Dead Hand is worse than Aegis and Tomahawk
The very best tool would be to resuscitate the Perimeter system.
Now in the media there is an intensive discussion of military reform. In particular, many journalists demand that all possible opponents be named by name.
I hasten to reassure everyone, now there will be no big war guaranteed. The pacifist blue dream came true - “XXI century without wars”. Since 2000, not a single country in the world has been in a state of war for a single day, although not a single day has passed so that fighting would not be fought at one or several points on the globe.
FRENCH OPTION FOR RUSSIA
Now the war is called "the fight against terrorism", "peacekeeping", "peace enforcement", etc. Therefore, I propose to change the terminology and speak not about war or defense of the fatherland, but about the reaction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to threats to national security. The illusions of some liberals, who believed that the source of the Cold War was communism and that peace and general prosperity would come after its disappearance, turned out to be a delusion.
Moreover, if before the 1991 of the year, the UN Security Council and International Law were to some extent holding back conflicts, now their action is negligible. As for the notorious world public opinion, then during the August 2008 conflict, everything fell into place. The whole world community supported the aggressor, not its victim. Western TV channels showed the burning streets of Tskhinvali, posing as Georgian cities.
It is time to recall the covenant of Alexander III the Peacemaker: "Russia has only two allies - its army and navy." Does this mean that Russia in a crisis should get involved in a symmetrical arms race like the USSR? Until the USSR 1991 traded weapons mostly at a loss, selling it cheaply to “friends”, or even simply donating it.
It is curious why our politicians and the military do not wish to recall the French phenomenon of 1946 – 1991? France was ravaged by the Second World War, then took part in two dozen large and small colonial wars in Laos, Vietnam, in the war for the Suez Canal 1956, the Algerian War (1954 – 1962). Nevertheless, the French managed, independently of other countries, to create a full range of weapons from ATGMs to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), almost not yielding to superpowers. All French ships, including nuclear submarines with ICBMs and aircraft carriers, were built in French shipyards and carry French weapons. And our Ministry of Defense now wants to buy French warships.
But the French people, in order to create the third largest military-industrial complex in the world, did not pull down their belts at all. The market economy was intensively developing in the country, the standard of living was steadily growing.
The casket opens simply. In 1950-1990, approximately 60% of the weapons produced by France were exported. Moreover, exports were carried out in all directions. So, in the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the armies of Israel and all the Arab countries were heavily armed with French weapons. Iran and Iraq also fought among themselves with French weapons. England is France’s NATO ally, but in the Falkland War it was French-made planes and missiles that caused the most damage to the British the fleet.
I fully admit that the refined intellectual will be indignant: “The French arms trade in all azimuths is immoral!” But, alas, if France would not have sold these weapon systems, others would have sold them guaranteed.
A rhetorical question arises: can our nuclear submarines sold to Iran, Venezuela, India, Chile, Argentina, etc., even hypothetically damage Russia at least in a separate future? What are nuclear boats? Take purely defensive weapons - anti-aircraft missiles. Why can't the C-300 anti-aircraft complex be sold to Venezuela, Iran, Syria and other countries?
AMERICAN ROCKET CALL
Unfortunately, our politicians and media pay very little attention to the US shipborne missile defense system, which was created during the modernization of the Aegis anti-aircraft complex. The new rocket received the name "Standard-3" (SM-3) and after certain alterations (of which the Pentagon keeps secret) it can be equipped with any of the United States 84 Navy ships having the Aegis system. These are 27 Ticondeur-type cruisers and 57 Airlie Burke-type destroyers.
In 2006, the CG-67 “Shiloh” cruiser hit the SM-3 missile with a missile warhead at an altitude of 200 km 250 km north-west of Kauan Island (the archipelago of Hawaii). It is interesting that, according to the Western media, the guidance on the warhead was carried out from the Japanese destroyer DDG-174 "Kirishima" (full displacement 9490 t; equipped with the "Aegis" system).
