First of all, this is another “resettlement of peoples”, which has now taken the form of mass migrations of the population. The consequence of this phenomenon is the “reformatting” of civilization cultures. Misunderstanding and, moreover, the neglect of this factor on the part of the authorities is fraught with the formation of significant, often well-organized and even armed groups of the population that are openly hostile to this state in the environment of non-adapted migrants.
Second, the widespread use of purely military and dual-use technologies throughout the world, as a result of which the official armed forces lose their monopoly on the means of suppressing riots and neutralizing "those who are dissatisfied with the ruling regime." The differences in the equipment of the rioters, criminals and military personnel are erased. Already created the conditions for the appearance weapons mass destruction not only in rogue states, but also in illegal anti-government forces. Terrorism in its various manifestations is becoming commonplace as a method of armed struggle against the military machinery of the legitimate authorities.
Third, the functions and powers of formal governments in individual states take on “imaginary” forms, resulting in an increased likelihood of state control passing into the hands of “illegitimate” groups. Against this background, in the United States, in the so-called community of “reform advocates”, a discussion ensued regarding the future development of the national armed forces and the disclosure of the causes that impel or impede its implementation.
LOTS OF MONEY - NOT PANATSIA
First of all, the thesis that, ostensibly, the greater the defense budget, the more powerful the armed forces are questioned. If there was a direct link between the “cost” of the state’s military machine and its ability to fulfill its intended role, in particular, American authority on military construction, Winslow Wheeler, argues, France and Great Britain should have broken Germany back in the 1940 year, and the US “deal ”With Vietnam in the middle of the 60s of the last century and quickly“ appease ”Iraq and Afghanistan in the beginning of the 2000s. These arguments are directly related to weapons and military equipment (IWT). The most striking example is the Soviet tank of the Second World War T-34, much more constructively simple and cheap than the expensive German Panthers and Tigers, which in the end turned out to be "the loser". Thus, a chain of conclusions emerges: the high price of a weapon can mean its inefficiency - difficulty in manufacturing and control, as well as a small amount in service with the army; their small quantity in service is fraught with futility of use; High individual indicators (TTH) of individual types of weapons do not solve the problem as a whole.
The desire to place and out of place to name individual cases of the successful application of new types of weapons and military equipment in conflicts of recent years as the “visible embodiment of the revolution in military affairs” is clearly premature. The episodes of defeat of Iraqi facilities by American precision weapons repeatedly demonstrated in electronic media during the Gulf wars in 1991 and even in 2003 were, in fact, very rare. On average, according to statistics, it took up to several tons of weapons to destroy one bridge, and “striking blows” on the enemy’s armored vehicles from the air were generally isolated cases.
The so-called unified system of sensors, computers and communication devices, partially embedded in US units and units in the 2003 war, thanks to which the enemy’s targets had to be opened at long distances and hit with the 100-percent probability, in reality did not justify the hopes placed on it. Huge arrays of information simply “overloaded” commanders into the field, and, moreover, acted with a delay. Intelligence about the deployment and actions of Iraqis, transmitted by "generals and colonels sitting in headquarters in Qatar or Tampa (Florida), were simply ignored by many commanders" as only "littering messages from their own lower-level intelligence agencies."
It is noteworthy that, as noted by “supporters of reforms,” the most advanced experts warned about such things at the beginning of the 80s. So, reference is made to the study of Jeffrey Barlow, published in 1981 year and received a wide resonance at that time, which unequivocally emphasized the "inevitable failure in the future with attempts to" control "the battle through a comprehensive network of communications from higher-level staffs to lower-level commanders immersed in real , rapidly changing situation on the battlefield. "
OBSERVE THE BALANCE OF “OPTIMIZATION” OF MANAGEMENT BODIES
At the beginning of the 90s of the last century, the question of the “optimization” of controls, which, as it later turned out, was not decided in the most successful way, became acute. Thus, some American initiators of the “reforms” believe that the main leitmotif in various kinds of reorganizations was the practice of centralizing the management of “everything and everyone”, that is, giving more powers to the hands of one person or body. In fact, it ignored, or, at best, limited the work of mechanisms that could bring real improvements. The system of checks and “balance of interests”, which directly and positively influences the analysis of proposals coming from various instances and people and is a manifestation of the struggle of ideas and competitiveness, was leveled to such an extent that decisions were made based only on the opinion of the “elect” or at best on the results of a survey of one, but "close to the authorities of the school." Except for subjectivism and the growth of bureaucracy, this practice led to nothing productive.
