Military Review

Slandered Admiral

93
165 years ago was born the commander of the Russian squadron in the battle of Tsushima Z.P. Rozhdestvensky


Slandered AdmiralVice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky (1848–1909), who was seriously wounded in the head and both legs in the Tsushima battle and who considered himself worthy of death for surrendering the destroyer “Bedovy” on which he was unconscious, is a negative hero historical and fiction. This has been the case since the time of Tsushima by A. S. Novikov-Priboy, and maybe even earlier, from the newspaper campaign against Rozhestvensky in 1906.

The memory of him has remained unkind since. The classic characteristic of the admiral is an arrogant, stupid, inert careerist. Even the grave of Rozhestvensky at the Tikhvin cemetery of the Alexander Nevsky Monastery in St. Petersburg was not preserved.

Boris Glebovich Galenin, author of the fundamental two-volume book “Tsushima - a sign of the end of Russian history. The hidden causes of well-known events ”(M., Kraft +, 2009-2010), one of the main characters of which is Z. P. Christmas. The chief of the Main Naval Staff of Russia was by no means stupid - well, if only because the illustrious Russian naval commander Stepan Osipovich Makarov was not stupid, who spoke of Rozhdestvensky in 1894 as a "reliable naval commander."

And, of course, a person could not be a careerist, who at the very beginning of his military career put her at risk for reasons of principle.

In July 1877, during the Russo-Turkish war, while on the Vesta steamboat, Rozhestvensky took command of the artillery to replace the killed Lieutenant Colonel Chernov and inflicted damage on the Turkish battleship Fethi Bouland, which forced him to leave the battle. For this battle, Rozhdestvensky was promoted to lieutenant captain and awarded the orders of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree with swords and bow and St. George of the 4th degree. It would seem, live and rejoice. But Rozhestvensky at the end of the war published the article “Battleships and merchant cruisers” in the newspaper Birzhevye Vedomosti, where he criticized the technical backwardness of the Russian fleet and a call to reorient to the construction of battleships. The feat of Vesta, to which Rozhdestvensky was obliged by orders and an extraordinary rank, he called "shameful flight." The article caused a great scandal and led to the initiation of a lawsuit in the Vesta case. Admiral S.S. Lesovsky promised to “erase the powder” of the obstinate officer.

And at the beginning of the Japanese war, when still all the newspapers, including the liberal ones, were overwhelmed with headscarring sentiments and shouted that the Japanese adventure would soon suffer a complete ruin, Rozhestvensky predicted a different course of the war. “We will have to fight hard,” he told a French correspondent in late March, nine hundred and four. He already believed that in the current situation, our squadron had nothing to do in the Far East, because when it appears there, the Japanese will have time to transport guns, shells, ammunition, supplies in sufficient quantity to Korea many months. But he was ordered - and he led the squadron into battle. By the way, one of his predictions of that time came to pass, unfortunately, within a few days. Then the star of admiral S.O. Makarov, he was excitedly praised by the newspapers, and Rozhestvensky praised: "This is a wonderful sailor, energetic boss, skillful, courageous ...", but he immediately declared: "He is a prisoner of the state of things that he did not create and cannot change." But the same can be said about Rozhestvensky himself! Many, for example, accuse him of not trying to evade meeting with the Japanese United Fleet and breaking through to Vladivostok. But Rozhestvensky had a completely different order. “Twice in the king’s telegram addressed to Rozhestvensky it is indicated that the squadron was not the breakthrough to Vladivostok, but the capture of the Sea of ​​Japan, that is, the battle with the main forces of the Japanese fleet and their defeat” (M. Petrov. Trafalgar. Tsushima. Jutlands fight. - M., 1926). And the orders, as you know, are not discussed.

By the way, April 1 1904, when the newspaper "Rus" reprinted the interview Rozhestvensky mentioned, she reported on another page about the death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" and Makarova ...

Even 12 years ago, in the story “The Story of a Defeat” (Our Contemporary, 2001, No. 8), I predicted the appearance of such books as Tsushima by B. Galenin.

The author, like the hero of my story, hypothesizes that the Japanese in the most successful battle for them in the war with Russia - Tsushima - were a close to defeat.

The Russian combined squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky opposed the Japanese United Fleet under the command of Admiral Heihatiro Togo. The Japanese, in addition to numerous auxiliary ships, destroyers, destroyers and gunboats, had 12 high-speed and well-armed armored ships, we also had 12, not counting the auxiliary, but only 4 of new ones, comparable in class to the Japanese. Just before the collision, in 12 20 hours of 27 minutes in May 1905, Rozhestvensky suddenly divided his ships into two parallel columns, which is believed to have halved their maneuverability and firepower. After all, with such a construction, it is difficult for ships to turn around to the enemy’s sides, where the main artillery was, and to fire without risking to get into their own ships. At that time, the “best maneuver in the form of a transverse stick over the letter“ T ”, that is, the coverage of the head and tail of an enemy column, was considered the best method of action. Naturally, Rozhestvensky could not make such coverage in two columns.

Russian sailors showed exceptional heroism, they did not leave burning ships, the fire from the guns were even seriously wounded, but the result for our sailors was sad. During the battle, which lasted almost a day, the Japanese burned, sank, captured the ships of the Russian squadron, excluding three ships that broke through to Vladivostok. Seriously wounded Rozhdestvensky was captured.

However, after returning home after the war, he wrote mysterious words in an explanatory note: “... I brought a squadron into battle - in a system in which all my battleships had to be able to shoot at the first moments on the headline of the Japanese line ... Obviously ... our first strike the squadron was put in unusually favorable conditions ... The benefit of this location of our squadron was to persist from 1 hour 49 minutes to 1 hour 59 minutes or more if the speed of the Japanese on the circulation was less than 16 nodes. " What kind of “system”, what “unusually favorable conditions” did Rozhestvensky say? After all, he is in 12. 20 destroyed this line, divided the squadron into 2 columns! "The wand over the" T "was no longer possible! But some experts, including Galenin, believe that Rozhestvensky would not have succeeded in this classic maneuver under any circumstances, because the Japanese had an advantage in speed, maneuverability and artillery armament. So, needed some other maneuver? And this explains the strange actions Rozhestvensky?

Similar assumptions were expressed earlier by historian V. Chistyakov, to whom Galenin belongs with great reverence, but 19 years ago they received documentary confirmation. Niece of the participant in the Tsushima battle of midshipman Ilya Kulnev (he is, by the way, a distant relative of the hero of the Patriotic War 1812, General J.P. Kulnev) I.F. Ogorodnikova handed me a manuscript of her uncle, entitled “Tsushima. From the notes of a non-rich officer. ” Then, in 1994, I published these notes with my comments in Moscow Journal, No. 8. On the last page of the notebook, Kulnev fluently drew a diagram of the beginning of the Tsushima battle. It is fully consistent with the schemes that Galenin placed in his book. So what do we see on it?

Top left - Japanese ships. On the right is the 1 Squadron of the Rozhestvensky squadron, the newest battleships Suvorov, Alexander III, Borodino and Orel. At the bottom left - outdated and low-speed vessels of the 1-th and 2-th Russian detachments at the head of the Oslyabya armored cruiser. But what is unexpected: we have not at all two regular parallel columns! The ships move with the famous “Ushakovsky Ledge”: the right column (high-speed) is ahead of the low-speed left by about half of its length. What does this mean?

