EKR Troops: Growth Diseases
Two years after the decree of the President of Russia on creating aerospace defense, the system is in a state of uncertainty.
On September 27, a round table was held in the State Duma of the Russian Federation on the “State, problems and prospects of development of the Aerospace Defense Forces”. The meeting was chaired by a member of the State Duma Committee on Defense Vyacheslav Tetekin.
In the new conditions
The topic of our discussion has a special character. This is about the state of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation, the significance of which, in my opinion, is still underestimated by our leadership in building the defense of the state. Out of habit, emphasis is placed on the traditional types of the Armed Forces: the Ground Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force. This is normal, but in recent years the conditions of hostilities have changed dramatically. Now have the advantage of aerospace attack. Therefore, protection against them acquires special, if not decisive importance in the country's defense system.
As for the underestimation of this direction, I will share my impressions of the exercises recently held at the Osipovichi range in Belarus with the participation of a small group of Russian troops. They were called strategic, but the troops of several military districts, tens of thousands of military personnel and military equipment should participate in such maneuvers. There was nothing like that. The troops of the two armies destroyed illegal armed groups consisting of 200 – 300 people, which is probably important. But if these are strategic doctrines, then first of all it is necessary to focus on the possible nature of a future war. We know what happened to Livia: as a god, the Gaddafi army was blown away from the air by the tortoise, not even allowing him to raise his head.
Now hardly kept the Americans from striking Syria by means of an aerospace attack. If the United States carried out a salvo from its aircraft carriers, destroyers and submarines, nothing would have remained of the Syrian defense system. She would, I believe, be absolutely ineffective: the Americans would immediately suppress it with interference.
Unfortunately, in the plan of the last strategic exercises, the attack from the aerospace forces was not lost, which is puzzling. Perhaps this topic was worked out elsewhere, but this did not happen in Osipovichi. And this is one of the reasons for our conversation.
Vyacheslav Tetekin,
Member of the State Duma Defense Committee
Managerial deadlock
How to destroy Yugoslavia
For Russia, the problem of creating an aerospace defense system is now coming to the first place. This is evidenced by the experience, lessons and conclusions of the use of forces and air defense systems in local conflicts. Take the example of Yugoslavia and the operation "Allied Force." Preparation for it continued throughout the year. IWT with high combat capabilities were used: navigation system, target designation equipment, providing work in weather conditions day and night, advanced intelligence, control and communication systems, airborne radio-electronic suppression stations, laser systems, highly accurate means of destruction and control.
The main objective of the operation, planned in two phases, was to destroy the military-economic potential of Yugoslavia. On the first stage - the destruction of air defense forces and equipment, communications centers and command posts, command posts, which was carried out. On the second, strikes against groupings of troops, ammunition depots, materiel, telecommunications centers, and objects of the military-economic industry. In the creation of a group of troops participated 14 NATO countries.
The Air Force group initially included about 400 aircraft, but then reached almost 700 military vehicles. Strategic aviation (V-1, V-2, V-52) in the amount of 25 units, tactical (F-111, F-116, "Tornado", "Jaguar", "Harier", "Mirage", A-10) - 550 , deck - 100, strategic and operational-tactical reconnaissance aircraft - 15, AWACS, Jistar, and radio reconnaissance systems - 30. Such a powerful aviation group was created.
The naval forces numbered 64 warships carrying cruise missiles, three nuclear submarines and four US Navy surface ships.
The ground forces were represented by NATO peacekeeping forces in neighboring countries, which were removed from the UN subordination and used for their intended purpose.
A special role was played by the forces and means of reconnaissance. For this, the U-2, R-135 electronic reconnaissance aircraft, Drones. The main role was assigned to AWACS airborne early warning and control aircraft, reconnaissance and strike control of the Jistar system, and space assets. In practice, such bundles as AWACS, Gistar and electronic intelligence aircraft were tested, which made it possible to conduct general reconnaissance, direct controlled weapon from fighter-bombers, F-135 P-16 electronic reconnaissance aircraft to suppress radar detection stations, and a number of others.
For the purpose of conducting the operation, more than 50 spacecraft were involved, as well as 15 – 20 types of Lacrosse systems - for radar and specific reconnaissance, meteointelligence, navigation, and communications.
What could oppose this to the armed forces of Yugoslavia, in particular air defense? The air defense system was organized according to the zonal principle. Eight anti-aircraft missile brigades, equipped with C-75, C-125 systems of the old 60's park, were attracted. Three aviation regiments equipped with 21 units of the MiG-62 type, two aviation brigades of fighter-bombers as part of the 54 MiG-21 machines, and other modifications. Over 1000 MANPADS, summarized in the air defense corps.
