that those who created naval SNFs in the United States and the Soviet Union, not to mention Britain and France, and now China, were entirely short-sighted experts and voluntarily “threw” a lot of money into these programs.
EXTENDED FEAR BEFORE THE MORDOR
Now about the "hordes of Mordor". Yes, these "hordes" are able to terrify anyone. However, the desire to reconcile the need to counter extremist detachments, which after Syria should probably be redirected by their "sponsors" against Russia, with the implementation of the program to create a modern ocean fleet in the country, is not entirely clear.
The Navy is an instrument of the state, allowing it to protect both its interests at sea and in the coastal zone, and to effectively solve strategic problems. Is it possible that the “smoke of Mordor” so obscures someone’s eyes that they no longer understand this?
No, the fleet, of course, can take part in the fight against the “hordes of Mordor”. For example, strike with the use of sea-based cruise and ballistic missiles in conventional or even nuclear equipment, both against the “hordes” that created a serious threat to the national security of Russia, and also to “Mordor” itself. However, experience has shown that militant units will not declare war and then rush through the Russian border in a mob, but prefer to penetrate it secretly, then going over to sabotage (“partisan”) activity. Fighting such an enemy is not the task of the fleet. And not the task of the army, if we speak frankly. This is primarily the task of the security and law enforcement agencies. In our case, these are the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB (including border guards), as well as the FMS and the Emergencies Ministry in terms of “trapping” such “infiltrates” and eliminating the consequences of their activities.
Expenses here go under the article "National Security and Law Enforcement." And the costs are considerable: 2014 is planned to be allocated for 1458,7 billion rubles, 2015 is 1472,2 billion rubles, 2016 is 1487,3 billion rubles. Including the financing of the Internal Troops, whose tasks are precisely the struggle with the militants, will go accordingly 120,3; 121,2 and 120 billion rubles. Moreover, the costs of the article "National Defense" in the same period will be, respectively, 1024,7 billion rubles., 1094,7 billion rubles. and 1087,2 billion rubles., And actually on the Armed Forces - 867,4; 908,1 and 942,5 billion rubles. respectively.
As you can see, the activities of those who must, among other things, fight against the “hordes of Mordor” are paid very well, and the purchase of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as other purchases of these security agencies for the period up to 2020, is provided for around 1,7 trillion rubles. Well, if that - the army and navy podsobyat. They will deliver rocket-bombing blows to the “sponsor safes” or “trample down with boots” these “banks”. However, if you do not have a fleet, then even delivering a powerful missile-bombing attack to objects distant from your own territory will be a very problematic task. Especially if the aircraft will need to fly in the airspace of other countries - you fly without permission, you will be shot down. What can we say about the "boot kicks", then you just will not get lost.
During the First World War, a propaganda poster was popular in the USA. A sailor with a soldier sitting on his shoulder and a slogan “Fleet will transfer them” (in the sense of transferring soldiers across the ocean) (in the sense of transferring soldiers across the ocean), were popular on the poster. Simple and rude, but with taste and quite understandable for the average person on the poster was shown the important role of the US Navy in the "business of punishment" of the enemy, hiding from Uncle Sam overseas. After all, it is more effective to destroy the hornet's nest at once, in one fell swoop, and not to stand, powerlessly brushing aside the "fighters" departing from it.
PIRATES OF THE XXI CENTURY
"For a more effective fight against international terrorism and the performance of individual tasks outside the Russian Federation, Special Operations Forces are being created," Russian President Vladimir Putin said at an expanded board of the Russian Defense Ministry. And how, interestingly, our experts think of the combat use of "on a wide range of issues" of such Special Operations Forces outside Russia without a powerful ocean fleet capable of delivering them to the place of operation and provide effective support? After all, it is necessary to act not only near the borders of Russia, which can be reached by land or, in some cases, by plane. It may also be necessary to use it as a “road” and a base station for the sea or ocean, or even the water column.
One of the options is the need to free the ship captured by pirates or terrorists under the Russian flag. In particular, last year, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Viktor Chirkov, stated that during the participation of Russian warships in the operation in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, not a single seizure of ships that accompanied Russian naval ships was allowed, but a common improving the situation in the region. “Undoubtedly, the anti-piracy actions of our fleet and the ships of other countries in this area allowed us to improve the situation,” noted Vice-Admiral Viktor Chirkov then. “This is eloquently shown by the fact that the number of successful pirate attacks to date has remained at the level of 2008 of the year, when the activity of pirates was much less than the one we are seeing at the moment.”