First, it means that the ships of the left column did not at all prevent the ships of the right from firing (at least three of them). Secondly, the squadron of Rozhestvensky needed to reorganize into one combat column again, it took not a quarter of an hour, as Togo thought, but half as much - due to the “ledge” movement and higher speed of the right column. Thirdly, the Rozhestvensky maneuver was misleading the Japanese, bypassing the Russian squadron on the right sidewalk, and provoked them to approach the ships immediately, without completing their “wand maneuver” over the “T”. They did so without seeing from a distance (as evidenced by the testimony of the English military observer on the Japanese ships of Captain Packham) that not two parallel columns, but “Ushakovsky ledge” were moving toward them.

When the Japanese abruptly went to meet us (move left), Rozhestvensky began rebuilding in one column. Further, the chronicle of the battle shows that in 13. 45, along the Kyoto meridian, Admiral Togo finally saw through binoculars that Rozhdestvensky had deceived him, and immediately ordered his ships to turn left on the 180.

It was a desperate decision: after all, the Japanese had to turn right in front of the muzzles of the guns of the Russian ships moving on them, which were the first to fire on 13.49.

The Japanese themselves couldn’t shoot for 10-15 minutes, as their ships, which had already turned, prevented those who were still at the turning point from firing. It was precisely this, as Rozhestvensky later asserted, that he sought.

The dashed line of Kulnev, coming from the right-wing Russian squad, shows that Rozhestvensky told him to go to the left, and that, in turn, shifted to the right. For this, the Russians did not need 25 minutes, as if they were walking in two regular parallel columns, but half as much, given the speed of battleships like "Suvorov". In 13.49 (13.30 along the Vladivostok meridian), the left gun of the Suvorov flagship crashed along the Mikaz. The battle of Tsushima began. "All Japanese ships had to come to a certain point one by one and turn to 1800, and this point remained stationary relative to the sea, which greatly facilitated the shooting of Russian artillery" (Chistyakov). Rozhestvensky forced all the main ships of the United Fleet to pass before the barrels of their best battleships. The plan of the Russian admiral was universal: no matter how Togo turned, he substituted for guns battleships like "Suvorov" either a rear guard or the vanguard of his column.

What happened next? Why didn't the Japanese ships be torn to pieces during these 10-15 minutes, but left the fatal zone with minor damage, lined up in a new line and crashed into our ships?

Rozhestvensky himself considered the poor shooting of our gunners to be the cause of the failure, but the facts do not confirm this. According to the Japanese (and they had a habit of underestimating their losses), in the first minutes of the battle the Togo fleet received large-caliber 150 hits, of which 30 had to hit the Mikaz flagship, including the captain’s bridge, almost killing Admiral Togo himself . Why, then, did the Japanese sank only three destroyers and only a few battleships temporarily failed?

Galenin fully shares Chistyakov’s suggestion that Russian pyroxylin shells, damp for a long journey in the tropics, also had a delayed action (so that, after piercing their armor, to explode inside the ship), most of them did not explode at all, but beat dead Japanese into the Japanese ships cargo or, piercing through unarmored surfaces, flew into the sea. The Japanese shells, on the other hand, were stuffed with the so-called shimoza (liddite) and did not have an armor-piercing, but a high-explosive action. The shells were torn from the first contact with anything, from the slightest delay in flight. The temperature of the explosion of the shimozy was so high that it immediately flashed paint on the steel sides. Everything flooded the liquid flame, our sailors burned alive. According to the calculations of Chistyakov, by the weight of the explosive emitted per minute, the Japanese exceeded us by about 30 times. We obviously could not win their frontal artillery duel.

But, speaking of the historical lessons of the Russian-Japanese war, it is impossible not to mention such a condition of victory as the will to it. After all, even in the brilliant Sinop case, the Russian squadron was inferior to the Turkish fleet in terms of its military-technical characteristics. But then the Russian sailors were representatives of a single, not split people. And in Kulnev’s notes we read: “... before the squadron departed, the team behaved disgustingly, it got drunk drunk, answered rudely, worked reluctantly ... There were many propagandists among the workers, in the morning there were proclamations everywhere on the battleships:“ Kill officers, drown your ships, why you go to certain death. " To deep grief, the command was influenced by these proclamations ... The team wanted to find fault with each other in order to make a complaint, and on one ship they succeeded: they killed (one sailor) the young midshipman for wanting to silence ... ”.

In the open sea, much has changed, the sailors pulled themselves together, but not a single army in the world, not a single fleet escaped confusion in their ranks if it reigns in the state.

The plan of the military technocrat Rozhestvensky was designed for other performers, for another morale. And the victory, among other things, is also the morale of the people. It was very well understood by Stalin, who utterly crushed the Japanese in August 1945, at sea and on land.
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  1. redwolf_13
    redwolf_13 13 November 2013 09: 14
    12
    Another "cleaner" How then, forgive me, such a naval commander had discipline at the level of a latrine. How he allowed 2 destroyers to split for 2 hours and transfer all evolutions for the Togo squadron. Without making more than one attempt to at least drive them away. Why forbade "Siberia" to turn on its powerful radio station and drown out the work of the Japanese, and whether the officers had a pretext to do so. Why did his genius not think of throwing a cruiser into battle during the battle and covering the destroyed battleships with destroyers and cruisers from attacks by Japanese destroyers at night? Many questions are answered as a commander and a coward. When the threat of execution loomed, he began to compose fairy tales.
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 13 November 2013 09: 44
      +3
      Quote: redwolf_13
      How he allowed 2 destroyers to split for 2 hours and transfer all evolutions for the Togo squadron. Without making more than one attempt to at least drive them away. Why did he forbid "Siberia" to turn on its powerful radio station and drown out the work of the Japanese, and were the officers an excuse to do this?

      And did not try to reflect why the Japanese themselves were allowed to do this? Did you hear anything about enemy disinformation? Togo received information about the course of the Russian squadron from destroyers. When they left, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt the squadron, which in the end at the beginning of the battle put Togo in an extremely uncomfortable position, forcing him to subsequently change course at the gunpoint of Russian guns.
    2. Yarik
      Yarik 13 November 2013 09: 49
      +2
      Only not "Siberia", but "Ural". And so everything is true.
    3. makst83
      makst83 13 November 2013 10: 46
      +6
      I agree! Why is the heroism of some, this, as a rule, someone razn3,14dzhestyvstvo !? In Russia, such a tradition - create difficulties, and then bravely overcome them !!! hi
    4. lelikas
      lelikas 13 November 2013 18: 06
      +5
      Again
      Oh, what an elephant was, what an elephant was. Elephant is bad, help is good © The koloboks lead the investigation
      If he was so smart and talented - why didn’t he know what was going on on his ships, and built the perfect maneuver based on the wrong assumptions?
      In my opinion, any commander should know such things, and not the number of pennants of his squadron.
      1. Delta
        Delta 13 November 2013 18: 13
        +1
        Quote: lelikas
        Again
        [b] If he was so smart and talented - why didn’t he know what was going on on his ships, and built the perfect maneuver based on the wrong assumptions?
        In my opinion, any commander should know such things, and not the number of pennants of his squadron.


