Military Review

Deep operation. The use of the "new concept" by the armies of the United States and Great Britain in NATO military actions


The experience of the military operation codenamed "Freedom of Iraq", conducted by the US and British armies in 2003, shows that it was based on the concept of "air-ground operation", and in the armies of the countries of the NATO bloc, its type - The concept of "struggle with the second echelon." However, not everyone knows that their essence is analogous to the theory of deep operations developed by Soviet military science as early as 1930-s instead of the outdated theory of sequential operations. This theory was a way out of the “positional impasse” that emerged in the theory and practice of military art during the First World War. The fact is that the possibilities of defense then turned out to be higher than the possibilities of an offensive, which was reflected in the passive opposition of the fronts.

Today the term deep operation can be clearly defined - This is a form of the use of armed forces in a war, providing for the simultaneous defeat of groups and means to the entire depth of the operational construction of the enemy’s defense. Substance deep operation in breaking through the tactical zone of the opposing side in the chosen direction, followed by the rapid development of tactical advantages in operational success by introducing into the battle the echelon of success development - mobile groups (tanks, motorized infantry) and airborne landings to achieve the goal of the operation.

In essence, this method of combat is a fundamentally new theory of offensive actions by massive, technically equipped armies and at the same time a qualitative leap in the development of the art of war. With the adoption of the theory of deep operations, the possibility of an offensive of troops to a great depth at high rates opened up with the aim of encircling and defeating large enemy groupings.

The development of the theory of deep operation and comprehensive practical verification of its positions at war games, exercises and military maneuvers were paid great attention by prominent Russian military leaders and theorists V.K. Triandafill, M.N. Tukhachevsky, A.I. Egorov, I. P. Uborevich, I. E. Yakir, Ya. I. Alksnis, K. B. Kalinovsky, A. N. Se-dyakin and others. In military writings, a deep operation was defined as an operation conducted by a shock army operating in the direction of the main attack. (1 schema).

For a powerful first strike against the enemy and the rapid development of success, a deeply echeloned operational formation of troops was foreseen, including an attack echelon, a breakthrough echelon, reserves, Aviation armies and airborne troops. Echelon attack as part of which it was planned to have rifle corps, reinforced with tanks and artillery, intended to break through the tactical defense zone.

Breakthrough Development Echelon (Mobile group), usually consisting of several mechanized or tank corps, served for the rapid development of tactical success in operational success with the support of aviation and in cooperation with the landing forces. The introduction of this echelon was considered the most expedient after the breakthrough of the tactical zone of the enemy’s defense, and in the case of insufficiently developed defense and the absence of large reserves of it, even earlier. When breaking through fortified bands, the use of this tier was not ruled out and, in order to complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, together with the attack echelon. However, this option was considered less appropriate.

Also developed (especially in the writings of V.K. Triand-fillov) are methods of actions for the development of a breakthrough in the operational depth with the use of decisive maneuver by forces and means. All this increased the chances of successful implementation of the enemy’s defense breakthrough, the development of an offensive at high speeds to a great depth. An important role in the methods of conducting a deep operation was assigned to the simultaneous impact on the entire depth of the operational construction of the enemy’s defense through the use of short-range and long-range aviation, as well as the consistent landing of airborne and naval assault forces in its rear.

This subsequently allowed the development of a deep offensive operation of the front. In this regard, the views on the role of front-line and army associations have also changed. Shortly before the start of World War II, it was concluded that deep operations can be carried out not only by one front, but also by several interacting front-line associations with the participation of large aviation forces, and in coastal areas - and the Naval fleet. At the same time, the front was regarded as an operational-strategic association.

Army same unions were intended mainly for action in the front. Independent conduct by the army of a deep operation was recognized as possible only on individual operating areas or in special conditions (mountains, deserts). For deep operations, it was considered expedient to have several shock and conventional armies in the front, 1 — 2 mechanized or tank corps, 15, and more aviation divisions (as part of the front air forces and combined-arms air forces). It was assumed that in such a composition the front could conduct an offensive in a band up to 300 — 400 km and to a depth — 300 — 300 km (2 schema). The main blow was struck on the site 60 — 100 km. Density was created at the breakthrough site: one division per 2 — 2,5 km, 50 — 10 guns, and 50 — 100 tanks — on the 1 km front.

