October 23 The 2013 of the year in Brussels hosted a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council. As usual, Moscow actively opposed the construction of missile defense elements in Poland and Romania with the assistance of the United States. The Secretary General of the Alliance during the meeting said that neither NATO nor Russia have yet agreed on any parameters for possible cooperation in this area. “But we all agree that further consultations are the way forward,” Rasmussen said. “Working together in this area does not work. Missile defense programs in Europe are developing, our concerns are not taken into account, ”the Russian side noted.
Sometime this period in stories the countries (among many others, of course) will give the name "The Age of Terry Non-Professionalism". It was a time when gynecologists were in charge of foreign policy, cardiologists - agriculture, and women from the tax service of the Northern capital, headed by Glavlenmebeltorg, dealt with the most important issues of military construction.
The consequences for any of the areas where "effective managers" invaded were usually the most disastrous. Sometimes terrifying and disastrous. It has not bypassed this plague and anti-missile defenses.
In this regard, I will tell a little story. At the end of 90, I was sent from the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff to a meeting of the working group on missile defense, which was held in the Foreign Ministry building at Smolensk-Senna, 32. The composition of the working group frankly surprised me. These were career diplomats. Apart from me, no one from those present ever under any circumstances had anything to do with matters of planning, combat use and, moreover, the operation of missile defense systems.
The issue that was on the agenda of the meeting of the working group was the prolongation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Exceptionally due to negligence (and possibly stupidity) in the first minutes of the working group meeting, I quietly asked: “What are you going to develop here, if of you, I'm sorry, no one understands anything about missile defense?”.
What started here! The head of the group said that if I didn’t immediately shut up, I would be immediately informed about my impudent behavior by the Chief of General Staff. And my name is just deleted right away from the working group lists.
One of the diplomats offended me: “Yes, I survived eleven rounds of talks on missile defense in Geneva!”. From the expression on his face, it was noticeable that for a diplomat to eleven times to attack and wipe his pants in Geneva were things from one series of events and phenomena. To myself, I thought: “Would you, sonny, try to endure at least one“ round ”of talks on missile defense in the winter in Sary-Shagan. In the fifth year of the existence of a missile defense ground without central heating. In Geneva, any fool and 110 rounds sit out. " But to voice this idea at such a high meeting, of course, did not. And before the end of the meeting, the working group did not open the mouth. I thought: first, I will be more whole, and secondly, diplomats absolutely do not need opinions and comments from specialists. Anyway, they do not hear me, I decided.
However, even then, it was at those moments of the working group meeting that it became shrillly clear to me how the negotiations on the ABM Treaty with the US would end. Domestic diplomats put their horns in only one wording: “The 1972 ABM Treaty of the Year is the cornerstone of world stability and global security.”
But, as you know, contracts are signed and respected with equal (parity) capabilities of the parties. With political and military corpses (and this is Russia at the end of 90-s), no one ever signs any agreements. And the more they do not comply.
And the possibility for a compromise on missile defense at the beginning of 2000's, according to unanimous estimates of real experts, was. It was not worth just struggling with one single wording. But look at any symposium, conference, meeting, negotiations on missile defense. Who are the main experts? That's right, diplomats, political scientists, economists, lawyers, etc. In the best case, you can see retired figures from the Strategic Missile Forces.
Therefore, the impression is persistently that the anti-missile faculty was opened at MGIMO and there were established departments of radiolocation, electromagnetic field theory and microwave technology, radio receiving and radio transmitting devices, automatic control and regulation theory, antenna devices and radio wave propagation.
Probably, the Maxwell Society of Amateurs of Maxwell’s Equations, the rotor of the rotor of the vector zet e have already been formed within MGIMO (there, it must be assumed, only true fans of the electromagnetic field theory are retiring), the Section of the Double Waveguide Tee sits fruitfully and fruitfully.
For example, not so long ago one of the leaders of the military department as the largest specialist in the field of missile defense was presented on the federal television channel. And he is a graduate of MGIMO. Presumably, he graduated from this anti-missile department and, without sparing his health, was optionally engaged in the Maxwell Equations Society.
There is an opinion that the people conducting negotiations on missile defense, theory and practice relating to issues of missile defense, to know nothing to do. They are like effective "negotiators" - and that says it all (what a fool after all, I wonder, came up with this word - "negotiator"). However, we turn to examples.
In particular, the topic of joint operation of the Gabala radar station was discussed intensively and intensively at all levels not so long ago. I speak plainly (I borrowed the wording from Wasserman) - this idea could not be born in the head of a specialist. It could only arise in the brains of political scientists ’diplomats. And I will explain why.
Suppose the parties agreed to jointly operate the Gabala radar station. The question immediately arises: how, in what form and where to transfer data from the Gabala radar station to the other side? After all, you will not climb on the CIC (command and measurement center) and you will not begin to wave flags towards NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Type - accept information, transmit by voice.
In this case, Gabala would have to pull a cable several thousand kilometers long. Or build a broadband radio relay line with repeaters every few tens of kilometers (due to the curvature of the earth's surface).
For example, they built it by waving with no less money than the construction of the station itself. Now we have to solve the next question. After all, information from Gabala will be transmitted in the standards adopted in Russia. With NATO, CENTO and SEATO (and even abatement), this does not match. This means you need to create some kind of interface. It will transform our information to the standards adopted in the West. Suppose we decided to solve this technical problem (a very complicated one, we note).