        about! And when I say that Popov is more to blame for the death of the Kursk than all the other Popov, they start arguing with me ...
    5. CHILD
      CHILD 13 November 2013 23: 12
      0
      about the disgusting quality of our shells of those years they really write a lot .... very poor penetration ... Makarov, if my memory serves me right, even developed special caps for shells ....
  2. makarov
    makarov 13 November 2013 09: 30
    +4
    SW Author.
    Before assessing the activities of Rozhdestvensky, it is necessary to familiarize yourself with the job description (according to the then Circular) of the squadron commander. Without the availability of this document, and not knowing its content, it is impossible to draw parallels.
    Forgive me, but your work, without bringing the normative document, is simply "water" not confirmed by anything.
    1. Alexey
      Alexey 13 November 2013 12: 43
      +1
      No, not water. If you want a detailed analysis, go to the book of Galenin. Here are the conclusions. The conclusions are incomplete, scanty, but generally correct. A short article cannot be a full-fledged scientific work; you should not demand this.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. avt
      avt 13 November 2013 13: 23
      +3
      Quote: makarov
      Forgive me, but your work, without bringing the normative document, is simply "water" not confirmed by anything.

      good The article is a kind of sob of an enthusiastic schoolgirl at the sight of a gorgeous man in a uniform with orders. Well, I would have thrown a couple of caps up. So what, and the tragedy of the second squadron has been completely dismantled, literature, serious, not like this article, is complete. The author, before becoming graphomaniac, it is advisable to start studying it. I recommend starting with "On the" Orel "in Tsushima" Kostenko, quite a diary of an eyewitness, and then to his contemporaries.
      1. Serg 122
        Serg 122 13 November 2013 16: 05
        0
        Do you want a detailed analysis - you have to book Galenina
        Boris Galenin May 27.05.2006, XNUMX
        Soplevat your Galenin to make such statements! Is he a contemporary of that period? Was there personally? Even if he is 7 span wolbu, then in any situation, he only describes his point of view - nothing more am
  3. The comment was deleted.
  4. Prometey
    Prometey 13 November 2013 09: 38
    +7
    Article plus. There are too many slandered events and personalities in our history for the sake of political conjuncture. You read books by Soviet writers on the Russo-Japanese War and you marvel — in the Russian army and navy there were almost completely fools and slow-witted people — Kuropatkin — admiral Vitgeft — utter mediocrity, the Rozhdestvensky uncouth and arrogant blockhead and almost all officers of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadron — the same lumps. Only somehow was lucky Makarov, Kondratenko and several other personalities (although, personally, my opinion is that if they survived to the end of the war they would also be written down as losers). And extol the Japanese military genius (which, of course, was not observed) - this is a rule of good form.
    I personally recognize the talent of Novikov and his "Tsushima" - our historical heritage, but I never shared his point of view that Rozhestvensky was a wayward fool. A combat officer and admiral, who fulfilled his duty and remained on the ship almost to the end, simply could not be a coward. Having made an unprecedented crossing over 3 oceans with an obvious unfriendly disposition to Russia and the absence of bases on the route, he proved his strong organizational skills. By the way, at the military tribunal, Rozhestvensky took all the blame for the death of the squadron on himself, which speaks of him as a man of honor, who did not play and did not blame his subordinates. It is not his fault that various factors merged into one and eventually led to disaster. I agree with the author of the article - Rozhestvensky did everything that could be done under those conditions - he outplayed Togo tactically at the beginning of the battle, but apparently military luck at that time did not favor the Russians. I think it's time for us to get rid of historical myths and reconsider views on a number of events in our history.
    1. dmb
      dmb 13 November 2013 11: 41
      +5
      Well, where does the Soviet writer? It is worth recalling that they did not begin to criticize Rozhdestvensky. And, say, V. Pikul is a Soviet writer. Regarding Kuropatkin, I did not read kind words from either Soviet or pre-revolutionary writers. And the result of the war speaks for itself. It’s all the same that some of them now swearing (and sometimes) rightly for Stalin during the summer of 1941 make unreasonably a great martyr from Pavlov.
    2. avt
      avt 13 November 2013 13: 40
      0
      Quote: Prometey
      There are too many slandered events and personalities in our history for the sake of political conjuncture.

      Aha. And therefore, instead of a serious analysis, opportunistic bleaching begins a la Gorbachev's perestroika? Just try to form an opinion not on the basis of good works of art such as Tsushima, Port Arthur, although generally written by the participants in the events, but also the opinion of specialists and engineers both of those years and of the present, I repeat, in addition to Pikul and his ,, Cruisers ",,, Three years of the time of Okino san" There is a lot of good analytical literature on this topic, and on quite itself archival documents.
    3. Drosselmeyer
      Drosselmeyer 13 November 2013 15: 01
      +6
      Or maybe it was? Could the selection system for those worthy in command of the army and navy of the Republic of Ingushetia be flawed? Look here: the Crimean War, sane commanders can be counted on fingers, the Russo-Turkish war in Bulgaria is again the same situation. The war with the Japanese and again in the presence of one Kondratenko and one Makarov. We get involved in the First World War and again problems with the command - the defeat of Tannenberg, the collapse of the army and state.
      1. Karlsonn
        Karlsonn 13 November 2013 21: 15
        +1
        Quote: Drosselmeyer
        The war with the Japanese and again in the presence of one Kondratenko and one Makarov.


        One moment - before the Russo-Japanese War, Makarov never commanded a squadron or even a detachment of ships. So it’s impossible to judge his talents as a naval commander. And his appointment as commander of the Pacific Fleet is highly doubtful.
        1. Prometey
          Prometey 13 November 2013 23: 00
          -1
          Quote: Karlsonn
          Makarov never commanded a squadron or even a detachment of ships. So it’s impossible to judge his talents as a naval commander. And his appointment as commander of the Pacific Fleet is highly doubtful.

          That's the whole point. What merits extol Admiral Makarov? Yes, he was an erudite, competent specialist, military theorist, but that's right - we cannot judge his naval art. But it so happened - Makarov - an exception in the vicious system of the Russian Empire. So they write and there is no doubt about it.
          1. Delta
            Delta 14 November 2013 02: 31
            +4
            Quote: Prometey
            What merits extol Admiral Makarov? Yes, he was an erudite, competent specialist, military theorist, but that's right - we cannot judge his naval art.


            Well, if only a theorist ...
            He was the first in the world to successfully use torpedo weapons. Not bad for a theorist. During the defense of Port Arthur, he organized sentinel service, led the reflection of night attacks by Japanese destroyers, made extensive use of mine weapons, organized cross-country shooting, arranged regular squadron exits to the sea for maneuvering and firing (and exits during one tide), trawling enemy mines in an external raid . Before him there was a standing swamp, everyone was sitting and stupidly waiting for something. Well, one can recall how twice the Russian squadron under his command prevented the Japanese fleet from trying to lock the Russian Pacific squadron in an external roadstead and block Port Arthur.
      2. Prometey
        Prometey 13 November 2013 23: 14
        0
        Quote: Drosselmeyer
        Or maybe it was? Could the selection system for those worthy in command of the army and navy of RI be flawed?

        So, if you dig around, nuggets were a rare exception in all the armies and fleets of the world. It is difficult to answer unambiguously.
      3. CHILD
        CHILD 13 November 2013 23: 29
        +1
        there is an opinion of historians that at the beginning we almost leaked the WWII because of the generals .... there are a lot of opinions as always ... but one thing is absolutely true, questions to gentlemen generals arose constantly .... but really capable people are depressing every time it’s not enough .... it turns out that the selection system is not just flawed)))) it seems that it’s simply not true ... only where can I get another ???? and whoever heard about it ??? it seems to me much easier))) ) in peacetime, military generals are not needed, I suspect not comfortable guys ... but in military all command places are already taken)))))
    4. Delta
      Delta 13 November 2013 18: 20
      +2
      Quote: Prometey
      I personally, I recognize the talent of Novikov and his "Tsushima" - our historical heritage, but I never shared his point of view that Rozhestvensky was a wayward fool. A combat officer and an admiral who fulfilled his duty and remained on the ship almost to the end - he simply could not be a coward.


