The best fleet. Only forward?
The previous series of short stories about "the best navy"Caused a mixed reaction among visitors to topwar.ru. Many of the commentators warned the author about the inadmissibility of excessive self-confidence and "hatred" in relation to the "probable adversary", especially when it comes to such a formidable formation as the US Navy. US naval forces are not ideal weapons, they, like everyone else, suffer from carelessness and accidents in peacetime, suffer losses in zones of military conflicts, but stubbornly strive for the goal. And if they are unable to accomplish the task, they do everything to harm their opponent to the maximum.
The annual budget of 155 billion dollars in size - more than the Russian SDO provides for before the 2020 of the year - allows you to increase the number of ship crews without any restrictions and, if necessary, to rudely “fill up” the enemy with equipment. At the same time, the scientific potential of the United States (where, according to statistics, 80% of research supercomputers around the world are concentrated) implies that every combat unit with a USS index (United States Ship - “United States Ship”) should be an unsurpassed technical masterpiece. Tomahawks and Aegis, superhuman carriers, littoral warships, the world's first 4-generation PLA (SeaWolf type), Ohio missile-carrying submarines with powerful and reliable Trident 2 (151 successful launch, 4 failures) ... Facts must be respected. But for some reason, a sense of respect is increasingly replaced by a feeling of disappointment.
By the beginning of the XXI century, the American fleet was completely outdated and degraded: in some incomprehensible way, the Navy, the development of which is spent every year hundreds of billions of dollars, was left without supersonic anti-ship missiles. It is difficult to believe in this, but all the newest destroyers of the US Navy are completely deprived of the ability to carry and use anti-ship weapons!
* The possibility of firing missiles at surface targets, as well as light helicopter-based Penguins, can be safely ignored; The adoption of subsonic LRASM - a vague prospect of the future.
Despite the huge expenditures on its maintenance and development, the American fleet is still left without anti-aircraft missiles with active homing heads (such missiles have already been in service with many European and Asian countries in the form of the PAAMS marine air defense system).
And this is despite the fact that fire control systems based on the multifunctional SPY-1 and AN / SPG-62 radar for illumination of the Stenderd / ESSM semi-active SAM systems also do not shine with perfection: mechanical control in azimuth and elevation, total 1-2 simultaneously fired at an attack from one selected direction.
The Yankee ships were left without a radar with active phased arrays. But the radar with AFAR - FCS-3A, SAMPSON, EMPAR, APAR, S1850M has long been used on ships of the naval forces of Japan, Great Britain, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands ... This is without taking into account the fact that the ships of all these countries are equipped with several specialized radars for of each type of threat - in contrast to the American focus, when one radar station of the UHF AN / SPY-1 range tries to simultaneously monitor both space and anti-ship missiles. Tracking targets at the LEO works well, unlike the search for low-flying anti-ship missiles.
Americans do not have anti-aircraft systems for submarines. Despite the apparent absurdity, it is one of the most interesting and relevant naval developments. All enemies of submariners fly awkwardly and slowly: as shown by tests, the submarine, using its hydroacoustics, is able to detect the “trace” of a helicopter rotor on the surface of the water and shoot the helicopter using rockets guided through a fiber-optic cable. In 2014, the Germans plan to adopt such a system (IDAS). His interest expressed the Turkish fleet. The French and Indians are working on the subject. But what about the Americans? And the US Navy again found themselves "in the span."
Amazing story associated with the promising destroyer Zamvolt: a ship whose cost, taking into account R & D exceeded 7 billion dollars, strangely lost the sightseeing radar! The Americans had enough money to experiment with stealth technology and to develop a six-inch with a range of 150 km, but did not have enough money to install a dual-band radar DBR. As a result, the over-slayer will only be equipped with a multi-functional AN / SPY-3 station, which is not able to effectively track air targets from a long distance. As a result, the Zamvolta anti-aircraft ammunition is limited only to short / medium range missiles ESSM.
