Military Review

Military and political crisis of the Soviet Union 1941

49
Military and political crisis of the Soviet Union 1941



Regarding the events of the summer of 1941, there is one very common characteristic - a catastrophe, i.e. irremediable event stories. In this article we will try to figure out how justified this characteristic is for the 1941 summer of the year and whether the term “crisis” is more acceptable for explaining the events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, i.e. a turning point in history leading to a dramatic improvement or deterioration.

Germany planned its actions in the East, relying on the concentration of the main forces of the Red Army west of the line of the Western Dvina-Dnieper rivers. Accordingly, the Barbarossa plan envisaged the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of the Red Army to the Western Dvina-Dnepr line in the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine. Eight weeks were allotted for the defeat of the Soviet Union. In the middle of July, the Wehrmacht 1941 was to reach Smolensk, and in the middle of August to occupy Moscow. (1, p. 60; 2, p. 8; 7, p. 468-469) The Barbarossa plan apparently involved coordinating the actions of Germany and Japan in defeating the Soviet Union.

According to A.A. Koshkin "an important indication that the activities of the Kantokuen plan were nothing more than preparations for an attack on the USSR, was developed by 25 June by the Japanese general staff and approved by the rate schedule of completion of the preparation and conduct of the war.

Decision on mobilization - 28 June.

Publication of the directive on mobilization - 5 July.

The beginning of the transfer and concentration of troops - July 20.

The decision to start a war - 10 August.

The beginning of hostilities - August 29.

Redeploying four divisions from Japan - 5 September.

Completion of operations - mid-October.

As follows from this graph, the plan "Kantokuen" to a certain extent was similar to the German plan "Barbarossa" and also assumed a "lightning war" against the USSR ". (3, p. 159)

The Soviet Union opposed the German plan to defeat the main forces of the Red Army to the Western Dvina-Dnepr river boundary plan to defeat the Wehrmacht troops at the Western Dvina-Dnieper river boundary. This plan, due to the mistakes of the Soviet military leadership, which incorrectly assessed the direction of the 3rd strike tank group and did not provide proper and timely cover for the border in the northern section of the Suvalka ledge, was disrupted and remained unfulfilled. The 3rd Panzer Group, breaking through the border at the junction of the North-Western and Western Fronts, together with the 2nd Panzer Group surrounded and destroyed Soviet troops in the Minsk region, which destroyed the entire Soviet plan.

At the same time, the German plan for Barbarossa was also thwarted by the deep echeloning of the Red Army troops. The Soviet leadership, at the expense of the armies of the Reserve Command, managed to close the gap in the Western Front. As a result, both the Soviet and the German plan for the rapid defeat of the enemy was thwarted and hostilities became protracted. Wehrmacht near Smolensk was met by fresh Soviet troops of the armies of the Reserve Command and, instead of the victorious capture of Moscow in August 1941, the Germans were forced to engage in a long bloody Smolensk battle. The fierce battles in the Moscow direction lasted two months (from July 10 to September 10 1941) and finally buried the plans of the German command to quickly defeat the Soviet Union in the next blitzkrieg.

Meanwhile, the opponents of the USSR took the initial military setbacks of the Soviet Union very seriously. Germany, in accordance with Directive No. 32, "after the defeat of the Soviet armed forces" planned to begin the conquest of Egypt, the Suez Canal region, Palestine, Iraq and Iran. In the future, the fascist German leadership hoped to seize Gibraltar, cut off England from its sources of raw materials and undertake the siege of the island. (6, p. 199-203; 7, p. 512-515)

The moderation of Hitler's requests is appealing - Germany demands Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Plans for an attack on England, the United States, and India are absent. Most likely, Germany demanded from England hegemony in Europe, control over the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East and the removal of W. Churchill from power. In any case, as Franz Halder notes in his diary, 30 of June 1941 of the year Hitler really discussed the issues of European unity as a result of a joint war against Russia and the possibility of overthrowing Churchill in England by conservative circles. (1, p. 60)

There is no visible pressure on England and the United States from Germany and in the later theses on the reorganization of the German ground forces after the end of the Barbarossa plan of July 15 from July 1941. It was supposed to reduce the army on 34 divisions from 209 divisions to 175. 11 divisions, Denmark - 1, Holland - 2 were allocated for the occupation of Norway. On the occupation of the Balkans - 6 divisions, the Soviet Union - 65, on France, including Spain - 43 divisions. 2 divisions remained in North Africa, 14 divisions were assigned to the Middle East. In reserve OKH left 31 division. (calculated by: 6, p. 212) Forces to capture England, India, and even more so the struggle with the United States of America is not visible. By the way, in September 1940 of the year, when the Wehrmacht’s numbers were reduced to 123 divisions, 77 divisions were allocated for the occupation of France, Holland and the operation of the Sea Lion by the German command. (calculated by: 5, 739-778)

