The INF Treaty is the long-standing pain of our defense policy. And it is precisely the defense, because I would like to look at someone who dares to assert that Russia's military-political views have at least something of an aggressive connotation. At the same time, hardly anyone would dare today to deny that the military-political actions of the United States are becoming more and more aggressive. And taking into account this collision, the problem of the INF, or more precisely, the INF, is actually not a problem for Russia. We need effective RSD with a continental range, and a point.
Alas, this obvious truth is still not obvious to everyone, so again and again it is necessary to prove it. Any idea and initiative in the military sphere and, as a result, any kind and class of the Armed Forces (and at a lower level, any weapon system) should be evaluated in Russia primarily from the standpoint of their ability to exclude the possibility of external aggression, that is, to strengthen the military political stability.
If a weapon system effectively reduces the likelihood of aggression and enhances stability (or provides quick recovery of stability if it is broken), such a system is needed. Otherwise, you can do without it.
HISTORY IN COMPOSITIONAL TILTING
In this respect, what can and should be said about those weapons systems that were eliminated by the Soviet Union under the INF Treaty? I put to brackets the issue of shorter-range missiles as secondary and I will only speak about the Pioneer medium-range complex, which, in fact, is one and can be the subject of correct consideration.
The “Pioneer” medium (continental) range missile, when built, was, under the conditions of the Soviet Union, a rather redundant system, and the pretext for its development - basing US medium-range missiles in Europe - was unconvincing. Regardless of the specific flight time of the Pershing-2 RSD, they, like American cruise missiles of any base, did not have a significant impact on the nuclear stability regime. The presence in the USSR of many hundreds of ICBMs with an MFR and dozens of PKK CH with hundreds of SLBMs guaranteedly excluded the threat of a first strike by the United States and, in general, a serious threat of a real exacerbation of the situation. In other words, the development and deployment of the Pioneer RSD, with powerful SNFs and conventional USSR Armed Forces, was a measure that was not very intelligible, redundant, rather undermining the security of the USSR than strengthening it.
Everything has changed in the world since in the USSR more than 500 RSD Pioneer were put on combat duty. Then they would rather disturb us, but how useful they would be now!
I propose to those who wish to imagine what the NATO policy would be in 90-s in terms of moving east, the admission of former members of the Department of Internal Affairs and former Soviet republics to NATO, if in the territory of the Russian Federation in the 90-s several hundred RSD were still deployed "Pioneer". I do not rule out that one warning of the population of potential NATO neophyte capitals that from the moment NATO joins NATO will be aimed at each capital and its environs in the Pioneers pair or three, it would be enough for this very population to think about - is it worth to join NATO?
Having today at its disposal several hundred Pioneer-type RSDs, Russia would be able to trade for the real restraint of the NATO countries not even to liquidate the Pioneers, but only to agree to reduce their number and relocate to Asia. In our system of regional deterrence, even the 200 – 300 RSM “Pioneer” would not be a trump card with which we could respond to the potential adventurism of our regional neighbors.
Russia doesn’t have real “Pioneers” now, and even the withdrawal from the INF Treaty will not automatically give them - large-scale (quite, however, feasible for the Russian Federation) efforts are needed to recreate the RSD with a range of 5000 km.
Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the RF from the treaty itself would automatically heal the European and world situation. Saying “improved”, I mean that sometimes the relaxation of tension is achieved not by gentleness, not by concessions, but by a good slap in the face - it is only important to give it resolutely.