The duration of the front of the operation, according to the views of that time, it could reach 15 — 20 days with average daily rates of 10 — 15 km offensive — for infantry, and 40 — 50 km — for mobile groups. The front envisaged the creation of a strong first operational echelon (from combined-arms armies), a mobile group (from tank and mechanized formations), as well as aviation groups and reserves.

An army advancing in the direction of the main attack of the front (the shock army) could have included 4 — 5 rifle corps, 1 — 2 mechanized corps, 7 — 9 artillery regiments and 7 — 8 anti-aircraft artillery battalions. Her actions were constantly maintained by the 2 — 3 aviation divisions. It was believed that in such a composition the army could break through the enemy defenses in the 25 — 30 km sector and advance in the 50 – 80 km wide band to the 75 – 110 km depth. Moving front group it was supposed to be used to complete the breakthrough of the tactical zone of the enemy’s defense or to enter into battle after the breakthrough of the second echelon of his defense to develop success. Great importance in the theory of deep operations was also attached to the organization of reliable air defense (AD).

In accordance with the theory of deep operations in the Soviet Armed Forces, already in 1930-ies, separate tank and mechanized corps were created, as well as strong air forces that were organizationally divided into the aircraft of the High Command (military special forces) and military (Air Force armies). Subsequently, it was assumed to have a military aviation (corps squadron).

The vitality of the fundamentals of the theory of deep operations was clearly manifested in the operations and battles of the Soviet troops against the German invaders in 1942 — 1945. During the war, this theory was improved in accordance with the equipment of the Soviet troops with more and more effective equipment and weapons, changes in their organizational structure and the acquisition of combat experience by commanders, headquarters and commanders. Thus, in 1942, when the enemy had not yet used deeply echeloned defense, mainly single-echelon battle formations were introduced at all levels. Such a construction of them provided a strong initial strike and was expedient in breaking through the shallow defense of the enemy. When the German troops in 1943 moved to the construction of a deep-echeloned positional defense, it was decided to move to deeper combat orders rifle corps, divisions and regiments.

1 schema. Offensive operation of the shock army on pre-war views

The breakthrough of the powerful deep-echeloned defense of the Germans was carried out by the front forces in one or several sectors with the subsequent development of efforts in depth and in the sides of the flanks, as well as in converging directions in order to encircle and destroy large enemy groups. Compared with 1941, the rates of breakthrough increased dramatically (to 12 — 20 km per day), and in a number of operations (Yassko-Kishenevskaya, Vistula-Oder, etc.) they reached 20 — 35 km per day or more. By the end of the war, the depth of front-line offensive operations increased significantly and reached 400 — 600 km. At the same time, in narrow breakthrough areas that made up 7 — 12 percent. width! offensive fronts and armies, often focused to 70 — 80 percent. artillery and up to 100 percent. tanks and ACS.

To promote success in the fronts and armies strong mobile groups, second echelons, aviation groups, as well as reserves from all combat arms were created. Great successes in carrying out operations were achieved in the art of encircling large enemy groups by forces of one or two interacting fronts. The art of eliminating surrounded groups was further developed through dissecting them into parts already in the course of encirclement and their subsequent destruction. The most typical examples of the liquidation of surrounded enemy groups include the Vitebsk-Orsha, Bobruisk, East Prussia and other offensive operations.

In the postwar period, the theory of deep operations continued to evolve with the advent of new technology and weapons.

Although the term “deep operation” is no longer used in official documents, however, the general principles of this theory have not lost their meaning even now. Moreover, the main content of the theory of deep operations organically became the basis of modern operational art. Nowadays, not the frontline (army groups) operation, but the operation in the theater of military operations (theater of operations) is considered to be the determining factor. Being a qualitatively improved operation of a group of fronts during the Second World War, it is carried out to a great depth, representing a combination of battles, battles, strikes, carried out in a theater of operations or a strategic direction for solving strategic or operational tasks. By its nature, it is a new combined arms operation, carried out by the efforts of all types of Armed Forces.

