Military Review

Post-soviet subdivision: resurface after a fall

58

K-535 "Yuri Dolgoruky", the lead ship of the 955 "Borey" project



Recovery of combat capabilities underwater fleet - One of the priorities of the military-technical policy of Russia. At the same time, the requirements for the structure of the Russian submarine are in many respects different from those for the submarine fleet of the US Navy, and are determined by the geopolitical position of Russia. The key difference between the Russian submarine fleet is the fundamental bet on maintaining a strong anti-ship component in its composition - the connections of large surface ships of the “probable enemy” are still considered as the most probable target for Russian submarines. In addition, the requirement to maintain the potential of the naval part of strategic nuclear forces remains unchanged.

Float as a countermeasure

The submarine fleet historically occupies a special place in the composition of the naval forces of our country. After the end of World War II and the beginning of the "cold war", it was the connection of the submarine that allowed the Soviet Union to challenge the sea power of Western civilization led by the United States, which inherited from the British Empire the burden of the ruler of the seas. The reason for such a bet on the submarine was simple: the creation of a balanced surface fleet capable of gaining dominance at sea in direct confrontation with the US Navy and its allies would have taken decades and threatened to be an unbearable burden for a country ravaged by war. At the same time, the construction of a powerful submarine fleet made it possible to create a real threat to the global maritime trade and to the naval forces of the West rather quickly and at an acceptable level of costs. This was confirmed, in particular, by the experience of the two world wars.


Russian Navy


In the future, despite the strengthening of the USSR economy and the growth of its industrial potential, the priorities in the creation of the fleet did not undergo major changes. The surface fleet, which by the end of the 1970s surpassed the US Navy in terms of total strength, was still focused mainly on missions in the seas adjacent to the USSR borders, with a relatively small component of the ocean zone. The basis of the strike power of the USSR Navy was a large submarine fleet, the value of which increased especially after the appearance of nuclear submarines (NS) and especially strategic missile submarines (SSBN) with ballistic missiles on board.

At the end of the 1980s, the USSR Navy had more than 300 submarines [1], including 64 nuclear and 15 diesel submarines with ballistic missiles of various ranges, 79 carriers of cruise missiles (including 63 nuclear), about 80 nuclear and about the same number of diesel torpedo submarines.

At the same time, due to insufficient development of the base infrastructure and boat maintenance, they could not be used with sufficient efficiency: the operating voltage (KOH) ratio of the Soviet sub-base did not exceed 0,2 – 0,25, i.e. at any given time, no more than 20 – 25% of combat-ready submarines were in the sea. The number of these submarines varied greatly depending on the subclass and the specific project - there were more of them on developed projects, fewer on newer types and those completing their careers. On average, approximately 2 / 3 of the submarine fleet were constantly on alert. The remaining third stayed in repair, on modernization, mastered by the crew after commissioning or, on the contrary, was preparing to write off.

The current State Armaments Program for the period 2011 – 2020. implies serious costs for the fleet (over 4 trillion rubles), of which a considerable part will go to the sub-melt. Major naval expenses are planned for the period after 2025.
Analyzing the structure of the Soviet submarine fleet, it should be noted a significant proportion of specialized carriers of cruise missiles (up to a quarter of the composition), in the overwhelming majority of those oriented to the performance of anti-ship targets. Such a composition was naturally determined by the nature of the tasks of the Navy, among which the main ones were two: to ensure, in the case of a relevant order, a nuclear strike on the enemy’s territory and, until the war turned into a “nuclear Armageddon”, to maximally complicate the operations of its surface fleet and sea cargo transportation.

The collapse of the USSR - the collapse of the fleet

The collapse of the USSR led to the rapid reduction of the Navy, including the sub-melt: by the middle of the 1990-s its payroll number had decreased by about half. Currently, the fleet is about 60 boats (excluding special purpose underwater vehicles and their carriers), i.e. about five times less than at the end of 1980's. The share of combat-ready submarines has also decreased: according to some non-public assessments, no more than 25 – 30 boats can perform combat missions, i.e. about half of the total. The operating voltage ratio due to the degradation of coastal infrastructure is still low, even despite the decrease in the total number of boats. Thus, no more than 6 – 8 submarines of the Russian fleet can be at the same time at sea. In the 2000's, Russia was not always able to maintain a permanent combat service of strategic missile submarines, which were mainly forced to keep watch “from the pier”.


Nuclear submarine K-329 "Severodvinsk", the lead ship of the project 855 "Ash"


The current State Armaments Program for the period 2011 – 2020. implies serious costs for the fleet (over 4 trillion rubles), of which a considerable part will go to the sub-melt. Large navy expenditures are planned for the period after 2025. In 2010 – 2020, the fleet should receive a total of up to submarines 35 – 36 and non-nuclear submarines (20). The total costs of the sub-melt at current prices can amount to at least 1,7 trillion rubles. without taking into account the modernization of submarines of Soviet construction. At the same time, in anticipation of the arrival of new boats, the fleet intends to modernize the old ones remaining in service. In general, the quantitative parameters of the update are comparable with the corresponding parameters of the US Navy. By 2030, the Americans are planning to build up to 30 atomic multi-purpose submarines of the Virginia type and to begin building new-generation nuclear submarines. In this regard, of interest are the differences in the structure of the Russian and American underfloat, due to different combat missions.

In this situation, the following conclusion suggests itself: it is necessary to develop a new, less ambitious and cheaper project that could replace multi-purpose boats withdrawn from the fleet in a one-to-one ratio.


The format of the submarine forces of the Russian Navy in the form in which it was originally defined by the state weapons program for 2011 – 2020, involving the construction of 8 SSBN (955 “Borey” project), 7 – 8 multi-purpose rocket carriers (885 “Ash” project) and 10 –12 non-nuclear submarines could not be called balanced. With adequate rates of replacement of SSBNs and non-nuclear submarines, this program in its original form threatened with a serious reduction in the number of atomic multi-purpose boats. Today, the Russian Navy has 27 multipurpose submarines of 949А, 971, 671РТМК and 945 / 945А projects, much of which will be written off due to physical obsolescence over the next 10 – 12 years.

