First network centric war

“We must recognize that so far [Russian] military science has not revealed a clear generalized type of modern war and armed conflict,” said Russian Defense Minister S. Ivanov in a speech at a meeting of the 24 Academy of Military Sciences in January 2004.

After almost ten years, this situation has not changed. The experience of recent army operations in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq remained unclaimed in the Armed Forces of Russia. Such a conclusion can be drawn from the refusal of the transition to the only currently generalized type of modern war called Network Centric Warfare (network-centric hostilities). The 5 approved February 2010 of the year The military doctrine of the Russian Federation does not contain similar language or its characteristic components.

The concept of network-centric hostilities was published in 1998 in an article by Vice Admiral Arthur Sebrowski and US Department of Defense Fellow John Garstka. The concept was based on a multiple increase in the combat power of the armed forces without increasing their numbers, only by raising to a qualitatively different level the technology of managing the armed forces by creating a single information network connecting all participants in the fighting in real time. This decision made it possible to change to the opposite value the balance of forces between the attacking and the defending sides, provided that the latter does not possess such technology.

Network Centric Warfire conceptual diagram

The new concept of warfare has the following effects:
- the reaction time during military operations is shorter by an order of magnitude;
- the continuity of the process of planning, conducting and logistics of military operations;
- a single level of operational and tactical awareness;
- self-synchronization of actions in general combat;
- a combination of the spatial distribution of the armed forces and the concentration of their fire impact on the enemy.

The technology of network-centric hostilities relies on the latest technical advances in communications and automation. Communication is based on the principle of a self-healing network that transmits digital data, voice information and streaming video through common channels. Automation of command and control is provided by creating a computer system, the computing power of which is distributed down to the level of combat vehicles and individual infantrymen.

It is necessary to emphasize the fundamental difference between the concept of Network Centric Warfare from the previously developed concepts of Blitzkrieg (Alfred von Schlieffen, 1905 year) and deep operations (Victor Triandafillov, 1931 year). Implemented respectively at the beginning and end of World War II, these concepts are based on the historically established hierarchical system of command and control of troops — all information from advanced units rises to the headquarters level, summarizes and, in the form of combat orders, descends again to the level of fire support units. The reaction time to a change in the operational-tactical situation is determined by the bandwidth capabilities of the communication channels and the speed of information processing at the headquarters level. Management at all stages is completely centralized: the disruption of the headquarters or communication channels leads to the disorganization of troops.

The ratio of the decision time between the Network Centric Warfire and deep operation

Unlike Blitzkrieg and deep operations, the concept of Network Centric Warfare provides for the formation of horizontal links between advanced units and fire support units. The staff level is involved only in order to monitor the implementation of the previously outlined plan of hostilities and make adjustments to it, taking into account the changing situation. Troop control in real time is decentralized while maintaining centralization of combat planning.

The concept of a deep operation still forms the basis of the military doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The concept of network-centric hostilities is included in the US military doctrine (Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020 versions) and put into practice in 2003 in the war between the US-British coalition, on the one hand, and Iraq, on the other.

In the Russian militaryhistorical literature, the military operations of the US-British coalition in the Second Iraq War are officially interpreted as conducting an air-ground war (a kind of deep operation) similar to the actions of the US armed forces in the first Iraq war, Yugoslavia and Vietnam. However, the high level of military potential of both warring parties, the transience of the conflict and the paradoxical balance of forces of the advancing and the defending directly indicate a network-centric war.

In 2003, Iraq possessed numerous armed forces with many years of combat experience, including military confrontation with American forces. Iraqi forces included 23 divisions of the ground forces and the Republican Guard with a strength of 230 thousand people and 200 thousand people in aviation and air defense forces, which were armed with 2200 tanks (including 700 T-72s), 3000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 4000 guns, mortars and MLRS, 100 medium-range ballistic missiles, 500 combat aircraft and helicopters, 100 mobile air defense systems. In addition, there were irregular military units of up to 40 thousand people armed with a rifle weapons, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and off-road cars. The number of reservists was 650 thousand people.

The forces of the US-British coalition included 6 divisions of ground forces and marine corps with a strength of 110 thousand people and 180 thousand people in aviation and navywhich were armed with 500 tanks, 1200 BMP and armored personnel carriers, 900 guns, mortars and MLRS, 1100 medium-range cruise missiles, 1300 combat aircraft and helicopters, 200 mobile air defense systems.

The numerical superiority of the Iraqi armed forces over the US-British coalition was:
- in manpower in 1,48 times, including in 2,09 times in the number of ground troops;
- in tanks in 4,4 times;
- in BMP and BTR in 2,5 times;
- in artillery in 4,4 times.

The numerical superiority of the American-British coalition over the Iraqi armed forces was:
- in mobile air defense systems in 2 times;
- in aviation 2,6 times;
- in medium-range missiles 11 times.

Location of Iraqi forces on 19 March 2003 of the year

In exact accordance with the concept of a deep operation (defensive in this case) and based on the numerical superiority of the enemy in aviation and medium-range missiles, the Iraqi troops were dispersed to the maximum extent in part of the country with rugged terrain and natural obstacles:
- on the east bank of the Tigris River along the Iran-Iraq border (southern slopes of the Iranian Highlands);
- in the interfluve of the Tigris and Euphrates (marshy lowland with irrigated agriculture).

The western part of Iraq’s territory between the right bank of the Euphrates River and the Saudi-Iraqi border, which occupies about half of the country’s area and is covered with rocky desert, was practically free from the deployment of troops and armaments. Fortifications were created around major cities.

As a result, the Iraqi troops were turned to the south-west, having a neutral state (Iran) in the rear, creating a deeply echeloned defense with three lines of natural obstacles - the Euphrates River, the marshy interfluve and the Tigris River.

The defense of the Iraqi divisions was built in the form of a set of strong points located along the perimeter of the cities. Field defensive positions in the form of full profile trenches and caponiers of combat vehicles were combined with urban defensive positions in the form of buildings and structures adapted for the shelters of combat vehicles and long-term firing points.

The strategic defensive plan of the Iraqi armed forces was based on the abandonment of the struggle for air superiority and the imposition of fights on previously prepared positions with inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy. The center of defense was Baghdad, where most of the air defense forces and the most combat-ready military units were concentrated. In connection with the quantitative and qualitative superiority of enemy aviation, it was decided to abandon the combat use of its own aviation. In the event of a breakthrough of field positions, it was planned to transfer combat operations to the line of urban development, using the latter as protective structures. In the enemy's rear on supply lines it was planned to deploy sabotage operations by forces of irregular military formations.

The ground forces of the American-British coalition before the beginning of the campaign occupied a bridgehead in Kuwait, bordering Iraq in the south-east. Aviation was based in Kuwait, other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, and also on aircraft carriers. Medium-range cruise missiles were part of tactical aviation ammunition and were deployed on military ships and submarines. A small number of special operations forces (about 4000 people) were located in Jordan near the northern border of Iraq.

US-British coalition fighting in March-April 2003

The strategic offensive plan of the American-British coalition envisaged the conquest of full air supremacy by suppressing air defense and creating a no-fly zone for enemy aircraft over the entire territory of Iraq. After achieving this result, it was planned to block Iraqi military units in the places of their deployment with the help of air strikes against enemy columns on the march. In addition, the aircraft should have consistently destroyed the enemy’s military equipment deployed to field defense positions around fortified areas and provide support to assault groups in the urban environment.

The ground forces of the American-British coalition were assigned three tasks:
- surround a large grouping of Iraqi troops in the fortified area around Basra;
- To inflict a flank attack on Iraqi troops located in the first echelon of the defense between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, with the further advancement and destruction of enemy strongholds along the Basra-Baghdad highway;
- to carry out a raid to the depth of 400 km along the outlying Iraqi desert areas along the leading edge of enemy defenses across the Euphrates River and seize the center of defense of Baghdad.

Military operations were launched on 19 March 2003, the invasion of northern Iraq (areas inhabited by Kurds) by special operations forces. The next day, a massive rocket-bombing attack was made on air defense complexes, radar stations and airfields to the entire depth of Iraqi territory. The task of winning air superiority and creating an unmanned zone was solved. March 21 aviation attacked the Iraqi army’s border control posts, allowing the ground forces of the US-British coalition to move into Iraqi territory. One British division blocked a fortified area around Basra, three American divisions (two expeditionary divisions of the Marine Corps and 82-I air assault) hit the flank of the first echelon of the Iraqi forces, two US divisions (3-I mechanized and 101-I air assault ) went to the raid on Baghdad.

Broken launchers of the Iraqi C-300 SAM

From this point on, the US-British aviation began to destroy Iraqi military equipment on the march and in field defensive positions. Every day only tactical aviation aircraft carried out 1700 sorties on average, without taking into account the actions of attack helicopters and strategic bombers B-52. The latter directly supported ground troops on duty in the air over combat areas, striking guided laser-guided bombs at targets highlighted by advanced aircraft gunners.

Four days after the start of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border crossing, the 3-I mechanized division operating in the first echelon of the offensive reached the outer line of the defense of Baghdad, located in the area of ​​the city of Karbala. After the suppression of the field defensive positions, one of the brigades of the 3 division in combat broke through to the south-west of Baghdad, located beyond the Tigris River. Twelve days after the beginning of the offensive from the southeast, the US Marine Corps approached Baghdad, which in its way bypassed the blocked fortified areas of Al-Nasiriyah and Kut between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The 101-I and 82-I air-assault divisions operated in the second echelon of the offensive, ensuring the protection of their communications.

The defeat of the Iraqi armored column on the march

Baghdad was taken to the ring. For three days, American-British aircraft suppressed the defensive positions of Iraqi troops directly within the city, after which the advanced units of the 3-th mechanized division entered it. All the counterattacks of the most combat-ready divisions of the Republican Guard of Iraq “Medina” and “Nebuchadnezzar”, as well as army special forces were repulsed with heavy losses for the defenders. 9 on April began the mass desertion of Iraqi troops throughout the country, with the exception of Tikrit, the hometown of the President of Iraq, whose garrison ceased resistance on April 13.

At first glance, the actions of the American-British coalition look like a classic air-ground offensive operation - the conquest of air superiority, the air blockade of the defending enemy in the places of its deployment, the air support for the advancing ground units. However, this development was not a surprise for the Iraqi command, which had previously built deeply echeloned defense in the form of fortified areas, having accumulated in them a sufficient amount of ammunition and food for autonomous combat operations for the period up to 60 days. In the settlements themselves in the houses were equipped shelters for military equipment and long-term emplacements, underground communications were used to move the infantry.

The aim of the Iraqi command was to draw the American-British coalition into protracted battles. Even the fourth day of the onset of the 3 th mechanized division to the distant approaches to Baghdad did not contradict this plan, since the enemy then had to move from a raid across the desert territory to frontal assault on field defensive positions, and then be drawn into urban battles with elite Iraqi units troops.

Trophy Iraqi MiG-25

The cause of the short-term defeat of the Iraqi armed forces was the effect of the implementation of the concept of network-centric hostilities, first used in practice by the American armed forces. Without exception, the strongholds in the offensive zone of the coalition forces, regardless of their location (in field conditions or within the city limits), were destroyed by the attackers without any special damage to themselves, despite the numerical superiority of the defenders in military equipment and manpower. For the period from March 19 to April 13, the losses of the killed American-British coalition amounted to 2003 man, the Iraqi armed forces - 172 man.

The entire Iraqi airspace was monitored round-the-clock with the help of American long-range radar reconnaissance and AWACS command and control aircraft. In connection with the refusal of the Iraqi command to use its air force, this system was mainly used for the dispatch control of flights of airplanes and helicopters of the American-British coalition. The J-Stars radar system installed onboard the Boeing E-250A / C aircraft was used for the operational control of the ground situation to a depth of 8 km from the front line, warning the ground forces of enemy movements and air and artillery strikes. Sources of radio emission at the location of Iraqi forces, including radars, radio transmitters, repeaters and EW, were detected, suppressed and destroyed with the help of electronic reconnaissance aircraft and self-guided missiles.

Boeing E-8A / C J-Stars Ground Purpose DRLO Aircraft

The use of the new integrated communications and control system FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below), developed from 1995, in the Second Iraq war played a key role in the successful actions of the ground forces. Her experimental versions were previously tested in military conflicts in Yugoslavia (1999 year) and Afghanistan (2001 year). FBCB2 linked automated systems for reconnaissance, positioning, fire control, situational awareness, combat planning and logistics of land forces, and also provided data exchange with automated systems of other types of armed forces and joint command.