On the other hand, centralization in some cases was very useful. Thus, the “reformers” are forced to agree that the position of the official who is solely responsible for the acquisition of weapons (“Acquisition King”), introduced in the Pentagon in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986 of the year), helped streamline the distribution of contracts and troops really best samples of weapons and military equipment.
Many managers look at their organization as "something given from above and not subject to any changes," forgetting the well-known postulate of Jay Galbraith that "an organization is a continuous, flexible process during which the management task is solved." Being currently the largest and most powerful armed forces in the world, the “reformers” point out, the US military is an example of an extremely inflexible organizational structure, little adapted and even hindering the fulfillment of tasks that inevitably arise in a dynamically changing environment.
Back in 2000, General Anthony Zinni, the commander of the United Central Command of the US Armed Forces, recognized "the inadequacy of his staff carried out by subordinate formations and parts of tasks." In this regard, US Marine Corps Officer Eric Mellinger notes: "The modern headquarters is a rudiment of the industrial age, personifying a rigid hierarchy, vertical of subordination and reporting for the work done." Another analyst from the laboratory, Bella Arnaud Penzia, complains that the existing command structure in the US Armed Forces "crush" talented and enterprising officers under them, puts them under "control" and prevents the exchange of "life-giving information." The hierarchical structure of the organization, continues Pentsia, must be such that at every level any member of it has the right to say no.
The way out of this impasse is seen in the introduction of so-called matrix headquarters structures into the military control system by the type of those that are often created in the form of temporary (ad-hoc) commissions to solve any specific tasks in civilian areas of activity. US Colonel John Price, who has extensive service experience, including in the Joint Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, gives an example in this regard. During the operation to eliminate the consequences of the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, in which American soldiers took an active part, the commander of the United Southern Command of the US Army, Admiral James Stavridis formed a “matrix staff structure” for operational management of all actions of his subordinates. This structure included officers from various administrative bodies of the UCR, who jointly and promptly solved all, sometimes quite unexpectedly, problems that arose. However, to the dismay of the admiral, as other organizations and agencies, both American and international, "weighted" with their slow internal interconnections, were included in the operation, the work of the headquarters was well-established and began to falter. Stavridis to restore the "traditional" relations with these organizations and interaction had to return to the "usual" practice of staff work, which led to an increase in bureaucratic obstacles and, most importantly, significant delays in the execution of instructions.
The proposed management structure is supposed to simplify all staff procedures. The main thing is that instead of narrowly functional divisions-managements focused entirely on personnel, intelligence, logistics, the "transformed" headquarters "dissolve" each of these functions in key areas of the execution of orders. To this end, specialist performers, each in their field of responsibility, are organized into unique cells (teams) capable of independent but collective work in the course of solving a particular task. Such an approach, in the opinion of J. Price, who was mentioned, during the period of “cuts” in defense budget funds and, accordingly, inevitable staff cuts, will not only ensure high efficiency of staff work by eliminating bureaucratic procedures and associated duplication, but also reduce the number of generals - Colonel positions required to manage departments and divisions.
AN EXAMINED APPROACH TO REORGANIZATION
At the same time, the “reformers” believe that in solving issues related to the reorganization of military structures, whether they are headquarters or military formations, an approach needs to be verified and tested many times in practice. Winslow Wheeler to illustrate this thesis gives the following example. In the 90 years of the last century, the research of Colonel Douglas Macgregor “Breaking through the phalanx: a new structure of ground power of the 21st century” was very popular among the initiators of the reforms of the US military machine. The author, in particular, convincingly proved that the main compound of the US Army - the division - was adapted for conducting military operations with the Soviet army in the Eurasian expanses, and not for conflicts in various regions of the world in the post-cold war period, because it was too "heavy" for relocation over long distances and "clumsy" in a fast-paced battle with an extremely mobile opponent of the "new generation". According to McGregor, the main formation of the NE could be a more compact, more flexible formation of the brigade structure.
