Military Review

World SSBN. Part 1


A nuclear-powered submarine with ballistic missiles (SSBN) is intended for launching nuclear missile strikes against strategically important military-industrial facilities and administrative-political centers of the enemy. The advantage of SSBNs being on patrol over other means of nuclear deterrence lies in its inherent survivability, which follows from the difficulty of its detection. This guarantees a nuclear missile strike against the enemy in the event of the start of a full-scale conflict. A SSBN can also be an effective means of a first - disarming strike, secretly approaching areas of intended targets, reducing the flight time of ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
In addition to the term SSBN in Russia, the designation is also used - the Strategic Missile Submarine Cruiser (SSBN).


The construction of ballistic missile submarines began in the late 50s. In the USSR, almost simultaneously, a series of diesel and nuclear submarines of this purpose was laid. The boats were built by shock, inconceivable for the present time pace.

The head diesel-electric submarines (diesel-electric submarines) of the 629, B-92 and B-93 projects were laid in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the 1957 year, at the end of the 1958 of the year they began testing, and the serial construction of boats began lasted until 1962 year. In total, 24 submarines of this type were built. Including one boat on the ZLK for the PRC Navy.

rocket diesel submarine pr.629A

The boats were originally designed to equip the D-2 complex with ballistic missiles. Each submarine carried three P-13-type liquid-propellant missiles placed in the cabin fencing. Start was carried out from the surface position. P-13 were the first specialized ballistic missiles in the world, designed to arm submarines. The single-stage rocket, whose launch mass was 13,7 tons, carried a detachable warhead equipped with a high-power thermonuclear charge. The launch range is 650 kilometers, the circular probable deviation is 4 kilometers, which ensured the defeat of only square targets. Later, part of the boats in the process of overhaul was re-equipped with the D-4 complex with the underwater launch of the P-21 missiles.

The construction of the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine missile carrier of the 658 project began in September of 1958, and in 1960, the headboat of this project has already been commissioned. Many technical solutions, parts and components were borrowed from the first Soviet nuclear submarine of the 627 project. This greatly facilitated the design and accelerated construction.

The differences from pr. 627 consisted in the implementation of the missile (fourth) compartment, almost entirely borrowed from the diesel-electric submarines of pr. 629. Replacing spherical bulkheads with flat ones, designed for greater pressure, install a RCP device (to replenish compressed air at the periscope depth), as well as a more powerful and sophisticated ventilation and air conditioning system. In addition, the composition of the torpedo weapon was changed. The lines of the light housing of the submarine of the 658 Ave. were the same as that of the submarine subway of the 629 Ave. Due to this, good seaworthiness was ensured and the superstructure deck flooding decreased, which, in turn, allowed launching of rockets from the upper edge of the mines.

World SSBN. Part 1

SSBN pr.658

Initially, the boats were designed for the D-2 armament complex, but in 1958, they decided to start developing a project that included re-equipping the submarine with more advanced missiles that had an underwater launch and an increased range.

It was assumed that the new complex will be installed on nuclear-powered ships in the process of modernization and major repairs. Modernized boats assigned the designation of the project 658-M.

To accommodate the P-21 missiles of the D-4 complex, the same launchers were used as for the P-13 missiles, since they initially had a larger internal diameter. To ensure the underwater launch of missiles, a system for automatically maintaining a given depth was developed.

The creation of Soviet first-generation submarine missile carriers allowed the USSR to increase the nuclear deterrence potential, and, despite the accidents and the victims associated with them, gain invaluable experience in operating ships of this type and prepare personnel for more advanced ships.

The first Soviet nuclear-powered nuclear-powered rocket ship, compared to the American George Washington SSBN, had higher surface and submarine speeds and a greater depth of immersion. At the same time, it was significantly inferior in noise and characteristics of underwater exploration assets. American boats far exceeded the Soviet ones in the number of ballistic missiles on board, carrying the Polaris A16 mine installations against the 1 on the first Soviet SSBNs.

This led to the fact that the circulation of boats pr.658 / 658М was limited to eight units. Soon the next generation submarine missile carriers replaced them at shipyards.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the USSR succeeded in creating a sufficiently effective Naval Nuclear Deterrence Force (NSNF) —the degree of realization of its combat potential, having increased 3,25 times as compared to 1967 in the year. The increase in efficiency was influenced by: quantitative and qualitative improvement of the naval personnel of the USSR strategic nuclear forces, an increase in the ammunition load on the Soviet SSBNs and the introduction of an RPG on an SLBM, and an increase in the technical reliability of Soviet SLBMs. The combat stability of the Soviet SSBNs armed with intercontinental SLBMs increased due to the transfer of combat patrol areas to the zones of domination of the Soviet Navy in the Barents, Japan and Okhotsk seas. The technical reliability of Soviet SLBMs was comparable to the reliability of American missiles.

Military patrol areas of missile submarines of the USSR in the Atlantic theater

At the end of the 80-x, the USSR Navy included 64 nuclear and 15 diesel submarines with ballistic missiles. On average, Soviet SSBNs went on combat patrols 4-5 times less often than American missile carriers. This phenomenon was caused by inadequate, the number of ship personnel, the construction of the infrastructure of the base and service, as well as the low technical reliability of nuclear power plants of the first Soviet nuclear submarines. That did not allow the use of ships with the required intensity, but because of the development of technical resources and delays in carrying out repairs led to the accumulation of non-combat-ready reserve

The lack of standardization and unification in the design, resulting in a large number of projects of missile submarines (RPL) armed with various types of missiles. For example, in 1982, the Navy of the USSR had 86 RPL of nine projects armed with seven types of SLBMs, which naturally increased the cost of their operation.

