H1 Superracket - a failed breakthrough
Russia is in dire need of a super heavy class carrier
Last year, Roskosmos announced a tender for the development of a heavy-class rocket based on the existing Angara project, which, among other things, could deliver a manned spacecraft to the moon. Obviously, the absence of super-heavy missiles in Russia, which can throw up to 80 tons of cargo into orbit, hinders many promising work in space and on Earth. The project of the only domestic carrier with similar characteristics “Energy-Buran” was closed at the beginning of the 90-s, despite the 14,5 billion rubles spent (in 80-x prices) and 13 years. Meanwhile, in the USSR, a supercar was successfully developed with stunning imagination of the performance characteristics. The readers of the "MIC" are invited to a story about stories create missile H1.
The beginning of work on the Х1 with a liquid-jet engine (LRE) was preceded by research on rocket engines using nuclear energy (NRE). In accordance with the government resolution of 30 June 1958, the design bureau 1 was developed in draft design, approved by S. P. Korolev 30 December 1959.
The OKB-456 (Chief Designer V.P. Glushko) of the State Committee for Defense Technology and the OKB-670 (M.M. Bondaryuk) of the State Committee for Aircraft Engineering joined the creation of the YARD. OKB-1 developed three variants of missiles with YARDs, and the third was the most interesting. It was a giant rocket with a launch mass of 2000 t and a payload mass of up to 150 t. The first and second stages were made in the form of packages of conical rocket blocks that were supposed to have a large number of X-NNXX LPN rocket engines in the first stage. The second stage included four YARDs with a total 9 ton-force, a specific thrust impulse in the void to 52 kg.s./kg when using another working fluid at the heating temperature to 850 K.
The prospect of using liquid hydrogen mixed with methane as a working fluid in the NRE was shown in addition to the decree “On the possible characteristics of space rockets using hydrogen”, approved by S. P. Korolev 9 September 1960 of the year. However, as a result of further studies, the expediency of heavy launch vehicles using liquid-propellant engines on all developed components using hydrogen as a fuel at all stages was discovered. Nuclear energy was postponed for the future.
Grand project
The government decree of 23 June 1960 of the Year “On the creation of powerful launch vehicles, satellites, spacecraft and space exploration in 1960 – 1967” provided for a design study and necessary amount of research to be carried out in 1960 – 1962 in order to create Years of a new space rocket system with a launch mass of 1000 – 2000 t, ensuring the launch into orbit of a heavy interplanetary spacecraft with a mass of 60 – 80 t.
The grand project involved a number of design offices and research institutes. On engines - OKB-456 (V. P. Glushko), OKB-276 (N. D. Kuznetsov) and OKB-165 (AM Lyulka), on control systems - NII-885 (N. A. Pilyugin) and NII- 944 (V.I. Kuznetsov), on the ground complex - GSKB "Spetsmash" (V.P. Barmin), on the measuring complex - SRI-4 MO (A.I. Sokolov), on the tank emptying system and adjusting the ratio of fuel components - OKB-12 (A. S. Abramov), on aerodynamic studies - Scientific Research Institute-88 (Yu. A. Mozzhorin), TsAGI (V. M. Myasishchev) and Scientific Research Institute-1 (V. Ya. Likhushin), in manufacturing technology - Institute of Welding them. Paton of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (B.E. Paton), NITI-40 (Y.V. Kolupaev), Progress plant (A.Ya. Linkov), according to the technology and methods of experimental testing and retrofitting of stands - SRI-229 (G. M. Tabakov) and others.
The designers consecutively examined multistage launch vehicles with a starting mass from 900 to 2500 t, at the same time assessing the technical possibilities of creating and the preparedness of the country's industry for production. The calculations showed that most of the tasks of military and space purposes are solved by a launch vehicle with a payload of 70 – 100 t, put into orbit at an altitude of 300 km.
Therefore, for the design studies of the H1, a payload of 75 t mass was adopted using oxygen - kerosene at all levels of the LRE. This value of the mass of the payload corresponded to the starting mass of the PH 2200 t, taking into account that the use of hydrogen as fuel in the upper stages of the fuel will increase the mass of the payload to 90 – 100 t with the same starting mass. Studies carried out by the technological services of manufacturers and technological institutes of the country showed not only the technical possibility of creating such a launch vehicle with minimal expenditure of funds and time, but also the readiness of the industry to produce it.
