November 28 - December 1 1943 was the meeting of the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in the Iranian capital. Roads that led I.V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to Tehran were difficult and dangerous.
During the discussions, the leaders of the allied states managed to solve a number of complex issues related to the continuation of the war against Nazi Germany, to determine the prospects for post-war Europe.
In Tehran, F. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill reported to I.V. Stalin is ready to open a second front in Europe in the spring of 1944. For the first time, proposals were made to coordinate the military efforts of the general staffs of the USSR and the Anglo-Americans, and also the idea was formulated to carry out joint efforts to disinfect Hitler and his generals about the military plans of the allies.
Unexpected task of the head of the GRU
In the afternoon of October 1 1943, the head of military intelligence, Lieutenant-General I.I. Ilyichev returned from the General Staff to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky set new tasks for military intelligence. One of them was connected with the upcoming meeting in Moscow of the foreign ministers of the USSR, the USA and the UK. The arrival of top diplomats from Washington and London was expected on October 18.
Military intelligence had to quickly obtain information about the attitude of the governments of the United States and Great Britain to the problem of opening a second front in Europe. The General Staff was interested not in the declarative promises of the Allies, but in the exact data on where and when they are still planning to open a second front. The same data also interested USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, the head of the Soviet delegation at the Moscow meeting.
Ilyichev immediately sent special assignments to the residents of Soviet military intelligence in Great Britain and the United States. In London, they were to be solved by the Major General tank troops to Ivan Sklyarov, in New York - to Colonel Pavel Melkishev, in Washington - to Major Lev Sergeev. Other scouts were also involved in these tasks. The tasks were complex, and little time was given to obtain information of interest to the Center.
In March, 1943, Mr. Sklyarov, Melkishev and Sergeyev, each in their own line, extracted valuable information about the plan of Operation Citadel, during which Hitler hoped to deliver a mortal blow to the Red Army near Kursk. Thanks to military intelligence, the Soviet command promptly organized deliberate defenses at the Kursk Bulge, creating superiority over the enemy in manpower and military equipment.
After the defeat of selected German tank divisions on the Kursk Bulge, the situation on the eastern front was favorable for the Soviet Union, although it was still far from complete victory. It was only possible to speed up the defeat of fascist Germany by the joint efforts of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. The Americans and the British promised to open a second front in Europe back in 1942, but almost a year passed, and the allies were in no hurry to fulfill their obligations. Every new day of the war cost the Soviet Union dearly: thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers died in battles against the Germans, the country suffered huge material losses. Therefore, preparing for the next meeting of foreign ministers, the Soviet leadership wanted to make firm and specific commitments from the allies about the timing of the opening of the second front ...
Colonel P.P. Melkishev acted in the United States for several years. His information about fascist Germany and its armed forces was highly appreciated by the Main Intelligence Directorate and was often used to prepare special messages that were intended for the highest political and military leadership of the USSR.
The Major General of the tank forces I.A. Sklyarov, who led the military attache. The officers subordinate to him obtained important information in London, revealing the plans of the German military command. The most productive acted Colonel A.F. Sizov.
After the German counterintelligence destroyed the residency of Soviet military intelligence in Belgium, Germany, France and other European countries, the residency activity of Major General I.A. Sklyarov acquired special significance.
Soviet military intelligence officers obtained valuable information not only from British officers, but also from many anti-fascists who settled in the British capital - intelligence officers of Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Yugoslavia and other countries occupied by German troops. It should be noted that Sklyarov and Melkishev were not engaged in reconnaissance of the American and British armed forces. After Germany’s treacherous attack on the USSR, the military departments of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain agreed to exchange intelligence information about the enemy and his plans, which were of interest to the general staffs of the anti-Hitler coalition countries. Therefore, the task of Ilyichev, which instructed Sklyarov and Melkishev to obtain information about the true attitude of the governments of the United States and Great Britain to the problem of opening a second front, was somewhat unexpected for them.
Sklyarov was the first to respond to the Center’s request. On October 9, 1943, he reported to Moscow: “The second front in Western Europe does not open for purely political reasons. It is believed that the Russians are not sufficiently weakened and still represent a great force, which is feared both in England and in America. A 500th expeditionary army has already been created in England, which is fully prepared and provided with everything necessary, including fleet for landing on the continent ... Most of all, our allies are afraid of the Russian invasion of Germany, as this can, as they say, cause communist revolutions in all European countries ... ”
“Until Germany is mortally wounded by the Russian offensive ...”
Information that in October 1943 G. General I.A. Sklyarov sent to Moscow on the preparation of the Allies for Operation Overlord, based on documentary data: one of his sources in London succeeded in early October to find out the contents of the secret American-British plan to invade Allied expeditionary forces in north-west France. Data on the content of this plan were in Moscow.
Sklyarov learned that the development of a plan for the invasion of Allied forces in Europe was quite successful and, in general, was completed in July-August 1943, when the unprecedented stories Wars tank battle at the Kursk Bulge. But the United States and Great Britain did not open in those days a second front in Europe that could alleviate the situation of the Red Army troops. The Soviet troops suffered huge losses in the Battle of Kursk, but defeated Hitler's tank divisions.
Studying the contents of the plan of Operation Overlord, Sklyarov drew attention to the fact that this important document contained everything, except the dates for the start of its implementation. If the British and Americans really wanted to land their expeditionary forces in France in the summer of 1943, they, as Sklyarov believed, could do it. The situation on the eastern front would be much more favorable for the Red Army.
