Before the war as part of the Baltic fleet there were 35 cruisers, although this number included hopelessly outdated former frigates and corvettes built in the 1870s that did not dare to send to the Far East even with Nebogatov's squadron. In 1906-1907 all obsolete cruisers remaining in the Baltic were converted into mine-layers, training ships or decommissioned. 14 cruisers died in battles with the Japanese fleet or from siege shells in the harbor of Port Arthur. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, only 9 battle-worthy cruisers remained in service in the Russian fleet in the Baltic and the Pacific. Two cruisers were part of the Black Sea Fleet.
To begin the revival of the fleet and the construction of new cruisers (as, incidentally, the ships of other classes), the concept of using the fleet and its construction program, for which budget funds are allocated, were necessary. We also needed a ship project that would meet the concept of using the fleet. There was nothing of this after the end of the war. Maritime Minister A.A.Birilyov in April 1906 at a meeting of the Special Meeting noted that there is no clear program of the country's armed forces in the country.
Period 1905 - 1909 was a transitional era of controversy and bickering about Russia's sea problems. In reality, the matter of recreating the naval forces during this time has not advanced. New ships, in whose projects the war experience would be fully taken into account, were not laid. Shipbuilding ships, laid down before or during the Russian-Japanese war, were being refined at an extremely low rate. Thus, for example, the battleships Emperor Paul I and Andrew the First-Called, which were laid back in 1903, were put into operation in 1912. In total, two battleships were put into operation for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets and four cruisers in the Baltic.
The termination of shipbuilding activities at the moment of an unprecedented weakening of the fleet led to the ever-growing inequality of the naval forces of Russia compared with the fleets of its potential adversaries, and above all Germany. And it was at that time when Germany, England and other countries were building in large quantities ships of all classes, but new types, taking into account the Russian-Japanese war.
In England, the Dreadnought, a battleship of a fundamentally new type, was put into operation in 1906, and the first ship of the new class, the Invinsible battlecruiser, was launched in 1907. Amethyst light cruiser with turbines was built in 1903. as main engines. Germany responded with the construction of dreadnoughts such as the Nassau and the Von der Tann and Moltke battle cruisers.
In Russia, there were discussions about what kind of fleet it needs - a powerful open sea fleet that would give the opportunity to continue Russia's imperialist policy, interrupted by an unsuccessful war or a defensive fleet that would be able to ensure the security of our coasts. As a result of disputes, the theory of Mahen and Colomb prevailed. As a result, it was decided to build a linear fleet primarily in the Baltic, since this made it possible to send a strong squadron to any area, besides the presence of a squadron ensured supremacy in the Gulf of Finland, saving the capital of the empire from the threat of a possible German landing.
In June, 1906 created the Marine General Staff (MGSh) on the basis of the strategic and organizational departments of the Main Naval Staff. This new command and control body of the Russian fleet was given the task of determining the place and role of the fleet in the system of the country's armed forces, developing its structure, drawing up shipbuilding programs, and defining the basic requirements for technical assignments for ship design.
MGSH developed “strategic bases for a plan of war at sea”, which were presented to the emperor and approved by him 19 March 1907. According to MGSH, the fleet was to be built by entire combat squadrons, depending on financial capabilities. In the Baltic and the Black Sea, it was supposed to have one combat squadron consisting of two brigades of battleships, two brigades of battle cruisers, two brigades of light cruisers and from four to nine battalions of destroyers. This squadron formation system influenced the development of shipbuilding programs. Thus, the programs included the number of individual classes of ships, almost always a multiple of four: four battleships, four battle cruisers, four light cruisers and thirty-six destroyers for the Baltic Fleet or four battleships and four light cruisers and seventeen destroyers for the Black Sea. Provided for the construction of submarines, as well as smaller ships and vessels.
Considering that the solution of the problem of reliable defense of the Baltic Sea can be achieved if there is a fleet capable of fighting the German fleet in the open sea. The Maritime General Staff considered it necessary to build two squadrons each for 1920, each consisting of: 8 battleships, 4 light cruisers, 9 light cruisers and 36 destroyers. Considering the actions in the Baltic, the Naval General Staff considered that "the tasks for the battleships should be such that this squadron, in case of need, could be sent anywhere."
According to the Black Sea Theater, MGSH considered one of the tasks offensive - to seize the straits to secure its borders and to enter the Mediterranean Sea. For a complete solution of the offensive task, a fleet capable of disturbing the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean was necessary. He was supposed to have in its composition: 8 battleships, 4 armored cruisers and 9 light cruisers. In the defensive task, the mine fleet should be strengthened, to which the 4 light cruiser should also be added.
Not forgotten, and the age-old dream of seizing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Built simultaneously with light cruisers, battle cruisers of the “Izmail” type were intended not so much for the shallow Baltic as for operations in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean. One of the tasks of light cruisers was to be their accompaniment.
Having calculated that by 1918, the Russian fleet will consist of 11 dreadnoughts, 8 old battleships, 15 cruisers, 48 destroyers MGSh stressed that "it would be unwise to build a military fleet for amounts exceeding a billion rubles just to protect the coast of the Gulf of Finland from the landing force of two German corps, landing very problematic from the point of view of a serious strategic calculation. "
In July, 1912 in Paris, the chiefs of the naval general staffs signed a draft Russian-French maritime convention. It provided for the transfer of a part of the Baltic Fleet to the Mediterranean, to the French base of Bizerte.
An attempt to develop a shipbuilding program was undertaken as early as 1906. Maritime Minister A.A.Birilev entrusted its development to MGS. But at the same time, the Minister for Marine Affairs ordered the development of a program for the General Naval Staff, whose functions did not include shipbuilding issues. As a result, two programs were developed that contradicted each other (it should be noted that both light cruisers were present). Both programs were rejected by the State Defense Council, and A.Birilyov was soon dismissed from his post as minister.
In April 1907 of MGSH presented to Nicholas II four options for the shipbuilding program. The emperor approved the one that provided for the construction of one squadron for the Baltic Sea. However, the program was heavily modified when considered by the National Defense Council. The revised program was called “Distribution of appropriations for shipbuilding”. However, the State Duma, despite the convictions of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Pyotr Stolypin, refused to allocate funds for the construction of new ships. Only after the personal instructions of Nicholas II did the naval ministry finally receive credits for new shipbuilding and 30 on June 1909. Four battleships were laid for the Baltic Fleet.
However, from the autumn of 1909 to the spring of 1911, the question of the further construction of new ships did not go beyond the stage of discussions, correspondence and red tape. IK Grigorovich, appointed in March 1909 as a comrade (deputy) of the minister of maritimes, wrote in his memoirs: “There is no exact grounded shipbuilding program for rebuilding the fleet ...” For more than two years, despite the fact that political events and the whole foreign policy course definitely led to war, wasted on useless negotiations.
A decisive breakthrough in the development of shipbuilding programs and the construction of the fleet occurred after the appointment of 18 in March 1911 to the post of minister of the sea IK Grigorovich.