A continuous radar field was created with a lower boundary from one to two kilometers. Low-altitude field at altitudes 100 – 200 meters formed only in the area of the most important objects.
As a result, the combined forces of NATO made more than 30 thousands of sorties during the operation (2 – 2,5 of the month). 870 cruise missiles were launched, including sea-based 790, an air-based 80 order. During the 78 days of operation, attacks were made on 498 objects of Yugoslavia, 55 percent of which were military objects.
NATO losses - seven combat aircraft, three helicopters, 11 unmanned aerial vehicles, around 20 cruise missiles. The effectiveness of the air defense system turned out to be so low.
Losses of Yugoslavia - 70 combat aircraft. Of the nine airfields, four were completely destroyed. 98 40 aircraft were destroyed for aircraft cover, and 30 was disabled.
Of the 32 positions of anti-aircraft missile systems destroyed nine. And also about 40 percent of those anti-aircraft missiles that were involved in the conduct of anti-aircraft battles. But at the same time the ground forces grouping was preserved.
Destroyed over 200 military-industrial facilities. The total damage to Yugoslavia is from 100 to 120 billions of dollars.
Political results: the main goal has been achieved - the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the disappearance of this state from the political map of the world. For the first time, force intervention was carried out without the sanctions of the UN Security Council, which we are now observing in the course of threats to Syria. The domination of the USA and NATO in the Balkans was consolidated. A dangerous precedent has been created for the arbitrary use of military force by the West against sovereign states.
Military results: tested the possibility of achieving the strategic goals of a local war without the invasion of ground groups. Priority is given to the air force and naval forces. The trends of widespread use of high-precision weapons and sophisticated weapons are fixed. The scale of development of forms and methods of informational confrontation, the wide multipurpose use of land-based, sea-based, airborne and space-based forces and facilities has been expanded.
Lessons for Russia
What would our homeland expect in such a situation and how would we like to see the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation? These are very important questions.
In December 2011 of the year, in accordance with a presidential decree, the Aerospace Defense Forces were created. The commander is responsible for organizing and carrying out the tasks of EKR in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in peacetime, air defense and antimissile cover for the Central, I stress, the Central Industrial Region of the Russian Federation. The structure of the Troops of the East Kazakhstan region includes three brigades of the RCU.
In October 2012 of the year, the range of tasks assigned to the EKR Troops was expanded. Among them, the organization of aerospace defense not only of the Central District, the organization of the development of plans for the aerospace defense of the country, a number of activities to improve the aerospace defense system, the formation of a unified military-technical policy, the organization and development of proposals to improve the regulatory framework in the field of aerospace defense.
In addition, the EKR of the Russian Federation is entrusted with participation in strategic deterrence, the fight against the means of aerospace attack during local military conflicts, the protection of the state border in the airspace, and the control of its use.
To solve these problems, the aerospace defense system includes subsystems of reconnaissance and warning of an aerospace attack, a subsystem of destruction, the suppression of aerospace attack means and a subsystem of comprehensive support and control.
The intelligence and warning subsystem should contribute to the solution of tasks on the ground, at sea, in space, in the air sphere on the basis of modern and independent intelligence and information tools and systems.
The subsystem of defeat and suppression is a combination of anti-missile, anti-space, air and anti-aircraft missile groups, parts and divisions of EW to destroy enemy SVKN and will include space, air, ground, sea-based. The control subsystem functionally follows from the above - this is the ability to manage all subordinate forces and means, including heterogeneous, of various types.
Today, the logistics subsystem is only at the stage of formation, although for two years now there has been a presidential decree on the creation of an EKO Army with their functions and functions. The construction of the aerospace defense system gives serious attention to the General Staff, the main bodies of military command, which is confirmed by a number of scientific and practical conferences, meetings and exercises involving troops. But the results, unfortunately, do not lead to the operational solution of the problems raised in the field of aerospace defense. Such a situation baffles the bodies of the military administration of the East Kazakhstan region, plunges the whole situation into a state of uncertainty.
From this it follows that there is no common understanding of the construction of the aerospace defense system of Russia by the command of both the Air Force and the Aerospace Defense Forces (two very important structures of the strategic military command). In this difficult question, the decisive role should be played by the bodies of the supreme military-political administration of the country, which we have already mentioned several times. As well as the General Staff of the Armed Forces, taking into account the developments of scientific research institutes, universities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, and other structures of the military department.
