The failure of another attempt to bring Russia and the US closer in the summer of 2013 led to a resumption of the discussion about the future of Russian-American relations. Restrained and optimistic assessments prevail among political scientists (logically, “they didn’t quarrel not for the first and not for the last time”). Still, the new failure of the dialogue between the Kremlin and the White House is alarming. The leaders of Russia and the United States are discussing, in essence, the same problems as at the end of the 1980s: reducing the intensity of confrontational rhetoric, resuming negotiations on arms control, and establishing economic contacts. Over the past twenty years, the parties have in fact never been able to build a constructive dialogue on these issues, if they are forced to return to them every two to three years.
In my opinion, a permanent confrontation between Moscow and Washington  is not caused by the stereotypes of the Cold War, and the increase of the real contradictions between them. The result of this process in the next ten to fifteen years may very likely be a Russian-American military conflict. This forecast, of course, hypothetical. However, for twenty years the sides only increased the likelihood of its implementation.
The renewed confrontation
Obama's doctrine. Lord of the two rings
The modern world order that emerged during the Second World War was originally an Anglo-Saxon project. Its main provisions were defined within the framework of the Atlantic Charter 1941. Soviet diplomacy, until the middle of 1942, negotiated with Winston Churchill's cabinet about whether its provisions were directed against the USSR. Only in June, 1942, the Kremlin agreed with the concept of "three policemen" proposed by President Franklin Roosevelt, according to which the United States, Great Britain and the USSR should play a leading role in the post-war world. Reaching a compromise allowed the allies in 1943 – 1944. to form the basis of the Yalta-Potsdam order.
The first transformation of the world order took place in the middle of the 1950s, when the USSR and the USA jointly dismantled the British and French empires. It was from that time that the world order became truly bipolar: it was based on the rivalry between the two superpowers who built relations with each other on the basis of the model of mutual guaranteed destruction and the ultimate ideological confrontation . The risk of a direct collision between the USSR and the USA remained minimal after 1962. The parties had a chronic shortage of reasons for the start of the war, and most importantly, a lack of technical capabilities to occupy the opponent’s territory. Neither the Soviet nor the American leadership had political fanatics who were ready to risk everything for the sake of victory in the “war-Armageddon”. There were no disputes between the superpowers around the territories where their interests could have clashed according to the 1914 scenario .
The second transformation of the world order came at the end of 1980-ies. Adjustment policies resulted in the dismantling of the socialist community and the USSR. However, the basic principles of the Yalta-Potsdam order preserved in the form of:
- Nuclear parity between Russia and the United States;
- Qualitative and quantitative separation of nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States from other nuclear powers;
- Russia and the United States monopoly on the production of a full range of weapons;
- Russia's monopoly and the United States to carry out the full range of scientific research;
- the current Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty weapons (NPT) 1968
From the point of view of the distribution of power, the modern world order differs little from the period of the Cold War. None of the “second-order” nuclear powers, including China, has the means to destroy the strategic potential of Russia and the United States .
The structure of world governance has not changed. There were no international political documents fixing the balance of power after the end of the Cold War. The leading role still belongs to the UN, more precisely - to the UN Security Council. The composition of the permanent members of the Security Council is limited to the victorious powers, which establishes the legitimacy of the modern world order on the outcome of the Second World War. The preservation of the sovereignty limitations of Germany and Japan by the victorious powers fits into this logic.
Against this backdrop, the United States, the 1990 announced their intention to create a new world order. Achieving this goal is possible if three conditions are met: (1) lack of other countries power potentials, comparable to the potential United States; (2) deprivation of the ability to block other American decisions; (3) recognition of the legitimacy of the order from other states. However, while maintaining the material and technical basis of the Yalta-Potsdam order we can talk only about the informal American leadership. And therein lies the foundation for Russian-American confrontation.
Firstly, the Soviet military potential was not removed on the model of Germany and Japan after World War II. Russia remains the only country capable of technically destroy the United States and to war with them on the basis of comparable weapons.
Secondly, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has the ability to block decisions of Americans.
Third, Russia clearly has opted to American leadership. Ideological form of the denial was the concept of a multipolar world, proclaimed by Moscow and Beijing, the 1997
Without solving the “Russian problem”, the American project of the global world is doomed to slip.
