October war 1973 year
The initiator of the military offensive on the territory of Israel became two states of the Middle East: Egypt and Syria. Diplomats of these countries repeatedly tried to negotiate with the Israeli authorities on the return of lands seized back in 1967. However, Israel categorically rejected the proposals received from neighbors, forcing the Arabs to go to extreme measures and sign the so-called “rule of three“ no ”, which implies the refusal of negotiations, recognition and peace with the Jewish state. This marked the beginning of a sluggish political conflict, which in history remained under the title “war of attrition”. The return of the lands taken away once turned for the Arabs into a matter of principle, a belated desire to wash off the dishonor obtained in the previous “Six-Day War”.
Having won a fairly quick and convincing victory in the war of 1967, Israel was absolutely sure that the Arabs, who, in their opinion, were not able to fight properly, would not dare attack them in the coming decades. Along the Suez Canal, the Israelis erected powerful fortifications called the “Bar-Lev Line (on behalf of their developer, General Chaim Bar-Lev). They consisted of several defense lines thirty to fifty kilometers deep. The first lane passed along the Suez Canal and included a twenty-meter high anti-tank rampart (about one hundred and sixty kilometers long) with platoon strong points equipped on the ridge. Each platoon of foot soldiers supported tank platoon. Pipelines were located inside the shaft to ensure oil flow into the channel. In a critical situation, it was supposed to be released and set on fire. Between the defense lines there was a road patrolled by groups of tanks and motorized infantry. The road was intended to transfer the battery of self-propelled guns to the threatened area. The second line was based on company strongholds, which, according to calculations, were able to hold autonomously for more than five days. And finally, thirty kilometers from the canal, three armored brigades stood in reserve. The construction of the “Bar-Lev Line” cost Israel three hundred million dollars. On the Golan Heights (Syrian front) a seventy-five kilometer defensive line was also erected. The base was composed of strong points located at heights, which included tanks dug into the ground (about twelve units per kilometer of the front). There was also a canal at the heights - a ditch six meters wide and four meters deep. In both the Syrian and Suez sectors, the Israelis were preparing for a defensive war, and the success of motorized units in previous battles on the peninsula led their commanders to reassess the importance of tanks and underestimate infantry and artillery. For these errors had to pay with blood.
The desire of Egypt, born back in 1967, to return the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights occupied by its neighbor and restore its territorial integrity, became of paramount importance after 1970 came to power in Egypt in the fall of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death in Egypt after the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Taking into account the mistakes made, the Egyptians did a great job of building up and strengthening their combat power, as well as developing a new military strategy. Preparations for the future performance were begun by the Arabs eager for revenge back in 1971, when special training centers were built near Alexandria and Cairo, “pieces of the Bar-Lev line”, in which the mobilized Egyptian armed forces worked out practical skills in fighting forcing a channel and overcoming heights in hilly terrain.
The number of demining units increased in the Egyptian armed forces. Particular attention was paid to the delivery of equipment to the bridgehead - to pull in and lower heavy machines from the shaft is slow and not the most pleasant. In addition, the Egyptians decided to use an off-the-shelf approach to solving the problem of moving heavy equipment through sandy shafts that came across. During the summer of the 1973 of the year in the Federal Republic of Germany and England, they purchased about one hundred and sixty water cannons - water cannons. The idea was simple and ingenious: instead of overcoming an obstacle through the top, it was decided with the help of water cannons to blur the passages in loose sandy shafts.
The next step was to bring another dissatisfied neighbor, Syria, into the attack on the offenders. In order to divert the attention and strength of the Israelis, she had to start hostilities from the Golan Heights, and Israel’s waging of war in two directions at once allowed to significantly increase the chances of the Egyptians to win. According to some sources, an additional impetus to the entry into the war of this Arab state was an Israeli attack. aviation to the Syrian MIGs on September 13, 1973. An air clash in which twelve Syrian aircraft were shot down by Israelis occurred over the Lebanese-Syrian border.
