In the author’s article “What the hens to consider, to work ...” (“NVO” No. 25, 19.07.13) proved that Russia is responsibly and punctually fulfilling its contractual obligations when developing appropriate types of START. Therefore, the US claims of violations of the INF Treaty by Russia are unfounded. It was also recommended that American experts refer to the basics of strategic missile ballistics and study the dependence of their flight range on the parameters of combat use data entered into the missile control system.
Nevertheless, the Daily Beast, with the suggestion of the same experts, announced that Russia also violated the “Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” which has nothing to do with the INF Treaty and missile launches.
In this regard, it seems relevant to analyze the “fresh” violations by the Americans of the INF Treaty and other non-proliferation-disarmament agreements.
VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT DURING LAUNCHING PROTECTIONS
Clause 5 of Article II of the INF Treaty states: “The term“ medium-range missile ”means a BRNB or RNSD whose range exceeds 1000 kilometers, but does not exceed 5500 kilometers.” The Treaty also noted that "each of the Parties liquidates its medium-range and shorter-range missiles and does not have such means in the future."
Once again, let us recall the opinion of the general designer of the unique Topol, Topol-M, Yars and Bulava-30 submarine-launching systems of academician Yu.S. Solomonov: "The Americans, in violation of the INF Treaty, actually created a medium-range missile for testing." This allowed for about 22 successful interceptor interception and adopting a Standard-3 type anti-missile system. The first stage of the creation of the European missile defense system has been completed and the deployment of the Aegis Eshoer ground control system in Romania has begun.
Unfortunately, Russian officials, various experts and “wise men” do not notice that the Americans are violating the provisions of the INF Treaty when conducting test launches of ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles designed to intercept strategic missiles in the middle segment of their flight trajectory. It is known that anti-missiles of this type have been adopted and deployed in Alaska and Vandenberg airbase.
At the same time, bypassing the INF Treaty, the American side:
1) develops medium- and intermediate-range target missiles for practicing anti-missile interception tasks;
2) without the consent of the Russian side, introduced the term "intermediate range";
3) did not submit a target missile to the demonstration and display of its distinctive features;
4) did not declare the launch sites of the target rockets;
4) does not transmit notification of the status and movement of target rockets.
Within the framework of the still “old” START-1 Treaty, an undeclared re-equipment of five silo launchers (silo silos) at AvB Vandenberg was carried out and anti-missile anti-missile systems were placed in them, making a similar list of breaches of contractual obligations. Moreover, little is known about the purpose and tactical and technical characteristics of these products. The data on their missile defense treaties are not confirmed, except as spectacular illustrations in the media.
This year, the Russian inspectorate at Avb Vandenberg did not reveal any works on refitting the silos, and the Americans did not show the type of products loaded into the silos.
Conducting undeclared launches of GBI interceptors from silos may create prerequisites for nuclear incidents between the United States, Russia and China. This is explained by the fact that notifications of launches of GBI interceptors in relation to the “Agreement between the USSR and the USA on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missiles of submarines from 31 in May 1988 of the year” are not provided. As a result, it is possible to provoke a reciprocal missile strike due to a false classification of the launch of an anti-missile missile system and its incorrect identification in flight, especially in the event of a crisis situation in the world. This is explained by the identity of the sizes of the anti-missile anti-missile systems with ICBMs of the “Minuteman-3” type and the similarity of ICBM warheads and interception stages of anti-missile anti-missiles. Therefore, it is quite difficult to distinguish an attacking ICBM and an “innocuous” antimissile in flight.
In addition, the Avb Vandenberg conducts combat training and test launches of Minuteman-3-type ICBMs with the use of full-time radar missile strike warning and control systems for outer space, control points at various levels, and infrastructure facilities of the ground data network. In addition, there is an insufficient level of professional training of the American SNF specialists and parts of the nuclear support, which in recent years have allowed several nuclear accidents that have received world fame. If necessary, you can also recall the nuclear incidents associated with undeclared missile launches and failures in the US anti-missile defense system.
The authorities of the Russian Federation know that the Americans, as part of the “old” START-1 Treaty, assured the Russian side: test launches of anti-missile missiles will be carried out from the experimental silos. However, these promises are not kept.
General Designer Yuri Solomonov has repeatedly stressed that “despite the fact that theoretically a target missile is a ground-to-air missile, it’s not a problem to modify it to the ground-to-ground class. Because after the active site to fly along a ballistic trajectory to the ground is not difficult. " Of course, such opportunities can also be realized in the anti-missile system of GBI, since its flight range is about 4000 km.
It should also be emphasized that the work of the final stage on the modernization of these antimissiles (by 2016 year) will require the creation of intercontinental target missiles, which will be associated with further violations by the United States of the START Treaty.
VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUS AND OTHER AGREEMENT AGREEMENT
The analysis of foreign information materials revealed new aspects of the violation by the Americans of Article XIII of the START Treaty: “The Parties do not transfer to the third parties strategic offensive weapons falling under the scope of this Agreement ... This provision does not apply to any cooperation practice existing at the time of signing this Agreement, including obligations in the field of strategic offensive arms between one of the parties and a third state. " At the same time, the term “the existing practice of cooperation” and areas of cooperation are not disclosed in the START Treaty. It is also unclear how many “third” countries can be.
The essence of the “fresh” violation of this article is that the Americans carry out the practice of cooperation with the UK that was not announced at the time of signing the START Treaty (8 on April 2010) regarding the preparation and conduct of test-combat launches of the Trident-2 SLBM with US Eastern Missile Range, for which the British SSBN arrives at the site. In recent years, there have been about 15 launches that are qualified as successful. At the same time, the Americans refuse to submit notifications about the upcoming launch, explaining that the UK is not a party to the START Treaty.
According to the results of launches of British (or American) SLBMs, telemetry information is not transmitted to the Russian side, which may mean covertly improving the tactical and technical characteristics of the missile and combat equipment. Also not provided notifications about the storage locations of British and American SLBMs, special identification marks, the location of each of the missiles and other information. However, paragraph 7 of Section II of the Protocol to the Treaty is perplexing: “Notification provided no later than five days after completion of the transfer of SLBMs to a third state or receipt of SLBMs from a third state in accordance with the existing practice of cooperation”. Of course, we are talking about the reception and transmission of American SLBMs between the US Navy and the UK. It is even difficult to imagine that Russia will transfer its SLBMs to a third state - the deficit itself, the YPLY Dolgoruky RPLSN still without missiles. A reasonable question is: why were the RPLNS and the Bulava-30 SLBMs in the START Treaty declared as existing, which made them objects to American inspections?
The content of the following violation of Article XIII lies in the fact that at the time of signing the START Treaty, the Americans did not declare any practice of cooperation in the area of START with their nuclear ally, France, but it does. Thus, information materials show that the United States, in violation of a similar article in the “old” START-1 Treaty, assisted France in the design of ballistic missiles and in ensuring the technical safety of nuclear materials. France, in turn, provided the United States with a variety of information on the results of simulated testing of nuclear warheads for ICBMs. There is a “Memorandum on reaching an agreement” between states on cooperation in the field of ensuring nuclear safety and protecting against unauthorized access. The document has a section on “Monitoring the state of the nuclear arsenal”, which regulates cooperation in the field of theoretical, numerical and experimental methods of modeling, and the section “Nuclear technical safety and protection against unauthorized access”, defines the procedure for the exchange of information on the design of nuclear weapons, research, development , testing, manufacturing, transportation and dismantling of components from nuclear and explosive materials.
Within the framework of the Memorandum, there is also an agreement “Long-term participation of technical personnel in joint projects and mutual visits to facilities”. After the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the nuclear cooperation of the United States, France, and Great Britain focused on maintaining the combat readiness and reliability of arsenals without conducting full-scale nuclear testing. In 2010, an agreement was signed between France and the UK, which involves the creation of joint radiographic hydrodynamic centers, one in France and one in the UK, necessary for computer simulation of testing nuclear components weaponswhat the US is interested in. In this connection, the tripartite cooperation of the United States with its nuclear allies, which is not declared in the START Treaty, is being developed. In this case, one of the states is an intermediary in the transfer of information between the other two. The question is quite reasonable: when will the US Congress ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty?
The American side is also violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), carrying out technical cooperation with Japan in creating a national missile defense system. Thus, the joint development of Standard-3 anti-missiles Mod. 2A falls under the restrictions of Category I of this Mode, which prohibits the transfer to other states: missiles with a maximum range of 300 km or more with a payload weight of 500 kg, as well as engines; elements of the control and communication system; software and other technologies. By the way, this anti-missile missile will be deployed in the third stage of the European missile defense system (2018 year) and poses a threat to the Russian strategic nuclear forces. In addition, Russian claims against the Americans, who are assisting Israel in deploying its own missile defense system based on the Arrow-type antimissile system, remain in force.
Thus, the United States itself violates the Hague Code of Conduct on the Prevention of the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Agreement between the USSR and the USA on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine ballistic missiles from 31 in May 1988 of the year.
