Military Review

Landing without chance of success

The first attempt of the deblokade of Leningrad in September 1941 was made by the forces of seamen, divers and cadets

In the Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War, Shlisselburg landing is shown primarily from the point of view of the heroism of sailors flotilla and paratroopers. At the landing site, on the banks of the Novoladozhsky Canal, in an inaccessible place, an anchor monument is installed. The inscription on the plate says that in this bay, in an unequal battle with the German invaders, the death of the brave marines, paratroopers, officers and cadets of the naval border school, KBF submarine divers and sailors of the Ladoga military flotilla. Finding a monument is not easy. An appeal to the encyclopedias gives little information that the Schlisselburg assault is a tactical assault of the Soviet Ladoga flotilla, landed on September 25, 1941 during the 1st Sinyavinsky operation to break through the blockade of Leningrad. The lack of information causes increased interest in the study of this little-known attempt to release Leningrad. But in addition to the heroism of the paratroopers, one should also note the poor preparation of operations, when the command sent soldiers to death without the slightest chance of success.

The landing operation was preceded by the end of August 1941 of the divisions of the 39 th motorized corps of the 16 th army of Army Group North to the south-eastern approaches of Leningrad. On August 30, units of the German 20 Motorized Division reached the Neva River in the Ivanovsky area and at the same time reached the Mga station and cut the Kirov railway, the last line linking Leningrad with the country. By capturing MGA, the German units launched an offensive towards the southern shore of Lake Ladoga and on September 8 captured Shlisselburg, completely blocking Leningrad from land. Thus began the heroic defense of Leningrad.

Landing without chance of success

The Soviet command hastily proceeded to the preparation of the operation on the de-blockade of Leningrad, which provided for the delivery of counter blows at the narrowest point of the blockade ring south of Ladoga (in the so-called bottle-neck). The troops of the Nevskaya operational group of the Leningrad Front from the right bank of the Neva and the 54 Army from the Volkhov River should, advancing towards each other in the general direction of the Mga and Sinyavino, unite and unlock Leningrad. Demanding the front commanders to launch an offensive as quickly as possible, the Supreme Command headquarters expected that the German command could not create a solid defense for 40 kilometers along the Mga - Shlisselburg line six to seven days after the capture of Shlisselburg. Part of the overall plan was the plan for the landing of the 1 division of the NKVD and the battalion of sailors of the Ladoga military flotilla (LVF) in the Shlisselburg region in order to capture the city and subsequent connection with the troops of the 54 army southeast of Sinyavino.

On September 16, Army General Georgy Zhukov, commander of the Leningrad Front, ordered the headquarters of the Ladoga military flotilla to begin preparations for the landing operation. The first landing force was formed from special purpose diving scouts and cadets of the maritime border school (185 people). For their delivery to the landing site, 12 boats and 10 inflatable army boats were prepared. The commander of the detachment of ships appointed Captain-Lieutenant Baltachi. The landing was planned for 19 in September of 1941, but due to the stormy weather on Lake Ladoga, the scheduled date was postponed. The ten-point storm on September 17 threw the Ulyanovsk steamer on the coastal stones, the Kozelsk, Voima, Michurin steamers and other ships with food for Leningrad swept over the waves, sank the barge with the women and children evacuated from Leningrad.

On the night of September 21, due to the strong excitement on the lake, the first attempt at the operation failed. The towing cables of the boats were torn, and they were spent on all the dark time searching for and re-taking in tow. On the second night, on September 22, the squadron, due to a navigational error, set about landing an assault on the 2,5 miles east of the deployment point, practically in the rear of its 54 army. During the landing, three boats overturned, two fighters sank. After the detachment returned to Osinovets, captain-lieutenant Baltachi was removed from office, arrested on October 24 and 1941 of the year by the military tribunal of the Leningrad Naval Garrison convicted of disrupting the landing operation, for which he was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment without losing his rights .