But no one had even asked before: do the Americans (and Europeans) need this information in principle? But it is not really needed. Neither large nor small. Americans have their own SPRNU - nuclear missile warning system. It has a global character, several echelons and successfully solves its tasks in every corner of the Earth.
So why around this issue of the joint operation of the Gabala radar station was raised such a bucha? And so many copies are broken, if the question obviously had no positive solution? And as we ourselves easily gave up this Gabala, when Azerbaijan broke the exorbitant price for the rent of the station. And in this quagmire they even dragged in the top state officials.
I think this happened only because of ignorance of the elementary principles of building an APN system and an UCCS. After all, political scientists and lawyers, apparently, do not suspect, in particular, that Gabala is just an octopus tentacle. And the head, eyes, brain of this octopus are located in Solnechnogorsk. As an independent element of any missile defense system, PRN, SCPC is the data transmission system (SPD). And the technical requirements for it are very high. For reference: only one microsecond in radar - 150 meters in range. For missile defense is already a very significant figure. And if they knew all this (or at least a small part), they wouldn’t have been grinding nonsense about the joint operation of the Gabala radar station. But after all the same tryndeli and long months.
Therefore, the subject, gentlemen, must possess - and no other opinions.
Or, dear comrades are sitting and discussing the issue of operating a joint missile defense system with the West. Although from the very beginning it is clear to the non-expert that there can be no joint missile defense system with our overseas partners simply by definition. And just for one simple reason. PRO is a bunch of advanced technology. The most that neither is the leading edge of the development of science and technology, in banal-pathos words. No one, never under any circumstances, will share these technologies with “partners” or even with “strategic partners”. For it is in fact a betrayal of national interests.
And political analysts are deliberately discussing the question of who will own the button in the future missile defense system. No, guys, no "Start" button in the missile defense system. PRO is a fully automatic system. In combat mode, it functions without the participation of a human operator (and it cannot be otherwise, when the missile and target convergence rates are more than seven kilometers per second). For example, in the domestic A-35 / 35М PRO system there was even a team that blocked all toggle switches, buttons and system switches during the combat cycle, in order to exclude any human intervention in the combat mode. The command to launch anti-missiles in any missile defense system is provided by a digital computing complex.
And how many copies are broken around the so-called non-directionality? Meanwhile, the missile defense system is not a gun or a rifle. It is not directed anywhere, but it works, as it is called, round. And it is intended for the defense of the area where the important objects are located (for example, points of the highest levels of command, administrative-political centers, etc., the starting positions of ICBMs).
And how many economists-lawyers and economists broke their foreheads demanding that the United States obtain "guarantees against the missile defense system" against Russia? Let's try to sort this question, as they say, on the fingers. To begin to simplify the situation. And we will try to understand what guarantees there may be.
Although, even before the analysis of this task, it is necessary to state at once that the United States will never give anyone any guarantees in this area. And it would be very naive to expect a similar result.
But still imagine. Anti-missile battle unfolded over the territory of Europe. The armed struggle began, say, between NATO and the states of the Middle / Middle / Far East, possessing missile technologies and corresponding weapons. Russia is not a party to the conflict. Therefore, no guarantees are necessary.
After all, there can be no such phantasmagoric situation, when in this hypothetical conflict East-West over the European continent, a flock of Russian missiles (and somewhere flying around their business) appeared from somewhere. And their US / European missile defense systems cannot be shot down due to previous commitments.
Next situation. Russia is a party to the conflict. Then what are the guarantees? Unclear.
Here's how with such baseline data you can achieve some positive result in the negotiations on missile defense? Never, nowhere and under any circumstances. Only one thing can be achieved - the complete loss of a military-political person, which happens with enviable regularity.
This whole treaty process in the field of arms control and reduction has never given our country at least some positive result. Absolutely nothing but loss and shame. Here are some milestones of the process.
CFE Treaty Sample 1990. When they signed, they themselves were horrified - how could such a crap be signed at all? Why did this happen? In the course of working on the document, not specialists were sent to Paris, but as an encouragement to the right people. This was also the Soviet era, when a foreign business trip was equated with an order. Therefore, it was not experts who traveled, but various petty crooks and assholes - up to and including political workers. And when they signed it, it became ridiculous.
INF Treaty. Stupidity in half with the betrayal of national interests. Although the word "nonsense" is probably too soft here. Military-political idiocy - it will be more accurate.
START treaties. Nothing but harm.
Moratorium on nuclear testing weapons? Again, military-political stupidity. And long-term harm.
The question arises: what to do? And that's what.
1. Stop all negotiations on missile defense. Complete this process, the zero result of which is visible now. And develop national systems. And the system to overcome missile defense probable opponents.
2. Stop all consultations and negotiations on START. Complete this process once and for all. Or for historically foreseeable time. No less than 50 – 75 years to this question not to return. Under no circumstances.
3. Exit the INF Treaty. Unilaterally. And to resume the production of these systems, which are extremely necessary for ensuring the national security of Russia.
4. Get out of the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons.
And this will be a policy of consistently upholding the deep-rooted national interests of the Russian Federation.