Fourth, Russia is initiating formal and informal coalitions designed to block US policy. In most international crises, Moscow tried to oppose the White House line with the policies of France, Germany, and the PRC. The signing of the Russian-Chinese “Big Treaty” 2001 proved that such coalitions can take practical form.
Fifth, Russia carried out independently of the United States commercial policy in the field of exports of military technology. It acts donor technologies to countries that want to create a potential force to counter Washington.
Americans are forced to put up with a similar situation, realizing that for the time being they have little means to punish Russia. (This is a real punishment, not pinpricks, such as the imposition of sanctions against Russian companies or allegations of human rights violations in Russia.) But without solving the “Russian problem”, the American project of the global world is doomed to slip.
Interests of the United States
Back in 1948, the Harry Truman administration identified the main goal in relations with the Soviet Union as reducing Soviet military capabilities to the United States  level. After the end of the Cold War, Washington confirmed this thesis. 12 May 1989 President George Bush Sr. pointed out that democratic reforms in the USSR are inseparable from the disarmament process. The position of the need to reduce the military potential of the Soviet Union was recorded in the US National Security Strategy 1991.
The most important achievement in the White House was the adoption in 1989 of the Wyoming compromise - new rules for conducting strategic dialogue. Further concessions the US leadership associated with the support of centrifugal forces inside the USSR. The administrations of J. Bush Sr. and W. Clinton supported Boris Yeltsin during the domestic political crises of the 1991 – 1993 years.  in exchange for strategic concessions: from the HEU – LEU agreement to the shutdown of reactors that have accumulated weapons-grade plutonium. An important concession to the Kremlin was the signing of the START-2 Treaty (1993), which envisaged the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
As B. Yeltsin’s power strengthened, the Kremlin was less and less willing to follow its unfavorable obligations. The turning point was apparently the visit of Russian President to Washington 27 September 1994, during which he stated that due to the position of the State Duma, ratification of START-2 was postponed indefinitely. By the end of 1994, the Clinton administration realized that the task of disarming Russia could not be quickly resolved. From that moment on, the Russian regime became hostile to Washington. Around the autumn of 1994, American experts began to talk about the “failure of democratic transit” in Russia and about the establishment of a “neo-royal” (“neo-imperial”) regime in it.
Gas Exporting Countries Forum in the Kremlin Palace
In 2000's, the situation worsened. The growth of hostility in Russian-American relations was not connected with the internal policy of Vladimir Putin: in order to realize his own goals, Washington regularly cooperated with regimes much more authoritarian than “Putin's Russia”. The fact was that the Kremlin rejected all attempts by the United States to begin negotiations on a radical reduction of strategic potentials on American terms. Moscow began to seek a revision of the Wyoming compromise, which was partially done within the framework of the START-3 Treaty (2010). The Americans were also worried about the philosophy of the Russian president, which was reflected in his Munich speech 10 in February 2007 G.: V. Putin announced the possibility of military opposition to Washington’s unfriendly steps.
Since the mid 1990-ies the United States began to work out new methods of influence on Russian political system:
- arresting Russian officials and businessmen on charges of money laundering, although their crimes against the US have not been proven;
- The creation of the media image of Russia as a criminal and authoritarian state whose policy is contrary to the interests of the world community;
- Extension of the accusations against Russia in energy blackmail other states;
- Financing of the Russian opposition in order to find leaders who are prepared in exchange for support to the accelerated reduction of Russia's strategic potential;
- Explore the possibility of supporting separatist tendencies in Russia .
The White House twice (in 1995 and 1999) condemned the Russian military operation in Chechnya. At the beginning of 2000, the State Department regularly received leaders of Chechen separatists. American experts discussed potentially dangerous problems for Russia: “the genocide of the Circassians,” “the deportation of the people of the North Caucasus,” the “unequal status of the peoples of the North,” etc. The study of the experience of the Far Eastern Republic of 1920 – 1922 gained popularity in the USA. . The Americans have repeatedly discussed the possibility of joining the APEC of the Russian Far East separately from the rest of the Russian Federation.
