On September 27, a round table was held in the State Duma on the theme “The state, problems and development prospects of the Aerospace Defense Forces”. The meeting was chaired by the member of the State Duma Committee on Defense Vyacheslav Tetekin. In the number 39 "MIC" published the first part of the most significant speeches.
There is no unified management
In 1998, we, together with headquarters, developed the concept of reforming our system. I then held the position of commander of the third separate army of a warning about a special-purpose rocket attack - the future army of rocket-space defense as part of the Air Defense Forces.
But it turned out what happened: the transformations were based not on state needs, but on the selfish interests of some managers. In order to support the fading structures of the Strategic Missile Forces, they decided to send back an army of rocket and space defense, tearing it out of the air defense system in the direct sense of the word. They invented fake figures that, as a result of the transfer, the combat effectiveness of the rocket forces rose by 20 percent. This, believe me, nonsense, this could not happen.
Then came the next stage, when there was a threat of liquidation (demotion) of the Space Forces. I will not say that these are the main reasons, but it was as if some kind of rock was hanging over the whole situation, that the army of anti-personnel missiles and, in general, the missile defense forces left the air defense system. When this happened, the structure of the air defense, one might say, began to disappear.
When the SPRN army was removed from the Strategic Missile Forces, the latter, as a type of the Armed Forces, also ceased to exist. Because the number of missile troops has become less, the level of the problems solved has fallen.
They tried, figuratively speaking, to insert the army into the Space Forces. The same thing happened as in the unforgettable Strategic Missile Forces. Believe me, there were no space troops as such, there were only control and measuring complexes and a few launching points at Baikonur. Then they took them. In the Space Forces, the launch positions remained at the Plesetsk training ground, and even in the center a small group. But to give them a new status, they put in an army of rocket and space defense. And then they began to somehow justify it.
After that, the control of the third army is removed, it is dismembered its components, operating according to one algorithm. As a result, the combat cycle is disrupted as one of the components of the entire work, and these are missile defense systems, anti-ship missile systems, and the UCCS. In a word, razderbanili and began to somehow manage. Aerospace defense began to form.
I repeat: the components of the RCO army work in one cycle, they simply cannot live without each other. And the key element here is the missile attack warning system, because all information links are tied to it. The missile defense cannot start working without an SPRN, an outer space monitoring system, because it has virtually no means of its own: it is based on information received from an SPRN.
And in this situation, the division of missile defense was given to the East Kazakhstan region. And the remaining units and formations formed into one structure, calling it the center, hesitating to call at least a corps, division or army: suddenly the adversary will think that again the Russians are rattling weapons.
All these perturbations entailed other negative consequences. I used to have six deputies in the army - generals, division commanders - from a colonel to a major general. 12 served thousands of officers, and now ... Today there are very few of them left ... and one general's position.
That's the whole social elevator, which is simply broken, it is not. It turned out as in the unforgettable Air Force. Remember the old joke, when the senior lieutenant at the age of 40 years retires to the reserve, and in his description they write: he is inclined towards careerism. So it will be here. For some reason, it is believed that for decent money, people will serve better. No, they will not do. We have never served for money. For a young man important career, the prospect of service. "In the civilian world" do not hesitate to talk about it, there it is called a career, but in the Armed Forces? We can’t even have wives near us serving, relatives.
Alas, the changes that took place were motivated mainly by the personal ambitions of the respective leaders, who in no way thought about the future. How can we talk about a single control now, if there is no command center in the structures of the rocket-space defense? Before this “round table” I suggested (jokingly) to form an army of rocket-space defense and transfer it to the rear of the Armed Forces for one year. Believe me, nothing will change, except that maybe the food will be better. Because everything else, including the control system, which supposedly now exists in the Space Forces, the current reform does not affect, as, by the way, the past. And, in particular, command and control, control of the combat cycle of several systems, without which it is impossible today in the Space Forces.
Previously, the status of the army commander was quite high. And this is justified. The timeliness of the transmission of the most important information to the Supreme Commander - the President of the Russian Federation - depends on the people who are in the supreme governing body of this army. Including about the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear attack, launch of missiles from submarines. This information goes straight to that very “nuclear suitcase” of the country's first person. The fate of the state may depend on its reliability and efficiency. And today, this person (army commander), who is responsible for performing tasks every second, every second, was simply equated with a motorized rifle unit commander, or even placed below.