At the same time, the possibilities of experimental and bench testing of PH units and blocks II and III stages were determined on the existing experimental base of the Scientific Research Institute-229 with minimal modifications. Launches of the launch vehicle were provided from the Baikonur cosmodrome, for which it was required to create there appropriate technical and launch facilities.
Also considered were various layout schemes with transverse and longitudinal division of stages, with load-carrying and non-carrying tanks. As a result, we adopted a rocket scheme with transverse division of the stages in suspended monoblock spherical fuel tanks, with multi-engine installations at stages I, II and III. The choice of the number of engines in the composition of the propulsion system is one of the fundamental problems when creating a launch vehicle. After the analysis, it was decided to use engines with 150 tons.
At the I, II and III stages of the carrier, it was decided to establish a control system for the organizational and administrative activities of CORD, which turned off the engine when its monitored parameters deviated from the norm. The thrust-carrying capacity of the RN was such that, if the single engine failed to operate, the flight continued in the initial part of the trajectory, and in the last parts of the flight of stage I it was possible to turn off even more engines without prejudice to the task.
OKB-1 and other organizations conducted special studies to substantiate the choice of fuel components with an analysis of the feasibility of using them for the PH Н1. The analysis showed a significant decrease in the mass of the payload (with a constant starting mass) in the event of a transition to high-boiling fuel components, which is due to low specific impulse impulses and an increase in the mass of fuel from tanks and pressurized gases due to the higher vapor pressure of these components. Comparison of different types of fuel showed that liquid oxygen - kerosene is much cheaper than AT + UDMH: by capex - twice, at cost price - eight times.
The booster H1 consisted of three stages (blocks A, B, C), interconnected by truss-type transition compartments, and the head unit. The power circuit was a frame shell that perceives external loads, inside which were placed fuel tanks, engines and other systems. The structure of the propulsion system I stage included 24 engine NK-15 (11Д51) on the ground on 150 ts located on the ring, II stage - eight of the same engines with high-altitude nozzle NK-15В (11Д52), III stage - four engines NK- 19 (11D53) with a height nozzle. All engines had a closed circuit.
Instruments of the control system, telemetry and other systems were located in special compartments at the appropriate levels. On the launching device, the PH was mounted with supporting heels along the periphery of the end of the first stage. The adopted aerodynamic layout made it possible to minimize the required control points and use the principle of misalignment of the thrust of opposite engines on the PH to control the pitch and roll. Due to the impossibility of transporting entire compartments of the rocket by existing vehicles, they were divided into transportable elements.
On the basis of the PH H1 stages, it was possible to create a unified series of missiles: H11 using II, III and IV stages of PH H1 with a launch mass of 700 and payload of 20 tons in the orbit of an satellite with a height of 300 km and H111 using III and IV levels of PH HXNX and stage II of the P-1A rocket with a launch mass of 9 t and a payload of mass 200 t in an orbit of an artificial satellite 5 km high, which could solve a wide range of combat and space tasks.
The work was carried out under the direct supervision of SP Korolev, who headed the Council of Chief Designers, and his first deputy, V. P. Mishin. Project materials (total 29 volumes and 8 applications) in early July 1962 was considered by an expert commission headed by the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. V. Keldysh. The Commission noted that the rationale for the PH H1 was performed at a high scientific and technical level, meets the requirements for draft designs of the launch vehicle and interplanetary missiles, and can be used as a basis for the development of working documentation. At the same time, commission members M. S. Ryazansky, V. P. Barmin, A. G. Mrykin, and some others spoke of the need to involve OKB-456 in the development of engines for the LV, but V. P. Glushko refused.
By mutual agreement, the development of the engines was entrusted to OKB-276, which did not have sufficient theoretical baggage and development experience of the LRE, with virtually no experimental and test bases for this.
