Most economists recognize that as a result of liberal reforms, the country did not reach the standard of living of the USSR - a very characteristic fact that had previously been carefully camouflaged by democrats and liberals. And what would have happened if the reformers hadn’t (or hadn’t given the people) destroyed the socialist system? ". If it were not for the reforms of the 1987-1991 of the year, the level of GNP in Russia would be more than 1,8 times now.
In present-day Russia, the richest 20% receive almost two-thirds of the national income going to consumption, while by 1987, this share did not exceed 30%.
If so, it turns out that by simply returning to the principles of distribution that existed during the years of Soviet power, one can increase the standard of living of 2% of Russians almost 80 times. In the process of liberal reform of the Russian economy, the share of spending on an apartment has sharply increased. Previously, during the years of Soviet rule, a person received 200 rubles on average and then, after 7 years (on average), he was given a two-room apartment (on average) for free, and the utility payments for such a person did not exceed 10% of his salary, now buy an apartment for 80,% of the population is almost impossible to do, and the share of utility payments in wages has increased to 20-30%, and even more. If we take into account the impossibility of buying apartments, then we can accept that due to the twist of flat money real wages should be reduced by 25-35%.
Almost 30% of the income spent on consumption, provided by rising oil prices, and if so, why not accept that the USSR would receive the same income from oil. If the USSR had not been destroyed and, therefore, the distribution of the consumed share of national income would have remained the same (and it was more or less stable for more than 30 years) and if the price of oil grew at the same pace, then 80% of Russians would live in 4 -6 times (pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, respectively) are better than they are now (without an increase in oil prices, this figure is four.
When the task is to give a forecast of Soviet GDP on 20 years, as if we were in 1985, it is easiest to allow the economy to grow at a constant rate and take the pace that corresponded to the previous decade or two. An econometric base for this is available (although, of course, if you parse the real data, then some particular difficulties may emerge). There is nothing prejudicial about such an extrapolation. The use of projection is justified; in this case, the best conditional estimate of the future (for the point in time 1985) is a linear trend obtained on the basis of information about the previous dynamics of the variable of interest.
Predicting US GDP growth calculated by this method for 1985-2005 based on 1947-1985 data gave a very good result. On 20 years ahead, the model was mistaken for 14% in comparison with reality. So, US GDP growth is not so badly predicted based on such a simple model with a constant growth rate.
WAS THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE USSR IN 1985 YEAR?
Liberals may argue: - "Well, let's say that forecasting based on statistics is possible and even quite acceptable is the use of linear models, but the USSR was special - it was hit by a deep crisis. And if so, the use of linear models to predict the growth of the USSR is unacceptable. " That is, to assert that the USSR was in a state of crisis before 1985 for the year. But is it?
The system in the USSR was stable and for decades provided a very high increase in national income. In 1979-1988 it reached a state of stable dynamic equilibrium — the USSR gave an average of 3-3,5% annual growth in national income. The country cannot develop faster, since the labor reserve has been exhausted, and the working day is limited to 40 hours per week (after the murder of Stalin by Khrushchev, the working week in the USSR was reduced from 48 hours to 40 hours), and the rapid increase in output standards and control of the result Intellectual labor is categorically not taken by the workers themselves. Growth was in spite of the fact that oil prices between 1982 and 1986 over the years have fallen 6,8 times, despite Brezhnev’s “insanity”, Andropov’s rush to bring order, Chernenko’s accession, Gorbachev’s publicity.
More and more countries are buying Soviet aircraft. Space, unified power grid, unified system of railways. Self-sufficiency in culture and tourism (such heights in culture as the USSR has reached, especially in the field of art for children, we will never reach). Even Canada bought Soviet hydro-turbines, with the proviso that this was not written in the press. Soviet education is the best in the world, the number of registered inventions in the USSR exceeded their total number in the rest of the world, and these were truly new technical solutions. Indeed, not all of them were introduced, but this is a huge creative potential. Science in the USSR ranked second in the world, although it had problems of growth.
The economy of the USSR looked good against the background of the developed countries of the West. So, in 1990, the USSR produced per capita 5964 KWh of electricity, the USA - 12659; Great Britain - 5543; Italy - 3765. The gas per capita was produced by 2624 cubic meters, in the USA - 2021, in Great Britain - 871, in Italy - 278. Meat was produced 69 kg per person, in the US - 123, in the UK - 66, in Italy - 64. It can be seen that the standard of living in the USSR practically did not differ from that in the leading countries of Europe, although it was lower than in the USA, Germany and Japan. The level of technological development of the USSR was also comparable to that of the leading countries of the West.
If we compare the average annual per capita income in international dollars (at purchasing power parity) 1988, then it turns out that from 1950, the per capita national income in the US increased from 6430 dollars to 14000 dollars in 1988, while in the USSR it increased 3,9 times - from 1750 dollars to 6750 dollars, which means that the Soviet economy grew 2 times faster than the US. The American directory of Soviet Economic Structure and Performance gives similar ratios of the USSR and the USA. For example, according to this guide, per capita national income in the USSR was 8363 dollars, and in the US - 18180 dollars. And Czechs and Slovaks (and East Germans) lived under socialism much better than Soviet citizens. Do you know why? They received annually 15 million tons of oil from the USSR - for one third of the price on the world market.