In the afternoon of September 22, front-line commander Zhukov demanded to land a landing force no matter what it was at the designated place for further movement to Shlisselburg, and also to make a reconnaissance detachment of seafarers in Shlisselburg Bay next night. And this time, on the night of September 24, the troops failed to land. In the intended place was a stone ridge, which did not allow the boats to approach the shore, and the depth precluded reaching the shore along the bottom. But that night, in the area of ​​the Shlisselburg Bay, a reconnaissance squad as part of the 40 sailors commanded by the head of the Baltic Fleet intelligence department, Lieutenant-Colonel N. S. Frumkin successfully landed.

A detachment on two boats approached Shlisselburg to a flooded sandbank. Having walked almost two kilometers across the chest in icy water, the landing went out unnoticed. Dispersed and disguised, the scouts observed the enemy, revealing the defense system in the area. Four artillery and six mortar batteries, 25 enemy machine gun points were found. The only radio station stopped working due to being in the water, and the detachment had to break through to its own in order to deliver the acquired information about the enemy. At night, a squad of fighting made its way across the front line to the location of the 54 Army in the area of ​​the settlement of South Limes, losing four people killed and two wounded.

On the morning of September 25, the commander of the armed forces, Rear Admiral B. V. Khoroshkhin, fulfilling Zhukov’s request, ordered an immediate landing of a landing force a day just east of Shlisselburg, straight to the enemy. The airborne detachment was formed from the units on hand - 40 scouts, divers, 105 cadets of the maritime border school, 44 people from the guard platoon of the flotilla headquarters. The landing party consisted of the Chapaev transport, the Saturn vessel, five patrol boats, four ZIS-type pleasure boats, two longboats and several boats. For fire support, the gunboats Olekma and Bureya, five small hunter boats and one armored boat, as well as the artillery division of the flotilla were identified. The guard ship “Designer” and the gunboat “Nora” remained in reserve on the Osinovetsky roadstead. Preparation of the landing, like all previous ones, was completely absent. By the appointed time, the headquarters of the flotilla had only time to assemble the ships at the loading point and land the troops.

The landing was carried out under the cover of smoke screens, set by boats. The fighters had to ford about a kilometer to the coast, overcoming the strong current from Ladoga to Neva. Under the cover of the ships' fire and the artillery battalion, the paratroopers were able to reach the coast and gain a foothold on the 16 watch. By that time, according to survivors ’memories, up to half of the landing force, including those commanding ahead, had already died from enemy fire.

As part of the anti-landing operation, the German command first attracted an assault Aviation, which attacked in groups of 10-12 aircraft, then launched a counterattack supported by tanks. Smoke from the explosions, stretching the entire coast, prevented targeted artillery support of the landing by the fire of ships and coastal artillery. With the onset of darkness on the night of September 26, the Schlusselburg landing was already completely destroyed.

Of the 189 participants in the operation, only 14 people survived. Of these, 11 fought their way through to their own ones in the Bugry area, and three of them sailed to Ladoga, where they were picked up by boats. 175 fighters and commanders died or went missing. Modern historians have managed to establish some names of those who survived the landing. This is the chief officer of the special purpose company BF Kadurin, the lieutenant of the maritime border school Safonov, the intelligence officer of the Ladoga flotilla Bavin, the cadets of the maritime border school Popov, Yerokhin and Vorobyov. From the landing force, only one person was subsequently awarded the Order of the Red Banner, another six people received the medal "For Courage".

The Soviet command did not make the right conclusions from the rapid death of the landing force. Already on September 26, the headquarters of the Ladoga flotilla began preparations for a new landing operation: two boats and a launch should have landed an incomplete company (95 man) from the 1 rifle division of the NKVD in the Shlisselburg pier. Another unprepared landing began at dawn 27 September. When approaching the pier, they were discovered by the enemy, meeting with artillery and machine-gun fire. Both boats were sunk, 17 people died, the rest managed to lift cover boats from the water.

In the evening of September 27, Zhukov set a new task: to land the infantry battalion of the 1 division of the NKVD (200 man, four guns, mortars and other heavy weapons) to the Oreshek fortress, where the Soviet garrison defended, to land it on the boats through 120-meter nevskuyu channel directly to Shlisselburg. To prepare for the operation was given a few hours. The troops were loaded from the pier, which was under the shelling of the Germans, and already there some of the ships were damaged. As a result, only one minesweeper managed to get to the fortress in the dark and disembark paratroopers. The remaining 130 fighters and artillery arrived there on the night of September 29, and on the way back the Shchors transport ran aground north of Nut. The crew managed to evacuate under cover of darkness, the enemy immobilized in the morning of September 29, the enemy discovered and destroyed with artillery fire.