The events of the last 20 years have clearly shown that the “best fleet” is powerless against sea mines and diesel-electric submarines. The noise background of modern “dizelukh” turned out to be below the threshold of sensitivity of American means of PLO. The absence of thundering pumps and GTZA, air-independent power plants, small size and power, systems of electromagnets compensating for anomalies in the Earth’s magnetic field - the results of joint exercises with the Australian, Israeli and Dutch navies showed that such submarines could pass through any US naval anti-submarine cordons. Allied Swedes were urgently called up with their Gotland naval base. Tests confirmed all previous concerns. The Swedish boat was immediately leased for two years (2006-08). Despite an intensive study of Gotland and the development of measures to combat such submarines, the American command still considers non-nuclear submarines to be one of the most dangerous threats and are not going to turn off the DESI (diesel-electric submarine initiative) program.
If some progress has been made in the fight against non-nuclear submarines — at least, the Yankees are paying increased attention to this problem and are actively looking for countermeasures — then the mine threat issue remains open.
The US Navy suffered significant losses from enemy mines. In 1988, the frigate “Samuel B. Roberts” was damaged in the Persian Gulf (this prankster was blown up by a contact mine of the 1908 model of the year). Three years later, the Tripoli helicopter carrier (ironically, the flagship of mine-trawling forces in the region) and the cruiser Princeton (blew up on the cleared fairway and then stood alone for a long time, were blown up on Iraqi minefields. None of the US Navy ships ventured to help the dying "colleague").
It would seem that the abundance of stocks of these deadly sea traps (according to military analysts and experts, one China has about 80 thousand sea mines!), As well as the real facts of familiarity with the "horned death" should have convinced the American command of the need to create effective means countering the mine threat. But nothing like this has been done!
The fleet, which is proud of eight dozen cruisers and missile destroyers, has only ... 13 mine and mine ships!
In theory, in addition to the old sweepers like the Evenger, 4 littoral warships can be used to search for and eliminate sea mines. However, the 3000-ton LCS seems not very effective as a minesweeper. Excessively large size, the abundance of metal structures - all this makes the search for magnetic mines in a deadly game. And after possible damage, it makes the repair redundantly complex, lengthy and expensive.
Further, only two squadrons of MH-53E minesweeper helicopters (squadrons HM-14 and 15) remained in service with the US Navy. Some attempts are being made in the field of creating unmanned underwater vehicles for searching and destroying mines - with a very dubious result. The Persian Gulf 2012 exercises clearly showed that the US Navy minesweepers, supported by ships from the 34 allied countries, were able to detect only half of the specified minefields from the 11 for 24 hours. In general, the disgraceful result for the superfleet, which claims to be global hegemony, but at the same time is not able to protect itself from the most primitive means of naval warfare.
If we are talking about the "primitive means of destruction", then this is a reason to recall the attack on the American destroyer Cole in the port of Yemen in October 2000 of the year. Two Arab ragged boldly moored to the side of the destroyer on a leaky boat and powered an SVU with a power from 200 to 300 kg in TNT. The consequences of the close explosion turned out to be terrible - the shock wave and the hot products of the explosion burst through the 12-meter hole into the body, destroying all the bulkheads and mechanisms in their path. “Cole” instantly lost its combat capability, lost its course and stability - an explosion turned the left side engine room, the lighting went out, the propeller shaft was deformed and the radar grille was damaged. Began intensive flooding of the premises. The crew lost 17 people killed, 40 more injured were immediately evacuated to a hospital in Germany.
It is curious that in January of the same year the destroyer USS The Sullivans was subjected to a similar attack. However, at that time, the terrorists acquired a boat that was too full of holes - as soon as they "lay down on the combat course," their fragile canoe filled with water and sank, bringing hapless kamikazes to the bottom.
The Yankees are well aware of the danger of terrorist attacks using fishing boats and feljugs - more recently, all destroyers are equipped with remote-controlled Xmash mm Bushmasters; an order was given to shoot at anyone who tried to get close to the board of the American ship (the Yankees had already managed to “dump” by mistake several Egyptian fishermen and a pleasure boat from the United Arab Emirates).
