Landing on the Dnieper
Two years of war
Like the entire Red Army, the Soviet airborne troops went through a hard school in two years of war. Manned by well-trained personnel, the five airborne corps have already distinguished themselves in border battles, in the defense of Kiev and Moscow, and in August 29, 1941 became an independent branch of the armed forces. From January to June 1942, the reformed airborne units took part in the largest airborne operation in the Great Patriotic War, Vyazemskaya.
The heavy defeats of the summer of 1942 of the year forced the Soviet military-political leadership to use airborne troops as a strategic reserve, using them as usual rifle formations in the Caucasus and in the Stalingrad battle (for more details on this - “Little Brother”, No. 9, 2012. E. Muzrukov. "Stalingrad landing").
Convinced of the effectiveness and high combat capability of the airborne units, the Supreme Command headquarters already 16 August 1942 decided to re-create eight airborne corps and five airborne brigade maneuvers.
All autumn 1942, these units were formed in the Moscow region, which became a kind of base for the training of airborne troops during the entire period of the Great Patriotic War. In December 1942, these units were again reformed into ten Guards Airborne Divisions and transferred to the North-Western Front, where from March to May 1943 took part in the unsuccessful operation "Polar Star" under the leadership of Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko .
Brought into reserve and replenished in the spring of 1943, seven airborne divisions were deployed to the Kursk Bulge, which became part of the Steppe Front. In the Prokhorovka region, the warriors of the 9 Guards Airborne Division distinguished themselves. 11 July 1943, the division occupied the defense directly in the village, where during the day the paratroopers bravely fought, blocking the enemy's way to Kursk.
But considering the future offensive operations to liberate the occupied territory, the Soviet High Command nevertheless wanted to have in its hands a powerful airborne grouping, which was to form a revived and mobile strategic reserve of the Stavka. To this end, in April 1943, in the Moscow region, the formation of seven Guards airborne brigades began, to which in the summer, thirteen Guards brigades were assigned. The final date for combat training and forging new units was appointed 1 October 1943 year.
Guards brigades
From the very inception of the Russian airborne troops in the middle of the 30, they were particularly careful in their recruitment. In addition to the relevant physical data, pre-army parachute and rifle training, the standards of the TRP and Osoviahima and, of course, compulsory political literacy were taken into account. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the best of the best were selected for the troops. V. I. Chuikov, commander of the 62 Army, later recalled the decisive actions of the paratroopers in the battles for Stalingrad: “This is really a guard. People are all young, tall and healthy, many of them were dressed in the uniform of paratroopers, with daggers and finns on belts. They fought heroically. When attacked with a bayonet, the Nazis threw over themselves like sacks of straw. ” But all this selective personnel were turned into regular infantry in 1942, where they suffered heavy losses.
Now, in April 1943, it was decided to send cadets of the disbanded military schools, who were excellent human material in all respects, from the educational level to the physical condition, to the landing troops, or, as they said, "to Comrade Stalin’s personal reserve". Also, the brigades were replenished with personnel seamen of the Pacific fleet and physically fit volunteers who were trained under the supervision of Airborne Veteran Officers.
The fitness of future paratroopers, ex-students of 18 – 22 years, was checked by “scrolling” ten turns on a special chair. So the vestibular apparatus of recruits was tested.
Instilling direct landing skills, we began by studying the design of parachutes PD-41 and PD-6 and the rules for their installation. During the war, the main parachute of paratroopers was the parachute of the PD-41 brand, which has an almost square dome and an uneven distribution of lines along its edge. This created a certain keel on the trailing edge of the opened parachute, contributing to the dome turning in the wind. Well, and soon began training jumps from a parachute tower, then from an aerostat from a height of 400 – 700. After five jumps, they proceeded to land from Li-2 and TB-3 airplanes.
After the first jump, each fighter received a parachutist badge, and for the jump itself - 15 rubles. A paratrooper had to make at least eight jumps a year at different times of the day and in very different weather conditions, but the standards overlapped many times. Those who served in the battalions committed 15 – 20 jumps, and tank destroyers and gunners jumped 10 jumps. We jumped with two parachutes, the main one and the reserve, all equipment together with two parachutes weighed more than 45 kg, and before the landing airfield, as a rule, 15 – 20 km passed on foot.
They prepared paratroopers mainly for night operations, imitated assault and seizure of airfields and carrying out various sabotage actions in the rear. The fighters underwent intensive training in hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting, learned how to properly kill with a knife, remove sentries, capture languages, studied a disruptive job, got acquainted with a walkie-talkie. Were trained in throwing grenades, tagged shooting from personal weaponssniper rifle, not sparing ammunition at the shooting ranges and landfills.