FBCB2 terminals were located directly onboard tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, rocket launchers and multi-purpose off-road vehicles of the United States Army and Marine Corps. The terminals were also equipped with mobile command posts, technical reconnaissance and fire control systems for artillery and rocket units, advanced artillery and air gunners. The terminals were connected to a two-level radio communications network, including the EPLRS / SINCGARS air segment and the INMARSAT space segment. Data exchange was carried out within the framework of a virtual network of tactical Internet.

Information network ACCS FBCB2

The commanders of combat vehicles and military units before the platoon / battery inclusive in real time on the displays of their terminals had a display of the current tactical situation, including the location of the enemy positions and their parts. In this regard, all attacks on the defensive positions of the Iraqi army were carried out mainly from the flanks and rear. The artillery armament of American tanks and infantry fighting vehicles was used at extreme distances outside the zone of aimed fire of artillery armament of Iraqi combat vehicles.

The commanders of the advanced divisions of the American divisions on the battlefield were given communication opportunities to directly interact with artillery units and tactical, in some cases, strategic aviation. Iraqi artillery was suppressed by multiple rocket launchers immediately after the determination of its positions according to radar reconnaissance for the trajectories of the projectile flights during the first sighting shots. After gaining air supremacy, the main type of combat use of the aviation of the American-British coalition (90 percent of sorties) was airborne defenses in combat areas and air support to their ground forces on the battlefield (using advanced aircraft gunners) or behind Iraqi troops (with using radar guidance).

As a result, the fire contact of the attackers and the defenders took place unilaterally, which greatly influenced the moral and psychological stability of the Iraqi military personnel. The inability to realize not only the defense plan, but also the elementary fulfillment of their military duty (to damage the enemy even at the cost of his own death) demoralized first the Iraqi army and then the Republican Guard of Iraq.

On the other hand, full possession of tactical information, preventive use of fire weapons, the practical absence of casualties from the attackers and the uninterrupted logistical support allowed them to destroy enemy forces in parts, even without a quantitative superiority in ground weapons and manpower.

Bombardment of the Baghdad City Districts

At the same time, one should not exaggerate the factor of air supremacy in the skies of Iraq. According to the estimates of the US ground forces command, the effectiveness of field defense defensive bombardments averaged 20 percent. To protect against air strikes, the Iraqis used a variety of camouflage and disinformation measures for the air enemy: burning automobile tires near combat-ready tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (to imitate their destruction), manually destroying stone mounds of parabolic trenches and caponiers, hiding equipment and personnel in residential buildings until start a ground attack, etc.

To destroy the remaining 80 percent of field defensive positions (including Iraqi combat vehicles buried in the ground), American tank and mechanized units used regular artillery weapons equipped with thermal sights and laser rangefinders. The shooting distance was from 2 to 2,5 km. When attacking in populated areas, assault groups of infantry used portable missile systems with high-explosive fragmentation warheads and guided bombs on targets in urban areas. The shooting / aiming distance was from 1 to 1,5 km.

Padded Iraqi tanks on the streets of Baghdad

The few attempts by Iraqi troops to counterattack each time stumbled upon the situational awareness of the American forces at an early stage about the transfer and accumulation of forces of the defenders. A typical example is the night counterattack attempt by two Republican Guard brigades, supported by 70 tanks, to bridgehead one battalion of the 3 Mechanized Division, reinforced by 10 Abrams and 4 BMP Bradley tanks, in urban development in Baghdad. Stumbling into a bombing strike and artillery fire before the start of the counterattack and having lost half of the killed and wounded in dense pre-battle order, the Iraqis were forced to retreat.

The unwillingness of Iraqi troops to conduct urban battles in the conditions of high-precision bombing and artillery fire at extreme distances is well illustrated by the tactics used by the 3-I mechanized division to establish control over Baghdad. The Thunder run method was used - high-speed raids of armored vehicles on city arteries with attacks on enemy firing points identified during raids. The last high-speed raid was accompanied by the landing of infantry at the intersections of highways with the deployment of strong points and ended with the seizure of a complex of government buildings in the city center. The contact of the Iraqi Armed Forces Command with President Saddam Hussein was lost. Night counterattacks were once again disrupted. The next morning, the resistance of the Iraqi army and the Republican Guard was broken. Armed conflict has passed into the stage of guerrilla war.

Scheme of the last raid Thunder run

The Network Centric Warfare technology in the Iraq war was largely built on speeding up the delivery of intelligence to the advanced units of the American army. Increased situational awareness helped them each time advance the opponent in their decision making. At the same time, special attention was paid to the priority identification and destruction of the command posts of the Iraqi troops, after which their combat command, built on a hierarchical basis, ceased to exist as an organized system.

The delay in obtaining intelligence about the Iraqi forces immediately affected the pace of the offensive - the absence of the usual red icons (designation of enemy positions) on the displays of the FBCB2 terminals acted as a brake light on the commanders of the advanced units of the American troops. For example, the sandstorm over Baghdad and the associated temporary suspension of reconnaissance aircraft forced American troops to proceed to the so-called siege of Baghdad in accordance with an official statement by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. However, active offensive actions immediately resumed after changes in weather conditions.

Combining automated systems Battle Command Systems US Armed Forces

After the Iraq war, 2003, the development of the material basis for the conduct of network-centric hostilities proceeded at an accelerated pace. In the US armed forces informational docking of the automation systems of the ground forces, air defense, aviation and navy was made using the DIB (DCGS Integrated Backbone) software interface. In the space and air segment, the transition to broadband is completed. The functionality of the FBCB2 automated system has been extended to С4 level. Completed equipping all units of the Army and Marine Corps with transportable terminals. At present, in accordance with the program of the Joint Battle Command Platform, we equip military personnel of permanent readiness units with wearable terminals. In 2014, it is planned to test the digital battlefield Digital Battle Field, which does not require the mandatory use of a satellite navigation system and laser illumination of targets.

HART Intelligence Network

In 2012, the number of unmanned aerial vehicles (7400 units) in the US military exceeded the number of main battle tanks (7200 units). A large flight fleet of UAVs, together with a broadband radio network and a network of computers, makes it possible to form an extensive fault-tolerant multispectral reconnaissance network of the HART type (Heterogeneous Airborne Reconnaissance Team) on a theater scale.

Since 2010, the Cyber ​​Command has been operating under the authority of the Strategic Command and operating the global information network GIG (Global Information Grid) of the US Armed Forces. Raising the information system to the same level as the nuclear triad (ballistic missiles, submarines and heavy bombers) shows the strategic importance of implementing the concept of Network Centric Warfare to achieve technological superiority over the enemy.

The functional structure of the Global Information Grid network

Unfortunately, the Armed Forces of Russia still rely on the concept of a deep operation, developed over 80 years ago. The lack of innovations directly affects their combat capabilities. A purely quantitative build-up of new types of weapons, including those created on the Armata armored platform, will in no way affect the ability to conduct a network-centric war.

As a result of the continuing ambiguity in the key issue of building the Russian Armed Forces, the experimental development of combat control systems for the Ground Forces compete with each other (ESU TK and Andromeda-D) cannot overcome the field test strip, do not have a proper communication network, do not support unified protocols data exchange with automated fire control systems of artillery, missile and anti-aircraft complexes. The task of organizing the information interaction of automated systems of the army, aviation and navy within a single network is not solved.

One can only hope for an early resolution of the question posed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2004.

Comments

[APES]

We are ready for the wars of the past, but not for the wars of the future.
Although the war never ended, it’s enough to read the news from the Caucasus, which you already perceive as a summary of the hostilities. What reaches the general public seems to me only a small part of the real state of things. Given the security - the openness of our borders, it seems that if the war starts, then it will begin immediately in Moscow.

[Max_Bauder]

I think if you briefly formulate the philosophy of secentric war, then we can say this: to kill a fly you do not need to beat with a sledgehammer, just clap a clapper.

[alicante11]

This is if you at 100% know that an elephant will not get caught in a fly.

[Xroft]

Another thing is interesting if Iraq had the S-300, how efficiently did they work? otherwise they were mentioned about them (in the form of a photo of the destroyed battery and that’s all) and Iraq had an air defense system layered .... that Iran just wants to do.

[sivuch]

Of course, Iraq didn’t have any 300k, nor did 200k

[Lesnik]

There is nothing to object :( As always, the question arises “where to run and what to do.” To increase and decentralize the control system? Give the commander of the combined-arms platoon the ability to make tactical decisions? Increase the number of RUKs and give them to the company-battalion commander? Increase the number of REB funds and air defense at the tactical level? Or is it stupid to copy the control system?
They win precisely in the tactical link due to the high speed of information processing and minimal response time.

[Orik]

The platoon, company, battalion commander must be ready for independent decision-making, this is a certain psychology.

[Lesnik]

to be ready and be able to slightly different things though generally agree

[cdrt]

Lecnic
They win precisely in the tactical link due to the high speed of information processing and minimal response time

Winning at the tactical level is not a way - but a result.
Probably the main thing is that the pace of attack reached 240 km / day.
None of the management systems that existed before this pace could not stand.
Excellence in the Boyd cycle in action.
It was very interesting to read articles in the American army press from 2005-2010, when they analyzed the experience of fighting. Many interesting conclusions - for example, about the need to include tanks in the reconnaissance order and the exclusion (or a sharp decrease in the number) of jeeps - at a database at such a pace, the scouts did not have time to covertly study the routes, because they were afraid to expose them to a blow of superior forces, they simply weren’t used for their intended purpose, taking them to the second echelon. Hence the conclusion (akin to German after WWII) - intelligence is not a knock on the door, but a kick that knocks the door out. In the charters, they have not yet realized this.

[Lesnik]

You and I again because of, let's say, an incorrect assessment of the situation, are stepping on the same rake as our fathers and grandfathers in the Second World War. do not you find that the situation of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War one by one is similar to the entire operation of the US armed forces in Iraq?

[Blackgrifon]

Quote: Forestman

one to one similar to the entire operation of the US armed forces in Iraq?

More than:
- a morally weak adversary (it is no secret that the Iraqis left their positions after a certain fee);
- low level of training and equipment (tanks and aircraft of the first modifications);
- lack of coordination of actions (the Iraqi Air Force did not participate in the database at all).
But the clash of the "Ultra Modern", prepared by American specialists of the Georgian army with several units of the conservative Russian army, ended with Russian paratroopers a few kilometers from Tbilisi.

[Lesnik]

Thanks to the personal heroism of the military personnel and only for this. None of the interactions, planning, provision, speech can go to my deep regret

[Victor]

The article is interesting and quite complete. But there are a few but.
Firstly, it is not 2004 now, and although with a great delay, the Russian Army is preparing to conduct network-centric wars. By and large, even the USSR in the last years of its existence understood and prepared for network-centric wars, developing a system of command and control and intelligence covering the army grouping. The Nineties and XNUMXs knocked us out of the rut, throwing military science far back and, oddly enough, it was during Serdyukov, a slow, but progressive movement began to comprehend and a phased transition to the preparation of a network-centric war. Everything became especially clear after the "Forcing Georgia to Peace", during which the level of obtaining intelligence and bringing it to the operating battalion-platoons was none. Interaction between the Air Force and the ground group was also absent due to the lack of both such and effective means of communication in real time.
it was these events that pushed the country's leadership and Min. defense to begin to create and implement in the troops systems similar to the American Battle Command Systems. The first experience of such implementation was the Andromeda BIUS, successfully tested and adopted by the Airborne Forces. Although, to be honest, the level of readiness of officers to work in this really good system is not very high so far. the basic training in military courses, where the basis of training has remained largely Soviet, is very good for its time, but clearly does not reach the modern level. It is clear that the American system started working much earlier and continues to improve, but this does not mean that we are standing still. The absence of a word about network-centric wars in the Russian military doctrine does not mean that this is not taught in the military academies of the RF Armed Forces. There is a translational motion and it is increasing.

[Lesnik]

"The absence of a word about network-centric wars in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation does not mean that this is not taught in the military academies of the RF Armed Forces. There is forward movement and it is growing."
In general, I agree with you, dear Victor. But the quality of the training system in military universities and especially in academies is a separate matter;), progressive movement strive for absolute 0, the result is needed yesterday and not in 10 years;) I'm sorry, but I think so.

[Victor]

Quote: Forestman

the result is needed yesterday and not in 10 years;) sorry but I think so.

Yes, you think correctly, but where to go if not 10, but 20 years were lost. And not only in the Army, but in the whole country. And you are right about studying at military universities and academies. For one strong and progressive military teacher there are ten retrogrades who cannot and do not want to learn on their own, and even more so to teach others. But all the same, the movement has begun, there are locomotive progressors in the troops who are pulling this new knowledge and skills to the mountain. Unfortunately, the operational-tactical command link in the formations is the most "dumb" one. I personally saw how some generals and colonels from the Airborne Forces used combat control computers as coasters for coffee and combat manuals. For them, this computer is an unbearable burden. It is necessary to change this link for young and advanced officers, who will study and teach others themselves, and of the old, only those who are ready to change should be left. I'm already under fifty myself, so I know what I'm talking about

[Savva30]

I remember in Chechnya ... from the headquarters: how the situation, the intelligence plans ... I say here guests are working with the GRU ... Yes, and what are they doing with you? How do I know, even if you don’t know ... This is how we plan, this is our "passability of information" ...