Replacing the output boats of the entire 7 – 8 “Ash” is hardly possible - with all the respectable characteristics of this project “Ash”, like any other submarine, not able to be in several places at the same time to fill the “holes” formed by a sharp reduction fleet. At the same time, it is also unrealistic to increase the volume of construction of “Ash” to at least 15 units to 2025 due to the high cost (exceeding 100 billion rubles per unit) [2] and the complexity of boats of this type.

In this situation, the following conclusion suggests itself: it is necessary to develop a new, less ambitious and cheaper project that could replace multi-purpose boats withdrawn from the fleet in a one-to-one ratio.

Post-soviet subdivision: resurface after a fall

Strategic missile submarine cruiser project 955 "Borey"


As a result, this decision was made. In early July, 2013, some media reported with reference to competent sources in the United Shipbuilding Corporation reported that a new nuclear submarine is being developed for the Russian Navy, which is intended to replace the submarines of the Soviet projects 671, 971 and 945. The main tasks of the new boat will be to protect their SSBNs from attacks from enemy multipurpose submarines and to hunt enemy missile carriers in their patrol areas.

Such specialization allows us to speak of a new boat as a “submarine fighter”, sharpened, above all, for battles with its own kind. At the same time, the development of modern missile weapons will allow them to retain a certain strike potential on these boats, albeit more modest than on the Ash trees carrying cruise missiles of various types up to 32 in 8 universal launchers.

The characteristics of the promising project have not yet been announced, but according to unofficial data, the promising submarine fighter will have an underwater displacement within 6 – 7 thousand tons (versus 13 – 14 thousand tons in “Ash”), the speed within 30 nodes and armament from 4 – 6 torpedo tubes and 8 – 12 cruise missiles in universal launchers. The cost of such a submarine should fit into the framework 50 – 60 billion rubles. at current prices.

A less powerful power plant and a simplified composition of armaments should allow these submarines to be built at a faster rate. It is assumed that the construction of the main building of the new project could begin in the coming 2 – 3 of the year. With normal funding, it can be put into operation for 2020 – 2021. Serial construction, deployed in several factories (besides Sevmash, it is technically possible to do this at the Admiralty Shipyards, Amur Shipbuilding Plant and, possibly, at the Krasnoye Sormovo Plant), will allow commissioning new fighters to 2030 before 20. However, even 10 – 12 new boats in combination with the “Ash” and modernization of the most “fresh” submarines of the Soviet projects will serve as a very serious replenishment of the fleet.

American approach: similarities and differences

The problem that the Russian Navy is solving today has been solved a little earlier by the US Navy, which, after the end of the Cold War, also faced a sharp reduction in allocations and rising costs of submarines of new projects.

Repeatedly expressed concerns about the need to accurately follow the "American way" and limit the series of boats of the type "Ash" number in 2 – 4 units, followed by the transition to the construction of boats cheaper project.


In the 1990's, the American fleet abandoned the serial construction of the Seawolf-type submarines - large, heavily armed and high-speed submarine cruisers. The choice was made in favor of a less ambitious project - a project of the Virginia type boats. The three “sea wolves” built in the 1990s instead of the 30s planned (the last one — Jimmy Carter — in the special boat version) did not continue. At the same time, the boats of the Virginia (the construction of the first one was begun in 1999) were replicated already in 10 specimens. As already mentioned, the US Navy expects to receive at least 30 boats of this type to replace obsolete Los Angeles-type submarines.

The structure of the American sub-fusion is quite simple. Its combat potential lies in two sub-classes of nuclear submarines: nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN - SSBN) and multipurpose nuclear submarines - "fighters", aimed primarily at hunting for enemy submarines and firing of coastal missiles (SSN - PLA) as an extra feature. The capabilities of cruise missiles, assessed during the 1990 conflicts, led to the creation in the US Navy of a new subclass of submarines - the specialized carrier of cruise missiles (SSGNs). Four of these boats, re-equipped from the Ohio-class SSBNs, became part of the US Navy in the 2000s.


Stephen Rountree Virginia Multipurpose Submarine


In the future, the modernized "Ohio" is planned to be replaced by carriers of cruise missiles built on the basis of boats of the "Virginia" type. At the same time, unlike the Russian / Soviet SSGNs that are focused on fighting the enemy’s fleet, the American ones are primarily intended for coastal attacks.

Anti-shipping potential like sine qua non

In the course of discussions on the ways of development of the domestic submarine, considerations were repeatedly made about the need to accurately follow the “American way” and limit the series of “Ash” boats to the number of 2 – 4 units, followed by the transition to the construction of boats of a cheaper project.

This decision is currently unacceptable for political reasons. In the Russian Navy, multi-purpose boats of the 885 "Ash" project should take the place of the 949A nuclear submarine cruisers, the main purpose of which is to combat enemy surface formations, primarily aircraft carriers. This task remains relevant in connection with the complex format of Russian-American relations and the current situation in the Far East. The main players in this region - Japan and China - are building up the potential of surface fleets, and the possibility of conflict with Japan from all the hypothetical variants of collisions with other developed countries for Russia is the highest.

Directly following the American path for Russia would be possible only if it was integrated into the American geopolitical orbit and military alliance with the United States, which is practically unrealistic in the foreseeable future.
With all its capabilities in the US Navy, “Seawolf” remained, first of all, a “submarine fighter" - the task of fighting the enemy’s surface fleet in the United States rests mainly with the deck Aviation. Thus, a direct adherence to the American path for Russia would be possible only if it was built into the American geopolitical orbit and a military alliance with the United States, which is almost impossible in the foreseeable future.

Based on the current geopolitical situation, the Russian submarine fleet must retain its “anti-ship” wing, and this task automatically dictates the need for a fleet of at least 8 – 10 multi-purpose submarines with powerful missile weapons. For the period up to 2030, it can be solved by building 7 – 8 submarines of the “Ash” type and retaining the upgraded 3А cruisers in the 4 – 949 fleet.