By developing extensively, by the middle of the 1970-s, the Soviet NSNF reached a quantitative parity with the United States NSFR - in the number of RPLs and SLBMs. The US strategic nuclear forces, developing in an intensive way, have always been ahead of the USSR in quality indicators.

Over the years since the collapse of the USSR, the number of strategic missile carriers in the Russian Navy has decreased by about 10 times. In combat readiness, the Northern and Pacific Fleets include 7 SSBNs of the 667BDR and 667BDRM projects built in 1979-1990. SSBN project 941 removed from the current composition fleet.

Satellite image of Google Earth: withdrawn from the SSBN fleet Ave. 941

SSBN TK-208 "Dmitry Donskoy" was upgraded to pr.941UM. The boat is used to test the Bulava-M D-30 complex, for which two launchers have been converted to ballistic P-30 ballistic missiles.

Satellite image Google Earth: SSBT TK-208 "Dmitry Donskoy", near the modernized for India, the aircraft carrier "Admiral Gorshkov"

RPSN K-535 "Yuri Dolgoruky" - the lead ship of the 955 "Borey" project was enlisted in the lists of the Russian Navy ships 19 August 1995. Due to the lack of funding and changes in the project, the construction was very difficult. To speed up the construction, the reserve of the submarine of the 971 “Pike-B” project K-137 “Cougar” was used. 12 February The 2008 of the year the boat was launched from a floating dock into the water and placed at the extension wall.

RPSN K-535 "Yuri Dolgoruky"

Until recently, she passed state tests. At the moment, RPSN K-535 is being repaired in Severodvinsk.

Satellite image of Google Earth: SSBN 955 K-535 Ave. “Yuri Dolgoruky” in Severodvinsk

Russian strategic submarine missile carriers have two permanent bases: Gadzhievo in the Northern Fleet and Rybachy in the Pacific Fleet.
In Gadzhiyevo, located on the Kola Peninsula, there are five existing SSBNs of the 667BDRM Dolphin Ave. Apparently, there will also be SSBN Ave 955 "Borey", which in the future should replace the "Dolphins".

Satellite image Google Earth: SSBN Ave 667BDRM based submarines Gadzhiyevo

Nuclear submarines of the Pacific Fleet are based in Rybachy not far from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. There, in the intervals between hikes, there are two boats of the 667BDR Kalmar Ave. There, in Rybachy, on the other side of the bay, there is a complex for the maintenance and repair of submarines.

Satellite image Google Earth: SSBN Ave 667BDR in Rybach

At present, the Russian naval forces of nuclear deterrence are going through hard times and need modernization and renewal. Unfortunately, the adoption of new strategic missile carriers is heavily delayed. This is largely due to the unreliability and lack of knowledge of the D-30 missile system.


The first American SSRB “George Washington” was launched in December 1959 of the year and entered its first combat patrol from the forward base of the US Navy in Holy Loch (United Kingdom) in the autumn of the year 1960. Originally, the boats of this project were armed with the Polaris A-16 ballistic missiles 1. Accuracy at test launches at a maximum range of 2200 km was 900 m, which was a good indicator for a sea-based missile.

SSBB “George Washington”

SSBN “J. Washington ”was designed on the basis of a“ Skipjack ”nuclear torpedo boat, into the hull of which an 40-meter central section was added to accommodate missile silos, rocket fire control systems, navigation equipment and auxiliary mechanisms. The overall layout of the “George Washington” type boats with vertical mines located behind the deckhouse was very successful and became a classic scheme for submarine strategic missile carriers.
For the armament of nuclear submarines, the Americans chose the development of solid-propellant rockets as much more compact and fireproof, and requiring less maintenance costs than liquid-powered submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This direction, as it became clear later, turned out to be more promising.

During the scheduled repair of the 1964-67, the Washington was reequipped with the Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of about 4600 km and a head part of the scattering (cluster) type (MRV technology, three nuclear warheads up to 200 km each).
The last boat of this type was withdrawn from the fleet at the start of the 1985 of the year.

By the end of the 60's, the American submarine strategic system was completely ready. The 41 SSBNs deployed the 656 SLBMs of the Polaris A-2 and Polaris A-3 types, which could deliver nuclear warheads to the enemy’s 1552 territory. The boats were part of the Atlantic (31 type “Lafayette”) and the Pacific Fleets (10 type “J. Washington”).

In 1991, as part of the USALNS, there were 8 SSBNs with PN XDUMX APRPs C & D APX 128, 3 SSBNs with NNRX APRTs C2080 18 XARS and 352 SSRAS APRN APRTs; YABZ). The total number of warheads was 4. Thus, the SSBN was 2816% of the available nuclear potential.
Currently, the US Navy is equipped with Ohio-type 14 SSBNs, each carrying a Trident II D24 5 ballistic missile. Unlike Russia, the main US nuclear potential is located precisely on the SSBN.

Ohio type SSBN

At the moment, in accordance with the SALT agreement, missiles on submarines cannot carry more 8 warheads. In 2007, the total number of warheads deployed in the United States on an SLBM was 2018 pcs.

In the US, there are two facilities where SSBNs are based. On the Pacific coast is in Bangor, WA. On the Atlantic coast is Kings Bay, Georgia. Both naval bases have a developed infrastructure for the maintenance and servicing of SSBNs.