Unsuccessful, but fruitful trials
The Keldysh Commission indicated that the primary task of the Х1 was its combat use, but in the course of further work, the main purpose of the super-missile was space, first of all an expedition to the Moon and return to Earth. To a large extent, the choice of such a decision was influenced by reports of the lunar manned program "Saturn-Apollo" in the United States. 3 August 1964, the government of the USSR by its resolution fixed this priority.
In December 1962 of the year OKB-1 submitted to GKOT coordinated with the main designers "Baseline and main technical requirements for the design of the launch complex for the Н1 rocket". November 13 The 1963 th Commission of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR approved by decision an interdepartmental schedule for the development of design documentation for the complex of facilities required for flight testing of the PH Н1, excluding construction itself and material and technical support. MI Samokhin and A. N. Ivannikov under the close attention of S. P. Korolev led the work on the creation of the polygon complex in the OKB-1 complex.
By the beginning of 1964, the total backlog of work from the stipulated timeline was one to two years. 19 June The 1964 government had to postpone the start of the LCI to the 1966 year. The flight design tests of the Н1 rocket with the simplified head unit of the LZ system (with the unmanned vehicle 7K-L1С instead of LOK and LK) began in February 1969. By the beginning of the LCI, experimental testing of components and assemblies, bench tests of blocks B and C, tests with the prototype model of the 1М rocket at the technical and launch positions were carried out.
The first launch of the rocket-space complex Н1-ЛЗ (№ ЗЛ) from the right launch of 21 in February of 1969 of the year ended with an accident. In the gas generator of the second engine, high-frequency oscillations appeared, the pressure tapping nozzle behind the turbine came off, components leaked, a fire started in the tail section, which led to a violation of the engine operation control system, which gave a false command to shutdown the engines for a second. However, the launch confirmed the correctness of the selected dynamic scheme, the dynamics of the launch, the control processes of the launch vehicle, allowed us to obtain experimental data on the loads on the launch vehicle and its strength, the effects of acoustic loads on the rocket and the launch system and some other data, including operating characteristics in real conditions.
The second launch of the H1-LZ complex (No. 5L) conducted 3 on July 1969 of the year, and it also crashed. According to the conclusion of the emergency commission chaired by V.P. Mishin, the most likely cause was the destruction of the oxidizer pump of the eighth engine of block A when entering the main stage.
Analysis of tests, calculations, research and experimental work lasted two years. The main measures were considered to increase the reliability of the oxidizer pump; improving the quality of manufacture and assembly of the tha; installation of filters in front of the engine pumps, excluding the ingress of foreign objects into it; filling in before starting and purging with nitrogen the tail compartment of unit A in flight and introducing a freon extinguishing system; introduction to the design of thermal protection of structural elements, instruments and cables of systems located in the tail section of block A; changing the location of devices in it in order to increase their survivability; the introduction of the lock command AED to 50 with. flight and emergency withdrawal of PH from the start to reset the power, etc.
The third launch of the H1-LZ rocket and space system (No. 6L) was held on 27 June 1971 of the year from the left launch. All 30 engines of block A entered the preliminary and main thrust modes in accordance with the standard cyclogram and functioned normally before they were turned off by the control system at 50,1 pp. However, since the beginning of the flight, the roll stabilization process was abnormal, and the error in rotation angle increased continuously and to 14,5 with. reached 145 °. Since the AED team was blocked up to 50 s., The flight to 50,1 s. became almost uncontrollable.
The most likely cause of the accident is the loss of roll controllability due to the action of previously disturbing moments, which exceed the available control points of the roll bodies. The revealed additional roll moment arose with all the engines running due to the powerful vortex air flow in the rear region of the rocket, aggravated by the asymmetry of the flow of engine parts protruding beyond the bottom of the rocket.
In less than a year, under the leadership of M. V. Melnikov and B. A. Sokolov, 11 N X NUMX steering engines were created to provide roll control for the rocket. They worked on the oxidizing generator gas and fuel extracted from the main engines.