Who shoots whom
One has to hear statements that the denunciation of the treaties does not strengthen de, but weakens the security of states. This thesis is dubious in itself. The simplest example of the opposite: the denunciation of the Brest Peace by Russia in the autumn of 1918 strengthened our security. With reference to America’s rejection of the 1972 ABM Treaty of the Year, this thesis is generally incorrect. The fact that the United States missed out on the abandonment of the PRO-72, since instead of the 100 permitted antimissile anti-missile 72 antimissiles, they plan to deploy the entire 2020 PR by the 44 year, just forgetting that the 100 PR is the upper ceiling that PRO-72 limited the missile defense infrastructure and did not allow the deployment of NMD, and after leaving the PRO-72, America can deploy as many and as many PR in any missile defense architecture, and America will do it at the right time for it. At the same time, all assurances that the US can be distinguished between strategic and non-strategic missile defense should be attributed to the dangerous epoch of illusions and euphoria of the 90's. The same "Standards-3M" - a means in the long term strategic!
Attempts to oppose the arguments of Alexander Shirokorad (“NVO” No. 24, 12.07.13), Yuri Baluyevsky, Midykhata Vildanova (“NVO” No. 25, 19.07.13) for quitting RIAC also look strange. Their reasons are not only not in different planes, but closely related, because they complement each other. Moreover, their arguments against the INF Treaty are far from being exhausted.
There is no logic in fears that if in the conditions of the USSR Pershing-2 reached the Moscow region, then with the hypothetical deployment of the United States RSD on the territory of NATO neophytes, Russia will be “shot through” to the Urals and beyond.
First, it is important for us that, in the presence of Pioneer-type continental RSDs, we will sweep the whole of Europe from the Urals. And not only Europe.
Secondly, if Russia, instead of mindless cuts in the SNF, reasonably massages them and provides them with active protection complexes, then the hypothetical US RSM will sweep through our territory, as before, only on staff maps during the exercises.
Thirdly, the official Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Bucharest and Sofia do not feel so confident that, like this, for US handouts, to make their countries hostage to US nuclear policy. And the old European members of NATO will have something to think about. Now Russia has no effective regional nuclear weapons systems capable of striking targets from its territory at a distance of up to 5000 km with a striking time of tens of minutes. This can only RSD. And the NATO countries are safe enough. Restoring our RSD will not deprive them of such security - if: a) NATO countries will not support the aggressive tendencies of the United States; b) they will force the USA to remove their nuclear weapons from Europe, which provoke Russia; c) refuse to place new US RSD in Europe.
If Europe does not directly or indirectly (through US nuclear RSD) threaten Russia, then why, one wonders, will Russia threaten Europe?
They may ask: why should we restore the RSD? Then, that our RSD in the Urals region will be an insurance continental guarantee for Russia's regional security, and no more.
AMERICA, THIRD COUNTRIES AND TALEIRAN
Likewise, it is far-fetched fears that the appearance of the RSD will allegedly provoke China. Everything is just the opposite - if we had 300 (better than 700) RSD in the Urals and Baikal region, which I would conditionally call Topolkami, then respect of China, Japan and others towards Russia would only increase. Where, where, where, and in the behavioral politeness of the East, they really appreciate only strength.
What can we say about the validity of anxiety about the possible threats to Russia from the side of RSD of third countries. There is nothing to worry about. First, Russia will keep the INF Treaty regime or not; those countries that deem it necessary for themselves will develop their own data systems. Secondly, it is incorrect to dump RSDs with a range of approximately 1000 km in one pile - they can be done by many countries, and RSDs with a range of about 5000 km - it is fundamentally more difficult to create them than RSDs with a range of 1000 km. And, thirdly, all third countries create RSD, absolutely not having in mind the threat factor of the Russian Federation as meaningful.
It is hardly possible to agree with such a grandmaster strategic analysis, when a reference to a possible US policy towards a nuclear DPRK or a sub-nuclear Iran justifies a forecast of US policy towards a nuclear Russia. Very much this is a different matter. A genuinely qualified analysis unequivocally shows that the US strategic goal is to provide such a new systemic nuclear monopoly, when it becomes possible unpunished US disarming first strike in the Russian retaliatory strike while neutralizing the extremely weakened retaliatory strike of the Russian Federation due to the multi-level massive US NMD. In the light of this unchanging paradigm of US policy toward Russia, all US military activities, including innovations in the field of strategic non-nuclear weapons and plans for a quick global strike (BSU), should be considered.