Google Earth Satellite Image: Ohio-type SSBNs at Bangor Navy

Google Earth Satellite Image: Ohio-type SSBNs at Kings Bay


The first carriers of British nuclear bombs were strategic bombers.
From the beginning of 60-s after the creation and mass production of the air defense system in the USSR and as a result of the qualitative strengthening of air defense, the British leadership decided to change the priorities in the field of nuclear deterrence. The program for the creation of ground-based ballistic missiles failed for several reasons, and it was decided to use all the resources when creating the SSBNs.

Great help to its strategic ally in this matter was rendered by the USA. Design work on the British SSBN started at the beginning of the 60-s. The project was based on the American La-Fayette SSBN.

The construction of a series of four submarines of the Resolution type began in the UK in 1963 year. In October, the Resolution 1967, the lead boat in the series, was handed over to the fleet. Initially, all the English SSBNs were armed with sixteen Polaris A3 SLBMs with a range of up to 4600 km, equipped with a scattering-type warhead with three warheads up to 200 Kt each. It was later created by the FER which was equipped with six 40-50 CT warheads. Such warheads can be aimed at individual targets located at a distance of 65-70 km from each other.

SSBN "Resolution"

British missile submarines began patrolling in 1969, with access to the North Atlantic. In peacetime, up to two SSBNs should be constantly at sea. With the exacerbation of the international situation in the areas of launching rockets were removed from the base and other SSBNs.

All boats of the Resolution type remained in service until the middle of the 1990s, until they were gradually replaced by more advanced SSBNs of the Vanguard type.

After withdrawal from the fleet, the submarines were disarmed, spent nuclear fuel was unloaded from the reactors. As long as the disposal of submarines or their submersion is not possible due to residual radiation, all the SSBNs of the “Resolution” project are kept in Rosayte.

Satellite image Google Earth: SSBN type "Resolution" in the sediment in Rosayte

At the beginning of the 90-s of the Vangard-type SSBNs, they replaced the earlier resolution-type missile carriers. At the moment there are four such boats in the British fleet. The ammunition of the SSRB “Resolution” consists of sixteen “Trident-2 D5” SLBMs, each of which could be equipped with fourteen 100 Ct combat units. However, for reasons of economy, only 58 missiles were purchased, which made it possible to provide only three ships with full ammunition. In addition, only 48 warheads should be on the boat instead of the state-provided 96.

All British SSBNs are based in Scotland, in the Clyde Naval Base area, in the Faslane base station, in the Gulf of Loch.

Google Earth satellite image: Vanguard type SSBNs at the Faslane location

All satellite images courtesy of Google Earth.
Articles from this series:
World SSBN. Part 1
World SSBN. Part 2
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. bif
    bif 17 December 2013 08: 15
    Thanks for the review.
    Currently, the US Navy is equipped with Ohio-type 14 SSBNs, each carrying a Trident II D24 5 ballistic missile. Unlike Russia, the main US nuclear potential is located precisely on the SSBN.

    Moreover, each rocket carries an 4 block of 100ct, which does not have individual guidance. Reducing the number of warheads - to maintain maximum range, also a deficit of new units and the lack of more powerful (450kt). So, in principle, parity is maintained in this part of the strategic nuclear forces.
    1. Apollo
      Apollo 17 December 2013 08: 36
      quote-By the beginning of the 1980-ies, the USSR managed to create quite effective Naval Nuclear Deterrence Forces (NNF) - the degree to which combat potential was realized, increasing by 3,25 times compared to the 1967 year.

      Data on the composition of the USSR Navy at the end of the 1980's: 64 nuclear and 15 diesel submarines with ballistic missiles, 79 submarines with cruise missiles (including 63 nuclear), 80 multipurpose torpedo nuclear submarines (all data on submarines on 1 January 1989 of the year), four aircraft carrying ships, 96 cruisers, destroyers and missile frigates, 174 patrol and small anti-submarine ships, 623 boats and minesweepers, 107 landing ships and boats. Total 1380 warships (not counting auxiliary ships), 1142 warships (all data on surface ships on July 1 1988 of the year).
    2. Know-nothing
      Know-nothing 17 December 2013 08: 47
      The Trident II is a very accurate missile, which allows it to hit high-strength targets with a lower charge power. Apparently, the task of "showing Kuzkin's mother" is not in the first place among the Americans.
      1. bif
        bif 17 December 2013 10: 47
        Trident II very accurate rocket

        It is correct to talk about the accuracy of warheads, not missiles. KVO 120 meters is a characteristic of the W88 warhead. These are the newest warheads in the states until 1989. There is unconfirmed information that China stole the documentation for this device and it turned out that the warhead "does not work", entering the dense layers of the atmosphere, it overheats and does not detonate. Therefore, a number of experts claim that they have been removed from service. There remains another W76 warhead with a capacity of 100 kt, the last one was made already in 1987, I did not find the KVO, but it is assumed that it is at the level of ours. An indirect indication of the presence of only these warheads in service with Trident is the constant extensions and upgrades.
        1. Ascetic
          Ascetic 17 December 2013 13: 56
          Quote: bif
          I did not find the QUO, but they suggest that it is at the level of ours.