      Many accuse Novikov, they say, from the position of a bailer to judge the war and the great battles, tactics and strategy - too tough. God is with him, with Surf, but Kostenko was after all. And this is a completely different level. Who else but Kostenko suggested that Rozhestvensky remove an extra tree from ships and boats? the great naval commander ignored, like many other sensible proposals
    5. Karlsonn
      Karlsonn 13 November 2013 21: 03
      -1
      Quote: Prometey
      Only somehow was lucky Makarov, Kondratenko and several other personalities (although, personally, my opinion is that if they survived to the end of the war they would also be recorded as losers). And extol the Japanese military genius (which, of course, was not observed) - this is a rule of good form.


  5. svp67
    svp67 13 November 2013 09: 43
    +5
    If he had shot himself, then by doing so he would have washed away much more of the "stain of shame" than the author is now trying to do ...
    1. cosmos111
      cosmos111 13 November 2013 09: 50
      +2
      Quote: svp67
      "a spot of shame" than the author is trying to do now ...

      It was necessary not to shoot, but to win the battle.
      The Japanese before tsushima, generally had no experience, major naval battles.
      The Russian fleet had a glorious history of 200 years.
      1. Prometey
        Prometey 13 November 2013 09: 56
        +4
        Quote: cosmos111
        The Russian fleet had a glorious history of 200 years.

        Not a single fleet of the world at that time had the experience of naval battles with modern (at that time) ships - armadillos. The whole glorious history of the Russian fleet was based on sailing ships. Is not it?
        1. Alexey
          Alexey 13 November 2013 12: 46
          +1
          Well, wasn’t it? And the battle of the Japanese cruisers with the Chinese armadillos in 1898?
          1. Prometey
            Prometey 13 November 2013 12: 55
            -1
            Quote: Alex
            Well, wasn’t it?

            So, minor hassles. Although your comment is not in favor of the fact that
            Quote: cosmos111
            The Japanese before tsushima, generally had no experience, major naval battles.
            1. avt
              avt 13 November 2013 14: 31
              0
              Quote: Prometey
              So, minor hassles. Although your comment is not in favor of the fact that

              "Minor skirmishes" as a result of which the entire Chinese fleet was covered with a copper basin and even became a trophy of the Japanese and led to the capture of Port-Arthur with a peninsula subsequently transferred to Russia !? laughing
      2. Zerstorer
        Zerstorer 13 November 2013 10: 10
        0
        Quote: cosmos111
        The Russian fleet had a glorious history of 200 years.

        But the Japanese had the British and in fact it turned out that the French battleships fought with the British ... In general, the article is a fat plus. Rozhestvensky had miscalculations, but who does not. We must learn from mistakes, and not indiscriminately blame one person. Then you can blame the entire "Top" from the emperor to the admiral. And we, by the way, now stubbornly climb on a similar rake.
        1. cosmos111
          cosmos111 13 November 2013 10: 19
          +3
          Quote: Zerstorer
          person. Then you can blame the entire "Top" from the emperor to the admiral. And we, by the way, now stubbornly climb on a similar rake.

          Then the power system is rotten to the ground.
          And now a similar situation.
          Christmas, of course, is to blame, but only in part.
          In my opinion, he did everything he could in this particular battle.
          1. Zerstorer
            Zerstorer 14 November 2013 10: 47
            +2
            Quote: cosmos111
            Then the power system is rotten to the ground.
            And now a similar situation.

            Here I am about it.
            Who is the initiator of sending the fleet there? Is it not obvious that the fleet will not be combat ready after such a transition? This is a strategic miscalculation. The Japanese could not win the war if it dragged on. And we ourselves came under attack.
            Nobody takes responsibility off anyone. But it’s not good to forget who made the main strategic mistakes.
        2. avt
          avt 13 November 2013 16: 29
          +5
          Quote: Zerstorer
          We must learn from mistakes, and not indiscriminately blame one person. Then you can blame the entire "Top" from the emperor to the admiral.

          Can you tell me for an hour what post this “martyr” of the battalion Novikov-Priboy occupied before his appointment to command the second squadron?
          Quote: cosmos111
          Then the power system is rotten to the ground.

          Here try to tell enthusiastic fans of Nikolasha No. 2 to the monarchists as well laughing I believe in the Stalinist will immediately.
      3. svp67
        svp67 13 November 2013 10: 43
        +1
        Quote: cosmos111
        It was necessary not to shoot, but to win the battle.

        and "by the RESULTS?" ...
        1. cosmos111
          cosmos111 13 November 2013 11: 55
          0
          Quote: svp67
          and "by the RESULTS?" ...

          On the basis of the received (bloody experience) to build a new fleet. And to develop tactics of sea battle in modern conditions.
          And he shot himself, who would benefit from this?
          1. svp67
            svp67 13 November 2013 20: 24
            0
            Quote: cosmos111
            And he shot himself, who would benefit from this?

            Admiral Christmas and Navy Honor
      4. Motors1991
        Motors1991 13 November 2013 15: 28
        -1
        It was just that the Japanese had this experience, they got it in battles with the Russian Pacific squadron, but Rozhdestvensky and his squadron did not have such experience. Moreover, the Japanese from battle to battle became more experienced and confident in their superiority, which can not be said about Russians. If Rozhdestvensky collided with Togo at the very beginning of the war, perhaps the result would be different. Nevertheless, you can’t refuse Rozhestvensky in strong-willed and mental qualities.
    2. Prometey
      Prometey 13 November 2013 09: 59
      +1
      Quote: svp67
      If he had shot himself, then by doing this he would have washed away much more the "stain of shame"

      In this case, half of the Russian commanders who lost the battle, well, at least Peter I in the Prut campaign, Kutuzov at Austerlitz, Suvorov in the Swiss campaign should shoot out. Strange logic, of course.
      1. Drummer
        Drummer 13 November 2013 10: 25
        +7
        Tsushima is not an ordinary defeat, and the circumstances of surrender are confusing.
        1. Prometey
          Prometey 13 November 2013 10: 31
          0
          Quote: Drummer
          Tsushima is not an ordinary defeat, and the circumstances of surrender are confusing.

          They were embarrassed if a white flag had been raised at the beginning of the battle. The fact of the capture of the shell-shocked Christmas, which is in an unconscious state, was confirmed by the Japanese themselves.
          1. Drummer
            Drummer 13 November 2013 13: 52
            +3
            As well as the fact of the surrender of a serviceable and efficient ship without a fight. The ZPR took responsibility for the delivery of "Bedovy".
      2. Djozz
        Djozz 13 November 2013 11: 22
        +3
        Explain about the "defeat" of Suvorov in the Swiss campaign, and Massena's comments on this matter!
        1. Prometey
          Prometey 13 November 2013 11: 35
          -2
          Quote: Djozz
          Explain about the "defeat" of Suvorov in the Swiss campaign, and Massena's comments on this matter!

