Military Review

Mujahideen Hunters

The Soviet special forces did not immediately turn into that formidable force that the Afghan Mujahideen feared. Not overnight the news of a possible confrontation with him began to excite the most experienced and successful opposition commanders.

Then, in 1979-80, having left the inhabited towns in the European part of the USSR, the special forces battalions were forced to go through a difficult survival school in completely new conditions before they began to pursue an effective anti-partisan war. Special Forces bases were located at different distances from the Pakistani border - from 10 to 150 kilometers, and the area of ​​responsibility in which the special forces conducted military operations, mainly extended to areas adjacent to Pakistan and Iran.

The proximity of the border, which the special forces had to block, intercepting the caravans of the Mujahideen, created for him many difficulties. After all, in case of danger, Islamic partisans could always retreat to Pakistani territory or pull up reserves from there if small groups of Soviet Rangers came too close to it. Spetsnaz was able to stand up for itself, therefore, sometimes Malisha * units from the Pakistani border guard came to the aid of the Mujahideen. Their form, including camouflage field jackets, gray national shirts to the knees, and black berets with a red and yellow cockade, often misled the special forces. At the sight of the Malisha, they believed that they were attacked by mercenaries from Western countries, and they fought with renewed vigor, trying to get a black take as a trophy.

* Malish - a fighter of the tribal formation in Pashtunistan, historical area located in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Sometimes clashes with Pakistanis arose due to differences in the application of the state border between Afghanistan and Pakistan on geographical maps used by Soviet and Pakistani military personnel. For example, on Soviet maps, the border of Kunar province runs along a mountain range located on the right bank of the river of the same name, and on the Pakistani map the line of the same border is drawn along the river, and the right bank is fully considered Pakistani territory. Because of this cartographic absurdity, there were cases when special forces groups went deeper into the fighting several kilometers into Pakistan, being sure that they were still on Afghan soil. After all, the border with its usual attributes to us - towers, rows of barbed wire, plowed strip - between the two countries does not exist.

Where special forces had to operate, the enemy had numerous base areas. A multi-tiered system of defensive positions, shelters capable of withstanding the direct hit of high-explosive bombs and rockets, inaccessible mountainous terrain, as if created for defensive operations, made the base areas very dangerous. For example, in order to defeat the base area of ​​the Javara Mujahideen in Paktia province near the Pakistani border, it was necessary to conduct a large army operation involving a large number of bombing and assault aviation. (See details: “Assault on the Dushman base of Javar”)

The special forces were not faced with the task of smashing these "wasp nests." He simply would not have the strength and technical capabilities to conduct such an action. Nevertheless, from time to time groups of "Rangers" invaded the territory of the enemy's base areas, destroyed individual objects there and smashed caravans. Having done their work, they hurried to leave the area, while many times the superior forces of Islamic partisans did not take them into the ring. Being on the territory of the "spirits", the special forces had to take all precautions so as not to be detected ahead of time. The slightest mistake led to sad consequences.

One day at the end of October 1987, in the area of ​​Duri-Mandekh, a group from the Shahdzhoy special forces battalion went deep into the territory of such an area. The soldiers inspected the caravan of nomads, and, fascinated by the test, they noticed too late that something was wrong. Mujahideen tried to surround them. We managed to get in touch with the base when the battle was already in full swing, so the helicopters were able to arrive very late. The remnants of the group were saved, but the eleven special forces guys no longer needed any help.

Not in favor of special forces worked and the climatic factor. The maddening heat of the summer, the marshy malarial shores of the Kabul River in the vicinity of Jalalabad, the desperate lack of Registan - one of the largest Afghan deserts, Farah’s sandy winds, which hurt the face, could hardly have come to taste. The harsh Asian nature and recklessness inherent in special forces sometimes led to tragic results.

The rapid, turbulent waters of the Afghan rivers cannot be called deep. Most of them can wade in the summer without wetting their knees, but there are exceptions. Anyone who has seen Farahrud, Helmand or Kabul during the spring flood period will never forget the mass of muddy, icy water with frantic whirlpools rushing at the speed of an express train. Special Forces have always sought to walk straight, often without scouting the roads.

So it was that March night 1985 of the year when crossing the river Kabul near the town of Muhmandara (Nangarhar province). In one minute, the rapid flow turned three armored personnel carriers with people. Drowned twelve special forces. For several days in a row, the battalion servicemen and their neighbors from the motorized rifle brigade were combing the coast in search of corpses. Some managed to find. The flow of the river carried them many miles from the site of the tragedy.

Shortly before this incident, under the same circumstances, the BMP from the Jalalabad battalion along with the landing force and a large number of trophy battered in the same river weaponstaken by special forces after a successful sortie in the town of Kama. Only a few people who had quick reaction and great physical strength were saved. They managed to throw off multikilogram equipment.