The fact is that since 2005, Japan has been equipping its fleet with Aegis system S-3 missiles with the help of the USA.
The first Japanese ship equipped with the Aegis system with SM-3 was the destroyer Atado DDG-177. He received anti-missiles at the very end of 2007.
November 6 2006 missiles SM-3, launched from the destroyer DDG-70 "Lake Erie", was intercepted immediately two ICBM warheads at an altitude of about 180 km.
And 21 March 2008 of the year the SM-3 rocket from the same Lake Erie struck at an altitude of 247 km and hit the American secret satellite L-21 Radarsat with a direct hit. The official designation of this secret spacecraft is USA-193.
So, in the Far East, American and Japanese destroyers and cruisers can shoot down ballistic missiles of Russian submarines in the initial part of the trajectory, even if they are launched from their own territorial waters.
I note that the American ships with the Aegis system regularly visit the Black, Baltic and Barents Seas. The maritime missile defense system is dangerous for the Russian Federation not only during the war. The US military deliberately exaggerates its capabilities, deceiving incompetent people in the United States and Europe, from presidents and ministers to shopkeepers.
The possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike of the Soviet Union frightened everyone, and since 1945, there has not been a direct military clash between the West and Russia. Now for the first time in 60 years, politicians and commoners of NATO countries have created the illusion of their own impunity. Meanwhile, our media does not occur to spoil this euphoria, recalling the American tests of nuclear weapons at altitudes from 80 to 400 km in the summer of 1962, on the Johnson Atoll. Then, after each explosion for several hours, radio communications were interrupted throughout the Pacific.
In 2001, the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) attempted to evaluate the possible effects of the tests on low-orbit satellites. The results were disappointing: one small nuclear charge (from 10 to 20 kilotons - like a bomb dropped on Hiroshima), exploded at an altitude from 125 to 300 km, “is enough to disable all satellites that do not have special protection against radiation. Denis Papadopoulos, a specialist in plasma physics at the University of Maryland, had a different opinion: "An 10-kiloton nuclear bomb detonated at a specially calculated height can lead to a loss of 90% of all low-orbit satellites for about a month." It is estimated that the cost of replacing equipment that was disabled by the effects of a high-altitude nuclear explosion will amount to more than 100 billion dollars. This is not counting the total economic losses from the loss of opportunities provided by space technology!
Why not ask American experts in the field of missile defense to explain how the Aegis system and other missile defense systems will work after the explosion in low orbits of two dozen hydrogen charges? Well, then let the Western taxpayers themselves think about what the Pentagon is spending money in a crisis.
RECORDED TOMAHAVKI
Another weapon that created instability in the world and gave rise to a feeling of impunity among military and politicians is American Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of 2200 – 2500 km. Already, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the United States and NATO countries can launch thousands of such missiles in the Russian Federation. "Tomahawks" can affect the mines of ICBMs, mobile ICBM complexes, communications centers, command posts. Western media claim that a sudden strike with non-nuclear cruise missiles could completely deprive Russia of the possibility of a nuclear strike.
In this regard, it is surprising that the issue of Tomahawk missiles is not included by our diplomats in the framework of the START negotiations.
By the way, it would be nice to remind our admirals and designers of the Novator Design Bureau that our Tomahawk counterparts - Grenades and others there are different - are not suitable even for American cruise missiles. And I'm not saying this, but Aunt Geography.
The US Air Force and Navy will never let our ships over a distance of 2500 km to the shores of America. Therefore, the Russian response to the American "Tomahawks" can only be ship missiles "Meteorite" and "Bolid" or their more effective counterparts with a range of 5 – 8 thousand km.
GOOD FORGOTTEN OLD
But the best way to rid the West of illusions about the possibility of delivering an impunity attack on Russia would be to reanimate the Perimeter system.
The system so frightened the West at the beginning of 1990's that it was called the “Dead Hand”. I will remind you briefly history this horror stories.