[Nayhas]

Quote: Savva30

This is how we plan, this is how we have "information throughput" ...

How many people have lost because of this ...

[Ramadan]

Maybe they did it for fear of information leakage? There were such cases ....

[ikrut]

Become interesting. Makes me think. Of course, the first thing that comes to mind is "and we also need it." Yes, I probably should. However, just catching up is not the most effective way. It would be interesting to know about the existence of any "asymmetric" responses to such "network strategies" of war. There must also be vulnerabilities in them. Starting from the global suppression of all "electronics" and ending with local means of disinformation and suppression. As I understood from the article, in the conditions of the information "blockade" all their military power is in a stupor and is waiting for "better times." Maybe there are also effective solutions along this path for confronting such an "advanced" enemy?

[Victor]

Quote: ikrut

Maybe there are also effective solutions along this path for confronting such an "advanced" enemy?

Under the USSR, such an answer was made. Space fighters were created, whose task was to destroy enemy control and reconnaissance satellites. The so-called IS series "Cosmos". A huge number of tests have been carried out on this topic. ISs were launched by the Cyclone missile. The last test was officially completed in 1982, Kind of finished. Under what markings everything goes now, I do not know.

[poccinin]

it all works well when there are satellites in orbit. and if they are disabled, launch into orbit a "box with 50 bolts. jerk a couple of nuclear charges in the atmosphere. then what?" THEY, after all, without electronics and toilet paper, everything will stop at once. or am i wrong?

[Nayhas]

Quote: poccinin

this all works well when there are satellites in orbit. and if they are disabled, launch a "box with 50 bolts into orbit."

As I understand it for you, space is a kind of plane in which one "bolt" is capable of knocking out all satellites on its way, regardless of orbit and speed? According to your logic, if the contents of the box with "bolts" are scattered in the air, then all the planes fall?

[specKFOR]

"they! Of course they will never defeat us, but only because there are many of us !!! and this is sadness (((With the advent of mobile phones on the civilian market, OUR army became mobile !!! 1000 times wrote that Americans are not stupid people and without paper and colas can fight. I saw it with my own eyes for a whole year + weeks. So do not build illusions ...!)))

[smile]

specKFOR
For your information there are more ... two with a penny

[cumastra1]

It is hardly possible to catch up and overtake the fuse in the spheres of control automation. Only asymmetric responses can keep our partners in check and at a respectful distance. Our sworn friends should know that behind the back of any of ours, even the most worthless soldier, is "Kuz'kina's mother." It is her that everyone should be afraid of.

[alicante11]

But I did not see any "wunderwaffe" in the "network centricity". The article provides a description of the campaign at the strategic level, which has been replicated many times. Moreover, not in great detail.

I fundamentally disagree with the conclusions. The main and only CRITICAL condition for such a quick and easy victory is FULL dominance in aviation, which completely deprived the Iraqi army of the possibility of maneuver. From the side of the Iraqis, obviously, the calculation was based on the fact that the Americans would be forced to lose time and suffer losses in manpower and equipment in the fortified areas. And to protect the capital, the most combat-ready units were allocated, which were supposed to crack down on the Americans who had broken through the fortified areas, who had suffered losses and lost organization. But it didn’t work out that way. If we look at the map of the development of hostilities, we will see that the Americans did not take a single Iraqi fortified area. They went around all the fortified areas, and aviation did not allow Iraqis to carry out counterattacks and raids on the rear with large forces. As a result, the Americans were able to get to Baghdad from the side from where the Iraqis did not expect them. Apparently, the city was not prepared for defense, at least from the north and east. Naturally, the Iraqis had to regroup their forces in a different direction of counterattack under the blows of Amer aviation. Still, 70 tanks with dowry infantry - this is not 3-5tys for you. Chechen fighters who could move in small groups in the Grozny building without fear of attacks from the federal aviation. As a result, the Iraqis suffered heavy losses before the start of the counterattack and were unable to solve their tasks.

Next, consider the thesis of the capture of Baghdad by raid columns. Sorry, but our units did the same in Grozny. True, the result was somewhat different, or rather, quite different. Obviously, because Grozny was defending itself by militants according to a certain plan precisely in the urban area, while the main battles for Baghdad unfolded according to the classical field army action pattern. If the raid groups are so omnipotent, why didn’t they take Basra, Karbala, En-Nasiriya with their help? Why did Sirte and Bani Walid last so long? Because these cities were equipped as fortified areas. Which obviously was not in Baghdad.

It is very much doubtful to me that the commanders of the battalion company level, not to mention the platoon and commanders of military vehicles, must have before themselves the entirety of the information that they are ready to apply it in a quality manner. After all, each commander is individual. And he can act depending on the situation in one way or another, depending on the assessment. Especially if this situation changes very quickly. To manage at this level, all decisions of commanders must be unified by the Charter and not allow deviations from it. As a result, army actions will become stereotyped and easily predictable. And in case of violation of plans, the whole system will turn into chaos. Since there will be no template solutions that could be used to build a new concept of the operation when the enemy counterattacks.

[nov_tech.vrn]

and another very powerful means of influencing the defense system was money, which forced them to make managerial decisions that were not the most correct from the point of view of defense of the Iraqi capital, and there was no longer any belief in victory.

[alicante11]

Another aspect I can highlight is the fact that in the event of a hypothetical war with Russia, the Americans will not have such complete intelligence information. Since the information from the satellites is not sufficient, and the amers will clearly not succeed in establishing a barrage of AWACS aircraft over our territory. Therefore, the amers will not have such a serious advantage in relation to intelligence. Plus, the more complex the communication system, the more links in it, destroying which you can destroy the entire system. Of course, the links can be reserved. But there will be more than one "move" on our side to destroy the enemy's communications structure.

Well, for a snack. I don’t think the Americans didn’t test their concept during the “three eights” war. It was not for nothing that there appeared some "jeeps" with communication equipment. At the same time, the result for the amerskoy side in this war turned out to be rather depressing. Although initially there was an almost natural blitzkrieg against the Ossetians.

Now about the positive aspects of "network centrism".
Of course, there cannot be a lot of intelligence information. And therefore, the task of the leadership of the armed forces is to provide the most complete picture of military operations. But not for the downstream connections, but for yourself. To make the most correct and timely decisions at the strategic level. Whereas on a tactical level, the "four-star" captains in the field are often better at grasping the situation than the "four-star generals" at headquarters.
Well, the work of communication, of course, should be as fast and smooth as possible. It was always and always necessary.

As a conclusion, I will assume that "network-centric" wars are another American horror story, such as SDI. Aiming to ensure that we start developing an expensive system for ensuring such a war, a system that we can never use, since we are not going to fight an enemy as technically inferior to us as the Iraqis were inferior to the Amers.

[Lesnik]

Dear alicante11, your comparisons of operations of the US Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces are at least incorrect!
I hope I do not need to explain why.
Further, I hope that it is not a secret for you that the AWACS AWACS aircraft should not enter the affected area of ​​enemy air defense systems.
The control system used by our sworn friends assumes that each weapon unit (soldier) that is the so-called ASUV system user not only consumes reconnaissance information but is also its supplier and, in turn, the ASUV system translator, which ensures its high stability.
Sworn friends were faced with the problem of an overabundance of information and not its deficit, which in turn affected the reliability of intelligence and the speed of its processing.
Unfortunately, they and we are at different stages of the development of military science and technology, which is very sad.
But we must honestly and frankly admit it and not hide behind various slogans like "we will throw our hats"

[alicante11]

Dear alicante11, your comparisons of operations of the US Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces are at least incorrect!
I hope I do not need to explain why.

So I did not compare. I just assumed (did not even claim) that in the war of three eights, the Americans tested their concept on us. With a negative result for them.

Sworn friends were faced with the problem of an overabundance of information and not its deficit, which in turn affected the reliability of intelligence and the speed of its processing.

In-in. I also say that this is "overkill". Moreover, the information from the soldier is rather irregular and contradictory. Now he is running, and the next second he fell behind the duval. Of course, someone else can run, but he can no longer run ... And this is an additional load on the program algorithms and the resources of the processing computer. Here you will have to have a super-computer for each battalion. Sorry, but this is a crazy idea. Information from the soldier is needed by his commander, who will isolate the important from it and pass it on higher.

AWAXS can be shot down not only with C-300. There are also interceptors and fighters. Which Iraqis could not apply.

Unfortunately, they and we are at different stages of the development of military science and technology, which is very sad.
But we must honestly and frankly admit it and not hide behind various slogans like "we will throw our hats"

Sorry, but this is complete stupidity. They said exactly the same when the Americans scared us with SDI. Here, they say, they are with lasers in space, and we with our flying bast shoes. But for some reason, still nothing good for amers with missile defense does not work.
By the way, about the "hats". I didn't say anything about them. NATO is a strong enemy and the Russian Federation cannot cope with them. But a war with Russia, even with the use of conventional weapons, will not be an easy walk for NATO. They'll overstrain, perhaps.

Sincerely.

[Lesnik]

With no less respect, I advise you to study this issue more deeply!

[alicante11]

However, the arguments would not hurt ...

[Lesnik]

Similarly
Although no, the link will definitely not hurt you
http://topwar.ru/34855-pervaya-setecentricheskaya-voyna.html

[Lesnik]

And more
http://pentagonus.ru/publ/materialy_posvjashheny/2000_nastojashhij_moment/sistem
a_boevogo_upravlenija_sukhoputnykh_vojsk_ssha_v_zvene_quot_brigada_i_nizhe_quot_
2012/122-1-0-2087
In general, there is quite a lot of information on this topic in open media
I wish you creative "success"

[alicante11]

In general, there is quite a lot of information on this topic in open media
I wish you creative "success"

Thank you, I read more complete and specific descriptions of both individual elements of the network and the network as a whole. I repeat, they did not impress me. Yes, the speed of information flow is higher. Yes, the situation is reflected more clearly. But this is not critical if amerms are opposed by well-trained troops (if officers can read the map well and work with it), with well-established communications, albeit without computer bells and whistles. Of course, it is good to have such a system, but it is better to have more tanks, planes and other weapons in good quality instead. Of course, the option of both would be generally wonderful. But, here, as they say, it is better to be rich and healthy than the poor and sick.

[alicante11]

http://topwar.ru/34855-pervaya-setecentricheskaya-voyna.html

Hmm, link to the same article. Error or joke like that?

[Lesnik]

joke sorry!

[andron352]

When at the end of the 80s he studied at the institute at the military department, our teacher major said: during the exercises they presented to the command the Automated Command and Control System (ASUV). One of the generals, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, asks - Can I use obscene language to your troops? No comrade general can not. - Yes, on X ..... I tell you this your system !!!

[Andreas]

Quote: alicante11

However, the arguments would not hurt ...

1. The first network-centric war (also known as the Second Iraqi War) included the following set of actions by American troops:
- planned aerial missile attacks on the air defense and air forces of Iraq (on previously identified targets), the result is 100%;
- operational air strikes on the columns of Iraqi troops on the march (on the sighting of the Boeing E-8A / C J-Stars AWACS), the result is 100%;
- planned air strikes on Iraqi armored vehicles in the field positions of Iraqis in the offensive zone (according to aerial photographs), the result is 20%;
- operational completion of Iraqi armored vehicles from tank guns at field positions in the offensive zone (according to the thermal imaging sights of tanks and UAV thermal imagers), the result is 100%;
- operational battle with the help of MLRS against Iraqi artillery batteries (according to the radar), the result is 100%;
- planned air strikes on the city of Baghdad (potential defense nodes) along the offensive route to the city center (according to aerial photographs), the result is 100%;
- operational air strikes on the accumulations of Iraqi troops on the streets of Baghdad before they begin to launch counterattacks (according to UAV thermal imagers), the result is 100%.

All that is planned, in principle, can be done by the Russian Armed Forces. All that is operational is only the US Armed Forces, since this requires continuous high-quality reconnaissance over the entire operational depth of enemy defense (300-500 km). In 2003, this kind of reconnaissance was conducted by Boeing E-8A / C J-Stars AWACS aircraft and, in part, by a few American UAVs. Now, for this purpose, AWACS universal aircraft and numerous UAVs are used.
Plus, a very developed communication network and computer network for online processing of video, heat and radar information.
Plus, as Lesnik quite rightly noted, every infantryman connected to the communication network serves as a source of intelligence.
As a result, the platoon commander, even before approaching the enemy's positions, on the terminal already illuminates all firing points - targets for defeat. Similarly, the higher command has real-time information about the enemy's movement (transfer of forces, accumulation for counterattacks, etc., etc.). Those. there is no "fog of war" for Americans.