So, as a result of the living creativity of the masses, a new type of living arrangement was formed in the USSR, which lay in line with the basic traditions of Russian organizational technologies, adapted to the modern geopolitical conditions of the country. We call such a political-economic system socialism. Its important features are the combination of economic and administrative, tax and business functions in a single economical management structure, so that a significant part of the social product was directly seized by the state without using the classical tax mechanism and was directed to the needs of the country. The distribution of wealth in a socialist society was carried out taking into account feasibility for the country as a whole. Such a system needed centralized planning, which had certain solvable drawbacks due to the difficulty of accounting for all information and because of the difficulty of reconciling the different interests of the center and periphery.
In the Soviet economic system there were several key decisions given by Russia's geopolitical features: elimination of capital outflow from the country through the monopoly of foreign trade, strict financial control and restrictions on exit; economical and recognized by all the mechanism of coordination of interests in society, performed by the CPSU; the rapid elimination of deficiencies and the adjustment of policy by the Soviets and the CPSU with the help of the press and state security organs; availability of a system for restraining the comprador elimination of the elite with the help of state and party organs. There were valuable money in circulation, but they were separated from the production of means of production, which made it possible not to be afraid of financial crises. The peculiarity of the institute of property under socialism was its multi-level character with a wide division of ownership rights to bundles. Socialism solved the problem of justice on both an individual and national level. Even critics of the Soviet economic system recognize that, for all its flaws, “it was a solid and stable system. And one of the properties of a sustainable system is the rejection of alien elements, which is what happened with cost accounting, Kosygin reforms. Their system was emasculated, cut and digested. "(1
The planned economic management system successfully solved the problems of scientific and technological progress, and the planning deficiencies were compensated by the administrative market (or rather, the administrative-market adjustment of the deficiencies of the planned distribution) —the mixed economy made it possible to mitigate, though not without flaws, many of the disadvantages associated with the inadequacy of the equalization distribution system , proclaimed official ideology.
In the 1978-1988, the USSR no longer had any serious conflict with the West, a security agreement was signed. And the mobilization development is almost over.
So, an analysis of the growth trends of natural production indicators shows that there were no signs of a crisis in the Soviet economy. Due to a centralized change in the structure of investments, improvement of production organization, reduction of losses and other methods, the crisis, according to some Russian and Western experts, and a decrease in the average annual increase in national production income could be postponed for another 5-10 years. It turns out that a real crisis (if we accept that it was inevitable, although this is not true) in the Soviet economy would have begun not earlier than 2005-2010.
Here it is necessary to take into account a very important fact, which the critics of the USSR deliberately get along with - after the murder of Stalin, the working week decreased from 48 to 40 hours, that is, the base for economic growth was reduced by 20%. Nevertheless, during the 60-70 years, the USSR maintained almost the same growth rates as under Stalin. The basis of this breakthrough was a sharp increase in spending on science.
According to official data, the national income of the USSR increased from 1950 to 1960 a year in 2,7 times, and from 1960 to 1984 a year to 3,7 times. By the year 2000, if the same tendency of absolutely linear growth of wages and GNP continued, then wages would increase 3 times compared to 1960 year, whereas GNP would increase 4 times, if we assume that investments in the USSR were about 35%, it turns out the ideal work of the economy and financial bodies. All this suggests that the USSR-85 was an absolutely healthy economy. Moreover, even those negative trends that existed were easily stopped due to an increase in spending on innovation activities. For example, the 12 billion rubles (in 200 prices) were allocated to the program for the modernization of the machine-building complex in the 1985-m five-year plan - two times more than in the previous ten years.
According to a well-informed member of the Gorbachev Politburo, E. Ligachev, the measures taken by the government had an effect. In the industry, the growth rate of production in 1986-88. amounted to approximately 4% compared to 3% in the XI five-year period, in agriculture, respectively, 3 and 1%. In the Gorbachev era, it was possible to increase the input of housing from about 300 million square meters. in 1981-1985 to 343 million square meters in 1986-1990 on RSFSR. Over 1986-1988, the average 128 million sq. M. m housing. A significant increase was achieved in the construction of residential buildings, which was not the case during the previous two five-year plans. Western economists unanimously claimed and argued that the Soviet economic system had significant economic reserves in the 1991 year, but the country's leaders did not even try to use them. "Why? - asks Vilkotsky, and he himself answers - “The answer suggests itself only one - the nomenclature needed to destroy the Soviet Union and create a convenient state system on its ruins.”
Many believe that the Soviet economy, that in Stalin, that in Khrushchev, that in the Brezhnev version, could not grow at all - there was no evolutionary mechanism. Only it turned out that moving science and technology, but over time, slower and slower. Meanwhile, a thorough analysis shows that the Soviet economy was just growing due to huge investments in public education.
Reformers of different persuasion, who called to the market (and those who are calling now, just not to the bad, as in today's Russia, but to the good), do not provide for scientific and technical progress. In the present conditions, any market system without the state’s great efforts to invest in innovation and science would inevitably, perhaps after some short-term improvement, lead to a new crisis.
some economists introduce the concept of a crime rate acceptable to the people. This is the optimal ratio for the growth and stable development of the price of measures to combat crime and its damage. When the cost of strengthening the fight against crime exceeds the reduction of damage from crime as a result of additional control measures, further strengthening the fight becomes meaningless.