In our opinion, the main criterion should be the ability of the troops to accomplish the assigned tasks, including the appearance and composition, which are considered by the military command and control agencies. It must be admitted that today neither the air force nor the aerospace defense are able to carry out the whole range of tasks defined by these regulatory documents. And that's why.
There is an insufficiency of forces and means of deployed groups of the aerospace defense on operational air and strategic directions to effectively repel an aerospace attack and cover objects. As well as the diversity of forces and means of the East Kazakhstan region by territorial, specific and generic features (district, Air Force Commander, command of the East Kazakhstan region, and so on).
Lack of equipment with modern, highly efficient models of weapons and military equipment and the need for considerable time for carrying out inter-theatrical regroupings involving land, sea, air forces and facilities, as well as large-scale logistics, technical and operational support measures. Thus, in the intelligence and warning system, the forces and means of radio and radio intelligence are not visible. At one time, the commander in chief of the country's Air Defense Forces had structures, forces and means that were engaged in conducting operational and strategic intelligence. The Commander-in-Chief of the country's Air Defense Forces every second, minute knew the condition of the troops of our potential adversary. That, say, the B-52 takes off from the US military base on the island of Guam, and the Orion reconnaissance aircraft is patrolling near our northern borders. Unfortunately, we have no such forces and means today. Therefore, together with the GRU of the General Staff, these issues must be solved and the warning subsystem must be introduced into the aerospace defense system.
It is imperative to reanimate the electronic warfare in the system of suppression and destruction. At one time, in the 80-s, we considered the forces and means of EW not only for the suppression of air defense weapons, the jamming of aviation. Units and parts of the EW could create serious problems for the passage of a cruise missile due to the impact on its airborne weapons. For example, to work an altimeter, which made the KR not fly at an altitude of 50 – 60 meters, but rise to 150 – 200 meters along a flight path, where it is much easier to deal with such air targets.
Today, the role and place of aerospace defense aviation are not defined. In particular, its composition, control methods, interaction with other forces and means. But this was a key problem in the military conflicts of the 20th century, it remains relevant in the 21st century.
The main bodies providing and organizing the interaction of the armed forces and aviation forces used to be air defense units and formations. We believe it is necessary for this purpose to re-create aerospace defense connections.
At present, responsibility for the aerospace defense is assigned to the commander of the Aerospace Defense Forces. However, a significant part of aerospace defense facilities is subordinated to the commanders of military districts, which does not allow solving the tasks of efficiently constructing the aerospace defense system of Russia. And the main command of the Air Force does not have its command and control center. In the Air Force there is no command post, where the combat crew of the Air Force High Command is deployed. The commander in chief, his deputies, chiefs, commanders of combat arms, services, and directorates do not have this governing body. Although the structure of the main command of the Air Force has a deputy commander for air defense. These structures are located, as they say, on our old foundations in the Moscow region, on Chernaya, they have an office and telephones, but there is no command center. That violates the unity of command and subordination, and most importantly - responsibility.
It is advisable to create a single system of aerospace defense of the country with the implementation of the principles of common responsibility, unity of command and centralized automated, and in some cases automatic control of all forces and means, a single information management space. These questions we worked out in due time. As well as the creation of local zones (front-line, district, regional), where there will be either a threat or the conduct of hostilities with the operational subordination of aerospace defense forces and equipment to the appropriate commanders (commanders).
Thus, the final appearance of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces can be either a type of the Armed Forces or the strategic command of aerospace defense, which should be self-sufficient across all subsystems of the EKR and include the main branches of the armed forces: VKO aviation, anti-aircraft missile and radio-technical forces , Electronic warfare, operational, combat, logistical and technical support. All this should be in a single contour of strategic, operational, tactical and combat control.
A separate conversation is about re-creating at the modern level the scientific basis of aerospace defense. It is necessary to logically link the tasks and interaction of research institutes, industrial cooperation, universities in creating weapons systems, solving military-scientific and military-technical problems. In the meantime, the situation is such that sometimes there is no clear understanding between the customer in the person of the Ministry of Defense, military research institutes and enterprises implementing the state defense order. Well at least that managed to defend and maintain the Military Academy of East Kazakhstan region in Tver.
Conclusion: the construction and development of the aerospace defense system should have not only priority importance for the Armed Forces, but also national importance. This means that all the problems associated with this need to be solved in the near future at the highest level of military-state administration.