Sklyarov had extensive contacts in London among political and military leaders, and maintained friendly relations with military diplomats from countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition. Many of them had information about Germany and its armed forces that were of interest to Soviet intelligence. Visiting the British military, at receptions in diplomatic missions, meetings with representatives of the British government, during friendly conversations with representatives of the allies, General Sklyarov exchanged information about Germany, current events at the front and prospects for interaction between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. To achieve victory over Nazi Germany, it was necessary to know not only when, where exactly, how many and what divisions Hitler would send to the eastern front. It was also important to understand the plans of the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition.
During meetings and confidential conversations with high-ranking British politicians and military, Sklyarov was convinced that in 1943, the United States and Great Britain would not start landing their expeditionary forces in northwestern France. He reported to the Center about this.
Valuable information was sent to the Center and the resident of the Soviet military intelligence in New York, Colonel P.P. Melkishev. It should be mentioned that in the spring of 1943, he informed the Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate that “... the main strategic plan of the USA and England for the summer of 1943, to seize the approaches to Italy and the Balkans and:
a) to withdraw Italy from the war, to prepare in advance an agreement with someone Italians like Dirlan;
b) force Turkey to oppose Germany, thereby opening the way for the invasion of the Balkans by the fall;
c) wait until autumn, see what events will unfold on the Eastern Front. ”
“The military departments of England and the USA,” Colonel Melkishev reported to the Center, “are confident that the Germans will undertake a broad offensive in the summer, but will be detained by the Red Army after losing some territory”.
According to Melkishev, the US and British governments will explain to the Soviet Union the absence of a second front in summer with the old motive - “a lack of transport makes it impossible to supply large armies on the continent of Europe” and a new one - invading the Balkans and drawing Turkey into the war will enable their army to unite with the Red Army in Romania and hit Hitler with a joint strike from the south. "
Performing the assignment of the head of military intelligence, Colonel Melkishev sent a report to the Center informing that the United States "is developing plans for an invasion of Greece, Sicily and Norway. America and Britain intend to enter the Balkans before the Red Army reaches Romania, and before the guerrilla movement becomes the dominant sector of German resistance in the Balkans. Anti-Soviet sentiment in the State Department and the US military are becoming stronger. They frankly talk about the need to prevent the Red Army from occupying the Balts, defeating Finland and entering the Balkans. ”
Colonel Melkishev, in his report to the Center, made the following conclusion: “... England and America will not undertake broad operations in Europe until Germany is mortally wounded by the Russian offensive. Britain and the United States seriously count on the fact that they will not really have to fight with Germany, that the German General Staff will understand the hopelessness of the situation, especially in connection with the successful offensive of the Red Army and, freed from Hitlerism, capitulate and let in American and British troops Bolshevism. It is for this purpose that these armies are being prepared, and not for a war with Hitlerism. ”
American sources gave Colonel Melkishev, who acted in New York under the guise of a post of an employee of the Soviet consulate, valuable information. Melkishev reported to the Center: “In 1943, the United States and Britain do not plan a broad offensive in Europe. The largest are private operations in Northern Norway and Greece. The intended actions in Norway are aimed at bringing Finland out of the war before it is defeated by the Red Army. The presence of American and British troops in Norway should keep the USSR in the old borders in the north. The main course of the United States is to create a system of capitalist reactionary governments in Europe as a barrier against the USSR and to create a large army to "support" American peace efforts as opposed to the efforts of the USSR. "
Further Melkishev informed that “there will be no second front this year. Small operations are being prepared in Norway, Greece and southern Italy, but they will not be until the summer campaign in the USSR shows that Germany has weakened and cannot seriously resist such operations. The Americans firmly decided not to open a second front in Holland, Belgium and France until the Germans exhausted the USSR or the USSR exhausted the Germans. ”
It was important to understand the strategy of the Allies' actions in Europe and their attitude towards the opening of a second front in the north of France and the report of Colonel Melkishev, in which he said that “Roosevelt and Churchill are playing a game of deceit, trying to show that they are going to open a second front, in in fact, their plan is to use both Germany and the USSR in the east, and then a deal with German industrial and military circles. US government circles are satisfied with the fact of the German offensive on the eastern front, as this makes it possible to confidently carry out their goals in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as against Greece and Yugoslavia in the fall. The second front is not mentioned at all. The Americans are convinced that Hitler is forced to keep 75% of his divisions on the eastern front, including 90% of the armored and 82% aviation».
From the information obtained by Colonel Melkishev, it was clear that the Americans were already "in contact with the governments of Romania and Hungary, but did not begin negotiations with them until the Anglo-American troops landed in Greece and Yugoslavia."
Melkishev also told the Center that British Prime Minister Churchill, while in Washington 1943 in September, said after a meeting with the American president that "the United States and Britain will not promise a second front to the USSR this year ...".
He successfully completed the assignment of a military intelligence resident in Washington, Major-General LA, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate. Sergeev. He reported that “the State Department and the military command do not believe in the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Soviet government on post-war issues. They fear that the Soviet Union will be the main force in Europe. Hence the tendency not to rush with the second front in order to bleed the Soviet Union and dictate its policy to it. ”
Sergeyev managed to obtain detailed information on the results of negotiations between US President F. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister William Churchill in Quebec. Sergeyev reported to the head of the GRU about the position of the allies on the opening of the second front: "... the leaders of the United States and England decided not to open the second front this year." And further: “Consent was expressed for the convocation of a conference with the participation of the USSR, directed essentially to a time drag. At this conference, it is supposed to pose the post-war problems as the main issue. At the conference, the Allies will point out that this year it is too late to open a second front through France and Holland, and that the only opportunity for this time is spring 1944 of the year. The main impetus for convening a conference in Quebec was the unexpected transition of the Red Army to the offensive. ”
In early November, 1943, Col. Melkishev, also informed the Center that “a second front in Europe until the spring of 1944 will not be opened. Acceleration of this period can occur only in the event of a sudden general crisis in Germany. The State Department is very concerned about the possibility of the rapid advance of the Red Army to the borders of Romania and the invasion of it. In this case, the invasion of the British, American and Turkish armies into the Balkans will have to occur. ”
"If ..., if ..., if ..."