In practical policy, the United States worked through schemes for the forced disarmament of “dangerous regimes”. The first precedent was Iraq, where the US and its allies conducted a military operation in 2003 under the slogan of removing chemical and biological weapons from the regime of Saddam Hussein. The next precedent is Iran, from which the Americans demand to curtail the uranium enrichment program. If successful, this will mean a revision of the NPT, under the terms of which all non-nuclear states have the right to nuclear power. A promising goal is the disarmament of the DPRK, from which Washington is seeking the elimination of nuclear warheads and plutonium enrichment facilities under the control of the IAEA or the "five powers" commission. From Pakistan, the Americans are demanding the introduction of a system for jointly managing their nuclear potential. A special precedent is Syria, where the emergency intervention scenario of the “international community” in the internal conflict, in which the “dangerous government” allegedly applied WMD, is being worked out.
After the disarmament of another two or three countries (for example, India and Brazil), one of such schemes will apparently be applied to Russia. Theoretically, there are two options. First: the arrest of major political figures of Russia and the organization of an international tribunal over them on charges of “genocide” of Chechens, Georgians or Circassians (underline) with the simultaneous raising of the question of the right of such a regime to have such a number of nuclear weapons. The second is the imposition of an agreement on accelerated reduction of nuclear weapons to a more loyal Russian government, providing American inspectors with access to Russian nuclear facilities.
The unprecedented harsh reaction of the White House to the return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin was caused by two reasons. First, V. Putin is viewed by the American elite as a figure not inclined to make concessions in matters of disarmament. Secondly, the Americans in the winter of 2012 realized that no funding for the opposition would create a critical mass for the foreseeable future to change the Russian regime. The US response was the tightening of policies in various forms: from the demonstrative refusal of President Barack Obama to meet with his Russian counterpart before adopting the Magnitsky Law, which denies the legitimacy of a part of the Russian elite. The problem is that the Kremlin, judging by the adoption of the “Law of Dima Yakovlev,” is ready to use all means to counter the potentially dangerous actions of Washington.
In this situation, the United States has an interest in defeating the Kremlin in a regional military conflict. Judging by the documents, Washington does not exclude military intervention in the conflict of Russia with someone from its neighbors. The objectives of such a local war can be a demonstrative "punishment" of the Russian regime, a demonstration of the strength of the leadership positions of the United States and the creation of prerequisites for regime change in Russia. A test of this option was the “five-day war” in August 2008, in which the United States was actually involved.
Russia is not a passive victim of American politics like Yugoslavia, Iraq or Syria. On the contrary, under certain conditions, the very logic of the Russian foreign policy can also contribute to conflict.
The modern Russian political system was a modification of the political system of the RSFSR . The Kremlin's pro-American rhetoric at the beginning of the 1990 was caused not by love for America, but by the need to solve three problems: to recognize the Russian Federation within the borders of the RSFSR 1991, to remove nuclear weapons from the territory of the former union republics and legitimize the Yeltsin regime in the fight against The Supreme Council. As the solution of these problems, the need for partnership with Washington decreased. American policy with its desire to reduce Russia's strategic potential began to be perceived in the Kremlin as hostile.
The key task of Moscow was to solve two problems: maintaining nuclear-missile parity with Washington and preserving Russia's privileged status in the world order by preserving the role of the UN Security Council. Both of these tasks objectively contradicted the US foreign policy strategy. Therefore, in order to force the White House to engage in dialogue, Moscow needed to go to power demonstrations. The largest of these were the Kosovo crisis (1999) and the “five-day war” (2008).
Another motive of Russia's foreign policy strategy is the instability of its internal political system. Over the past twenty years, the Russian leadership has managed to maintain the territorial integrity of the country. However, the problem of the division of property has not been solved to the present day: the clan struggle continues in Russia. The majority of the population does not consider the current forms of ownership to be legitimate and rejects (with the exception of a part of the inhabitants of megacities) a competitive ethic. Nostalgia for the Soviet past is widespread in the mass consciousness of the inhabitants of the regions. In this situation, it is important for the Russian authorities to demonstrate foreign policy successes, which serve as a form of legitimization.