Nonatomic future


Project 877 "Halibus"


Another difference between Russia and the United States is the need to maintain an impressive fleet of non-nuclear submarines [3] - due to the presence of relevant sea theaters such as the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean, Sea of ​​Japan and the absence of allies capable of taking on this burden.

For the US, such allies are, for example, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Japan and a number of other countries. The existing scope of tasks dictates the need to maintain in the fleet at least 20-like submarines capable of solving tasks in closed sea theaters without attracting the forces of the nuclear sub-melt.

Today, the fleet includes only 18 diesel submarines of the 877 “Halibus” project built by 1980 – 1990-ies, better known as Varshavyanka, much of which is not capable. The restoration of the potential of a non-nuclear subsurface proceeds in two ways: the repair of Varshavyanki and the construction of new combat units. The repair is more or less clear, while in the course of the implementation of the new 677 "Lada" project there were difficulties.

In the 2000-ies for the Russian Navy were laid three "Lada", but their construction was delayed due to the lack of knowledge of the power plant, the new hydroacoustic complex and other equipment. As a result, today only one submarine of the new project has been accepted into the fleet, which has not yet shown “contractual” capabilities.

Another difference between Russia and the United States is the need to maintain an impressive fleet of non-nuclear submarines.


To refine the "Lada" and its power plant were thrown the best forces of the underwater and energy design bureaus. At the same time, the process was delayed, in particular, due to the diversion of engineering and engineering personnel from the energy industry to the restoration of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric station damaged in the accident.

As a result, as a temporary measure, it was decided to build boats of the spent 636 project (advanced export version of the 877 project) with a delay of almost 10 years, since the 636 project was proposed for the Russian Navy at the beginning of the 2000s. If this decision were made on time, today the fleet could have at least 6 – 8 diesel submarines of a new construction. Nevertheless, 6 boats of this project have been ordered to restore the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet, and 3 of them are already under construction: the main submarine of the 636.3 project. Novorossiysk should be launched this year.

Required minimum

Today, as part of the fleet there are, as already noted, at least 60 boats (excluding various special purpose vehicles and carrier submarines of such devices). At the same time, according to various estimates, no more than 4 – 5 submarine submariners, 12 – 15 multi-purpose atomic submarines and 8 – 10 non-nuclear boats can perform combat missions. less than half the available forces. This is clearly not enough even for simply maintaining a presence in critical areas, not to mention building up forces if necessary.

Subject to repair and upgrade to 2025 – 2030. 2 – 3 “strategist” can survive, 8 – 10 multi-purpose nuclear and 6 – 8 diesel boats can survive.

Thus, the restoration of the potential of the subsurface requires the construction of 8 – 10 SSBNs, 18 – 22 multipurpose nuclear submarines and 12 – 15 non-nuclear submarines. Of this number, 4 SSBNs, 2 multipurpose nuclear boats and 3 non-nuclear are currently built (or are being built), and by the end of 2013, another SSBN, one multipurpose nuclear boat and two non-nuclear multipurpose boats are expected. Such a “construction line” is still in line with the identified priorities - the restoration of the potential of naval strategic nuclear forces and the preservation of anti-ship potential. At the same time, such a bias is fraught with a reduction in the ability to combat the submarine forces of the likely enemy and protect its own missile carriers from possible underwater attacks.

In view of the above, it seems relevant to revise the priorities of the construction of the submarine fleet with the postponement of the implementation of some programs. In our opinion, the 955 project’s construction program for missile carriers of the 8 project, according to which 2020 SSBN is planned to be built to 667, can be tolerated for five years. the basis of the naval strategic nuclear forces of Russia.

1. Pavlov A.S. Soviet Navy. 1990 – 1991 G.: Reference book. Yakutsk, 1991.
2. Subsequently, it was announced that the military and industry "agreed" on the price of serial "Ash" within 50 billion rubles. However, many experts now call such an understatement of the price unjustified and politically motivated. A more realistic forecast is the price of the order of 75 – 80 billion rubles.

3. The term "non-nuclear submarines" was used instead of the traditional "diesel submarines" after the appearance of various air-independent power plants, including those without traditional diesel engines.
Author:
Originator:
http://russiancouncil.ru/
58 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. mark1
    mark1 1 November 2013 09: 56
    +6
    It was immediately obvious that the expensive pr.885 could not be the main type (even the USSR would not have pulled it massively) and cheaper and simpler nuclear submarines are needed (at least at the first stage) .At the same time, the unfinished pr.971 nuclear submarines are being completed for India, although they and 671RTM would be happy, the unfinished project 949A is being converted into some kind of incomprehensible carrier of underwater stations (most likely as a means of saving our leadership), the Sharks have been ruined ... The question is ripening - what is the fleet management doing?
  2. govoruha-otrok
    govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 10: 02
    +5
    no more than 4–5 submarine missile carriers, 12–15 multipurpose nuclear submarines and 8–10 non-nuclear submarines, i.e. less than half of the available forces.
    This means in the sea they can be on the BS: 1-2 / 3-5 / 2-3, respectively. In all fleets! Horror!
  3. crest
    crest 1 November 2013 10: 13
    +1
    I want to ask all knowledgeable people. And where is the radiator near the submarine, how it discharges excess heat, and judging by the power plants it should be unmeasured.
    1. govoruha-otrok
      govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 10: 19
      0
      http://www.bellona.ru/reports/NothernFleet/1180701214.07
    2. Misantrop
      Misantrop 1 November 2013 10: 28
      +9
      Quote: crest
      And where is the radiator near the submarine