          KVO of the order of 400m.There is a Life Extension Program (LEP) upgrade program.
          2000. A total of 2000 of the available 3000 .. The number of warheads modernized at the moment is not disclosed. According to the plan, the program will last until 2018. W-76 suffers from a number of birth defects, including unexpected low power output and vulnerability to nuclear effects during fuse and ignition system. Actually, to eliminate these defects, the modernization program W-76-I was undertaken, during which the charge life was extended and a new fuse was installed, which allows the MC4700 to be buried (arming and fuzing subsystem). The modified nuclear charge W76 was designated W76 Mod 1 (or W76-1), and the warhead carrying it began to be called Mk-4A.
          The Bush administration's plan is to expand 63 percent of the W76 reserves required to produce about 2000 W76-1 warheads between 2007 and 2021.
          In the diagram, the calculation of production for the period 2007-2021. The accuracy characteristics are not disclosed but should be better than the native model.
          Government documents and statements by government officials hint that the W76 Power Line is quietly building weapons with vastly improved military capabilities over the older version. While the old fuse was only allowed to target vulnerable targets, the new MC4700 Arming, Firing Detonation (AF&F) System gives the W76 a hard target kill opportunity for the first time. The former head of the Navy's Strategic Systems Program, Rear Admiral George P. Nanos, who later became director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, which designed the W76, explained in an article in The Submarine Review in April 1997 that "the ability to [existing] Mk4 ... not very impressive by today's standards, in large part because the Mk4 was never given a fuse, which made it capable of placing an explosion at the correct height to keep industrial facilities apart from being at risk. "But" with D5 and Mk4 accuracy , by simply changing the fuse in the body to re-enter Mk4, you will get a significant improvement. "said Nanos. In fact, "Mk4, with modified fuse and Trident accuracy, can meet the original D5 hard target requirement".

          I apologize for Google translation
    3. Nross
      Nross 19 February 2016 21: 22
      Correction: the warheads in Trident D5 can be installed up to 14 pieces, but put them in 8 each to increase the tonnage, and you probably took the number 4 from the special. the capabilities of these 8 death machines: function 2 into one goal to achieve the coefficient. lesions up to 95% at ranges up to 8000.

      Oppenheimer burns in hell.
  2. Bongo
    17 December 2013 09: 12
    American SSBN Ohio-class returning from combat duty
    1. bamboo
      bamboo 17 December 2013 18: 44
      Ehhh, this ubiquitous Shpien Google)))
    2. stjrm
      stjrm 18 December 2013 18: 12
      The photo was taken from the KIK "Chukotka". One of the first hotels near about. Guam.
      Here you google smile
  3. soul
    soul 17 December 2013 09: 34
    In 1991, the United States Nuclear Forces included 8 SSBNs with 128 Poseidon C3 missiles (2080 nuclear warheads), 18 SSBNs with 352 Trident-S4 SLBMs (2816 nuclear warheads) and 4 SSBNs with 96 Trident-2 D5 SLBMs (1344 Yabz). The total number of warheads was 624090.

    The last number is a typo?
    1. Bongo
      17 December 2013 10: 17
      Yes of course, thanks for noticing, 6240 should be. hi
  4. washi
    washi 17 December 2013 10: 20
    I liked the photos of the locations.
    Comparison is not in our favor.
    1. Bongo
      17 December 2013 10: 23
      Infrastructure, maintenance and repair have always been a weak point of our fleet.
  5. avt
    avt 17 December 2013 10: 25
    Good, popular article good . It’s only a pity the Franks didn’t get into it, well, the Chinese, for complete happiness. Although no, while writing, I dulled, I forgot that there will be a continuation, we are waiting.
  6. sevtrash
    sevtrash 17 December 2013 11: 49
    Well, if you look at and compare the infrastructure of the bases, it is impressive in the USA. And the resort location, everything looks beautiful - from above, at least. By the way, among the Chinese, too, and among the British and French. Money, money, economics, economics. And someone else says - let’s give us aircraft carriers. We would see how much more needs to be done for the existing fleet.
  7. rudolff
    rudolff 17 December 2013 13: 59
    The bases of American SSBNs have always caused some envy and lively discussion of our sailors. Especially under 100 grams in the officer's "hotel"! "Oh, but it would be nice, you go out of the checkpoint, and there are palm trees all around, girls in bathing suits. You put on shorts and go to the beach!" Like this. But seriously, it has always been puzzling why such a powerful country, which has hundreds of nuclear-powered ships in its arsenal, is not able to equip their bases at the proper level.
    1. Old_kapitan
      Old_kapitan 17 December 2013 18: 04
      But seriously, it was always puzzling why such a powerful country, armed with hundreds of nuclear powered ships, is not able to equip their bases at the proper level.
      To plant palm trees in the North? Although, of course, you are right. As I recall the snow on the windowsill to half the window! From the inside ...
    2. dv-v
      dv-v 18 December 2013 03: 59
      Despite the beauty of Kamchatka, fiercely envied the Primorye - we in September in Pavlovsky paid off from the heart. and zkp tof generally in the same type of resort area was - on a chamor. Black Sea residents, presumably, did not complain too much.)))

      and, I forgot to add - in B. Pavlovsky 4th flpl based.
      1. stjrm
        stjrm 18 December 2013 17: 59
        And in the winter?
        In Big Stone, they drove their nurse for winter repairs. Left the factory (in the tavern wink ) ... the overcoat came back brown from the dust ... More and did not go.
    3. stjrm
      stjrm 18 December 2013 18: 04
      Imagined PKZ-2 in Kamchatka as an "officer's hotel") ... whinnied.
      Although it seemed in the year 1967, this was when this PKZ was new, then the crews of 629 projects lived on it (my father served them), it was very nothing ... smile
  8. air wolf
    air wolf 17 December 2013 15: 12
    plus current per shot
  9. zyablik.olga
    zyablik.olga 17 December 2013 16: 07
    Oddly enough, someone puts cons to the article, for what? Apparently not to like it, the pictures show a comparison of our coastal infrastructure with that of a "potential enemy". Article bold +
  10. indiggo
    indiggo 17 December 2013 16: 14
    yes a good article. Well, who can article minus only liberals and hamsters laughing
  11. lelikas
    lelikas 17 December 2013 16: 20
    Quote: rudolff
    but it would be nice if you go beyond the checkpoint, and around palm trees, girls in swimsuits.