Alexander Gorkov,
Chief of the Air Force Missile Troops (2000 – 2008), Lieutenant General
On September 27, a round table was held in the State Duma of the Russian Federation on the “State, problems and prospects of development of the Aerospace Defense Forces”. The meeting was chaired by a member of the State Duma Committee on Defense Vyacheslav Tetekin.
In the new conditions
The topic of our discussion has a special character. This is about the state of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation, the significance of which, in my opinion, is still underestimated by our leadership in building the defense of the state. Out of habit, emphasis is placed on the traditional types of the Armed Forces: the Ground Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force. This is normal, but in recent years the conditions of hostilities have changed dramatically. Now have the advantage of aerospace attack. Therefore, protection against them acquires special, if not decisive importance in the country's defense system.
As for the underestimation of this direction, I will share my impressions of the exercises recently held at the Osipovichi range in Belarus with the participation of a small group of Russian troops. They were called strategic, but the troops of several military districts, tens of thousands of military personnel and military equipment should participate in such maneuvers. There was nothing like that. The troops of the two armies destroyed illegal armed groups consisting of 200 – 300 people, which is probably important. But if these are strategic doctrines, then first of all it is necessary to focus on the possible nature of a future war. We know what happened to Livia: as a god, the Gaddafi army was blown away from the air by the tortoise, not even allowing him to raise his head.Now hardly kept the Americans from striking Syria by means of an aerospace attack. If the United States carried out a salvo from its aircraft carriers, destroyers and submarines, nothing would have remained of the Syrian defense system. She would, I believe, be absolutely ineffective: the Americans would immediately suppress it with interference.
Unfortunately, in the plan of the last strategic exercises, the attack from the aerospace forces was not lost, which is puzzling. Perhaps this topic was worked out elsewhere, but this did not happen in Osipovichi. And this is one of the reasons for our conversation.
Vyacheslav Tetekin,
Member of the State Duma Defense Committee
Managerial deadlock
How to destroy Yugoslavia
For Russia, the problem of creating an aerospace defense system is now coming to the first place. This is evidenced by the experience, lessons and conclusions of the use of forces and air defense systems in local conflicts. Take the example of Yugoslavia and the operation "Allied Force." Preparation for it continued throughout the year. IWT with high combat capabilities were used: navigation system, target designation equipment, providing work in weather conditions day and night, advanced intelligence, control and communication systems, airborne radio-electronic suppression stations, laser systems, highly accurate means of destruction and control.
The main objective of the operation, planned in two phases, was to destroy the military-economic potential of Yugoslavia. On the first stage - the destruction of air defense forces and equipment, communications centers and command posts, command posts, which was carried out. On the second, strikes against groupings of troops, ammunition depots, materiel, telecommunications centers, and objects of the military-economic industry. In the creation of a group of troops participated 14 NATO countries.
The Air Force group initially included about 400 aircraft, but then reached almost 700 military vehicles. Strategic aviation (V-1, V-2, V-52) in the amount of 25 units, tactical (F-111, F-116, "Tornado", "Jaguar", "Harier", "Mirage", A-10) - 550 , deck - 100, strategic and operational-tactical reconnaissance aircraft - 15, AWACS, Jistar, and radio reconnaissance systems - 30. Such a powerful aviation group was created.
The naval forces numbered 64 warships carrying cruise missiles, three nuclear submarines and four US Navy surface ships.
The ground forces were represented by NATO peacekeeping forces in neighboring countries, which were removed from the UN subordination and used for their intended purpose.
A special role was played by the forces and means of reconnaissance. For this, the U-2, R-135 electronic reconnaissance aircraft, Drones. The main role was assigned to AWACS airborne early warning and control aircraft, reconnaissance and strike control of the Jistar system, and space assets. In practice, such bundles as AWACS, Gistar and electronic intelligence aircraft were tested, which made it possible to conduct general reconnaissance, direct controlled weapon from fighter-bombers, F-135 P-16 electronic reconnaissance aircraft to suppress radar detection stations, and a number of others.
For the purpose of conducting the operation, more than 50 spacecraft were involved, as well as 15 – 20 types of Lacrosse systems - for radar and specific reconnaissance, meteointelligence, navigation, and communications.
What could oppose this to the armed forces of Yugoslavia, in particular air defense? The air defense system was organized according to the zonal principle. Eight anti-aircraft missile brigades, equipped with C-75, C-125 systems of the old 60's park, were attracted. Three aviation regiments equipped with 21 units of the MiG-62 type, two aviation brigades of fighter-bombers as part of the 54 MiG-21 machines, and other modifications. Over 1000 MANPADS, summarized in the air defense corps.