2 July 1941 in Japan at the imperial meeting adopted the "Program of the national policy of the Empire in accordance with changes in the situation", which included "continuing the war in China and the simultaneous completion of preparations for war against the United States and Britain, and against the Soviet Union. From the transcript Imperial Conference (Godzen Kaygi) 2 July 1941: ... Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. However, until we intervene in this conflict. We secretly strengthen our military training against the Soviet Union, adhering to an independent position. At this time we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great caution. If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to our empire, we will resort to the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders .... By the decision of the imperial conference, an armed attack on the USSR was approved as one of the main military and political goals of the empire. Having made this decision, the Japanese government essentially broke up the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed only two and a half months ago. In the adopted document, the Neutrality Pact was not even mentioned. "Despite pressure and threats from Germany," Japan was preparing to attack the USSR under the condition that the Soviet troops were clearly defeated in the war with Germany. War Minister Tojo stressed that the fall should happen when the Soviet Union "becomes like a ripe persimmon ready to fall to the ground" ....

In accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, the General Staff of the Army and the Ministry of War of Japan developed a set of broad measures aimed at speeding up preparations for conducting offensive operations against the Soviet armed forces in the Far East and Siberia. In the Japanese secret documents, he received the coded name "Kantogun to Enshu" ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") - abbreviated "Kantokuen". 11 July 1941, the imperial headquarters sent a special directive No. 506 to the Kwantung Army and the Japanese armies in northern China, which confirmed that the purpose of the “maneuvers” was to strengthen readiness for action against the Soviet Union. “Kantokouen” was based first on the operational strategic plan of the war against the USSR, developed by the General Staff on 1940 year, and from the first half of July 1941 on the “Project of operations in the current conditions". (3, p. 142, 149, 151, 157-158)

In accordance with the schedule for completing the preparation and conduct of the 5 war on July 1941, the Supreme Command of the Japanese Armed Forces issued a directive ... to conduct the first mobilization line ... After the second mobilization line was ordered by order No. 102 from 16 July 1941 in Manchuria and Korea was concentrated 850 thousand soldiers and officers of the Japanese army. " (3, p. 159-161, 165, 196-197)

3 July 1941 of the year at the Headquarters of the High Command of the German Ground Forces discussed further plans for the occupation of the industrial regions of the USSR and the advance of the Wehrmacht in the Middle East after forcing the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. (1, p. 77) 15 July 1941, the requirements of the occupation and protection of Russian territory were detailed. It was assumed that “as soon as the Russian troops east of the Dnieper-Dvina line are overwhelmed, the operations will need to be continued, if possible, only by motorized formations, as well as those infantry formations that will finally remain on Russian territory. Most of the infantry formations should in early August, after reaching the line Crimea - Moscow - Leningrad, proceed to the return march. " The German Armed Forces should have been reduced from 209 divisions to 175 connections.

The European part of Russia was divided into four state formations - the Baltic States, Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus, for the occupation of which two army groups were allocated as part of 65 German formations, as well as one Italian and Spanish corps, the Finnish, Slovak, Romanian and Hungarian units. "Mobile units (12 tank, six motorized, one cavalry divisions) are designed to perform the following tasks -

a) One tank corps (two tank, one motorized divisions) to act as a task force in Transcaucasia.

b) Two tank corps (three tank, two motorized, one cavalry divisions) to capture the Don-Donets industrial region and protect the Southern Volga region.

One tank corps (three tank, one motorized division) for mastering the Central Russian industrial region and for the protection of the Northern Volga region.

c) One tank corps (two tank and one motorized divisions) advances to the South Urals.

One tank corps (two tank and one motorized divisions) is being advanced to the Northern Urals. "(6, p. 207-212)

“Hitler’s confidence that the issue with respect to Russia would be reached in September 1941, determined his cautious strategy in the war on the Atlantic Ocean.“ There should be no incidents with the United States until mid-October. ”However, Russia stubbornly held on.” (4, p. 203) 27 July 1941 of the year, in connection with the tightening of hostilities in the East in Germany, the plan of operation against the industrial area of ​​the Urals was considered, which involved not so much occupation as an expedition to destroy the Ural industrial region.