One of the lessons learned from the Six Day War was the massive rearmament of the armies of Syria and Egypt. A huge contribution to their equipment with more modern military equipment was made by the USSR, which supplied not only its tanks of various modifications to Egypt, but also experienced instructors who trained soldiers in proper combat using armored vehicles. The Arabs equipped their army with a large number of “Little” anti-tank missiles, which were able to quickly and effectively destroy enemy equipment. Periodically conducted exercises, which at first alerted Israeli intelligence and border patrols, finally became perceived by neighbors as the norm.
No less attentively, the Arabs approached the question of choosing the day of the offensive, which was one of the main Jewish holidays, Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement). They knew that the Israelites spend the Judgment Day in prayer, and the cities seem to be dying out: institutions and public transport do not work, and radio and television suspend their broadcasting. However, the cunning adversary did not take into account the fact that it was precisely the absence of traffic congestion that allowed the Israelis to quickly mobilize and get reinforcements soon after the start of the offensive.
Calling the attack of the Egyptians and Syrians sudden will not be entirely correct, for it is known that already early in the morning, long before the invasion began, mobilization was announced in Israel. The adoption of urgent measures, some members of the Israeli government demanded a long time, and regularly received intelligence information about the impending attack worried all the ruling circles of this country. However, the uncertainty and indecisiveness of Prime Minister Golda Meir, which was pressured by the US Secretary of State, as well as the skepticism of the then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan were ultimately decisive.
Suddenly for the Israeli military was the power with which the enemy of October 6 fell on the territory they held Sinai. Describing the tank battles of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, many historians compare them with such grandiose historical events as the Battle of Kursk in World War II. Eyewitnesses of the battles recall the countless armada of Egyptian tanks that had moved to the Israelis, stretching to the horizon. The land was constantly shuddering from the explosions of artillery shells. It was one of the most massive tank battles in world history. Exactly in 14: 00 an Israeli air strike was made on the position of the Israelis, and five minutes later the Egyptian artillery delivered a crushing blow, in which more than two thousand guns and mortars took part. The readiness of the offensive is eloquently shown by the fact that in just twenty minutes the Egyptians had already put out of action all the firing points of the Israelis, and after another ten minutes they were at the top of the rampart, moving the fire deep into the defense. Their troops forced the Suez Canal all the way down while simultaneously preparing vehicle passages in seventy designated places. After lunch, jubilant Anwar Sadat called Vladimir Vinogradov, the Soviet Union’s ambassador to Cairo, and shouted into the phone: “We crossed the canal! We are on the east bank. Egyptian flag on the east coast! ”
Although the Israelis were discouraged by the unexpected pressure of the enemy, the speed and scale of the attack, their reaction was not long in coming. As soon as the first Egyptian soldiers set foot on Israeli soil, they were immediately attacked by tank units. Due to lack of preparation time, they acted blindly, without intelligence data, which turned out to be a very rash decision. As a result, by the end of the day, the Egyptian calculations of the ATGM, with the support of infantry, succeeded in disabling more than two hundred Israeli tanks. Defeat after defeat suffered and the glorious Israeli aircraft, just three days lost more than eighty aircraft.
In the evening of October 7, two tank, one mechanized, and five infantry divisions of the Egyptians already hosted on the territory of Sinai. The number of infantry reached a hundred thousand people, tanks - more than eight hundred. At the same time, the second army of Egypt led the offensive towards the Mediterranean coast, and the third army attacked in the Suez region. The fighting continued even at night, and in this plan the Egyptians and Syrians had one important advantage. The fact is that the bulk of the tank fleet of Arabs was Soviet T-55, which had night-vision devices with the ability to control the crew commander and directly the gunner. This made it possible to conduct a successful bombardment of the enemy’s armored vehicles, which had to be more difficult - only a driver could use night vision devices in Israeli tanks. In addition, the small size of the T-55 and high maneuverability due to its relatively low weight made them less vulnerable than the heavy and larger Israeli tanks. However, with larger dimensions and weight, the tanks of the Israeli army provided more comfortable conditions for their crews, had a greater angle of lift and lowering guns, two or three times more ammunition and volume of fuel tanks, as well as more powerful engines. These factors subsequently played an important role in the outcome of that war.