The American leadership continues not to fulfill the provision stated in the preamble to the START Treaty: “... recognizing the relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons, the growing importance of this relationship in the process of reducing strategic nuclear weapons and the fact that current strategic defensive weapons do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of START Parties. ” So, the Americans have successfully completed the program of the first stage of creating the EuroMD system; declared their intention to strengthen the defense of the US territory from strikes by ICBMs and SLBMs by deploying more 14 anti-missile missiles and proceeded to the selection of a positional area; carry out the deployment of a ground-based anti-missile complex Standard-3 Mod.1Б in Romania, capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs; they are assisting Japan and Israel in deploying national missile defense systems, as regional missile defense systems aimed primarily against Russia. In connection with the progress of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, the leadership of the United States and NATO do not plan to adjust plans to create a European missile defense system. Thus, NATO members have already stated that “the European missile defense system is not aimed at protecting against any particular country. It's about protecting against real and growing threats, but against real threats, we need real defense. ”
It should be noted that the US State Department once again violated the requirements of Section 5 of Article VII of the START Treaty: "Each Party has the right to publicize data on its strategic offensive arms." Thus, on October, the State Department’s website published the combat structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces: 473 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and TB; 1400 warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and TB nuclear warheads; 894 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed TB. By the way, how is the counting rule implemented in the table: for each TB - one warhead and how many TB warheads? Also relevant is the question of the mechanism of transfer of Russian data for inclusion in the certificate of the US State Department.
Further. The United States Party, deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on the territory of a number of countries that are members of the NATO bloc, violates the first article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As is known, this article introduces a ban for nuclear powers to transfer or provide control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, and the second article of the NPT prohibits non-nuclear powers to acquire and use nuclear weapons.
Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said: “The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in non-nuclear countries goes beyond the NPT. Tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe can theoretically be delivered to the borders of the Russian Federation in a short time, while Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons cannot be moved to the US border in a short time, and it does not pose a threat to America’s security. Nuclear weapons must be returned to the United States, and the infrastructure must be destroyed. ”
TIME IN ALL OBJECTIVE TO UNDERSTAND
It is important to note that Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time stated that the INF Treaty does not fully meet the interests of ensuring the military security of the state: “Other states are actively improving medium-range missiles, and almost all of our neighbors are developing these weapon systems around us. At one time, the Soviet Union and, naturally, the Russian Federation abandoned medium-range missiles, signing an agreement with the United States. This is not very clear, since these systems are not relevant at all for the Americans, because they have nowhere to use, and for the Soviet Union and for today's Russia, especially given the fact that our other neighboring countries are developing these attack systems, this solution was at least controversial. "
The head of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, Sergei Ivanov, stressed: “Americans don’t need this class of weapons at all; they didn’t need it earlier or now. Because with the help of such weapons they can theoretically fight only with Mexico or Canada, and the range of their flight does not allow to hit objects in Europe. ”
The failure of the Russo-American initiative on the globalization of the INF Treaty, which was announced at the 62 session of the UN General Assembly in 2007, is also a matter of concern. This is largely due to the disinterest of the American leadership in promoting the initiative. As a result, the number of countries possessing medium-range missiles is growing, and not a single one of them has expressed a desire to join the Interim INF Treaty.
It appears that this programmatic statement by the President of the Russian Federation and his instructions at a meeting in Sarov allow an objective analysis of the START Treaty to be carried out in order to meet the interests of the military security of the state, since more than two years have passed since its entry into force.
As an example, consider two articles that are detrimental to Russia. Thus, paragraph 7 of Article III reads: “For the purposes of this Treaty: a) a missile of the type created and tested solely for intercepting objects and fighting objects not on the surface of the Earth is not considered as a ballistic missile covered by the provisions of this Treaty” . It must be admitted that the item was creatively written off from the INF Treaty and does not have a direct relationship to the START Treaty. There is no doubt that the Americans will continue to develop medium-range, intermediate and intercontinental target missiles, and the topic of analyzing violations of the INF Treaty and making claims can be closed.
The wording of Article X, paragraph 2, is puzzling: “The obligation not to apply camouflage measures includes the obligation not to apply them at test sites, including measures that conceal ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the relationship between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during tests” .
Thus, the Russian side is invited not to carry out the operational camouflage measures: during the conduct of combat training (test) launches of new missiles, tests of promising types of combat equipment and missile defense equipment with the submission of telemetric information to Americans; when developing new forms and methods of actions of PGRK Topol, Topol-M and Yars. At the same time, the Americans do not plan to develop new strategic missiles in the near future, except to conduct test launches of the Minuteman-3 type ICBM and the Trident-2 SLBM with the aim of extending their service life. In this regard, the composition and content of telemetric information on the results of launches of the existing type of American missiles are not of particular interest.
It has to be stated that a significant number of restrictive and flawed provisions are in force in the START Treaty, its Protocol and the Appendices, concerning the Russian PGRK, which the Americans do not have. Conclusions from the analysis of their content will be presented in a separate article.