USA: playing on foreign field by its own rules

What factors determine US strategy in Eurasia? Of course, there is a wide and dynamically changing range of American approaches to contemporary challenges in this vast space. At the same time, it can be noted that the most stable schemes and algorithms of Washington’s policy in this part of the world were influenced by a number of “Atlantic” geopolitical concepts of the 20th century. It seems that today it is time to take a closer look at them.

"Geographical threat to world freedom"

The famous English geographer Halford Mackinder (1861 – 1947) adhered to the belief that Hartland, by which he meant the inner space of the Eurasian continent, plays the role of a key region in global world processes. The main conclusion of the scientist: who dominates the Heartland, sooner or later will dominate the world. And then the gaze of Mackinder turned to Russia with its vast territories of Siberia and the Urals. The scientist strongly recommends that the United States move away from a Eurocentric approach to politics in Eurasia, noting that “one should not think about Europe” separately, for example, from Asia.

The United States and Great Britain identify the “world order” for Mackinder. According to the English scientist, the main issue for the Anglo-Saxons should be the creation of a security belt between the continental forces in the shape of Germany and Russia in the form of countries that necessarily have a state orientation different from Germany and Russia. It must maintain political alignment with the United States and the United Kingdom.

From the concept it can be concluded that Russia, and also to some extent Germany, express the Eurasian idea of ​​development. China and, possibly, Iran (also part of the Heartland) are in the same group with them. So, according to Mackinder, a sanitary cordon is objectively “necessary” between Russia and China, Russia and Iran, China and Iran.

The United States and Britain need to contribute to the emergence of contradictions between continental forces. The ambitions of Germany should be restrained by joining forces with France, and then with Russia, and building a new world order with the “leading role of the United States and Great Britain” with the help of China.

It is very important to understand that Heartland is designated as a "geographical threat to world freedom." Hence the foreign policy approaches of the United States and Great Britain to countries located in the Heartland spaces. A tough recommendation is given: the states of Eurasia should be “removed” from such influential continental centers of power as Europe (where Germany still plays a key role in its integration), Russia, and China. And on the contrary - in their political orientation they are close to the USA and Great Britain.

Mackinder was one of the first to try to bring under geopolitical categories a certain ideological basis, namely, the defense of democracy and the maintenance of peace. Need I remind you how widely Western propaganda uses this approach?

Based on sea power

The founder of the American school of geopolitics, Alfred Mahan (1840 – 1914), who in his assessments firmly adhered to the idea of ​​advantage and total domination of the most powerful maritime power, theoretically substantiated the importance of control of Rimland for the United States (English rim - edge, border) space of Eurasia.

Like Mackinder, Mahan proceeded from the thesis of the deep differences underlying the development of maritime and land states, proving that the first model is superior to the second. According to the American scientist, the advantages of a maritime power, such as the United States, are associated with a number of objective conditions created by the environment of the World Ocean in the form of greater mobility of movement and the economic benefits that depend on it. Moreover, according to Mahan, the commercial basis of a maritime power forms its peaceful character, while a land power is always distinguished by aggressiveness. At the same time, Mahan is sure that “pressure from the sea on land” should reduce the aggressiveness of the latter. According to Mahan, the desire of a maritime state to develop trade and, accordingly, fleet, as well as communication lines, leads to the fact that the new formula for international leadership can be expressed as follows: “Control of the sea [...] means dominant influence in the world.”

Without a doubt, the United States is seen as a leading sea Mahanu, and hence the world power. He is confident that the active foreign economic, political and military line, where the navy becomes the main driving force of the strategy and the guarantor of its success, meets the vital interests of the United States. At the same time, an American scientist advocates the need for the United States to display "political ambitions" at the global level. Among the arguments about the feasibility of the US conducting such an overarching foreign policy are exclusively economic considerations: commercial interests, industrial growth, the need to protect foreign markets.

Being a supporter of power - military - measures of influence on the world around and at the same time supporting the idea of ​​free trade, considering himself a "free trader by conviction", Mahan (like Mackinder and other founders of the "Atlantic" school of geopolitics) highlights some inconsistency not only of his teaching but also the entire strategy of the United States, combining the principles of realism and liberalism.

According to Mahan, liberalism performs "serving" functions in relation to realism. Reasoning about commerce, its significance is reduced by Mahan to the force factor, and the so-called open door policy he advocates, according to his own estimates, is nothing but “another direction of expression of the policy of balance.” Emphasizing the fact that the “external expansion” of the United States, which directly depends on sea power, pursues political, economic and commercial, rather than military objectives, Mahan insists on the need for America to be ready for armed confrontation anywhere in the world where its interests exist .

To solve the problem of economic, political and military domination of the United States in Eurasia, Mahan considers it expedient to create a chain of bases along the periphery of the continent. Here, key, strategically important areas are highlighted, for example, intersections of transport and communication routes. Developing his ideas, Mahan sets a more global challenge for American politics — forming support for the US presence from “friendly regions” located around military bases. He rightly notes that “the bases will become more stable if they are located in the territory of an allied or even neutral government”. The scientist notes that "offensive actions depend on energy" and "the security of a number of places where these resources are located." This logic of Mahan objectively leads to the strategic need for the United States to keep the named regions under control.