The Guards airborne brigade of the 1943 model of the year numbered 3550 people and consisted of a brigade headquarters, four paratroop battalions, and an anti-tank battalion of two batteries; communications company, reconnaissance scooter, anti-aircraft machine-gun and sapper-blasting company. In each battalion (820 people) there were three parachute-rifle companies, a machine-gun and mortar companies, and a company of anti-tank guns. In total, the brigade was: 45-mm guns - 8 pcs .; 82-mm mortars - 24 pcs .; 50-mm mortars - 36 pcs .; Maxim machine guns - 48; machine guns DP - 132 pcs .; DShK - 12 units; PPS or PPSH - 976 pcs .; PTRS - 120 units; carbines - 2106 pcs. On the whole, it was a rather mobile unit, adapted in its organization and armament to a wide maneuver, an independent and long-lasting warfare in the enemy's rear, apart from its troops. Of particular note is the psychological training that the paratroopers received before disembarking in the enemy rear. Any operation of this kind by the majority of personnel was perceived as an inevitable and heroic sacrifice in the name of the Motherland and the common cause of victory over the enemy. The slogan “Marines do not surrender in captivity!” Did not become empty words. Very soon, many paratroopers confirmed these words in practice.
September forty third
In early September, 1943 of the year in connection with the rapid advance of the advanced units of the Soviet troops of the Voronezh Front in the Dnieper created favorable conditions for the use of large airborne assault forces in order to capture the bridgehead on the west bank of the Dnieper and to help the forces of our forces cross the river. The planning of the airborne operation was carried out by the operational control of the front and the operational group of the Airborne Forces headquarters, which arrived in early September at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front. For the airborne operation, 1-i, 3-i and 5-i separate airborne brigades were assigned, which were combined into an airborne corps, numbering about 10 thousand paratroopers, 24 anti-tank 45-mm guns, 180 mortar guns 82 caliber and 50 mm, 328 anti-tank guns and 540 machine guns and light machine guns under the command of the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Major-General I. I. Zatevakhin.
By September 17, the headquarters of the Voronezh Front had developed a sufficiently detailed plan of the operation, which provided for interaction with bomber and assault aircraft, as well as ground artillery, for which the liaison officers from these combat arms were supposed to be included in the landing force. The overall plan of the operation was reduced to the landing of the consolidated airborne corps, which was supposed to prevent the enemy troops from regrouping and the approach of its reserves when the forcing of the Dnieper was started by ground units of the Red Army.
Simultaneously with the landing in the bend of the Dnieper, the airborne operation in the Crimea was planned by three guards airborne brigades, whose task was to prevent the enemy forces from regrouping when the Crimean land bridge began to break through with the ground forces of the Red Army. In accordance with this plan, in September 1943, the 4-I, 6-I and 7-I Guards airborne brigades were consolidated into a consolidated corps and were under the operational control of the Southern Front. All responsibility for the preparation for the landing was assigned to the commander of the airborne forces, Major General A. G. Kapitokhin (who took this post only in June 1943), and directly for the landing, to the deputy commander of the ADD, Lieutenant General N. Skripko.
The aviation support of the landing force was carried out by the 2-I Air Army, Colonel-General S. A. Krakowski.
On September 19, the plan was approved by Marshall G.K. Zhukov, a representative of the Stavka, who had experience in conducting the Vyazma airborne operation in the winter of 1942. Marshal demanded maximum secrecy in the preparation and conduct of the operation. To this end, reconnaissance aviation flights to the area of the forthcoming landing stopped, and it was decided to ground troops to report the operation only after the commencement of the landing.
The 150 IL-4 and B-25 "Mitchell" bomber from the 101-th ADD regiment under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union were assigned for landing from long-range aviation. S. Grizodubova, as well as X-NUMX transport aircraft Li-180 and 2 gliders A-35 and G-7. The departure area for landing included Bogodukhovsky and Lebedinsky airfield sites. However, due to difficulties with rail transport in the newly liberated territories, up to 11 September, the brigades were in places of permanent deployment and were able to concentrate in the area of Bogodukhovsky hub only by 17 September.
German intelligence was not asleep, and on the same day over the airfield Lebedin, the German plane dropped the following leaflets: “We are waiting for you! Fly in! We promise you a warm welcome! ”
But in the evening of September 22, the forward detachments of the 40 Army and 3 guards. tank army on improvised means crossed to the west bank of the Dnieper and fought in the areas of Rzhishchev, Trakomirov, Zarubensy, holding the bridgehead, later called Bukrinsky.