The information received by the chief of military intelligence from Sklyarov, Melkishev and Sergeev was taken into account when drafting special reports of the GRU for members of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the position of Great Britain and the USA on the opening of the second front.
October 15 1943 Propulsion GRU Lieutenant-General I.I. Ilyichev sent the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin reported on the content of the draft of the plan of operation “Overlord” extracted by the intelligence officers. Copies of this report were sent to the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov and the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky. In a report to Lieutenant General Ilicheva stated that the operation of the Allied invasion of Normandy and Brittany was developed in mid-June, the 1943 and was called "Overlord". Further in the report stated that "in the opinion of staff, develop a plan, this operation can be carried out about 1 May 1944 years under the following conditions:
- if for the period before 1 May 1944 of the year there is no strengthening of defense in the landing area;
- if the number of German fighter aircraft in the West will remain unchanged (in July there were 600 German fighters);
- if the German army group "West" on the day of the attack will not have more than twelve divisions of the 1 class or equivalent;
“If this group cannot receive reinforcements from the Soviet or other front for more than fifteen 1 class divisions within two months from the date of the attack.”
The information indicated in the report indicated that the draft plan of the operation had been drawn up, but its implementation was due to many reasons. In particular, the command of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain can open a second front in Europe only when Nazi Germany is finally weakened by the war against the Soviet Union, when German troops can not provide the Anglo-Americans with serious resistance and will not be able to restrain the offensive of the allies.
Report of Lieutenant-General I.I. Illicheva was accompanied by a detailed map of Operation Overlord, which reflected the Allies' plan, the deployment of their forces and technical means.
Apparently, the developers of the invasion operation plan had serious thoughts about the choice of the landing site of the expeditionary forces. The report of the head of the GRU on this occasion stated the following: “when choosing the landing area, four contradictions arose:
- it is necessary to penetrate to the East as far as possible in order to shorten the way to Germany:
- it is necessary to have a sufficient number of ports through which it would be possible to deploy troops, not yielding to the Germans in the transfer of reserve divisions;
- it is necessary to take into account the power of the coastal defense of the enemy;
- during the first phase of the attack, it is necessary to remain within the range of action of fighter aircraft based in the UK. ”
The Anglo-American troops could not move as far as possible to the east and remain within the range of actions of fighter aircraft based in Great Britain. Therefore, the conditions for selecting the landing site were mutually exclusive.
Discussion remained and the problem associated with the timing of the start of the attack. “From the point of view of the army and the air force,” said I.I. Illicheva, - the most favorable is the landing at dawn. The Admiralty, given the large number of ships, believes that the army will be successful only if the attack occurs three hours after dawn and three hours before the tide begins. ” In this regard, at the headquarters, to develop a draft plan of "Overlord", confirmed the opinion according to which it was necessary to "establish satisfying these requirements day attacks, and not to adhere to the exact date of May 1 1944 years."
The beginning of the invasion of Anglo-American troops in France was also connected with weather conditions. It was believed that for the successful use of airborne troops "it is necessary to have at least half of the moon phase." The document of the GRU chief noted that in the event of weather deterioration, the beginning of the attack “could be changed at the last minute.”
In general, information about the draft plan of Operation Overlord, obtained by military intelligence, was interesting for the Soviet leadership. They testified that Allied troops prepared to invade, but do not start it up until the war with Germany will develop the most favorable conditions for them, and demand from the USSR any additional obligations.
The information obtained by the intelligence officers was also useful in the preparation of the head of the Soviet delegation, V.M. Molotov to negotiate with the leaders of the US and UK foreign policy departments. During negotiations with the VM Molotov, the head of the British delegation, A. Eden, and the head of the American delegation, C. Hell, spoke evasively about preparing the landing of Allied forces on the Atlantic coast of France, made various kinds of reservations and avoided answering the question about the specific dates for the start of the invasion operation. Eden makes possible the disembarkation of troops of the climate conditions in the region of La Mancha, and other circumstances. The same position was held and the US Secretary of State Hull.
During negotiations with the heads of the diplomatic departments of England and the USA V.M. Molotov was restrained and tactful. Thanks to military intelligence, the Soviet foreign commissar knew that neither Eden nor Hell was authorized to take concrete decisions on the opening of a second front.
The Moscow meeting of Allied foreign ministers ended on October 30. The communiqué of the Moscow Conference stated that the Allied Powers recognized "the primary goal is to accelerate the end of the war", but the ministers could not agree on the exact timing of the opening of a second front in Europe.