A continuous radar field was created with a lower boundary from one to two kilometers. Low-altitude field at altitudes 100 – 200 meters formed only in the area of the most important objects.
As a result, the combined forces of NATO made more than 30 thousands of sorties during the operation (2 – 2,5 of the month). 870 cruise missiles were launched, including sea-based 790, an air-based 80 order. During the 78 days of operation, attacks were made on 498 objects of Yugoslavia, 55 percent of which were military objects.
NATO losses - seven combat aircraft, three helicopters, 11 unmanned aerial vehicles, around 20 cruise missiles. The effectiveness of the air defense system turned out to be so low.
Losses of Yugoslavia - 70 combat aircraft. Of the nine airfields, four were completely destroyed. 98 40 aircraft were destroyed for aircraft cover, and 30 was disabled.
Of the 32 positions of anti-aircraft missile systems destroyed nine. And also about 40 percent of those anti-aircraft missiles that were involved in the conduct of anti-aircraft battles. But at the same time the ground forces grouping was preserved.
Destroyed over 200 military-industrial facilities. The total damage to Yugoslavia is from 100 to 120 billions of dollars.
Political results: the main goal has been achieved - the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the disappearance of this state from the political map of the world. For the first time, force intervention was carried out without the sanctions of the UN Security Council, which we are now observing in the course of threats to Syria. The domination of the USA and NATO in the Balkans was consolidated. A dangerous precedent has been created for the arbitrary use of military force by the West against sovereign states.
Military results: tested the possibility of achieving the strategic goals of a local war without the invasion of ground groups. Priority is given to the air force and naval forces. The trends of widespread use of high-precision weapons and sophisticated weapons are fixed. The scale of development of forms and methods of informational confrontation, the wide multipurpose use of land-based, sea-based, airborne and space-based forces and facilities has been expanded.
Lessons for Russia
What would our homeland expect in such a situation and how would we like to see the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation? These are very important questions.
In December 2011 of the year, in accordance with a presidential decree, the Aerospace Defense Forces were created. The commander is responsible for organizing and carrying out the tasks of EKR in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in peacetime, air defense and antimissile cover for the Central, I stress, the Central Industrial Region of the Russian Federation. The structure of the Troops of the East Kazakhstan region includes three brigades of the RCU.
In October 2012 of the year, the range of tasks assigned to the EKR Troops was expanded. Among them, the organization of aerospace defense not only of the Central District, the organization of the development of plans for the aerospace defense of the country, a number of activities to improve the aerospace defense system, the formation of a unified military-technical policy, the organization and development of proposals to improve the regulatory framework in the field of aerospace defense.
In addition, the EKR of the Russian Federation is entrusted with participation in strategic deterrence, the fight against the means of aerospace attack during local military conflicts, the protection of the state border in the airspace, and the control of its use.
To solve these problems, the aerospace defense system includes subsystems of reconnaissance and warning of an aerospace attack, a subsystem of destruction, the suppression of aerospace attack means and a subsystem of comprehensive support and control.
The intelligence and warning subsystem should contribute to the solution of tasks on the ground, at sea, in space, in the air sphere on the basis of modern and independent intelligence and information tools and systems.
The subsystem of defeat and suppression is a combination of anti-missile, anti-space, air and anti-aircraft missile groups, parts and divisions of EW to destroy enemy SVKN and will include space, air, ground, sea-based. The control subsystem functionally follows from the above - this is the ability to manage all subordinate forces and means, including heterogeneous, of various types.
Today, the logistics subsystem is only at the stage of formation, although for two years now there has been a presidential decree on the creation of an EKO Army with their functions and functions. The construction of the aerospace defense system gives serious attention to the General Staff, the main bodies of military command, which is confirmed by a number of scientific and practical conferences, meetings and exercises involving troops. But the results, unfortunately, do not lead to the operational solution of the problems raised in the field of aerospace defense. Such a situation baffles the bodies of the military administration of the East Kazakhstan region, plunges the whole situation into a state of uncertainty.
From this it follows that there is no common understanding of the construction of the aerospace defense system of Russia by the command of both the Air Force and the Aerospace Defense Forces (two very important structures of the strategic military command). In this difficult question, the decisive role should be played by the bodies of the supreme military-political administration of the country, which we have already mentioned several times. As well as the General Staff of the Armed Forces, taking into account the developments of scientific research institutes, universities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, and other structures of the military department.