On the morning of September 23, Army General N. F. Vatutin arrived at the command post of the 40 Army. They reported to him that in the area of the Bukrin bend, large enemy forces were not detected, and the army general, through the commander of the airborne troops, clarified the combat missions to the airborne assault forces. The purpose of the operation remained the same: to prevent the enemy's reserves from approaching the Bukrin bridgehead from the west, southwest, and south. To achieve this goal, the front commander ordered on the night of September 25 to land two guards. vdbr in the area north-west of Kanev and in the area of the station Lazurna on the area 10 x14 km. The time has come for the actions of the "Dnieper landing".
Leap into hell
The acute shortage of time led to haste and confusion at the final stage of the preparation of the operation. Lining followed one after the other. The commanders had to assemble the brigade commanders and bring the task to them several hours before departure, and those, in turn, could only briefly instruct the fighters on the targets and tasks of the landing force on the aircraft. Further more: instead of 65 Li-2 transport aircraft for landing 5 guts. In-flight aviators were able to concentrate only 48. Moreover, it turned out that all the transport workers already with the “broken out” motor potential and their load-carrying capacity are less than planned according to the landing plan. This forced an extra redistribution of people and equipment on the available aircraft and caused a chain of serious mistakes that affected the organization of the command and control of the landing force already in battle. Whole headquarters 3 Guards. Vdbr was on board one aircraft, but without a single radio. Other aircraft were equipped with walkie-talkies (where 3, and where even 6), but without communications officers, who had radio codes. There were airplanes fully loaded by medical instructors and even ... a brigade orchestra. To crown it all, it turned out that there are not enough tankers at the six departure aerodromes and there simply isn’t enough aviation kerosene. The paratroopers had to run around the airfield in search of aircraft ready for departure.
As a result, on the night of September 25 1943 from all airfields starting from 18.30 Moscow time, 298 sorties were made and 4575 paratroopers and 690 containers were dropped. 3 has been fully planted. Vdbr and about half 5 Guards. vdbr (alas, completely without artillery and mortars), when the airfield finally ran out of fuel and about 30% of the landing force was left on the ground. But the most serious test was waiting for the paratroopers ahead.
Here, the order of Marshal Zhukov about the observance of "super-secrecy" played a fatal role. The absence of air reconnaissance for three days and the fact that the guerrillas and troop reconnaissance were not notified of the landing led to the secretive transfer of German command to the Bukrinsky bridgehead of the 3 infantry, motorized, 1 tank divisions. They were precisely in those areas in which the planned landing. As a result, Soviet paratroopers jumped on the heads of German soldiers and in the hatches of German tanks. Naturally, they were expected by a very “warm”, and most importantly, a completely unexpected reception for the paratroopers.
When approaching the landing area, Soviet aircraft fell under a very strong barrage of anti-aircraft guns and were forced to gain altitude, and from an altitude of 2 thousand meters to carry out an assault landing. And the spread of landing was 30 – 100 km, i.e., from Rzhishchev to Cherkasy. For example, the commander of the 5-th Guards Airborne Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Sidorchuk landed in the Kanev Forest area, an hour later he met the soldier 3-th Guards Airborne Brigade, by the morning he had gathered five people and for eight days was searching for and gathered around him small groups of paratroopers. He met the officers and soldiers who jumped out of the same plane with him only on the ninth day after landing. We must honestly admit that this happened as a result of the lack of experience of landing in transport aircraft pilots. The following facts indicate a low level of pilot training: as a result of the loss of orientation of 13 aircraft, they did not find their landing areas and returned to airfields with paratroopers, the crew of one aircraft landed fighters right in the Dnieper, where everyone drowned, and 230 paratroopers led by deputy commander 5- In the rear, on the left bank of the Dnieper, lieutenant colonel M. B. Ratner. Places of landing fighters from several aircraft in general could not be established.