    It’s very difficult to pull the country closer to the equator!
    Well, it has never been set, we have comfort at the forefront, although in vain.
  12. 1c-inform-city
    1c-inform-city 17 December 2013 17: 09
    Quote: bif
    There is unconfirmed information that China stole the documentation for this device and it turned out that the warhead "does not work", entering the dense layers of the atmosphere, it overheats and does not detonate. Therefore, a number of experts claim that they have been removed from service. There remains another W76 warhead with a capacity of 100 kt, the last one was made already in 1987, KVO

    I completely agree, not only the Chinese, but the United States themselves declared this problem. They even had closed hearings in the congress. And most importantly, if the fleet still has only warheads, the land sysas have a full caput and carriers. The United States has traditionally focused on the navy and missed the ground part. Moreover, the modernization of 76x warheads comes with a creak and only for the fleet. There are many warheads, but many are too old which, by and large, are suitable only for disposal. I wonder how we deal with aging charges?
  13. Kir
    Kir 17 December 2013 17: 29
    By the way, why didn't the author indicate the maximum launch depths of the missiles? Could it be because it will not be in favor of the zakordonniki. Then why does the author point out that We developed extensively, and they developed intensively? Also, why did they forget to point out that they took a lot of things from us, but at least the same outer rubber, then how many records for Ours, this is one thing, and let's not forget how it was done with us and with them, if I remember correctly, the shafts were given to the Swiss for fine-tuning etc., and as long as I remember according to the Marine Collection, our "tables" were made of special stainless steel, and they have a coating, etc.
    As a conclusion, not everything is so shitty with us, and not everything is so chic with them, and we will not forget how many years it takes us ..... already from 1985 !. if not earlier, now at least some attempts are being made, although so far there will obviously not be any good they listen to.
    About comfort, well, right, there was only one thing in which companies they participated in, where it was necessary to seriously fight - World War II ?, Korea, Vietnam, etc. Where?
    An article is no plus no minus!
    1. Old_kapitan
      Old_kapitan 17 December 2013 18: 30
      By the way, and that the author did not indicate the maximum depth of rocket launch? Is it not because it will not be in favor of the muzzle?
      It's not entirely clear: the Yankees have 30-40 meters, we have 50-55. So what?
      1. Kir
        Kir 17 December 2013 19: 07
        How long does it take to climb these average 17.5 meters?
        1. Old_kapitan
          Old_kapitan 17 December 2013 19: 23
          How long does it take to climb these average 17.5 meters?
          Compared to prelaunch training - negligible. In addition, combat patrols are carried out at a depth close to the starting one (at 667Б the launch depth is 55 meters, the patrol depth is 60). I suppose the same for the Yankees. So the launch depth does not play a special role, if only not from the NP.
          1. dv-v
            dv-v 18 December 2013 03: 53
            I don’t understand at all. , in stormy weather, the ass was thrown out of the water). it is only on boats of the new generation that teleperiscopes are meant, and it will take a large corresponding depth, but still hardly equal to the depth of patrolling.
            1. Old_kapitan
              Old_kapitan 18 December 2013 06: 33
              I didn’t understand at all why are you reasoning with your counterpart
              Good day, colleague.
              You have to understand that, do we serve on BDRs? I'm on a beech.
              I just tried to explain that the depth of the start is far and far from the most important thing. By the way, about the depth of the connection. Not necessarily periscope (on the "beech" it seems like 14 meters). Or did you have VVABT "Paravan"? So this is unlikely. And its release depth is quite decent, I don't remember exactly, but obviously more than 100 meters.
              1. stjrm
                stjrm 18 December 2013 17: 37
                If you guys remember, they are 50-60 meters on Paravan. The BU signal is also received at it. They become retractable once every two days (well, of course, if the session on Paravan passes) for what? ... and for reception for the sake of it ..
              2. dv-v
                dv-v 19 December 2013 09: 35
                otherwise you don’t know what traditional Byad-Byad was with these paravanes)) - in my memory, and at sea I was kicked more often than others from the division’s specialists, when we moved to the shooting range just to launch the rocket, we lost such and such. )))