In the US, 1970 began the development of the “Limited Nuclear War” doctrine. In accordance with it, the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the Strategic Missile Forces communication lines will be destroyed by the first blow, and the surviving communication lines will be suppressed by radio-electronic interference. In this way, the US leadership was hoping to avoid a nuclear strike.
In response to the USSR, it was decided, in addition to the available RSVN communication channels, to create a special command rocket, equipped with a powerful radio transmitting device, launched in a special period and giving commands to launch all intercontinental missiles on alert throughout the USSR. Moreover, this rocket was only the main part of a large system.
To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was initially designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is able to decide on a retaliatory strike independently, without participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. The system included numerous instruments for measuring radiation, seismic vibrations, it is connected with early warning radar stations, early warning satellites for rocket attacks, etc. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, however, it is, in fact, the only deterrent that gives real guarantees of the potential adversary’s refusal from the concept of a preventive crushing blow.
ASYMMETRIC "PERIMETER"
The principle of operation of the Perimeter system is as follows. In peacetime, the main components of the system are on standby, monitoring the situation and processing the data coming from the measuring posts. In the event of a threat of a large-scale attack with a nuclear weapon, confirmed by data from early warning systems about a rocket attack, the Perimeter complex is automatically alerted and begins to monitor the operational situation.
If the sensory components of the system confirm the fact of a massive nuclear strike with sufficient reliability, and the system itself loses its connection with the main strategic missile forces command centers for a certain period of time, it initiates the launch of several command missiles, which, flying over their territory, broadcast control signals installed on board with powerful radio transmitters signal, and launch codes for all components of the nuclear triad - mine and mobile launch complexes, nuclear submarine missile cruisers and strategic aviation. The receiving equipment of both the Strategic Missile Forces command posts and individual launchers, having received this signal, begins the process of immediately launching ballistic missiles in fully automatic mode, providing a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even in the event of the death of all personnel.
The development of a special command missile system "Perimeter" was given to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by a joint resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the CPSU Central Committee No. 695-227 of August 30 of 1974 of the year. As the base rocket, it was originally supposed to use the MP-UR100 rocket (15A15), later they stopped on the MP-UR100 UTTH rocket (15A16). The rocket modified in part of the control system received the index 15А11.
In December 1975, the draft rocket of the command rocket was completed. The rocket installed a special warhead, which had an index of 15B99, which included the original radio engineering system developed by the OKB LPI (Leningrad Polytechnic Institute). To ensure the conditions of its operation, the MS should have a constant orientation in space during the flight. A special system for its sedation, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing a propulsion system for a special MS “Mayak”), which significantly reduced the cost and terms of its creation and development. The production of a special MS 15B99 was organized at the Strela research and production association in Orenburg.
After ground testing of new technical solutions in 1979, flight design tests of a command rocket began. At NIIP-5, sites 176 and 181, two experimental mine launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command center was set up at the 71 site, equipped with a newly developed unique command and control equipment to provide remote control and launch of a command missile following orders from the highest levels of command and control of the Strategic Missile Forces. A shielded anechoic chamber equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of a radio transmitter was constructed at a special technical position in the body of the assembly.
Flight tests of the 15А11 rocket were conducted under the direction of the State Commission, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant-General Varfolomey Korobushin.
The first launch of the command rocket 15А11 with the equivalent of the transmitter was successful on 26 December 1979 of the year. The interaction of all systems involved in the launch was tested; the rocket brought the 15B99 MS to the nominal trajectory with a peak about 4000 km and a range of 4500 km. Total for flight tests was made 10 missiles. However, from 1979 to 1986 a year, there were only seven starts.
During the tests, real launches of various types of ICBMs from combat facilities were carried out on orders transmitted by the 15A11 command rocket during the flight. To this end, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and receivers of the Perimeter system were installed. Later, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent similar modifications. In total, during the flight test design (LCI), six launches were deemed successful, and one - partially successful. In connection with the successful course of the tests and the fulfillment of the tasks set, the State Commission found it possible to be satisfied with seven launches instead of the planned ten.