It is an operation in theater includes a system of not only simultaneous (as it was before), but also sequential operations of several fronts (army groups) and the fleet, as well as airborne and antiamphibious, affecting and anti-fighting operations in the theater of operations under a single all-arms command. It was she who fully embodies the idea of ​​a deep operation.

Operation in theater can be both defensive and counteroffensive (offensive). Unlike the operations of the group of fronts of the Second World War, it can in many cases be focal in nature, be carried out at a higher pace, be distinguished by the exceptional dynamism of military operations on land, in the air and at sea, which develop simultaneously in large spaces not only along the front, but and in depth.

As part of a strategic operation in continental theater, the first and subsequent operations of the fronts (army groups) can be conducted, and in the coastal areas, the first and subsequent operations of the fronts can also be carried out. The qualitatively new nature of the modern deep operation requires clarification of other concepts, including the concept of “direction of the main strike” in the operation. Along with the actions of the troops (forces) to defeat the opposing enemy grouping in the most important direction, the main blow in the modern conditions must also include the top priority destruction of the enemy’s most important targets and objects in the depth, even if they are not in the chosen strike line, but also in the strength of their range and significance can have a decisive influence on the success of a breakthrough and the operation as a whole. The preservation of superiority until the end of the operation is carried out at the expense of a wide maneuver by fire, forces and means. At the same time, the role and importance of air attack weapons is sharply enhanced.

2 schema. Offensive front operations by pre-war views

The ideas of the prewar theory of deep operations are now used in the military concepts of the NATO bloc, with their implementation by modern means of warfare. The development of long-range high-precision weapons, and above all reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes, qualitatively new means of control and equipping of troops, as well as shock space means, caused changes in the methods of conducting combat operations. For example, the concept of the air-ground operation (battle) is the basis of the operations of the US troops, as already mentioned, and in the armies of the countries belonging to the NATO bloc, its type is the concept of fighting the second echelon. Their essence is similar to the theory of deep operations and consists in simultaneously delivering massive strikes not only on the troops of the first echelon of the opposing group, but also on the most important objects in the rear (on the second echelons, control points, reserves, positions of rocket forces, artillery, airfields and communications) the depth of the operational construction of the enemy forces.

The depth of simultaneous defeat by means of an army group, according to these views, can reach 500 km or more. At the same time, strikes against targets in depth are planned to be inflicted by disparate forces with strict coordination of their actions on the target, place, time, and in coordination with the combat operations of airborne assault forces and troops advancing from the front. The primary importance is given to a sudden transition to the offensive and the seizure of the initiative.

Thus, the simultaneous striking of the entire depth of the opposing enemy in modern conditions is becoming the leading trend in the development of combined-arms operations with the wide use of high-precision means of air attack, of all means of deep impact. High tension in the actions of the troops, their wide focal nature, quick and sudden changes in the situation, the unprecedented dynamism of operations more than ever increase the role of the interaction of the troops, aircraft and naval forces participating in the operation and in advance organized by them from the side of the all-arms commander and staff, as well as a large complex of measures for operational (combat), material and technical support.

In order not to be unfounded, let us turn to the experience of the military operation codenamed “Freedom for Iraq” conducted by the US and British armies in 2003.

Final Operational Plan only 18 March was issued. 2003. The invasion of the ground forces and the landing of the naval assault forces were to be carried out in the morning of March 21.

In the direction of the main strike was the grouping of troops "South", whose main task - the defeat of Iraqi troops on the defensive line along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, access to Baghdad and its blocking. Conducting an attack on the capital was planned simultaneously in two operational areas: Northeast (Kuwaiti-Iraqi border - Basra - Amara - Baghdad) and northwestern (Kuwaiti-Iraqi border - Nasiriyah - Hill - Baghdad). The operational building of the troops envisaged the creation of a second echelon in the north-west direction and the allocation of a general reserve from the airborne and amphibious airborne formations, which were intended to solve further tasks of capturing the capital and other large cities.