In May, 1911 adopted by the Duma the laws “On the appropriation of funds for the construction of four battleships for the Baltic Sea” and “On the appropriation of funds for strengthening the Black Sea Fleet”, were approved by the king. Together with the law 1908, they entered the Small Shipbuilding Program. In accordance with it, four PCs for the Baltic were to be completed, three LCs for the Black Sea, as well as destroyers and submarines, were to be built. Construction of cruisers Small program was not provided.
Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral N.O. von Essen (during the Russo-Japanese War, the commander of the Novik cruiser) 23 March 1911 in a memorandum on the shipbuilding program for the Baltic Fleet offered: "... 9) In the current 1911 year, lay the slipways of the Baltic Sea Fleet and Admiralty plants of two light cruisers with a displacement of 6000 tons with turbine engines capable of having some stock of mines barriers. The readiness of these ships should be in the spring of 1914.
10) On launching the light cruisers mentioned in paragraph 9), lay two more such cruisers, of which readiness should be conditioned by the spring of 1915 of the year ... "
Unfortunately, the admiral's proposals were not implemented (the cruiser project was not ready, the program providing for their construction was not approved and there was no funding). Otherwise, by the beginning of World War I, the Baltic Fleet would have had two new light cruisers, two more would have been operational in the first year of the war.
June 6, 1912 was held historical meeting of the State Duma, which considered the bill on the allocation of 500 million rubles for the construction of the fleet. IK Grigorovich also made a big report at it, arguing once again that "the Fleet cannot receive unilateral development of some types of vessels to the detriment of others, it is necessary to have vessels of all types and in a certain proportion." As a result, the “Program for hastily strengthening the Baltic Fleet” was approved, which provided for the construction, among other ships, of four light cruisers, as well as two light cruisers for the Black Sea Fleet. The explanatory note to the program stated that 000 should be taken for the time period by which a modern squadron in the Baltic should be formed.
Russia's rival on the Black Sea Turkey in 1913 ordered two new dreadnought in England. At the end of the same 1913, Germany sent the newest battle cruiser “Geben” and the light cruiser “Breslau” to the Mediterranean Sea.
Concerned about the strengthening of the Turkish fleet, the maritime minister in December 1913 addressed Nicholas II with a special report. The minister considered it necessary to immediately start building one battleship, two light cruisers, 8 destroyers and 6 submarines.
Having received the prior consent of the emperor, the maritime agency 17 in March 1914 entered the Council of Ministers with a proposal for the construction of new ships. In his explanatory note stated: "... The number of ships, the construction of which must be made in a hurry, is determined as follows:
b) in order for cruisers to fulfill their purpose, illuminate the necessary areas of the sea and protect battleships from destroyer attacks during a battle, there must be at least four of them. Therefore, in addition to the two under construction, it is necessary to lay two more of the same type. ”
In June, 1914, the “Program to urgently strengthen the Black Sea Fleet” was approved by the Duma. Together with the 1912 program, they became known as the “Great Shipbuilding Program”. In accordance with it, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were to receive four new light cruisers.
The basic principles laid down in the implementation of this ambitious program are the development of ship projects on a competitive basis with the involvement of domestic and foreign enterprises and the construction of ships at Russian factories. Dozens of allied factories, both in Russia and abroad, were involved in the creation of ships under approved programs.
The same program provided for the construction of two small turbine cruisers for the Siberian Flotilla. The main objective of these ships was the destruction of destroyers and other light ships of the enemy and reconnaissance in enemy waters. Designing them was carried out in parallel with light cruisers.
The projects of the Putilov factory, Nevsky and Revelsky are presented. However, the statements of these plants about the price for the construction of the above cruisers and the time of their manufacture could not satisfy the Navy Ministry, why it was decided to go abroad. The maritime ministry signed a contract with the German firm F. Schihau for the construction of two cruisers. They should have a displacement of 4300 t, length of 135 m, speed of 27,5 knots. Armor belt 50 mm, deck - 20 mm. Armament 8 130-mm guns.
These two cruisers, "Admiral Nevelskoy" and "Muravyov-Amursky", were the only ships built abroad. After the start of the 1 World War I, they were requisitioned by Germany and joined its fleet (with German arms) under the names Elbing and Pillau.
Work on the creation of new cruisers began in 1907, but for a number of reasons was delayed.
On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, the 1 and 1892 cruisers were in the Russian fleet in accordance with the 1 classification of February 2.
The 1 rank cruisers included such ships as “Russia” and “Thunderbolt” with a displacement of up to 14 Ltd., which had a reservation of the side to 203 mm, armed with 203-mm, 152-mm and smaller guns. This type of ship was an ocean raider. More often they were called armored. The “Bayan” type ships with a displacement of 7800 t. Golovnoy were built in 1902 and they participated in battles with the Japanese fleet as part of the port-arthur squadron. He was the most successful type of armored cruiser. According to his type, the construction of three units began in 1905.
At the turn of the XIX and XX centuries, construction began on the relatively small high-speed so-called armored cruisers, which were also listed as 1 rank cruisers. They were intended for long-range reconnaissance, guarding battleships from destroyer attacks. Their participation in squadron combat, as well as in operations on the enemy’s trade routes, was not ruled out. Thus, they were to become universal ships. They had a displacement from 5900 to 6730 T and a travel speed from 20 to 24,5 knots. Armament of cruisers consisted of guns of three different calibers - 152, 75 and 47 mm. Designed and built in different factories, including foreign ones, cruisers differed in the placement of artillery of the main caliber. On the Aurora, all 152-mm guns were placed in deck installations, on the Varyag and As-Kold - in deck installations and casemates, on the Bogatyr - in towers, casemates and deck installations. Cruisers differed in the number of main steam engines: “Varyag” and “Bogatyr” - two cars, “Askold”, “Aurora” - three. The fighting showed the unpromising of armored cruisers. Weakly armored and with artillery in deck installations they suffered heavy losses in squadron battles and during meetings with Japanese cruisers. A large number of small-caliber artillery turned out to be ineffective even against destroyers.
The 2 rank cruisers had a displacement from 2000 to 3500 t, armed with 120-mm guns and speeds of 20-25 knots. To protect the cars, boilers, artillery cellars and steering gears, they had an armored karapasnuyu deck. Appointment - close reconnaissance, protection of large ships from the attacks of destroyers, support for their destroyers, actions on enemy communications. After the Russian-Japanese war, only two of them survived.
All armored and armored cruisers that survived the Russo-Japanese War after repair and modernization participated in the First World War in all theaters: from the Barents Sea to the Far East.
After the Russian-Japanese war, the classification of the ships of the Russian fleet was revised and the 10 order of October 1907 was replaced by a new one, which already had armored cruisers and cruisers. But this classification is already outdated when approved. Already in 1906, the terms “battle cruiser” and “light cruiser” appeared in official documents.
In the majority of the fleets of the world after the Russian-Japanese war, the specialization of cruisers continued to deepen. The construction of large (6000-7000 t) armored cruisers in all countries ceases. The further development of armored cruisers was usually accompanied by an increase in displacement, the caliber of the main artillery encased in the towers, the thickness of armor and speed, which brought them closer to a new type of cruisers - linear. So in Germany built armored cruisers armed 210-mm guns in 1906, the "Scharnhorst" (displacement 11 600 t 8 210-mm guns, including 4 in the towers), in 1908, the "Blücher" (displacement 15 800 t, 12 210-mm guns in six towers), and in 1909 the first Fon der-Tann battlecruiser was launched with a 18 700 tonnage with 8 280-mm guns.