In general, Moscow was pleased with the results of the meeting, which opened up prospects for negotiations at a higher level. The results of the Moscow meeting in Washington were also positively evaluated. Melkishev reported from the United States: "... As followers and opponents of US President Franklin Roosevelt did not expect such a favorable outcome of talks in Moscow ... Position Roosevelt to establish good relations with the Soviet Union strengthened the most since the breakdown of the German offensive at Kursk and the Red Army's transition to the offensive . Roosevelt persuaded Hella that is necessary to conclude an agreement with the USSR, the real, because the previous policy of waiting (as the Soviet Union will be bled white -. VL) in connection with the Red Army's victories went bankrupt. Americans are very concerned about the position of the British after the war and want to use the Soviet Union as an obstacle to the strengthening of their influence in Europe, especially in the Balkans ... ".
British diplomats also appreciated the results of the Moscow meeting. Military intelligence obtained a copy of the report of the British Ambassador A. Kerr from Moscow to London. The ambassador said: "The main reason for the success of the conference is that, for the most part, mutual suspicions of the parties were not substantiated."
According to the source of the Soviet military intelligence, "... in the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs can only be heard accolades about the conference and to see a pleasant surprise at the friendliness and tact Russian."
The road to the meeting of the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain was opened. Preparations for the meeting of I.V. began in Moscow, Washington and London. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.
What did the Allies hide from Stalin?
4 September the head of military intelligence Ilyichev received a report from London, which was prepared by "Sonia" (under this pseudonym in the GRU was listed as one of the most experienced spies Ursula Kuczynski). She also reported to the Center on the results of the meeting in Quebec Roosevelt and Churchill. The main thing in the report W. Kuczynski was the message on signing the American president and the British prime minister of the secret agreement to join efforts to build an atomic bomb. This secret treaty Roosevelt informed Stalin in his letters to August 1943 26 August of Roosevelt, in particular, wrote: "The following is a solution, which we have arrived during our just concluded meeting in Quebec City, the military operations, which must be held during 1943 and 1944 ... ” But regarding the US-British atomic project, Roosevelt did not write a word to Stalin.
So, Stalin learned that the United States and Great Britain are joining forces to create an atomic bomb. It became clear that secret decisions were taken in Quebec to create a union of two states that were least affected during the war with Nazi Germany. This union was formed in secret. Therefore, in Moscow, it could be assumed that the atomic bomb was not created against Hitler and his Wehrmacht. This circumstance could not alert the Soviet leadership. Therefore, Stalin was not in a hurry to respond to F. Roosevelt's proposal to hold a trilateral meeting.
At the same time, the circumstances prevailing on the Soviet-German front, - a convincing victory at Kursk, which demonstrated the Soviet Union's ability to achieve victory in the war against Nazi Germany, and without the help of allies, as well as decisive progress of the Red Army to the west - have become important new accents in relations USA and England with the USSR. Soviet leadership needed intelligence information that would make the right decisions, ensuring the achievement of the nearest main strategic task - the expulsion of German troops from Soviet territory and the defeat of Nazi Germany, as well as future - determining the prospects for postwar Europe.
Major General I.A. Sklyarov, Colonel PP Melkishev and Major LA Sergeev continued to carry out the assignment of the chief of military intelligence. September 17 Melkishev reported to the Center from New York: “To the Director. Roosevelt at a meeting in Quebec with Churchill insisted on convening a conference of the leaders of the three countries without delay. Churchill offered to wait until the situation on the Eastern Front stabilized. ”
This message indicates that, despite the signing of an important secret agreement on joint work on the creation of the atomic bomb in the United States, there were contradictions between Roosevelt and Churchill. As far as they were deep, it was still necessary to establish and understand before holding the meeting of the “Big Three”. Moscow believed that the main result of this summit was to be the consent of the United States and Great Britain to open a second front. In September and the first half of October, Stalin was not sure that he would be able to get a promise from the American President and British Prime Minister about the specific dates for the start of the Allied landings in France. But since the second half of October, Stalin’s position has changed.
What could have an impact on the assessment of the situation of the Soviet leader? Only one - studying intelligence reports, it seems, gradually became convinced that he could in the course of the negotiations to succeed. This confidence in the victory on the diplomatic front, gradually gained strength, helped and was in Moscow in early October, the general data about the content Sklyarov «Overlord» operation plan. The plans of the allies were carefully studied by experts of the Main Intelligence Directorate.
On November 12, Major General Sklyarov informed the head of the GRU: “On November 10 cocktail I had a long conversation with the brigadier Kirkman. Speaking about the situation on the Western Front, I said that now is the best time to strike a blow from the west of Germany and thus shorten the war. When asked what point you consider most favorable for attacking Germany from the west, Kirkman replied that the collapse of Germany and its inability to conduct effective defense in the west could become such a moment. I asked him if bad weather would prevent the landing of your troops. To this he replied that in the event of the collapse of Germany, we will land our troops, no matter what the weather. ”
This report of Sklyarov, the head of the military intelligence ordered to send I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and AI Antonov. General of the Army AI Antonov in 1943 was the first deputy chief of the General Staff.
It became clear that the Allies prepared for the landing of his troops in France, but is still waiting for a favorable moment, which is not associated with their commitments, and, most likely, with the rate of advance of the Soviet troops to the west and a further weakening of Nazi Germany. During the next summit the Allies had to promise that in the case of landing of expeditionary forces in the west of Europe, the Red Army will launch a broad offensive that will not allow the Germans to transfer more troops to France.
When Stalin realized that he could make during the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill to take concrete commitments on opening a second front, it took Roosevelt's invitation to hold a trilateral meeting. He also believed that the time had come to discuss other international problems with the allies. In particular, Stalin was opposed to the idea of Roosevelt, who was supported by Churchill, about the dismemberment of Germany into five states; should determine the way the rebirth of Poland, to decide the question of the future of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia agree on the conditions to ensure the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, in whose territory the Soviet, British and American troops, as well as resolve other issues.