The successes of the Arabs in the Sinai direction were more than offset by the failures of the Syrians in the region of the Golan Heights. After two days since the first attack, the Israelis came to their senses and on October 8 switched to decisive fighting, rather strongly beckoning the Syrians. Before October 14, the Israeli army managed to make significant progress in the direction of Damascus and firmly consolidate its positions in order not to stretch communications.
During the entire 8 of October, the fiercest tank battle continued in Sinai, in which the Israeli tank brigades lost up to sixty percent of their equipment. In one of the desperate attempts to break through the defense of the Arabs, the Israeli brigade in eighteen minutes managed to lose twenty-four tanks. Remarkable was the fact that almost half of the armored vehicles were destroyed by Egyptian helicopters armed with ATGMs, and the Israeli squadron, which was always considered “invincible”, could not help, since the Egyptian air defense forces worked flawlessly. On October 9, the Egyptian army succeeded in completely destroying the 190 th Israeli tank brigade, and its commander, Asaf Yaguri, was captured.
October 10, after four days of intense battles, the situation on the battlefield stabilized slightly and there was a slight respite. From time to time, the Israelis launched minor counterattacks against Egyptian gun emplacements. The lull was explained very simply: both sides of the military conflict expected reinforcements from their sponsors, such as the United States for the Israelis, and the USSR for Egypt and Syria. The Israelis preferred not to risk, their position was already very precarious, and any enemy attack could result in a breakthrough in the defense, opening the way for the Arabs to the north.
Activity on the Sinai front resumed in 6: 30 in the morning on October 14, when four infantry and two tank divisions of the Egyptians sharply attacked the enemy and advanced ten kilometers ahead. But then the Arabs flew two hundred entrenched Israeli tanks. With the support of eighteen helicopters equipped with TOW anti-tank systems, the Israelis managed to destroy almost half of the advancing tank brigade of Egypt near the Mitla Pass. Then in the ensuing night battle, they destroyed another two hundred sixty tanks and two hundred Egyptian armored personnel carriers. The Israeli army’s own losses amounted to slightly more than forty tanks. On the same day, General Mendler, who commanded Israel’s armored forces in Sinai, was killed.
The losses of both sides have grown so much that without additional delivery weapons and technology from the interested "benefactors" was not enough. Frankly speaking, if it were not for the assistance of the United States, the outcome of the October war would hardly have been so favorable for Israel. In those days, the countries of Europe completely refused military aid to the country. Day and night, Golda Meir continuously called Washington and asked to arrange her meeting with the President of America and the air bridge. The set of her phrases sounded like this: “Help us today. Tomorrow it will be too late. ” At the same time, the prime minister constantly reminded the Americans that “huge deliveries of Russian weapons” are being carried out to Syria and Egypt. In the end, Nixon gave permission and October 14, on the ninth day of the battle, an air bridge arose. Hearing that the first military transport plane landed at the airport, Golda Meir, by her own admission, burst into tears with happiness. It was really something to rejoice about - the distant allies did not stint on tanks, shells and missiles (especially air-to-air). Over the next ten days, Israel received one hundred and twenty-eight combat aircraft, one hundred and fifty M60 tanks, two thousand new-range ATGMs, a large number of missiles and cluster bombs. Military cargo was delivered to twenty-seven thousand tons.
On October 14, a group of Israeli saboteurs disabled the Egyptian radio interception center in the Jebel Ataq area. This loss greatly complicated the last command of the troops and reconnaissance. October 15 forces of the nine tank brigades, the Israelis launched the first frontal counterattack. And although intensive hostilities took place throughout the day, none of the warring parties succeeded.