In our opinion, the main criterion should be the ability of the troops to accomplish the assigned tasks, including the appearance and composition, which are considered by the military command and control agencies. It must be admitted that today neither the air force nor the aerospace defense are able to carry out the whole range of tasks defined by these regulatory documents. And that's why.
There is an insufficiency of forces and means of deployed groups of the aerospace defense on operational air and strategic directions to effectively repel an aerospace attack and cover objects. As well as the diversity of forces and means of the East Kazakhstan region by territorial, specific and generic features (district, Air Force Commander, command of the East Kazakhstan region, and so on).
Lack of equipment with modern, highly efficient models of weapons and military equipment and the need for considerable time for carrying out inter-theatrical regroupings involving land, sea, air forces and facilities, as well as large-scale logistics, technical and operational support measures. Thus, in the intelligence and warning system, the forces and means of radio and radio intelligence are not visible. At one time, the commander in chief of the country's Air Defense Forces had structures, forces and means that were engaged in conducting operational and strategic intelligence. The Commander-in-Chief of the country's Air Defense Forces every second, minute knew the condition of the troops of our potential adversary. That, say, the B-52 takes off from the US military base on the island of Guam, and the Orion reconnaissance aircraft is patrolling near our northern borders. Unfortunately, we have no such forces and means today. Therefore, together with the GRU of the General Staff, these issues must be solved and the warning subsystem must be introduced into the aerospace defense system.
It is imperative to reanimate the electronic warfare in the system of suppression and destruction. At one time, in the 80-s, we considered the forces and means of EW not only for the suppression of air defense weapons, the jamming of aviation. Units and parts of the EW could create serious problems for the passage of a cruise missile due to the impact on its airborne weapons. For example, to work an altimeter, which made the KR not fly at an altitude of 50 – 60 meters, but rise to 150 – 200 meters along a flight path, where it is much easier to deal with such air targets.
Today, the role and place of aerospace defense aviation are not defined. In particular, its composition, control methods, interaction with other forces and means. But this was a key problem in the military conflicts of the 20th century, it remains relevant in the 21st century.
The main bodies providing and organizing the interaction of the armed forces and aviation forces used to be air defense units and formations. We believe it is necessary for this purpose to re-create aerospace defense connections.
At present, responsibility for the aerospace defense is assigned to the commander of the Aerospace Defense Forces. However, a significant part of aerospace defense facilities is subordinated to the commanders of military districts, which does not allow solving the tasks of efficiently constructing the aerospace defense system of Russia. And the main command of the Air Force does not have its command and control center. In the Air Force there is no command post, where the combat crew of the Air Force High Command is deployed. The commander in chief, his deputies, chiefs, commanders of combat arms, services, and directorates do not have this governing body. Although the structure of the main command of the Air Force has a deputy commander for air defense. These structures are located, as they say, on our old foundations in the Moscow region, on Chernaya, they have an office and telephones, but there is no command center. That violates the unity of command and subordination, and most importantly - responsibility.
It is advisable to create a single system of aerospace defense of the country with the implementation of the principles of common responsibility, unity of command and centralized automated, and in some cases automatic control of all forces and means, a single information management space. These questions we worked out in due time. As well as the creation of local zones (front-line, district, regional), where there will be either a threat or the conduct of hostilities with the operational subordination of aerospace defense forces and equipment to the appropriate commanders (commanders).
Thus, the final appearance of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces can be either a type of the Armed Forces or the strategic command of aerospace defense, which should be self-sufficient across all subsystems of the EKR and include the main branches of the armed forces: VKO aviation, anti-aircraft missile and radio-technical forces , Electronic warfare, operational, combat, logistical and technical support. All this should be in a single contour of strategic, operational, tactical and combat control.
A separate conversation is about re-creating at the modern level the scientific basis of aerospace defense. It is necessary to logically link the tasks and interaction of research institutes, industrial cooperation, universities in creating weapons systems, solving military-scientific and military-technical problems. In the meantime, the situation is such that sometimes there is no clear understanding between the customer in the person of the Ministry of Defense, military research institutes and enterprises implementing the state defense order. Well at least that managed to defend and maintain the Military Academy of East Kazakhstan region in Tver.
Conclusion: the construction and development of the aerospace defense system should have not only priority importance for the Armed Forces, but also national importance. This means that all the problems associated with this need to be solved in the near future at the highest level of military-state administration.
Alexander Gorkov,
Chief of the Air Force Missile Troops (2000 – 2008), Lieutenant General
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