2. The Americans deliberately focused on the assault on the center of defense of Iraq - the city of Baghdad, bypassing other fortified areas on its way to it. It is as if the Germans in 1941 were able to bypass Minsk, Kiev and other cities and immediately begin to storm Moscow (naturally, while ensuring control over their communications).
Therefore, the Americans did not bother with the assault on Basra and other Iraqi cities.
But if such a task stood, they would have acted standardly - demolishing urban areas along the offensive direction, introducing infantry assault groups as combat reconnaissance, delivering 900-kg bombs with laser-guided bombs to surviving firing points (i.e. buildings where they are located).
The assault on Baghdad was facilitated by the presence of wide thoroughfares, separated from urban development and leading to the city center. However, American aviation and artillery thoroughly ironed the Iraqi field defensive positions on the approach to Baghdad.

[alicante11]

- operational air strikes on the columns of Iraqi troops on the march (on the sighting of the Boeing E-8A / C J-Stars AWACS), the result is 100%;

And what, with a simple communication system without a "military Internet", target designation for the aircraft cannot be received from the AWACS aircraft?

- operational completion of Iraqi armored vehicles from tank guns at field positions in the offensive zone (according to the thermal imaging sights of tanks and UAV thermal imagers), the result is 100%;

Moreover, according to the results of the information from its thermal imager, the tank cannot fire without a computer? However, he probably means that the tank with a thermal imager acted as a spotter. But weren't spotters active before the advent of the "war internet"?

- operational battle with the help of MLRS against Iraqi artillery batteries (according to the radar), the result is 100%;

Actually, as far as I understand, these actions are being worked out for themselves. True, I do not remember what the results were when exposed to Georgian artillery and MLRS. I remember that someone was pierced. But I don’t remember who either pilots or gunners.

- operational air strikes on the accumulations of Iraqi troops on the streets of Baghdad before they begin to launch counterattacks (according to UAV thermal imagers), the result is 100%.

Reconnaissance and adjustments, as I said before, may well be carried out with the help of "previous generation" communications, the main thing is that it works and is protected from electronic warfare. In general, the Germans did it very well in 1941.

All that is planned, in principle, can be done by the Russian Armed Forces. All that is operational is only the US Armed Forces, since this requires continuous high-quality reconnaissance over the entire operational depth of enemy defense (300-500 km). In 2003, this kind of reconnaissance was conducted by Boeing E-8A / C J-Stars AWACS aircraft and, in part, by a few American UAVs. Now, for this purpose, AWACS universal aircraft and numerous UAVs are used.

I beg to differ. We can do all this too. Just for this you need to organize the interaction of the troops. In the situation in which the Americans were against Iraq, we would have worked no worse. But in a war with an equal enemy, it is unlikely that Amers will be able to work out in this way. Since our Air Force and Air Defense, unlike the Iraqi, will not allow the AWACSM to calmly examine our positions. And in conditions of data shortage, this system will only be harmful.

[Andreas]

1. Aircraft AWACS E-3 with the help of automation and digital communication channels simultaneously gives target designation to 100 tactical and fighter aircraft with a staff of 19 people (in two shifts).
With simple (voice) communication, it will be necessary to place at least 200 operators on board.

2. Network-centric technology (early detection and operational reporting in the form of tactical signs on an electronic map with exact coordinates) was used to ensure situational awareness of American tankers while still approaching the defensive positions of Iraqis (beyond the scope of thermal imaging sights).
This allowed tankers to attack the enemy’s defenses not from the forehead (where they were waiting for), but from the flank or rear.
Mention of the method of aiming tankers is given as a confession that the war was not limited to aviation and most enemy armored vehicles in prepared positions were destroyed by ground troops.

3. Mention of the use of MLRS in counter-abbreviation is also given as an explanation of the land combat fighter in this case too. Network-centricity manifested itself in the rapid transmission of the digital coordinates of the enemy’s batteries over the network to the SLA of the MLRS.

4. The reconnaissance and adjustment of fire certainly work by voice. That's only on the digital network, they work several times faster. As a result, the enemy is struck even before he can fire a second or third shot.

5. Your hypothetical option - the war of Russia against Iraq of the 2003 model is accepted. Of course, Russia could defeat Iraq by conducting military operations in accordance with the concept of a deep operation.
The predicted result of such a war is the number of those killed by the attacking side and the time of the operation will increase by one or two orders of magnitude.
The reason is the inability to organize the interaction of troops based on voice communications at the same level of efficiency that is achieved with digital communications in a network-centric warfare.

[alicante11]

As a result, the platoon commander, even before approaching the enemy's positions, on the terminal already illuminates all firing points - targets for defeat. Similarly, the higher command has real-time information about the enemy's movement (transfer of forces, accumulation for counterattacks, etc., etc.). Those. there is no "fog of war" for Americans.

This is advertising. Think of the dust storm and the "siege" of Baghdad. If everything would be so good, then why would amers stop because of the impossibility to act by air reconnaissance. In fact, in order to transmit information from each infantryman, the system must either be implanted into his brain, distinguishing the images that he sees, or the infantryman must speak the language of the machine, or the machine must understand the infantryman's speech (and the "voice acting" of the battle slightly different from speech input in voice recognition programs). For some reason, I doubt that each of the three options is feasible anytime soon.

2. The Americans deliberately focused on the assault on the center of defense of Iraq - the city of Baghdad, bypassing other fortified areas on its way to it. It is as if the Germans in 1941 were able to bypass Minsk, Kiev and other cities and immediately begin to storm Moscow (naturally, while ensuring control over their communications).
Therefore, the Americans did not bother with the assault on Basra and other Iraqi cities.

The Americans COULD not "bother", but the Germans could not. Because the Red Army counterattacked constantly, and the Iraqis were pinned to the ground by the overwhelming superiority of enemy aircraft. And the Germans could not even leave Kiev on their flank and diverted tank groups from Army Group Center to provide the flanks with offensive encirclement operations, instead of rushing further towards Moscow. the Americans were much freer in this respect.

But if such a task stood, they would have acted standardly - demolishing urban areas along the offensive direction, introducing infantry assault groups as combat reconnaissance, delivering 900-kg bombs with laser-guided bombs to surviving firing points (i.e. buildings where they are located).

ours in Grozny and the Germans in Stalingrad also acted in a "standard" way. However, the results are not impressive.

The assault on Baghdad was facilitated by the presence of wide thoroughfares, separated from urban development and leading to the city center. However, American aviation and artillery thoroughly ironed the Iraqi field defensive positions on the approach to Baghdad.

I completely agree with this. About which I said that Baghdad was poorly applied to the defense, it was supposed to defend it with counterattacks, which in the conditions of the domination of enemy aviation is not always possible. Especially in fast-paced environments.

[Andreas]

1. The Americans suspended the attack for three days during a dust storm, and also several times 2-3 hours for interruptions in the communication system. But the rest of the time, they came at a pace that more than compensated for all the costs of the network-centric technology that was new at that time.
The speed of overcoming field defensive positions and the surprisingly low losses of advancing (!) Americans killed (of the order of 200 people) compared to the losses of Iraqis (of the order of 10000 people) clearly confirm the statements of the first about the exhaustive nature of situational awareness (using FCBC2 automated control systems).

3. We in Grozny and the Germans in Stalingrad did not have an American high-precision weapon - 900-kg laser-guided bombs.
The Americans used their infantry in Baghdad in battle reconnaissance mode (with the subsequent erasing of the dust of urban buildings), and did not throw in the cleaning of buildings as assault groups, following the example of the Germans or Russians.

4. The master plan for the development of Baghdad included wide city highways, separated by green stripes from roadside buildings. At the same time, highways led directly to the city center. For defense, such a building is not well adapted.
However, on the outskirts of the city, fortifications were erected in full. Nevertheless, the Americans quickly and without loss broke through, because they relied on intelligence and fired outside the enemy’s weapons.
It is not their "fault" that the Iraqi command has placed the country's defense center in a city with wide highways.

[alicante11]

1. The Americans suspended the attack for three days during a dust storm, and also several times 2-3 hours for interruptions in the communication system. But the rest of the time, they came at a pace that more than compensated for all the costs of the network-centric technology that was new at that time.

No, well, you say that everything is captured there, both vertically and horizontally, and each soldier is a provider of information. What then did the weather prevent, did the soldiers still supply information?

The speed of overcoming field defensive positions and the surprisingly low losses of advancing (!) Americans killed (of the order of 200 people) compared to the losses of Iraqis (of the order of 10000 people) clearly confirm the statements of the first about the exhaustive nature of situational awareness (using FCBC2 automated control systems).

Damn, how much can one and the same thing? This is the result of unchallenged air supremacy, which allowed reconnaissance to the full depth of the Iraqi battle formation. It will not work against us. Our Air Force and Air Defense simply will not allow this.

3. We in Grozny and the Germans in Stalingrad did not have an American high-precision weapon - 900-kg laser-guided bombs.
The Americans used their infantry in Baghdad in battle reconnaissance mode (followed by the erasure of the dust of urban buildings)

The Germans did not have an overwhelming advantage in aviation in Stalingrad. And in Grozny, the militants used the tactics of small maneuverable groups, which are very poorly suppressed by aviation precisely because of their mobility and small size. Although, during the second campaign, the interaction between the infantry, aviation and infantry and artillery was quite on the level.

rather than throwing them at cleaning buildings as assault groups, following the example of Germans or Russians.

Have you read anything here besides this article? Well, there were articles about the first and second Chechen. Why carry frank delirium?

4. The master plan for the development of Baghdad included wide city highways, separated by green stripes from roadside buildings. At the same time, highways led directly to the city center. For defense, such a building is not well adapted.

What I had the honor to talk about.

It is not their "fault" that the Iraqi command has placed the country's defense center in a city with wide highways.

And what does it have to do with it?

However, on the outskirts of the city, fortifications were erected in full. Nevertheless, the Americans quickly and without loss broke through, because they relied on intelligence and fired outside the enemy’s weapons.

Something I remember is that these very "field fortifications" were not there, at least where the Americans were advancing, i.e. bypassing. That is why the Iraqis were forced to take counterattacks, and with the transfer of forces, during which they suffered.

[Andreas]

For alicante11 (4)

3. One of the main effects of network-centricity is the territorial distribution of the communication and control system, i.e. the possibility of autonomous warfare by individual units in case of failure of higher command posts.
As the experience of the war in Iraq showed, the advancing ones are active until they receive intelligence information about the enemy. At the same time, the source of information (own UAV or a group aircraft AWACS) is absolutely not important.

4. The SDI program was never implemented, and therefore it is a "horror story".
The concept of Network Centric Warfare is fully implemented in communication systems, computer technology, operational tactical techniques and draws on the experience of the Iraq war. Therefore, network-centricity is a reality.

[alicante11]

3. One of the main effects of network-centricity is the territorial distribution of the communication and control system, i.e. the possibility of autonomous warfare by individual units in case of failure of higher command posts.

Again, we remember the "dust storm" and understand that we have believed in the American advertising. The point is that if at least one link is cut off from this system, the "fog of war" will thicken. in this place. So the more command or route information points fail. the more poor the information of the system will be and the more useless.

As the experience of the war in Iraq showed, the advancing ones are active until they receive intelligence information about the enemy. At the same time, the source of information (own UAV or a group aircraft AWACS) is absolutely not important

This is bad. Because until they deal with the next "storm", they will receive a counterattack for which they will not be ready.

[Andreas]

1. The first network-centric war took place in Iraq. The intelligence processing center was unified (located in Kuwait).
To date, a decentralized approach to the collection, processing and distribution of intelligence has been implemented. Therefore, the dust storm in one area of ​​the military operation now does not affect the situational awareness in other areas.
The redundancy of the communication network and computer technology is multiple, so the failure of their parts will also not affect situational awareness.

2. As the experience of the storming of Baghdad in the 2003 year showed, a dust storm equally affected the advancing and defending ones - both sides stopped active operations for three days.
True, American aviation even in this situation continued to strike at key buildings with known coordinates.

[alicante11]

1. The first network-centric war took place in Iraq. The intelligence processing center was unified (located in Kuwait).
To date, a decentralized approach to the collection, processing and distribution of intelligence has been implemented. Therefore, the dust storm in one area of ​​the military operation now does not affect the situational awareness in other areas.

Yes, you sho? How is this so? In fact, the Americans stood up due to the lack of intelligence that the aircraft could not provide. but not at all due to lack of communication.