MEDICATION FOR POSSIBLE ILLUSIONS
Simultaneously with the LKI missiles, ground tests of the functioning of the entire complex were carried out under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. The tests were carried out at the site of the Kharkov Physical-Technical Institute, in the laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas-16), as well as at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the equipment at the levels of impact of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion exceeding those specified by the TTZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
In addition, during the tests, the USSR Council of Ministers resolution was tasked with expanding the functions of the complex, bringing combat orders not only to ground-based intercontinental missile launchers, but also to nuclear-powered submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft on airfields and in the air, and control points of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy. The flight tests of the command missile were completed in March 1982 of the year, and in January 1985 of the year the Perimeter complex was put on combat duty.
Data on the "Perimeter" system is highly classified. However, it can be assumed that the technical maintenance of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base 15А16 rocket. The launcher - mine, automated, highly protected, most likely the type of OS - upgraded OS OS-84.
There is no reliable information about the system, however, according to indirect data, it can be assumed that this is a complex expert system equipped with a variety of communication systems and sensors that monitor the combat situation. The system tracks the presence and intensity of negotiations on the air at military frequencies, receiving telemetry signals from the posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, the level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates that coincide with sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth cortex (which corresponds to the picture of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes), and the presence of living people on the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike. After setting on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command and staff exercises.
In December, the modernized system, called Perimeter-RC, was put into service until December 1990, when the complex was removed from combat duty as part of the START-1995 agreement.
It is quite possible that the Perimeter complex should be upgraded so that it can respond quickly and to the strike with non-nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles.
I am sure that our scientists can come up with more than a dozen asymmetric responses to the US military threat, and an order of magnitude cheaper ones. As for their immorality, if some British ladies consider anti-personnel mines to be immoral weapons, and “Tomahawks” are very respectable, then it’s not a bad idea to scare them well. And the more the lady will vote, the less will our Western friends be willing to bully Russia.
I hasten to reassure everyone, now there will be no big war guaranteed. The pacifist blue dream came true - “XXI century without wars”. Since 2000, not a single country in the world has been in a state of war for a single day, although not a single day has passed so that fighting would not be fought at one or several points on the globe.
FRENCH OPTION FOR RUSSIA
Now the war is called "the fight against terrorism", "peacekeeping", "peace enforcement", etc. Therefore, I propose to change the terminology and speak not about war or defense of the fatherland, but about the reaction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to threats to national security. The illusions of some liberals, who believed that the source of the Cold War was communism and that peace and general prosperity would come after its disappearance, turned out to be a delusion.
Moreover, if before the 1991 of the year, the UN Security Council and International Law were to some extent holding back conflicts, now their action is negligible. As for the notorious world public opinion, then during the August 2008 conflict, everything fell into place. The whole world community supported the aggressor, not its victim. Western TV channels showed the burning streets of Tskhinvali, posing as Georgian cities.
It is time to recall the covenant of Alexander III the Peacemaker: "Russia has only two allies - its army and navy." Does this mean that Russia in a crisis should get involved in a symmetrical arms race like the USSR? Until the USSR 1991 traded weapons mostly at a loss, selling it cheaply to “friends”, or even simply donating it.
It is curious why our politicians and the military do not wish to recall the French phenomenon of 1946 – 1991? France was ravaged by the Second World War, then took part in two dozen large and small colonial wars in Laos, Vietnam, in the war for the Suez Canal 1956, the Algerian War (1954 – 1962). Nevertheless, the French managed, independently of other countries, to create a full range of weapons from ATGMs to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), almost not yielding to superpowers. All French ships, including nuclear submarines with ICBMs and aircraft carriers, were built in French shipyards and carry French weapons. And our Ministry of Defense now wants to buy French warships.