It is not difficult to imagine what hell the Soviet paratroopers had to go through that night and in the air that night. The future well-known film director Grigory Chukhray (at that time commander of a communications platoon) recalled this: “We were unlucky: we jumped out of aircraft in the sector of anti-aircraft fire. Before that, I had to sip a bit of a military leg: I was wounded twice, fought in Stalingrad. I had to fall to meet the glittering trails of bullets, through the flames of parachutes burning in the sky comrades, this has not yet experienced ... Once in the air, I did not understand anything at first: the fire was burning below. Burned peasant huts. In the light of the fires, the white domes of the parachutes were clearly visible against the dark sky. The Germans opened fire on the landing of monstrous power. Tracing bullets swarming around each of us. Many of our comrades died before they reached the ground. ”
A large number of rockets of different colors, both their own and the enemy, taking off from the ground, in landing areas, confused the signals set for collection, and the glow of fires and searchlights of the enemy illuminated people both in the air and after landing. The plane in which the 3 command was located was shot down on the approach, and the remaining paratroopers were divided into small groups because of the large variation in area, and more often singles, without any single command, were left to themselves and fought fiercely. In the evening of September 25, in the forest east of the village of Grushevo, an extremely stubborn battle was fought around 150 fighters from the 3 unit, and they all died heroically.
The Germans, meanwhile, were reporting to their command that by the evening of September 25 the 692 paratroopers had been destroyed and another 209 captured. Lt. Col. Binder of the German 19 Panzer Division later recalled: “Broken into small and very small groups, they were doomed. They tried to hide in narrow ravines, but very soon they were searched for, killed or taken prisoner. Among them, of course, were well-aimed arrows with steel nerves. Goldman’s company suffered heavy losses - most of them died from shots to the head. ”
In the rear of the enemy
By the morning of September 25, no one got out of contact with the landing force headquarters, and the front command sensibly decided to abandon the landing of the second echelon of the landing force. In the meantime, the surviving paratroopers only engaged in battle in the rear of the enemy. By the end of September 25, in various places of the vast region, completely isolated from each other, without any means of communication and heavy weapons, the 35 groups gathered together and launched combat operations, uniting 2300 people from the total number of airborne troops.
The German command launched a large anti-amphibious operation using aircraft, armored vehicles, ROA units, the Turkestan Legion, Cossacks and policemen. The landing party member M. Likhterman recalled: “The Germans drove us across the steppe and gradually exterminated them. The raids with dogs ... At first there were three of us, then a group of 12 paratroopers was formed. ... For three days in a row we fought our way through the shrinking ring of the pursuers, but it turned out that we were squeezed in a narrow area. Only four of them went through ravines. ”
The fighting went on for several days in a wide area in the rear of the enemy, while the paratroopers continued their attempts to find each other in order to unite. To a certain extent, these actions disorganized the enemy's supply routes and diverted a significant part of the enemy’s forces. On the night of September 30, in the area of the village of Potok, a group led by Senior Lieutenant S.G. Petrosyan destroyed the headquarters of the enemy battalion and, before 180, soldiers and officers, 45 vehicles, 9 guns and 2 mortars.
The fact that the paratroopers hampered the Germans is testifying to the fact that the local population was promised a reward in 6 of thousands of occupation marks or a cow for any information about parachutists. But local residents and partisans helped the paratroopers in every possible way. Badly guards. Captain M. Sapozhnikov 14 of days together with the banner of the 3 Brigade hid in a haystack until the local residents were found by the Gaponenko brothers, who kept the banner and returned it to the 1944 part of the year. Only after 32, the brothers were awarded the medal "For Courage".
K 5 in October 1943 in the Kanev forest concentrated several separate groups of paratroopers (about 600 people), united by the commander of the 5 airborne brigade lieutenant colonel P. M. Sidorchuk into the airborne brigade of three battalions, engineer platoon, PTR platoon , reconnaissance and platoon communications. All this time, the front command tried to establish contact with the Sidorchuk paratroopers. On the night of September 28, three communication groups were parachuted, but they went missing, and the Po-2 aircraft sent during the day of reconnaissance was shot down to the front line. Only 6 of October in Kanev forest approached a group of signalers with a radio station, through which the first air communication with the 40 army was established.
The Germans relentlessly pursued the brigade, clutching the ring tighter, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sidorchuk made a decision: on October 13 to rush west to the Taganchansky forest away from the front line, 20 km north of Korsun. Here, the paratroopers received an order to go to the sabotage activities to disorganize the German rear, and they began to deliver food and ammunition to the air. The sabotage of the railway, the bombings of the bridges, attacks on the headquarters and the garrisons forced the German command to conduct the 23 of October, a major operation to clean up the Taganchansky forest with the support of tanks and armored personnel carriers. But the paratroopers again managed to escape from the enemy ring by ravines at night and, having made the 50-kilometer crossing, concentrated on October 26 in a forest west of Cherkasy.