The leadership of Russia has strong concerns about regional separatism. Difficult negotiations with Tatarstan on the signing of a Federative Treaty, two military operations in Chechnya, separatist tendencies in North Ossetia, Karachay-Cherkessia and Dagestan - all this created the feeling that under certain circumstances the threat of disintegration of the Russian Federation may well become a reality. Therefore, Washington’s attempts to build an independent strategy of behavior with the Russian regions cannot but cause concern of the Kremlin.
Political crisis of the turn of 2011 – 2012 stepped up these trends. He showed that the support of the leadership of Russia is less than it seemed to sociologists five or seven years ago. The crisis has demonstrated the limited mobilization resources of the government: neither Nashi, nor Cossacks, nor Seligerians came up to disperse small protest demonstrations. The unrest revealed the presence in society of the “fatigue effect” from the figure of the current president. The Kremlin made a serious concession, returning direct elections of regional leaders. In the coming years, Putin’s administration will have to build relationships with more independent local authorities .
The demonstratively unfriendly attitude of the B. Obama administration to the figure of V. Putin meant the transfer of the "red line" by the Americans: before, the White House had never made bilateral relations dependent on a particular leader. The next year and a half confirmed the reluctance of the United States to build a dialogue with Putin who returned to the Kremlin. The “Magnitsky law” and the “Bout case” showed that the United States does not consider the Russian elite “its own” and does not guarantee its security. To force Washington to engage in dialogue, the Kremlin needs either a drastic weakening of the US position, or an impressive force demonstration.
The ideal solution could theoretically be the victory of Russia in a regional conflict. It will force Washington to dialogue, just as 2008’s “five-day war” prompted the Americans to curtail the process of admitting Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Inside Russia, the “common test” will finally make it possible to draw a line under the collapse of the USSR and the privatization of the 1990s. The situation is all the more interesting because under the "victory" you can turn up any outcome of the conflict. Suffice it to recall that in the Soviet propaganda the Brest Peace (1918) and the Soviet-Polish War (1920) were presented as victories: “young Soviet Russia stood in the ring of enemies”.
However, such a conflict should not be a “small victorious war”, in the terminology of Vyacheslav Plehve. The 2008 experience showed that a quick victory over Georgia did not break a single trend. For a fracture, a more serious test is needed, which will truly unite Russian society.
The hypothetical Russian-American conflict will hardly resemble World War II or the nuclear apocalypse. Rather, it will be similar to the wartime wars of the 18th century, when the parties exchanged several frightening gestures and resumed negotiations. Although such a scenario does not imply nuclear escalation, it can not be completely eliminated: the military doctrines of the US and Russia with 1993 lower the nuclear threshold, justifying the admissibility and even the desirability of using a limited amount of tactical nuclear weapons. It is more important for both sides to declare themselves a winner by solving their problems.
Third Russian-Japanese War
An ideal testing ground for the clash is the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute. For Russia, Japan is a strong adversary with at least equality, if not superiority, in the surface navy at the Pacific theater of operations. However, the intervention of the Russian aviation, especially for strategic purposes, makes Moscow’s ultimate victory undoubted. Victory in conflict may look like historical Russian revenge for defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 (the 1945 campaign cannot be considered such a revenge, since the USSR defeated Japan not alone, but in alliance with the USA and Great Britain). Another advantage is the existence of an alliance treaty between Washington and Tokyo in 1960: the war will look like a manifestation of the US weakness (if it does not enter) or (if it does) as a victory in the "tense struggle" with the US-Japanese coalition.
For the United States, conflict can also play a positive role. The Washington intervention at the final stage can be presented as evidence of the effectiveness of the American power and the inability of the Allies to solve problems without US participation, as well as stopping and even discarding "Russian expansion."
In Japan itself, there are forces that may be interested in defeating their country. The US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Assurance Agreement of 1960 bans Japan from having full-fledged armed forces and reserves the right for the US to pursue an almost uncontrollable military policy on its territory. In the Japanese establishment, there are two parties advocating the restoration of the country's sovereignty in the military sphere. The first considers it possible to do this through the re-signing of the US-Japan treaty, the second through the organization of regional crises in which the US does not fulfill its obligations under the treaty of union. Over the past thirty years, all attempts by Tokyo to re-sign the 1960 agreement have failed. But the collapse of the American “security umbrella” will allow Japan to legally recreate full-fledged armed forces and, possibly, curtail the American presence on its territory.