An important condition for the adoption of I.V. Stalin final decision to hold a meeting with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were obtained intelligence GRU information on the US position and the UK on almost all issues of the forthcoming conference - including the position of the allies on Iran. Military intelligence was able to obtain documentary evidence of the "general line of policy in the matter of allies in Iran, which roughly takes the British delegation at the upcoming conference of the three powers ...".
Military intelligence was also able to find out what contradictions exist between Roosevelt and Churchill on the main issues of the upcoming conference. Colonel Melkishev reported that the American president adhered to a position close to the proposal of the USSR: the United States and Great Britain open a second front in France and are stepping up their efforts to defeat Nazi Germany from the west. Major General Sklyarov reported that Churchill, on the contrary, wanted the Anglo-American troops to step up strikes on Germany and its allies in the Balkans. It became clear that although the American president was afraid of advancing the Soviet troops deep into the European continent, he also did not allow the reanimation of the British Empire, the restoration of its influence in Europe. If Churchill could not agree that England irrevocably lost the status of a world colonial power, then Roosevelt did not share this view and did not want to help Churchill ...
After receiving information about the positions of his allies on the main issues of the possible agenda of the conference, Stalin agreed to a meeting. Much was still unclear, but the basis for a meeting with the leaders of the United States and Britain was already.
In Europe, there was nowhere to hold a meeting of the "big three". Not suitable for these purposes and the territory of the USSR. Roosevelt and Churchill still August 19 1943 was reported to Stalin that, in their opinion, for such a meeting, "Neither Astrakhan nor Archangel are not suitable." They offered to meet in Alaska, in Fairbanks, but Stalin told the US president that "to go to the front in such a distant place" in such a tense time, he can not, and offered to hold a meeting in a country where "there is a representation of all the three countries, such as Iran ".
The territory of Iran was controlled by Soviet, British and partly American troops. The Red Army and the British military contingent entered Iran in late August - September 1941 The reasons for the introduction of Soviet troops were set out in the note of the Soviet government to the Iranian leadership on August 25 1941 In it stated that "German agents the most flagrant and brazen way ... turned the territory of Iran in the arena of preparation for a military attack on the Soviet Union ... This requires the Soviet government to immediately implement those measures that it is not only entitled but obliged to accept in order to defend itself. ”
The note indicated the names of German intelligence officers and agents who were engaged in subversive work against the USSR on the territory of Iran. The Soviet invasion of the northern regions of the country took place in strict compliance with article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921
The southwestern provinces of Iran occupied the British troops. Soviet troops joined them near the town of Qazvin. American troops entered Iran at the end of 1942 This military action was carried out under the pretext of security, delivery of military cargo for the Soviet Union. Without any contractual clearance, the US military units occupied the ports of Bender-Shahpur and Khorramshahr.
Through the territory of Iran had been laid road that became available in the Soviet Union, American military supplies under Lend-Lease. In the northern regions of the country, the security of the Soviet borders and the transported military goods was ensured by the strike force, which included the 44 and 47 armies. The intelligence headquarters of the Army worked hard to neutralize the activities of German spies, saboteurs and terrorists. In Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Kirmanshahe, Isfahan and Rezayse were established residency Soviet military intelligence. At the end of 1942, they received information from sources 28 working in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs of Iran, as well as a number of major military units.
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, whose activities are directed Lieutenant General FF Kuznetsov also reported to the political and military leadership of the USSR on the situation in Iran. The most important information used in the preparation of "intelligence reports in the East", which was developed in the quarterly Intelligence Agency on the basis of agent data. Special attention was paid to collecting data on the activities of German intelligence officers and their agents in Iran. In one of the intelligence reports stated that "... the German ambassador in Iran came into contact with the editors of Iranian newspapers" Ettelaaat "and" De-Tehran Magazine ", with which published articles fascist direction. In Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Bushehr and babolsar Germans have their own cell Fascist organized and under the guise of shops, offices, mechanical and other workshops .... "
Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet intelligence activities of German agents, secret fascist organizations and groups based in Rasht, Pahlavi, Qazvin and other cities in northern Iran, was under the control and at any time could be blocked.
The situation in the capital of Iran was also difficult, but controlled. The Soviet 182 Mountain Regiment was stationed in Tehran, its servicemen guarding the most important objects. Most Iranians respected the Soviet Union. This facilitated the work of representatives of Soviet intelligence, operating under the cover of various missions and finding volunteers among Iranians.
In early October 1943, the head of the GRU, Lieutenant-General I.I. Ilyichev received from the Chief of the General Staff another important task: the military intelligence was to ensure the covert withdrawal of the 182 Mountain Regiment from Tehran. Instead, it was planned that, in preparation for a conference of leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, it was planned to introduce a military unit from the Transcaucasian Front, which was more prepared to protect the facilities, to the Iranian capital.
14 1943 October, General Ilyichev sent to Tehran resident military intelligence colonel BG Razin following note: "stationed in Tehran 182-th Mountain Rifle Regiment, being in isolation from the rest of his division and while serving scattered garrisons, is unable to conduct systematic combat training. In connection with this, the General Staff of the Red Army decided to withdraw the regiment from Tehran to the quartering area of the 68 Mountain Division.