                By the way, on beech trees I also went out to sea a couple of times.
                1. Old_kapitan
                  Old_kapitan 19 December 2013 15: 25
                  otherwise you don’t know what traditional Byad-Byad was with these paravanes)
                  Happened and lost. But I would not say - traditionally. We (and visited the sea very often) did not lose a single one.
                  1. dv-v
                    dv-v 19 December 2013 16: 17
                    then you're in luck)). In general, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk often served on the tof as the BS area, where there were cases of capture of fishing nets. I do not think that the Barents fishermen were less famous, although the regions of the BS were different in the north. in a word, on my share, as a rule, a rocket was worked out with a periscope to the start depth + paravanes were still not so hot.
                    1. Old_kapitan
                      Old_kapitan 19 December 2013 16: 38
                      I do not think that the Barents fishermen were less famous
                      When I came to the ship, I drew two oblique scratches on the wheelhouse - rubber proporota to metal. It turned out - the fisherman was caught.
            2. stjrm
              stjrm 18 December 2013 17: 44
              So in stormy weather it does not just throw the "ass", but sometimes half a hump outside .... Therefore, it is not always possible to go to the depth by simply shifting the steering wheel (the air is in the superstructure ..) to take in fast and increase the speed .... if the depth allows ...
              But Lyachin did not see enough room for maneuver ...
              1. Kir
                Kir 18 December 2013 17: 50
                Thanks to everyone I understood, the situation is the same for us and for them.
                1. alex86
                  alex86 18 December 2013 19: 19
                  Quote: Kir
                  Thanks to all

                  Since thanks are told to people who are knowledgeable and experienced, I have an amateurish question for them (last year I received a sharply negative answer from the submariner): given the not very good condition of the submarine fleet and the approach of the antisubmarine forces of the probable enemy to basing places and deployment lines, does it make sense to return to a diesel-electric submarine with spent (albeit liquid) missiles in the wheelhouse guard - pieces of four by four warheads - this is both sufficient nuclear potential, and with a better exit frequency, and less noticeability, and even from the base not far, but not at the wall, etc. Strongly do not swear, like - this is a dead end branch, but something for business, pliz ...
                  1. dv-v
                    dv-v 19 December 2013 09: 44
                    nonsense, especially in economics - four mobile poplars and their ilk are cheaper already.
                    1. alex86
                      alex86 19 December 2013 17: 36
                      Quote: dv-v
                      four mobile poplars

                      I am distrustful of mobile Topols - I think that their "undetectability" does not correspond to reality, but under water (especially not a nuclear submarine, which in the future will be determined from orbit by gravitational sensors, but a modest and small diesel-electric submarine) is still difficult to detect ...
                      1. dv-v
                        dv-v 20 December 2013 02: 19
                        they wrote to you about the mass-dimensional characteristics of the rocket that you need to put in there - simply, since they are not strong in physics, the elementary arithmetic when comparing the displacement of the SSBs and the largest dpl is an order of magnitude difference. but since they spit on the economy, which now seems especially strange, increasing the range while squeezing the optimization maximum was primarily connected with the enemy’s area, from which one can optimally protect one’s near their shores.
                        geomagnetic cushion sensors
                        b - pl have been actively hiding under the surface guards for a long time, however, even they are slightly hypothetically better than today's optical search systems for mobile systems.
                        finally, if you completely break away from reality, then a pair of special ammunition on winged ash trees is just that. In the meantime, it is also possible, but only when air-independent and, consequently, increased autonomy of navigation are normally worked out, then it will be possible, like 667a / ay, closer to the shores of potential opponents. in the modern world the main thing is not how much, but where it is guaranteed.

                        By the way, just the acoustics have more success, having thoroughly worked on the jump layer.
                      2. alex86
                        alex86 20 December 2013 18: 58
                        Quote: dv-v
                        mass-dimensional characteristics of the rocket

                        4 missiles for submarines with a displacement of 2,5 thousand tons, subject to the addition of a compartment (you can’t get anywhere), are quite real
                        Quote: dv-v
                        times in physics are not strong, elementary arithmetic when comparing the displacement of a sailboat and the largest dpl - an order of magnitude difference

                        about physics - these are your fantasies, and a comparison of displacement - that's the point, so that a small submarine would pose a significant threat - I do not see any contradictions
                        Quote: dv-v
                        spit on the economy
                        - so it is that diesel-electric submarines are much cheaper
                        Quote: dv-v
                        you can optimally protect your own near your shores.
                        so am I about the same
                        Quote: dv-v
                        geomagnetic sensors