I will refer to a public statement made at the Conciliar Hearings at the St. Daniel Monastery 12 in November 1996, Lieutenant-General Nikolai Leonov, MGIMO professor, until 1991, the head of the analytical department of the KGB of the USSR: “I led intelligence activities against the US, therefore I can on its own experience, it is unambiguous to say that in the ruling circles of the United States the primary goal has always been the destruction of Russia, regardless of its structure, whether it will be monarchist, democratic or socialist. They do not need any great power in this geopolitical space. And it is driven into the public and political consciousness of the entire state. "
And not only in relation to Russia, America is pursuing a policy of provocation. Such a clever and subtle analyst, as Talleyrand, a diplomat demanded by both the Directory and Napoleon and Louis XVIII, wrote: “Europe should look at America with open eyes and not give any pretext for repression. America will turn into a tremendous force, and the moment will come when she wishes to have her say on our affairs and lay hands on them. On the day that America comes to Europe, peace and security will be driven out of it for a long time. ”
So, not Russia sees the enemy in America, but America in Russia. Russia is not destabilizing Europe and the world, but America is no longer a century. And until America really changes its foreign and military policy, only extremely irresponsible people can regard nuclear deterrence by America’s aggressiveness as meaningless.
As for the essence of the NATO policy, including in the light of the INF Treaty, everything has been clear for a long time. Now, evaluating the policy of NATO, it is sometimes said that the masks are dropped. True, however, let me say that the North Atlantic bloc has never seriously worn a mask of peace-lovingly, so hurriedly threw a sheep-skin on a wolf's policy, nothing more. Already in 1994, Richard Haass, a former employee of the US National Security Council, wrote in Foreign Policy magazine: "If problems arise again with Russia, then it is better that they appear on the borders of Russia than on the borders of Western Europe."
Frankly and essentially, without any masks. And after all, the possible “problems with Russia” meant one thing - Russia's refusal from the policy of surrendering national interests.
The question of Russia's early withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the re-creation of the Pioneer-type RSD is not a matter of “self-affirmation,” everything is much more serious. If at the intercontinental level, at the very least, we have military-technical means to ensure military-political stability, at the continental level, we do not have them now. But they can be. “Pioneers” can and should be replaced by “Topolki”. Projects on the development of some high-precision warheads to equip ICBMs or the Kyrgyz Republic are not even worth the objection. Even for the United States, such ideas are nothing more than a cunning cheating, and for Russia, with its limited number of ICBMs, it’s just an unwise chimera.
NEW - GOOD FORGOTTEN OLD
Not for the sake of self-promotion, but to illustrate that clarity did not arise yesterday, I would like to remind you that 14 years ago in HBO my article was published with the title “Pioneers” must be revived ”(No. 31, 1999, p. 4), where : “The treaty between the USSR and the USA on the elimination of ... The INFD has eliminated a whole class of our missile systems with ranges up to 5000 km. Europe was freed from the Pershing. The question seemed to be closed forever. However, the oblivion of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the NATO policy and the “Yugoslav syndrome” put on the agenda the idea of returning to our defense arsenal of medium-range continental nuclear missiles. After all, the logic of NATO's actions leads in the future to the fact that the nuclear charges of the West may be in the same place where Soviet military contingents once were stationed. Who, if not Russia, will target these charges? ”
At the same time, the following was said: “Increasing regional instability, uncertainty of prospects here, as well as US and NATO policies towards Russia create objective prerequisites for analyzing the promising role and significance of our continental classes in the 21st century. TNW is not a “battlefield weapon”. Like strategic nuclear weapons, it cannot be considered a means of real combat operations. Prospective tactical nuclear weapons should be a system analogue of strategic nuclear weapons with the only difference that if strategic nuclear weapons are designed to ensure military-political stability at the intercontinental level, then tactical nuclear weapons should have the same functional value at a lower continental level. If earlier tactical nuclear weapons were often viewed as a possible “battlefield weapon”, then nuclear weapons of the continental class should have solely regional deterrence of hypothetical power pressure and attacks on our national interests. This approach to TNW is justified for Russia. Moreover, the military-political functions of such TNW are best embodied in medium-range missile systems (from 1000 to 5000 km) range. ”
From what has already been said in 1999, a logical conclusion was made: “Obviously, the missile systems with a range of fire up to 5000 km, that is, medium-range ballistic missiles of the Pioneer type, respond best to the formulated requirements. The formula of the “Pioneer type” is used here only for brevity. In fact, we can talk about other variants of rocket carriers. It is important to restore in the structure of Russian nuclear warrs not so much concrete complexes as a specific firing range. ”
Earlier, Major-General Retired Vladimir Belous in the article “Tactical nuclear weapons in new geopolitical conditions”, published in the journal Nuclear Control (No. 14, 1996), expressed the correct idea: “Because of the peculiarities of the geostrategic position of Russia, Russia has a much greater military and political significance than for the United States. " He also has a good wording: “The American TNW is a war for export.”