In Tehran replaced 182-th Mountain Infantry Regiment redeployed to other infantry regiment of the Transcaucasian Front. Immediately find out the attitude of the Iranians to the planned event and immediately inform. ”
Lieutenant-General Ilyichev knew that the redeployment of the 182 Mountain Regiment was one of the measures carried out according to the plan for preparing a Soviet government delegation’s visit to Tehran. The level of this delegation, as General Il'ichev understood, was rather high. The head of the military intelligence was aware that K.E. Major General S.M. Voroshilov and Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff Shtemenko. Who will head the Soviet delegation, General Ilyichev did not know.
In the fall of 2003, I managed to meet with a veteran of military intelligence, Lieutenant General G.I. Dolin, who worked in Iran for about 10 years. From 1948 th to 1958, Col. Dolin was an employee of the military attache unit, and then a resident of the GRU in Iran, and knew Colonel Razin well. In his estimation, Colonel Razin was one of the most experienced residents of the GRU. He was born in 1905 in a peasant family in the Astrakhan province. In 1924, he voluntarily joined the Red Army, in 1928 he graduated from the Kiev Artillery School, in 1931 he completed special courses at the IV (reconnaissance) department of the Red Army headquarters, served as assistant chief of the border intelligence point. After graduating from the military academy, Razin became the chief of the intelligence department of the Central Asian Military District in 1937 and knew the internal political situation in Iran well. That is why in 1942, he was appointed head of the station in Tehran. After some time, B.G. Razin became the main GRU resident in Iran, to which all military intelligence officers operating in the country were subordinate.
Boris G. Razin was an inquisitive, courageous and persistent man. For several years he personally held secret meetings with the most valuable sources of military intelligence in Iran, and on the eve of the Tehran Conference, he conducted extensive preparatory work in almost all areas of ensuring the security of members of the Soviet government delegation.
Responding to an urgent request from the chief of military intelligence, Colonel Razin reported: “... Currently, representatives of Moscow and Tashkent have worked out a plan for the redeployment of the 182 Mountain Regiment and the arrival of a regiment from the Union.
The main part of the regiment is located in Tehran at the central airfield of Kale Morga, where foreigners are denied access. Officially, Iranians know that we have a special team in Tehran for the distillation of vehicles intended for servicing the airfield. We have taken all measures to ensure that the redeployment goes unnoticed. The Iranians were not asked this question, and the latter do not show any interest. I will follow this issue and if there is new data I will immediately inform you.
The head of the GRU reported to V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria and General S.M. Shtemenko, responsible for the preparation of the Tehran Conference.
In mid-October, 1943, Col. B.G. Razin informed the chief of military intelligence that Mohammed Reza-shah Pahlavi visited the Soviet garrison stationed in Mashhad. The young monarch, who turned 1943 of the year in 22, was pleased with the meeting with the Soviet officers. At a reception hosted in his honor, the Shah declared "his sympathy for the Soviet Union and the Red Army."
Reza Shah respected the Soviet Union, highly appreciated the Soviet military equipment, especially combat aircraft, which he himself flew no worse than a first-class pilot. Razin reported that the Iranian monarch, who was educated in Switzerland and England, is a politician who will seek the full independence of Iran and intends to maintain mutually beneficial friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
In 1943, the development of Soviet-Iranian relations was secretly opposed by the British. A resident of the Soviet military intelligence in Iran has repeatedly reported to the Center that the British in every way assist in the appointment to responsible government and military posts, both in Tehran and in other major cities, of people loyal to them. They tried to carry out such "personnel operations" even in the settlements and military units located in the zone of Soviet control.
Messages Razin from Tehran testified that the British are seeking to strengthen their political position in a country rich in oil, gas and other minerals.
The future of Iran was also to become one of the issues negotiated by the leaders of the great powers. Therefore, some reports from Colonel Razin, the head of military intelligence, sent to the USSR Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. These intelligence data were undoubtedly taken into account in the preparation of Stalin’s meeting with the Iranian Shah.
In October, 1943, at the direction of the military intelligence chief, Colonel Razin, and his resident officers, as well as intelligence personnel from the headquarters of Soviet military units and formations stationed in northern Iran, purposefully collected information on the internal political situation in Iran and its analysis. 13 October 1943 Mr. Razin reported to the Center: “With this mail I am sending you a summary of the Anglo-American and Polish troops stationed in Iran and Iraq, a brief overview of the situation in the Middle East and the activities of Dr. Milspo in Iran ... I send a full report on Iranian gendarmerie as of 1 in October 1943
At present, the residency apparatus is working on the preparation of a report on the situation in Tehran. A report will be presented to you in due time. Information on the radio-agent situation in Tehran will be included in the general report. ”
Moscow was preparing for a meeting of government delegations from the USSR, the USA and the UK. LP Beria and his numerous apparatus took measures that completely excluded leakage of information about the upcoming event. Mention of him in any secret correspondence was strictly prohibited. Preparations for the meeting went according to a single plan, the full content of which in Moscow was known only to the first persons of the state: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria.
“Ensure uninterrupted communication with Moscow ...”
All questions of arrival and accommodation in Tehran of the members of the Soviet delegation were thought out in advance and carefully. The government delegation of the USSR was supposed to stay on the territory of the Soviet embassy. It housed the building of the diplomatic mission, the ambassador’s residence and a number of other office buildings.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his entourage were to be accommodated in the British Embassy. The British and Soviet diplomatic missions were on opposite sides of a single street in Teheran, no more than 50 meters wide. The US delegation led by US President F. Roosevelt was to be located on the territory of the American diplomatic mission.