How are the Americans going to fight now? They have ensured that they have a return potential of warheads that are stored and can be returned to the carriers at any time. And we agreed to destroy them. They went and the elimination of rocket mines, warheads, the missiles themselves. I'm not talking about the Gor-Chernomyrdin agreement, when 500 tons of highly enriched Russian uranium were sold in the USA for 11,8 billion dollars at a cost of 1,8 trillion! And the Americans have kept everything. They have it all and now they say: if the need arises to strike back, they can simply do so, from the warehouses, the arsenals, to place warheads on the missiles and finish us with you.
There is no other such country in the world with a potential that ensures guaranteed destruction of the United States, except Russia. Therefore, the Americans are preparing to fight precisely against us. In the relevant documents they have clearly written: we are for them the enemy No. 1, and not partners, friends or comrades.
The US military doctrine is changing, we are not doing anything to improve our aerospace defense, we continue to rub in the glasses to the leadership that it is supposedly already created. More than two years have passed, and in fact nothing has been done.
I'm talking about my army. What prevents to make a command post, to create a detailed training system? At one time, the Zhitomir Higher Military Command School of Radio Electronics, the Kiev Higher Anti-aircraft Missile Engineering School, the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School, the Marshal of the Soviet Union Air Defense Academy named after A. Govorov in Kharkov, the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense named after Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov in Tver.
All of them trained specialists for the EWS army. And there were also Pushkin Higher School of Air Defense Radio Electronics, Moscow Higher Military School of Air Defense Radio Electronics in Kubinka. And now? There is nothing. Only one department remained in Tver, and it was transferred to the Academy named after AF Mozhaisky. What for?
I would like common sense to prevail in all our decisions. Do not be afraid to say that this is an aerospace defense force with all the consequences and tasks arising from this. That this is not just one system, but a set of the most serious systems and means ensuring national security, the future of a country like Russia. It is impossible to recreate the state air defense system in its previous form, but it is necessary to work in this direction.
With all due respect to the current leadership of the Space Forces, more precisely, the IACVA is necessary for it to look at itself from the outside and assess its readiness to respond to the challenges of time, to solve the most serious tasks, and most importantly to be responsible for their implementation. One thing is to inflate the cheeks of importance and quite another to effectively manage the entrusted structure, to achieve concrete results.
Commander-in-Chief of the Special Army (1991 – 1998), Lieutenant General
The importance of CTP is underestimated
There is an underestimation of the importance of aerospace defense. Until now, very high leaders consider the Ground Forces and combined arms groups to be the dominant type and force of the Armed Forces. It is harmful to the sun nostalgia.
Let's talk about military officials today. I served in 17 years aviation Naval fleet and 30 years in the aviation of the Air Defense Forces of the country, five times he was chairman or deputy of the state commission for aircraft, starting with the MiG-25, MiG-31, A-50, Su-27. For ten years he was the commander of air defense aviation. Therefore, in air defense, obviously, a person is not random.
MiG-31 actually trampled, and in fact the modification had excellent prospects. Now two MiG-XNUMHD, which I oversaw, are rotting in Balkhash. Such machines should have been included in the EKO for work on low-orbit targets.
Further, the Americans have spawned thousands of UAVs. Who will fight them? Or will we rank our complexes large? But in the 80-ies on the MiGs, we have already destroyed cruise missiles.
So, about bureaucratic obstacles. For five years, my colleagues and I, at the Ministry of Education and Science, were trying to convert the first cadet corps into aerospace. This would allow direct training of personnel at the VVKO. We achieved, but other problems appeared. Now the cadet corps is headed by a 72-year-old colonel, who does not even have a higher education. We would like to see another person at the head of the school and include the corps in the Air Force, and then, if possible, in the VVKO. We ask for support.
Commander of Air Defense Aviation (1977 – 1987), Colonel General of Aviation, Honored Military Pilot of the USSR, Candidate of Military Sciences
No machines, no rockets
Compared to 1991, the volume of domestic production in Russia has decreased dramatically this year. In contrast, in Belarus, the increase in the order of 50 percent. Our country produces almost nothing. We swing oil, on another elemental base we collect cars, TVs. Speaking of high, we dream of creating an information field, groupings, training personnel. But the basics on what to do, no.
We began to change the element base on the Proton launch vehicle - a good, reliable truck. In the year Russia produces 14 – 16 such PH. At the same time, we give a significant part of the missiles to the goals of the European and international community. Therefore, we will never increase the grouping of GLONASS with the NSA “Hurricane”. In 1994, when I became the head of armaments, there were more than 430 spacecraft in orbit, and now less than 50. As soon as the Proton drags the cargo to the international station, it flies. As soon as it is launched with our NCAs, it falls. Why? I think because of the lack of its own element base.