However, this landing also turned out to be in vain, and October landing operations were canceled on October 1. Thus ended the attempt to liberate Shlisselburg from the side of Lake Ladoga. All troops delivered to Oreshek Fortress were subsequently redeployed to the right bank of the Neva under enemy fire and casualties.

Earlier, September 26 ended and the first Sinyavskaya offensive operation, launched on September 19. As a result of joint efforts, the 54 army moved towards Sinyavino only 6 – 10 kilometers, and in the Mginsky direction they were forced to move away from the Mga-Kirishi railway line to the Nazia River. Parts of the Neva operational group managed to force the Neva and seize a bridgehead on the left bank in the Moscow Dubrovka area. Subsequently, the bridgehead will be called "Nevsky Piglet" and until the 1944 year will become the site of bloody battles.

Summing up the landing operations, one should pay attention to the fact that not a single task was achieved. There is an opinion that the landing was required to divert the attention of the enemy from the Nevsky Piglet. But this is not confirmed by the German documents, according to which no additional forces to the site of the landing of small airborne troops did not condone. They did not create serious threats to the coastal defenses of the enemy, and the death of the Schlusselburg landing clearly showed the senselessness of the attacks of the fortified coast by small forces without adequate thorough preparation and support, and the 1 division of the NKVD with artillery and other heavy weapons was never landed. However, the command did not learn any of the lessons of the Schlesselburg landing, having spent the same disastrous landings in Peterhof and Strelna in the autumn of the same 1941.
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. alex20081308
    alex20081308 7 November 2013 09: 29 New
    There is another survivor, at that time, a cadet of the Maritime Border College, then went through the whole war and ended it in Japan. Subsequently, the first commander of the bark = Kruzenshtern = my grandfather Vlasov Pavel Vasilievich.
    1. hook
      hook 7 November 2013 22: 49 New
      Oh, how many of them have fallen into this abyss ..- glory to HEROES-THEY wrote the lines of death. Two thousand years war-war without any particular reason-war is the work of young people - a medicine against wrinkles. Red-red blood-through already again earth-
    2. Kubanets
      Kubanets 7 November 2013 23: 00 New
      I will add. At the beginning of 80, fate brought Anatoly Akimovich Captain of the First Rank to Guban. At the beginning of the war, the "Frunzenki" cadet underwent floating practical training in Tallinn. Evacuated from the main base on the Sneg TFR. .At the end of 70, the commander of a brigade of the Marine Corps of the Border Troops in the Far East. Surprised on the jacket, the Order of Ushakov 2st, although the Second World War Anatoly Akimovich graduated as a lieutenant in the Baltic in a brigade of patrol boats.
  2. Rinat 1
    Rinat 1 7 November 2013 09: 43 New
    Glory to the fallen sailors and foot soldiers soldier
  3. Grenz
    Grenz 7 November 2013 09: 52 New
    And who made such bloody and meaningless decisions?
    On his conscience there are still many gloriously (from the side of the fighters) ruined lives near Rzhev, Zeelovsky heights, and so - from his own gun.
    I never believed in stories about the genius commander.
    1. apostrophe
      apostrophe 7 November 2013 10: 16 New
      Well, you would have done much better, who would have doubted smile
    2. svp67
      svp67 7 November 2013 10: 59 New
      Quote: grenz
      And who made such bloody and meaningless decisions?

      The decision to land the FIRST assault force is correct. In that setting, it was JUSTIFIED. The question arises about further attempts, but "EVERYONE IMAGES HIMSELF A STRATEGY SEEING A FIGHT FROM THE SIDE ..."
      1. Ingvar 72
        Ingvar 72 7 November 2013 11: 34 New
        There is a good book by A. Veresov, Klyuch Gorod, about the Oreshek fortress in Shlisselburg, there are described the times of Peter and the Great Patriotic War. And about this landing is also interestingly told.
    3. Alekseev
      Alekseev 7 November 2013 12: 25 New
      Quote: grenz
      I never believed in stories about the genius commander.