Future officers are taught not to be afraid of dirt.
It is noteworthy that the leadership of the US Army, the truth "without enthusiasm," took this idea, but, as it turned out, only formally. The reorganization of the main formations of the SV into the so-called brigade fighting groups began. This process, called the “modernization of the army”, led to the “wrinkling” of traditional brigades, in effect, depriving or significantly reducing in their composition the means of providing all kinds. The number of brigades has increased, but their combat power has decreased. But the number of brigade headquarters has increased, and consequently, the number of colonel’s and even general’s posts.
A significant problem that cannot be “left out of sight” during the reorganization of the national military machine, the American “reformists” point out, is the problem of training the military, and above all the officers. “Reformers” complain that both the legislative and executive branches of government, declaring their concern for the armed forces, concentrate entirely on material values, on IWT, but often forget about such important components of combat readiness in general, as the selection for service in the sun the best representatives of the population, their education and training. In other words, says Winslow Wheeler, "the emphasis is on" hardware "to the detriment of people."
But even military leaders, according to another analyst, a veteran of the American Armed Forces, Colonel Robert Killebrew, have little concern about the formation of a "new caste of commanders" adapted to the conditions of the new era. In his opinion, the current American generals, educated during the Cold War and quenched in confrontation with a formidable, but “studied to the basics” adversary, do not feel very confident when a new, far from trivial threat “arises” in front of him.
Indeed, during the Cold War period, the American military training system for military personnel developed quite intensively and reached certain heights. Thus, when confronted in 1991 in Iraq with a military machine prepared according to the patterns of the traditional Soviet school of military art, the commander of the anti-Iraq coalition, General Norman Schwarzkopf, noted not without pride that the US military had been so well trained that they put them in the place of Iraqi pilots or tankers in the Soviet models of technology and, conversely, the Iraqis - in modern American technology, the result would be the same - the defeat of the Iraqi army.
By the way, in a similar way, in 1983, he evaluated his pilots who had been trained by the American methods, the head of the Israeli Air Force headquarters, who, after another war in the Middle East, said that even if Syrian pilots were put in F-15 and F-16, and Israeli - in the Soviet "MiGs", the result of air battles would be the same - 83: 0.
Regarding the level of training of the faculty of the American military schools of the time, the editor of the Topgan Journal, James Stevenson, gave an example when instructors and aviators flying on the outdated F-5, as a rule, always came out victorious in training "fights" with the cadets who ran the most modern at that time F-14 and F-15. From these examples, American “reform advocates” conclude that a properly motivated and, most importantly, better trained soldier is more valuable for a fight than a specialist mediocre of even the most modern equipment.
MAJOR - COMMANDER'S BRAINS
Donald Vandergiff, the author of a broadly resonant study in the 90s, “The Path to Victory: The Army of America and the Humanitarian Revolution,” recommended the creation of a system of more in-depth, fundamental education for military leaders, which should replace the current system of training officers The United States, which would orient them towards the mastery of the studied subjects through "reflection and activation of the mental process" in the direction of "cognition of the features of military confrontation in the future, and not today." According to Vandergriff, the armed forces need not so much high-speed aircraft and Tankshow many fast-working brains of commanders are capable of instant decision making, which will give a gigantic advantage over the enemy on the battlefield.
In one of his works, published in the middle of 2000, Wandergriff gives recommendations on how to form the thinking of an officer who could "think soberly in conditions of combat stress and quickly make the right decisions." He says that American commanders, educated and trained in the spirit of the second generation of wars (World War I), almost always ended up as outsiders in fights on the battlefields of World War II with the Germans adapted to the demands of the third generation wars. Wandergriff calls on the American generals to carefully study the training system for officers of the 19th-century Prussian army, who fully embraced the training principles laid out by the Swiss scholar Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, the founder of the pedagogical theory and practice that has not lost its relevance. At the same time, the practice of “careful consideration by the commander of each decision, rather than an immediate response to every change of the situation without reflection” should be put at the forefront of automatism.