In Russia, in the 1909 (simultaneously with Bayan-type cruisers), the Rurik cruiser with a displacement of 15 200 and 4 254-mm and 8 203-mm guns in two and four turrets, respectively, entered service.
At the same time, high-speed (25-29 knots) are built, turbine cruisers with a displacement of 3600-5500 t. Moreover, as the speed increases and, as a result of the power of the turbines, the displacement has increased. In England, these were cruisers of the Bristol type 1909 g. (4800 t, 2 152-mm and 10 102mm guns), Southampton 1912 g. (5400 t, 8 152-mm guns), in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, 1907 3600-mm guns), in Germany of the Dresden type 10, 105 1912-mm guns), in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, 4570 12-mm guns), in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, 105 XNUMX-mm guns), in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, XNUMX XNUMX-mm guns), in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, XNUMX XNUMX-mm guns), in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, in Germany of the Dresden type X NUMX, XNUMX XNUMX-mm guns) (XNUMX t, XNUMX XNUMX-mm guns), Magdeburg XNUMX (XNUMX t, XNUMX XNUMX-mm guns).
In Russia, this process was completed by 1912 by approving projects of Izmail cruisers and Svetlana-type light cruisers, finally approved in the new classification of the 1915 fleet. Thus, domestic cruiser-building followed the trend of building the world's leading fleets, but with a few years late. This delay was fatal for the Russian fleet, which never received a single modern cruiser.
In drawing up assignments for the light cruiser MGSH, he was guided by his appointment — he had to perform the following functions: reconnaissance, patrol and guard service, a single battle with enemy light cruisers, actions against destroyers, support for his destroyers, and participation in the development of success of a torpedo attack, setting mine barriers in enemy waters. According to MGSH, this required enhanced development of such elements of the cruiser as the speed and area of navigation, to the detriment of artillery weapons and reservations. The objectives of the action on the enemy’s sea lanes and the destruction of its merchant ships were not set.
Requirements for armament were also determined based on the destination of the cruiser. His artillery was to consist of guns capable of hitting destroyer destroyers and equivalent light cruisers of the enemy, i.e. of 102-mm and 203-mm guns. The location of the artillery was to meet the requirement of concentrating the strongest fire on the bow and stern.
To test the possibility of creating a light cruiser on assignments from MGSH, we recruited specialists from the government-run Baltic Marine Plant. The 2 cruiser of the “Novik” rank was chosen as a prototype, but under the condition that the speed of 28 knots is increased. Built to order in Germany, this cruiser was the most successful of the 2 cruisers of the rank. With a displacement of 3080 t, he was the fastest cruiser of the fleets of that time (1900 g.), Three-screw with triple-expansion machines with a capacity of 18 Ltd. hp and water tube boilers, he developed to 25 bonds. In service, he had 6 120mm and 8 47-mm guns. It was Novik that served as the prototype for numerous light cruisers built in Germany and England.
10 September 1907 factory presented its study. According to it, the cruiser should have a displacement of 4500 t, speed 28 kn, a three- or four-shaft turbine unit with a capacity of about 29 ths. Armament: one 203-mm gun in the tower and six 120-mm guns in the three towers.
In parallel with the plant, variants of the cruiser were worked out in the shipbuilding department of the Marine Technical Committee (MTC). MTK has developed four variants of the 4500, 4600, 5800 and 6000 cruiser with a speed of 27 - 28 knots. The power of the mechanisms ranged from 27 000 - 34 600 hp depending on the displacement with the full stock of fuel.
All variants of the cruiser were armed with one 203-mm gun and four-six 120-mm guns in the towers.
The installation of artillery in the towers and the rejection of small-caliber artillery - this was affected by the experience of the war: the commander of the cruiser "Oleg" LF Dobrotvorsky believed that it was necessary either to book all the artillery, or leave it all open. The inconsistency in the degree of protection makes a “depressing impression” on those commanding officers who “find themselves under execution at open arms”, while some of their comrades are hidden behind the armor of towers and casemates. There will be no damage from the removal of 75-mm and smaller guns, as well as repelling the attacks of the destroyers over the fire of larger guns and "high speed". The same idea was unanimously expressed by all the officers in their answers to the questions of the GMG: the shells of at least 120-152 mm are effective against the destroyers. The 75-mm and smaller-caliber guns are completely useless, as “too small calories to stop the destroyer”. The Aurora officers were annoyed that they had so many 75-mm guns to the detriment of 152-mm. The “Diana” gunners directly pointed out that they reflected most of the mine attacks with 152-mm cannon fire.
However, at that time they had not yet decided to install guns of one caliber. The presence of 203-mm guns was a step backwards. Single-turrets stood on Bayan-class cruisers and, because of their complexity, their unjustified power was considered a lack of cruisers.
German turbine company Tur-Biniya assisted in the development of the turbine plant, and the required power of the power plant was determined from the results of model tests in the basins of St. Petersburg and Bremershafen.
The studies were reviewed at a meeting of the Admiralty Board 29 of September 1907. As a result, it was decided to develop three more versions of the project: with a single 120-mm caliber with the same displacement; with reinforced armament up to two 203-mm and twelve 120-mm guns, installation of two or three underwater torpedo tubes, increase in speed to 29 knots, with 25,4-mm armor belt (displacement is not limited) and, finally, with a consistent decrease in these characteristics ( The speed of at least 28 - 28,5 kn), allowing to fit into the 6000 tonnage. The adjustment and reworking of options continued in 1908, however, the project remained unfulfilled due to changes in the shipbuilding plans and the workload of the MTC projects of battleships and turbine destroyers.
The development of tasks and specifications for the design of a light cruiser resumed in February 1910 after the appointment of the inspector of shipbuilding A.N.Krylov to the position. The basis for the new task was the second option, developed in 1908, but with the strengthening of some elements. It turned out that the tactical elements of the light cruiser (speed 30 knots, 76-mm armor belt, armament from two 203-mm and 12 120-mm guns, etc.) provided by MGSH require an increase in displacement to 7000 t, and turbine power - up to 43,5 thous. hp
In May, 1910 decided to abandon the side armor and other requirements to facilitate the cruiser MGSH.
At the end of July, the 1911 in the task-project remained only deck-based booking, but the artillery armament was completely changed: twelve 152-mm guns with 50 barrel lengths in four towers. The location of the towers was supposed to be made linear in the diametral plane so that the two middle towers would rise above the end ones. A strict requirement was also placed on the deck of a mine obstacle (in different variants of tasks from 50 to 200): rail tracks were provided for the greater part of the length of the upper deck and transom stern formation for better dropping. These MGSH requirements for the light cruiser for artillery were used as the basis for design specifications in 1912. In fact, this was the first version of the conditions, which was then subjected to repeated changes.
Displacement cruiser technical conditions are not established. Full speed was limited to 30 knots, provided that the hull lines would increase it to 32 knots. Reservations were subject to the lower deck (25-35 mm), its bevels (50 mm), towers (75 mm), ammunition elevators (50 mm), and the conning tower (75 mm). The system of turbine mechanisms was not specifically indicated, but it was emphasized that "the main mechanisms should be turbines of one of the newest systems tested practically on military ships of the same type and proved to be durable and economical."