In the summer, the worst was the heat. In order to be less under the influence of the burning rays of the sun, the Rangers sought to wage hostilities and move in the terrain at night, at dusk, or at dawn. For a long time they could not understand how the Mujahideen manage to transfer the inferno relatively calmly. In Asadabad (the center of Kunar province), meticulous Europeans solved the mystery of the endurance of local residents, who drank salted tea to prevent dehydration and the removal of salts from the body. Disgusting, tasteless, but necessary if you want to survive. The special forces did not want to repeat the mistakes of their motorcycle neighbors, who, in one hot day in June 1984, killed ten soldiers in the mountains from sunstroke and dehydration.

Being in the mountains under the rays of the scorching sun, the special forces resorted to one more method, which helped them to withstand the heat without losing their combat capability. In some groups, the iron rule was that water from flasks could only be drunk with the permission of the group commander. And God forbid, if someone tried to secretly attach to the neck of his flask. The guilty was punished. This cruel rule did not originate from scratch. Often, the soldiers in the first hours of their stay drank the entire contents of their flasks, and then suffered from thirst, since finding water in the Afghan mountains is an extremely complicated matter.

At the new site, special forces encountered another problem, which he did not suspect, operating in the northern regions of Afghanistan, populated mainly by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen. In the special forces battalions a certain number of soldiers always served - people from Soviet Central Asia. If necessary, they could always easily talk to their Afghan counterparts to find out the situation, or to interrogate the captive mojahed. Pashtuns mostly lived here, who, at best, only a little spoke of Dari *. And the soldiers instantly lost the power of speech, immediately feeling the insurmountable language barrier.

Employees of Khad ** helped out, whose services were sometimes very doubtful, because they often translated only what they considered necessary. The current situation changed for the better only when military translators from Moscow began to arrive in the battalions with knowledge of Pashto.

* Dari is one of the languages ​​of Afghanistan, close to Tajik
** Khad - Afghan State Security Service

At first, the battalions that had been redeployed from the Union did not have enough experience in conducting military operations against such a skilled and cunning adversary as the armed Islamic opposition was. And the Afghan war itself was strikingly different from what the special forces were teaching.

Mujahideen Hunters

A truly tragic story happened at the end of April 1985 in the Kunar province with the Asadabad Special Forces battalion arriving from Minsk. Probably because they were barely familiar with the new enemy, among the military personnel of the battalion there were reigning sentiment towards the Mujahideen. Both the commanders and their subordinates had clearly exaggerated ideas about their own forces and underestimated the combat capabilities of the enemy. At that time, strong, well-armed and trained numerous units of Islamic partisans functioned in Kunar. They reigned supreme throughout the province except for a few settlements. The small garrison of Soviet and Afghan troops in Assadabad was in fact under constant siege. The enemy acted boldly and skillfully, and the proximity of Pakistan gave him confidence that he would always be supported. Several times the Mujahideen managed to inflict tangible damage to the Soviet and Afghan government forces when they conducted operations in the mountains.

The warnings of motorized infantrymen who had long been active in the area were heard out by the battalion’s leadership with a certain degree of skepticism. The battalion was preparing for its first independent operation, and, apparently, the battalion commander considered that the special forces were not fit to be guided by the instructions of "some kind of infantry."

The beginning of the operation did not foresee a tragedy. A cool April night, a little dawn, a rapid rush of one of the battalion’s mouths into the depths of the Maravani gorge and several mojaheds, cowardly fleeing from the Soviet “Rangers” ... Both the company and the battalion commander in charge of the KP operation bought this tested reception and allowed themselves into the trap to the border with Pakistan, where an ambush was already waiting for them.

Launching special forces deeper into the gorge, Islamic partisans hit from several sides, showered the soldiers, who were excited by the prosecution, with bullets and grenades from RPGs. Then they cut off the group of people in 30 from the main forces, surrounded it, and forced the rest to retreat from the gorge. Instead of immediately calling in aircraft, artillery fire, inquiring about the help of motorized infantry units standing nearby, the battalion commander decided to do on his own and “not to take the rubbish out of the hut” for public viewing. After all, the first operation under his leadership.

Time has been lost. Surrounded resist to the last. Some of them rushed to the breakthrough, others took up defense in a dilapidated structure. They repulsed not for long. Mujahideen dragged recoilless guns and multi-rocket launchers. From the nearest opposition camps located in Pakistan, reinforcements arrived to them. A few hours passed, and the resistance was broken. Almost all of those who got into the ring were killed, and their corpses, stripped naked, were betrayed by mockery and mockery. Towards evening, the Afghans, having built up a chain, carefully combed the gorge, finishing off the wounded Special Forces troops.

The next morning, a warrant officer crawled out to the Soviet posts with a lot of bullet wounds, and then a soldier of the same company came out. They were the only ones who survived the Maravari massacre. In order to pull corpses from the battlefield and send them to the Union, the operation had to be carried out by two brigades.

After this defeat, the personnel were pretty demoralized, and it took a lot of time for the special forces to begin fighting again. Now they were preparing for them, thoroughly studying the terrain, the situation and tactics of the Mujahideen. Nobody counted on an easy victory. The battalion commander was removed, and the officers of the battalion were diluted by people from other parts of the special mission who had combat experience. Later, the Asadabad battalion fully paid off the Mujahideen for its defeat in the first operation.