November 23 1972 made the fourth launch of the rocket number 7L, which has undergone significant changes. The flight control was carried out by the on-board computer complex according to the commands of the gyro-stabilized development platform of the Scientific-Research Institute. The composition of the propulsion system introduced steering engines, fire suppression system, improved mechanical and thermal protection devices and onboard cable network. Measuring systems were equipped with small-sized radio-telemetry equipment developed by OKB MEI (chief designer A. F. Bogomolov). There were more than 13 000 sensors on the rocket.
No. 7L flew without comment 106,93 with., But for 7 with. before the estimated time of separation of the first and second stages, an almost instantaneous destruction of the engine oxidizer pump No. 4 occurred, which led to the elimination of the rocket.
The fifth launch was scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1974. By May, all design and constructive measures to ensure the survivability of the product, taking into account previous flights and additional research, were implemented on the rocket number 8L, installation of the upgraded engines began.
It seemed that the superracket would fly sooner or later where and how it should be. However, academician V.P. Glushko, appointed in May 1974, the head of the TsKBEM reorganized into NPO Energia, with the tacit consent of the Ministry of General Engineering (S.A. Afanasyev), the USSR Academy of Sciences (M.V. Keldysh), the Military Industrial The Sovmin Commission (L.V. Smirnov) and the CPSU Central Committee (D. F. Ustinov) stopped all work on the Н1-ЛЗ complex. In February, 1976, the project was officially closed by a decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. This decision deprived the country of heavy ships, and priority went to the US, which launched the Space Shuttle project.
The total costs of mastering the moon according to the H1-LZ program by January 1973 amounted to 3,6 billion rubles, the creation of the Н1 - 2,4 billion. The production reserve of the rocket blocks, almost all the equipment of the technical, launch and measuring complexes was destroyed, and the costs totaling six billion rubles were written off.
Although design, production and technological developments, operating experience and ensuring the reliability of a powerful rocket system were fully used in creating the Energia launch vehicle and, obviously, will be widely used in subsequent projects, it is necessary to note the fallacy of stopping the HNNXX operations. The USSR voluntarily ceded the palm to the Americans, but most importantly, many design bureaus, research institutes and factories have lost their emotional charge of enthusiasm and a sense of dedication to the ideas of space exploration, which largely determine the achievement of seemingly out of reach fantastic goals.
Last year, Roskosmos announced a tender for the development of a heavy-class rocket based on the existing Angara project, which, among other things, could deliver a manned spacecraft to the moon. Obviously, the absence of super-heavy missiles in Russia, which can throw up to 80 tons of cargo into orbit, hinders many promising work in space and on Earth. The project of the only domestic carrier with similar characteristics “Energy-Buran” was closed at the beginning of the 90-s, despite the 14,5 billion rubles spent (in 80-x prices) and 13 years. Meanwhile, in the USSR, a supercar was successfully developed with stunning imagination of the performance characteristics. The readers of the "MIC" are invited to a story about stories create missile H1.
The beginning of work on the Х1 with a liquid-jet engine (LRE) was preceded by research on rocket engines using nuclear energy (NRE). In accordance with the government resolution of 30 June 1958, the design bureau 1 was developed in draft design, approved by S. P. Korolev 30 December 1959.
The OKB-456 (Chief Designer V.P. Glushko) of the State Committee for Defense Technology and the OKB-670 (M.M. Bondaryuk) of the State Committee for Aircraft Engineering joined the creation of the YARD. OKB-1 developed three variants of missiles with YARDs, and the third was the most interesting. It was a giant rocket with a launch mass of 2000 t and a payload mass of up to 150 t. The first and second stages were made in the form of packages of conical rocket blocks that were supposed to have a large number of X-NNXX LPN rocket engines in the first stage. The second stage included four YARDs with a total 9 ton-force, a specific thrust impulse in the void to 52 kg.s./kg when using another working fluid at the heating temperature to 850 K.
The prospect of using liquid hydrogen mixed with methane as a working fluid in the NRE was shown in addition to the decree “On the possible characteristics of space rockets using hydrogen”, approved by S. P. Korolev 9 September 1960 of the year. However, as a result of further studies, the expediency of heavy launch vehicles using liquid-propellant engines on all developed components using hydrogen as a fuel at all stages was discovered. Nuclear energy was postponed for the future.