The operation was supposed to be carried out by motorized troops using eight tank and four motorized divisions. Depending on the situation, separate infantry divisions are involved (to protect rear communications) .... The operation is carried out in full compliance with surprise while all four groups perform simultaneously. Its goal - as soon as possible to reach the Ural industrial region and either hold, if the situation allows, captured, or again move away after the destruction of vital structures specially designed commissioned and trained for this by the troops. " (6, p. 216-217)

"In the summer of 1941, the Kwantung Army deployed the battle formations of the six armies and a separate group of troops against the USSR, not counting the reserve. In accordance with the Kantokouen plan, three fronts were formed for conducting combat operations: the eastern part of the 4 armies and the reserve, the northern part of 2 armies and reserves and the western part of the 2 armies. By early August, the grouping allocated for the invasion of the Soviet Union was mainly prepared. The deadline for making a decision about the start of the war was approaching - August 10. ii hesitant, waiting for the defeat of the Soviet Union in the West. " (3, p. 159-161, 165, 196-197)

6 September 1941 of the year at the imperial meeting due to the failure of the German Barbarossa plan, as well as the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran 25 August 1941, the implementation of the Kantokuen plan in 1941 year was canceled, which, however, did not mean abandoning the Kantokuen plan , but only postponed the deadline for its implementation. " (3, p. 197)

Analysis of the events of summer and autumn of 1941 of the year made it possible to establish that the governments of Germany and Japan intended to work together to defeat the Soviet Union in the summer and autumn of 1941. Later, after the expulsion of the British from Europe (seizing Gibraltar), North Africa and the Middle East, as well as the removal of W. Churchill from power, Germany intended to coexist to some extent with both England and the United States of America.

To the German plan for defeating the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers, the Soviet command set off a plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht troops at the Dvina and Dnieper line. The Soviet plan was thwarted by the encirclement and destruction of the Minsk grouping of the Red Army. At the same time, the German plan "Barbarossa" was thwarted by deep echeloning of the Red Army. The Soviet leadership, at the expense of the armies of the Reserve Command, managed to close the gap in the Western Front. As a result, both the Soviet and the German plan for the rapid defeat of the enemy was thwarted and hostilities became protracted.

Thus, since the Western Front after its catastrophe was nevertheless restored, it was possible to avoid the worst development of events (the Wehrmacht during the entire war did not allow further Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, and Japan did not dare to open military actions against the Soviet Union) the events of the summer of 1941 must be spoken of as a disaster of the Western Front and the crisis of the Red Army, which was overcome at the cost of enormous human losses and material deprivation. As a result, the extremely painful military catastrophe of the Western Front did not escalate into a military catastrophe of the entire Red Army and the political catastrophe of the entire Soviet Union.

Sources and literature:
1. Halder, F. The Military Diary, 1941-1942 [Text]: Memoirs / F. Halder. - M .: AST; SPb .: Terra Fantastica, 2003. - 893 with.
2. Carell, P. "Barbarossa": from Brest to Moscow [Text]: memoirs / Paul Carell; per. with him. A. Utkina. - Smolensk: Rusich, 2002. - 432 with.
3. Koshkin, A.A. "Kantokuen" - "Barbarossa" in Japanese. Why Japan did not attack the USSR [Text]: monograph / А.А. Koshkin. - M .: Veche, 2011. - 384 with.
4. Morison, S.E. "The American Navy in World War II: The Battle for the Atlantic" [Text]: monograph / S.E. Morison; per. from English R. Khoroshchanskaya, G. Gelfand - M .: AST; SPB .: Terra Fantastika, 2003. - 512 with.
5. Müller-Hillebrand, B. Land Army of Germany 1933-1945 [Text]: monograph / B. Muller-Hillebrand; per. with him. A. Vysokovsky, I. Glagoleva, V. Dubovik. - M .: Isografus, 2002. - 800 with.
6. Top secret! Only for command ". The strategy of fascist Germany in the war against the USSR. Documents and materials [Text]: collection of documents / Compiled by V.I. Dashichev. - M .: Nauka, 1967. - 752 p.
7. The Nuremberg trial of the main German war criminals. In 3 volumes. T. 1. Nazi conspiracy against the world and humanity. The crimes of the German monopolies [Text]: a collection of documents / under total. ed. R.A. Rudenko. - M .: Legal literature, 1965. - 800 with.
Author:
Originator:
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1545171.html
49 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. The comment was deleted.
  2. Maximus-xnumx
    Maximus-xnumx 18 November 2013 09: 31 New
    +3
    I doubt it. 4 Japanese divisions, against the entire Far Eastern Front .... Yes, and not so foolish samurai. Twice they snatched from the Red Army, and whatever many modern historians wrote about the Halkin Gol. the Japanese nevertheless attacked the United States and not the USSR.
    1. Bronis
      Bronis 18 November 2013 12: 56 New
      +2
      Quote: Maximus-22
      I doubt it. 4 Japanese divisions, against the entire Far Eastern Front
      Kwantung army in 1941 g. - 350-400 thousand. + More about 100 thousand. Manchzhou. Given reinforcements, by the fall of 1941, Japan could concentrate about 600-800 thousand people. For example, by 1941 there were about 1 400 thousand soldiers and officers (and this is taking into account the fact that there was a war with the USA)
      1. Su-9
        Su-9 18 November 2013 19: 57 New
        0
        The Yap war with the conspirators began in December 41st.
        With CCCP, the Japanese relied on the experience of battles in Hassan and Halkin-Gol, where the USSR army did not prove invincible and the final results were achieved by maximizing the efforts of the Red Army. Again, their thinking was influenced by the historical experience of victories in 1905 and easy control over the vast territories of the Far East in the civilian. The fact that they wanted to attack the USSR does not raise any doubt from a historical factual point of view.
        They didn’t attack for many reasons - the need for war with the states, the naval lobby that wanted a second Tsushima, and the need for resources ....
        But already in 42 the situation has changed radically. The USSR showed that it can quickly recover from defeats and restore fronts. In Yap, the front lines and supply lines stretched to an acceptable limit. The famine in units began as early as 42 ...
  3. Selevc
    Selevc 18 November 2013 09: 51 New
    +5
    Quote: Maximus-22
    the Japanese nevertheless attacked the United States and not the USSR.