          Massena defeated the Rimsky-Korsakov corps, what other comments do you need. As a result, Suvorov’s Swiss campaign turned out to be a futile undertaking. Suvorov did not meet with the main forces of Massena.
          1. Djozz
            Djozz 13 November 2013 11: 50
            +4
            And, what does Suvorov have to do with it! "I am ready to give all my victories for one passage of Suvorov across the Alps" -Masséna! Learn history.
            1. Prometey
              Prometey 13 November 2013 11: 58
              -2
              Quote: Djozz
              And what does Suvorov have to do with it!

              And what does Massena have to do with that? No one disputes the strength of the military spirit of the Suvorov soldiers, but the whole campaign eventually became in vain. After the transition, Suvorov did not dare to go out to meet Massena's army.
    3. Zerstorer
      Zerstorer 14 November 2013 11: 00
      +1
      You can always have time to shoot yourself. And who will generalize and take into account the experience gained at such a great price. Shoot himself - too stupid way out in this situation. The Emperor is out of the picture at all. My hut is on the edge - I don't know about the war. I am generally silent about the rotten elite. Many in "high society" wanted our troops to be defeated. So for good others it was necessary to shoot.
  6. Fin
    Fin 13 November 2013 10: 19
    +3
    one of the main characters of which is Z.P. Christmas. The Chief of the Main Naval Staff of Russia was by no means stupid

    No one even says he's stupid. But it was he who killed the squadron. Much has been written about the Tsushima battle and everything is disassembled in minutes. Indecision, inertness and lack of faith in victory led to disaster. There are many talented people, but not everyone knows how to apply it in business.
    "This is a wonderful sailor, an energetic leader, skillful, courageous ...", but immediately declared: "He is a prisoner of the state of affairs that he did not create and which he cannot change."

    Here is his decadent mood after the outbreak of war. Lost the battle before going to sea.
    The author apparently wanted to stand out. I don’t even want to read a book.
    1. Alexey
      Alexey 13 November 2013 12: 49
      -3
      You are superficial and, in fact, simply believe in what you once read.
    2. Alexey
      Alexey 13 November 2013 12: 49
      0
      You are superficial and, in fact, simply believe in what you once read.
  7. Prometey
    Prometey 13 November 2013 10: 25
    -3
    Quote: Fin
    Much has been written about the Tsushima battle and everything is disassembled in minutes. Indecision, inertness and lack of faith in victory led to disaster.

    All this is based on the opinion of almost one person who asked fashion to consider the Tsushima battle - Novikov-Priboy, which is not true.
    1. avt
      avt 13 November 2013 17: 36
      +1
      Quote: Prometey
      All this is based on the opinion of almost one person who asked fashion to consider the Tsushima battle - Novikov-Priboy, which is not true.

      It is not true when, after reading one book, pass judgment on the event as a whole without appeal. And even more so when you believe that no one has read anything else, and if you have read it, then certainly a retelling of Tsushima. ”Look and find, Tsushima catastrophe has technically and every minute. As well as the biography of the defendant from lieutenants to admiral.
    2. Dovmont
      Dovmont 13 November 2013 18: 24
      +2
      Why are you all appealing to fiction? I agree that the novels "Port-Arthur", "Tsushima" are undoubtedly talented works, many of us have read them in childhood. But this is fiction, and deeply ideologized - remember at least "The Zvonarev Family" - the continuation of "Port Arthur"! It should be based on the works of military experts dedicated to Tsushima, of which there are already not a single hundred!
  8. sevtrash
    sevtrash 13 November 2013 10: 34
    +1
    Perhaps Christmas was actually a victim of circumstances. But only to a certain extent, because similar circumstances acted against other generals. However, Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, Suvorov, Nelson and others achieved victory in different conditions, including when these very circumstances were against them.
    Maybe Christmas was a good admiral, but maybe not bad. In those conditions, this was not enough. Maybe it was necessary, at that moment when Togo began to turn the squadron, to throw the Russian squadron into close combat. But it would be a very bold decision. Ushakov, perhaps, would have decided. And that is not a fact.
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 13 November 2013 10: 51
      -1
      Quote: sevtrash
      Maybe Christmas was a good admiral, but maybe not bad.

      Well, it’s worth talking about. Not everyone is given to be great. Accusing Rozhdestvensky of being neither Nelson, Ushakov, nor de Reuters is at least stupid.
      Quote: sevtrash
      when Togo began to turn the squadron, throw the Russian squadron into close combat.

      The times of boarding battles are long gone, and only a madman could lead ships at point-blank range, given the level of artillery development at that time. Still, not the era of sailing ships.
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 13 November 2013 11: 08
        +1
        Quote: Prometey
        The times of boarding battles are long gone, and only a madman could lead ships at point-blank range, given the level of artillery development at that time. Still, not the era of sailing ships.

        We are not talking about boarding at all. This option - close combat after the turn of Togo - was considered as an alternative to the action of Rozhdestvensky. Even Novikov-Priboy cites the words of one of the commanders of the squadron ship during the turn of Togo, that this option should be tried.
        Kostenko or Novikov-Priboy also have a justification for this decision, including taking into account the quality of artillery training, the quality of shells, and the possibility of concentrating fire on the course corners of the ships of the Russian squadron.
        Once upon a time a well-known and debated option.
        1. Prometey
          Prometey 13 November 2013 11: 28
          +2
          Quote: sevtrash
          Once upon a time a well-known and debated option.

          The fact of the matter is that the risk is little justified. There is only an assumption that supposedly Russian shells at a short distance could show their armor-piercing power, but they might not show. And for the sake of justice, at that time the squadron was apparently not ready to break the order in any fleet. Also, in the Battle of Jutland, neither the Germans nor the British took this risky step, but were hollowed by clumsy wake columns, which was justified for artillery duels.
  9. UVB
    UVB 13 November 2013 10: 46
    +7
    All this is based on the opinion of almost one person who asked fashion to consider the Tsushima battle - Novikov-Priboy, which is not true.

    You are wrong. I recommend books by V.P. Kostenko. "On the" Eagle "in Tsushima" and VI Semenov. "Pay". Both authors, unlike Novikov-Priboy, are officers, and Kostenko is also a talented shipbuilding engineer. Both are participants in the battle. And their opinion about the command of the 2nd squadron Rozhdestvensky does not differ very much from N.-P.
  10. Apologet insane
    Apologet insane 13 November 2013 11: 06
    -5
    And here they stuck Stalin =) Our troops defeated the incapable archaic Kwantung army, armed with the latest technology of the 20s, but practically did not meet with the fleet and aircraft.
    1. ac5pr7u
      ac5pr7u 13 November 2013 14: 02
      +3
      And why did the Japanese archaic army beat Americans, British, French, or are they also armed at the level of the 20s.
      1. Apologet insane
        Apologet insane 13 November 2013 16: 45
        -2
        But remember where and in what conditions, and with what exactly the Japanese beat the British, French and Americans, and what was the nature of the battles with the Soviet troops. They beat allies on land in the jungle and on rugged terrain, with virtually no equipment, where there is no operational scope for the use of armored vehicles. At the same time, they used overwhelming superiority in the air and good material and technical support, the proximity of the main bases, which the allies cut off from the metropolises could not boast of. Plus, almost all the allied fortified areas at the beginning of the war were within the reach of the fleet, Japan's only strong military force. And at the end of the war the fleet was already defeated, aviation too. Plus, the land equipment of the Kwantung Army was terribly outdated. Well, in the classical struggle on land, the Japanese could not oppose the USSR. So it goes.
    2. SkiF_RnD
      SkiF_RnD 18 November 2013 16: 57
      0
      In vain they minus a person. In the technical backwardness of the Japanese, he is absolutely right, damn it. The Japanese beat the Americans and the British in 41-42, by the end of the war, unlike Germany, they were whipping boys. Enough to read about the battles of the Americans against Japan in 1944. Even then, the "imperials" were merging into a clean one. Those who put minuses are completely unfamiliar with the topic.
  11. The comment was deleted.
  12. fennekRUS
    fennekRUS 13 November 2013 11: 08
    +4
    for tips on books, thanks. I read it. In general, it is a thankless business to give assessments. Everyone has their own, the only correct (tm) opinion) This question also always worried me - "Why were the Japanese ships not blown to shreds in these 10-15 minutes, but left the disastrous zone with minor damage, lined up in a new line and collapsed to our ships? " I haven't found the answer yet
  13. dievleha
    dievleha 13 November 2013 11: 14
    +4
    "Rozhestvensky himself believed that the reason for the failure was the poor shooting of our artillerymen" did not understand this quote, who if not he was responsible for their preparation, and there was a lot of time for it And the article minus the failure to blame the sailors and the Bolsheviks is not even funny
  14. Djozz
    Djozz 13 November 2013 11: 19
    0
    In World War II, the Japanese stepped on the same rake as the Russians under Tsushima, replacing the Shimoza with high-slowdown armor-piercing rounds that pierced American aircraft carriers with minimal damage.
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 13 November 2013 11: 50
      0
      Quote: Djozz
      In World War II, the Japanese stepped on the same rake as the Russians under Tsushima, replacing the "shimoza" with armor-piercing shells

