All the world's media, the whole West, are buzzing with sad words to the death of 95-year-old fighter against apartheid Nelson Mandela.
So it was in life - the Western world made of it its sentimental legend, proving the unprecedented humanism of the West itself. Stars, presidents, heads of corporations, representatives of the world establishment, the great and most promoted came to him. He was the legalized number one revolutionary after the death of Gandhi.
Why? Have you ever been tormented by this question? Why did those against whom Mandela seemed to be fighting (and apartheid is the same phenomenon of Western civilization as fascism) sang odes to him during his lifetime, and now they will arrange a real show of his funeral? It has already been announced that Obama will come to bid farewell to the greatest western legend. Finishing beautiful history Mandela.
Perhaps this question can be answered by Naomi Klein’s book “The Doctrine of Shock,” an excerpt from which I quote: “February 11, 1990, two weeks after he wrote this note, Mandela was released from prison. He enjoyed the reputation of a living saint, perhaps like no other in the world. The inhabitants of South Africa fervently celebrated this event, they were firmly convinced that nothing could stop their struggle for liberation. Unlike Eastern Europe, the liberation movement in South Africa was not defeated, it gained momentum. Mandela at that time overcame the strongest cultural shock: he even took the camera’s microphone as “the newest look weaponscreated while [he] was in prison.
The negotiations on the end of apartheid dealt with two big themes that often intersected: politics and economics. And, of course, most people's attention was riveted on political summit meetings between Nelson Mandela and the leader of the National Party, F.V. de clerk. De Klerk’s strategy in these negotiations was to retain as much power as possible. To do this, he tried many proposals: splitting the country, introducing a federation, giving veto rights to minority parties, leaving a certain percentage of seats in government structures behind each ethnic group — anything, just not to introduce the majority principle, which, he was sure, would entail for a large-scale expropriation of land and the nationalization of corporations.
As Mandela later said, “The National Party tried to maintain White’s superiority with our consent.” Weapons and money stood behind de Klerk, but his opponent was supported by millions of people. Mandela and his chief negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosis, were able to win on almost every point.
Much less noticeable on the background of these summits, where the situation often seemed explosive, there were other negotiations concerning the economy. Basically, they were conducted by the ANC by Thabo Mbeki, then the rising star of the party, and now the president of South Africa. In the course of the negotiations, the National Party could understand that the parliament would soon be in the hands of the ANC, and then the party of the South African elites focused their energy and intellectual forces on the economic negotiations. The whites of South Africa had to cede black government, but the wealth accumulated during the apartheid period was under threat, and they decided not to give up.
The de Klerk government used a dual strategy in these negotiations. First, referring to the “Washington consensus” popular in the minds, which was considered the only true economic program, they spoke of the key positions of the economy: trade policy or the central bank - as “technical” or “administrative” issues.
Secondly, it used the entire set of new policy instruments, such as international trade agreements, changes in constitutional law and structural adjustment programs, as instruments that allowed the transfer of power over these key positions to the hands of so-called impartial experts, economists and IMF leaders, World Bank, the General Agreement on Customs Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the National Party - to anyone except the ANC. It was a strategy of "balkanization" - not geographic (as de Klerk first thought), but economic.
In these negotiations, the ANC fell into a different kind of trap - a network of cleverly composed rules and laws, woven to limit the power of elected politicians and tie their hands. While this network was entangled with the country, almost no one noticed it, but when the new government came to power and wanted to give its voters the real benefits that they expected and voted for, the network was tight and the administration felt bound hand and foot. Patrick Bond, who worked as an economic adviser at Mandela’s office in the early years of the ANC, recalls the bitter joke of the time: “Well, we have a state, but where is the power?” And when the new government tried to implement the promises of the Freedom Charter, it saw that power belongs to someone else. ”
As you can see, Nelson Mandela covered with his speeches about freedom and equality the operation to preserve the economic levers and wealth of South Africa for the Western oligarchs. That is, Mandela, willing or not, played into the hands of Western capital — whatever one may say.
The illusions of freedom and the triumph of the revolution were designed to divert attention from the important decisions made in the quiet of the cabinets. Decisions on how, with the external transfer of power to local Aborigines, to maintain real power through control of the Central Bank, treasury, corporations and financial flows.
I am far from the position of the author of the book, which is a radical socialist, calling for all property to be taken away and divided. The problem is different. Instead of waging a real struggle for economic leverage, selecting financial and natural resources from Western corporations for the benefit of his state and people, Nelson was satisfied only with beautiful words and fanfare about the freedom of Africans and the victory over apartheid.
That is why the West has made its legend of it and now grievously grieves for its death.