The redundancy of the communication network and computer technology is multiple, so the failure of their parts will also not affect situational awareness.

Reservation is good. That's just how they will reserve the knocked out AWACS and UAVs.

2. As the experience of the storming of Baghdad in the 2003 year showed, a dust storm equally affected the advancing and defending ones - both sides stopped active operations for three days.
True, American aviation even in this situation continued to strike at key buildings with known coordinates.

Well, what does it have to do with it? The Iraqis did not have this super-duper system. And she did not help amers in this situation ... So it’s worthless for such a "cart".

[Andreas]

The first network-centric war took place 10 years ago.

Now the US Army is driven by HART - a distributed communications and computer network (redundant by definition).

Since 2014, it is planned to switch to Digital Battle Field technology (digital battlefield), which does not need constant radar or laser illumination.

[alicante11]

Yes, let it rule what it wants. I ask again, how are they going to reserve the downed AWACS and reconnaissance UAVs? Waddles will not tear?

[Andreas]

It is impossible to shoot down AWACS - it is covered by air defense and missile defense systems.

American UAVs can be shot down, but no more than 1 / 5 of the total - after that the entire supply of anti-aircraft missiles will run out.

[alicante11]

It is impossible to shoot down AWACS - it is covered by air defense and missile defense systems.

And air defense and missile defense systems can also be destroyed. And then bring down AWACS.

American UAVs can be shot down, but no more than 1 / 5 of the total - after that the entire supply of anti-aircraft missiles will run out.

And can you find out where such accurate calculations come from? Well, well, UAVs from amers 5 thousand you said. And we get only a thousand missiles, and what about both the air defense systems and the airplanes? Rave, dear.

[Andreas]

Quote: Blackgrifon

it’s no secret that Iraqis left their positions after a certain fee

Until April 8, 2003 (the day the Americans seized the government quarter of Baghdad and Saddam Hussein moved to Tikrit) there were no cases of betrayal by Iraqi troops, especially the Republican guards who defended Baghdad.

The reasons:
- An effective Iraqi state security service, which until the last moment controlled the entire generals;
- personal loyalty of Iraqi generals and their family ties with Saddam Hussein, primarily in the Republican Guard;
- the patriotism of the Iraqi command staff (most, from the platoon level to the brigade level, died in the enemy offensive zone).

The mass transition of the Iraqi generals to the enemy’s side began only on April 9, 2003 after unsuccessful nightly attempts to drive the Americans out of the government quarter of Baghdad and lost contact with the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces, Saddam Hussein, who moved to Tikrit and stopped contacting.

[Blackgrifon]

Yes, BUT where was the Iraqi aviation. Andreas, the Iraqi Air Force had a lot of experienced pilots and a good quality composition, and yet, not a single plane or helicopter was lifted into the air.

[Lesnik]

Irkutsk buried them in the sand and the Americans then dug them

[Blackgrifon]

Is this an example of proper use of the air force? Moreover, the same ones as the Iraqi Mi-24s had quite a few victories over the Iranian cobras and a couple of years before the Iraq campaign one of the attack aircraft was shot down.

[Andreas]

Iraqi aviation was buried in the sand by order of Saddam Hussein, bribery in this case is excluded.

Hussein proceeded from objective reality:
- numerical superiority of the enemy in aviation;
- lower technical level of Iraqi aviation;
- the lack of target designation and control type AWACS;
- lack of long-range air-to-air missiles.

In addition, Hussein was guided by his own plan to exhaust the enemy in urban battles in order to win the war and save aviation for the post-war period.

[alicante11]

Actually, it was Saddam who had AWACS. Self-made on the basis of IL-76. Together with 29 MiGs, he dumped the Iraqi defeat field into Iran. And the rest - yes, it was the case. Plus, do not forget the very poor technical condition of the fleet. Since during the sanctions there were no normal deliveries of salary.

In addition, Hussein was guided by his own plan to exhaust the enemy in urban battles in order to win the war and save aviation for the post-war period.

I do not think Saddam was hoping to win the war. Not so.

[Blackgrifon]

Quote: Andreas

Hussein proceeded from objective reality

Andreas! I didn’t understand something - how did he expect to defeat a stronger opponent without the Air Force? In Yugoslavia, in conditions of significantly more massive use of the NATO Air Force, the Serbs actively used their planes and helicopters.

[Andreas]

Exhaust the enemy with the help of ground forces during the assault on fortified areas (on the outskirts of cities) and the cities themselves (in dense buildings), extend military operations for several months, inflict the greatest possible damage to the Americans (whose compatriots are very sensitive to the numbers of those killed), incur their losses among civilians and then ask for support from Arab, Muslim and world public opinion with a request for help in stopping the aggression.

[Witold]

Quote: Blackgrifon

More than:
- a morally weak adversary (it is no secret that the Iraqis left their positions after a certain fee);

Russian checkpoints, military units and command also left their positions after a certain fee in Chechnya.

[Lesnik]

Yes, it is likely that it was so, but is it really a pleasure for you?

[Xroft]

You do not see the flag of this wonderful user?) Read the comments of people with this flag ...

[Blackgrifon]

Quote: Vitold

after a fee in Chechnya

In the first campaign? And what's new - the country has betrayed its army and its people, but, nevertheless, in the end we won.

[aszzz888]

A.V. Suvorov began writing his treatises "The Science of Victory". It’s me that you want peace, prepare for war.
And in terms of a scientific approach, without fail.

[SkiF_RnD]

You read the comments and you wonder ...
quote "Everything that is planned, in principle, can be carried out by the Russian Armed Forces. Everything that is operational, only the US Armed Forces, since this requires continuous high-quality reconnaissance to the entire operational depth of enemy defense (300-500 km)" end of the quote.

quote "Further, I hope that it is no secret for you that AWACS aircraft should not enter the zone of destruction of enemy air defense systems." end of quote.

Wake up, you, what is it all about? What are 300-500 km? US aviation completely dominated the entire territory of Iraq and could in advance, within a few days, to obtain the full and most relevant data on the current location of all the goals of interest.
Despite the author's request not to overestimate the role of US air supremacy, the truth lies precisely in this very superiority. The Americans have implemented their vaunted concept on the scale of Iraq, and under no circumstances will they succeed in attacking a more serious adversary. How can we not overestimate aviation, if it was she who gave the advancing troops almost all the intelligence? Is it not obvious that it was not so much the coordination of their own actions that brought the mattress mates victory, but the fact that they saw "all the cards in the hands" of the Iraqis? A well-coordinated attack may be better than the old "deep operation", but it will not even give such an effect if the UAVs burn up on approach, shot down by the army air defense, the nose turntables are not exposed under the Tungusok fire, and long-range aircraft will only be able to fly over their own territory , illuminating the edge of the defense of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, stretching hundreds of kilometers into the interior of the country. Yes, if AWACS begins to fly "in safety", over its own, then there will be little sense from it, but at the same time it will reveal itself and receive a missile from some S-400 or MiG-31BM. What kind of "network centric" will the United States sing about then? Moreover, given the volume of intelligence, given the size of Russia.
Many who read, succumbing to the author's stories about the new "miracle weapon", clearly overestimated the importance of the subject of the article. After all, the correct conclusion from the material I read about the war in Iraq is that the greatest effect in the 2003 war was given by undivided air supremacy. The rest is secondary. The "network" accelerated the outcome, optimized costs and combat losses, it is needed, it is a promising direction for development, but it does not in any way replace superiority over the enemy in such components of the Armed Forces as the air defense force, air force, armored vehicles, and so on. Without the Network, victory was possible. Despite all the calculations and comparisons, the weapons of Iraq cannot be equated with the weapons of the coalition. There were "Scuds", but where to beat them? There were tanks, but 1st and 2nd generation. There were planes, but ... And so on. Geography, finally. Iraq had no way of responding, or hitting London or Washington. And Iraq itself is in full view. Excellence was achieved in all respects, what credit can we talk about "NCW"?
Dear author, you are misleading people!

[Abracadabra]

As if the situation with the Russian Air Force is much better? In the state in which the RA today, the situation will not differ much from the situation in Iraq. I’m afraid that if Russia tries to catch up with the US / NATO on technical equipment, it will simply go bankrupt, even if officials stop stealing .. Moreover, it’s not only money, but it will also be necessary to find an army of engineers, high-tech factories, and so on. now it’s just not in the right quantities and qualities .. In addition to the technical advantage, there is also a significant advantage in training, from infantry and tank crews to pilots. Readiness checks at the end of 2012 and this year revealed huge problems, both in technical and in terms of training.

AWACS see targets from 50 cm at distances up to 550 km, so they do not fly over enemy territory. In general, today's NATO intelligence system is not limited to aviation alone. Everyone who takes part has their own tablet and already in the course of hostilities, intelligence, etc. enough to poke a finger and enter information (fortified area, tank ..), how all this, all the way to the main staff, can be seen in real time and in a few minutes, maybe even seconds, some shell, ATGM, helicopter, etc. will already fly there. d ... And against Tungusok, countermeasures have long been conceived for a long time, until Apache Block III no longer reaches n.p.

In general, it is hard to believe that the Americans / NATO will someday fight with Russia, even if Russia finally falls into an Asian-type dictatorship .. Because during the Soviet era, the communist ideology posed a particular danger, but now there is no ideology. But if this happens, IMHO, then only in two cases, in the event of a civil war in Russia itself, in the country where nuclear weapons are stored. Anarchy and loss of control in a country with nuclear weapons is a wild horror for not only the West .. And such a scenario, in a country where all "stability" together with the economy depends on "stable" oil and gas prices and where the notorious vertical power structure reigns will quite happen ... In this case, the initial and most important goal will be to prevent nuclear weapons from creeping anywhere. Or if suddenly the obscurantists in the Kremlin decide to annex by force some former republic of the USSR, Ukraine, Belarus, or their parts by force. It’s scary to imagine how the actions will develop then .... But for now, the entire Puteni "elite", in spite of its anti-Western, anti-American propaganda, is happy to arrange life there, in the decaying West, that is, transfers there "earned" families buys real estate, while they are tolerated in the west, nothing is confiscated, no war with the west will be and is not foreseen .. Except that chatter through zombokanals to keep people in good shape .. But China looks at weak Russia like a scavenger at a sick beast!

P.S. By the way, the Americans have already tested 2 or 3 times the orbital platform, I don’t remember the name XM37 like. As planned, this device should fly to anywhere in the world and at a speed of about 9000 km / h to 40 km or 200-600 km from above with 2-meter tungsten arrows, which in turn due to fast speed, about 10km / s will be able to overcome any air defense and have a powerful destructive force, only due to kinetics. If such a system is adopted in service, any modern, or even promising air defense system will lose its effectiveness. Now of course there is no such system, but the project has long been beyond the scope of plans, it is really being brought to mind. That's it..

[Lesnik]

Accepting your logic, having won air superiority, the US Armed Forces might not have conducted a ground operation since the enemy surrendered himself
I advise once again to clarify the nomenclature of weapons at least by means of air defense of Iraq.
And let me remind you that the Iraqi 9M77s worked quite well for almost all the neighbors, and as the special forces and aviation didn’t press them, they didn’t crush them, I hope this is an argument for you
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Pentagon/fig2.gif
And no matter how sophisticated the US Air Force was without a simple platoon, Joni, this operation loses its meaning.
Just following your logic, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation need only the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Air Defense.
Indeed, why do we need other types of troops if wars are won by the Strategic Missile Forces
And by means of obtaining intelligence, then deep intelligence groups grazed there long before the start of the active phase of the operation.



and finally I would like more information and not imotions

[alicante11]

Accepting your logic, having won air superiority, the US Armed Forces might not have conducted a ground operation since the enemy surrendered himself

Well, in Yugoslavia it happened. The Iraqis turned out to be slightly more stony eggs than the Serbs.

Just following your logic, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation need only the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Air Defense.

You misunderstand this logic. Without the "platoon Vanyusha" we are nowhere. But without communication in social networks during the battle, he will somehow survive :).

And by means of obtaining intelligence, then deep intelligence groups grazed there long before the start of the active phase of the operation.

In-in, here it is one of the secrets of network-centricity :).

[Lesnik]

No oil was found in Yugoslavia.
And about "social networks" then as far as I know there are several of them in this complex

[alicante11]

No oil was found in Yugoslavia

So what? Milosevic still worked on a par with Saddam. Only without a land campaign.

[Andreas]

We are talking about this - in Yugoslavia (more precisely, Serbia), Network Centric Warfire technology was not used.

It is incorrect to compare small Serbia (7 million people, 88 thousand square kilometers) with large Iraq (31 million people, 437 thousand square kilometers), stuffed with clogged armored vehicles, airplanes, air defense and tactical missiles.