The statement is not unfounded. During 2011, the Somali pirates managed to seize 28 civilian ships, whereas in 2010, they were around 50. According to the Singapore International Maritime Bureau, "the decline was due to the preemptive strikes of warships, more efficient ship management and the presence of armed security personnel on board, which played a deterrent effect." By the way, that year, Russian sailors in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa secured 32 escorts for convoys consisting of 169 ships (under the flag of 27 states), and on 62 of them were citizens of the Russian Federation (total 448 Russians), and for the first half of 2012 years, warships of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy escorted 14 caravans that included 92 ships flying the flag of 27 countries, including 3 ships flying the Russian flag and 36 ships with Russian citizens on board. The safety of 237 Russian citizens was ensured and an attempt to seize one vessel was prevented. The case with the liberation of the tanker “Moscow University” of the company “Novoship” in May, which was captured by pirates and released two years later by the marines operating from BPC “Marshal Shaposhnikov” (2010 pirate was killed, 1 taken in captivity).
At the same time, the fight against piracy is not a whim of Moscow and our admirals, as it may seem to the average man. First, Russia, as mentioned above, is gradually reviving its commercial fleet, and secondly, the title of permanent member of the UN Security Council obliges Russia to take an active part in such large operations under the flag of an international organization as the fight against pirates.
Can the army and the air force solve this problem? The question is purely rhetorical.
SUPPORT FACTOR
“Russia consistently stands for solving all international and regional problems by exclusively peaceful, diplomatic means. But I must say bluntly that the factor of military deterrence still plays a very significant role, ”said Russian President Vladimir Putin at the board of the Russian Defense Ministry already mentioned.
The determining factor here is the high value of the military deterrence factor. However, if your opponent is not at home, but somewhere overseas or ocean, and even more so if the conflict with him arose due to the influence on some third country, powerful RVSN, the army and the Air Force will not be able to fully play a deterrent role. Illustrative examples are Libya and Syria.
It is by no means possible to use nuclear weapons in every case of a military conflict, especially if it is not in your territory. Air power can be seriously limited by the enemy’s air defense forces and means, and aviation cannot capture or hold any territory on its own (General Douet’s doctrine has very serious flaws - confirmed by practice). Well, with the infantry tanks just won't get it. Sometimes you can send blue berets to the case, but if the enemy has strong air defense, the task will turn into an ordinary slaughter.
It is quite another thing if you have a fleet capable of becoming the cement that can solder an army, aircraft and paratroopers with marines into a single powerful fist, as well as having the opportunity to provide substantial assistance with their firing capabilities - sea-based cruise missiles and deck aircraft . In the end, whatever one may say, and without the Russian fleet — if, of course, it wants to remain a great world power, it cannot be done. Remember the words of Peter the Great? "Every Potentate, who has a single land army, has one hand, and who has a fleet, has both hands."
Peter I can be blamed in many ways. In excessive harshness and even cruelty in the implementation of his plans, in excessive admiration for the West and in many other ways. But not only in the absence of the intelligence and talent of the commander, and certainly not in the absence of the ability of a strategic vision of the position of the Russian State on the world chessboard. And what are we, the descendants of Peter the Great, going to continue to make Russia a “one-armed invalid”, without a modern ocean fleet, lulling ourselves with a lack of funds, an unfavorable conjuncture in the oil products market, or something else? The richest country in the world and suddenly - no money! Sounds like a bad joke. Moreover, the military shipbuilding program can become a locomotive for civil shipbuilding. However, the budget of the state enterprise “Shipbuilding Development for 2013 – 2030” in 2014 – 2016 provides for the allocation of 52,8 billion rubles, while a comparable amount - 58,2 billion rubles. - according to SE “Development of the aviation industry for 2013 – 2025 years” is allocated only in 2014 year, and for 2014 – 2016 years its budget is 174 billion rubles.
It is noteworthy that on the Day of St. Andrew’s flag in St. Petersburg, the Military Council of the Russian Navy began to work, which traditionally summarizes the military training of the Navy in the outgoing year and sets tasks for the next year, and also discusses the most important issues of the fleet and naval construction. Opening the meeting of the Council, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, read the words of the famous Russian statesman Pyotr Stolypin: “Russia needs a fleet that at any given moment could fight with the fleet that is at the level of the latest scientific requirements. If this does not happen, if the fleet of Russia is different, then it will only be harmful, since it will inevitably become the prey of the attackers. ”
Offering Russian sailors to once again suffer with the renewal of the naval personnel and weapons, postponing for too uncertain “later” the implementation of too “expensive and extremely inertial” programs, the authors of such proposals just contribute to the emergence of “another” fleet, which, according to Stolypin, “will only harmful "and" will inevitably become prey to attackers. " So, under the specious pretext of saving money and redistributing them in the direction of fighting the “hordes of Mordor”, the Russian fleet is actually preparing a new Tsushima in advance.
In my opinion, one was quite enough for “working on the mistakes”, but the Russian military-political leadership managed to allow the second Tsushima: in the 1990-ies a ruthless blow was struck on the domestic fleet - warships and auxiliary vessels, many of which did not serve and half of their appointed time, and some even with not fully dismantled weapons and equipment, were sold for pennies for scrap metal to domestic and foreign firms. The Russian fleet, whose headquarters under the far-fetched pretext of the only one "evicted" from Belokamennaya, will not survive the third Tsushima.
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