In the second half of November, 1943 in the Soviet embassy in Tehran began to carry out inconvenient events for all services of the diplomatic mission. 16 November 1943 Razin reported to the Center:
“Director. Today, the business manager (Ambassador of the USSR in Iran, A. Smirnov. - V.L.) informed me that all office buildings, including residential apartments, should be vacated for a month for reasons known to you.
In this regard, I transfer my office to the school together with the embassy, and I received apartments in a house rented by the owner in a city or in a hotel. It is not yet known exactly, but it is as if the walkie-talkie can be left in place ...
We must by the evening of November 17 release all the buildings. Property ordered to leave the apartments. Will there be any instructions from you on this issue? ”
Directions followed. On November 27, General Ilyichev sent Razin a request with the following content: “Light up, can you have the radio operators you have available ensure that your radio is working continuously around the clock for a week?”
For a long time, one radio operator, Lieutenant A. Semenov (alias Zerar), was at the disposal of Razin. During 1942, he ensured uninterrupted communication of the GRU residency with the Center. In the middle of 1943, another radio operator arrived in Tehran - Lieutenant V. Tumanov (Derbent). The cipherman in the residency was Senior Lieutenant I. Kuznetsov (“Rudbar”).
Semenov, Tumanov and Kuznetsov successfully coped with their duties, and Colonel Razin said that his subordinates radio operators will be able to perform any task of the Center.
At the end of November I.V. Stalin left Moscow. The terminal station to which his letter train No. 501 was supposed to arrive was little known. The departure of the Soviet leader from Moscow took place in conditions of deep secrecy - no one knew that the Supreme Commander had left their Soviet capital.
Literny was on the route Moscow - Stalingrad - Baku. Stalin was located in a separate armored car. Beria rode in a separate carriage. He was responsible for the security of the delegation, which included Molotov, Voroshilov, Shtemenko, senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. On one of the sections of the train, the train was almost hit by German bombers ... Stalin traveled from Baku to Tehran by plane.
Churchill went from London to Egypt. He reached Cairo without incident, hoping during a meeting with the American president to try again to reconcile the positions of the United States and Great Britain on the main issues of negotiations with Stalin.
Roosevelt crossed the Atlantic Ocean on the best in those years in the US battleship Iowa. The presidential ship was accompanied by a reinforced escort of warships, which managed to avoid meeting with German submarines. The Atlantic was mostly supportive of the journey of the American president, although once the Americans were still patted by a strong storm. On one of the escort ships, a spontaneous launch of a torpedo took place, which nearly landed in Iowa.
After a nine-day sea crossing, "Iowa" arrived at the Algerian port of Oran.
Roosevelt and Churchill met in Cairo, and on November 28 the delegations of the three powers were already in Tehran. For the German saboteurs, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill were tempting targets. Any unsuccessful terrorist act could have disrupted the work of the Tehran Conference. The danger was real, its political consequences were unpredictable.
It is known that the day after Roosevelt arrived in Tehran, Molotov informed the allies about the danger of a terrorist act against the “big three”. The American president accepted an invitation to settle in the building of the Soviet embassy, which was released from diplomatic and technical staff in advance.
Churchill, whose embassy was opposite the Soviet diplomatic mission, preferred to work under the roof of the British representative office and was under the protection of agents of the British secret service. He came to meetings at the Soviet embassy along a specially constructed covered corridor connecting the Soviet and British embassies. Around the united “security corridor” Soviet-British diplomatic complex, where the meetings of the leaders of the three states of the anti-Hitler coalition were held, three rings of enhanced security were created.
"Overlord", the dismemberment of Germany, the Curzon Line, the plan of mystification and deception of the enemy
Tehran discussions continued from November 28 to December 1.
On November 10, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill conveyed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin honorary sword - the gift of King George VI of Great Britain in commemoration of the heroic defense of the city of Stalingrad. At the transfer of the sword attended by US President F.D. Roosevelt and other officials are members of the government delegations of Great Britain, the USSR, and the USA.
In the ensuing negotiations, the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition countries discussed all the problems that interested them and affected the course of the war against Nazi Germany, agreed on the timing of Operation Overlord, and discussed the prospects for post-war reconstruction in Europe. The perspectives of the war against Japan were also touched. A common understanding was reached on a number of important issues.
During the conference, Roosevelt proposed to discuss the question of the dismemberment after the end of the war of Hitler Germany into five autonomous states. The proposal of the American president was supported by Churchill. However, Stalin did not agree with the opinion of the Allies and proposed to transfer the consideration of the question of Germany to the European Advisory Commission.
As expected, the Tehran conference addressed the issue of Iran. During the discussions, the leaders of the three powers adopted a declaration in which they stressed the desire of the governments of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain “to preserve the complete independence, sovereignty and territorial inviolability of Iran.”
The question of the future of Poland was also discussed. The discussion about Poland was difficult. Nevertheless, it was tentatively reached an agreement that its eastern border would be along the “Curzon Line”, and the western border - along the Oder River.
Before the defeat of Nazi Germany was still far away. However, the American president in an interview with the Soviet leader, which took place on November 29, proposed to discuss the post-war structure of the world. F. Roosevelt said that it was necessary to create such an organization that could ensure a lasting peace after the war. I.V. Stalin supported the idea of creating an international organization that should be based on the principles of the united nations, which was supported by Winston Churchill.
Evaluating the post-war world, the leaders of the three states were unanimous. “With regard to peacetime,” said the leaders of the three powers, “we are confident that the agreement between us will ensure lasting peace.” We fully recognize the high responsibility that rests on us and on all united nations for the implementation of such a world, which will be approved by the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and which will eliminate the calamities and horrors of war for many generations. ”
Roosevelt and Churchill did not say a word to Stalin about combining the efforts of the United States and Great Britain in the field of creating an atomic bomb ...