[alicante11]

Yes, that’s just the point, in Yugoslavia the Americans managed without any computer stuff. Only on one air superiority.

It is incorrect to compare small Serbia (7 million people, 88 thousand square kilometers) with large Iraq (31 million people, 437 thousand square kilometers), stuffed with clogged armored vehicles, airplanes, air defense and tactical missiles.

And why something wrong? Show me examples of Iraq’s use of air defense (which was jam-packed, and not only with equipment, but also with bookmarks for imported equipment and failed due to the lack of spare parts) and the results of using OTP? But the small Serbs, for example, 117 th shot down stealth. But there was no land campaign in Serbia, so the tanks had nothing to do with it.

[SkiF_RnD]

By my logic, "network centrika" does not replace superiority in air defense, air force, armored vehicles, and so on. I wrote about it. There is no Strategic Missile Forces here at all. It's about a conventional conflict. BTV are armored troops, just in case.
Sincerely.

[Andreas]

Quote: SkiF_RnD

US aviation completely dominated the entire territory of Iraq and could in advance, within a few days, to obtain the full and most relevant data on the current location of all the goals of interest.
Despite the author’s request not to overestimate the role of US supremacy in the air, the truth lies precisely in this very superiority. The Americans realized their vaunted conception on the scale of Iraq, and in no case will they succeed in attacking a more serious opponent

AWACS "sees" at 500 km, the S-300's firing distance is 150 km. In total, 350 km of safe control of the enemy's rear both in the air and on the ground.

The field defensive positions of Iraqi forces were hit by air strikes in only 20 percent of cases. The rest was finished off by ground forces (tanks, artillery, MLRS).

The great honor of American UAVs (over 5000 from 7400) is in the state of the ground forces.

In 2003, direct air support for the American ground units during the assault on fortified areas (primarily located in the city limits) was the dropping of guided bombs from the sides of the B-52 strategic bombers, which performed the role of improvised carrier platforms. After 10 years, the place of bombers was taken by MLRS MLRS with guided missiles with a firing range of up to 300 km.

[alicante11]

"sees" at 500 km, the firing distance of the S-300 is 150 km. In total, 350 km of safe control of the enemy's rear both in the air and on the ground.

At 500km, AWACS sees in the air. On Earth - on 300. And the range of the latest C-300 modifications for such high-flying objects is also not 150km.
Well, you still ignored the presence of interceptors.

The great honor of American UAVs (over 5000 from 7400) is in the state of the ground forces.

That's just the Iranians have shown perfectly that these wunderwaffles can be disavowed by a mere interception of control.

After 10 years, the MLRS MLRS with guided missiles with a firing range of up to 300 km took the place of bombers.

Well, so we have MLRS. So what?

[Andreas]

1. Even if you take your figure of 300 km (figures from 425 to 500 km are given on the Internet), all the same, the AWACS plane illuminates the territory of the enemy 150 km in depth, while remaining 150 km away from the front line. I doubt anyone will deploy the S-300 (with a range of 150 km) directly on the front line.
Again, according to open sources, the S-150 complex missile, which has not reached the test stage, has a firing range of more than 400 km.
In any case, S-400 anti-aircraft missiles and air-to-air missiles launched from fighter-interceptors can in turn be intercepted by missiles from the ABM system covering the AWACS patrol area.

2. Since 2001, the American UAVs have performed hundreds of flights over Iran, control take-off was only in isolated cases.

3. The transition to long-range MLRS reduces the share of the air component in a network-centric warfare.

[alicante11]

In any case, S-400 anti-aircraft missiles and air-to-air missiles launched from fighter-interceptors can in turn be intercepted by missiles from the ABM system covering the AWACS patrol area.

You see, the situation is not so simple. Our military is not "suckers". If necessary, a combined operation can be carried out to destroy the enemy reconnaissance component, say, to cover the deployment of counterattacking troops or accumulate troops for an attack, or to ensure a retreat. In any case, in such an operation, various types of aircraft can be involved, air defense systems of different ranges, both belonging to the Air Force and the Ground Force. The operation may include strikes on the positions of the air defense missile systems covering AWACS aircraft, on enemy airfields, attacks by patrols and covering enemy air forces in the air. Electronic warfare means can be used. In general, by using this system against us, the Americans are putting themselves in the position of the defender, spending unnecessary resources with an unclear result, since we will have the initiative in such actions.
I do not deny the usefulness of the various links in this chain. Even a global exchange of military information network can be built. I am against tying troops on it. Since I show the vulnerability of this system. And, given its complexity and cost, we do not need it yet. We do not have a printing press and a lot of fat oligarchs. Therefore, to build a combat-ready army, we should not scatter the available modest resources, but rather create well-developed and balanced armed forces, without being carried away by those tasks that give a guaranteed result.

2. Since 2001, the American UAVs have performed hundreds of flights over Iran, control take-off was only in isolated cases.

Firstly, dashing trouble began, and secondly, do not compare our and Iranian capabilities.

3. The transition to long-range MLRS reduces the share of the air component in a network-centric warfare.

Well, we have it all too. Therefore, hgbveotcndf amers MLRS do not give.

[Andreas]

At the moment, only troops using Network Centric Warfire technology can be well-developed and balanced aircraft (in simple terms - fewer tanks, more communications and computers).

All other solutions (such as more modernized T-72s and new "Armata" for voice communication) against the background of the US Army look like exhausted / balanced Kazan Tatars (with bows) against the background of the troops of Ivan the Terrible (with beepers).

Based on the example of the First Network-Centric War, it is clear that any "combined" (non-nuclear) operation of the Russian army will be suppressed even at the stage of preparation, since it will be recognized in advance by the enemy (NCW technology) and will be suppressed by high-precision weapons.

[alicante11]

At the moment, only troops using Network Centric Warfire technology can be well-developed and balanced aircraft (in simple terms - fewer tanks, more communications and computers).

In the root is not true. I showed enough reasons. They can be reduced to the main postulate - the system is too vulnerable to enemy influence, which does not allow it to give systemic superiority.

All other solutions (such as more modernized T-72s and new "Armata" for voice communication) against the background of the US Army look like spent / balanced Kazan Tatars (with bows) against the background of the troops of Ivan the Terrible (with beepers)

And I would remind you of such a battle - as "The Night of Sorrow" - the flight of the Spaniards, who were armed with guns and arquebus from Tennochtitlan, whose guilt did not even know the iron.

Based on the example of the First Network-Centric War, it is clear that any "combined" (non-nuclear) operation of the Russian army will be suppressed even at the stage of preparation, since it will be recognized in advance by the enemy (NCW technology) and will be suppressed by high-precision weapons.

The example of the first network-centric war does not show anything, since there was no real opposition to the "network-centrics", here I would just cite as an example to you in response - the shooting by the Japanese of BrBo Admiral Ushakov, who could not even reach the enemy from his shot guns, whereas "on paper" it looked quite menacing against them. We have the opportunity to provide such opposition. And so I would compare the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces to the NATO Armed Forces, as the capabilities of the 1st or 2nd TOE separately against the Japanese Joint Fleet.

[Andreas]

The NCW concept contains an innovative idea - its implementers "shine" through their opponent and disarm him with a preemptive strike at the preparatory stage.

Therefore, any historical analogies with respect to the NCW are not true.

[alicante11]

Yes, this "innovative" concept is as old as wars between people. It is called intelligence. It's just that there are different intelligence tools at different stages in the history of wars.

[SkiF_RnD]

The fact of the matter is that in Iraq the Americans "saw" everything. Not 150 kilometers. All of Iraq. This is a major difference. If you look at that eighth part of the land on which is ... Hmm. Nevermind. 150 km is one and the same as the entire airspace of Russia, apparently.
By the way, we have such a thing ... The MiG-31 is called. He has interesting opportunities to attack just such "radars". The big question is who will be the first to shoot down whom. In general, Iraq, this is not Russia. Sincerely.

[SkiF_RnD]

MLRS did not take the place of the B-52, I ask you, stop it. Sincerely.

[Andreas]

Quote: SkiF_RnD

UAVs burn up on approach, shot down by army air defense

The cost of a Raven UAV with a 5 km flight ceiling is 300 thousand US dollars (and is decreasing all the time). The cost of an anti-aircraft missile of the army air defense is over 300 thousand dollars (and is increasing all the time).
The number of UAVs Raven - 5000 units, the number of anti-aircraft missiles - hundreds of units.
After an hour of shooting, the army’s air defense will be completely disarmed, while more than 4000 UAVs will still hang in the air.

[alicante11]

And what difference does it make how much the UAV costs if it does not transmit information? The Jews, however, built an "iron kumpol", a shot of which costs more than the value of the targets it hits.

[Andreas]

The point of comparing the cost is that for the same amount of funding you can build more UAVs than anti-aircraft missiles.
Therefore, in the event of a war of attrition within a few hours, the air defense system will be completely disarmed by running out of stock of missiles, even if it is not retaliated.
The remaining UAVs will ensure the collection and transmission of intelligence.

[alicante11]

UAVs can be destroyed not only by air defense systems (not necessarily S-300, Buk is enough). High-altitude UAVs can be destroyed by aircraft, and low-flying ones - by MANPADS. I don't understand why come up with problems that have been solved a long time ago? Can you imagine what an opportunity to drink the dough this system will give, the parameters and purpose of which no one here understands. And, therefore, it will be impossible to react to this "drank" even in the style of "Vasilievsky".
I repeat once again. If we had extra money, then this system would not hurt us if we did not tie a strong army to it, but use it as an auxiliary. But due to the inability to be rich and healthy, let's be at least poor and healthy.

[sivuch]

Is this hornet rocket worth so much?
5000 ravens, as I understand it, is at the disposal of the US Armed Forces? And who has hundreds of missiles?

[SkiF_RnD]

I doubt that the missiles of our air defense systems are so expensive. You do not think that the S-300 will bring down your ravens? Wasp for what? Arrows, Needles? These are UAVs, they are low-altitude.
And than. I wrote a post here. You answered it all the same. So in my post nothing is said about the strength of the armies. I didn’t try to count who had how much of what. I just spoke about the fact that the role of the subject of the article is greatly exaggerated, without comparing the number of "Tomahawks", UAVs and other garbage.
Sincerely.

[Andreas]

The ceiling of the Raven UAV is 5 km, the ceiling of the Igla MANPADS is 3,5 km.

In addition, the Raven UAV has no thermal signature, since it has an electric motor. The case is plastic, radiolucent. A small radio-reflecting surface (of the order of 0,01 sq. M) is possessed only by an electric motor, a battery and on-board equipment.

[SkiF_RnD]

I got acquainted with "this your" Raven.
Well, you know. I thought so. And what about Raven and the network-centric?
This is a toy, a radius of 10 km from the controller, a camera (normal or IR). Well, it does not give those fabulous advantages that are described in the article, and, yes, it is, of course, not useless, but all the benefits are manifested, first of all, in a local conflict of low intensity. "Ravens" patrol the surroundings, approaches to US military facilities. In the event of a full-scale "meat grinder", the United States will not be a monopolist in intercepting the initiative of the battle. After all, we have a lot of things in service, and these 5000 toy UAVs will cause "ours" a lot of trouble, here do not go to the fortuneteller, but pass them off as a key means of "network-centric" war, or, even more so as a factor "disarming" our air defense , to put it mildly, an exaggeration. Americans have much fewer more serious UAVs.

But what about our missiles, are you serious? Do you doubt whether we will have 5000 missiles? Given the number of aircraft in the US Air Force and the USSR, it is easy to guess that as early as the 80th ammunition for air defense systems was produced an order of magnitude more than the number of interest to you. Sincerely.

http://youtu.be/ShYmDO4WSoE

[Andreas]

Riven's chip in starting with hands and landing on the heels. Continuity of patrolling is ensured by the change of batteries at intervals of one hour. During this time, the UAV manages to fly 100 km.

A miniature thermal imager on a stabilized platform with a large magnification of an optoelectronic lens provides the necessary detail of images. The process of further miniaturization of video equipment with an increase in its resolution occurs annually.

5400 Raiden - this is 5400 companies / 1800 battalions / 600 brigades / 200 divisions, equipped with regular reconnaissance equipment at tactical depth.

In the near future, it is planned to use new batteries with a 10-fold increased capacity, switch to communication via relay UAVs and introduce software with artificial intelligence elements into the autopilot (including for performing anti-aircraft maneuvers) in order to refuse remote piloting.

Reaching 1000 km range / 500 km radius is already operational and tactical depth of reconnaissance.

And the implementation of network-centric technology, as always, is that Raidenov is a lot and they are all connected to a single reconnaissance and computing network, which allows you to on-line add up the whole picture of the tactical (operational-tactical) situation on the theater from a mosaic of several thousand streaming videos.