The turbines needed to be adapted for the economic course of the 14 ties with the lowest fuel consumption. Reversing turbines were supposed to stop the ship at full speed after it had traveled a distance equal to no more than six cruiser lengths. The system of boilers and their number was not strictly stipulated, but improved boilers of a triangular type, model of the English Admiralty, were recommended.
It was proposed to install four AC turbo-generators with voltage 226 V with a frequency of 50 Hz and power of 150 kW each, as well as two diesel alternators for 75 kW, as the sources of electricity on the cruiser, but the idea of switching to AC power did not develop further .
The torpedo armament of the cruiser consisted of six traverse underwater vehicles with a stock of 18 torpedoes with a diameter of 450 mm.
During the Russo-Japanese War, Commander Novik, Captain 2 of the rank MF Schultz, even in 1905, proposed to remove submarine mines from outgoing ships (“Memory of Mercury” and “Cahul”). values. This opinion was supported by many experts and even the commander (chief commander) of the Black Sea Fleet. However, the 20 Naval General Headquarters of October 1906 reported to the Minister that this view was erroneous and "does not meet the requirements of the current state of the naval art." In support of this, the following arguments were made: mine (torpedo) weapons on the ship help keep a weak opponent from striving to get close to a mine shot; mines strike is crucial in combat; the mine is progressing in range, and the limits of this progress are not visible; our opponents have and put underwater mine vehicles on new ships; mine vehicles (underwater) are recognized as the necessary armament of large vessels.
The arguments about the mine vehicles as a means of self-defense of the ship lost control MF Schultz considered inconclusive. The enemy knows the location of the vehicles, so it will not be difficult for him to approach the ship in the dead zone. The uselessness of the vehicles on the battleships and cruisers was fully revealed during the war, when not a single shot was fired from large ships. Only Vladivostok cruisers used torpedoes on Japanese transports. But for this there were specific conditions: the absence of opposition, the immobility of the target and a small distance (almost at close range) of shooting. In real combat, of course, there will be no such conditions. But underwater torpedo tubes continued to be installed on new battleships and cruisers.
The cruiser was supposed to take on board the 150 min. The convenience of dropping mines overboard was provided by a wide stern with a transom. It was also recommended to provide storage of mines not only on the upper deck, but also on the lower one.
The technical conditions for the design of light cruisers for the Baltic Sea were approved on January 21, 1912, and then they were sent to the boards of Russian factories and representative offices of foreign companies in St. Petersburg with an invitation to participate in the competition.
Among the domestic enterprises were the Baltic, Admiralty, Putilov factories, the Society of Nikolaev factories and shipyards (ONZiV), the Russian shipbuilding society (“Russud”) in Nikolaev and the Russian society for the manufacture of shells and military supplies (Russian-Baltic plant) in Reval. Nevsky Plant, specialized in the construction of destroyers and small cruisers, was forced to refuse to participate in the competition, because a cruiser built in accordance with TK could not pass the Neva bridges.
Many well-known foreign firms also received an invitation to participate in the competition. At the same time, all of them were informed that “the construction of the aforementioned cruiser must be made in Russia, and in order to receive this construction one should enter into an agreement with a Russian shipbuilding company”.
After reviewing the conditions of the competition and learning that light cruisers must be built in Russia, and the projects sent to the competition are not remunerated, all foreign companies refused to participate in the design of the cruiser under one pretext or another. Some of them expressed a desire to provide technical assistance to Russian factories that will build light cruisers.
The Baltic Shipyard loaded with the design of the battle cruisers, the Russud and the ONZiV loaded with the design of battleships and destroyers did not participate in the competition. In addition, the southern factories expected to get a finished cruiser project for the Baltic Sea.
However, as a result of the studies on these tasks, it turned out that when all the technical requirements were met, the cruiser displacement should be around 10 Ltd. t. As a scout such a ship became too noticeable, and due to the lack of onboard armor it was vulnerable even to the destroyer guns. Tower installations that were not mobile enough to combat maneuverable destroyers were supposed to be replaced with deck 152-mm or 130-mm, speed increased to 32 (forced 34) ties, and displacement limited 4000 - 5000 t.
3 April The 1912 of MGSH sent for approval to the Marine Minister new tactical tasks for designing a light cruiser for the Baltic Sea instead of the previously approved ones. The report accompanying the TK stated: “The change in the tasks was caused by the desire to reduce the displacement of the cruiser, since under previous assignments, according to information received from the factories participating in the competition, it increased by more than 10 000 t, which does not correspond to the idea of a light cruiser. With the new tactical missions, the cruiser, although it will be a little weaker, will still be quite sufficient for carrying out its strategic and tactical tasks. Its displacement will decrease quite significantly. "
The reduction of the displacement of the MGSh cruiser was associated with the abandonment of the tower artillery, but instead offered to strengthen an equally important tactical element - speed, increasing it to 34 knots. But the mechanical department of the GUK expressed doubts about the achievement of such speed at the recommended boilers. To achieve 34 knots, increased capacity boilers would be required. Therefore, in the TZ, the speed was reduced to 32 knots.
In the new tasks of MGSH neither the main dimensions nor the displacement of the light cruiser were established. Special attention was paid to ensuring the high seaworthiness of the light cruiser in fresh weather on a big run, which, according to MGS, could be achieved by appropriate formation of the freeboard in the bow — a sufficiently high tank, forecastle or raising the sideline in the nose. At the same time, it was necessary to provide for icebreaking formation of for- and akhtersh-tevny for swimming in broken ice.
Heating of boilers was supposed to be made purely oil. A normal supply of fuel should have ensured 30-knot cruiser travel for 24 hours (720 miles), and a full supply of 48 hours with 24 knots (1870 miles) 32-node travel could be given only in extreme cases with large risk of failure of boilers.
But the most important difference between MGSH requirements from previous ones was the rejection of the towers and the reduction in the caliber of the guns. MGSH offered to install at least fifteen 130-mm guns with shields or in casemates, as well as four 63,5-mm guns to fight airplanes. This decision brought the Russian light cruisers closer to the usual type of reconnaissance cruisers adopted in other fleets.
To change the composition of artillery weapons according to MGSH there were several reasons. First, during this period, he considered tower artillery to be insufficiently mobile and rapid-fire for fighting highly maneuverable modern destroyer-destroyers, the main opponents of light cruisers. On the Bogatyr type armored cruisers, the 152-mm turret gun fire rate was lower than that of deck installations of the same caliber. The 203-mm casemate guns of the Andrew the First Called battleship (commissioned in 1912) had a rate of fire almost twice the rate of fire of the same guns in turret installations. It should be noted that the tower artillery installations appeared on light cruisers only after the First World War.
Secondly, the change in the composition of artillery weapons was due to the desire to reduce the weight load at the expense of artillery, ensuring reservation of the board. Of considerable importance was the fact that the new 130-mm gun, only developed by the Obukhov factory and launched into the series, had good ballistic characteristics. The gun had a manual loading, which eliminated the need for a tray, mechanical tiller, overload device and other mechanisms required for mechanical loading.