In a systemic sense, everything is correct here: for the United States, tactical nuclear weapons are a type of nuclear weapons, in terms of their legitimate interests, redundant. That is, aggressive, pushing America to export war, being waged - which is traditional for the United States - far from their national territory.
But if so, then why is the problem of the INF Treaty becoming the focus of US-Russia bilateral relations? For the USA, their “non-strategic” nuclear weapons is an export war, but where is the export? Probably, first of all to Europe.
And if so, then the issue of the INF would have to be primarily concerned about Europe, or rather, NATO countries (although today NATO is almost the whole of Europe). In fact, the United States does not even have a deliberative, not a decisive vote in the INF problem. For the USA, any system of continental and subcontinental range is a war for export, it is a tool for provoking some countries against other countries. Is it even unclear to someone today?
ABOUT COMPARISON OF ARSHINS AND PUDS
Most experts rightly believe that the presence of effective RSD in the defense arsenal of Russia would level out the superiority of certain countries in conventional armaments, in the number of troops, etc. But the problem is objectively wider! Only new massed RSDs with a range of ~ 5000 ... 6000 km and with variant nuclear combat equipment, which allow us to deliver a warning demonstration first, and then a strike that affects the aggressor, will provide us with regional stability across the entire spectrum of possible threats. And not a possible war, but the containment of aggression or its almost instantaneous "folding" - this is a truly worthy task for the Topolkov needed by Russia.
Sometimes they write that tactical (although no, it is not “tactical” for Russia, but strategic, but at the regional level) nuclear weapons turns out to be a backbone factor in geopolitical confrontation. However, this is not entirely true. Unlike the United States and a number of other powers, Russia is involved in this confrontation, while the United States and a number of other powers produce it, which is far from the same ...
As for the expediency of negotiations on "non-strategic" nuclear weapons, they do not make much sense just because the same Russia and the United States will lead them - objectively - to talk about fundamentally different concepts for them.
For the USA, everything is determined by the “war on export” formula. For the Russian Federation - the fundamental tasks of ensuring the security of the national territory. You can not, forgive, compare arshins with poods, meters with kilograms!
Therefore, frankly, it is advisable for Russia to negotiate in the only format acceptable for us - with a view to recognizing the special significance for the Russian Federation of regional systems and the special rights of Russia to the presence of massive effective RSM in its arsenal by the United States and NATO. At the same time, such negotiations can be conducted with our great eastern neighbor - China, but in any case, the presence of hundreds of new RSM “Topolek” in the Russian Federation will not complicate our mutual relations, but will certainly heal them.
How many rosy tears of emotion have been shed for more than a decade ago — and not by the USSR or by clever people in Russia — for the coming era of “cooperation for peace” instead of the era of confrontation! In fact, the tears were crocodile. And is it not time to look this truth in the eyes - both at the global and at the regional level of ensuring the security of Russia?