Plus heavier UAVs of the Predators type (360 units) for reconnaissance in strategic depth of defense and lighter ultra-modern UAVs weighing about 0,1 kg for reconnaissance directly on the battlefield (the potential number of which can be tens of thousands).

[sivuch]

Broken launchers of the Iraqi C-300 SAM
------------------------------------
If only they could tell where they got such grass ?!

[alicante11]

Here, too, I somehow doubtful. Where did they get C-300. More like a C-200 in a stationary version.

[Andreas]

You are right, in the photo of the S-200, judging by the search for Google images.

[sivuch]

[quote = Andreas] [/ quote]
AWACS "sees" at 500 km, the S-300's firing distance is 150 km. In total, 350 km of safe control of the enemy's rear both in the air and on the ground.
[/ Quote]
I’d like more about land control, in particular, why did the E-8 then.
PS
We accept by default that E-3 and E-8 are unbreakable

[Andreas]

The latest version of the Boeing E-3D Sentry AWACS equipped with AN / APY-2 radar and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System automated system allows you to monitor both airborne and ground targets http://www.warships.ru/england/Boeing_E-3D /BoeingSentry.htm

Aircraft AWACS Boeing E-8A / C J-Stars were used in the 2000s before the commissioning of the above version of the Boeing E-3D Sentry. A total of 18 E-8 aircraft were built
http://avia-museum.narod.ru/usa/boeing-e-8.html

PS By default, it is recommended to accept the cover of the barging area of ​​the AWACS aircraft using the ground-based missile defense system.

[sivuch]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/e-3-var.htm
Strange. Here they write that 3D is just an option for shaving. Maybe G?
And how can the missile defense system help? No, I understand that if ballistic missiles are used to naughty at avax, then you can’t do without it

[Andreas]

As for the modifications of D and G, I can only say one thing - the last letter follows the first, from this we can conclude that G is no worse in functionality than D.

The missile defense missiles in the mobile version (mounted on the destroyers of the US Navy) are designed to intercept ballistic missile warheads with a flight speed of about 7 km / s. Therefore, they may well intercept the anti-aircraft missile of the S-400 complex with a flight speed of 2,5 km / s, aimed at the AWACS aircraft.

[SkiF_RnD]

This statement is devoid of logic. Think for yourself, a maneuvering anti-aircraft missile requires a fundamentally different guidance algorithm than "ballistics" following a predicted trajectory.

[Andreas]

Missile defense missiles deployed on the US Navy's forward-based destroyers are designed, among other things, to intercept ballistic missiles in the active phase, i.e. the possibility of maneuvering is taken into account. And their energy is quite sufficient to intercept targets moving at a speed almost three times faster than the speed of S-400 missiles. At the same time, the S-400 missile is sharpened to intercept air targets. If she also performs "anti-missile" maneuvers, the firing range will drop to the level of the S-300 (which is not enough to shoot down AWACS).

As an ABACS missile defense, you can also use anti-satellite missiles suspended on F-15 fighters, which will make up the AWACS motorcade, similar to an aircraft carrier’s motorcade.

Another option is to include a cheap unmanned aerial vehicle with a simplified radar on board in the AWACS tuple. In the event of an attack by a S-400 missile, the AWACS is turned off for several minutes and goes away, the UAV takes a hit.

But from the point of view of the NCW concept, the most correct solution is to install long-range radars on board a large number of UAVs and place them in the air in the form of a multiple redundant network along the frontier / front line with the enemy.

[sivuch]

In short, E-3 does not detect any ground targets (surface and hovering helicopters can), at least they are now in service. However, for this topic, this is not essential -E-3 or E-8. Much more important is the presence of the enemy has an interference producer capable of covering his troops from surveillance radar

[Andreas]

If you believe the open sources of information, the latest modifications of the E-3 are also equipped with electronic intelligence systems - i.e. can determine the coordinates of jammers to direct guided missiles on them.

The flight time of a guided missile is several minutes; during this period, radar reconnaissance of targets will not be carried out.

[sivuch]

RTR stations, of course, have

[Old scoop]

All this is good against weak opponents who do not have countermeasures, for example Serbia. In Iraq, they simply bribed and intimidated by freezing the accounts of the generals and Co. What will a high-tech army do without its covered gadgets? Germany at the time of the attack on the USSR had the best army, the most advanced in technical terms. The bet was made on highly qualified pilots and tankers, high-tech equipment. As a result, they were ground easier to manufacture, and therefore more massive samples of technology.

[Lesnik]

Yeah, we’ll throw our hats

[alicante11]

No, not with hats, we'll just wage a normal war on the battlefield, not on social networks. "And this will win" (c), "Although it is unlikely" (c).

[Andreas]

It turned out to throw hats (bodies) with us in WWII, when the population of the USSR was twice the population of Germany.

As of 2013, the Russian population is 142 million people against 316 million people in the USA and 1363 million people in China.

[alicante11]

But this is already complete stupidity and even distortion.
First, the losses of the USSR in the war are comparable to the losses of Germany and its allies operating on the eastern front. Just do not bring me a slayer. Take for example Muller-Gilebrandt.
Secondly, Germany did not go to war with the USSR alone. Taking into account all the allies and the population of the occupied territories, which worked in the Stakhanov style for the benefit of the Wehrmacht (and, often, fought in its ranks or the SS troops), the USSR had no superiority in manpower.

As of 2013, the Russian population is 142 million people against 316 million people in the USA and 1363 million people in China.

In addition to the general figures, there is also the strategic position of the country. If you look at it, it turns out that NATO, in principle, cannot realize its superiority, since it does not have access to the border on a front wide enough for this.
Well, about China - do not make my slippers laugh. China is a paper dragon. A non-nuclear missile strike from strategic bombers on China's irrigation systems will lead to flooding and the death of several tens of millions of people, a complete collapse of communications in the most densely populated areas of China and, in the long term, starvation of several hundred million more Chinese. They need it ?!

[Andreas]

If for comparison we use Germany with the satellites, then on the opposite side we must take into account the military and industrial potential of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (including Canada, Australia and India). The proportion is not in favor of Germany will grow by an order of magnitude.

On 8 of July 2013, the pro-government Chinese newspaper Wenweipo published the article “Six wars in which China should participate in the next 50 years”, (the original article on ChinaNews.com, an English translation of the Midnight Express 2046 Hong Kong blog), Russian translation of an excerpt from the article :
“WAR SIX: RETURN OF LANDS FROM RUSSIA (YEARS 2055 - 2060).
Both countries are closely monitored by each other. Russia fears that the rise of China threatens its power, but China has never forgotten the possessions lost in favor of Russia. When the case turns up, China will return all the lost territories.
By 2050, after victories in the previous five wars, China will be able to make territorial claims on the basis of the domain of the Qin Dynasty (as in the war for the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia on the basis of the domain of the Republic of China) and conduct propaganda campaigns in support of such claims. Efforts must be made so that Russia breaks up again.
In the days of “Old China,” Russia seized 1,6 million square kilometers of land, which is equal to one sixth of the territory of present-day China. Thus, Russia is China’s worst enemy.
This requirement will lead to a war with Russia. Although by this time China will become the foremost military power in the field of aviation, Navy, ground and space forces, this will be the first war against a nuclear power. Therefore, China must be well prepared in the field of nuclear weapons and the possibility of a nuclear strike against Russia from the beginning to the end of the conflict.
When China deprives Russia of a retaliatory strike, Russia realizes that it cannot compete with China on the battlefield. They will only have to give up the occupied lands, paying a high price for their invasions. ”

[alicante11]

If for comparison we use Germany with the satellites, then on the opposite side we must take into account the military and industrial potential of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (including Canada, Australia and India). The proportion is not in favor of Germany will grow by an order of magnitude.

Stupidities say, it was about that we threw the Germans bodies. And I spoke about the losses of the Germans precisely on the eastern front. And about taking into account precisely those forces that participated in the battles on the eastern front.

On 8 of July 2013, the pro-government Chinese newspaper Wenweipo published the article “Six wars in which China should participate in the next 50 years”, (the original article on ChinaNews.com, an English translation of the Midnight Express 2046 Hong Kong blog), Russian translation of an excerpt from the article :

Yeah, exactly when they are preparing for war - they always shout about it at all crossroads.
However, I do not see in your link a description of the ways in which China intends to defeat Russia. "Eat something, he eat it, but who is he to give it ..." I did not speak about the "nuclear" strike. I was only talking about the use of strategists in non-nuclear equipment.
Are you aware of the development of communications in the Far East? You can’t tell how the Chinese will attack Komsomolsk if there are only two roads - highway and rail. In principle, there are no roads from Primorye to the northern regions of the Khabarovsk Territory. To the north of Blagoveshchensk there is only one railway to Tynda and to the west - one Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chita-Khabarovsk highway. So where are the Chinese to realize their notorious numerical advantage. Here we have 300 Spartans resting ...

[Andreas]

"Secondly, Germany did not fight the USSR alone. Taking into account all the allies and the population of the occupied territories, who worked in a Stakhanov way for the good of the Wehrmacht (and, often, fought in its ranks or in the SS troops), the USSR had no superiority in any way in manpower "- alicante11 (4), (Copyright).

The Chinese will strike in the Urals with the help of aviation and infantry, which crossed the Kazakh-Chinese border (there is a railway). Siberia and the Far East will go to them in the form of a prize.

[alicante11]

"Secondly, Germany did not fight the USSR alone. Taking into account all the allies and the population of the occupied territories, who worked in a Stakhanov way for the good of the Wehrmacht (and, often, fought in its ranks or in the SS troops), the USSR had no superiority in any way in manpower "- alicante11 (4), (Copyright).

And where is the contradiction? Romania, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia. Were they fighting against the Western allies? Or did the Czech Skoda factories produce submarines to sink American and British ships, and not at all self-propelled guns that plowed the leading edge of our positions? How did the Danes or the Belgians blame the Allies? In SS units, there were more than enough of them on our front. Well, perhaps the French set records for the repair of "wolf packs".

[Andreas]

In 1945, 40 percent of the ground forces and 2 / 3 of German aviation fought against the western allies of the USSR
http://www.infran.ru/vovenko/60years_ww2/demogr8_3.htm

[alicante11]

In 1945, 40 percent of the ground forces and 2 / 3 of German aviation fought against the western allies of the USSR
http://www.infran.ru/vovenko/60years_ww2/demogr8_3.htm

Sneaker is in 1945. Then we don’t care how much the Germans sent to the West there, all the same, they would have rolled everyone out. And from 1941 to 1944?

[Blackgrifon]

Quote: Andreas

In 1945 year

And in the period from 41 to mid 44, these allies sat on the islands. And in 45 on the Western Front, for the most part, there were not personnel divisions (there were few of them), but parts from reservists (German officers write about this directly).

[alicante11]

The Chinese will strike in the Urals with the help of aviation and infantry, which crossed the Kazakh-Chinese border (there is a railway). Siberia and the Far East will go to them in the form of a prize.

Yeah, i.e. the same thing that we have in the Far East - a railway and a couple of highways. And how to supply the army with them, which will give superiority over the Russian-Kazakh armed forces - I can’t imagine. Explore the causes of Russia's defeat in Crimea. It may be that for you it will become clearer on the question of the war between Russia and China.

[Blackgrifon]

Quote: Andreas

The Chinese will strike in the Urals with the help of aircraft and infantry that crossed the Kazakh-Chinese border (there is a railway)

In this case, the conflict will immediately turn into a nuclear one. And then, yes, our army is now not the very best, but it will be able to inflict losses on opponents of such a level that even his victory becomes Pyrrhic.

[Andreas]

Nuclear conflict is suicidal for all parties to the conflict. Therefore, there is always the likelihood (several percent) of non-escalation of a normal conflict (between nuclear powers) into a nuclear one.

At the same time, the aggressor aimed at territorial capture (China) will not be the first to use nuclear weapons (the consequence is the unsuitability of the area for living and exploitation), since this completely contradicts its purpose of the war.

The likelihood of non-escalation of the conflict into a nuclear one increases significantly (up to 100 percent) if the defender is able to:
- reveal in advance the intentions of the enemy;
- get ahead of the enemy in the deployment of forces and strike with high-precision weapons to the entire depth of the formation of the battle formation of the enemy;
- go on a counterattack, seeing all the enemy’s actions, ahead of him at every stage of the operation and delivering preemptive attacks on him.

At the moment, only one concept / technology is known that allows you to thus fight and defeat a larger enemy (such as the USSR in the mid-1980s or China in the mid-2000s) - this is Network Centric Warfire.