In other areas it was envisaged to conduct limited actions by units of special forces. In addition, in the north-east operational direction, part of the forces of the South group were allocated to accomplish the task of taking control of oil-bearing areas on the Faw Peninsula by conducting an amphibious landing operation.

Order for creation of a united group of troops (forces) He was handed over to the Secretary of Defense through the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces 24 in December 2002. By the beginning of the hostilities, the deployment of the naval and air forces was completed.

Navy grouping It was deployed in three main directions: in the Persian and Oman gulfs - 81 combat ship, including three aircraft carriers of the US Navy and one - the British Navy, 9 surface ships (NK) and 8 nuclear submarines (PLA) - carriers of Tomahawk SLCM ; in the northern part of the Red Sea - 13 carriers of SLCM (7 NK and 6 PLA); in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea - 7 warships, including two aircraft carriers and four SLCM carriers. Total - 6 aircraft carriers that have onboard 278 attack aircraft and 36 carriers SLCM with ammunition to 1100 missiles. At the same time, about 900 missiles were located directly on ships and before 200 - on support vehicles.

The composition of the deployed air force group It included more than 700 combat aircraft, of which about 550 tactical aircraft attack aircraft of the US, UK and Australian air forces stationed at the air bases (Avb) of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and 43 of the strategic bomber of the US Air Force based on Avb UK, USA and Oman. At the same time, part of the B-2 A bombers were, for the first time, located not on their own White White airbase, but on Fr. Diego Garcia, where special hangars were installed for them with a system for maintaining a certain temperature and humidity conditions.

The overall composition of the forces and means of air attack of the air force and navy of the coalition group was about 875 attack aircraft and more than 1000 cruise missiles of sea and air basing.

The deployment of the coalition group of land forces was carried out with a lag behind the buildup of the Air Force and Navy in the region. The direct leadership of its creation in the area of ​​the forthcoming operation was carried out by the headquarters of the 3 th field army of the command of the Ground Formation Command Center of the US Armed Forces. From the second half of 2002, the headquarters efforts were aimed at deploying a command and control system; obtaining intelligence information on the status and activities of the Iraqi forces; creating conditions for the rapid reception and deployment of ground troops. To this end, five brigade sets of weapons for the ground forces were stored in advance on the territory of Kuwait. The advance creation of stocks of material and technical means and the storage of weapons and military equipment in the theater reduced the time for deployment of ground connections from 40 to 15 days.

By the beginning of the operation, the combat structure of the coalition group of ground forces consisted of three divisions, seven brigades and eight battalions. To support them, 11-I tactical group (OTG) of army aviation, 75 OTG field artillery and OTG air defense / missile defense of US ground forces were formed. The group numbered up to 112 thousand people, up to 500 tanks, more than 1200 armored combat vehicles, about 900 guns, MLRS and mortars, over 900 helicopters and up to 200 anti-aircraft missile systems.

The coalition forces were based on the South grouping, which included three divisions, seven brigades and two battalions. Most of it was located in field camps in northwestern Kuwait, and the United States 24 Expeditionary Marine Battalion (Ebmp) and the British 3 Brigade (UK) were aboard ships in the Persian Gulf.

The grouping "West" was created in Jordan. It consisted of two battalions of the 75 Infantry Regiment of the Rangers, the US Special Forces Special Forces battalion and up to the Special Forces Special Forces Company of Great Britain. Units with a total of about 2 thousand people were located in field conditions in the eastern part of the country. In the north of Iraq (the territory of the Kurdish Autonomous Region) was concentrated up to two battalions and a company of Special Forces of the Ground Forces of Great Britain and the USA. Their actions provided up to 10 helicopters.