    Yes, they didn’t attack - because the southern direction was a priority for them - all the same there is oil ... But on the territory of the Soviet Far East they would find nothing but the taiga, wolves and Chukchi :)))

    The Japanese calculated everything correctly - they attacked their main strategic competitor and potential enemy in the US region !!! But they overestimated their capabilities and underestimated America ...
    1. Su-9
      Su-9 18 November 2013 20: 03 New
      +1
      They calculated just not right. The Japanese attacked the states in the hope that they would retreat from their strategic tasks by losing a couple of pelvis in Pearl Harbor.
      The states simply took advantage of this event as an occasion to transfer their huge economy to war footing and to conquer the entire Pacific Ocean in three and a half years, completely displacing even their allies from it. And if not for Mao in China, then the states would have reached the borders of the USSR as far back as 45m using the venality of Chiang Kai-shek ....
      1. Selevc
        Selevc 18 November 2013 20: 15 New
        +2
        Quote: Su-9
        And if not for Mao in China, then the states would have reached the borders of the USSR as far back as 45m using the venality of Chiang Kai-shek ....

        Well, you’ve come up with it - they didn’t even decide to land on the Japanese islands except Okinawa ... They figured out their possible losses and decided that it would be better to dust a couple of cities and at the same time scare the rest of the world !!!
        1. Su-9
          Su-9 18 November 2013 20: 31 New
          0
          Yah? And how do you think they ended up in Korea?
          "You" - with a capital letter, by the way.
          1. Su-9
            Su-9 18 November 2013 20: 38 New
            +1
            And so, after that, here’s one of the references to the amers in China .. everything is basically described in principle, including about the attitude towards Mao. In English, really.

            http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-C-ChinaO/
          2. Selevc
            Selevc 18 November 2013 21: 09 New
            +1
            Here is a reference for you - the answer to your question !!! (I honestly do not care what letter to write) ...

            http://kore-saram.ru/Vstuplenie-Sovetskogo-Soyuza-v-voinu-na-Dalnem-Vostoke-i-ra
            zdel --- poluostrova-po-38-i-paralleli.aspx

            The Americans didn’t fight in Korea - they simply occupied their part of the country by agreement with the USSR when the Japanese already hoisted a white flag there - only Soviet troops fought there ...
            1. Su-9
              Su-9 18 November 2013 22: 48 New
              -1
              Thank. I appreciate the irony.
              Americans were preparing a steady landing both on the islands of the mother country and in Korea.
              In Korea, they landed according to plan - September 8, and yes, after the Yapi surrendered ...
              But this only confirms that in China they would have been if not for Mao.
    2. Garrym
      Garrym 18 November 2013 21: 53 New
      +1
      Hmm, "underestimated" .... How many years did they beat off Indochina (the Americans)? ... And as soon as "Stalin gave the order" to the second front, two atomic "babies" were immediately thrown off on the quiet (here they just underestimated). If not for this, it would not only be for Kunashir and Shikotan that slanting, watery eyes would look ...
  4. vladimirZ
    vladimirZ 18 November 2013 10: 12 New
    19
    The leader of the USSR, Stalin IV, skillfully using the contradictions in the capitalist countries, was able to adequately get out of the confrontation of the USSR with the entire capitalist world, which dreamed of destroying the only socialist state.
    Stalin I.V., as the Supreme Commander of the USSR, losing the first stage of the war, managed to win over the strongest states of the capitalist world - the USA and England, organized the antitraditional union of states, which determined the final defeat of the union of fascist states.
    The military crisis of 1941 did not turn into a military catastrophe of the USSR.
    The USSR, under the leadership, as we now understand, of the brilliant Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, withstood and won a crushing Victory over fascist Germany.
    Thanks to I.V. Stalin, and not "in spite of", as modern Russian liberals claim, our Victory has been won! ...
  5. msv
    msv 18 November 2013 10: 43 New
    +9
    Article plus. Rarely is there a clear logical presentation of factual material without cheering patriotism and liberalism. Such articles are not enough. However, I would like to note that the crisis was not only on the western front. There were encirclement in Uman, Kiev and the blockade (actually encirclement) of Leningrad. But in general, I agree with the author. A catastrophe is called to give greater importance to failures and the formation of a corresponding negative attitude. But this is already an element of the information war.
    1. knn54
      knn54 18 November 2013 15: 46 New
      +3
      -msv: article plus.
      The main law of History is not to dare to lie, the second is not to be afraid to tell the truth.
      Pope Leo XIII
  6. SIT
    SIT 18 November 2013 10: 48 New
    +1
    The author, introducing the crisis in the USSR in the title 1941, describes only with 2 lines the plan of the Soviet command without any reference. But without a joint analysis of German and Soviet operational plans, it is impossible to understand the reasons for what happened in the summer of 1941. The last approved operational plan of the General Staff of the Red Army was the plan of 14.10.1940/1941/1940. This plan did not take into account the main provisions of the blitzkrieg strategy and incorrectly determined the directions of the main attacks of the enemy. G.K. Zhukov became the chief of the General Staff only in February 1 and didn’t even have a new plan, not to mention its implementation, because Barbarossa was already approved in December 1941 and preparations were in full swing. At the same time, the head of the German General Staff Halder was the chief of staff of the army corps back in World War I, when G.K. Zhukov was still a non-commissioned officer. Naturally, experience is incomparable. It was already impossible to change anything in such a short time and the rout of XNUMX was a foregone conclusion.
    1. zmey_gadukin
      zmey_gadukin 18 November 2013 11: 24 New
      +1
      Quote: SIT
      G.K. Zhukov became chief of the General Staff only in February 1941