      On the submarine, this is called heat exchangers, including the main condensers of the steam turbine plant. They are located in the lower rooms of the turbine compartments, and their inlet and outlet pipes are led out of the light housing (shown in the photo by an arrow). This is done so that when moving it is possible to cool the HA with a free flow. By the way, 4 GC circulation pumps, turned on at high speed, are able to disperse this rather large ship to a speed of 1 knot
      1. Snake4
        Snake4 1 November 2013 18: 24
        0
        Only you forgot to say how much energy the MCP consumes and where to get it;)
        And also the fact that the water in the primary circuit driven by the MCP is not renewed from the outside and physically cannot move the turbine.
    3. doktor_alex
      doktor_alex 1 November 2013 15: 01
      0
      Slightly to the left of the brake tank, which is to the right of the Recaro captain's chair, by the way, they say that the design for the "Ash" was developed in Pininfarina, can someone confirm? laughing
  4. Col.
    Col. 1 November 2013 10: 19
    14
    The term "subfloor" in the article is used unprofessionally, with a distortion of its meaning. Real "sea wolves" mean PEOPLE by this word! Submariners! NOT SUBMARINES. It has now become fashionable to trump terms, without bothering to find out their meaning ...
    1. govoruha-otrok
      govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 10: 22
      +2
      collective this word.
      submelt
      SURFACE -a; m. Specialist. Submarine Floating Aids. Harbor submarine.
      Great Dictionary of Russian language. - 1st ed.: St. Petersburg: Norint, S. A. Kuznetsov. 1998
      1. Col.
        Col. 1 November 2013 10: 37
        +4
        Quote: govoruha-otrok
        Great Dictionary of Russian language


        Ask any sailor, he will tell you about the dictionary ...
        Here, read, for example, an interview with a super professional, deputy. Admiral Burtsev, the Navy Naval School of the Navy (by the way, I know him personally): "Podplav - the elite of the Navy". http://flot.com/nowadays/concept/reforms/oleg_burtsev.htm
        Can iron be the elite? Admiral Chernavin (former Navy Civil Code) is right: the submariner is for life, and the submarine is fate.
        There are professional terms that have been established for decades and even centuries, and distorting their meaning is silly, illiterate, and embarrassing.
        1. govoruha-otrok
          govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 10: 39
          0
          I will ask. although you, of course, know better what and what is called in the Navy :-)))
        2. Max otto
          Max otto 1 November 2013 15: 24
          15
          A little humor is off topic, but what is actually said and what to do in retirement.smile
          Quote: Colonel
          ... Admiral Chernavin (former Navy Civil Code) is right: a submariner is for life, and a submarine is fate ...
      2. Misantrop
        Misantrop 1 November 2013 10: 53
        +3
        Quote: govoruha-otrok
        Submarine Floating Aids.

        There is, as in any serious business, its own professional jargon. In general, in the Navy, FLOATING is considered to be that it is capable of independently supporting itself on the surface, but does not have its own means of movement (i.e., it is capable of moving only under the influence of external forces). To tell a sailor that his ship does not go, but floats is a good enough reason for serious offense lol

        But this is purely naval jargon. For the same tankers, "amphibious tank" means something completely different ... request
        1. govoruha-otrok
          govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 10: 59
          +4
          I do not want to offend you, but you are clearly using the information obtained from what you read. No? There are, of course, expressions that only shit swims, and the sailors walk, but there is no trepidation before using the word "swim". Example: surfacing, floating craft, crew and the same sub-surfacing, etc. terms. Nobody renames it to approach, location or travel composition)))

          Silence and then applause, those sitting in the hall deservedly appreciated the song “Depth” performed by A. Stolyarov and “Tired Submarine” performed by D. Gorovoy. And how could it be otherwise, if those songs dealt with her - about a fighting steel friend, and about them - sailors and midshipmen, lieutenants and admirals, about everything that fit into this capacious and such an expensive concept - RUSSIAN FILL !(with)
          1. Col.
            Col. 1 November 2013 11: 15
            +4
            Quote: govoruha-otrok
            crew and the same subfloor and other terms.


            Right. "Ship crew" is a generalizing concept, but mainly the crews of surface ships. "Podplav" - submariners. Or, for example, about aviation: there is a "flight crew", and there is a "flight crew", as well as an "engineering and technical" one, but all are aviators. In general, often professional jargon, terms in their meaning differ (and quite strongly) from the generally accepted "in civilian life".
            1. govoruha-otrok
              govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 11: 21
              +1
              what is the argument about? moreover, neither one nor the other remained. Here are the quotes for you:
              ... When I, presenting my pass to the sentry, entered the submarine courtyard, as the sailors call the abbreviation fleet, ...
              ... XX century gave her a diving fleet - SUN. ...
              ... former division commander Poleshchuk ...
              ... And how many boats the KBF submarine counted by the beginning ...
              And so on)))

              And the sailors are also called surface watermen and submariners, those who receive "sea"
          2. gunnerminer
            gunnerminer 5 November 2013 20: 23
            0
            Quote: govoruha-otrok
            I do not want to offend you, but you are clearly using the information obtained from what you read. No? There are, of course, expressions that only shit swims, and the sailors walk, but there is no trepidation before using the word "swim". Example: surfacing, floating craft, crew and the same sub-surfacing, etc. terms. Nobody renames it to approach, location or travel composition)))

            Silence and then applause, those sitting in the hall deservedly appreciated the song “Depth” performed by A. Stolyarov and “Tired Submarine” performed by D. Gorovoy. And how could it be otherwise, if those songs dealt with her - about a fighting steel friend, and about them - sailors and midshipmen, lieutenants and admirals, about everything that fit into this capacious and such an expensive concept - RUSSIAN FILL !(with)



            The existence of the Russian subfloat is reduced only to the presence of talk about it. There is a constant reduction of first-line submarines and linear crews (handed over or confirmed L-1, L-2, L-3).
        2. kirpich
          kirpich 1 November 2013 14: 02
          +1
          Quote: Misantrop
          . In general, in the Navy, FLOATING is considered to be that it is capable of independently supporting itself on the surface, but does not have its own means of movement (i.e., is capable of moving only under the influence of external forces



          Now and then I did not understand why the navigators in the diploma says - "Navigator of the long voyage"
          1. Misantrop
            Misantrop 1 November 2013 18: 32
            +3
            Quote: kirpich
            Now and then I did not understand why the navigators in the diploma says - "Navigator of the long voyage"