Operation Iraq Freedom, As planned, it began in 21.00 19 in March 2003 from the massive use of special operations forces in Iraq. Land Combat Operations Coalitions unfolded a day before the planned date and before the start of the massive use of forces and means of air attack (air offensive operation).

Troops of the South group (3 scheme) in the northeastern operational direction, they launched an offensive in the early morning of March 20 simultaneously with a coalition of selective rocket-bombing attacks on Iraqi targets. The invasion of Iraqi territory was carried out in the pre-battle order with the support of artillery, army and tactical aircraft. The fire preparation of the attack was not carried out. Military units and subunits of the 1 Expeditionary Division of the Marine Corps (Edmp), 7 of the Armored Brigade (BTR), 1 of the Armored Division (BRL) and 16 of the Separate Air Assault Brigade (OWB) developed the attack and the 15 Expeditionary Marine Battalion (Ebmp) - at Umm-Qasr.

On the night of March 21 a naval landing operation was carried out. The landing of the landing force on the Faw Peninsula was carried out in a combined manner using helicopters and amphibious assault vehicles with the support of naval and coastal artillery. As a result, the task of taking control of the southern oil terminals was successfully solved. At the same time, with the move of Basra and Umm Qasr, the main forces of the coalition group in the north-east operational direction did not succeed and had to refuse to move further in the direction of Basra-Amar.

In the north-west operational direction, the troops launched an offensive on the evening of March 20. First echelon in the military units of the 3 th mechanized division (MD), it advanced mainly in the pre-battle formations along the desert area along the right bank of the r. Euphrates In the second tier there were military units of the 101 th air assault division (VSD). Brigade tactical groups (BrTG) of the first echelon tried to seize bridges and bridgeheads on the left bank of the r. The Euphrates near the cities of Nasiriyah, Samawah and Najaf. However, the stubborn resistance of the Iraqi garrisons forced the Americans to move to positional actions.

Under these conditions, advanced military units of 3 md continued their advance to the north and by March 25 reached the first defensive line of the Iraqi defense on the approaches to the capital near the city of Karbala, overcoming four days around 400 km. At the same time, further advancement was not possible, since up to two thirds of the divisional forces were linked by battles at Nasiriyah, Samawah and Najaf. Due to the large gaps between military units, there was a threat of striking Iraqi troops on the open flanks and rear areas. The large length of communications made it difficult to solve the tasks of providing rear forces to the rear. (4 schema).

In the current situation, the command of the South group halted the offensive and carried out a regrouping of the troops. Military units and 1 units, 2 Ebrmp and 15 Ebmp units were redeployed from the northeastern direction to the city of Nasiriyah, and the 101 squadron (second echelon) was tasked with releasing military units 3 md at the approaches to the cities of Es Samaw An-Najaf. One brigade of the 82 Airborne Division (Airborne Division), withdrawn from the operational reserve, was sent to reinforce the “West” grouping. The second brigade also received a new task: it was supposed to guard the supply routes for the troops.

Units and military units of the Marine Corps, concentrated in the Nasiriyah area, were tasked with: part of the forces to block the Iraqi garrisons in the settlements, the main efforts to focus on the breakthrough in Interfluve and the accelerated exit to the Iraqi capital, which meant the opening of hostilities in the new operational sector (Nasiriyah - Kut - Baghdad).

3 schema. Military actions of the group of troops "South" in operation "Freedom to Iraq" (2003)

March 27 military units and units 1 extmp and 15 ebmp, reinforced 24 ebmp, entered into the battle from the operational reserve, with the support of aviation forced the river. Euphrates, went to Mesopotamia and developed an offensive on the city of Kut. After forcing the river. The tiger and the blocking of Kut part of the forces and means of the marines were redirected to the capture of the city of Al-Amar from the northern direction together with the units of the UK armed forces operating from the south. The main forces of 1 EHMP continued their offensive along the Kut-Baghdad and 5 roads on April to the eastern and south-eastern outskirts of the capital.