      And before him was Shaposhnikov. And Meretskov. Are stupid people really? )))
      1. SIT
        SIT 18 November 2013 12: 39 New
        +3
        Quote: zmey_gadukin
        And before him was Shaposhnikov. And Meretskov.

        And you read why they shot Meretskov. But in his report he relied on intelligence No. 8 prepared by the Intelligence Agency back in December 1940 based on an analysis of the information received. Reconnaissance knew the numbers of all 110 German divisions at that time and the names of their commanders. Moreover, part of these divisions, especially armored, was transferred from France, and therefore had real combat experience, because took part in operation Gelb.
        1. zmey_gadukin
          zmey_gadukin 18 November 2013 15: 02 New
          -1
          I read. He had both good luck and defeats. However, for the defeat of 1941, it would not be possible to isolate the specific culprits.
          Well, Shaposhnikov? His only name was Stalin by name. And this meant the immense respect that Stalin had for him.
          1. SIT
            SIT 18 November 2013 17: 05 New
            +1
            Quote: zmey_gadukin
            Well, Shaposhnikov?


            He was removed from his post as head of the General Staff in August 1940. He did not direct the development of the latest operational plans.
            1. zmey_gadukin
              zmey_gadukin 18 November 2013 20: 27 New
              -2
              Quote: SIT
              I did not direct the development of the latest operational plans.

              world war plan - not an operational plan
      2. Day 11
        Day 11 18 November 2013 13: 41 New
        +1
        In general, Meretskov is a rather dark personality. How was he dragged along to the famous victorious marshals? By and large, an unsuccessful Finnish company - on him (cheerfully promised Stalin to shower the Finns with hats) - filled Mannerheim's line with corpses. Only thanks to Shaposhnikov, they ended the war with the result which is. And when he was taken for ... (after all, they took a lot of dirt on him to participate in Tukhachevsky's conspiracy, anti-Soviet activities) What did this guy say to Pavlov? --- "In the event of a German victory - it will not be worse for me or for you. "It's a fact! How did you turn out? Maybe someone" leaked "? X knows. And who drove the 2nd shock into the boiler? (" Thank you "from me personally, I have a grandfather on the Volkhov front left health). Until the end of the war, everything is in the same spirit. In general, the "dark" personality. The results of his sabotage before the war can be seen in the photo
        1. Day 11
          Day 11 18 November 2013 13: 44 New
          0
          How about that?
          1. Day 11
            Day 11 18 November 2013 13: 49 New
            0
            "It will not be worse for me or for you ..."
        2. Asan Ata
          Asan Ata 18 November 2013 16: 05 New
          0
          Tell me, if you know what kind of photo? Looks like Kazakhs, I have two mother's brothers who went missing.
          1. Day 11
            Day 11 18 November 2013 16: 24 New
            0
            It’s difficult to determine the date and place from the photo (and nationality). The photo was taken from E-Bay (there are a lot of such photos). Presumably this is Eastern Ukraine. And where did your relatives serve? Are the letters preserved (field mail, date)? Can I ask the guys dealing with such issues.
            1. Asan Ata
              Asan Ata 22 November 2013 09: 59 New
              0
              Unfortunately, there was nothing left, the grandfather hid somewhere, and then was lost. they got to the front in 1941, as far as I know, there were letters - one or two - and got out of hand.
        3. IRBIS
          IRBIS 18 November 2013 16: 53 New
          0
          Quote: Den 11
          What side did he drag to the glorious victorious marshals?