A non-standard and unexpected way out was found by one of the most talented Israeli military leaders, Major General Ariel Sharon. An excellent student of political and military training of the times of the old Arab-Israeli wars was hastily pulled out of the reserve. What inspired the development of his plan Sharon - a specific historical example or the general hopelessness of the situation, supported by unintelligible high command - today is difficult to say. It is only known that earlier he fiercely criticized the construction of the Bar-Lev line, noting that the very similar “Maginot Line” did not help France in the 1940 year.
Sharon decided to use a very adventurous technique - to strike 143 with her armored division at the weakened junction of the second and third Egyptian armies, covering the positions of Israelis. Interestingly enough, Moshe Dayan ordered earlier that the entire Southern District should refrain from offensive actions. Stabilization of the front was necessary for the government in the run-up to possible cease-fire negotiations with the Egyptians. However, Ariel Sharon ignored this instruction.
On the night of October 15 and 16, a small Israeli detachment, consisting of seven tanks and eight armored personnel carriers, crossed Great Bitter Lake, taking a small bridgehead on the Egyptian coast. The enemy army missed the beginning of the Israeli movement, without allocating additional funds for the defense of the West Bank. It was due to the presence of the entrenched bridgehead on the enemy coast of the part of Sharon who managed to build a pontoon bridge and send tanks to the opposite bank.
When the Egyptians realized what threatened them with their carelessness, they immediately attacked, trying to cut off the small group of the enemy, which settled on the west bank. But even air support and the power of the tank and infantry divisions could not bring significant results. The battle on Gorky Lake near the "Chinese farm" was, according to some observers, the most fierce. The night battle ended very poorly for the Egyptian army: Sharon's troops managed to knock down one and a half hundred Egyptian tanks with personal losses of seventy vehicles. The next day, October 17, the Egyptians lost as many units of armored vehicles, while the losses of the Israeli army amounted to only eighty tanks. At the end of the day, the Egyptians made their last desperate attempt to drive back the enemy, for which they paid for the loss of eighty-six vehicles, while the Israelis lost only four pieces of equipment.
October 18 The 252 th and 162 th divisions of Israel, having crossed the canal, began to enter the rear of the main group of Egyptian troops represented by the third army. One of the first and most important losses of the Egyptians was the virtually complete destruction of their air defense forces, located west of the canal. And this, in turn, opened the sky for Israeli aviation. October 19 position of the third army from the dominant turned into a threatened. The Israeli army was preparing to deliver a decisive blow to the hated neighbor, but at that moment the UN decided to intervene in relations with Middle Eastern countries, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities. Both sides used a slight lull in order to take a breath and regroup their forces, preparing for new battles. The Israeli army was in no hurry to follow the advice of the “big brothers” and stopped only on October 25 after the capture of Suez, which was the last chord of the battle of Sinai. Three-day psychological pressure on the ruling circles of Tel Aviv with a demonstrative bringing into full combat readiness of the US nuclear forces and the Soviet Airborne Forces gave their results. The war was stopped.
In each family, questions, questions ... You begin to answer, and in their eyes: he died, and you are alive. And to say everything until the end, I could not. For example, there were cases when our soldiers were covered by their own artillery. How can you tell a mother that her child fell from an Israeli shell. "
All participants in the war suffered noticeable losses: during nineteen days of fighting, the Arab states lost three hundred and sixty-eight helicopters and airplanes (and sixty-nine of them were shot down by their own air defense forces due to errors and misunderstandings), seventeen hundred armored vehicles. More than eighteen thousand people died, about fifty thousand were wounded. Israel lost one hundred and fourteen helicopters and aircraft, more than eight hundred armored vehicles and tanks. About two and a half thousand Israelis were killed and seven and a half thousand wounded.