In the northwestern direction, the brigade tactical groups of the 3 th mechanized division, transferring the captured lines at the approaches to the cities of Nasiriyah, Samawah and Najaf, moved to the city of Karbala, which allowed them to resume the offensive against Baghdad. After blocking a group of Iraqi troops in the area of ​​Karbala - Hill, the main forces of the division made a bypass maneuver along the shore of the lake. El Milch and April 5 reached the south-western outskirts of Baghdad.

For three days, American artillery and attack aircraft carried out the systematic destruction of fortified positions, resistance centers and individual firing points of the Iraqi defense at the nearest approaches to the capital.

The assault on Baghdad, which, in the opinion of the Anglo-American command, was to become the most difficult part of the operation, was not as such. The inglorious result of Iraq for Baghdad’s “strange defense” was the result of an operation to bribe senior Iraqi military leaders, including General Al-Tikriti, commander of the Republican Guard in the capital. Later, the American side in the person of the BCC commander, General T. Franks, generally acknowledged that she resorted to extensive bribing of Iraqi commanders, forcing them to lay down arms in certain cities without a fight.

After the capture of Baghdad, the main efforts of the South grouping were focused on mastering Tikrit. In the direction of the main strike (Baghdad - Tikrit) military units of 3 md, 1 edmp and up to two BrTGr 4 md, arrived from Kuwait, were active. Part of the 1 edmp force was deployed to eliminate one of the last centers of resistance in the Ba-Akub area (about 80 km northeast of Baghdad). However, with the fall of the capital, the garrisons of other Iraqi cities ceased resistance. Tikrit was abandoned by Iraqi forces 13 on April. On the same day, British troops established control over Umm Qasr.

In other directions (4 schema) the content of the hostilities of the coalition forces was generally consistent with the plans of the operation.

From 27 March, the deployment of the coalition of ground forces "North" began. It was based on 173 ovdbr and battalion 10 lpd with a given company tactical group 1 md. Arms and equipment were airlifted to the airfields of the Kurdish Autonomous Region of Iraq. Most of the personnel parachuted parachuted. By early April, the North grouping, in which, besides the deployed military units, the Special Forces divisions of the US and British ground forces were operating in the northern regions, there were about 4000 people. The military units and units of the group, together with the Kurdish armed forces, with the support of aviation, captured the city of Kirkuk on April 10 and the city of Mosul on April 12. At the final stage of the operation, part of the forces and means of the North grouping took part in mastering the city of Tikrit.

The success of the coalition forces in the operation was achieved thanks to the organization of close cooperation of all types of armed forces. At the same time, according to the American command, the main role in achieving it was played by the combat operations of the Air Force and Navy, which ensured absolute supremacy in the airspace, information superiority over the enemy, as well as strong support for ground forces.

A massive use of air assault forces and assets in the framework of an air offensive operation was carried out from 21.00 21 March to the end of March 23. In the course of the VNO, two massed rocket-air strikes (MRAU) were inflicted. In just two days, the aircraft flew about 4 thousand aircraft sorties. About 3 thousand units of high-precision weapons were used on Iraqi facilities, of which up to 100 ALCM and 400 SLCMs were used.

From March 24 to the end of the operation, aviation was used in the form of conducting systematic hostilities with single and group rocket-air strikes. Airplanes and naval aircrafts carried out an average of 1700 sorties every day. At the same time, the tendency to a decrease in the share of departures for the destruction of previously planned objects was determined (from 100 percents during the VNO to 20 percents in the course of conducting systematic hostilities). Direct air support of the ground forces and marine infantry groups with the start of the ground-based offensive operation was carried out with limited forces, and from March 25, this task began to be allocated up to 75 percent. strike aviation sorties.

4 schema. Military operations in the north and west in Operation Freedom for Iraq

To the share of US strategic bombers It had more 500 departures, with the most actively used aircraft B-52 H, based at Fairford Air Force Base (UK) and on. Diego Garcia. On the fourth day since the outbreak of hostilities, the B-52 H bombers switched to airborne alert duty over the western regions of Iraq to attack the ground forces, which is a new way to use these heavy strategic aircraft. B-1 B bombers from the Markaz-Tamarid airbase (Oman) and B-2 A from the Whitement airbase (USA) and Fr. Diego Garcia.