          Who is this to?
          Quote: Den 11
          By and large, an unsuccessful Finnish company is on it

          Did the other marshals have only victories? Or are you just looking for Meretskov's name everywhere? So try to find Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky and others, oh-oh-a lot of interesting things you will learn about the marshals of "victory".
          Quote: Den 11
          In general, a "dark" personality.

          Not darker than the rest, who had four classes of education and a cavalry school behind them.
          Quote: Den 11
          We see the results of his wrecking before the war in the photo.

          These are the results of the "leadership" of our entire generals.
          1. Day 11
            Day 11 18 November 2013 17: 10 New
            0
            Actually, we are talking about Meretskov. And the failure in the Lyuban operation? Google it if you don’t know. What did Stalin tell him? - “The Russians say: hurry up, make people laugh. You did just that, rushed to the offensive without preparing it , and made people laugh. If you remember, I suggested that you postpone the offensive if Sokolov's shock army is not ready, and now you are reaping the fruits of your activities. "(He was supposed to take Luga). Read how he broke through the blockade of Leningrad. Well, where did he end read the war too. Believe me, this statement of facts says a lot about this man. Well, what are his successes and victories as a commander in the war?
  7. understudy
    understudy 18 November 2013 10: 59 New
    +1
    Without questioning the content of the entire article, I strongly disagree with the proposed concept of a "crisis" at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.
    I will explain my position with an illustrative example: an airplane crash with the death of passengers ... is it a disaster or a crisis? Yes, I agree, this is not an aviation-wide disaster. But this is not a crisis for a single event in a strictly defined period of time. And given the amount of destroyed human and "technical" resources ... no, not a crisis. The "crisis" were the battles for Moscow, Stalingrad, near Kursk ...
    Something like that.
    1. Selevc
      Selevc 18 November 2013 14: 35 New
      +2
      Quote: Understudy
      Without questioning the content of the entire article, I strongly disagree with the proposed concept of a "crisis" at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

      And what else to call the initial period of the Second World War as a disaster? Even the word crisis does not fit at all - if by the beginning of the 42nd year the Red Army practically lost tanks and aircraft, what can it be called? If the Germans were already west of Minsk a week after the start of the war and were already near Smolensk in early July? And huge cauldrons - the soldiers who died and captured there, the equipment abandoned or destroyed by the enemy?
  8. ed65b
    ed65b 18 November 2013 11: 31 New
    +6
    Not knowing the truth or not, but stumbled upon it
    From Hitler’s latest interview with Swiss journalist Kurt Speidel:

    "During the years of this war, I was forced to reconsider my racial worldview. I'll tell you what, no one here in Europe knows Russia and never knew it. I do not idealize Russians at all, by no means, Russians still have too much Asian But the fact remains that the Russian nation turned out to be stronger and more enduring in this crazy war, and I would not be surprised if salvation for the white race comes from the East. It will be logical. "
    1. Asan Ata
      Asan Ata 18 November 2013 16: 08 New
      +2
      I say, the Russians themselves from Asia, it’s been a long time ago, they forgot. drinks
  9. chehywed
    chehywed 18 November 2013 11: 44 New
    +2
    Quote: Author Sergey Lebedev
    ... it is necessary to speak about the events of the summer of 1941 as a catastrophe of the Western Front and a crisis of the Red Army, which was overcome at the cost of enormous human losses and material deprivation.

    Indeed, if the Western Front had resisted, the situation in 1941 would have been less dramatic. All this, of course, is reasoning on the topic "what would happen if ...", but the catastrophe of the South-Western Front is a direct consequence of the defeat of the Western Front.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 18 November 2013 13: 52 New
      +1
      Quote: chehywed
      ... the disaster of the Southwestern Front is a direct consequence of the defeat of the West.

      Not. It is a consequence of the Germans stop at Smolensk, on the Western Front.
      The inability to move forward in the Moscow direction created the prerequisites for the 2TG Guderian to turn south. This tank group became the northern claw of the Kiev boiler.
      There would have been no Guderian, there would have been no catastrophe in the SW front.
      1. chehywed
        chehywed 18 November 2013 15: 05 New
        0
        Quote: BigRiver
        Not. It is a consequence of the Germans stop at Smolensk, on the Western Front.