      Shimoza is not a stable explosive. It was abandoned in favor of Tola in the First World War. And in fact - Tsushima - the first and last triumph of high-explosive shells. All fleets of the world switched to armor-piercing shells.
      1. Djozz
        Djozz 13 November 2013 12: 04
        +2
        I wrote about armor-piercing shells with fuses with a long delay, with which Russian ships were equipped! And who told you that all the fleets of the world used only armor-piercing shells.
  15. svskor80
    svskor80 13 November 2013 11: 37
    +4
    Explain about the "defeat" of Suvorov in the Swiss campaign, and Massena's comments on this matter!

    I would also like to hear an explanation. Suvorov, in his youth in Poland, had a episode that could be pulled by the ears as a defeat, but not a brilliant Swiss campaign, after which it was worth the French generals to shoot.
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 13 November 2013 11: 53
      -1
      Quote: svskor80
      but not brilliant swiss hike

      Brilliant - like a triumph of military spirit - agrees. In a tactical and strategic sense - it turned out to be meaningless. After the defeat of the Russian corps in Switzerland, Suvorov had to urgently take his legs away.
      1. SkiF_RnD
        SkiF_RnD 21 November 2013 15: 15
        0
        As far as I understand, we are talking about the talent of commanders. From the point of view of military science, Suvorov is an innovator and an excellent tactician and strategist. Politics, allies, campaign goals, diplomacy is not his business at all. Everything that depended on him was done in the best possible way. The futility of the Swiss campaign is the problem of politicians, not Suvorov. Comparing with defeats on the battlefield is inappropriate. Sincerely.
  16. Djozz
    Djozz 13 November 2013 11: 53
    +2
    "All my victories, I would give for one Suvorov crossing the Alps" -Masssena!
  17. Bugivugi
    Bugivugi 13 November 2013 12: 26
    +1
    A wonderful book about these events "Port Arthur".
    1. sevtrash
      sevtrash 13 November 2013 17: 42
      +1
      Not at all about these events, about the defense of Port Arthur. In general, it is closer to the artistic, or rather, it is a novel based on real events. The battery was probably the exact one, but those artillery men might not exist in reality, we would have to read it one more time.
      A good book, yes. Although I read it well for a very long time.
  18. Alexey
    Alexey 13 November 2013 12: 58
    +4
    To the author +. For me, there is nothing new in the article. I came to such conclusions a long time ago. But thank you.
    Py.Sy. Why, as a child, I read "Tsushima" by Surf. This is one of the books that piqued my interest and defined my profession. Alas, as time went on, knowledge was added, the facts were learned, and over time my views on the battle, the reasons for the defeat, etc. have changed markedly. Alas, N. Priboy, battalier of article 2, nurtured among the masses the grain of his personal fierce hatred of Rozhdestvensky.
    1. sevtrash
      sevtrash 13 November 2013 17: 50
      0
      Quote: Alex
      Alas, the article 2 N. N. Priboy raised among the masses the grain of his personal fierce hatred of Rozhdestvensky.

      I do not think that Novikov Priboy hated Rozhdestvensky so much. Rather, he carried out the state order, the tsar admiral could not be good. Unless proletarian or close origin.
      I read it as a schoolboy, it was interesting, now it’s not so, of course.
      1. Delta
        Delta 13 November 2013 18: 11
        +1
        Quote: sevtrash
        Rather, he carried out the state order, the tsar admiral could not be good. Unless proletarian or close origin.


        Why does Novikov speak well of the same Makarov?
        1. sevtrash
          sevtrash 13 November 2013 18: 51
          +2
          Quote: Delta
          Why does Novikov speak well of the same Makarov?

          Novikov writes "... the only man in the fleet, being the son of a boatswain of the Vladivostok crew, thanks to happy circumstances, penetrated an extremely closed and closed caste of officers ..."
          Partly because of this - the origin was declared suitable, well, plus to that - a scientist, researcher, shipbuilder - that is, already almost a worker, almost a proletarian. The works of Makarov were again clamped, the same Rozhdestvensky.
          1. Delta
            Delta 13 November 2013 19: 19
            0
            Quote: sevtrash
            being the son of a boatswain of the Vladivostok crew


            Osip Makarov, EMNIP rose to the rank of captain, and the fact that he was once a boatswain doesn’t really begin. Not all admirals were of noble origin.
      2. Alexey
        Alexey 14 November 2013 06: 08
        0
        Roads of Rozhestvensky and Novikov used to intersect. Watchhouse drunk ...
  19. Prometey
    Prometey 13 November 2013 13: 04
    0
    Quote: Alex
    Alas, the article 2 N. N. Priboy raised among the masses the grain of his personal fierce hatred of Rozhdestvensky.