In the process of adaptation to the new conditions, the special characteristics of the special forces were changing. For the first time in the years of the Afghan war, special forces were given helicopter units on a permanent basis. For example, the rare operation of the Lashkargah battalion did without interaction with the 205 th helicopter squadron. On helicopters, the special forces flew over large areas of the border area, inspecting the caravans, flew them to the landing areas. Helicopter fire support securely covered him in battle. The attack on the enemy in its classical sense during the war in Afghanistan was an unusual phenomenon. If the Soviet troops went to the frontal attacks on the machine guns of the enemy, as was the case during the Great Patriotic War, our losses in Afghanistan would not be fifteen thousand dead, but a much larger number. As a rule, no one went on the attack. The only exception was special forces.

Its interaction with helicopter pilots reached such an extent that it allowed even in open areas to attack the positions of the Mujahideen. It happened as follows: the helicopter went to the target and opened fire on it from all machine guns, cannons and cartridges with NURSs. The nerves of the Mujahideen, who had previously shot from a large-caliber machine gun and felt invincible, could not stand it. Mujahideen hurried to hide from death in shelters. At this point, the special forces made a rush, approaching the goal. Then they lay down when the helicopter, coming out of a dive, went to a U-turn to return to the enemy’s machine-gun position. Having made several perebezhek. Special Forces soldiers threw grenades into the calculation of the machine gun, if he did not have time to run away, throwing down a weapon, or was not destroyed by helicopter gunners.

Having received helicopters at their disposal, the special forces were now turning things that they couldn’t even think of before. In the summer and autumn of 1986, during overflights of Baluchistan *, “turntables” with special forces aboard, using relatively flat terrain and disguised behind low hills, flew 15 – 20 km to Pakistan and then went over caravan paths towards Afghanistan . Of course, the pilots risked, but the calculation was accurate - in those few minutes that they were above a foreign territory, the Pakistanis would not have time to shoot down their air defense forces. In the Pakistani land, the Mujahideen walked blithely - without masking, during the day. Hearing the noise of helicopter engines, they did not hide, taking Soviet helicopters for Pakistani. A second later, a barrage of fire fell on them.

Changed for the better and the pattern of completing parts of special forces. As a rule, almost all of the officers who arrived in Afghanistan were graduates of the Ryazan Airborne School, reconnaissance departments, and amphibious companies of combined arms, engineering, and political schools. Some senior officers were experienced in fighting in Ethiopia, Angola and the Middle East.

Before shipment, the soldiers and sergeants underwent a special training course at the training center in Chirchik in Uzbekistan, since the climatic conditions and terrain of this region were similar to those in Afghanistan. In the special forces unit, they tried to select those who were seriously involved in sports in the civilian world. Especially willingly took arresters in judo, boxing, wrestling.

The training in Chirchik even included such a specific element as practicing movements of karez ** and conducting combat operations in them. The lack of karezes in the training center was more than compensated for by the terribly neglected urban sewers. In its underground labyrinths, special forces for hours climbed in gas masks. After a three-month drill, the recruits were sent to Afghanistan and there in the first six months they completed their practical training directly in the battalions, became real hunters of the Mujahideen.

* Baluchistan - a region in southern Afghanistan
** Kyariz - underground water tunnel used for irrigation of fields. Kerizas can reach hundreds of meters underground.

In addition, short-term retraining courses for officers were opened at the Chirchik training center. For one month, before sending "beyond the river", special exercises were conducted with special forces officers. They included the driving of armored vehicles, the firing of guns and machine guns mounted on it, the mining of the terrain and objects. Lectures were given on the tactics of the Mujahideen actions and methods of the anti-partisan struggle, on the general military-political situation in Afghanistan. The courses had a rich collection of captured mines and mine bombs, which served as teaching aids in mine clearance classes.

The effectiveness of the special forces was largely due to the degree of freedom of the commanders of the units when planning combat operations. In the motorized rifle and airborne units, fighting was planned at headquarters, the decision was made by the unit commander and asserted at the army headquarters. Then it went down to the same part, and the units began to act according to its points. Therefore, very often, from the moment intelligence information was received until the units entered the operation, so much time passed that the situation changed completely.

In spetsnaz, almost all decisions were made by a company or battalion commander on the basis of intelligence. The battalion commander claimed the decision of the company commander for a combat operation, and the next night the groups went to hunt for caravans. There were cases when commanders took people to the operation and without preliminary data. The special forces officers themselves claimed that it was often possible to observe the next scene. In company office, languishing from heat and longing, company and his deputy at random with closed eyes throw sharpened feathers into the map of the region covered by their area of ​​responsibility. Where the feather will stick, there will go a company there at night. Oddly enough, often in such a randomly chosen area, special forces gave a good result, returning to the base with trophies and prisoners.