            Everything is correct, the navigator himself DOES NOT GO, he is TAKEN (and he is taxiing). lol In general, the term itself comes from the time when ships did not yet have their own power plant (except for rowing galleys). They used an external source - the wind. That is why there used to be "swimming", and now they use the term "hike" more. request
            1. Wachels
              Wachels 3 November 2013 15: 30
              0
              And therefore, sailing, not sailing. And so far only sailing. And civilians, called ships and steamboats, also go.
  5. govoruha-otrok
    govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 10: 31
    0
    Quote: Misantrop
    4 circulation pumps GK, included at high speed, are able to disperse this rather large ship to a speed of 1 knot

    Theoretically or in practice? I just don’t recall such experiments during my service
    1. Misantrop
      Misantrop 1 November 2013 10: 49
      0
      Quote: govoruha-otrok
      Theoretically or in practice?

      Exactly what is practical. There was even an idea to officially recognize these pumps as a reserve means of movement, but the impressive speed is only too low when moving only under them
      1. govoruha-otrok
        govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 10: 50
        0
        interesting. and on what projects, BDR, BDRM?
        1. Misantrop
          Misantrop 1 November 2013 10: 58
          0
          This was a feature of a total of 667 projects. As was the case with other projects, just do not know. It is clear that 1 knot is rude, no one has carried out accurate measurements of displacement in this way on a measured mile
          1. govoruha-otrok
            govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 11: 01
            0
            I do not know. Not on the DB, the BDR did not notice this. On the foot, with a power plant running, in theory, we should quietly move forward, pulling the mooring lines (when parked at the floating dock, for example). This is at what capacity should the installation work?
            1. Misantrop
              Misantrop 1 November 2013 11: 13
              +2
              Quote: govoruha-otrok
              This is at what capacity should the installation work?

              Circulation pumps at high speed in general VERY rarely turned on. And practically NEVER when parked at the pier, otherwise there was too great a chance to clog the circulation routes with all sorts of rubbish, which is simply immeasurable under the pier. Moreover, when moving with medium and full moves, they were sometimes stopped altogether, the oncoming flow was quite enough. And the point here is not even the power at which the installation is operating, but how open the etching valve is (i.e., the power reserve). And most often they tried to keep it almost covered so as not to "boil the ocean in vain"
              1. govoruha-otrok
                govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 11: 16
                +1
                well, as I thought. theoretically) Is this your practical knowledge? Then I take the words about "information obtained from the read" in the back)))
                1. gunnerminer
                  gunnerminer 5 November 2013 20: 25
                  0
                  Quote: govoruha-otrok
                  well, as I thought. theoretically) Is this your practical knowledge? Then I take the words about "information obtained from the read" in the back)))



                  Your knowledge, as the former F-1 of one of the Hajiyev’s divisions for some time, went into the category of theoretical. Especially if you work for a long time as a security guard at Volgodonsk NPP.
        2. AVV
          AVV 1 November 2013 14: 09
          +3
          Most importantly, boats are needed as air, and they need to be built as quickly and as possible !!!
  6. Misantrop
    Misantrop 1 November 2013 11: 25
    +7
    Quote: govoruha-otrok
    Is this your practical knowledge?
    Precisely what is purely practical. Throughout his service, he turned them on at high speed three or four times. One - when they grabbed (apparently) a school of fish into the receiving lattices and the circulation just stopped. Under the ice, walking on one side. The AZ ATG and GTZA worked, and, since the TsNPK were at high speed, it was just a miracle that we managed to keep the AZ YR from triggering the AZ of the 1st kind by stopping them ... Then we would not have gotten off so easily ... And so, these the pumps "grind" this plug, so that the vacuum in the main chamber was restored in seconds. Well, then it's a matter of technology ... request

    Well, on the GOS, when they twisted a bunch of measurements, chasing the settings in all possible modes and parameters. That's when the operators of the delivery crew demonstrated this tricky mode of movement. And in the documentation on the AEC 667 project about this - not a word. So there’s just nowhere to read request
  7. govoruha-otrok
    govoruha-otrok 1 November 2013 11: 28
    +1
    why did you go under the ice on one side? experiments?
    1. Misantrop
      Misantrop 1 November 2013 11: 38
      +6
      Quote: govoruha-otrok
      experiments?

      No, the usual transition. Going underwater almost the entire passage through open water, the second side decided not to start. In fact, they just crossed the edge of the ice field. And it was just then that this muck should happen, just on my watch ... sad
      1. barbiturate
        barbiturate 1 November 2013 15: 11
        0
        and what can you do? well, come on, nobody will give an order to you anyway, to launch, right? a barge with people?
        1. Misantrop
          Misantrop 1 November 2013 18: 36
          0
          Quote: barbiturate
          and what can you do? well, come on, nobody will give an order to you anyway

          In general, the decision to enter and withdraw the board during the campaign is made by the commander together with the mechanic. Depending on the tasks assigned to the ship and the prevailing situation. No commands "from above" are required for this.
  8. 1c-inform-city
    1c-inform-city 1 November 2013 12: 59
    0
    If the hunters are talking about new boats, then this is very good. Only interesting is that they will be fundamentally new or based on a 971 project that has proven itself well.
    1. desava
      desava 2 November 2013 06: 44
      0
      Fundamentally new - this is unlikely. A new generation is being designed based on the previous one. Without the use of a prototype, it is impossible to design a new ship. How deep improvements and changes are another matter. Externally, pr. 945 and 971 are different, but it turns out to be almost one project, both were built using the prototype 671.
      One of the most important components of submarine design - the mass load - on a fundamentally new ship, without using prototype data (i.e., without starting from any initial data), it can be calculated, but the work will be unreasonably time-consuming, costly and too long.
      In general, "fundamentally new" or "based on" is the lyrics. It depends on how to operate with terms and for what purpose.
  9. RMRS
    RMRS 1 November 2013 15: 28
    +2
    The article is, of course, correct, but the problem of the construction sites has been discussed many times. The merchants will not give Krasnoye Sormovo for the construction of the submarine, the Amurskiy is in a depressing state, the Admiralty and SevMash remain, which also need to be modernized. Even if they give the project now, it will not be fulfilled, purely physically !!! no way !!! So I think - why create a new project, spend a lot of money, if now, at a certain and fairly low level of costs, it is possible to continue building the modernized project 971.
    1. Denis_469
      Denis_469 1 November 2013 16: 37
      +3
      Quote: RMRS
      Why create a new project, spend a lot of money, if now, with a certain and fairly low level of costs, you can continue to build a modernized project 971.