In 1987, the last year before the reform, in the RSFSR 9,2 thousand murders or attempted murders were committed, 33,8 thousand looting and robberies. Expanded reproduction of crime was not !!! From the data presented in the USSR 1990 statistics collection, it is clear that the role of the shadow economy was minimal. With the total money income of the population in 493,5 billion rubles, in 1988, the blessings worth 502,9 billion rubles were consumed. The excess was less than 2%. Again almost perfect indicator.
Note for comparison that in 2011, 14,3 was registered in thousands of murders and 147,9 in thousands of thefts and robberies. The number of grave and especially grave crimes has been fluctuating at the level of 1,8 million per year for many years (besides, the proportion of those crimes that are recorded and even more disclosed are revealed). The concealment of income and tax evasion became general.
NOT DEFICIENCY, BAD CRIMES
The second typical accusation of the Soviet system was the assertion that it constantly created deficiencies. As an example, 1991 is usually given the year when store shelves are completely empty. In fact, this is a typical manipulation by substitution of the thesis. Before 1985, there were deficiencies, but rarely. "Sausage" electric trains - the result of the creation of a "showcase of socialism" in Moscow. But a lot was done and, in particular, the problem of shortage of meat was successfully solved. For example, in Ivanovo, it was solved due to a sharp increase in the production of duck and duck dumplings. Gradually, by the year 1985 in Ivanovo, the situation began to be resolved in unconventional ways. When they began to introduce coupons for basic products, the workload of trains died away. Everyone knew that half a kilo of butter per month would give us, and 2 kg of meat, and half a kilogram of sausage ... There were fresh and smoked ducks. Pork appeared - better than nothing. Milk has become - heaps. Cooptorgi were opened, and it became possible to buy meat for 5 rubles, but on the market it was almost for the same price and was not translated.
As for the deficits constantly exaggerated by the liberals in the last years of Perestroika, they were artificial. They were specially organized in order to cash in on speculation. A. Kasatkin in the article “Deficit in the USSR” in N5 (454) of the newspaper “Duel” explains how the deficit was artificially made in the USSR. There are other testimonials. So, V.I. Potapov, the first secretary of the Irkutsk Communist Party Regional Committee in the years of Perestroika, testifies that for certain types of food the deficit was created artificially: speculation, theft ... U. Sarsenov from Kazakhstan writes about this - for some services, goods were created artificially deficient, which allowed all sorts of “bugs” »To withdraw from under the floor of the cost of the goods, air ticket, hotel room its margin, its percentage, not taxed, of course, no tax. The elite torpedoed pricing reforms in 1987, when, instead of comprehensively addressing prices and tariffs in the national economy, the Goskomtsen and Gosplan began pushing the idea of revising wholesale prices first, and not to touch retail prices for some time. So, the deficit was before Perestroika, although it was also created artificially, and it did not in any way interfere with the normal functioning of the national economy, since it affected no more than 1% of the goods and services sold. The magnitude of this phenomenon increased dramatically only after the 1987 year.
So, there was no crisis in 1985 in the USSR. It was artificially created by reformers in 1987-1988, which was reflected in the negative increase in national income in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the economy.
LONG DOES CRISES IN ECONOMICS GO ON?
Well, in general, why in today's Russia does not the crisis go away? Do economic crises last? A study of the development of different countries shows that within a single economic system, the economic decline usually lasts a maximum of 7 years. Crises lasting over 7 years in new stories did not have. As a rule, all economies straighten out very quickly, unless they are completely destroyed. Malaysia and South Korea took 2 of the year, Cuba - 4 of the year. Even the USA after the Great Depression took only 6 years to get out of the crisis. Economic recovery after the war also takes a maximum of 7 years. Even during the transition from one social system to another, as after the bloody Civil War, which claimed millions of lives and led to the complete ruin of the economy, the time for economic recovery did not exceed 7 years. After the Great Patriotic War, the restoration took 5 years with even greater destruction.
We have in today's Russia more than two decades of continuous crisis - the crisis is evidenced by the lack of development of the country (not growth associated with an increase in oil prices, but development), the complete destruction of the innovation infrastructure and, in particular, Soviet science ... All the mechanisms of scientific technical progress. By itself, the duration of the crisis in today's Russia and other former socialist countries speaks of its systemic nature; it proves that the crisis is of a non-economic nature, that it is man-made. The situation is similar to that after the fall of Ancient Rome, when during the long ten Dark Ages Europe could not reach the standard of living that existed in the Roman Empire.
So, there is no reason to believe that a crisis was brewing in the USSR in 1985, and if so, then the use of linear models for forecasting is quite reasonable.
Conscious collapse of the USSR economy
Thus, having come to power, Gorbachev got a stable working state. Yes, there were flaws and they had to be eliminated. But how to eliminate? It is necessary to conduct a differential diagnosis and make a diagnosis. Andropov tried to do this when he declared that we do not know the society in which we live. Gorbachev behaved quite differently. Instead of starting to study society, he began to shy away: let's speed up, let's, but how? Accelerated, but the system is inertial - it extinguished the excitement. Let's debug the economic mechanism, but again the system with its inertia suppressed the initiatives of amateurs. Then they took up the foundations on which the buildings of socialism stood ...