Tactical aircraft the Allied Air Force, represented by the F-15 E, F-16 C / D multipurpose fighters and Tornado fighters, the F-117 A, A-10 A and Harrier fighter-bomber fighters operated from the Middle East. In-flight refueling was ensured over 30 aircraft KS-250 and KS-135.

The use of carrier-based aviation was planned to be carried out from aircraft carriers of the 50 th carrier strike brigade (AUS) from the regions of the northern part of the Persian Gulf and 60 th AUS - from the areas of the eastern Mediterranean. In the latter case, the choice of areas of combat maneuvering was due to the need for fire destruction of groups of the armed forces of Iraq in the northern areas of the country.

Sea-based cruise missiles were launched at Iraqi facilities from surface ships and nuclear submarines from the Persian Gulf, the northern part of the Red Sea and the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. The launch of the first missiles was carried out on 20 in March two hours after the decision was made by the President of the United States to launch selective attacks.

The landing of a tactical assault from a helicopter

In the framework of the implementation of the concept of “conducting combat operations by dispersed platforms united by centralized networks”, the method of massive use of nuclear submarines (PLA) against enemy coastal facilities was carried out for the first time. So, in the first MRAU air offensive operation took part 14 PLA (US Navy - 12, the British Navy - 2), from which about 100 cruise missiles were launched. Estimated for the time of the air campaign, the US and British naval submarines deployed around the Tomahawk 240 SLCM. All in all, rocket attacks were attracted to 23 NK and 14 submarines that used a total of more than 800 missiles (62 percent of the total ammunition load).

In total for 25 days (20.3 — 13.4), the Air Force and the US and British Navy made about 41 thousand flights, spent about 29 thousand ammunition. Taking into account the use of SLCM and ALCM, the share of high-precision weapons was 68 percent.

The main outcome of Operation Freedom for Iraq is of geostrategic importance. The United States has expanded its strategic base for its further advancement in this region.

Militarily, a tendency to an increase in the role of the Air Force and Navy, reconnaissance and precision weapons in achieving the objectives of the operation was confirmed. A qualitatively new stage in the development of high-precision systems was the implementation of the concept of joint and interconnected in time and space use of space, air, sea and ground-based reconnaissance and destruction tools integrated into a single system.

The results of the hostilities in Iraq had a direct impact on the content of the main construction programs of the US armed forces. The priority areas that will receive the most intensive development in the coming decades were the following: improvement of the observation, intelligence and information collection systems; improving the accuracy of air and sea attack weapons and increasing their ability to strike targets at long range, including both the weapon itself and its carriers; expansion of opportunities in the field of data transmission and network integration of all the above tools and systems.

Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. FAO_48E
    FAO_48E 4 October 2013 10: 44
    Good article. Interestingly, the author did not mention that the 4th infantry division, which was supposed to be deployed in Turkey, was to become the core of the "north" grouping, but could not do this due to political differences between the governments of Turkey and the United States, and that the landing of the 173rd brigade, reinforced The USAREUR Immediate Ready Force (IRF) elements were pure improvisation designed to replace 4pd. And yet, the photography, of course, is spectacular, only it could not have been done in 2003, since the digital Army Combat Uniform (ACU) began to be massively introduced only in 2005.
    1. mikkado31
      mikkado31 4 October 2013 17: 36
      That's right. The 4th Infantry entered Iraq from the south, a month after the start of the operation. If the 4th had hit from the north as planned, Baghdad would have fallen a week earlier. :)
    APASUS 4 October 2013 12: 09
    The modern theater of operations does not imply a breakthrough in defense in depth; recent wars have been short-lived and the basis of the operation was air and missile gifts. The breakthrough technology is outdated
  3. chunga-changa
    chunga-changa 4 October 2013 13: 27
    The basis of operations is still the actions of the ground forces. Air and missile strikes offer their successful actions.
    1. mikkado31
      mikkado31 4 October 2013 17: 38
      It depends on what kind of operation. If there is no purpose to capture the territory, then it is quite possible to limit yourself to massive air strikes on the infrastructure, command posts and enemy equipment.
  4. The comment was deleted.
  5. kostya_a
    kostya_a 4 October 2013 19: 46
    Duck is the meaning of a blow to infrastructure and is the seizure of territory! Those. further land operation!
    1. mikkado31
      mikkado31 4 October 2013 19: 54
      Who told you? in Yugoslavia, for example, there was no land operation. If the task is to force the enemy into negotiations on favorable conditions for himself, then massive point-based airstrikes are enough.
      1. chunga-changa
        chunga-changa 5 October 2013 11: 42
        There was no ground operation in Libya either, in Syria, obviously, it will not be either. The operation in Yugoslavia was not a thing in itself, as you write. The air operation saved the ground forces of the separatists from defeat, and ensured them victory in the land civil war. The ground operation directly by NATO troops was not carried out, but it was getting ready and the forces were concentrated. The operations described by you flew in, bombed, flew away, the Papuans restore what was destroyed, in its purest form Israel conducts, but they are not massed at all, but targeted.
        1. kostya_a
          kostya_a 5 October 2013 15: 49
          You guys from which planet ??? Here are the facts:
          Operation Allied Force!
          In April 1999, about 8000 soldiers and officers arrived in Macedonia. In Albania, for the same purposes, there were 7500 troops, in addition to which at the end of April a group of 5000 American soldiers and officers arrived, which included 30 tanks, 28 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 27 artillery pieces of various calibers, as well as 26 military and 26 transport helicopters. In addition, there was a NATO stabilization contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, numbering 32 soldiers and officers, and soon increased to 000.
          The ground forces in Albania and Macedonia, creating a potential threat of invasion, had a serious chilling effect on the actions of the Yugoslav leadership, and after the bombing was brought into Kosovo and Metohija as the basis of the NATO peacekeeping contingent!
          "Civil" war in Libya.
          About 17000 (according to other sources, less than 35,000-40,000 volunteers, including another 1000 trained on March 23!

          And after that you will say that there was no land operation ??? Also say that the government of these countries capitulated immediately after the air operations!
  6. cdrt
    cdrt 5 October 2013 00: 20
    In general, the equality of the Deep Operation and the air-ground operation (battle) is painfully far-fetched.
    Still, this is a deep, deep development of the blitzkrieg, at a new level, and the construction of the operation on the idea of ​​the superiority of its troops over the enemy in the Boyd cycle.
    In the Iraqi company 2003, the breakthrough speed reached 20km per hour and 160km per day.
    There was a good article in American army magazines about the features of conducting military intelligence at such a pace.
    The words of the commander of the first reconnaissance battalion of the marines were also very clear: "Anyone who stops to prepare for a battle does not understand the essence of the operation ...", and the essence is the collapse of the enemy's command and control due to its growing lag in the pace of the operation.
    So ... apparently (s) well, it’s not at all the same as a deep operation. And do not flatter yourself winked
    1. FAO_48E
      FAO_48E 5 October 2013 02: 14
      Our Boyd’s cycle, by the way, is not called by name, because Boyd was not the only one who thought of this thing; and call it simpler - decision-making loop (decision cycle). You are right in the sense that the idea of ​​the operation in 2003. consisted in imposing such a pace of events at which the adversary is not able to complete his decision-making loop. As for the complete absence of an equal sign between East Kazakhstan region and a deep operation, I do not quite agree with you. And one and the other pursued the goal of defeating the battle formations of the enemy to the maximum possible depth and preventing him from reacting accordingly. If you dig into the relevant literature of the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s and study the genesis of aerospace defense, you will find a number of references to the Soviet doctrine of a deep operation .... But I did not quite understand something about flattery.
  7. samoletil18
    samoletil18 9 October 2013 08: 05
    The article is interesting. Only after the publication of the rezun's little books, do all home-grown strategists know that the correct military thought is only SOVIET.