But what is the danger of such “asymmetric threats”? After all, next time it will not be a boat, but some other "focus" - for example, mortar shelling of a ship standing in the harbor (a famous case is rocket shelling of the Jordanian port of Aqaba at a time when there were ships of the US Navy, 2005). . Or the attack of underwater "saboteurs" (even at the most primitive level, using civilian public equipment and impromptu). As practice shows, to deal with such flexible threats in the absence of a clear front line is impossible. The terrorists will certainly respond to every American cunning with another “stupidity”.
The Yankees are lucky that no one is seriously fighting with them - all incidents are limited to minor incursions of Islamist groups and the entertainment of the Arab punks. Otherwise the losses would be huge. Every port in the Middle East would turn into a scaffold for American sailors.
In unison with the asymmetrical threats of the “War on Global Terrorism” there is a problem of low ship security - a situation where a boat worth $ 300 disables a ship worth 1,5 billion, sounds at least suspicious. No “active” means of defense or half measures in the form of local booking by Kevlar will fix this problem - only the armor belt of 10 thickness and more than centimeters of steel will help minimize the consequences of the explosion.
Low security is a problem of all, without exception, modern ships built according to the standards of the second half of the 20th century. The US Navy is no exception. The Yankees have riveted 62 disposable “pelvis” and are very proud of the result. "Cole" showed that its type destroyers completely lose their combat capability from a surface explosion with a capacity of 200-300 kg of TNT - any cruiser of the Second World War would only startled by a blow and looked at the bent armor-plates in surprise at the epicenter of the explosion. Peripheral armored UVP destroyer "Zamvolt", performing the role of a kind of "armor", also can not be considered an adequate means of protection.
Nevertheless, the risk of losing the 7 billionth ship from a single hit by a small-sized RPC should certainly attract the attention of designers to this problem.
Finale
The two-part story about the misadventures of American sailors was intended not just to laugh at the failures of the “best fleet in the world.” These facts are an occasion to reflect on the role of the navy in the 21st century and its optimal appearance in the conditions of the modern geopolitical situation.
The main feature of the US Navy is that no one is afraid of them. Despite the huge number of ships and brilliant (often the best in the world) training, no one pays attention to the American squadrons moving on the horizon. Populist notions “projection of force” or “control of sea communications” lose all meaning after becoming acquainted with real historical facts. Those countries who should have been horrified by the invincible AUG and amphibious groups of the US Navy, do not react to the presence of starship-flagged ships on their banks, continuing to commit unfriendly acts towards America.
North Korea, without batting an eye, boarded the American reconnaissance ship in neutral waters, and a year later the reconnaissance ship EC-121 of the United States Naval Forces shot down over the Sea of Japan.
For several years, Iran bombarded tankers and mined the neutral waters of the Persian Gulf, without hesitating the presence of American warships. In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini’s supporters seized the US Embassy in Tehran and held the day 444 captive for American diplomats. No demonstration of force with the help of the AUG had any effect there (as was the attempt to force the release of hostages by special forces "Delta").
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait without even looking in the direction of the US Navy's carrier strike groups.
Colonel Gaddafi 40 has been a thorn in the eye of the American administration for years: even after Operation Fire on the Prairie, he continued to stubbornly bend his line and really got excited only after the collapse of the USSR.
The reason for this self-confidence is known. All these political, military and religious figures understood very well that a real war would only begin when caravans of American transports were pulled into the ports of neighboring states tanks and weapons. And all airbases and airports in the region will buzz from hundreds (thousands) of US and NATO countries flying from all over the world. Without all this, the defile of American ships was perceived as a cheap joke.
The power of the modern fleet is primarily determined not by the number of ships, but by the political readiness to use this force - with close cooperation with other types of armed forces. Without all this, the fleet turns into a useless pantomime theater. This is well demonstrated by the modern US Navy. A monstrously expensive, inefficient mechanism, which by its existence causes more damage to the economy of its own country than to all geopolitical opponents of the United States.
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