There is a joke in such stories, but in general they are close to the truth. Experienced group commanders who fought in Afghanistan for the second year knew some areas of their area of ​​responsibility in such detail that they calmly did without a map during the operation. Based on their experience, they, even without having operational information about the enemy, were well aware of which paths and time to expect to move caravans, where the Mujahideen should be wary. One of the special forces officers said jokingly: “I could well earn a million from the spirits. I would go to them as conductors, and all things. " Some groups were unofficially assigned certain areas of the territory to which they were constantly hunting. Sometimes even the soldiers knew the terrain, that is, its relief, trails, wells and villages, not worse than the indigenous people.

The actions of special forces not following a pattern have always put the Mujahideen in a dead end. Ranger units were characterized by independence in decisions, freedom in choosing a maneuver, and initiative. Believing in their success, the special forces nevertheless took into account the possibility of failure. In war, anything happens. Therefore, before going to the operation, the places of gathering were determined, the probable routes of movement of the groups in case all the radio stations available in the group break down at once.

Usually, planning of large-scale operations by the headquarters of the 40 Army was carried out in cooperation with the General Staff of the Afghan Army through the staff of advisers. Often secret information about the upcoming operation straight from the Afghan headquarters fell into the hands of the Mujahideen. For example, during a landing operation in the Black Mountains region near Jalalabad in September 1984, in one of the captured enemy fortifications, a letter was found among the trophy documents with exact information about the number of helicopters and airplanes involved in the operation, timing and location. The operation was being prepared jointly with the Afghan government forces, and the informers of the Mujahideen among the senior officers of these troops worked without interruption. The situation was similar in May 1982 during the operation in Panjshir. Already during the battles, when the first prisoners were questioned, it became clear that Islamic partisans had learned about the exact time and place of the helicopter landing in the week before the operation began.

The special forces practically never acted together with the Afghan government forces. Therefore, their incompetence in the activities of the "Rangers" in no small measure contributed to the success of the special forces in the anti-partisan struggle. The special forces did the exception for the Afghan State Security Service, with which he had quite close ties. The agents of the headquarters in the field — the so-called “gunners” —and the most trusted personnel of this service were involved in the operation. Sometimes small groups from the KhAD operational battalions went with special forces. But before the operation, they were kept for several days on the basis of special forces, making it impossible to contact the Mujahideen if they wanted to. Moreover, having information about the area of ​​the forthcoming hostilities, the Afghans were completely unaware of the special forces ’route to the target, the number of participants in the operation, the means of support. Thus, the special forces insured against any accident, which could lead to failure.

In addition to the intelligence supplied by Khad, the special forces used information from the GRU residency, whose employees operated in each Afghan province. The most accurate information was given by the HAD. During the operations carried out by the special forces, it was confirmed on 60 - 70%.

The special forces themselves also had sufficiently broad capabilities for conducting reconnaissance. He collected a considerable amount of information himself by studying the captured documents, interrogating the captured Mujahideen, radio interception data and aerial photography. Without exception, the intelligence agencies of various agencies that sometimes compete with each other tried to transfer the collected information first of all to the special forces, which was the strike force of the “limited contingent”. If, thanks to the data received, he managed to defeat the Mujahideen, or, as it was said in Afghanistan, “give results”, then the staff of the department that provided the information could count on a reward.

The adaptation period, which took place for the special forces with blood and sweat, laid the foundation for successful combat operations in the future. Having passed it, the special forces went on the warpath to win.
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  1. albai
    albai 6 December 2013 08: 20
    The entire experience of the operations of special forces in Afghanistan did not become a reference book in military schools, with the exception of courses in Chirchik. For all the time of training at the infantry school, they gave us only the basics of conducting combined arms combat and only according to the regulations of the times of the Second World War, there was nothing new from the experience of military operations in Afghanistan. Perhaps that is why all replacement officers were trained for 3 months in BROS battalion reserve officers, in Kushka. And then we would have fought there. Your hill, our hill! Damn, the inertness of the military’s thinking has always been a household word. And how many lives of fighters would be saved! As I see it, and now the same state of affairs. I remember there was a meeting of all the major ranks, including the head schools in Kabul in the year 84-85x, arriving from there, our stated, the experience of waging war in Afghanistan shows that marching training leaves much to be desired, and it started - every exit to the training center was on foot, and go 50km, but nothing dragged in, that’s kind of everything from the Afghan.
    1. Timeout
      Timeout 6 December 2013 12: 28
      Yes, the experience of actions remained with the officers ... In my memory, only 1 combat will be repeated, a combat officer from the 22nd brigade got to the academy and then to the General Staff. Nobody just had to pass on the experience. Most simply hung in local conflicts (Karabakh, Abkhazia, Ingushetia). Someone died, and someone just was commissioned or retired. By 1995, there were simply no carriers of experience left.
      1. razgibatel
        razgibatel 7 December 2013 17: 50
        We were taught at the school (in front of Afghanistan) and 21-year courses (lieutenants-crap to go into the army), and normal officers (I also had a commissary from Afghanistan). Until we were trained and trained, the war ended. Then the 90s. how they entered Grozny. I watched on TV and oh ... fell away from these commanders. There is an order, but where is their training? Where is the knowledge of battle tactics in the village?
  2. Ols76
    Ols76 6 December 2013 08: 50
    Interesting article +
  3. svskor80
    svskor80 6 December 2013 08: 57
    Well, judging by the first Chechen campaign, the experience of the war in Afghanistan was left only to those who fought there.
  4. Veter
    Veter 6 December 2013 10: 03
    Frequent mention of the word "ranger" hurts the ear and the eye. And so the article is excellent. +
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. Timeout
        Timeout 6 December 2013 12: 08
        There are many inaccuracies in the article, especially the tactics of the actions of groups, but the author is excusable, he diligently studied the material. All the same, many specific details for a long time no one will know.
        During my service there were also such cases, a repost of my own comment:
        On the night of November 24, 1987, an ambush group of 18 people of the 3rd company of the 173rd Specialized Separate Detachment (22 OBRSN) of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense took the battle near the village of Kobai, and after a while a cover group joined them. Destroying more than 5 spirits during a 150-hour battle. The company lost 9 people killed and 11 wounded. And there are dozens of such examples ...