But the French people, in order to create the third largest military-industrial complex in the world, did not pull down their belts at all. The market economy was intensively developing in the country, the standard of living was steadily growing.
The casket opens simply. In 1950-1990, approximately 60% of the weapons produced by France were exported. Moreover, exports were carried out in all directions. So, in the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the armies of Israel and all the Arab countries were heavily armed with French weapons. Iran and Iraq also fought among themselves with French weapons. England is France’s NATO ally, but in the Falkland War it was French-made planes and missiles that caused the most damage to the British the fleet.
I fully admit that the refined intellectual will be indignant: “The French arms trade in all azimuths is immoral!” But, alas, if France would not have sold these weapon systems, others would have sold them guaranteed.
A rhetorical question arises: can our nuclear submarines sold to Iran, Venezuela, India, Chile, Argentina, etc., even hypothetically damage Russia at least in a separate future? What are nuclear boats? Take purely defensive weapons - anti-aircraft missiles. Why can't the C-300 anti-aircraft complex be sold to Venezuela, Iran, Syria and other countries?
AMERICAN ROCKET CALL
Unfortunately, our politicians and media pay very little attention to the US shipborne missile defense system, which was created during the modernization of the Aegis anti-aircraft complex. The new rocket received the name "Standard-3" (SM-3) and after certain alterations (of which the Pentagon keeps secret) it can be equipped with any of the United States 84 Navy ships having the Aegis system. These are 27 Ticondeur-type cruisers and 57 Airlie Burke-type destroyers.
In 2006, the CG-67 “Shiloh” cruiser hit the SM-3 missile with a missile warhead at an altitude of 200 km 250 km north-west of Kauan Island (the archipelago of Hawaii). It is interesting that, according to the Western media, the guidance on the warhead was carried out from the Japanese destroyer DDG-174 "Kirishima" (full displacement 9490 t; equipped with the "Aegis" system).
The fact is that since 2005, Japan has been equipping its fleet with Aegis system S-3 missiles with the help of the USA.
The first Japanese ship equipped with the Aegis system with SM-3 was the destroyer Atado DDG-177. He received anti-missiles at the very end of 2007.
November 6 2006 missiles SM-3, launched from the destroyer DDG-70 "Lake Erie", was intercepted immediately two ICBM warheads at an altitude of about 180 km.
And 21 March 2008 of the year the SM-3 rocket from the same Lake Erie struck at an altitude of 247 km and hit the American secret satellite L-21 Radarsat with a direct hit. The official designation of this secret spacecraft is USA-193.
So, in the Far East, American and Japanese destroyers and cruisers can shoot down ballistic missiles of Russian submarines in the initial part of the trajectory, even if they are launched from their own territorial waters.
I note that the American ships with the Aegis system regularly visit the Black, Baltic and Barents Seas. The maritime missile defense system is dangerous for the Russian Federation not only during the war. The US military deliberately exaggerates its capabilities, deceiving incompetent people in the United States and Europe, from presidents and ministers to shopkeepers.
The possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike of the Soviet Union frightened everyone, and since 1945, there has not been a direct military clash between the West and Russia. Now for the first time in 60 years, politicians and commoners of NATO countries have created the illusion of their own impunity. Meanwhile, our media does not occur to spoil this euphoria, recalling the American tests of nuclear weapons at altitudes from 80 to 400 km in the summer of 1962, on the Johnson Atoll. Then, after each explosion for several hours, radio communications were interrupted throughout the Pacific.
In 2001, the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) attempted to evaluate the possible effects of the tests on low-orbit satellites. The results were disappointing: one small nuclear charge (from 10 to 20 kilotons - like a bomb dropped on Hiroshima), exploded at an altitude from 125 to 300 km, “is enough to disable all satellites that do not have special protection against radiation. Denis Papadopoulos, a specialist in plasma physics at the University of Maryland, had a different opinion: "An 10-kiloton nuclear bomb detonated at a specially calculated height can lead to a loss of 90% of all low-orbit satellites for about a month." It is estimated that the cost of replacing equipment that was disabled by the effects of a high-altitude nuclear explosion will amount to more than 100 billion dollars. This is not counting the total economic losses from the loss of opportunities provided by space technology!