In 1987-1988, decisive mistakes were made (or rather, crimes against the people) —the visiting committees of the regional committees were eliminated. This meant that now foreign contractors would be able to give bribes to responsible Soviet workers in the form of trips to the West and marked the complete elimination of control over the elite.
A valve was opened separating the cash money supply from non-cash. For this, the so-called centers of the “Scientific and Technical Creativity of Youth” were first created, the first gateway for pumping cashless in cash. Under the guise of the development of a youth economy, the plundering of state enterprises was organized. Then came the era of co-operatives, which, like leeches, began to pump non-cash money out of the state. In the first quarter of 1990, banking institutions issued 6 billion rubles from the accounts of cooperatives. in cash, and only 450 thousand rubles were credited to their accounts. The total size of the shadow economy in recent years has reached Perestroika approximately 120-130 billion rubles, or about a fifth of the national income of the USSR. (59) Pumping from “cashless” to “cash” in the USSR was a clear theft, since cashless money practically did not real prices for enterprises (and the individuals who cashed them under the obligations of state-owned enterprises did not respond).
Finally, in 1987, the branch departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which exercised Party (and in fact, people's) control over the economy, were liquidated. The economic elite could now do everything they wanted, and it began to rock the country. Some reformers, in particular B. Saltykov, the former Minister of Science in the Yeltsin government, admit that the crisis in the economy of the USSR arose in 1989-1991, and not earlier.
Gorbachev’s statement in the book “The Fourth Power and Four Secretary Generals” in Victor Afanasyev’s book is very characteristic. “At first we made a bet on scientific and technical progress, but the mechanisms for its implementation did not work. Undertook the reform of the economic mechanism, but it was also blocked. Then the idea of political reform appeared ... ”
As we see, the leader had no attempt to deal with the essence of the matter. There was confidence that the country urgently needed not the Constitution, or Sevruzhina with horseradish, but each new failure convinced the group of "reformers" not that they did not understand something and that they had to figure it out, but what was stopping them system to break. It did not happen with a swoop (and there many efforts are required) for scientific and technical progress - let's redo the whole economy! In science and technology, our ideas have diverged from reality - we will deal with the economy, this will definitely come to us, and science and technology will regulate the market. It didn’t work with economic reform - we’ll introduce democracy, the market will be immaculate with it! As they say, there will be no bread - we will eat sturgeon.
Here is just one example. According to Ligachev, a member of the Politburo A.N. At the end of the period of perestroika, Yakovlev sent a note to the General Secretary about the separation of science from the state, the termination of its budget financing, the liquidation of the State Committee on Science and Technology. So can act only an American agent.
WANTED PEOPLE TO REFUSE SOCIALISM?
One of the versions of supporters of the objectivity of the collapse of the USSR is the assumption that the people of the USSR are tired of socialism. As if the economy of the USSR was optimized as a wartime economy and during the 70 years (or 50) of the war - the people were tired. Like, one generation is a lot. And in Eastern Europe, the population of 30 is less tired from communism.
In fact, this assumption has no basis. At the very beginning of perestroika, no one even had any thought that socialism should be destroyed. All thoughts were focused on the improvement of socialism, which without exception was considered by all as the best social order. Everyone wanted to improve socialism.
They did not want to break socialism and most of the leaders of the CPSU. Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee E. Ligachev in a report at a solemn meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on the 69 anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution 6 in November 1986, said: “Of course, this is not about changing the essence of our social system. On the contrary, this process is aimed at strengthening and developing the fundamental socialist principles, at eliminating everything that is incompatible with them, at creating conditions for the effective use of the enormous potential of socialism ... All the tools of restructuring, all our experience, all our will, focus on reliably to ensure a new, steady rise in the economy and the welfare of the people. ”
Many believe that in any case they would have had to abandon the most hateful (in the then mass representation) traits of the Soviet economy. But, as it turned out, after two decades of reforms, these so-called "hateful" features are the price of other good features that far outweigh the "hateful ones."
To conclude this section, allow me to quote one author from the Czech Republic, already fed up with capitalism. “Today there is a lot of toilet paper in the shops ... But, on the other hand, resolve the question, why do I need toilet paper, if there is nothing to eat? You know, I'm 6 years out of work, six years old, my friend. Sorry for the sharpness of the tone, but I prefer the queues for toilet paper to the queues in front of the labor exchange. ”
So, socialism was destroyed not by objective economic factors, but by the hands of reformers. Consciously or not, this should be established by the competent authorities. The population, neither in the USSR nor in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of Poland, did not want to abandon the gains of socialism. The cause of the economic catastrophe is the penetration of the ideology of liberalism and reform. And to destroy the USSR helped international economic agencies.
Here is the opinion of the Nobel Prize winner Stiglitz. (68) “In the future, Russia's economic indicators were impressive, but its gross domestic product is still almost 30% lower than it was in 1990 year. With growth rates around 4% per year, it will take another ten years for the Russian economy to reach the level it was at the time of the collapse of communism. ”
WERED sober voices?