      Now our authorities do not want to resume the construction of 971 projects. I don’t know what they think there, if at all they think with something, which I strongly doubt.
      Now our military believes that the 971 boats of the project have too strong weapons and a large stock of weapons, which, allegedly, during the war they will not have time to completely use up. Type NATO will not give them that. Because now they are sculpting project 671 in a new iteration. They want to build something like them. They will have less type and ammunition, and therefore will have time to use it to death. Our military believes that all the same, the boats will be disposable, therefore they should be as cheap as possible. Here are torpedoes and smaller missiles. 650-mm torpedoes nafig: all the same, during a battle trip the boats are unlikely to meet targets of 50000 gross vehicles for which such torpedoes may be required. A nuclear power plant is simpler and without reloading. Speed ​​cut. Reduce immersion depth. Vitality to remove. Etc.
      In general, they are now designing option 671 for kamikaze. Based on the fact that the boats will be disposable. Moreover, for their one-time use, everything will be extremely simplified. And at the same time, such a reduction in cost will allow peeling to increase.
      These are the new boats will be. I think that with this design approach, the entire crew will have to drink sake before going on their combat campaign.
      1. arane
        arane 1 November 2013 19: 46
        +2
        Boats 971 project magnificent ships. Denis, are you from Vilyuchinsk?
        1. Denis_469
          Denis_469 1 November 2013 19: 47
          +2
          Quote: arane
          Denis, are you from Vilyuchinsk?

          No, once from Severomorsk.

          And now from Ryazan.
          1. arane
            arane 1 November 2013 19: 57
            +3
            It’s clear, and I’m from Kamchatka, now in Sochi
      2. desava
        desava 2 November 2013 06: 55
        0
        Do not think that I am criticizing your position on the concept of a new nuclear submarine, but the "cut down" nuclear submarine described by you, in my opinion, should be exactly that, at least at the current stage of development. This submarine is seen as a ship for a "big" war, and not a battle with a knowingly weak side. As for removing the 650 mm, of course it is nonsense. This, along with anti-ship missiles, is the main caliber against aircraft carriers. Speed ​​is not needed at 35-40 knots. Much more power is needed, respectively, the mass of the power plant and nuclear submarine increases exponentially. Stealth falls. And the meaning of 35-40 knots? Avoid enemy torpedoes? Quick transition from one area to another? And of course the cost and construction possibilities. Submarine of the big war - a ship that can be launched into series - the time for the construction of one ship did not exceed 1 year.
        1. Denis_469
          Denis_469 2 November 2013 08: 19
          0
          Quote: desava
          Do not think that I am criticizing your position on the concept of a new nuclear submarine, but the "cut down" nuclear submarine described by you, in my opinion, should be exactly that, at least at the current stage of development.

          What I described was not what I came up with. This is the artistic mapping of TTZ onto a new submarine issued to our Navy by designers. In the form that it is now being designed is a submarine for kamikaze. Because it is designed as a one-time task with the task of not returning from the first military campaign.
          Speed ​​yes - fast transition between areas. Or to the bases and from them.
          Nuclear submarines will never be able to build in a year - their bottleneck is the production of a nuclear power plant.
          1. desava
            desava 2 November 2013 08: 35
            0
            Quote: Denis_469
            What I described is not what I came up with

            Yes, I am aware of this concept. And I am her adherent (not ardent, but I think it is appropriate).
            Quote: Denis_469
            In the form that it is now being designed is a submarine for kamikaze.

            Why? Due to the low speed compared to early projects? No. Due to less ammunition and number of TA? Again, this does not make her a kamikaze. A larger torpedo salvo than of four is impossible because of the impossibility of pointing them - they interfere with each other - this is a machine gun shooting with eyes closed. And the fact that its secrecy will increase by an order of magnitude with this approach - does it mean that the submarine is for kamikaze? Survivability - our two-hull nuclear submarines - this is never, I repeat once (!!!) not a single ship of ours was saved. And why the hell did I carry on myself then the extra 2, 3, 5 thousand tons of iron to the detriment of the main quality of the submarine - stealth?
            Quote: Denis_469
            Nuclear submarines will never be able to build in a year - their bottleneck is the production of a nuclear power plant.

            I am sure that everything is possible. Although categorically I can not decide.
            1. Denis_469
              Denis_469 2 November 2013 13: 16
              0
              I wanted to answer in detail, but here it is forbidden (such as a comment too long). Therefore, I will say briefly:
              1 - full speed in some cases is critical for the task. No it - the task will not be completed
              2 - caliber and number of torpedoes directly determine the combat effectiveness of submarines in wars
              3 - 8 torpedo room homing torpedoes were already executed in the war really. There were no problems with the impossibility of pointing torpedoes. There was a problem with the quality of the torpedoes themselves.
              4 - due to the double hull of our boats, at least 6 submarines were saved from death. I don’t write in more detail, because again the text will be too large.
              1. desava
                desava 2 November 2013 14: 08
                0
                In some cases, almost any parameter can be critical - therefore, design is carried out by a systematic approach. Most-most - this we have already passed. The deepest. The fastest. The biggest. The most armed. ToR for the development of the project is formed not just like that, but according to the results of research.
                However, I will not argue. Because this topic is wide and there are pros and cons to each of the supporters of their views on the future project. This is logical. Sincerely. hi
              2. gunnerminer
                gunnerminer 5 November 2013 20: 29
                0
                Quote: Denis_469
                I wanted to answer in detail, but here it is forbidden (such as a comment too long). Therefore, I will say briefly:
                1 - full speed in some cases is critical for the task. No it - the task will not be completed
                2 - caliber and number of torpedoes directly determine the combat effectiveness of submarines in wars
                3 - 8 torpedo room homing torpedoes were already executed in the war really. There were no problems with the impossibility of pointing torpedoes. There was a problem with the quality of the torpedoes themselves.
                4 - due to the double hull of our boats, at least 6 submarines were saved from death. I don’t write in more detail, because again the text will be too large.