    Support.
  20. pahom54
    pahom54 13 November 2013 13: 16
    +6
    I quote: "He is a prisoner of the state of affairs that he did not create and which he cannot change" ...
    Even from the work of Novikov-Surf "Tsushima" it was clear that the squadron for sending to the Far East was going, as it were, "with the world on a string", that is, they were sending what could float ... So, in fact, the outcome of our battle was hypo squadron was already known in advance. Only the heroism of our sailors was able to inflict damage on the Japanese squadron, and only he, and not their fault, and not the admiral's fault in losing this battle.
    In general, history has long been a political mechanism for fooling people, and not only in Russia - the USSR - and again in Russia. Many worthy people are ostracized (easier - they justify ..), and many vile personalities praise her (history).
    But (well, now I’ll pick up the minuses) the collection of our modern squadron located in the Mediterranean reminds me of something (God forbid, of course) ... Does history repeat itself?
  21. Leisure
    Leisure 13 November 2013 13: 30
    0
    Anything can happen. There was a reason to get even.
  22. Astartes
    Astartes 13 November 2013 13: 35
    +1
    The admiral is not to blame, the "bad sailors" are to blame - the conclusion: the author is moral, especially not quite skillful, contradicts himself, at first he writes about heroic sailors who do not leave sinking and burning ships, and then writes how bad and "propagandized" they are. Delirium in one word.
  23. Standard Oil
    Standard Oil 13 November 2013 13: 55
    10
    By the way, we must not forget about the mood before the Russian-Japanese war "right now, we pound the monkeys," after all, no one thought that everything would end with such a huge failure. Well, since the efforts of the liberals and Bolsheviks, the Russian-Japanese war in general and Tsushima in particular is covered with myths and not you will disassemble where is the truth, and where is lies, I propose to simply judge by the results:
    1. The Russian Empire suffered perhaps the most shameful defeat in history;
    2. The Russian fleet was defeated;
    3.Port Arthur was commissioned;
    4. Wherever the "Holy Great Martyr and Strong Business Manager Nicholas 2" completely failed, the "tyrant and bloody maniac-murderer" Stalin had to be corrected. And you probably know the halo of the saint that above Nikolashka's head interferes with thinking and thinking.
    I don’t see the point of arguing about what the Rozhdestvensky naval commander was, for the result is obvious. It's like with Nelson and Villeneuve, with Nelson it’s clear, let's argue how good this man was this Pierre-Charles de Villeneuve, but he blew Trafalgar and with the help of his actions / omissions brought Great Britain into the greatest sea powers. So with Rozhdestvensky, maybe he was a wonderful man and naval commander, but with his actions / inactions allowed a monster called the Japanese Empire with its fleet and ambition + Nazi ideology to be born, to deal with the cat Roy had another.
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 13 November 2013 14: 21
      +2
      Quote: Standard Oil
      but through his actions / omissions allowed the birth of a monster called the Japanese Empire with its fleet and ambition

      Here you are fundamentally wrong - the Japanese Empire was created by English and American money.
      1. Standard Oil
        Standard Oil 13 November 2013 16: 44
        +3
        Money was of tremendous importance, but didn’t Russia’s self-exclusion from the region completely free Japan's hands? And if Russia won in that war, who knows how our history would turn out, it would probably not be February or October 1917, or even World War I.
        1. Sour
          Sour 13 November 2013 19: 12
          0
          World War I would still be, because its main reason was the aspirations of Germany. And the results of the Russo-Japanese War did not influence this in any way.
          And the revolution would still be. Its cause was a severe systemic crisis of Russian statehood, and this was not eliminated by foreign policy successes. Even if the WWII did not take place, then the revolution would still be. WWII - this is not the cause of the revolution, but just the situation in which it took place.
          The only thing that the victory of Russia in 1905 would have influenced is the position of Japan in the future. In this case, Japan in WWI would most likely be an ally of Germany. And Russia in 1914-1917 would have fought on two fronts.
  24. RPG_
    RPG_ 13 November 2013 14: 33
    0
    Any adequate person knows that Rozhdestvensky is a good admiral. But he could have won the battle of Tsushima, but he did not. He did not send 4 of the latest high-speed battleship Borodino to fire at the turning point, and there was no strategy for the battle and had not been discussed before. And after his injury, everything fell apart and the beating of the baby began. It is also incomprehensible what for he overloaded the battleships with coal? I counted on a multi-day battle and the impossibility (difficulty) of bunkering at sea during the battle is extremely doubtful.
    As a result, he made more mistakes than Togo. It was not lucky that they wounded him so early, but the strongest were lucky.
    1. tomas.09
      tomas.09 13 November 2013 17: 12
      0
      Well, it was said that the Russian fleet went without bases at all. So they loaded coal as much as they could take. The British then had an abundance of coal stations, etc.
      1. Storm
        Storm 14 November 2013 09: 23
        0
        There is also a version that Rozhestvensky planned to go to Vladivostok bypassing Japan. Hence, such a load of coal.
        By the way, the Japanese, too, were heavily loaded with coal, more than the norm - so that in case of something, not to waste time entering the bases and bunkering.
  25. Drosselmeyer
    Drosselmeyer 13 November 2013 15: 16
    +4
    There is an old Roman proverb: "Woe to the vanquished!" History gave Rozhdestvensky a chance that every military man dreams of all his life and which may never come. He could have won this battle and stood on a par with Nakhimov, Ushakov and Makarov, but now he will forever be the personification of the shame of the Russian fleet.
    Even judging by this short article, you understand that at the very beginning of the campaign the squadron commander internally relieved himself of responsibility for the defeat, which he considered inevitable. By the way, with the same mood, the French Admiral Villeneuve drove his fleet to the slaughter at Trafalgar. These commanders lost the battle before they began. Admiral Togo was not a genius strategist, like Wellington at Waterloo, for example, but they firmly knew what to do, were active and did not even allow the thought of defeat.
  26. Babon
    Babon 13 November 2013 15: 42
    +2
    The investigation was carried out after Tsushima, and the conclusions are simple, either the admiral was completely incompetent, or purposefully sent the squadron to the slaughter, one of two. Well, since Rozhdestvensky was associated with Plehve’s entourage, it seems to me that purposefully he sent the squadron to slaughter. It would be nice for the author to add the facts that were charged to him in court, and the conclusions of the investigation, and it turns out that he is not so slandered, indeed many of his actions did not give in to logic, even before the start of the battle.
  27. c3r
    c3r 13 November 2013 17: 03
    +2
    Of course, you cannot name the winner of Rozhestvensky, but I want to note the following points, which in my opinion can be credited to this naval commander.
    1. In essence, at that time, the Tsushima battle was the first battle of a steam armored fleet of such proportions and at such a distance from its bases (the battle in the Yellow Sea was faster and in more favorable conditions). Accordingly, all tactical conclusions (formations, the use of weapons, logistics, reconnaissance, etc.) were based either on the level of the sailing steam fleet, or on theoretical (well if tested on training grounds or mock-ups) calculations. This can also be attributed to the debate about the type of shells, which got on edge. In tests at the test site, armor-piercing shells with pyroxylin showed at least an acceptable destructive effect, therefore they were put into service and at that moment no one thought that the battle would be carried out at long distances where even in optics it’s difficult to shoot without a clearly visible flash, this is a cue for thinking at the level of a sailing steam fleet.
    2. In addition, not only the Tsushima battle itself, but also the transition was the first in the history of so many armadillos and other ships to the theater of operations. And taking into account that the Russian fleet’s bases were virtually absent along the transition route (it was necessary for the Germans and the French to refuel, there was no talk of any repairs or cleaning of the hulls, as well as the fact that the transition as a whole was trouble-free, although it was overloaded with coal , the fatigue of the personnel already gave a large number of reasons for this, this fact of the transition can be credited to both the naval commander and the heroic crews.
    3. As a result, I want to say that negative experience is also an experience that must be studied and taken into account to prevent it from repeating and blaming one person for the shortcomings of the whole system is currently pointless, especially since the court of that time did not recognize him as a coward and an unworthy person .
  28. Luga
    Luga 13 November 2013 18: 43
    +1
    Long thought to put a minus or plus to the article. Didn't put anything. The "slandered admiral" was reproached for cowardice, lack of initiative and incompetence. Look at the biography of Rozhestvensky - for almost thirty years of service, he has never shown either one or the other, or the third. Why should we believe that on the most important day for him, these three ailments, suddenly, he was fatally struck? And to accuse the admiral of treason for the sake of some political considerations - in my opinion, is generally beyond the bounds.
    And this devastating defeat is explained, in my opinion, by the fatal coincidence of a whole range of reasons, including the political and moral condition of the crews, their low technical literacy, the disgusting quality of shells, guns, gunner’s qualifications, and simply the general technical backwardness of the fleet, the suppression of the initiative of lower officers by higher officers and the higher the position, the less allowed to take the initiative, and not vice versa, and, finally, the fatal luck that was on the side of the Japanese throughout her this miserable war.
    You say "the strongest is lucky". Yes, unfortunately it is. It's just that the Japanese were stronger at that time and in that place.
    In my opinion, Rozhdestvensky is simply an honest naval officer who does not have the special talents of a naval commander, although he did not have Makarov’s charisma, but is no worse than Togo. If Nakhimov or Ushakov were in his place, I think that simply a defeat would not be so devastating.
    1. Sour
      Sour 13 November 2013 19: 01
      +2
      Quote: Luga
      In my opinion, Rozhdestvensky is simply an honest naval officer who does not have the special talents of a naval commander, although he did not have Makarov’s charisma, but is no worse than Togo. If Nakhimov or Ushakov were in his place, I think that simply a defeat would not be so devastating.