The 130-mm gun was supposed to be made universal - to use as a mine caliber on battleships and battlecruisers and as the main artillery on light cruisers.
It should be noted that the German light cruisers built before the beginning of the First World War were armed with 105-mm guns. Only after fighting with Russian cruisers and destroyers of the Novik type they were replaced with 150-mm.
Special attention was paid to the rate of supply of ammunition, which would fully correspond to the rate of fire of the guns. In the normal load, it was proposed to include 150-200 shots per gun. Moreover, in each cellar it was allowed to store ammunition for no more than two guns.
MGSH requirements envisaged enhanced torpedo armament: three underwater vehicles from each side. The cruiser was also assigned the task of setting minefields in enemy waters, for which the ship was to take on board at least 100 mine barriers.
7 April 1912. The meeting of the Technical Board of the GCM was held, at which the MGSH tasks were discussed. On it were developed the basic requirements for the project of the light cruiser. The ship's displacement varied depending on the booking system and accordingly was 5600, 6000 and 6500 t. The first option was planning an armored deck with a thickness of 25 mm and armored bevels throughout the boiler and turbine sections with a thickness of 50 mm. In the second version, the deck was without bevels, but there was an onboard armored belt on KVL with height 2,1 m and thickness 75 mm, which covered only boiler rooms and machine rooms. In the third version, this belt extended over the entire length of the ship.
In all variants, the cruisers had the same armament, as proposed in the MGS report to the naval minister.
The meeting participants decided to lower the cruiser speed to 30 knots during the 12 hour test, but set the fuel burning rate to no more than 3,5 kg of oil per 1 m2 heating surface of the boilers in one hour to be able to force (to 4,5 kg / m2) and If you need to speed up more than 30 knots. The normal navigation area was determined by 18 h sailing at full speed (540 miles) and the largest - 50 h (1500 miles). The meeting also drew attention to the fact that if you take the sailing speed at full speed not 30, but 29 knots, you will be able to book around the board, without going beyond the 6000 tonnage. This proposal seemed very attractive and was further developed in light projects cruisers, but with a slightly increased displacement.
The conclusions of the meeting of the Technical Board of the GOK were reported by the head of the shipbuilding department, N.N. Pushchina, to a comrade (deputy) of the Minister of Maritime Affairs for further decisions. Rear Admiral Mikhail V. Bubnov sent this report to the state-owned Admiralteisky Plant (Marine Ministry) to study the possibility of creating a light cruiser project based on new assignments.
The head of the plant presented to GUK "a draft design of a light cruiser in 6500 t, compiled on the basis of the secret report of the head of the shipbuilding department to the Commander of the Minister of the Navy".
The certificate, compiled by the head of the shipbuilding department of the State Management Department, N.N. Pushushin, as a result of consideration of the design of the Admiralty Plant, indicated that it could be considered satisfactory with minor remarks. Amendments to these comments caused an increase in displacement to 6800 - 7000 t, which, according to N.N. Puschina, was very acceptable.
On the basis of this reference and the conceptual study of the Admiralty Plant, the appropriate corrections were made to the first version of the technical specifications for the design of the light cruiser.
14 April 1912, after approval by the Marine Ministry, the new technical conditions were again sent to the plants participating in the competition. The second version of the conditions contained a number of fundamentally new provisions that determined the course of further design of light cruisers.
The displacement of the cruiser was limited to 6800 t, and the length of the 156-158 m along with the armoring of the decks were introduced two armored belts: the upper one with a thickness of 25 mm and the lower one with 75 mm. The ship’s defense was based on the principle of invulnerability from hitting projectiles and artillery debris from its main opponents — destroyers and light cruisers.
Body (about 29% displacement)
Reinforcements for guns
Wood, paint, interior
device and practical things
Systems and devices
Boats and boats
Artillery and ammunition
Mechanisms and boilers with water
Normal fuel capacity
Armor and wheelhouse
Main artillery - 15 130-mm guns with tower-like or box-shaped shields. More specifically, issues related to the power plant were outlined. As the main mechanisms, it was planned to install four combined turbines of Curtis (each turbine in one building) and locate them in four engine rooms. Turbine speed was limited to 450 rpm at full speed. Specifications prescribed to apply on the cruiser boilers of the type Yarrow, six universal and seven purely oil. Steam consumption should not exceed 0,8-0,85 kg / hp.
As a result, draft designs of the Putilov plant, the Revel Russian society for the manufacture of shells and military supplies (Russian-Baltic) and the state-owned Admiralty plant were submitted to the competition in July. In August, 1912, they were reviewed in MGSH and departments of the QM and at a meeting of the Technical Council. All departments gave their comments on the projects.
The Admiralteysky Plant project was recognized the best in providing onboard booking, and the Revel Plant project in terms of the reliability of protecting the bow.
According to Lieutenant-General A.N. Krylov and Major-General I.G. Bubnov, the project of the Putilov Plant was distinguished by the most optimal hull design and weight data security. He completely satisfied others with the new MGSH requirement of “single-view with a type of destroyer-carrier” in connection with the abandonment of the towers.
Since the Admiralty Plant participated in the competition on the orders of the Marine Ministry and knew that the light cruisers would not be built (the factory built battleships and battle cruisers at the time), it served as a regulator of prices and technical level of the project development. Thus the competition as such did not work.
18 September 1912. At the meeting of the Technical Council of the GUK, it was decided to entrust the Putilov and Revel factories to develop a joint final project of the light cruiser and submit it for approval to the Marine Ministry in October 1912. On October 26 an extended meeting of the Technical Council was held with the participation of the flagship specialists of the Baltic Commander’s headquarters fleet, officers MGSH, GUK, representatives of plants. The joint project of Putilovtsev and Re-Veltsy was approved.
After five years of searching for the optimal technical design requirements for a cruiser, during one 1912, technical specifications for the competition were issued, then reworked and issued for the second time, a competition was held, and a draft design of a light cruiser was developed and approved.
In accordance with it, the cruiser had the following characteristics: displacement 6800 t, length according to GVL 154,8 m, width 15,35 m, draft 5,6 m, coefficient of overall fullness - 0,52, ratio of length to width 10,1, power of 50 000 hp, power 7,35 l s / t, 29,5 speed knots, Froude number 0,39, Admiralty ratio 184, normal fuel 500 tons of oil and 130 tons of coal, 1167 tons full, 2000 miles sailing range (24 nodal course), 15 130 / XNXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXY mm guns and two underwater torpedo tubes, the mass of metal in the side salvo is 55 kg, the main armor bel - 295 mm.
After its approval, each plant began to develop the project in detail. Initially, the plants requested for the construction of cruisers for 9,6 mln. Rub. for a unit. But then, at the beginning of 1913, the final price for one cruiser, 8,3 million rubles, was agreed upon between the customer and the performers. This was achieved through concessions in speed, which, during the time of approval of the draft, gradually decreased from 31,0 to 29,5 knots.
The project of the cruiser Putilovsky and Revelsky plants became the basis for the creation of a light cruiser in the southern factories. 6 March 1913 Head of the Main Directorate of Post-admiral P.P. Muraviev sent to the boards of Russud and ONZiV in St. Petersburg drawings of the light cruiser for the Baltic Sea with a request to take them as a reason to submit to 20 of March 1913 his statements about the cost and the construction time of such same cruisers for the Black Sea.