A number of tendencies of the last five years speak in favor of the “Japanese script”. Among them are the complete blocking of the Moscow and Tokyo talks on the territorial problem, the refusal of the parties to compromise initiatives, escalating escalation due to such steps as the demonstrative visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to the South Kurils or the adoption by the Japanese parliament of the law on the occupied status of the "northern territories". The purchase by the Russian side of Mistral-class helicopter carriers shows exactly where Moscow sees the main naval theater of military operations. The conflict can begin with the proclamation by Japan of sovereignty over the "northern territories" and the landing on them of several thousand peaceful Japanese. The retaliatory step of Moscow, apparently, will be a limited military operation to "force Tokyo to peace".
Realistic scenario is a clash in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is currently unavailable for normal life and regular mining. Thesis about the profitability of their production and their very presence and no one ever has not been proven. Despite this, the Arctic powers exchanged harsh and provocative steps.
In 2002 the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has sent Russia's application for revision. In 2014 Moscow must submit a modified version of proving that the underwater Lomonosov and Mendeleyev ridges are a continuation of the Siberian continental platform. If the Commission rejects the amended version, Moscow declared sovereignty over the Soviet Arctic sector unilaterally. Reaction of other countries can be violent opposition Russia modeled conflict between the USSR and the USA for Wrangel Island in the city of 1924
Theoretically, there are two possible collisions: the conflict between Russia and Canada around the North Pole or the conflict between Russia and the Scandinavian countries over the Barents Sea and the status of the Northern Sea Route. But with the Scandinavian countries, Moscow is building a patient dialogue, including serious concessions: from the Murmansk Treaty with Norway (2010) to attempts to revive the Conference on the Barents Region (2013). Canada is another matter. The dialogue between Moscow and Ottawa is blocked from 2002, and it is the position of this country that is presented in the Russian media as the most anti-Russian. Conflict over the status of the North Pole remains between Russia and Canada.
For Russia, squeezing out small Canadian groups from the Russian sector (perhaps after a tense air battle) will look like a “win through”. An awesome success will be the stuffing of the thesis on the "split of NATO" if Oslo and Copenhagen are left out of the conflict. The United States will be able to intervene in the conflict as stopping the expansion of the Russian regime. In addition, the conflict in the Arctic can be used by Washington as an excuse to begin the reform of the UN Security Council as an organization that has failed in its responsibilities.
Experts often build scenarios of the Russian-American partnership in the Pacific. But it is here that Moscow and Washington have territorial disputes: the Bering Sea border, the status of the Sea of Okhotsk (the United States does not recognize it as the inland sea of Russia), the inseparability of the shelf zones of the Bering Strait and the ambiguity of the border in the Chukchi Sea . In addition, the United States does not recognize the status of the Northern Sea Route as Russia's internal transport artery and does not completely abandon historical claims to the De Long archipelago . An additional source of conflict may be the American support for separatist tendencies in the Far East.
For the US, this scenario will be an attempt to push the scenario of the collapse of the Russian Federation. Even if it does not work, Washington can use it to dismantle the institutional basis of the Yalta-Potsdam order. In Russia, such a conflict can be filed almost as the “Third World War”. The question of the inefficiency of the raw materials economy will be pushed aside, just as the 1812 war allowed freezing discussions for half a century about the inefficiency of serfdom and autocracy.
In addition to these scenarios, other options are possible - first of all, the clash between Russia and the United States in the CIS. The most realistic training ground theoretically are:
- Excitement in Belarus due to its possible exit from the Union State;
- Escalation of the conflict around the Kaliningrad region due to territorial claims on it from Poland or Germany or the emergence of separatist sentiment in it, which will be supported by the EU;
- the aggravation of the problem of the status of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia, following the pattern of the conflict around the “bronze soldier” in May 2007;
- the aggravation of the problem of separatism in north-west Russia - the transfer of part of the metropolitan functions to St. Petersburg may coincide with the desire of regional elites to build special relations with the EU.