        And with my main guys ran into because of the disinformation that was given to our intelligence department by the Khadovtsy. And this happened right up to the conclusion ... And the guys from the 5th battalion we were given as an example in the training. They rest in peace ...
    2. ed65b
      ed65b 6 December 2013 12: 36
      Quote: Veter
      Frequent mention of the word "ranger" hurts the ear and the eye. And so the article is excellent. +

      Islamic partisans too.
      1. ruslan207
        ruslan207 6 December 2013 18: 46
        Also you say these savages the whole world helped the United States, China, Pakistan Europe without this support these partisans would be blown away in a couple of years
      2. ruslan207
        ruslan207 6 December 2013 18: 46
        Also you say these savages the whole world helped the United States, China, Pakistan Europe without this support these partisans would be blown away in a couple of years
      3. Vova Vartanov
        Vova Vartanov 8 December 2013 17: 38
        The spetsnaz throughout the Union called themselves "Rangers". What is the reason for this - admiration for the West, corporatism with the fighters of even the opposite camp, or a simple explanation by the "sonority" of this word, I don't even know how I didn't think about it then!
  5. -Dmitry-
    -Dmitry- 6 December 2013 11: 29
    Well, judging by the first Chechen campaign, the experience of the war in Afghanistan was left only to those who fought there.

    Grachev seems to have fought there, but something was somehow not visible ...
    1. malikszh
      malikszh 6 December 2013 12: 00
      he is a minister of defense and not a soldier
    2. George
      George 6 December 2013 20: 49
      Quote: -Dmitry-
      Grachev seems to have fought there, but something was somehow not visible ...

      In my opinion, you can clearly see what happens when a person becomes a traitor for the sake of a political career.
      By the way, the swan also fought there. I read the book of one paratrooper officer, he spoke very enthusiastically of both of them, what would he say now.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. aviamed90
        aviamed90 7 December 2013 17: 56
        P. Grachev ball there as the deputy commander of the traffic police and the commander of the traffic police, and in the second "walk" - the commander of the airborne division.

        But his military merits cannot be compared with the "merits" later.
  6. malikszh
    malikszh 6 December 2013 11: 59
    one of the first special forces was a Muslim battalion before crossing the border with the SA they already worked there
    1. razgibatel
      razgibatel 7 December 2013 18: 29
      Salam. My older brother was there when the GRU went.
  7. ed65b
    ed65b 6 December 2013 12: 38
    many Tajiks speak Pashto in this the author is not right. article not minus but not plus. A gray article.
    1. pawel57
      pawel57 7 December 2013 00: 35
      Not everyone understands. Tipo for us is sub-Ukrainian.
    2. ulugbek
      ulugbek 7 December 2013 14: 11
      Not a single word Tajiks will understand. Pashtun is a completely different language. belay
  8. Penek
    Penek 6 December 2013 13: 27
    I don’t know the details, I did not serve in the Special Forces, but the tragedy in Maravary occurred during one of the first training exits. "- may the veterans forgive me.
    We are leading a convoy to Jalalobad b-na from Belarus (sorry, I can be mistaken), NSh takes AKMS and shoots the overtaking Toyota without any reason. To the question "why the heck, because you live here and fuck" - the answer is "You cho, will you teach me to fight? ".
    War is not only a shootout, but also the art of local compromises.
    1. Zymran
      Zymran 6 December 2013 14: 42
      Quote: Penek
      We are leading a convoy to Jalalobad b-na from Belarus (sorry, I can be mistaken), NSh takes AKMS and shoots the overtaking Toyota without any reason. To the question "why the heck, because you live here and fuck" - the answer is "You cho, will you teach me to fight? ".