Grand project
The government decree of 23 June 1960 of the Year “On the creation of powerful launch vehicles, satellites, spacecraft and space exploration in 1960 – 1967” provided for a design study and necessary amount of research to be carried out in 1960 – 1962 in order to create Years of a new space rocket system with a launch mass of 1000 – 2000 t, ensuring the launch into orbit of a heavy interplanetary spacecraft with a mass of 60 – 80 t.The grand project involved a number of design offices and research institutes. On engines - OKB-456 (V. P. Glushko), OKB-276 (N. D. Kuznetsov) and OKB-165 (AM Lyulka), on control systems - NII-885 (N. A. Pilyugin) and NII- 944 (V.I. Kuznetsov), on the ground complex - GSKB "Spetsmash" (V.P. Barmin), on the measuring complex - SRI-4 MO (A.I. Sokolov), on the tank emptying system and adjusting the ratio of fuel components - OKB-12 (A. S. Abramov), on aerodynamic studies - Scientific Research Institute-88 (Yu. A. Mozzhorin), TsAGI (V. M. Myasishchev) and Scientific Research Institute-1 (V. Ya. Likhushin), in manufacturing technology - Institute of Welding them. Paton of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (B.E. Paton), NITI-40 (Y.V. Kolupaev), Progress plant (A.Ya. Linkov), according to the technology and methods of experimental testing and retrofitting of stands - SRI-229 (G. M. Tabakov) and others.
The designers consecutively examined multistage launch vehicles with a starting mass from 900 to 2500 t, at the same time assessing the technical possibilities of creating and the preparedness of the country's industry for production. The calculations showed that most of the tasks of military and space purposes are solved by a launch vehicle with a payload of 70 – 100 t, put into orbit at an altitude of 300 km.
Therefore, for the design studies of the H1, a payload of 75 t mass was adopted using oxygen - kerosene at all levels of the LRE. This value of the mass of the payload corresponded to the starting mass of the PH 2200 t, taking into account that the use of hydrogen as fuel in the upper stages of the fuel will increase the mass of the payload to 90 – 100 t with the same starting mass. Studies carried out by the technological services of manufacturers and technological institutes of the country showed not only the technical possibility of creating such a launch vehicle with minimal expenditure of funds and time, but also the readiness of the industry to produce it.
At the same time, the possibilities of experimental and bench testing of PH units and blocks II and III stages were determined on the existing experimental base of the Scientific Research Institute-229 with minimal modifications. Launches of the launch vehicle were provided from the Baikonur cosmodrome, for which it was required to create there appropriate technical and launch facilities.
Also considered were various layout schemes with transverse and longitudinal division of stages, with load-carrying and non-carrying tanks. As a result, we adopted a rocket scheme with transverse division of the stages in suspended monoblock spherical fuel tanks, with multi-engine installations at stages I, II and III. The choice of the number of engines in the composition of the propulsion system is one of the fundamental problems when creating a launch vehicle. After the analysis, it was decided to use engines with 150 tons.
At the I, II and III stages of the carrier, it was decided to establish a control system for the organizational and administrative activities of CORD, which turned off the engine when its monitored parameters deviated from the norm. The thrust-carrying capacity of the RN was such that, if the single engine failed to operate, the flight continued in the initial part of the trajectory, and in the last parts of the flight of stage I it was possible to turn off even more engines without prejudice to the task.
OKB-1 and other organizations conducted special studies to substantiate the choice of fuel components with an analysis of the feasibility of using them for the PH Н1. The analysis showed a significant decrease in the mass of the payload (with a constant starting mass) in the event of a transition to high-boiling fuel components, which is due to low specific impulse impulses and an increase in the mass of fuel from tanks and pressurized gases due to the higher vapor pressure of these components. Comparison of different types of fuel showed that liquid oxygen - kerosene is much cheaper than AT + UDMH: by capex - twice, at cost price - eight times.
The booster H1 consisted of three stages (blocks A, B, C), interconnected by truss-type transition compartments, and the head unit. The power circuit was a frame shell that perceives external loads, inside which were placed fuel tanks, engines and other systems. The structure of the propulsion system I stage included 24 engine NK-15 (11Д51) on the ground on 150 ts located on the ring, II stage - eight of the same engines with high-altitude nozzle NK-15В (11Д52), III stage - four engines NK- 19 (11D53) with a height nozzle. All engines had a closed circuit.