Why not ask American experts in the field of missile defense to explain how the Aegis system and other missile defense systems will work after the explosion in low orbits of two dozen hydrogen charges? Well, then let the Western taxpayers themselves think about what the Pentagon is spending money in a crisis.
RECORDED TOMAHAVKI
Another weapon that created instability in the world and gave rise to a feeling of impunity among military and politicians is American Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of 2200 – 2500 km. Already, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the United States and NATO countries can launch thousands of such missiles in the Russian Federation. "Tomahawks" can affect the mines of ICBMs, mobile ICBM complexes, communications centers, command posts. Western media claim that a sudden strike with non-nuclear cruise missiles could completely deprive Russia of the possibility of a nuclear strike.
In this regard, it is surprising that the issue of Tomahawk missiles is not included by our diplomats in the framework of the START negotiations.
By the way, it would be nice to remind our admirals and designers of the Novator Design Bureau that our Tomahawk counterparts - Grenades and others there are different - are not suitable even for American cruise missiles. And I'm not saying this, but Aunt Geography.
The US Air Force and Navy will never let our ships over a distance of 2500 km to the shores of America. Therefore, the Russian response to the American "Tomahawks" can only be ship missiles "Meteorite" and "Bolid" or their more effective counterparts with a range of 5 – 8 thousand km.
GOOD FORGOTTEN OLD
But the best way to rid the West of illusions about the possibility of delivering an impunity attack on Russia would be to reanimate the Perimeter system.
The system so frightened the West at the beginning of 1990's that it was called the “Dead Hand”. I will remind you briefly history this horror stories.
In the US, 1970 began the development of the “Limited Nuclear War” doctrine. In accordance with it, the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the Strategic Missile Forces communication lines will be destroyed by the first blow, and the surviving communication lines will be suppressed by radio-electronic interference. In this way, the US leadership was hoping to avoid a nuclear strike.
In response to the USSR, it was decided, in addition to the available RSVN communication channels, to create a special command rocket, equipped with a powerful radio transmitting device, launched in a special period and giving commands to launch all intercontinental missiles on alert throughout the USSR. Moreover, this rocket was only the main part of a large system.
To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was initially designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is able to decide on a retaliatory strike independently, without participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. The system included numerous instruments for measuring radiation, seismic vibrations, it is connected with early warning radar stations, early warning satellites for rocket attacks, etc. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, however, it is, in fact, the only deterrent that gives real guarantees of the potential adversary’s refusal from the concept of a preventive crushing blow.
ASYMMETRIC "PERIMETER"
The principle of operation of the Perimeter system is as follows. In peacetime, the main components of the system are on standby, monitoring the situation and processing the data coming from the measuring posts. In the event of a threat of a large-scale attack with a nuclear weapon, confirmed by data from early warning systems about a rocket attack, the Perimeter complex is automatically alerted and begins to monitor the operational situation.
If the sensory components of the system confirm the fact of a massive nuclear strike with sufficient reliability, and the system itself loses its connection with the main strategic missile forces command centers for a certain period of time, it initiates the launch of several command missiles, which, flying over their territory, broadcast control signals installed on board with powerful radio transmitters signal, and launch codes for all components of the nuclear triad - mine and mobile launch complexes, nuclear submarine missile cruisers and strategic aviation. The receiving equipment of both the Strategic Missile Forces command posts and individual launchers, having received this signal, begins the process of immediately launching ballistic missiles in fully automatic mode, providing a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even in the event of the death of all personnel.