      They say that very many people completely broke the tower, which then had a very negative effect on the attitude of the local population.
      1. Egor.nic
        Egor.nic 6 December 2013 15: 06
        It’s not worth talking for many. It’s better to be silent when you don’t know the essence.
        1. Zymran
          Zymran 6 December 2013 15: 24
          Quote: Egor.nic
          It’s not worth talking for many. It’s better to be silent when you don’t know the essence.

          Did you serve there? If not, then your opinion is of little interest to me, and I turned to Penek.
    2. pawel57
      pawel57 7 December 2013 00: 41
      Before replacing in Herat, they went 4 times to the same place. The first time a young spirit (without arms, such a hooligan one jumped out at me about 30 meters away. I was with the fighters at the crash of an Islamic school. I didn’t call out and threatened with an assault rifle. Bacha briskly left. 4 times a day brought a company, never a perfume They shot. Maybe by chance?
  9. Kolyan 2
    Kolyan 2 6 December 2013 16: 12
    Quote: albai
    The entire experience of the operations of special forces in Afghanistan did not become a reference book in military schools, with the exception of courses in Chirchik. For all the time of training at the infantry school, they gave us only the basics of conducting combined arms combat and only according to the regulations of the times of the Second World War, there was nothing new from the experience of military operations in Afghanistan. Perhaps that is why all replacement officers were trained for 3 months in BROS battalion reserve officers, in Kushka. And then we would have fought there. Your hill, our hill! Damn, the inertness of the military’s thinking has always been a household word. And how many lives of fighters would be saved! As I see it, and now the same state of affairs. I remember there was a meeting of all the major ranks, including the head schools in Kabul in the year 84-85x, arriving from there, our stated, the experience of waging war in Afghanistan shows that marching training leaves much to be desired, and it started - every exit to the training center was on foot, and go 50km, but nothing dragged in, that’s kind of everything from the Afghan.

    From Dushanbe to the Aini training ground 37km. The weather who was there know. Always on foot but early. the headquarters was an Afghan, there was an opportunity to go with us and talked a lot about how to fight, maybe thanks to him I'm still alive.
  10. Ustas77
    Ustas77 6 December 2013 16: 35
    Quote: Alex 241
    "Rezanulo" description of the death of the 1st company of the 334th OoSpN (5th battalion) of the 15th ObrSpN GRU General Staff! Here's how it really happened: The death of the Maravara company - an episode of the Afghan war (1979 - 1989), during which on April 21, 1985 in the Maravar Gorge in the Kunar province (Afghanistan), the 1st company of the Soviet special forces under the command of Captain N. Tsebruk. The company made an exit to the Sangam village (ambush and search operations), located at the beginning of the Maravarsky gorge, 10 km. from the border with Pakistan. There was no enemy in the village, but dushmans were noticed in the depths of the gorge. During the pursuit, the company was drawn into the gorge and was ambushed.

    Eternal memory to them

    For a long time, help to the four hundred Dushmans blocked in the gorge, the company of Soviet special forces could not break through.

    The ammunition of the defenders quickly ended, the soldiers fought off with grenades.

    Preferring death to captivity and bullying, special forces fighters blew themselves up with grenades, seven fighters, gathered together, blew themselves up with an assault grenade made from an OZM-72 mine.

    According to the recollections of eyewitnesses to the battle and units that evacuated the fallen, seriously wounded soldiers before death, they brutally tortured: they had ripped open their stomachs, their eyes were gouged out, they were burned with fire, machine guns and stones crushed the bones of their legs and arms.

    In a fierce battle, 31 special forces soldiers heroically died. No one surrendered in captivity. Http: // P = 5177
  11. Severok
    Severok 6 December 2013 18: 55
    Thanks to the author for the excellent analysis of his information. I learned a lot of useful things for myself.
  12. Kostya pedestrian
    Kostya pedestrian 6 December 2013 20: 05
    As I understand it, the majahideen are the same peasants, only Afghani. But the Crusaders will not hunt you much, because unlike the former, the latter were seen both in the murder of women and children, as well as in sadistic inclinations for prisoners of war, and it seems that everyone in Russia has Japanese strabismus!

    I came across a monument from Freuds from Berlin in Yekaterinburg, so I just wanted to bomb fascist nits in the tank and on the Kursk Bulge.

    By the way, the signature on the monument in German:
    Berliner Bären - Geschenk des deutschen Generalkonsulats an die Stadt Jekaterinburg
    (Barents Sea?) (For geisha of Germany?) (Cowards?) (From men of tank destroyers, Japanese?)

    And if the submariners are reading, then you can go deeper and look at Vicky "bullfight", a picture of a carrida, so there our D-1 cannon is drawn, only without a muzzle, and there is a link about Marshal Ustinov.

    But it seems to me that the artist was just painting a picture at the time of assembly of the gun?

    Pies: I congratulate Yekaterinburg on a wonderful friend. Only in the mouth there are not enough sticks for breathing. And so, the spilled character of wonderful Papanov from the magnificent film Gaidai’s diamond hand.