                        I'm talking about gravitational - local changes in the gravitational field in the presence of a massive object
                        Quote: dv-v
                        closer to the shores
                        so this is part of the problem - this does not work for us.
                        And somehow calmer - I just asked, I saw the point of view of experienced people, I don’t agree with her - the realities today are not the ones on which the experience is based, there are not enough forces, time is even less, the submarine fleet more and more against the wall is a target, not component of nuclear forces. It is not possible to organize a full-fledged combat duty - this is based on your (well, not personally yours, but experienced people) messages. Therefore, I consider DEPL with SLBMs as a palliative - at least inferior, but working.
                      3. alex86
                        alex86 20 December 2013 19: 31
                        In continuation - if you said that the diesel-electric submarine today spends the same amount of time at the wall as the nuclear submarine - that would be an argument (by the way, can you tell?). He would testify that "ruin is in the heads" and no matter what kind of weapon, it is important who and how uses it. Then - no question, it is necessary to build the command staff, so that the submarine at the wall would be a flagrant disgrace or an emergency. And then the nuclear submarine has no alternative. And today I want to have at least something, but on a campaign. (I myself am a land man, and my army was short and strange, although very necessary)
                      4. Bongo
                        21 December 2013 05: 16
                        Currently, if I am not mistaken, there are 15 diesel-electric submarines in our Navy, if I am not mistaken. Including 1-Black Sea Fleet, 2-BF, they go to sea not much more often than nuclear ships, and only on their shores. There are also serious problems with repair and maintenance. It should be understood that each diving trip affects the battery life. Replacing them is not cheap now, and there are almost no enterprises that produced batteries for boats.
                        In Komsomolsk-on-Amur, a battery factory that supplied the Pacific Fleet batteries eliminated 10 years ago.
                      5. dv-v
                        dv-v 21 December 2013 05: 19
                        no, it is necessary to work just on the air-independent one - the vulnerability of the dpl is precisely in its diesel engine (the snrohel, as you know, was invented by the Germans in the WWII), i.e. reducing stealth, then such a boat is just gold for its own plo and threat of aug. By the way, the women of Warsaw have secretly passed Gibraltar more than once or twice. and the increased autonomy of navigation - the ability to covertly crawl to the shores of a potential enemy and deliver a sensitive strike with cruise missiles. Consider at least the example of aviation, albeit roughly, but approximately - an arsenal with technical specifications tu-22m3 and su from the 27 family. the difference in class and tasks is exactly the same with pl. including technical and operational. I hope "better less is more" will now be more pronounced, although there are enough difficulties. in the north, the situation seems to me better than in tof.
                    2. dv-v
                      dv-v 21 December 2013 05: 05
                      oh mein got - in terms of weight and dimensions, look at least the genesis of the 667th project, and your obstinacy on the subject of the "famous" k-19 is exactly the same and confirms - a displacement of 5300 with no pH characteristics. I already told you that if you were so impatient, but with yabp - optimally winged phs, because it is cheaper to rebuild even newly protected mines for ballistic mines than to rivet boats for four missiles, even only because of the complexities of operating complex systems. but since mines in the days of UAVs and high-precision ammunition completely exhausted their capabilities - it is easier to mobile with active camouflage and false targets, of course, and serious anti-aircraft and anti-sabotage defense.

                      with physics, it’s funnier - I don’t have time to look at the details specifically, I'll have a look later, but I emphasize again that acoustics have much more perspectives than space spies - you should not get carried away with Holiwood fairy tales.)) coverage, accuracy, isolation, noise immunity, etc. - look, though to the size of the mass of container ships with tankers.))
                    3. alex86
                      alex86 21 December 2013 19: 49
                      We will assume that together you convinced me - first of all, by the same state of the submarine, regardless of the type of power plant. Acoustics - I think they will always have a problem with the detection range, and we won’t pull our SOSUS either. About the detection by means of changes in the gravitational field - civil technology for natural (stationary) objects exists, for mobile - a matter of time. Thank.
          2. Old_kapitan
            Old_kapitan 19 December 2013 10: 26
            is there any point in returning to a diesel-electric submarine with well-developed (albeit liquid) missiles in the fencing enclosure - four pieces, four warheads
            And how do you see it? You are not suggesting a return to the 629th with its poor and at that time characteristics and the P-13 with a range of 600 km? And this is not so easy despite the wretchedness. So we take the best that we have at this moment from the rocket engine - R-29RMU2 "Sineva". Well, where are we going to squeeze it? To Varshavyanka? Not even one will fit. This means we need to create a new boat. And all this R&D is not only more than one year of time, but also more than one billion rubles (and even more than a dozen and more than one hundred). So does it make sense?
            1. Bongo
              19 December 2013 10: 33
              That's right, totally agree with you. In addition, even if we assume that such a boat will be created, she will be able to operate only on her own coast.
              1. Old_kapitan
                Old_kapitan 19 December 2013 15: 19
                she can only operate on her shores.
                As far as I understand, the short range with the corresponding missile flight range did not seem to my colleague a significant drawback in comparison with the ability to quickly and cheaply get a certain number of diesel-electric submarines armed with SLBMs. But he did not take into account that it will not work out quickly and cheaply. At this stage, it will probably be more expensive than finishing Borey with Bulava.
              2. alex86
                alex86 19 December 2013 18: 15
                Quote: Old_Kapitan
                Not even one will fit.

                It is clear that the existing one will not fit into Varshavyanka. But in terms of dimensions - the hull plus the height cabin and the added compartment along the length (8 meters will have to be added, but this is not the first time - add compartments) - not strong R&D, in terms of placing one rocket - 4 to Varshavyanka and 16 to Borey - it may not be a big difference, but the simplicity and gradualness of putting a submarine into operation, as well as secrecy, more time on combat duty and less likelihood of tracking DEPLs (even with SLBMs) ​​is an opportunity to have at least something. A SSBN (SSBN) at the wall is worse than nothing, it is an illusion of a retaliation strike. 4 Synevs with 8 warheads each (I would prefer 4 warheads of the megaton class, since a retaliatory strike involves striking cities, but maybe I'm wrong) under water, in my opinion, better than 16 Clubs (somehow not in Russian) at the wall, as it is scary to let go of combat duty - it will suddenly break.
              3. Old_kapitan
                Old_kapitan 19 December 2013 20: 13
                (8 meters will have to be added, but this is not the first time - add compartments) - not strong R&D
                It only seems so to you. Adding a compartment is really not a problem. And squeeze in the mines too. What about new equipment (BIUS, mine microclimate systems, etc., etc.)? And all this must be linked, act as a whole. In fact, you will have to convert a torpedo boat into a rocket boat, and this is a considerable boodyag. And as a result, we get some kind of ersatz. Considering that building a full-fledged "Varshavyanka" is problematic ... You understand. These half measures are useless. Waste of money, which is better spent on fine-tuning full-fledged nuclear-powered ships. As they say - everyone must carry their own suitcase. And it turns out: how to repair a Mercedes, let's put its engine in a Zaporozhets.
  14. dv-v
    dv-v 19 December 2013 09: 43
    why? The 949th is not 667bdr / bdrm - not a hump, sides ...
  • Black
    Black 17 December 2013 17: 42
    The Federation of American Scientists has published a report on the formation of a new US nuclear doctrine, which proposes to redirect missiles from densely populated cities to 12 key objects of the Russian economy. So:
    First, there are three oil refineries - Omsk (owned by Gazprom Neft), Angarsk (Rosneft) and Kirishsky (Surgutneftegaz). Secondly, the most important metallurgical enterprises - Magnitogorsk, Nizhniy Tagil and Cherepovets metallurgical plants (owned by MMK, Evraz and Severstal, respectively), Norilsk Nickel, as well as Bratsk and Novokuznetsk aluminum plants owned by Rusal. The list of targets in Russia is closed by Berezovskaya GRES (owned by OGK-4, the main shareholder is German E.ON), Sredneuralskaya GRES (OGK-5 and Italian Enel, respectively) and Surgutskaya GRES (there are two power plants with this name, GRES-1 is owned by Gazprom OGK -2, GRES-2 belongs to OGK-4.