Mahan’s approaches, set out in the context of opposing sea and land directions of development of states, identifying certain key areas in Eurasia, preparing the US for military actions, lead to a conceptual definition of the most dangerous potential adversary, which becomes the only continental power. - Russia.

Among all the countries of Asia, Mahan gives the most attention to China, in which the American scientist sees great potential, noting "the great hidden power of the Chinese character." Mahan distinguishes such a geopolitical feature of China as the ability to exert influence not only on Asia, the Pacific region, but also on Europe. The scientist considers China as the future key object of the US strategy, in respect of which it is necessary to pursue a line on economic involvement, the so-called open-door policy. Mahan focuses on the need to prevent a change in the maritime orientation of China’s development towards a continental one, increasing its influence on him from some other external state (meaning most likely Russia).

Who controls Eurasia rules the world

American scientist Nicholas Spykmen (1893 – 1943) developed the theory of Mahan, while being influenced by the teachings of Mackinder. Spikeman’s concept seemed to draw a certain line under the geopolitical discussions of the beginning - the middle of the 20th century. It stands out against the background of other concepts (for example, the same Mahan and Mackinder) with its greater systematic nature, an attempt to examine the processes in the world based on a comprehensive analysis that takes into account a whole complex of factors and their interdependence.

Using the term “geopolitics” in his writings, Spykman puts in it clearly more meaning than his predecessors in the American, English, and German schools of geopolitics (many of which avoided this expression altogether). Geopolitical analysis, according to Spykmen, is an important tool when examining the past, present and future situation at the global and regional level, including security issues, the nature of the state, the balance of forces and interests, and the actual prerequisites for the occurrence of wars.

The main element of the whole concept of Spikeman was the concept of the Eurasian Rimland (or the “marginal crescent” of Mackinder). Spykman included Western Europe, the Near and Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, the territories of modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, parts of China and Southeast Asia, the Korean part of this geopolitical formation, located between Hartland (as the central part of the continent) and the seas washing Eurasia. Peninsula and the Far East. Outside this zone, of course, there are island states, including Great Britain and Japan.

Despite the fact that Spykmen views Rimland as a “buffer” space, with the function of protecting himself both on land and at sea, he notes its vital importance to global processes. The American scientist changed the "domination over the world" formula derived by his English counterpart Mackinder. According to Spykmen, "who controls Rimland - he controls Eurasia, who controls Eurasia - he controls the fate of the world."

Contributing to the development of the theory of confrontation between sea and land powers, Spykmen simultaneously emphasizes that the possibility of any alliance of countries such as the United States, Great Britain and Japan can lead to the potential likelihood of the unification of continental forces represented by Russia, Germany and China, who will feel in a hostile environment.

In this regard, according to Spykmen, for America it is important to combine methods of marine (as well as air) and land impact on the processes in Eurasia. Thus, at that time, the scientist even considered justified the need for close cooperation between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the direction of control over the events in Romeland.

However, on the whole, breaking his theory in accordance with American national interests, Spykman poses a number of tasks for the United States, the main of which is to prevent the threat of domination of Rimland by any forces other than the United States. For the USA is “geographically surrounded”, and the resources of the Eastern Hemisphere provide great opportunities for influencing the Western Hemisphere. The combined potential of Eurasia will be able to "outweigh" the potential of America.

All this gives Spykmen reason to assert that providing security for the United States is inextricably linked to their active "political participation in Europe and Asia." The scientist emphasizes that both in the Old World and in the Asian continent the United States must counter the emergence of hegemonic powers, "whose principles and ideals contradict the general context of the development of Western civilization." According to Spaykmen, the need for the United States as a whole is “both in peace and in wartime” to prevent “uniting the centers of power” of Eurasia into a coalition hostile to American interests.

Spykman regards the need to maintain a balance of power on the Eurasian continent as a key task for America’s national interests. Moreover, the processes of any kind of economic and political integration in this area can also be considered as "hostile" to the interests of the United States. As if to confirm this, Spykman notes that "the European Federation is not the kind of education that the United States should promote." He is certain that it is the balance of power in Europe, and not their integration — that is what the United States needs, which meets their needs. He is convinced that federative Europe can potentially undermine the value of the United States as an Atlantic power and greatly weaken American positions in the Western Hemisphere.

In general, according to Spykmen, America reached "hegemony positions" only because the states of the Eurasian continent "were never able to unite against us (US. - V.P.), and because concern about the balance of power at home prevented them from even identifying small some of their strengths for stocks across the Atlantic. "

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The geopolitical concepts of the 20th century are still in demand in the United States and continue to influence the nature of the American strategy in Eurasia. Among them, the concepts of Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan stand out. Despite the presence of some differences in approaches, all these scholars insist on the need for the active participation of Washington in Eurasian events. This position is dictated by the vital interests (economics, politics, ideology, etc.) of the USA.

Among the countries capable of forming Eurasian and, consequently, possibly anti-American alliances in their focus, Russia, Germany and potentially China stand out in particular. The most prominent representatives of the Atlantic school of geopolitics conclude that the very likelihood of uniting the efforts of these states, for example, in the case of their strategic alliance, could push the United States to the periphery of international life.

At the same time, the observed antagonism between the US-led Atlantic line in Eurasia and the concept of continental integration is associated for America primarily with real fears of remaining on the sidelines of Eurasian and global economic and political processes.