The plants did not submit their project, and using the project sent by the GUK, they stated the approximate price, which according to the calculations of Russud was over 10 million rubles.
30 April 1913. “Russud” and ONZiV organized a joint working body - the central committee for the design and construction of light cruisers.
The load of the masses of the cruiser "Svetlana" at a normal displacement
ship devices and practical items
supply and supplies
A month earlier, an agreement was reached between Russud and the British firm J. Brown ”on technical assistance in the design and construction of light cruisers. The company undertook to test in its pool a model of a light cruiser manufactured according to the theoretical drawing of “Russud”, determining the necessary power of the mechanisms, and then design the entire power plant. The construction of boilers and machines was assigned to ONZiV or other Russian plants. Separate parts of the mechanisms that could not be manufactured in Russia were also ordered by the firm “J. Brown.
Having received the project of a cruiser for the Baltic Sea, the leadership of Russud expressed doubts that with the 6800 displacement it would be possible to fulfill all the requirements of the Technical Conditions for Design, which the Navy presented to light cruisers. Together with his consultant - the British firm "J. Brown, ”it appealed to the Maritime Ministry with a report that cruisers with the specified displacement of 6800 t can develop no more than 27,5 - 28,0 bonds. As a result, the GUK allowed to submit a draft cruiser for the Black Sea with a displacement of 7600 t. The fears of the southern factories, however, were not confirmed, and the Baltic cruiser Profintern (former Svetlana) of the Revel plant tested 1928 on 29 knots during displacement 6800 t.
The main design tactical-technical elements of the Black Sea cruisers slightly different from the Baltic ones were as follows: displacement 7600 t, length GWL 163,2, width with armor 15,7, draft 5,58; power of the four-shaft steam-turbine power plant 55 000 hp with 14 boilers, speeds up to 29,5 knots. The reservation was basically the same as that of the Baltic cruisers, but the armor belts were lengthened by increasing the length of the hull. The composition of weapons is the same as the Baltic, (see table)
The additional 800 t displacement was used mainly to reinforce the hull set, armor and ship systems. On 52 t, the stock of liquid fuel increased while the mass of mechanisms was reduced by 90 t. Turbine power was increased by 5000 hp
16 July 1913. “Russud” sent a written statement to the Marine Ministry: “It is proposed to build a cruiser according to a project that we developed together with our consultant, the firm J. Brown ", with a displacement of 7600 t in the performance of all tasks of the Maritime Ministry". The proposal also indicated that the power of the mechanisms increases slightly and the speed of 29,5 knots is maintained. “For the cruiser we offer, the statement said, a very reasonable price was set as an exception - 8 600 000 rubles.” At the end of 1913, the draft design of a light cruiser for the Black Sea was approved by the Navy Minister.
Since the construction plants had no experience in creating steam turbines for large ships, they had to turn to foreign firms. Therefore, ships from different factories differed in the types of turbines and boilers. On the cruisers of the Putilov factory there were Parsons turbines, on the Revel turbines of the Curtis-AEG-Vulcan system, on the Black Sea cruisers - the Brown-Boveri-Parsons.
Work on the projects of cruisers continued during construction. In December, the 1915 of the GUK, as proposed by the artillery department, demanded an increase in the limiting angles of elevation of 130 mm guns to 30 °. This entailed the arrangement of special banquets for implements and the introduction of additional reinforcements, which, in turn, increased the mass of the hull and the increase in displacement, and also led to a change in metacentric height.
The tank superstructure of cruisers, which provides good seaworthiness, had a height of 4 m. Therefore, it was decided to divide it in height by mezzanine. In April, 1917 was followed by a decision to cut through additional portholes in the mezzanine room of the tank superstructure. That is why in the technical design drawings the tank superstructure has one row of portholes, and in the reporting, two.
Even greater alterations should have been caused by the GCU requirement to place two hydraulic airplanes on cruisers. It was planned to deploy two seaplanes on cruisers: on the Baltic “Du Perdussem”, on the Black Sea - “Tellier”. For this it was necessary to arrange platforms between the second and third pipes, install cranes and shield the cabins for the pilots.
Construction of cruisers like "Svetlana"
The implementation of the shipbuilding program contributed to the rapid development of the domestic shipbuilding industry and related companies. On the enterprises already existing to 1912, new stocks were erected, workshops were reconstructed. Under the licenses of foreign firms, the production of ship steam turbines was mastered. New factories were built. In the Baltic States in a short time it was built several factories equipped with the latest technology.
However, the Russian industry was not ready to implement such an ambitious shipbuilding program. There were not enough berths, the volume of production of turbines and auxiliary machinery at Russian plants could not meet the need of shipyards. Therefore, we had to order turbines and mechanisms, range finders and gyrocompass abroad.
Cruisers for the Baltic Sea
A feature of the construction of light cruisers for the Baltic Fleet was that having developed a common project and approved it, having won the tender for the construction of cruisers, Revelsky and Putilovsky factories were not yet ready to build large ships. Only after receiving orders for the construction of ships under the “Program of the urgent strengthening of the Baltic Fleet,” did the construction of the plants begin in full force.
In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the joint-stock enterprise “Russian society for the manufacture of shells and military supplies” was created. In December, 1911 shareholders decided to build a shipyard in Reval. 13 in May 1913, on the basis of the Revel Shipbuilding Plant of the Russian Society for the Production of Projectiles and Military Supplies, the Joint-Stock Company Russian-Baltic Shipbuilding and Mechanical Plant was established. for the construction of the plant began in full force only after the receipt of orders for the construction of two cruisers and six destroyers.
The Russian-Baltic plant was built from scratch according to a previously developed plan. It was supposed to have four stocks for destroyers and two large stocks for building ships with a displacement of up to 30 thousand tons. The machine shop of the plant was to produce eight ship turbines per year. A huge outbuilding pool was also built.
The joint stock company of Putilov factories also received a large order for the construction of cruisers and destroyers. By the beginning of 1913, it had several small stocks and low-capacity shipbuilding workshops. It was decided to build a new first-class enterprise instead. 16 in May 1913 from the joint stock company was allocated a new Putilov shipyard.
By November 1913 the construction of the shipyard was basically completed. An open boathouse was built to build large ships, 4 stocks for destroyers, large and small shipbuilding workshops, turbine, boiler room, electrical, etc. workshops, equipped with the latest technology and not inferior to the best foreign. Putilovskaya shipyard was a "ship-building and mechanical" plant, though called by the shipyard.
14 February 1913. The maritime ministry signed a contract with the Revel plant for the construction of two cruisers with a displacement of 6800 tons. Since the turbine and boiler workshops were not yet completed, the contract allowed "to order turbine mechanisms abroad and half the number of boilers for the first cruiser." The readiness of the ships for testing was set for the head - 1 July 1915 th, the second - 1 October 1915 g.
The contract draft is 5,63 m, the metacentric height is 0,9 m, and the plants had to pay a fine for retreating from them. The lower limit of the speed at which the cruiser could be taken to the treasury was 28 knots.