    A warhead, even if 70% of them are warmed up and will not detonate, is enough to destroy and destroy the country's economy ....
    The remaining winter (maybe) and winter, but the second is unlikely.

    In the States, the same oil painting .....

    This is nuclear parity and guaranteed mutual destruction ....
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 17 December 2013 23: 34
    Yes, the article is just a brief tour of the types of submarines in different fleets of the world from the beginning of this type to our times. I suppose that in the next part there will be France, China and possible owners in the future. And perhaps conversion projects for the conversion of SSBNs into carriers of other types of weapons.
    But this is not what I want to say. During the interest in the history of the Navy of both Russia and the world as a whole, one thing that has always seemed vicious to me is the domestic shipbuilding industry - multiplicity. If in the days of the sailing fleet the gradation was not so noticeable, and the conditions themselves were such that the difference was only in the size and number of guns on board, then with the advent of a couple of staggering in the doctrine and brains of the admirals, they reached such a limit that even the same type of ships were distinguished in the fleet . A vivid example of this is the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, only mine-sweeping forces possessed more or less the same type. And then only because of the cheapness and speed of construction.
    They tried to fix something for the World War (Small Shipbuilding Program), but as always ...
    The same rake in the Second World War, but not so noticeably, because the role of the fleet was tied to the support of the army.
    With access to the world and the application for an ocean-going fleet, this problem has come to the fore, which is still being heard. Almost every year a new type of submarine appeared (for which many received awards and orders for development - sadly, this system took root in the Union). Yes, we needed parity. Nobody denies this, but when creating a ship, you need to create an infrastructure for its provision and maintenance. Otherwise, it's a pile of metal. What's the use of several types of SSBNs, if they went out to sea almost several times less adversaries, and repairs after 2-3 voyages had to be expected for years. And now the same picture. But if in the USSR, what it was somehow working (just the current number of enterprises and shipyards was very small to service an armada of ships), but today the very thinning fleet lacks even one "Sevmash". And the boats, as they were at the berths, are still standing.
    And no matter how insidious they were, in terms of organization, they gave us such a head start that it was time to wipe the snot and do something. For the real fleet is many times weaker than the fleet on paper.
    The uniformity of the classes of ships already makes maintenance cheaper and reduces the repair time. Not only is there a shortage of personnel at Sevmash, but two submarines of the same type can hardly be found from several submarines being repaired or awaiting repair. Therefore, these expensive toys are even more expensive to operate. The same applies to surface ships. Ships are available, but the question is: how many of them are serviceable?
    And ask our admirals - how many SSBNs are currently on alert at sea, and not at the base, or it’s convenient to say that our missiles will be taken from the enemy’s base. Only another question - will you hide from them at the base for a subsequent retaliation strike? After all, SSBNs were created to hang Domoco swords above the enemy’s head SOMEWHERE in the depths of the ocean.
    And which is better: 4-5 types of SSBNs, standing at the bases, or one type of several units, but at sea in service?
    This is just my opinion. Of course, I am proud of the will of our sailors, but do we need a second Tsushima?
  • rudolff
    rudolff 18 December 2013 00: 27
    Rurikovich, in principle, they wrote everything correctly, but the problem is much deeper than just the multiplicity of projects in each class of ships. Take a look at the current Northern Fleet, from SSBNs (SSBNs) only Project 667 BDRM boats are in service. Borei so far only for beauty, the only running Typhoon / Shark is essentially a test bench. There are no problems with repairs, with modernization (on the R-29 RMU2), too, but they never went to sea, and they don’t go. The entire service is mostly at the pier. Going out to sea is a rare and significant event. The operating voltage coefficient is from 0,05 to 0,15. Compare KOH with the Americans. There is not only an inability to plan and organize a proper military service at sea, but also an elementary reluctance and reassurance. It seems that no one is going to attack yet, and the BS at the "wall" seems to be simpler and safer. Well, the navigation binding is reinforced concrete! Sit yourself in the headquarters, get the next admiral's stars and a minimum of hemorrhoids.
  • voliador
    voliador 18 December 2013 22: 01
    Of course, one type of SSBN is much easier to maintain and identify and correct deficiencies.