                About speed, hang noodles on your ears. How about the most low-noise, minimum-low speeds? The whole list of speeds? About the caliber and the number of torpedoes is an extravagant thought. Some retired chief engineer of the TTB, F-3 formations or fleets, the commander of the mpl or diesel engine reads your comment and laughs.
          2. Misantrop
            Misantrop 2 November 2013 10: 19
            +1
            Quote: Denis_469
            Nuclear submarines will never be able to build in a year - their bottleneck is the production of a nuclear power plant.
            At one time, the NSR issued 667 projects per year for one nuclear submarine for a rather long period. So there is nothing fundamentally impossible in such terms
            1. Denis_469
              Denis_469 2 November 2013 13: 17
              0
              During the war, the fleet will need to surrender 10 submarines per month or more of this amount.
              1. Misantrop
                Misantrop 2 November 2013 14: 35
                +3
                Quote: Denis_469
                10 submarines per month
                I would not dare to go to sea on such, and I would not advise you either ... You still have to get to the place of the battle somehow, which is also quite problematic on such "early ripeners" ...

                I agree to die in battle, but BEFORE the battle, trying to get there on a "leaky bucket" ... sad
                1. rudolff
                  rudolff 2 November 2013 14: 56
                  +1
                  And ten crews a month is simply impossible to prepare now.
                  1. Misantrop
                    Misantrop 2 November 2013 15: 11
                    +4
                    Quote: rudolff
                    ten crews a month just prepare now impossible

                    This is NEVER possible, not just now. If this is a CREW, and not "a herd of poorly trained baboons locked in a leaky bucket." Professionals would never be paid for if replacements could be easily and cheaply prepared ... request
                    1. vkrav
                      vkrav 2 November 2013 15: 21
                      0
                      Quote: Misantrop
                      No one would ever pay professionals, if they could easily and cheaply be replaced ...

                      Golden words!
                    2. rudolff
                      rudolff 2 November 2013 16: 26
                      +2
                      Misantrop, I'm about the 90s. When dozens of boats were decommissioned, and officers were kicked out of civilian life with kicks. How many well-coordinated crews were disbanded! Breaking does not build.
                    3. Denis_469
                      Denis_469 2 November 2013 16: 38
                      0
                      Quote: Misantrop
                      This is NEVER possible, not just now. If this is a CREW, and not "a herd of poorly trained baboons locked in a leaky bucket." Professionals would never be paid for if replacements could be easily and cheaply prepared ...

                      Well, professionals - this is just now. During World War II, they became professionals after 2 military campaign. In wartime, all preparation periods are very different from peacetime.

                      Just the timing of the preparation of German crews for new boats from scratch using the example of "U-255":
                      1 - sailors initially underwent 6-month training. By the time the boat was built, the training period was reduced to 3 months.
                      2 - midshipmen (non-commissioned officers) were trained by promotion from sailors. The sailor was supposed to serve 2-3 years, after which he was sent for training for a period of 3 to 10 months, depending on the specialty
                      3 - officers - training period 12 months. This is with the condition of retraining into submariners from pilots (the commander of the "U-250" was before her a pilot of the German Air Force)
                      After that, a staffed crew (average manning period of 6 months without officers) came to the plant and studied the boat during its construction.
                      Further "U-255" entered service on November 29, 1941, and already on June 15, 1942 went on a military campaign. The boat became fully operational in just 6-8 months. In fact, the crew of the boat began to be completed when it was laid down, and by the time it entered service, the crew was already ready.
                    4. Denis_469
                      Denis_469 2 November 2013 16: 41
                      0
                      Due to the limited length of the posts, I can’t talk about the speed and power of learning, but even in the USSR there was nothing like that. And the increase in the number of crews was parallel training in several training centers.
                      And every month, not even 10 crews surrendered, but much more.
                      If we now apply the same load and scheme, then the training of the crews will proceed at no less pace.
                      1. rudolff
                        rudolff 2 November 2013 16: 55
                        +1
                        Denis, is it possible to compare the technology of the times of the second world and modern? Then, fighter pilots were trained in a few months, but what can now be taught in a few months?
                      2. Denis_469
                        Denis_469 2 November 2013 17: 02
                        0
                        Quote: rudolff
                        Denis, is it possible to compare the technology of the times of the second world and modern?


                        Can. Now boats will be even simpler. I don’t think that the mechanics on the boats will now be taught how to use a diesel engine while the crankshaft will crack and -1-2-3-4 cylinders will fly out. And how to use a diesel engine, when he has only 8 of XNUMX cylinders left.
                        Relays also do not learn what to do with vertical control when the tiller burst, and the boat goes on 15 nodal course during the battle.
                        Modern BZZH does not fulfill BZZH in conditions when due to explosion of a subversive charge at a depth of 100 meters it knocks out 1 frame.
                        Modern torpedoes do not learn how to repair torpedoes on their own using improvised materials.
                        And so on and so forth.
                        With that approach, sailors and foremen can be trained in the same 3 months. Michmanov for 6 months. And officers for 10 months.
                  2. gunnerminer
                    gunnerminer 5 November 2013 20: 30
                    0
                    Quote: Misantrop
                    Quote: rudolff
                    ten crews a month just prepare now impossible

                    This is NEVER possible, not just now. If this is a CREW, and not "a herd of poorly trained baboons locked in a leaky bucket." Professionals would never be paid for if replacements could be easily and cheaply prepared ... request


                    Good and accurate answer. Podplavsky.
                2. Denis_469
                  Denis_469 2 November 2013 16: 27
                  0
                  Quote: rudolff
                  And ten crews a month is simply impossible to prepare now.