Liberals can declare that it’s good, they say, to wave their fists after a fight. Say, in those years, all economists, as one, recognized the goodness of the market for the USSR. But is it? Did all learned economists support the direction of the restructuring of the Soviet economy, elected by Gorbachev and the then young reformers? It turns out that not all.
For example, Academician Yaremenko categorically objected to the economic policy leading to the destruction of a significant part of the existing production potential, the “technological core” of the national economy, reasonably showing the futility of the raw materials orientation of the domestic economy, inexorably arising from the nature and content of 90-s production , science, social sphere. (69)
Yu.V. Yaremenko warned that the production and technological structure of the national economy is not able to adequately respond to the governing "macroeconomic" impacts, carried out in accordance with the traditional canons of market regulation. According to his views, the role and functions of the state in the economy should not only not weaken, but even strengthen.
The efforts of the reformers were not in vain. Here is an interesting fact. In the 1922, the USSR was formed, which accounted for only 1% of global industry, and after 50 years - in 1972 - 20% of the total world industrial production. Currently, the share of Russia in the global industry does not exceed 1,5%. We should cite the authoritative opinion of I. Nikolaev, who convincingly showed that the GNP that the State Statistics Committee expects has little to do with reality. He analyzed investment and physical production indicators and gave an estimate of GNP in 42% of the Soviet for 2003 a year. Since then, the GNP has grown 1,3 times to a level of about 60% of the Soviet. The reformers, of course, count more, but still, even they recognize that the level of production that existed in the RSFSR has not been reached.
So, after all of this I make the final conclusion: the linearity of the prediction is applicable for the USSR 1985 of the year.
HOW TO HAVE PLAYED US
While I was concerned about the standard of living on average. Now you need to go to the details of income distribution among the population. Social inequality can be estimated by comparing the incomes of the poorest, lower 10% of the population with the incomes of the richest, the upper 10%. This ratio is called the decile coefficient. (91) The income of the bulk of the population is often largely determined not just by the level of GNP, but by the decile coefficient. In Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in the world, the bottom 10 percent of the population gets the entire 0,5% of national income consumed. While the top 10 percent get 43,6%. In rich Switzerland, the lower 10% already receive 2,9%, and the upper 10% - only 28,6%.
Now in official calculations, the decile coefficient in Russia is equal to 16 (for example, in 2004, the ratio of incomes to 10% of the richest and 10% of the poorest Russians reached 15,2-fold size (92)) and the quintile coefficient (the ratio of the lowest wage among 20% The most paid workers to the highest wages among 20% of the lowest paid workers (93) are equal to 89. By this indicator, which measures the social stratification of the population, Russia by 2002 was overtaken not only by all developed countries - the United States (15,9), the United Kingdom (XN UMX), Greece (13,8), France (10,0), Germany (9,1), Spain (9,0), Japan (9,0), but also a number of developing and postsocialist countries: Dominican Republic (4,5), Philippines (17,7), Thailand ( 16,5), Tunisia (13,4), Turkey (13,4), Poland (13,3), Hungary (9,3), Indonesia (8,9), Pakistan (7,8). (7,6)
But the official data are clearly underestimated. For example, in an article close to the Kremlin of Rimashevskaya, a decile coefficient equal to 14 is given. According to the CIA, US intelligence, which I somehow trust more than through mendacious (see (97)) data of the Russian statistics, in 1998, the decile coefficient in Russia was 22,7 (98) -22,8. (99) B 2000, according to the international agency that calculates the human development index, (100) the decile coefficient in Russia was equal to 20,3.
But that is not all. A group of experts from the World Bank, the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the University of North Carolina (USA), which conducts long-term monitoring of the budget of 4's thousands of households (large research project “Russia longitudinal monitoring monitoring”), gives the decile coefficient for 1996 - 36,3! Domestic economists have a similar opinion. Thus, the Institute of Public Examination, as well as the most authoritative sociologists today argue that the decile coefficient in Russia reaches 40.
I tend to trust American and independent Russian scientists more than official “democratic” statistics. And it is quite reasonable. For example, such facts indicate an ever increasing increase in the difference in the incomes of Russians.
HOW TO ASSESS DIFFERENTIATION OF INCOME?
So, the incomes of Russians differ tenfold, but what decile and quintile coefficient should be chosen for calculations? The scatter obtained by different authors of indicators is too large. As in the case of the USSR, I preferred the figures provided by international agencies, in particular the CIA.
DIFFERENTIATION OF INCOME IN THE USSR
The next question, how to assess the differentiation of income in the USSR? The level of income differentiation under Stalin was great. Then the apartments were built very little and did not give apartments. Apartments were given mainly to specialists. According to the directives of the 20th Congress, one of the party’s goals was to “reduce the difference in the level of wages of low-paid and highly paid workers, and increase the wages of low- and middle-paid workers and employees”. At about the same time commercial stores were liquidated. In 1968, the decile coefficient went down to a record low of 2.7, it rose to 1990 by 3.3. (114) In fact, the Soviet state set a progressive tax on the sale of luxury goods at the expense of uneven prices for essential goods and luxury goods, and It means a tax on the rich.