      But he believed in the tales of various cheaters from history. request
      Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side, having read a newspaper and dubious opus.
    4. Avenger711
      Avenger711 7 November 2013 14: 56 New
      Close your mouth, expert sofa, it would be better if you studied the real documents of those years.
    5. Tver
      Tver 7 November 2013 19: 43 New
      I support! I grew up in St. Petersburg, my father taught at the Frunze School. So - not one of the officer-teachers never mentioned the "genius commander" with a kind word.
    6. hook
      hook 7 November 2013 23: 25 New
      Then Vyazma-Stalingrad, a little later, the battle of Kursk
    7. sasska
      sasska 8 November 2013 08: 52 New
      do not read the yellow press.
      especially at night
  4. apostrophe
    apostrophe 7 November 2013 09: 59 New
    Yes, everything was in vain, it was necessary to relax and have fun, and then easily and easily die of hunger and torment in the next concentration camp. The author would probably do so.
    In hindsight, we are all strong.
    1. hook
      hook 8 November 2013 00: 07 New
      Of course, they later died on surrender - the ARMY was- yes, General Paulus then otmazatsya because of communication with the population. Mr. HANDED over the entire headquarters of the Wehrmacht, thought of his daughter out of wedlock and the Romanian princess-wife.
  5. Tommygun
    Tommygun 7 November 2013 10: 24 New
    Yes, they learned hard to fight
  6. Tommygun
    Tommygun 7 November 2013 10: 25 New
    In 44 they fought in a completely different way
    1. IRBIS
      IRBIS 7 November 2013 17: 56 New
      Quote: Tommygun
      In 44 they fought in a completely different way

      Unfortunately, the same. And in 45, too. This is evidenced by the losses and the number of unknown fallen fighters. Outside the USSR, there were burials of 4,5 million soldiers, of which 1,5 million were unknown soldiers. This is official data.
    2. Heccrbq .2
      Heccrbq .2 7 November 2013 21: 50 New
      They fought in 41 and 45 in the same way - with meat. "Memories of the War", "Vanka Company" This is the real truth about that war.
  7. Walking
    Walking 7 November 2013 10: 40 New
    Zhukov only gave the order, but it was not he who was engaged in the preparation, someone on the spot simply sent people to death. In general, the preparation and landing of naval assault forces in the Union in World War II was weak especially in the initial period, but the soldiers fought courageously and heroically.
    1. user
      user 7 November 2013 10: 52 New
      If you raise the history of the war, then he has all the time -

      "Zhukov only gave the order, but it was not he who was involved in the preparation, someone on the spot simply sent people to death."

      No wonder he was called "The Butcher" in the army.
      1. apostrophe
        apostrophe 7 November 2013 10: 57 New
        What exactly was that called? smile Well, not the Rezunoids, they call him so smile
      2. Walking
        Walking 7 November 2013 11: 30 New
        You yourself were there and heard what they called him?
      3. Avenger711
        Avenger711 7 November 2013 12: 59 New
        Sorry, but you are completely incompetent. And the losses in equal conditions, Zhukov has always been less.
        1. IRBIS
          IRBIS 7 November 2013 17: 59 New
          Quote: Avenger711
          And the losses in equal conditions, Zhukov has always been less.

          Give the battle as an example, please .... Especially on equal terms. Only objectively, and not from his opus "Memories".
        2. dmb
          dmb 7 November 2013 20: 45 New
          Of course it's bad. And he and Stalin slept and saw how to ruin more of the Russian people. That is why the latter sent Zhukov to the most difficult sectors of the front. It is for ruining. And they won the Great War purely by accident against the will of the leadership. Oh yes, they still say with pathos that the people won, and not these ghouls. The authors of these deep thoughts should be brainwashed, if they certainly exist, why at the first stage of the war several million were taken prisoner, who were not ordered to give up bugs and Stalin. So the people are the people, and without leadership, any army turns into a herd.
      4. sasska
        sasska 9 November 2013 21: 11 New
        og, and you take into account that Zhukov was in those areas where there was a very strong defense of the Nazis? here it is not surprising that the losses were large.