        On August 18, Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, presented to Adolf Hitler a plan to attack Moscow with the help of the Army Group Center. However, on August 20, Hitler sharply rejected this offer and signed a directive on August 21, according to which part of the Army Center Group’s forces It must turn south in order to encircle and defeat the Soviet Union’s South-Western Front with Army Group South. The directive determined that “the most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, industrial and coal regions on the Donets River and the blocking of Russian oil transportation routes from the Caucasus.” On August 23, Halder personally delivered this directive to the headquarters of Army Group Center, where it was met with disapproval, especially by the commander of the 2 Tank Group Heinz Guderian. On the same day, Guderian flew to Hitler’s headquarters, where he tried to convince him of the need to attack Moscow however, Guderian did not succeed. On August 24, Guderian arrived at his command post to lead the south offensive.
  10. Gorinich
    Gorinich 18 November 2013 11: 54 New
    +1
    Apparently the Japanese knew the Barbarossa plan in detail, already on August 10 they came to the conclusion that the German plan had failed ...
    1. Motors1991
      Motors1991 18 November 2013 18: 48 New
      0
      I think we should thank Roosevelt for launching the latter against the USA with his embargo on oil supplies to Japan, otherwise Japan would certainly attack the Far East, and the USSR could not stand the war on two fronts at that time. It is clear that Roosevelt was not an altruist saving the Soviet Union, he saved himself, his America. Otherwise, after the fall of Russia, the United States would have to deal with immeasurably stronger powers, Germany and Japan. England could not be taken into account, after the death of the USSR, its days would be numbered.
      1. chehywed
        chehywed 18 November 2013 19: 11 New
        0
        Quote: Motors1991
        I think we should thank Roosevelt that, with his embargo on oil supplies to Japan, he launched the latter against the United States.

        Motors1991Are You An Incorrigible Idealist? As far back as September 1940, Japan captured the northern part of French Indochina. The direction of Japanese aggression towards the southern seas alarmed Washington and London. The United States responded by imposing an embargo on the export of certain strategic raw materials to Japan, primarily iron and scrap metal, to 26 on September 1940. This was followed by gradual licensing of US and English exports to Japan. These measures did not have tangible economic consequences for Japan, but they testified to the growing tension in its relations with the United States and England. Japan's claims to monopoly domination not only in China, but throughout Southeast Asia seriously violated the imperialist interests of the United States and Britain.
        Even the state of war with Japan and Germany did not prevent American business from selling them fuel and strategic raw materials through third countries.
        1. Motors1991
          Motors1991 18 November 2013 19: 36 New
          0
          Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese squadron hiding in the Kuril Islands until the last moment did not know what order they would receive, attack the Far East, Hawaii or go south. Until the very last moment, the Japanese did not want to enter the war with the United States, but they were forced to do so. And the fact that they seized Indochina cannot be helped, grief for the vanquished. But the main thing that interested them at that moment was access to oil, or death. As for business, the Japanese in Sakhalin (the Soviet part) had concessions for coal mining up to 1944. And no one accuses the USSR of helping the enemy of his ally, so that the Japanese could kill more Americans, you can regard it anyway.
          1. Su-9
            Su-9 18 November 2013 20: 16 New
            +1
            The American pro-military lobby wanted a war with Japan and in every way indulged the reasons for this war. It is unlikely that anyone hoped for Pearl Harbor, no one could have dreamed of such an excuse for war, but it is certain that they hoped for an excuse for a police action against Yapov. The states, even in the 41st year, had no reason to be afraid. With a fleet superior to Yap by 2-3 times, with an economy superior to Yap by 7-10 times ...
            1. Selevc
              Selevc 18 November 2013 20: 33 New
              -2
              Quote: Su-9
              no one could have dreamed of such a pretext for war, but what they hoped for a pretext for a police action against Yapov

              What is the police action? The Japanese fleet was comparable in strength to the US fleet - the Americans were just twice lucky in the first period of the war with Japan - the Japanese did not catch their aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor and under Midway the Americans managed to catch the Japanese aircraft carriers by surprise and quickly destroy the main core of the Japanese aircraft carrier fleet ...
              Under Midway, the forces of the parties were approximately equal - Yapam could have been lucky, and then the quick capture of Pearl Harbor, the failure of the Panama Canal and the landing forces in the large Ameri ports of the Pacific Ocean and all - the United States would be on their knees ... At least in the Pacific Ocean the dominance of the Amer fleet could be forgotten !!!
              1. Su-9
                Su-9 18 November 2013 20: 55 New
                0
                Quantitative / qualitative comparison - the states have 2 times more.
                It’s just that it’s always been beneficial for Americans to publicly show their weakness.

                US Navy at 41 - Yapov Navy at 41
                aircraft carriers - 7 + 1 Esc 3 + 7 Esc
                battleships -17 6 + 4 lines. cruisers
                T.KR-18 16
                l cr - 19 16
                destroyers - 171 112
                U-boats - 112 65

                The training of personnel was in the states at the highest level.

                Well, the landing on the Pacific coast of the states is utopia. There was somehow a topic about this - you can see
                1. Selevc
                  Selevc 18 November 2013 21: 26 New
                  0
                  Quote: Su-9
                  Quantitative / qualitative comparison - the states have 2 times more. It’s just that it’s always been beneficial for Americans to publicly show their weakness.