Instruments of the control system, telemetry and other systems were located in special compartments at the appropriate levels. On the launching device, the PH was mounted with supporting heels along the periphery of the end of the first stage. The adopted aerodynamic layout made it possible to minimize the required control points and use the principle of misalignment of the thrust of opposite engines on the PH to control the pitch and roll. Due to the impossibility of transporting entire compartments of the rocket by existing vehicles, they were divided into transportable elements.
On the basis of the PH H1 stages, it was possible to create a unified series of missiles: H11 using II, III and IV stages of PH H1 with a launch mass of 700 and payload of 20 tons in the orbit of an satellite with a height of 300 km and H111 using III and IV levels of PH HXNX and stage II of the P-1A rocket with a launch mass of 9 t and a payload of mass 200 t in an orbit of an artificial satellite 5 km high, which could solve a wide range of combat and space tasks.
The work was carried out under the direct supervision of SP Korolev, who headed the Council of Chief Designers, and his first deputy, V. P. Mishin. Project materials (total 29 volumes and 8 applications) in early July 1962 was considered by an expert commission headed by the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. V. Keldysh. The Commission noted that the rationale for the PH H1 was performed at a high scientific and technical level, meets the requirements for draft designs of the launch vehicle and interplanetary missiles, and can be used as a basis for the development of working documentation. At the same time, commission members M. S. Ryazansky, V. P. Barmin, A. G. Mrykin, and some others spoke of the need to involve OKB-456 in the development of engines for the LV, but V. P. Glushko refused.
By mutual agreement, the development of the engines was entrusted to OKB-276, which did not have sufficient theoretical baggage and development experience of the LRE, with virtually no experimental and test bases for this.
Unsuccessful, but fruitful trials
The Keldysh Commission indicated that the primary task of the Х1 was its combat use, but in the course of further work, the main purpose of the super-missile was space, first of all an expedition to the Moon and return to Earth. To a large extent, the choice of such a decision was influenced by reports of the lunar manned program "Saturn-Apollo" in the United States. 3 August 1964, the government of the USSR by its resolution fixed this priority.
In December 1962 of the year OKB-1 submitted to GKOT coordinated with the main designers "Baseline and main technical requirements for the design of the launch complex for the Н1 rocket". November 13 The 1963 th Commission of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR approved by decision an interdepartmental schedule for the development of design documentation for the complex of facilities required for flight testing of the PH Н1, excluding construction itself and material and technical support. MI Samokhin and A. N. Ivannikov under the close attention of S. P. Korolev led the work on the creation of the polygon complex in the OKB-1 complex.By the beginning of 1964, the total backlog of work from the stipulated timeline was one to two years. 19 June The 1964 government had to postpone the start of the LCI to the 1966 year. The flight design tests of the Н1 rocket with the simplified head unit of the LZ system (with the unmanned vehicle 7K-L1С instead of LOK and LK) began in February 1969. By the beginning of the LCI, experimental testing of components and assemblies, bench tests of blocks B and C, tests with the prototype model of the 1М rocket at the technical and launch positions were carried out.
The first launch of the rocket-space complex Н1-ЛЗ (№ ЗЛ) from the right launch of 21 in February of 1969 of the year ended with an accident. In the gas generator of the second engine, high-frequency oscillations appeared, the pressure tapping nozzle behind the turbine came off, components leaked, a fire started in the tail section, which led to a violation of the engine operation control system, which gave a false command to shutdown the engines for a second. However, the launch confirmed the correctness of the selected dynamic scheme, the dynamics of the launch, the control processes of the launch vehicle, allowed us to obtain experimental data on the loads on the launch vehicle and its strength, the effects of acoustic loads on the rocket and the launch system and some other data, including operating characteristics in real conditions.