According to official Goskomstat data, the decile coefficient in the USSR in 1990 was 4,4. Even three years after the start of reforms, in 1991, the decile coefficient was equal to 4,5, whereas in the USA it was 5,6. But by 1994 in Russia, he jumped to 15,1. According to RAS scientists, who took into account the hidden incomes of the rich, the actual decile coefficient in Russia in 1996 was 23. (115)
Therefore, for the 1985 of the year, I will take the decile coefficient equal to 3,2. (116) The 4 table shows the distribution of income during Soviet times. The income distribution was calculated by me based on the Lorenz curves. (117)
Now take the first 8 groups and compare with the latest 2. That is, 80% of the population and 20% of the richest. In today's Russia, 80% of the population accounts for 34,1% of income. The richest 20% get 65,9% consumed by GNP of Russia. In the USSR, the situation was different. 80% of the population received 63,9% of income, while the richest 20% received only 36,1%. In other words, if we establish the decile and quintile coefficients that were in the USSR, then the revenues of 80% of the population automatically (without any change in the level of production) will increase 1,8 times. So, in and of itself, a return to the principles of social policy that existed in the USSR makes it possible to improve the lives of the overwhelming majority of Russians in 1,8.
And here is another important parameter - the ratio of prices for essential products and luxury products. Bread has risen in price relative to the average car (VAZ-2105) about 5 times, and travel by metro to 8 times. The prices of absolutely essential goods soared up even more - relatively cheap domestic cigarettes and the most necessary medicines. In the USSR, on the contrary, low prices for the most necessary products eased the situation of people with low incomes, almost equalizing them on the main indicators of lifestyle with well-to-do people. (118) If we take into account that the average wage does not take into account the consumption basket, the poorest segments of the population - due to the relative rise in price of essential products, they lowered their standard of living even more. I would attribute at least 10% to this factor (coefficient 1,1).
Democrats brought the price for one square meter to 32 thousand rubles, and in Moscow - about two hundred thousand rubles, and after that they lie about Soviet power without a twinge of conscience! (119) Now almost half of Russians (43%) spend on rent and utilities ( electricity, gas, water, telephone) from a quarter to half of the total income of their families. 17% spend on it from half to three quarters of earnings. Less than a third of Russians give a communal bill up to 25% of their money.
So, because of the rise in housing prices, the rent on homeowners, invisible in the USSR, became visible and for its maintenance more than 30% of the money supply is required. Now the cost of utilities is often 30% of revenues. If we take into account the payment for apartments when they are purchased, then the share of money spent on the service of payment for accommodation will be 50%, but I will accept this share as 30%. In other words, from the general level of consumption in present-day Russia, about 30% falls on scrolling through the market for housing prices. If this is the case, then it should be recognized that the level of average wages in today's Russia should be reduced by 1,3 times.
These two factors determining the standard of living of the majority of the population (introducing property rents, mainly real estate, and rising oil prices into the money turnover), gave an increase for even the absolutely stagnant USSR 1,6 times, and taking into account the 1,1 coefficient even 1,75.
And finally, the last. Recall that about 30% of the current consumption growth in Russia is associated with rising oil prices. It is no secret that the main factor ensuring the growth of the Russian economy is not any effort of the people on innovations or technical development, but simply an increase in the price of oil and gas in international markets. During Soviet times, oil prices fell. Now is growing rapidly. There is no reason to believe that if the USSR collapsed, the price of oil would not rise. If the USSR had remained intact, then oil prices would have increased anyway. This is the law of a capitalist economy - a rise in prices for a product that is lacking. If the increase in oil prices were the same, they would give an additional increase in GDP by 30%. That is why I am introducing an amendment to this factor in the average salary. Salary in the USSR should be increased 1,3 times.
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION FUNDS
But that's not all. In my calculations, I did not take into account social consumption funds. They constituted a significant part of the national income consumed. For example, in 1988, only payments from public consumption funds accounted for almost 36% of the population’s cash income. Under socialism, the people got what they really needed, education, security, health, apartments ... and now he buys what he is being driven into advertising.
The destruction of city and district Soviets, the practical elimination of self-government, the dictatorship and the autocracy of the “executive branch” had the most dramatic effect on the appearance of urban areas, especially on the outskirts, and the way of life in them. On the site of working and sleeping areas, urban ghettos are formed, and parks and recreation areas are diverted to “elite development” zones, which are trying to become zones of prosperous capitalism among the ruined urban environment.
HOW WE WORK BEFORE AND HOW NOW?
Well, what about the intensity of the work? One graduate student went to Switzerland. He came for the holidays and said: "I knew that I would have to work hard, but in order to have so much ...". What am I for? To the fact that the late Brezhnev years were not a war at all, but a complete relaxation. All worked much less than many spinning in today's Russia. This is evidenced by at least a sharp reduction in reading literature. “Once,” as another graduate student in America told me. “There is no time to read, it’s necessary to plow.”
There was a lot of information about how they worked in the USSR and in the West. I remember one story. Our Hero of Sotstrud from Ivanov, the foremost textile industry, V. Golubev, gave 5 a multiple production rate and I myself saw how she had to fly between the machines. She went to Belgium. She was taken to a weaving mill, and she saw that there, on the same Belgian machines, she worked like a 80% shift.