The development of a special command missile system "Perimeter" was given to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by a joint resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the CPSU Central Committee No. 695-227 of August 30 of 1974 of the year. As the base rocket, it was originally supposed to use the MP-UR100 rocket (15A15), later they stopped on the MP-UR100 UTTH rocket (15A16). The rocket modified in part of the control system received the index 15А11.
In December 1975, the draft rocket of the command rocket was completed. The rocket installed a special warhead, which had an index of 15B99, which included the original radio engineering system developed by the OKB LPI (Leningrad Polytechnic Institute). To ensure the conditions of its operation, the MS should have a constant orientation in space during the flight. A special system for its sedation, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing a propulsion system for a special MS “Mayak”), which significantly reduced the cost and terms of its creation and development. The production of a special MS 15B99 was organized at the Strela research and production association in Orenburg.
After ground testing of new technical solutions in 1979, flight design tests of a command rocket began. At NIIP-5, sites 176 and 181, two experimental mine launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command center was set up at the 71 site, equipped with a newly developed unique command and control equipment to provide remote control and launch of a command missile following orders from the highest levels of command and control of the Strategic Missile Forces. A shielded anechoic chamber equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of a radio transmitter was constructed at a special technical position in the body of the assembly.
Flight tests of the 15А11 rocket were conducted under the direction of the State Commission, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant-General Varfolomey Korobushin.
The first launch of the command rocket 15А11 with the equivalent of the transmitter was successful on 26 December 1979 of the year. The interaction of all systems involved in the launch was tested; the rocket brought the 15B99 MS to the nominal trajectory with a peak about 4000 km and a range of 4500 km. Total for flight tests was made 10 missiles. However, from 1979 to 1986 a year, there were only seven starts.
During the tests, real launches of various types of ICBMs from combat facilities were carried out on orders transmitted by the 15A11 command rocket during the flight. To this end, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and receivers of the Perimeter system were installed. Later, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent similar modifications. In total, during the flight test design (LCI), six launches were deemed successful, and one - partially successful. In connection with the successful course of the tests and the fulfillment of the tasks set, the State Commission found it possible to be satisfied with seven launches instead of the planned ten.
MEDICATION FOR POSSIBLE ILLUSIONS
Simultaneously with the LKI missiles, ground tests of the functioning of the entire complex were carried out under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. The tests were carried out at the site of the Kharkov Physical-Technical Institute, in the laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas-16), as well as at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the equipment at the levels of impact of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion exceeding those specified by the TTZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
In addition, during the tests, the USSR Council of Ministers resolution was tasked with expanding the functions of the complex, bringing combat orders not only to ground-based intercontinental missile launchers, but also to nuclear-powered submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft on airfields and in the air, and control points of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy. The flight tests of the command missile were completed in March 1982 of the year, and in January 1985 of the year the Perimeter complex was put on combat duty.
Data on the "Perimeter" system is highly classified. However, it can be assumed that the technical maintenance of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base 15А16 rocket. The launcher - mine, automated, highly protected, most likely the type of OS - upgraded OS OS-84.
There is no reliable information about the system, however, according to indirect data, it can be assumed that this is a complex expert system equipped with a variety of communication systems and sensors that monitor the combat situation. The system tracks the presence and intensity of negotiations on the air at military frequencies, receiving telemetry signals from the posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, the level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates that coincide with sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth cortex (which corresponds to the picture of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes), and the presence of living people on the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike. After setting on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command and staff exercises.
In December, the modernized system, called Perimeter-RC, was put into service until December 1990, when the complex was removed from combat duty as part of the START-1995 agreement.
It is quite possible that the Perimeter complex should be upgraded so that it can respond quickly and to the strike with non-nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles.
I am sure that our scientists can come up with more than a dozen asymmetric responses to the US military threat, and an order of magnitude cheaper ones. As for their immorality, if some British ladies consider anti-personnel mines to be immoral weapons, and “Tomahawks” are very respectable, then it’s not a bad idea to scare them well. And the more the lady will vote, the less will our Western friends be willing to bully Russia.
Information