Mace is the same. I explain: it is very difficult to make an SLBM. All give an example with a liquid PCM-54 "Sineva". Good, but its age has already outlived. When it was put into service, the 32 launch was unsuccessful. When testing, first check the surface start, then start from the 15-meter depth, then from the 50. A liquid rocket below 50 meters can not be allowed: crushed tanks, an explosion will occur. This can not happen with a solid rocket. Therefore, initially the considerations of increasing security in the Bulava are correct.
Let's return to aerospace defense. There are several aspects, especially legal. For the sale of combat plutonium and for positioning areas in particular.
By international agreements in the USSR, it was allowed to have two missile areas. The Americans covered the basing areas of ground-based ICBMs. We covered Moscow and Balkhash. The metropolitan missile defense system was made up of 106 missiles, of which 36 was a long-range missile, the rest of the short-range interception (chief designer Peter Grushin). In 2005, the warranty period came out. Now there is actually nothing. By the deadline began to prepare more in 90-x. First born "Favorite", then C-300В. But these are near-interception systems. Their capabilities are limited.
The second aspect is the presence of a single radar field. We only in the stationary version for the air defense of the country had more than 12,5 thousands of detection stations and they were constantly breaking down. But then there was the Soviet government, which produced 430 – 450 stations per year. For ten years it was possible to make four thousand radar. Now how much do we produce? To tell? You will cry.
Therefore, when we are talking about a single information space, we must clearly understand: Samara, Rostov, Krasnoyarsk - all are based on the stations “Motorola” of English, Italian production, and so on. Airspace control, which was in Soviet times, is not there. There are zones of control.
Therefore, I consider it paramount to restore a single information space that would allow space, ground, and air echelons of an early warning system.
Further, a system is needed to ensure the collection and processing of information and the transmission of target designation. MBR from the USA reaches our territory in 30 minutes. Pershing from Europe could reach the USSR in 5,5 – 7 minutes. Need a distributed network.
The issues discussed are related to the philosophy of the information space, common coding systems, data transmission, and phono-target environment. All this in Soviet times and before 2000 was developed and maintained, because the MO was about 60 institutions in each area. Now the work is minimized and is not being conducted. Creating a single information space, we must build a processing system. It is not, we all buy the elements of computing equipment abroad. In order for “Bulava” or any other not to fall, a protected network is needed, in particular, by information and other means. Now we can not make bearings for aviation, even plug connectors, and most importantly, we have eliminated the means of production industry. No machines, no equipment.
In order to provide a circular radar field system, we planned to build four over-the-station stations - Kovylkino, Omsk, Zeya, Magadan. In Ukraine, there was a station near Donetsk. In the Russian Federation - in Nakhodka. The United States covers the entire land part of the trans-horizon stations. The field of such a radar provides reconnaissance at a distance from 800 to 2800 kilometers. In addition, over-the-horizon radar should be supplemented with conventional ones. Two intersecting systems will provide guaranteed cover.
The Soviet Union realized that every time preparing 12,5 thousands of radar stations was extremely costly. Reutov NPO Mechanical Engineering has proposed the creation of the Almaz orbital station, the basis of the space flight of radar surveillance. The information base is formed primarily by the space echelon, first of all we are talking about the warning of a rocket attack.
Airborne and ground long-range radiation detection systems are extremely important.
Rather serious systems of power suppression have been created - С-300, С-400, С-500, С-300В. Everything that we have done in a short-range, medium-range complex, works great, including cruise missiles. It is necessary to move on to creating new “smart” missiles, multichannel and jam-proof homing heads. And again we run into the element base. The entire control system is built on the computers we buy, they are not protected. There used to be a profile 22 th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. He eliminated.
We turn to the forces and means. Who will manage this system? Command. And without KP this can not be. Those command posts that were in Soviet times ended their existence in 2008.
What now? Decides to reflect the global raid of the president. To reflect on the theater of operations such a decision for those who command theater. When attacking a division, the decision is made by its commander. When officially there is a local conflict, everything is clear. And if a sudden attack, to whom and where, relatively speaking, call?
At one time, they made an M-17РМ - high-altitude (H - 20 kilometers) radio-relay aircraft. They offered to put in Chechnya. Not a single short-range rocket will bring down an aircraft, and the equipment will provide high-quality communications and surveillance. Fought in 2008-m with other people's cell phones. So, control systems, information transfer and orders are paramount. And this all rests on a regular basis. There will be no state, there will be no structure, nothing will be.
Chief of Armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (1994 – 2000), Colonel-General, Member of the Public Council, Chairman of the Military-Industrial Complex, President - Chairman of the Board of Directors of Aviadvigatory Company Vladimir Klimov - Motor Sich