At this point, the brigade consisted of about 1200 people, 12 heavy machine guns, 6 anti-tank guns. In the same area, there were guerrilla groups “For the Motherland”, “Name of Kotsyubinsky”, “Batya”, “Name of Chapaev”, “Fighter”, 720-th partisan detachment of the GRU GSH with a total number of more than 900 people. In addition to purely sabotage tasks, paratroopers and partisans carried out reconnaissance of the German defense system along the Dnieper for the headquarters of the 52 Army of the 2 of the Ukrainian Front.
From 13 to 28 in November 1943, part of the brigade with a sudden blow from the rear helped units of the 254 Infantry Division to force the Dnieper, seize and hold a bridgehead in Sidovok, Sekirna, Budyshche, repelling the enemy’s numerous attacks, including the Viking SS division. Here the commander of 2 pdb guv especially distinguished. Major A. A. Bluvshteyn. He was the first with his battalion to break into the village of Sidovok, and then for three days with only eight fighters held the village of Dubievka, repelling the numerous attacks of the Germans. In total, his battalion destroyed over one thousand soldiers and officers, 16 tanks, 104 vehicles, 2 aircraft, and 4 guns during the operations in the enemy rear. Gunner anti-gun gun gv. ml. Sergeant I.P. Kondratyev during a three-day battle near the same village Svidovok personally hit four tanks, two armored vehicles and three trucks with infantry, but was seriously wounded.
November 28 1943, part of the 5 Guards. Vdbr lost their positions 7 Guards. airborne divisions and were withdrawn to the reserve headquarters of the Supreme Command in the city of Kirzhach, Vladimir region. So, two months later, the Dnieper airborne operation ended ...
Bitter lesson
The price of the apparent incompetence of the leadership of the Airborne Forces and ADD and the headquarters of the 1 of the Ukrainian Front in preparing the operation turned out to be very high. As a result of the operation, more than 2,5 thousand paratroopers died and went missing. This is more than half of the personnel. We must also pay tribute to Stalin, who soberly assessed the result of the operation and called the perpetrators really in it: “I state that the first airborne landing conducted by the Voronezh font 24 of September failed, causing massive unnecessary casualties. It happened not only because of Comrade. Skripko (ADD), but also due to the fault of Comrade. Yuriev (G. K. Zhukov) and Comrade. Vatutin, who were to control the preparation and organization of the landing of the landing. The release of mass landing at night indicates the illiteracy of the organizers of this case, because, as experience shows, dropping a mass night landing even on its territory is fraught with great dangers. ”
Until the end of the war, the Soviet Airborne Forces did not undertake large airborne operations, finally turning into elite infantry. At the end of 1944, the main units of the Airborne Forces were transformed into the 9 Guards Army, which took part in the battles in Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Nevertheless, in two months of operations in the enemy rear, the landing group was not destroyed and itself caused serious damage to the enemy. More than 3 thousand soldiers and officers, 15 echelons, 52 tanks, 6 aircraft, 250 vehicles were destroyed. The paratroopers showed courage, mass heroism and loyalty to military duty. Practically all the participants of the landing party were awarded with high government awards, and guards. Major A. A. Bluvshteynu, Art. Lieutenant S. G. Petrosyan and Jr. Sergeant I.P. Kondratiev was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. After the complete liberation of the landing area at the beginning of 1944, a special commission of the Airborne Forces headquarters worked on its territory, which in great detail restored and summarized information on the progress of the operation, its losses and miscalculations.
But the most eloquent testimony is German documents. Highlighting the poor training and organization of the landing force, they pay tribute to the heroism of the Soviet paratroopers. Here is how they were characterized in the report of the headquarters of the 8 of the German army on October 7 from the 1943 of the year: “The hunting dexterity of each individual fighter was an integral feature of the paratroopers. Their behavior in the most critical situations was exceptional. The wounded showed themselves particularly hardy and stubborn in battle, who, despite their injuries, continued to fight. Repeatedly the wounded blew themselves up with grenades to avoid captivity. It was especially difficult to find shelter places for troops. It has been repeatedly established that the enemy is perfectly camouflaged in ravines ... If our reconnaissance groups managed to find such shelter, the enemy tried to get rid of annoying observers without a single shot, shouts of "hurray" and noise. As soon as the main forces of the detachment were assembled, they put up stubborn, desperate resistance, using the minimum amount of ammunition. But even when the enemy had no ammunition, he defended himself with wild fanaticism. Each paratrooper was armed with a dagger, which he skillfully used. ” Undoubtedly, personal courage and readiness for self-sacrifice solved a great deal, but not all. In this case, we have to agree with the opinion of the chief marshal of artillery N. N. Voronov: “With great regret, I must say that we, the pioneers of the air assault, did not have reasonable plans to use it.”
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