And finally, another problem that, in the opinion of the “reformers”, cannot but be taken into account when orienting the US military leadership to the transformation of the country's military machine is the so-called moral issues. These issues, which, as the “reformers” indicate, should be given even more attention than to the issues of military theory and practice, and even more so to equipping the armed forces of weapons and military equipment. “In war,” Napoleon said, “morality refers to the physical factor as three to one!” A better-trained and trained fighter is always defeated if he does not have a desire to fight: fear inevitably arises, and then panic arises.
Questions of morality, or, in domestic terminology, of a moral and political factor, from the point of view of American military science, extend from the bottom up, from the subdivision to the top military and political leadership of the country, to which the "supporters of reforms" also pay considerable attention. According to them, if one “descends” to the lowest level, to a unit of the armed forces, that is, to a branch (group), platoon or company, then the question arises about the formation of a “cohesive unit of the unit” or something like a “subunit hitch”. This implies the creation of a specific atmosphere in the lower collective of military personnel, contributing to the development of such bonds of mutual trust and respect between them, which make it possible to withstand stress while maintaining combat cohesion in combat conditions. Servicemen in a minimally but formally organized team, whether branch or platoon, do not have the right to show feelings of “disgust” in relation to their colleagues for one reason or another, whether it is racial, class, or other, and “unwillingness” to execute a command, and all the more show your cowardice.
In this regard, it is interesting to say one of the American experts in the field of military psychology, William Henderson: “Most of the soldiers are fighting not for money and not because they were obliged to do this, and certainly not for God, their own mother or homeland ... they fight, to win, defending his friend in the next trench. ”
Wandergriff and his associates believe that the system of education of military personnel in the XX century was based on the so-called industrial principles, when each individual in the military team was considered by the authorities as a “cog in the mechanism”, which can always be successfully replaced by another. And only in recent years, the US military leaders allegedly realized the viciousness of such an attitude to the issues of cohesion of military groups.
It is important, the mentioned expert Winslow Wheeler emphasizes, to realize the fact that the ties that unite the military teams should extend not only horizontally but also vertically, penetrating the entire military organization from top to bottom. Otherwise, a unit in which there is no confidence in the higher commander will not be able to fulfill the task set by this commander. Likewise, if the superior commander does not trust his subordinates, excessively regulates their behavior in battle, is ultimately doomed to failure. An indicator of commanding confidence in his subordinates, Wheeler continues, may not be a trivial, usually accepted in practice, order-regulated in all respects, more reminiscent of a recipe from the Cookbook, but a kind of “task order” or “order of intent”. In other words, an order of the type to take such a hill or destroy such and such formation of the enemy looks much more convincing from the point of view of the commander’s confidence in his subordinates than, for example, a detailed regulated document of the type to move such and such a distance to such a hill to such and such time, using such and such means when advancing, and such and such during an attack, having spent so many shells and rifle ammunition in either case, and reporting on the implementation at such and such a time!
What may be decisive in the course of a military action of any scale is the mutual confidence of the command and troops, based primarily on the high authority of the country's leadership and the armed forces among the military personnel. “Reformers” as negative examples, that is, the actual absence of such a “moral bond” between the country's military-political leadership and military formations of the Armed Forces, usually result in the defeat of the Americans in Vietnam at the end of 60 and early 70 of the last century as a result first of all, the “moral failure” in relations in the state leadership - the armed forces and a series of failures of the American military machine in Afghanistan and Iraq in the beginning and middle of the 2000-s due to extremely low of the authority of the leaders of the US military department, and above all of its head Donald Rumsfeld among the “masses of military personnel he despises”, as well as the head of state personally - President Bush Jr., who failed to provide a reliable “moral support” to the armed forces.
Perhaps we confine ourselves to this. However, in conclusion, it should be emphasized that the same American “supporters of reforms” in the military sphere cannot help but note the fact that the process of planning changes in the armed forces of any state is fraught with a difficultly predictable image of the international situation and, accordingly, “fitting” to its conditions and the requirements of the armed forces of the future. In this regard, it seems appropriate to cite a reflection of the above-mentioned expert Robert Killebrew, who noted that if in 1913, the US military forecasters asked what the US military would be like that in 50 years, they would say: “ At least three infantry divisions, one reinforced infantry regiment for the defense of the Panama Canal and one in the Philippines. Perhaps another hundred aircraft. Comments are superfluous!