                  Now yes. Because the technology of serial training of crews has been lost. During World War 2, they could successfully cook. Both Germans and Americans.
              2. Denis_469
                Denis_469 2 November 2013 16: 25
                0
                This is the standard speed for building diesel boats in Germany at the end of the war. And not even a peak.
                And such boats sometimes performed a dozen military campaigns. Block-modular construction, however, worsened the characteristics of the boats. Because the strength of the interblock seams was not the same as that of a solid body. As a result, instead of 400 meters, VIIC / 41/2 received 250-280 meters at XXI and 100 meters at XXIII.
                But it was the only payment for the speed of construction.
  • Walker1975
    Walker1975 1 November 2013 16: 32
    0
    And what have you heard about "Boreas", on which a lot of money and time have been spent? As far as I understand, problems with Bulava continue? They said that Shoigu did not rule out abandoning her, and there was nothing to replace her with.
    1. Onyx
      Onyx 1 November 2013 17: 43
      0
      Quote: Walker1975
      And what have you heard about "Boreas", on which a lot of money and time have been spent? As far as I understand, problems with Bulava continue? They said that Shoigu did not rule out abandoning her, and there was nothing to replace her with.

      Shoigu did not say anything like that.
      1. Walker1975
        Walker1975 2 November 2013 00: 17
        0
        I found this in the Military Explorer:

        “Sergei Shoigu was asked if the military department was planning to consider replacing it with another missile because of the next unsuccessful launch of the Bulava. To this the minister replied:“ Until we find out everything, we will not do this. ”Such an answer, suggests that the military department does not exclude the possibility of abandoning the Bulava, which would mean the collapse of the entire program for the development of the naval component of Russia's nuclear triad. There is simply nothing to replace the Bulava with now. "
  • rudolff
    rudolff 1 November 2013 17: 43
    +1
    Today at RIA Novosti, a message flickers that the Boreas can temporarily perform the tasks of multipurpose boats. Nah ...
    1. Onyx
      Onyx 1 November 2013 17: 52
      +3
      According to Interfax, the Defense Ministry denied reports that it is allegedly planned to use Borei-class strategic nuclear missile submarines as multipurpose submarines.
      "The information that Borei-class strategic nuclear submarines will be adopted by the Navy to perform tasks" as multipurpose submarines "does not correspond to reality," the General Staff of the Navy told Interfax-AVN.

      RIA Novosti writes that they were informed about this by a certain high-ranking source. I do not believe in similar news, because when the name of the person reporting the decision is not communicated, such news is simply a duck.
    2. Misantrop
      Misantrop 2 November 2013 15: 13
      +3
      Quote: rudolff
      Boreas can temporarily perform the tasks of multi-purpose boats.
      "Temporarily carry on the resuscitation machines of the cardiological center rubble for the construction site"? IMHO, the one who offered this is clearly "mind-chamber" ... lol
  • rudolff
    rudolff 1 November 2013 18: 06
    +3
    Onyx, I also hope it's just a duck.
    The best way out would be to continue the construction of the Schuka-B series. The ship is excellent and does not require serious processing of the project. Unless only vertical launchers add.
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 1 November 2013 20: 14
    +2
    In the Soviet 80s, nuclear submarines and submarines built 4 large shipyards. Well, in addition to the NSR, which became a jack of all trades, and the Admiralteysky (formerly LAO), the other two peripheral ones may have collapsed to the point where only longboats and boats can build. And I agree with the author that it is desirable to have an analogue of 671 projects (on technical specifications and tasks) in 2018-22. Just do not repeat the typical mistake of the Soviet military-industrial complex - to have a dozen different types of Pl at once winked
  • krasstar
    krasstar 1 November 2013 20: 21
    +3
    I'm afraid that everything is much worse than what is described in the article. And we need to think not only about the "iron" plowing the ocean (by the way, in the near future - 3-5 years - only ships created in the USSR are capable of plowing), but also about that where these "modern" (due to the difficult economic situation) pieces of iron will be drowned by our probable friends. They will be drowning in UZKOSTYAH-Kola Bay, Motovsky, at the exit from Avachinskaya, etc. The fleet was cornered like a dog in a booth, the maneuver is only at the pier. If you think about it, then this is completely different money, try to restore the base in Gremikha!
  • indiggo
    indiggo 1 November 2013 22: 13
    +1
    I will express my opinion, 885m will be the main multi-purpose submarine. yes the boat is very expensive but there is no alternative.
    if you really calculate the amount that the design and construction of a new project will fly into, you get the same money that you plan to build 885m. and if you take into account additional parameters such as training and infrastructure, it’s also not a fact that it will be cheaper. )))
    1. Hitrovan07
      Hitrovan07 4 November 2013 11: 47
      0
      I agree with your opinion. It is also annoying "shuffling" in the information space from "abandoning a bunch of projects" to "replacing too expensive, but already commercially available."
  • qwert1707
    qwert1707 2 November 2013 07: 05
    +1
    You read, here are such articles and you understand that over the past 20 years I have been sorry, about everything that is possible. And when the fried rooster pecked at Gazprom and Rosneft that the Arctic Ocean Shelf needed to be defended, they realized that there was nothing and nothing to replace and build properly.
  • k-239
    k-239 4 November 2013 19: 19
    0
    During the collapse of everything in a row, unique avenue 705 (705k) was destroyed.
    Unique - titanium (eternal!), Small, nimble to ugliness (running away from torpedoes),
    20 minutes from the pier (like a diesel engine), crew - 32 people, a full automatic machine with a reactor at the MMT (mass
    4 times less than VVR), etc. etc.
    Now we will frantically invent a "bicycle" for an incomprehensible loot. Those who studied
    "Alpha" may already over the hill, along with the sequel "Corsair"
  • The comment was deleted.