    By the way, Internationalist wars, I heard that in Australia, around the Russians, the local Kuklus clan wanders around, could you?

    On the banner of the Guards Regiment
    There are numbers of three hundred and fifty
    And may we all be hairless for now,
    You will not find more reliable guys.
    The landing regiment is dear to us and we love,
    And we have long been accustomed to trust
    A route that for others is impassable
    And the paths where we can’t retreat.

    Guard banner in honor of our homeland
    Guys in vests carry through battles
    On the scarlet banner are two bright orders,
    This is a reward for our military work.

    At the black rocks our helicopter hovered
    Under the jets of smashing lead
    But the landing platoon again goes into the hatch
    Fight to the bitter end.

    Many thanks to Wikipedia, who raised the discarded banner of knowledge and took the trouble to educate and develop our thinking after they overthrew Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
    1. Aleksey_K
      Aleksey_K 6 December 2013 20: 24
      "As far as I understand, the Majahideen are the same peasants, only Afghan ones."

      Mujahid is a participant in jihad, literally a “fighter,” “making an effort.” Mujahid is not only a warrior, but also any Muslim whose struggle fits into the causal framework of one of the definitions of jihad.
      According to the Qur'an, every Muslim should be diligent in the establishment and defense of Islam, to spend his material resources and all his strength for this. In case of danger, it is necessary to rise to an armed struggle against the enemies of the faith. Jihad is the pinnacle of Islam, the surrender of all forces and opportunities for the spread and triumph of Islam is one of the main responsibilities of the Muslim community. During the period of the national liberation movement, the ideas of jihad can be applied to the struggle against colonialism.
      The concept of military jihad has become the main meaning for non-Muslims and has received the name "holy war." However, some Muslim authors reject this approach.
      1. Kostya pedestrian
        Kostya pedestrian 9 December 2013 04: 45
        The Mujahid is the same sucker who was thrown by the German mafia! And about the wars of jihad, just google "akbar" and you will find out that this takes its toll from the beginnings of Bangladesh. Google pictures from Bangladesh and you will see what it is.

        And as for the Afghans, I’ll say that they match Belarusians, only exceptional events will force the Belarusians to fight abroad. Protecting your home and homeland is a sacred thing for any people.

        As a Bolshevik, I spit on all these religious religions that are violent, especially educated in three nine lands. They are all not good for us, but in order to plague us like Mays heaped shells on the Kursk Bulge.

        As I considered the Arctic Ocean to be my ancestor, I still think so, so no Japanese will convince me to leave my house to follow on Venus. Not to mention the stink of Japan living 100 years at my expense. I’d better show them to God.

        So go to Jena, Germany, there is, by the way, the largest lens factory of Karl Zeiss, and look at the architecture. Of course, I'm not saying that it reminds me of the padded Kursk lying on the ground in the Barents Sea, but look at the city's coat of arms and compare it with the Greenland coat of arms.

        Ridiculously, the Church of St. Paul, decided to abandon the darkness and rise above the Ocean itself belay , claiming that the earth is flat, and immediately make of themselves aliens, such Irish green men with devils servile Russian priests. Those. continue the course of intimidating "sheep"

        And jihadists should know who invented the kamikaze, which god they serve, and where they are going. It would be better to be a man and work with the GRU than to sit on the lap of a geisha from a Japanese-German samurai 13dora.

        Here is such a "Lieben tango"

        PieS: science is the faith of the Gods, which says: when you badly wish your enemies three times as much. When well wish your guardian angels three times as much.

        For the rest, do not forget how many Russians killed the Afghans, but how many Germans. I am generally amazed why David was not among the Jews and did not stole a nuclear bomb to take revenge on German sadists?

        PieS: I wonder if someone hit Shakhnazarov, why so many Russian tanks were burned in the cinema. Did the white tiger leave the hill? You’re lying a bastard, you won’t leave us! Break through the Melbourne Docklands 380, and compare the histapo building, Berlin and the Pampin Station Saintswark Museum of Melbourne. look who actually tormented Soviet soldiers Afghans or Germans hunters to sodomy?
    2. razgibatel
      razgibatel 7 December 2013 18: 40
      There, from the Urals, Kostya Tszyu. No pasaran!
      1. Kostya pedestrian
        Kostya pedestrian 9 December 2013 05: 18
        By the way, I got into a serious alteration in Adelaide, Jupiter himself, hit me at the local spill (like a neo-yuppie), so a girl pulled me out of the Urals. So, the Urals are dear to me and close to me.
  13. George
    George 6 December 2013 20: 52
    Scout war.
    Thank you for the article, a couple more successful operations as an example, like how the "Black Storks" led by Laden were gouged.
    1. razgibatel
      razgibatel 7 December 2013 18: 57
      No brother can no longer. The current FSB, when I was the KGB, has other tasks: power and money. Although ... eh? Our Putin has oiled them (for power), but what about the money? lose. The bobble circle in nature. This is not a poker losers will not (not for everyone).
  14. Stasi
    Stasi 6 December 2013 21: 09
    The main reason for the SA’s mistakes in Afghanistan was that the SA was preparing to fight in the European theater of operations. The same can be said of special forces. But in spite of everything, we managed to adapt to the mountain war and learned to fight. The bad news is that the experience of the Afghan war was never claimed and studied after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, it was remembered in the Chechen war.
    1. razgibatel
      razgibatel 7 December 2013 19: 30
      The Afghan side is here. If you talked with Chechens and Dagestanis, you have to understand! They recognize only power. Several Ch. And D. are always written in front of each other, or to the public-reality today. (When there are no elders). Elders gave the go-ahead against Russia-the result of the whole world (the war in Chechnya). The Soviet Deputies did not reach the mountain settlements, the ideology of the USSR for them. And when I ran into them in the SA, they first arranged a battle, and then became friends before the demobilization.
  15. Zomanus
    Zomanus 8 December 2013 15: 37
    Instructive. And yes, I will join in many comments about that. what experience gained in afghanistan. Chechnya and other hot spots are not taken into account when training the current military. Everyone teaches us to fight against NATO and Europe ...
  16. Kostya pedestrian
    Kostya pedestrian 9 December 2013 05: 06
    Well, what do we steal from these green men their flying saucer so that there is nothing to fight?