                  You do not forget that the U.S. fleet had to control the Atlantic besides the Pacific Ocean ... So the U.S. fleet could boldly divide in half ... It was necessary to fight German submarines, escort convoys, cover its landings in Africa and Europe, and so on. ..
                  Quote: Su-9
                  Well, the landing on the Pacific coast of the states is utopia. There was somehow a topic about this - you can see

                  Why Utopia? The Japanese only had to temporarily land in large American ports — to destroy port infrastructure and military factories there, and that would be a huge damage to America ... Given the high morale of Japanese soldiers, this looks quite real !!! As they say in kamikaze and samurai they had no shortage :)))
              2. Yarik
                Yarik 18 November 2013 22: 44 New
                0
                And, which may not be the last in the list of Japanese failures at Pearl Harbor: they completely ignored the oil storage facilities, there were huge reserves there. The American fleet would have been neutralized.
          2. chehywed
            chehywed 18 November 2013 20: 40 New
            0
            Quote: Motors1991
            As for business, the Japanese in Sakhalin (the Soviet part) had a concession for coal mining until 1944, and no one blames the USSR for helping the enemy of his ally

            Do not distort. Until August 1945, the USSR was not at war with Japan. And the United States entered the war with Germany in December 1941.
            1. Motors1991
              Motors1991 19 November 2013 15: 59 New
              0
              And the USSR with whom was at war? With Germany. The USA and the Soviet Union were allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. The United States, as well as England, by the way, also an ally of the USSR, fought with Japan. Last, the Soviet Union granted its territory in concession for production coal. Why do I need coal, I hope you do not need to explain?
  11. nnz226
    nnz226 18 November 2013 15: 28 New
    -3
    The cost of only disrupting the Soviet plan to defeat the Wehrmacht between the Western Dvina and the Dnieper was enormous: 27 MILLION LIVES !!! So ... the generals "missed a little", and then the country was in ruins ...
    1. i.xxx-1971
      i.xxx-1971 20 December 2013 19: 49 New
      0
      Not true - 270 million lives!
  12. Asan Ata
    Asan Ata 18 November 2013 16: 12 New
    -2
    In April, the Germans flew to us, the order was to drive, but not shoot in the direction of the border. Ours had phrasebooks German-Russian, with phrases like- Where is the burgomaster? The Germans were ahead, yes, it seems that Stalin didn’t really want to attack. In general, Stalin behaved inappropriately at the beginning of the war.
  13. FormerMariman
    FormerMariman 18 November 2013 16: 50 New
    +1
    My cousin grandfather in 1941 was captured by the whole company! The company was stationed and did not have time to issue small arms. Until 1945, he was captured in Norway, until we were released! The fact that the Germans really came close to the village brought fighters in underpants saved from a firing line in their homeland (except for those fighters who agreed to cooperate, after the war their families in the aul just disappeared overnight) Without a single shot!
  14. RomanN
    RomanN 18 November 2013 16: 51 New
    -5
    According to the stories of my grandfather, who served in Primorye on the border with Japan in 41-42, there was simply no combat readiness of local military units, as ordinary personnel were all Uzbeks, Turkmens, etc. With his words, the Japanese could have split ours very quickly. The fact that they did not climb the USSR is simply their mistake and our luck.
  15. Vladimir65
    Vladimir65 18 November 2013 20: 03 New
    0
    I do not agree with the conclusion of the article. It is impossible to consider the events of the summer of 1941 as a disaster. War is not a game of tin soldiers, but a combination of a huge number of circumstances. When considering the events of the beginning of the summer of 1941, all aspects of that time should be taken into account. By the summer of 1941, Germany had a fully mobilized army with experience in warfare and was the most powerful army in the world. All of Europe looked into Hitler’s mouth and offered her help; her industry worked for the Germans. On the contrary, the Soviet Union was not completely ready for war, it was not enough 1,5-2 years to rearm the army and he was alone. In addition, Japan threatened in the east. The events of the beginning of the war were predetermined by the situation in the world and the condition of the armies of Germany and the USSR. But the military catastrophe of the entire Red Army and the political catastrophe of the entire Soviet Union could not be. Otherwise, that would be the end of the story.
  16. DesToeR
    DesToeR 18 November 2013 21: 46 New
    0
    Guess what? Disaster or not. Stalin himself about 1941 said that Lenin gave them the first socialist state in the world, and they prosra ... and. I think that for the master of the dilemma, it was not a disaster or not.
    1. i.xxx-1971
      i.xxx-1971 20 December 2013 19: 51 New
      0
      This is from the words of Mikoyan, who went from Ilyich to Ilyich ... He is another valuable witness. I do not believe that Stalin said that.