S.G. Kara Murza writes: “I once argued with a friend, the captain of a Spanish fishing trawler. He says: “You violated Lenin’s law on labor productivity. When we passed by the Soviet ship, our fishermen looked with hatred: the Russians, free from the watch, were sunbathing, playing chess on the deck. And we on the same vessel had half the staff, and worked on 16 hours per day. From each flight, I drove one or two under protection — I went crazy. ” I ask: “So what's so good about it? After all, in the port you had the same number of unemployed who have killed themselves with drugs. Why such a performance? “But Lenin said so,” and there were no more fair arguments. And unfair (like benefits for the owners), he himself did not want to use. He thought about this for a year, and then admitted that the Soviet fishermen had better, and in this case socialism does not need a performance criterion. ”Now Russia has surpassed Spain in this regard.
Further. Visiting Ivanovo, I often ask my friends about how they spin. It turns out that now most of them work in two or even three jobs. There is almost no time for rest. Children are abandoned. And the intensification of labor is intensifying. For example, a surcharge has recently been introduced for district doctors, but President Putin forgot to extend the effect of the allowance to leave and now district doctors have stopped taking holidays. But in the years of Soviet power, doctors and teachers had the longest vacation among workers. What do I want to say? The fact that the so-called average salary in today's Russia includes a sharp intensification of labor, which means that this factor should also be taken into account when assessing the standard of living. It turns out an interesting phenomenon - it seems that labor productivity in the USSR was less than in the West, they worked less, but you should, and Tanks there was enough money and lived 1,4-1,7 times better than now.
FORECAST GROWTH FOR A DEATH COUNTRY
After all these calculations, I was faced with a new question: what is the basic growth rate to take to forecast salary growth in the USSR after 1985? Until 1987, the country grew at an average of 3,5%. This is evidenced by the data of independent calculations by economists of reformers, and more precisely the teams of Yavlinsky, who are hard to blame for being addicted to socialism. This is also indicated by the data from the growth check of natural indicators, which demonstrates that the growth in the USSR in recent years before the beginning of the 1989 crisis was about 3% per year. And most importantly, over the years with a rate of about 3% electricity consumption has grown, and this is an integral indicator. The increase in electricity consumption from 1980 to 1988 year (8 years) was 32%, if there was an increase in 3%, then the increase would be 34%. Considering that gas consumption grew at even higher rates, the forecast that these stable growth rates within 3-3,5% per year would continue seemed very high.
5 table. Natural indicators of production and living standards in the USSR ("National Economy of the USSR in 1990, the Statistical Yearbook. M. 1991. Finance and Statistics") (127)
Natural indicators Years 1980 1985 1988
Sending passengers by all modes of transport (million people) 69124 75917 82445
Including aviation +104 113 125 XNUMX
Machines for making org. fertilizer (thousand pieces) 47,9 56,3 70,7
Machining centers (thousand pcs.) 0,7 2,5 3,7
Rotary and mouth.-conv. lines (pieces) - 860 1558
Electricity (billion kWh) 94 1544 1705
Including at nuclear power stations 72,9 167 216
Trolley buses (pieces) 2015 2467 2545
Cargo. cars (thous. pcs.) 787 823 862
Min fertilizers (million tons) 24,8 33,2 37,1
Paintwork materials (million tons) 2883 3315 3650
Cement (kt) 5792 79089 84030
Beef and veal (thousand tons) 4392 4957 5848
Poultry Meat (kt) 1224 1744 2137
Milk (recalculated in million tons) 25,5 29,8 33,5
Canned food (million standard cans) 15270 17993 21109
Meat per capita (kg. In brackets in auxiliary household) 34,4 (4,7) 39 (5,5) 44,9 (5,6)
Average month salary in state farms (rub.) 149,7 184,4 212,4
The length of the trolleybus routes (km) 7009,8 8147,1 8803,2
Number of 20167 27185 33281 telephones
Growth GNP 100 120 134
In addition, gas consumption increased, the public transportation system, consumer services improved. These are all the factors that created the increase in energy supply.
Therefore, I had the right to assume that the RSFSR would develop steadily and would give 3-3,5% growth per year, as it was on average in previous years. But I deliberately did not take 3% growth, which gave the RSFSR during 1978-1987 years, a decade of stable development - not to tease geese - I took the forecast in 2,5% growth, which, as it turned out, was minimal, by statistical modeling of growth trends .
After reviewing all these issues, taking figures from internationally available sources on the Internet, showing the growth rate of GNP in Russia, I made calculations and it turned out that in 2005, Russia’s GNP was 237% of the 1965 year, while in the 1991, the RSFSR had The corresponding figure in 264,7%. If we take the peak of the achievements of the RSFSR in the Soviet time 1989 year, then that year the GNP amounted to 288,5% from the level of 1965 year. So, international statistics show that today's Russia has not yet reached the highest level that Soviet Russia had (82% of the 1989 level of the year). This fact is reflected in such an indicator of international statistics as the Human Development Index (100), which in Russia has not recovered within the framework of the Soviet era level.