    the main thing is that the Gestapo doesn’t snap, or else they’ll stick it in patsaki. Personally, I, as a fan of the 7th Guards Tank, are not afraid.

    But how many Russian, true, and good believing children have tormented and humiliated the spirit, having stolen them in Chechnya or after the Krim showdown. Finally, you need to think about who eats joy, and who is sadistic, and why in Australia there is so much that is not thank God. Either in Tasmania the lamb of God will commit suicide gangbang, then the whole village, in Roman, will be lowered into cement, then in Lutfafen, skyscrapers in New York will be brought down - these German aces love to attack from the sun!

    So I am greedy for awards, and I have loved trophies since childhood, and after the movie Predators, I also want to take everything from these aliens so that our women are not stolen and not infected.
  17. Kostya pedestrian
    Kostya pedestrian 19 December 2013 05: 32
    I have always argued that the nationalist separatist and other pedera "SS" -ic organizations in Australia were in the throes of terrorism, including on New York (USA) with the Pentagon.

    To assert, of course, direct evidence is required, which can be obtained by the official authorities, but I only collect indirect, so to speak, in Sherlockholms - in Brest! Evidence that may interest only decent rangers who don’t like when their plots cut down visiting eccentrics on the “M”

    But the news that, yesterday, 19, mines from the Great Patriotic War blew up in Gomel, this is too big a blunder even to such a wellness as the local Gozbels ozy, this already indirectly suggests that state Ragozin himself, a great monarchist, should declare war suck the secret to the local fascists from Tula. By the way, the Thule-Ananerbe is easy to find in Melbourne: how did you get out of Melbourne the international airport “Tule Marin” (not to be confused with craig marinoami - they are pickling people in barrels in the SA (according to the Pentagon class), and here, in Melbourne, selected SS (by Nyklass).

    So how do you leave Tulemarin to the (Ge) ring road then right to the center to the local AXA exchange (Ananerbe).
    Where is the point? The last GAZmyas on the stock exchange is called STO, and so, that they showed Russian blue blood here, which can also serve as indirect evidence that the citizens of Shambhala (if we consider the abwehr flag official) took part in the murder of the family of Russian Tsar Nikolai 2. It’s enough to see Monument and image of Veles.

    Oh, by the way, here I have a white-white wooden house opposite De-y-li, so when the sun is already in the west, the exhaust pipes from the toilet and bathroom cast a shadow (!!!!! NSA !!!!) on the roof , and they nicely advertise an ambulance, not an UAZ, but a Volkswagen, well, the one that showed off in the pictures after the bombing of the Minsk metro.

    By the way, local terrorists are very rich, and in addition to money, they also have an expanded distribution network around the world.
    So the local belles, the patron saint of cattle, jawed down his mouth on our sacred Bor, Dubrava and Birch grove!

    And you, majahideen, majahideen! The Madjahideen, at last, slipped an alkayda instead of the treasure and wealth of Australia, as well as our wars that did their duty, slipped poverty, contempt, and PBB in the class of my district of the Masonic church under No300, also a "game for survival" By the way, I would have advertised Difficult the target of the movie is with Van Dam, but it’s a pity for blacks, because if you read the patch of the name of the black man, you might think that he is a Catholic priest who came to teach the boys true love. Yes, I thought the Negroes as a boxer. The gladiator from the movie is my friends, but they are cool in their raps, and they all suck puppets in bestial way. Otherwise, such a stab in the back would have cut through.

    But we will not let down our sacred Bor Russian Russians, and we will break off the regicide, and at the same time, I heard that countless treasures were stolen in Russia and transported to the UK, and it’s great! Here it seems to me that they were transported here.

    How? Let’s gather a squad, as Prince Vladimir of Novgorod once, already the Tsar of the city has reached it!