[alicante11]

The likelihood of non-escalation of the conflict into a nuclear one increases significantly (up to 100 percent) if the defender is able to:
- reveal in advance the intentions of the enemy;

To reveal the intentions of a nuclear power to use nuclear weapons in case of failure with conventional weapons? Do you need networking for this? Americans are not like you imagine them. They are well aware that they’ll shit on them with a vigorous loaf.

- get ahead of the enemy in the deployment of forces and strike with high-precision weapons to the entire depth of the formation of the battle formation of the enemy;

Yeah, only this is no longer the Network, but a strategy of a sudden disarming strike, for which the network doesn’t need to. And which is also only on paper so far. Because you can strike this blow only from the air. But the amers have no sufficient advantage for this.

- go on a counterattack, seeing all the enemy’s actions, ahead of him at every stage of the operation and delivering preemptive attacks on him.

Oil oil. You have already "preempted" the enemy in deployment, so if it comes to a counterattack, mushrooms have already grown over your cities.

[Andreas]

It is said that nuclear war is suicidal for both sides of the conflict.

No one will strike the first disarming, he is the last suicide blow before the start of a loss in a non-nuclear conflict.

It is necessary to prepare not for the "vigorous loaf" (thanks to the ancestors, everything is fine with that), but for the modern NCW war.

[alicante11]

No one will strike the first disarming, he is the last suicide blow before the start of a loss in a non-nuclear conflict.

Well, why then get ready for the NSV war (even if we assume that it is a prodigy), if there is a vigorous loaf and the Americans are well aware that if we start to lose, then we are crazy about it?

[Andreas]

Chinese UAV over the Urals, 2050

[alicante11]

The sleep of reason gives birth to monsters :).

[alicante11]

I suggest the network's advertisers create a scenario of a NATO attack on the Russian Federation using all the bells and whistles. Maybe then it will be clear that this is crap, or, as an option, they will be able to prove that "network is Foreva", and "r.a.shka ami - must give".

[Andreas]

The scenario of the attack on today's Russia is fully worked out in Iraq in 2003.

[alicante11]

Well, if you think that you can not compare Iraq and Serbia, then how can you compare Iraq and Russia? Here some distances are worth something. Those. no specifics are expected? Only unfounded allegations that the network is our everything, on the basis of the defeat of a third-rate state, weakened by the same sanctions? You’re bad advertisers, gentlemen, you can’t even argue normally :(.

[Andreas]

In the 1980s, NATO technically implemented the concept of an air-to-ground operation (launching a missile strike on the second and third echelons of the Warsaw Treaty Organization). It was planned to use exclusively tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons (until the time the strategic nuclear weapons were used by the USSR).
By the way, from the available military plans of the ATS, it is also known about planning to use only tactical and operational tactical nuclear weapons on the way to the English Channel. Those. The military-political leadership of both blocs was completely sane and did not plan bilateral suicide with the use of strategic nuclear forces.

In the 2000s, the United States implemented and put into practice (in Iraq) the development of this concept - NCW, which relied on a distributed reconnaissance-computer-communications network (with a level of implementation of the 2003 model) and high-precision non-nuclear weapons. The effect was deafening - the smaller side defeated the larger side, while its losses differed by two orders of magnitude compared to the enemy.

In this regard, the US / NATO / China is tempted to apply the proven nuclear-free technology on a large scale. Let’s say, to use 1 million military personnel of the ground forces (and not 220 thousand, like Iraq) against 3 million military personnel of the enemy (the strength of the RF Armed Forces with all reservists). It is not a fact that the level of sanity of the Russian military-political leadership differs from the level of sanity of the Soviet, and that the first will run to press the red button when defeated in a war with conventional weapons.

It is much easier to implement the modern NCW concept for the same money than to sit on a tank with a vigorous loaf and a pre-written funeral

[alicante11]

Oh, God, stop advertising posters here. You specifically give a scenario of military operations against Russia using the advertised prodigy.

It is not a fact that the level of sanity of the Russian military-political leadership differs from the level of sanity of the Soviet, and that the first will run to press the red button when defeated in a war with conventional weapons.

What level of sanity are you talking about? Show you the dying pictures of Gaddafi and Saddam, or will you find it yourself? Do you think that the sanity of the GDP is enough in case of defeat to press the red button so as not to be in place of these two martyrs?

The effect was deafening - the smaller side defeated the larger side, while its losses differed by two orders of magnitude compared to the enemy.

Blah blah blah. Everything was decided by the superiority of amers in aviation 2,6 times according to your own words (although in reality the Iraqis did not resist at all in the air).

[sivuch]

Based on the example of the First Network-Centric War, it is clear that any "combined" (non-nuclear) operation of the Russian army will be suppressed even at the stage of preparation, since it will be recognized in advance by the enemy (NCW technology) and will be suppressed by high-precision weapons.
-------------------------------------------------
This is if there is enough suppression and suppression. Even with respect to the current Russian aircraft, unlike Iraqi, this is far from a fact. The fundamental difference in both technical means and in the ability to use them

[Andreas]

To suppress the Russian air defense system (radars + missile launchers), 4000 Tomahawk is enough on a European theater of operations (duration - several hours).

After suppressing the air defense, they will destroy Russian aviation using a multiple advantage in NATO aircraft (duration - several days).

After the destruction of Russian aviation, NATO AWACS and E-8 aircraft will strike at ground targets (CPs, communication centers, columns on the march), blocking Russian ground forces in the areas of deployment to a depth of 1000 km (duration - several weeks).

After the blocking of Russian troops, NATO will deploy its ground forces, which, with intelligence from 7400 UAVs, will remotely destroy defensive positions in the NATO offensive zone for several months.

And so before the occupation of the center of defense - the city of Moscow. Half a year

[ramsi]

and there will be no nuclear strike of retaliation?

[Lesnik]

Quote: ramsi

and there will be no nuclear strike of retaliation?

Read the whole pliz branch

[Andreas]

The probability of the use of nuclear weapons by the Russian side is less than 50 percent.

One of the reasons is the vulnerability of Russian strategic missiles at the launch site from the advanced-based US missile defense system deployed on destroyers in the Norwegian and Barents Seas.

Another reason is that Russian tactical nuclear weapons can only be used against a limited European-based US contingent.

The main contingent of US expeditionary forces will be transferred to Europe by sea from the American continent after the exhaustion of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

And if Russian tactical nuclear weapons are not used, then a limited European-based American contingent will independently cope with the task of capturing the defense center - the city of Moscow (using NCW technology).

[alicante11]

The probability of the use of nuclear weapons by the Russian side is less than 50 percent.

F on what analytical calculations are your 50% built? I gave you reasons to use nuclear weapons for GDP. I can also refer to the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. But what are your calculations based on? On the OBS?

One of the reasons is the vulnerability of Russian strategic missiles at the launch site from the advanced-based US missile defense system deployed on destroyers in the Norwegian and Barents Seas.

Yeah, and whom did the acers bring down in space with their vaunted Aegis? Is it a satellite flying along a previously known trajectory? It will be harder to shoot down a rocket flying along an unknown trajectory. This time, second, these destroyers are suicide bombers. Not for nothing, our SF is the strongest of the fleets of the Russian Federation. Plus strategic aviation.

And if Russian tactical nuclear weapons are not used, then a limited European-based American contingent will independently cope with the task of capturing the defense center - the city of Moscow (using NCW technology).

Do you know the size of this contingent? And then he did not even try to compete with the Yugoslav army with complete superiority in the air. Do you assume his database is against the RF Armed Forces? As they say, the farther into the forest, the thicker the partisans ...

[alicante11]

Oh, what a stupid thing I missed :).

To suppress the Russian air defense system (radars + missile launchers), 4000 Tomahawk is enough on a European theater of operations (duration - several hours).

Firstly, the effectiveness of a tomahawk strike against air defense depends mainly not on their total number, but on the number in a salvo. And there are funds for the simultaneous shooting of at least half. Secondly, where did you see the use of 4000 axes? More 400, IMHO, did not apply.

I'll explain to you what will happen if the Americans try to "cut" our air defense system. The missile launch will be detected by our over-the-horizon radar, as will the missile launch in the Mediterranean near Syria. Taking into account the number and direction, of course, the air defense system will be brought into combat readiness. Medium-range complexes (Buk, Tor) will leave the peacetime deployment sites and deploy in positions to repel a strike and cover the positions of long-range complexes. A-50 flying radars will rise into the air. Which will track each of the 400 missiles fired. On the path of which short-range complexes will be sent - ZRPK (for example, Pantsir) and interceptors. And when the "axes" fly up to our border, they will already be met by the ZRPK and will suffer the first losses. Taking into account the subsonic speed of the "hatchets", these losses will be rather big. Then the planes will exercise on them. Even the MIG-21 is a terrible enemy for an ax. After the approach of missiles to air defense facilities, the time will come for Bukov, each division of which can fire up to 50 missiles in a salvo. And those who are lucky enough to break through to three hundred and radars will be finished off by object air defense. And this will be repeated up to 10 times so that the Americans can throw off the ballast of the old axes.
However, even if the Americans launch in some way, all 4000 axes at once, the situation will not change much. Perhaps they will be able to break through to stationary objects, there as over-the-horizon radars, to hit airfields and some command posts. However, mobile systems, such as 300s, 400s, and our smaller air defense systems are all smaller, just change their location and that’s all. As for the airdromes, it is not a long matter to patch the stripes, and there will be enough time to disperse the aircraft. Even damage to the aerodrome supply equipment is not a problem. Since it is supposed to use even sections of highways specially fortified in peacetime to ensure the dispersal of aviation during a database, which indicates the availability of mobile flight support facilities. That is, Russian air defense may suffer losses. But clearly not critical for their combat power.

After suppressing the air defense, they will destroy Russian aviation using a multiple advantage in NATO aircraft (duration - several days).

Even imagining that the amers managed to suppress air defense, they can destroy aviation exclusively in the border zone. Russia is not Iraq and not Serbia. They do not have enough stupid range. Just do not talk about flying tankers. They get off no worse than AWAX.

And so before the occupation of the center of defense - the city of Moscow. Half a year

I remember that the guy with the bangs and mustache was already planning to get "there" in three months. And he was escorted home. Stop fantasizing. If the Americans COULD do it, they would ALREADY do it.

[sivuch]

With such posts it is necessary here
http://forum.mars-x.ru/
Mars-X :: Science Fiction Forums

[Andreas]

Thanks for reviewing my comment.

In the future, I recommend to be guided by the installation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces:
"However, the means of reconnaissance, control, logistics and technical support, supply - all this, according to the parameters required today, still requires improvement. The weakness of even one, separate link, a separate unit in this entire system as a whole reduces the effectiveness of the entire complex, especially in conditions modern combat "- Vladimir Putin, opening speech at the meeting" On the progress of the implementation of the State armament program for 2011-2020 in terms of equipping the Ground Forces with weapons and special equipment "dated September 18, 2013.

[alicante11]

Well, we were led to the SOI. How it ended - you yourself know. And now you are propagating a losing idea in advance on what to spend billions, instead of updating weapons.

[sivuch]

The probability of the use of nuclear weapons by the Russian side is less than 50 percent
-------------
Okay, so far we are not specifying the methodology for determining these 50%. But it’s interesting how Obamych will determine which half will play in a particular case. Maybe he’ll guess on a daisy?
And Putin, in fact, did not say anything that Captain Obviousness could not confirm.
Of course, it is necessary to improve, improve and improve.
Just comparing the capabilities of Iraq-2003, and even earlier, of modern Russia, even with the current collapse and theft is not serious.

[Andreas]

The methodology for assessing the likelihood of using nuclear weapons is simple - now in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the term "specified damage" is used instead of "a massive nuclear missile strike" (Military Strategy, M., Voenizdat, 1968)

Vladimir Putin is the only Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Ingushetia, the USSR and the Russian Federation who has publicly recognized the problem of the domestic armed forces as a weak system of command, communications, and rear support. It costs a lot.

It is about the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces of the 2020 model of the year, after the completion of the 20-trillion rearmament program. The six remaining years are not many. One trillion rubles for NCW technology is clearly not in the way.

[alicante11]

The methodology for assessing the likelihood of using nuclear weapons is simple - now in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the term "specified damage" is used instead of "a massive nuclear missile strike" (Military Strategy, M., Voenizdat, 1968)

you better read the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. Ofigete :).

Vladimir Putin is the only Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Ingushetia, the USSR and the Russian Federation who has publicly recognized the problem of the domestic armed forces as a weak system of command, communications, and rear support. It costs a lot.

Well, we have problems in all areas of the armed forces. During the 90 years it was difficult and in general the armed forces to lose.

It is about the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces of the 2020 model of the year, after the completion of the 20-trillion rearmament program. The six remaining years are not many. One trillion rubles for NCW technology is clearly not in the way.

Well, if you have it, I think that GDP and Shoigu will be grateful to you :).