The collision of the Russian and American armed forces is theoretically possible in such conflict points of the CIS as the Crimea, the Black Sea, and Transcaucasia. However, this conflict will not allow either Moscow or Washington to solve deep political tasks. For Russia, the victory in it will look too obvious, and for the USA it will raise the question of escalation because of the need to increase military assistance to the allies.
* * *
There is an accumulation of contradictions between Moscow and Washington that create the potential for armed conflict. At the same time, the nuclear factor does not serve as a guarantee of peace. The destructive power of nuclear weapons and insinuations on the theme of “nuclear winter” encourage political elites to treat them more carefully than to a different type of weapon. But the experience of the First World War proved the possibility of limited use of weapons of mass destruction, the experience of the Second World War - the possibility of conducting military operations without the use of chemical weapons. The prospect of limited use of nuclear weapons in the light of the experience of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Chernobyl does not look transcendent. Much more important is the accumulation of political and psychological reasons for a possible collision.
1. The literature on the topic of the Russian-American partnership until the middle of the 1940-s, which was supposedly curtailed by the “Stalinist expansion”, is popular in the literature. As an example of partnership, an episode of the times of the Civil War in the USA is given, when in 1863 two Russian squadrons entered US ports to organize possible military actions against Great Britain. But the Russian-American partnership is limited to this example. The rest of the time from the beginning of the XIX century between the Russian Empire and the United States was intense rivalry in the Arctic and the Pacific, not to mention the regular condemnation of the Russian political system by the Congress. Until 1933, the United States did not recognize the Soviet Union at all. During the Second World War, Washington also did not conclude a bilateral treaty of alliance with the USSR and did not recognize the legitimacy of the Baltic states joining it. For more information about the nature of the relations between Russia / USSR and the USA, see: Trofimenko, G.A. USA: politics, war, ideology. M .: Thought, 1976.
2. Formally, the Washington Treaty was signed in April 4 1949 However, the creation of a real institutional framework of NATO was only after the adoption of this organization in Germany 1955 of this event was the reason for creating the same year the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
3. The only “territory” where such an escalation could have taken place was the “German question” due to the highly conflicted relations between the GDR and the FRG, as well as the situation around West Berlin. However, after the second Berlin crisis 1961, Moscow and Washington took urgent steps to normalize it.
4. A detailed analysis of the structure of the nuclear potential third nuclear powers see .: Nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation / Ed. Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin. M .: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2005.
5. The main opponent: Documents of the American foreign policy and strategy 1945 – 1950 / Per. from English; status and auth. entry Art. THEM. Ilyinsky. M .: Publishing House of the Moscow Humanitarian University, 2006. C. 175 – 210.
6. Goldgeier JM, McFaul M. Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
7. At the official level, the United States has not yet declared support for Russian separatism. The exceptions are the 2008 reports in October about the readiness of McCain headquarters to recognize the independence of a number of Russian regions, including the republics of the North Caucasus and the Komi Republic (http://www.thenation.com/article/mccains-kremlin-ties#axzz2f6BAG3CR).
8. Wood A. The Revolution and Civil War in Siberia / / Acton E., Cherniaev VI, Rosenberg WG (eds.) Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914 – 1921. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997.
9. Afanasyev MN The ruling elite and post-totalitarian Russia statehood. M., 1996.
10. In this regard, you can take a different view on the popular in Russia since the fall of 2009 slogans of modernization and non-resource-based economy. Rejection of resource-based economy implies some form of mobilization. Meanwhile, in Russia today has emerged a kind antimobilizatsionny way of life: a large stratum of urban residents combines work and stay at home and does not have a standard working day. In this regard, the question arises: how to be perfect rotation of these populations to the mobilization projects?
11. According to the bilateral Treaty 18 (30) in March 1867, the new Russian-American border passed through the center of the Bering Strait, separating at an equal distance about. Krusenstern (Ignaluk) from about. Ratmanova (Nunarbuk). Further, the border was directed “in a straight line, boundlessly to the north, until it was completely lost in the Arctic Ocean” (“in its prolongation as far as the Frozen ocean”).
12. The American expeditions of Adolf Greeley (1879) and George De Long (1879 – 1881) discovered to the north of the New Siberian Islands the islands of Henriette, Jeannette and Bennett (they entered the De Long archipelago).