The contract with the Putilov factory was concluded simultaneously with Revelsky in February 1913. The period of readiness for testing the first ship was planned for 1 August 1915, the second - 15 October 1915.
For the creation of each cruiser (pre-production and construction), the plants received 8 300 000 rubles. without armor, artillery and min. An order for the manufacture of armor for four cruisers was issued Izhora plant. The cost of armor for each cruiser - 558 695 rub.
The cruiser of the Russian-Baltic factory and the Putilov shipyard were identical not only in their tactical and technical characteristics, but also in the layout of the premises. They differed only in the type of main turbines and their servicing mechanisms. On the ships of the Russian-Baltic factory were turbines of the type “Curtis-AEG-Vulcan”, on the cruisers of the Putilov shipyard of the Parsons system. Technical assistance
Revel plant provided the German company "Vulcan" in Stettin.
In accordance with the Highest Maritime Administration Order of 28 September 1913, the light cruisers of the Revel plant were given the names Svetlana and Admiral Greig. The first ship inherited the name of the cruiser “Svetlana” of the heroically deceased 28 in May of 1905 in the Tsushima battle. The cruiser "Svetlana" was considered the lead ship of the series, which became known by its name. By the same order, the cruisers of the Putilov shipyard assigned the names “Admiral Butakov” and “Admiral Spiridov”.
Maritime Minister Admiral I.K. Grigorovich wrote in his memoirs: “The construction of Revel’s plants was so advanced that I found it possible to bookmark the light cruisers of submarine destroyers of submarines ordered by them, as well as attend the lighting and the opening of the workshops of these plants. The impression of the built factories is magnificent ...
I ordered the laying of ships at the factories in St. Petersburg to a comrade of the Minister ... ”(IK Grigorovich. Memoirs of the former minister of the sea. SPb.1993).
24 November 1913. On the large, not yet completely completed stockpiles of the Revelsky plant, the ceremonial laying of the cruisers Svetlana and Admiral Greig took place. The ceremony was attended by the naval minister, Admiral I.K. Grigorovich, the governor of Estland, I.V. Korostovets, the head of the fortress of Peter the Great, vice-admiral A.M.Gerasimov, etc. However, the plant was not yet fully completed. The steel for the hulls was not prepared; the breakdown of the theoretical drawing on the plaza just ended. In fact, the Svetlana hull assembly began on April 1, and Admiral Greig began on August 1 1914. The construction of the plant continued with the construction of ships.
A week earlier - 16 in November 1913, the cruiser Admiral Butakov and Admiral Spiridov were laid on the large stocks of the Putilov shipyard. The ceremony was attended by the Deputy Minister of the Navy, Vice-Admiral M.V. Bubnov, the Head of the Main Administrative Board, Vice-Admiral P.P.
Colonel I.Ye. Khrapovitsky and mechanical engineer captain 2 rank V.I.Voyshvilo were appointed to oversee the construction of cruisers at the Putilov shipyard.
V.Ozarovsky was appointed as the builder of cruisers at the Revel plant, observing from the Marine Ministry I.Vlagoveshchensky (by hull), G.M. Khomentovsky, then A.A. Shafrov (by mechanical part).
Turbines and boilers for the cruiser were manufactured in the mechanical workshops of the Russian-Baltic plant with technical assistance from the German company Vulcan.
The ship's inactivity and delays in the delivery of materials led to the fact that by the end of 1913, the readiness of the Putilov plant cruisers was 1,7%, and that of the Russian-Baltic one - 2,5%.
After a long delay at the beginning of the construction work in 1914 was quite intensive. By the end of 1914, the readiness of the 1912 cruisers of the program was: "Svetlana" - 31,9%, "Admiral Greig" -9,7%, "Admiral Butakov" 14,0%, "Admiral Spiridov" - 10,1%.
The beginning of the First World War complicated the construction of cruisers. The help of the German company “Vulkan” in the construction of mechanisms ceased, some of them had to be reordered in England, some in domestic factories, already overloaded with the implementation of the shipbuilding program.
The Sormovsky plant manufactured the spike and steering gears, the Riga plant of the Universal Electricity Company - electrical equipment, the Petrograd plant Robert Krug - heat exchangers, the firm Pirvits - auxiliary mechanisms, the GA Leessner plant - artillery elevators and aero-refrigeration devices Westinghouse-Leb-Lan systems, N.G.Geisler plant - shooting control systems and many other enterprises.
By October 1915, the Svetlana’s readiness for the hull was 64%, and by the mechanisms - 73% (the cruiser Admiral Greig - 46 and 15% respectively). 28 November 1915. The cruiser "Svetlana" was safely launched. By November 1916, the boilers and turbines were loaded onto the cruiser, tests of almost all water- and oil-tight compartments were completed, and mechanisms were being mounted. The readiness of the ship was in the hull - 81%, according to the mechanisms - 75%.
A year after “Svetlana” - 26 in November 1916 was launched “Admiral Greig”. The gap in their readiness continued to widen.
At the end of 1916, a commander and part of the team was appointed to "Svetlana" to master the techniques and mechanisms. The ship was assigned to the Guards crew. Before the revolution, three commanders changed on the cruiser.
It was supposed to commission the Svetlana in September-November 1917. The readiness date of the cruiser Admiral Greig was repeatedly postponed.
The rate of construction of cruisers at the Putilov shipyard lagged behind the Revel. By the beginning of the war, their hull readiness was 9,7%. But the pace of construction of turbines ahead of the readiness of buildings. According to the mechanisms, the readiness of “Admiral Boo-tako” reached 30%, since all parts of the turbines, their assembly and adjustment were carried out in the workshops of the Putilov shipyard. The boilers, main refrigerators and part of the auxiliary machinery were manufactured by the engineering part of the shipyard. As at the Revel plant, the second ship, the Admiral Spiridov, lagged far behind the Admiral Butakov. By October 1 1915, their availability was 38,9 and 46%, respectively. According to IK Grigorovich, the construction of cruisers at the Putilov shipyard lagged behind the Revel factory due to the fault of the administration of the shipyard, which was unable to properly organize work on the stocks. The descent of the Putilov cruisers took place with a difference of a month - on July 23 1916, the Admiral Butakov descended from the stocks, and on August 27 the Admiral Spiridov descended.
On the eve of the revolution, the decision of the Provisional Government of October 11 from 1917 stopped the construction of most of the ships. Of the eight light cruisers under construction, only two were allowed to continue building - the Svetlana at the Russian-Baltic Plant and the Admiral Nakhimov at Russud.
In October 1917, after leaving Riga and the Moonsund Islands, there was a real threat to Revel. The Naval Ministry decided to transfer all ships that were being built in Reval to Petrograd. For the evacuation of unfinished ships and equipment factories in the Baltic States created a special evacuation commission. Then, the Interdepartmental "Conciliation" Commission chaired by Major-General N.V. Lesnikov was set up under the Maritime Ministry, which resolved the transfer of unfinished ships to Revel factories to Petrograd and other enterprises for completion. 3 November 1917 GUK sent letters to the administration of the Admiralty and Russian-Baltic plants asking them to urgently work out with the Admiralty plant an agreement to tow the Revet and complete the construction of the Svetlana cruiser on it, specify the transfer procedure, the cost of completion, identify those responsible for the change and determine new terms of readiness. It was also proposed to determine the number of artisans who need to be delivered from the Russian-Baltic plant for this.