During discussions about the situation on the Soviet-German front and the prospects for a war against Nazi Germany, Roosevelt and Churchill promised Stalin to open a second front in Europe no later than May 1944.
The final date for the start of the landing of the Allied forces in Normandy was to be determined in the first half of 1944. in Europe. I.V. Stalin supported this proposal. A preliminary agreement was reached that the Soviet General Headquarters would take part in the development and conduct of this operation. The document, which recorded the military decisions, said: “The conference took note that Operation Overlord will be undertaken during May 1944, along with the operation against Southern France. This last operation will be undertaken on a scale to which the availability of landing craft allows. The conference further noted the statement by Marshal Stalin that the Soviet troops would launch an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German troops from the eastern to the western front. ” And further: the Conference “agreed that the military headquarters of the three powers should henceforth maintain close contact with each other with regard to forthcoming operations in Europe. In particular, it was decided that a plan of mystification and deception of the enemy with respect to these operations should be agreed between the respective headquarters. ”
In the evening of November 30, a solemn reception was held at the British Embassy on the occasion of the birthday of Winston Churchill, who turned 69 years old. I.V. Stalin arrived at this reception in the parade of marshal's uniform, he was accompanied by V.M. Molotov and K.E. Voroshilov. He presented Churchill with an astrakhan cap and a large porcelain sculptural group for the plot of Russian folk tales. F. Roosevelt presented an old Persian bowl and Isfahan carpet to the British premiere. At the reception there were many toasts, but one was remembered by everyone. The President of the United States said: “While we are here celebrating the birthday of the British Prime Minister, the Red Army continues to crowd the Nazi hordes. For the success of the Soviet weapons! "
By the evening of December 1 in Tehran got cold. Snow suddenly fell in the mountains of Khuzistan. Weather conditions have changed dramatically. This forced Roosevelt to hurry with the departure from the Iranian capital. Hastily the text of the final declaration was agreed. Solemn ceremony did not hold its signing. Signatures under this most important document, as written by the translator of Stalin V.M. Berezhkov, collected "by the survey method. Each of the main participants of the conference individually hastily delivered his visa. ” “We have in our hands,” wrote Berezhkov, “there remains a fairly crumpled sheet with signatures made in pencil.”
The appearance of the leaflet was in no way in harmony with the content of the document, which became known to the whole world as the Tehran Declaration of the Three Powers. The declaration stated that the conference participants agreed on plans for the destruction of the German armed forces and came to a complete agreement on the scale and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south. “Having finished our friendly meetings,” said Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, “we are confidently waiting for the day when all the peoples of the world will live freely, not subjected to tyranny, and in accordance with their various aspirations and with their conscience ...”.
During his stay in Tehran I.V. Stalin heard a report from the resident military intelligence colonel B.G. Razin about his work. Here is what Colonel Razin 2 of December 1943 reported to the Center about this meeting:
"Lightning. CEO. I understand that on November 10, 2, in Tehran time, I was received by Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade. By Stalin. Before admission to Comrade. Stalin had a conversation with Comrade. Molotov.
Marshal Comrade. Stalin was briefly interested in the general state of the Iranian army, spoke about the visit of the Shah and about the arrangements for the organization in Iran of tank and aviation schools with our equipment and instructors.
The delegation of the USSR, headed by I.V. Stalin during a meeting with Iranian Shahinshah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. 1 December 1943
I briefly reported on the state of the Iranian army and the Iranian generals, how many generals have a Russian school, as well as the influence of the British on the leadership of the Iranian army ...
Marshal Comrade. Stalin listened to the answers to his questions and gave the following instructions: "The Shah and his closest aides are intimidated by the English influence, but adhere to our orientation, what needs to be supported, to encourage their intentions and confirm with our work ...".
Marshal Stalin said that he intended to give the Iranians about 20 aircraft and the same number of tanks that we need to pick up Iranian personnel, which we would prepare ourselves.
To my answer about the deployment capabilities of the aviation and tank schools, the marshal had previously agreed. The aviation school is organized in Mashhad, and the tank school in Tehran.
They were told that a final decision would be made in Moscow on this issue, and that this event was a secret one.
When I left the office, the marshal returned me and added: “Look carefully at the situation and help the Iranians ...” Then he said goodbye to me. I took part in his wires at the airport.
Tov. Molotov was also asked about the organization of these schools. He was also interested in the opinion on the results of the conference. ”
The Soviet delegation left Tehran in the afternoon of December 2. First from the Tehran airfield, heavily guarded by a regiment specially introduced into the Iranian capital, two twin-engine aircraft took off. In one of them was I.V. Stalin, in the second - a group of experts of the General Staff. After some time, Tehran was informed by military radio communications that the planes had landed in Baku.
Stalin safely reached Moscow. In a letter to US President F.D. Roosevelt 6 December 1943 I.V. Stalin, noting the success of the Tehran Conference and the special significance of its decisions, wrote: "I hope that the common enemy of our peoples - Hitlerite Germany - will soon feel this."
7 December 1943 was published in the Soviet press on the meeting of the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in Tehran, the texts of the Declarations and other documents adopted during the conference were printed.
December 7 in the USSR for the first time it became known that I.V. Stalin traveled from Moscow and for four days participated in negotiations in Tehran with the leaders of the United States and Great Britain.