Until now, researchers from different countries have not come to the same opinion on the issue of evaluating the outcome of the war. Arab countries believe that they won the 1973 year by destroying the myth of the invulnerability of the Israeli army. In Egypt in general, October 6 is celebrated as Victory Day. As proof, it is argued that only after the war, Israel agreed to negotiations that resulted in the liberation of the Sinai Peninsula. In Israel, on the contrary, they believe that they won, and it’s hard to argue: after eighteen days, the IDF was a hundred kilometers from Cairo, the third army of Egyptians was surrounded, and Damascus was lying in front of Israeli gunners. And yet, if we proceed from the goals that the belligerents set for themselves, none of them has been fully achieved.
The fourth Arab-Israeli war, according to most historians, ended in a “draw” with the exception of one positive point - the Israeli elite, finally, seriously took up the establishment of its relations with the countries of the Middle East. After the end of hostilities in Israel, a commission was established headed by the chairman of the Israeli Supreme Court, Shimon Agranat. It was she who was instructed to investigate the causes of the "misunderstanding" that had nearly grown into a national catastrophe. The preliminary findings of the commission, which were announced on 1 on April 1974, shocked the public. According to her conclusion to reveal the true intentions of the Egyptian military, the Israeli intelligence services put a cover in the form of ongoing exercises, and the premature mobilization of forces was postponed in order not to provoke Arabs to the conflict.
Four months after the end of the conflict, Golda Meir openly declared that the highest governing circles of Israel had made gross mistakes that nearly caused the defeat. In response, most of the inhabitants of the country recognized her as the main culprit of the “Doomsday War”. After some time, or rather 11 on April 1974 of the year, at the peak of a wave of mass street protests, the prime minister was forced to leave his post, giving way to his former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, who during the more successful Six-day war of 1967, commanded the General Staff Israeli army. At parting, she threw: “C me enough. For five years I was carrying this burden, my strength is gone. ” Heads and military men also flew: the Chief of General Staff David Elazar, the commander of the entire Southern District, Shmuel Gonin, as well as prominent military intelligence leaders went to resign. The hero of the war went to Sharon, who virtually single-handedly saved the nation from defeat, since he headed the Southern District until the end of the summer of 1973. To implement the actual policy of national reconciliation had the successor of Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, who was appointed to the post of Israeli Prime Minister in the 1977 year. The result of this policy was the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, which actually marked the end of the Arab struggle with the Jewish state. The irony of history - Begin concluded peace with Sadat on almost the same conditions that Golda Meir rejected in 1971. The powerful crack of the "October War" once again proved to Israel and the whole world that pride is a very bad adviser in politics.
The October War is becoming increasingly important as it goes into the past. In particular, it marked a new era of military conflicts in which various ground-to-air, ground-to-ground, sea-to-ground and air-to-ground missiles were widely used. In light of the findings, military strategists had to rethink all military equipment and science. In addition, the Arab-Israeli war was the formal cause of the very first world oil crisis. October 17 1973 year, the main oil exporters from among the Arab countries adopted a resolution to reduce its production, as well as impose an embargo on the supply to the United States. These measures have had a tremendous impact on the global economy.
Among the subjective factors, the foreign policy of Anwar Sadat, who began to transform Egypt from an ally of the USSR into a hostile country open to cooperation with the United States, is particularly noteworthy. Soviet diplomats were pushed aside from participation in the Middle East settlement processes, which gradually assumed the character of bilateral treaties between Israel and Egypt under the patronage of Washington. In 1976, the first C-130 military transport aircraft from the United States flew to Egypt. At the same time (14 March 1976 year, to be precise) Sadat announced the termination of the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR. Within one month, all Soviet military services left the country.
Information sources:
http://btvt.narod.ru/2/wsd.html
http://ria.ru/analytics/20131006/967823621.html
http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/izrail/nativ/kedmi/
http://www.polit.ru/article/2008/10/08/war/
- Igor Sulimov
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