The second launch of the H1-LZ complex (No. 5L) conducted 3 on July 1969 of the year, and it also crashed. According to the conclusion of the emergency commission chaired by V.P. Mishin, the most likely cause was the destruction of the oxidizer pump of the eighth engine of block A when entering the main stage.
Analysis of tests, calculations, research and experimental work lasted two years. The main measures were considered to increase the reliability of the oxidizer pump; improving the quality of manufacture and assembly of the tha; installation of filters in front of the engine pumps, excluding the ingress of foreign objects into it; filling in before starting and purging with nitrogen the tail compartment of unit A in flight and introducing a freon extinguishing system; introduction to the design of thermal protection of structural elements, instruments and cables of systems located in the tail section of block A; changing the location of devices in it in order to increase their survivability; the introduction of the lock command AED to 50 with. flight and emergency withdrawal of PH from the start to reset the power, etc.
The third launch of the H1-LZ rocket and space system (No. 6L) was held on 27 June 1971 of the year from the left launch. All 30 engines of block A entered the preliminary and main thrust modes in accordance with the standard cyclogram and functioned normally before they were turned off by the control system at 50,1 pp. However, since the beginning of the flight, the roll stabilization process was abnormal, and the error in rotation angle increased continuously and to 14,5 with. reached 145 °. Since the AED team was blocked up to 50 s., The flight to 50,1 s. became almost uncontrollable.
The most likely cause of the accident is the loss of roll controllability due to the action of previously disturbing moments, which exceed the available control points of the roll bodies. The revealed additional roll moment arose with all the engines running due to the powerful vortex air flow in the rear region of the rocket, aggravated by the asymmetry of the flow of engine parts protruding beyond the bottom of the rocket.
In less than a year, under the leadership of M. V. Melnikov and B. A. Sokolov, 11 N X NUMX steering engines were created to provide roll control for the rocket. They worked on the oxidizing generator gas and fuel extracted from the main engines.
November 23 1972 made the fourth launch of the rocket number 7L, which has undergone significant changes. The flight control was carried out by the on-board computer complex according to the commands of the gyro-stabilized development platform of the Scientific-Research Institute. The composition of the propulsion system introduced steering engines, fire suppression system, improved mechanical and thermal protection devices and onboard cable network. Measuring systems were equipped with small-sized radio-telemetry equipment developed by OKB MEI (chief designer A. F. Bogomolov). There were more than 13 000 sensors on the rocket.
No. 7L flew without comment 106,93 with., But for 7 with. before the estimated time of separation of the first and second stages, an almost instantaneous destruction of the engine oxidizer pump No. 4 occurred, which led to the elimination of the rocket.
The fifth launch was scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1974. By May, all design and constructive measures to ensure the survivability of the product, taking into account previous flights and additional research, were implemented on the rocket number 8L, installation of the upgraded engines began.
It seemed that the superracket would fly sooner or later where and how it should be. However, academician V.P. Glushko, appointed in May 1974, the head of the TsKBEM reorganized into NPO Energia, with the tacit consent of the Ministry of General Engineering (S.A. Afanasyev), the USSR Academy of Sciences (M.V. Keldysh), the Military Industrial The Sovmin Commission (L.V. Smirnov) and the CPSU Central Committee (D. F. Ustinov) stopped all work on the Н1-ЛЗ complex. In February, 1976, the project was officially closed by a decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. This decision deprived the country of heavy ships, and priority went to the US, which launched the Space Shuttle project.
The total costs of mastering the moon according to the H1-LZ program by January 1973 amounted to 3,6 billion rubles, the creation of the Н1 - 2,4 billion. The production reserve of the rocket blocks, almost all the equipment of the technical, launch and measuring complexes was destroyed, and the costs totaling six billion rubles were written off.
Although design, production and technological developments, operating experience and ensuring the reliability of a powerful rocket system were fully used in creating the Energia launch vehicle and, obviously, will be widely used in subsequent projects, it is necessary to note the fallacy of stopping the HNNXX operations. The USSR voluntarily ceded the palm to the Americans, but most importantly, many design bureaus, research institutes and factories have lost their emotional charge of enthusiasm and a sense of dedication to the ideas of space exploration, which largely determine the achievement of seemingly out of reach fantastic goals.
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