1990 g. - 0.817
1995 g. - 0.770
2003 g. - 0.795
What happened? It turned out that if there were no Perestroika and subsequent reforms, the GNP in Russia would be at the level of 428,3% of the level of 1965 of the year. At the end of the year, 2005, this figure was only 237%. In other words, even if we take deliberately underestimated predicted results of GDP growth, Soviet Russia would have, without any straining, a level of economy in 1,8, and therefore a standard of living, than now. Remember this figure. If we take the increase in 3,5%, then by the year 2005 the RSFSR would have a GNP in 500,3% of the level 1965 of the year. In other words, we would live 2,1 twice as good as it is now. Finally, take the most pessimistic forecast - the annual increase in 1,5%. Then you would live in 1,54 times better than now.
I note that the consequences of the degradation of science would gradually manifest themselves without sharp jumps in the decline in GDP growth from 3,5% to 1% by the end of the period. What on average would give the same 2%, or even higher. Tendencies to deterioration would not be detected, since the effect of degradation of science usually manifests itself after 10 or more years. Given the very high level of higher education in the USSR, the system would have been viable for at least 15 years, even if everything was left as it was.
If we take into account the opinion of the “democrats” that there were good reasons to assume that trends in the USSR economy changed significantly during the 75-85 of the year, then they are reflected in the “pessimistic scenario” with 0% growth. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet economy would show a much lower growth rate, that is, it would fall in 2 times, without starting a restructuring. In the end, the Great Depression was not least due to government action. It could either be avoided or the consequences substantially reduced. And the consequences of this depression were significantly lower than the effects of Perestroika. In any economy after a crisis, there are usually higher growth rates. Even after the Civil War in Russia, the economy was restored to 10 in 1928 years to the year. Moreover, industrialization, the GOERLO plan, the increase in the financing of science have already begun. In the current Russian economy there is no high growth rate of the economy itself. And there is no growth associated with high oil prices. That is, the economy continues to degrade. No amount of depreciation required, no investment ...
SO MUCH AS BETTER WE WOULD LIVE?
Now I will try to calculate what would have happened if Gorbachev had not come. In my calculations, I will define an optimistic and pessimistic scenario and then compare how we would live in the first and second cases.
To begin with, the average salary is now 157 rubles, and the pension is 62 rubles. In the USSR, 1985, the average salary was 200 rubles, and the pension was 132 rubles. If we accept that pensioners make up 10% of the adult population, then the average per capita income in Russia will be 148,3 rubles, and in the USSR - 1985 - 192,2 rubles. If we take into account the decile and quintile coefficients, then 80% of the population in Russia - 2012 have an average income of 50,6 rubles, and in the USSR - 1985 - 123,5 rubles. If the Soviet salary was compensated for the increase in oil prices (1,3 ratio), then it would be 2012 rubles in the USSR - 179,8. If we take into account that 30% of the average salary of Russians now goes to the maintenance of housing issues, then the non-apartment part, corresponding to the total in the USSR, will be 38,98 rubles.
So far we have not taken into account the increase in GNP in the USSR. But even in this case, 80% of the population in the USSR-2012 would live better than in Russia - 2012 in 4,2 times. If we take the linear trend of growth of the average salary in the USSR - 1985 and accept that this trend will not change, then the average income in the USSR-2012 would be 256,2 rubles, which is 5 times higher than the corrected income in Russia-2012.
In other words, it turns out that if the USSR would not be broken now, then 80% of the Russian population would live 5 times better than they are now. Well, what would have happened if the most pessimistic forecast had come true (annual increase in 0%). Then you would live better 4 times. Agree - not bad either. Imagine, the salary in 4 would be higher than the current one, and this at current prices and without taking into account additional factors.
. “Changes in the level and quality of life of the population have been transformed into acute social and economic problems that had equally acute demographic consequences. Among them:
• catastrophic decline in income and material security of the main part of the population;
• a high proportion of the poor with an extremely poor definition of poverty level;
• unprecedented polarization of living conditions;
• significant unemployment;
• degradation of social security and the actual destruction of the social sphere, including housing and communal services.
“Shock therapy” led to a sharp drop in the monetary incomes of the population, and hopes for their recovery in the coming years are low.
It can be said that now there are two Russia who live in different dimensions, poorly understand each other, have different orientations and preferences, their own demand and the market for supply of goods and services
So, the majority of Russians should realize that, without hindering the destruction of the USSR by their passivity, they have done a lot of stupidity. Under the USSR, they would live many, many, many better than they do now. And this is not a propaganda slogan. Quite a few unbiased Western scholars hold the same opinion. So, the authors of the Journal of Cold War Studies, which is published in Harvard (articles on economics, but not on politics, there are reasonable), do not hesitate to admit that, according to their calculations, it turns out that in some areas of the USSR it has reached significant success (but do not select indicators in such a way as to create the impression that the USSR was a paradise on earth).
If someone says that there is no alternative history, then I will answer what happens. For the Democrats. After all, it was they who dragged out Mendeleev’s forecast about what the population of Russia should have been in the 20 century. This prediction was also made by simple linear extrapolation. However, the real population of Russia in the 20 century turned out to be much less numerical. The difference was declared by the Democrats as victims of the Bolshevik regime. This is where the numbers in 60 of millions of victims originate. Why they can, but I can not?