      Rozhestvensky is certainly not the sole respondent for Tsushima. But it is one of the main ones. He, the admiral, and besides, "a person close to the emperor" (and what else to call the admiral of the EIH's retinue?), Is certainly responsible for the combat readiness of the fleet, otherwise it is not clear what he was paid for.
      To say that Rozhdestvensky is not responsible for Tsushima is about saying that Suvorov was not involved in the capture of Ishmael.
      1. Luga
        Luga 14 November 2013 00: 10
        0
        I agree with you. I wanted to say that there are many reasons for this defeat, and not just Rozhdestvensky alone. No need to hang ALL dogs on it. It is much more to blame for the humiliation of the country's top military-political leadership, led by the king and governor. And the admiral’s fault is only that he was not outstanding. Although this in itself is not enough.
  29. Luga
    Luga 13 November 2013 18: 43
    +2
    Long thought to put a minus or plus to the article. Didn't put anything. The "slandered admiral" was reproached for cowardice, lack of initiative and incompetence. Look at the biography of Rozhestvensky - for almost thirty years of service, he has never shown either one or the other, or the third. Why should we believe that on the most important day for him, these three ailments, suddenly, he was fatally struck? And to accuse the admiral of treason for the sake of some political considerations - in my opinion, is generally beyond the bounds.
    And this devastating defeat is explained, in my opinion, by the fatal coincidence of a whole range of reasons, including the political and moral condition of the crews, their low technical literacy, the disgusting quality of shells, guns, gunner’s qualifications, and simply the general technical backwardness of the fleet, the suppression of the initiative of lower officers by higher officers and the higher the position, the less allowed to take the initiative, and not vice versa, and, finally, the fatal luck that was on the side of the Japanese throughout her this miserable war.
    You say "the strongest is lucky". Yes, unfortunately it is. It's just that the Japanese were stronger at that time and in that place.
    In my opinion, Rozhdestvensky is simply an honest naval officer who does not have the special talents of a naval commander, although he did not have Makarov’s charisma, but is no worse than Togo. If Nakhimov or Ushakov were in his place, I think that simply a defeat would not be so devastating.
  30. samoletil18
    samoletil18 13 November 2013 18: 46
    0
    It is necessary to develop the Northern Sea Route. Otherwise, again through the Cape of Good Hope ...
  31. Sour
    Sour 13 November 2013 18: 49
    +4
    Quote: dmb
    Well, where does the Soviet writer? It is worth recalling that they did not begin to criticize Rozhdestvensky. And, say, V. Pikul is a Soviet writer. Regarding Kuropatkin, I did not read kind words from either Soviet or pre-revolutionary writers. And the result of the war speaks for itself. It’s all the same that some of them now swearing (and sometimes) rightly for Stalin during the summer of 1941 make unreasonably a great martyr from Pavlov.

    I will subscribe to almost every letter.
    Especially about Pavlov and Rozhdestvensky.
    I will only correct that Count A.A. Ignatiev wrote in his memoirs that Kuropatkin "strategically outplayed Oyama." By the end of the campaign, the Japanese army was badly exhausted, and a counterattack at Sippingai could have nullified all Japanese victories. But there was not enough political will. And there were opportunities.
    And here is another from the memoirs of Count Ignatieff.
    Kuropatkin, upon learning of my departure to Russia, invited me to dinner on his train, where he again moved from Hersu. He was probably curious that I would begin to talk about him in Petersburg. After lunch, he called me to his salon-car and, sitting in a chair, asked:
    “Well, dear Ignatiev, who do you think is the most to blame?”
    “Well, Your Excellency,” I replied, “you have commanded us, and of course you will remain guilty.”
    - And what do you think is especially to blame? - calmly asked Kuropatkin.
    - First of all, that few people were persecuted ...
    “Who are you hinting at?” What are the last names?
    “Yes, to those top generals whom you yourself did not trust.” Well, for example, the commander of the seventeenth corps, Baron Bilderling, the commander of the first army corps, Baron Meyendorf and others.
    Then my boss got up, went into the corner of a dark carriage, calmly opened a small safe and gave me the following telegram to read:
    “Your emperor finds the emperor to be excessive in your proposals for the renewal of the high command staff, and in particular for the replacement of Baron Bilderling by a general with such and such, etc.
    Signature: Minister of the Court Baron Fredericks. "

    After a moment of heavy silence, Kuropatkin continued the conversation about the officers ...
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  33. Pashhenko Nikolay
    Pashhenko Nikolay 13 November 2013 19: 38
    0
    It would be strange if you respect the admiral who surrendered. Vlasov and Paulus, too, were in a hopeless situation. Did anyone respect them for choosing to stay alive, unlike the soldiers who died in those battles?
    1. Babon
      Babon 13 November 2013 19: 50
      0
      And if you recall D.G. Pavlova? After the defeat of his troops, how did he end?
  34. Babon
    Babon 13 November 2013 19: 45
    0
    Here is another opinion.
    http://www.odnako.org/almanac/material/show_25004/
  35. kamakim
    kamakim 14 November 2013 00: 04
    0
    winners are not judged. here is another matter ...
  36. remez
    remez 14 November 2013 15: 21
    0
    The article is really good. to the author in plus.
  37. unknown
    unknown 17 November 2013 12: 52
    0
    The main responsibility for the defeat in the battle of Tsushima is Rozhdestvensky
    He made many mistakes, but the main thing was the low speed of the squadron, which allowed the Japanese to knock out Russian ships with concentrated fire.
    Recent studies show that Japanese ships had no real technical advantage. Incorrect tactics destroyed the Russian squadron. And the wrong tactics was chosen by Rozhdestvensky
    1. goga13
      goga13 April 6 2019 11: 49
      0
      The main responsibility for the defeat in the battle of Tsushima is Rozhdestvensky
      He made many mistakes, but the main thing was the low speed of the squadron, which allowed the Japanese to knock out Russian ships with concentrated fire.
      Recent studies show that Japanese ships had no real technical advantage. Incorrect tactics destroyed the Russian squadron. And the wrong tactics was chosen by Rozhdestvensky

      Comrade, learn history not from the corrupt libels of Kostenko and Novikov. Rozhdestvensky HERO and it is not his fault that he was detained for THREE months, allowing the YaF to reboot. They sent Nebogatov with "samotopes", dampened the shells ... in general, they did everything so that the company would not be successful.