        by the way, here: "" In the book of the front-line soldier A. V. Pyltsyn, "Penalty Strike, or How the Officer Penal Battalion Reached Berlin" contains a more weighty argument drawn from the very thick of the Penal Battalion: a special one called him "dad", although the surname began with the syllable "bat", consonant with this warm word "dad". " Former penal officers blamed the commander of the 65th Army, General Batov, for not the shore of the military, in particular, intentionally sending people to a minefield, and for any successful action, the battalion made a decision to justify only those penalties who died or were injured. "
  8. The comment was deleted.
  9. The comment was deleted.
  10. Avenger711
    Avenger711 7 November 2013 12: 59 New
    Expert has become smarter than commanders. Another spit. Article minus.
  11. RomanN
    RomanN 7 November 2013 14: 05 New
    Exactly the same senseless landings were arranged in the forty-fifth in the Korean Rangin and the second not far from the rangin behind the rear of the Japanese. Both landings were lost. Even in the preparation stage the command staff did not understand the meaning of these landings, but there was an order, it was necessary to carry out.
  12. Russ69
    Russ69 7 November 2013 14: 46 New
    Now it’s easy to argue what was right and what wasn’t. War, alas, develops, not only from victories. Moreover, we fought with the best army at that time.
  13. mithridate
    mithridate 7 November 2013 14: 51 New
    war is hard bloody work
  14. kafa
    kafa 7 November 2013 18: 18 New
    fascist machine gunners in those days often went crazy. the losses were such that the Germans and the equipment and people could not stand so much to kill ...
    the memory of the heroes must be eternal in the hearts of descendants crying
  15. Jager
    Jager 7 November 2013 23: 38 New
    According to the laws of wartime, it was not necessary to judge the lieutenant commander (I do not think that his fault exists in nature at all - weather conditions, logistical support and time frames, as well as a small and extremely weak landing force even leveled the theoretical success of the operation), but the highest command staff - the authors and organizers of this "landing". How many of them were, stupid and incompetent commanders who trampled all the principles and laws of military art. How much wasted blood and suffering on their conscience. This is especially true for operations in 41.
    Each general, like every surgeon, has his own personal cemetery.
    The more valuable our Victory becomes. Overcoming unthinkable trials, our people broke the back of fascism. Glory to the fallen sailors!
  16. specKFOR
    specKFOR 7 November 2013 23: 48 New
    as it was sung in the song - "We will not stand for the price ..." And we did not.
  17. uzer 13
    uzer 13 7 November 2013 23: 49 New
    The author is well aware of the details of the operation, which means about the further development of events, too. There was an attempt to break through in the Chernaya Rechka area and to the south, in the area of ​​the Zamoshye railway station, which did not end in success. Compared to these operations, the losses in the Shlisselburg area look insignificant. Even if this fortress were recaptured from the enemy, it is unlikely that in this area it was possible to prepare and develop an offensive and connect with parts of the Volkhov Front in the area of ​​the Black River. It was necessary to overcome the well-fortified strong points-4 and 5 of the village, and the whole area shot from the Sinyavinsky heights, also well fortified. All attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Nevsky Piglet area, Arbuzovo, in the winter on the Neva ice near Kirovsk were also unsuccessful and led to huge losses.
  18. mamba
    mamba 8 November 2013 00: 18 New
    About Shlisselburg landing yet:
    Here is a diagram of the landing in Peterhof and Strelna 05.10.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    More details:
  19. ochakow703
    ochakow703 8 November 2013 00: 47 New
    Quote: dmb
    So the people are the people, and without leadership, any army turns into a herd.

    Here is the herd and mumbles now, saying that the whip hurts. Only now, without a whip, no one wants to move a horn! So it was, and unfortunately, it will be so. And now you can pour dirt on Zhukov. If he wasn’t, it’s been a long time since everyone became gay. One name for such tales is fagots. And further. All such strategists, directly the General Staff, but no one said anything clever.
  20. Ols76
    Ols76 8 November 2013 04: 32 New
    Glory to the fallen heroes!