In addition to the Svetlana, the cruiser Admiral Grig, squadrons of destroyers and four minesweepers were evacuated from the Russian-Baltic plant. By 13 in November 1917, all “finished and semi-finished products and materials belonging to them” were loaded onto the cruisers, as well as the equipment of the workshops (turbine, shipbuilding, foundry, model, etc.). "Svetlana" took about 650 tons of valuable factory equipment and materials, and "Admiral Greig" about 1100 tons. Workers evacuated on the same ships. The tugboats brought the Svetlana into the pool of the Admiralty Plant, where its completion continued. December 11 cruiser "Admiral Greig" in tow of the icebreaker "Tarmo" left Reval harbor and headed for Petrograd. The readiness of the light cruisers “Svetlana” and “Admiral Greig” by this time reached 85 and 50% respectively.
The readiness of the Admiral Butako-va and Admiral Spiridov corps at the time of the termination of work was 45-50%. Some of the main machinery and boilers were ready, but not loaded onto ships.
At first, after the October Revolution, all the institutions of the Marine Ministry, shipbuilding plants and their boards continued to work as before, but under the control of commissioners or factory committees. The board of the Russian-Baltic joint-stock company in Petrograd continued to function. It did not stop efforts to complete the construction and delivery of the cruiser "Svetlana" and acquired the missing equipment.
But at the end of March 1918, work on the ship finally stopped. Cruiser readiness was 80%. It was planned to introduce the Svetlana into the operating unit of the Red Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1919, but this turned out to be unfulfilled.
Cruisers for the Black Sea
In contrast to the Russian-Baltic Works and the Putilov Shipyard, the “Russud” and ONZiV were ready for the construction of ships of any class by 1913. They had already built battleships, destroyers, submarines. The factories themselves were located in Nikolaev, but their boards were located in St. Petersburg.
September 21 1913 was the highest approved names for cruisers for the Black Sea - "Admiral Nakhimov" and "Admiral Lazarev".
On October 11, at the meeting of the Shipbuilding Conference, it was decided to immediately lay two light cruisers, without waiting for the completion of the design work and the conclusion of contracts. October 19 1913, before Revelsky and Putilovsky, on the stocks of the “Russud” plant in the presence of Comrade (Deputy) of the Minister of the Navy Vice-Admiral M.V. Bubnov and the Head of the Main Directorate of Vice-Admiral P.P. Muravyov laid the cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov” "And" Admiral Lazarev. "
16 December 1913. At the meeting of the Technical Council of the GOK, which was attended by representatives of the administration of the plants, the contracts were reviewed and the deadline for full readiness of the cruisers for testing was set - October 20 1916.
The contract for the construction of the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was concluded with the board of Russud 11 in March 1914. The first article of the contract stated that "the construction of mechanisms is allowed to be transferred to the OZiV and the manufacture of boilers to another factory." Since the boiler house workshop ONZiV was overloaded with the manufacture of boilers for destroyers and battleships, the boilers for Admiral Nakhimov were ordered at the Kharkov Locomotive-Building and Mechanical Plant. The next day, 12 March, a contract was signed with the ONZiV for the construction of the cruiser "Admiral Lazarev".
The contracts provided for a maximum draft of cruisers no more than 5,6 m, a metacentric height within 0,9-1,5 m and a speed of 29,5 knots. For non-compliance with these characteristics, factories had to pay fines. The minimum speed at which ships could be taken to the treasury was set equal to 28 knots. The cost of each cruiser without armor, artillery and mines was determined in 8 600 LLC rub. The armor for these two cruisers was ordered at the Nikopol-Mariupol mining and metallurgical society plant for 1 650 000 rub.
In February 1914, the Board of Russud, informed the GAM that an agreement had been reached between it and ONZiV on the division of work on the construction of cruisers between them. Both corps will be built "Russu-house", and mechanisms - ONZiV.
Armament, equipment and most of the auxiliary mechanisms for the Black Sea cruisers were supplied by the same factories as for the Baltic ones.
After laying the work on the stocks, there was almost no work, because the Kolomna Plant, which supplied steel for the hulls, delayed its delivery for almost two months. It was only in July of 1914 that the intensive construction of cruiser hulls began. By the end of 1914, the cruisers' readiness was: “Admiral Nakhimov” - 14,4%, “Admiral Lazarev” - 14,2%.
Mechanical workshops ONZiV had no forging presses for the production of turbine rotor forgings. In Russia, there was also no production of turbine blades. The unrealizable dream of the naval minister IK Grigorovich was the foundation in Nikolaev of a forging plant for the production of turbine rotors. Therefore, the blades, forgings of the rotors, the active wheels of Curtis and some other parts of the turbines had to be ordered in England by J. Brown. In England, all auxiliary machinery for turbine and boiler rooms, safety valves and feedwater regulators were also ordered.
Delivery of parts of turbines and mechanisms from England was carried out on English and Russian transports to Arkhangelsk, and then to Nikolaev by rail. The last forgings of the rotors and turbine parts for “Admiral Nakhimov” were delivered by the end of 1915, and for “Admiral Lazarev” they arrived during 1916. Manufacturing of hulls and other parts of turbines and their assembly was carried out in workshops at the ONZiV using English technology.
By the end of 1915, he had manufactured four turbines for the Admiral Nakhimov cruiser. After the test, the ferry they were loaded onto the ship. The build period of the cruiser was completed in 15 months. October 24 1915 was the descent of "Admiral Nakhimov." At the time of launching the ship, 2343 tons of steel were installed, which amounted to 57% by weight of the hull.
Under the law of 24 on June 1914, funds were released for the construction of an ONZiV cruiser of the type “Admiral Lazarev” and “Russud” - of the type “Admiral Nakhimov”
In accordance with the program of urgent strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet, the 29 Naval Ministry of August 1914 entered into contracts for the construction of two more cruisers for the Black Sea - Admiral Istomin (ONZiV) and Admiral Kornilov (Russud). The ship’s readiness for delivery was set in February-March 1917. Their cost was approved just like the first two cruisers - 8 600 000 rub. without armor, artillery and min. The distribution of works among the factories in the contract was determined to be the same as when the first two cruisers were built - the “Russud” hull, the mechanisms - the ONZiV.
The official launch of cruisers took place on 11 in November on 1915. From the beginning of construction, all plants had such a situation that the pace of construction of one of the cruisers outstripped the pace of assembly of the second. And after the start of the First World War, due to the difficulties encountered in the supply from foreign and domestic enterprises, with disruptions in the work of transport, the gap widened.
The situation was similar in the southern factories. The promotion of the construction of the cruiser “Admiral Lazarev” was somewhat behind the pace of construction of the first ship. This was explained by the fact that the administration of Russud, in an effort to lower the Admiral Nakhimov as quickly as possible, sent part of the artisans from Admiral Lazarev to him. As a result, at the time of the descent of the Admiral Nakhimov on the Admiral Lazarev cruiser in the stern, only part of the outer skin was assembled, and the installation of armor was not started at all. With the prevailing average pace of work on the Admiral Lazarev cruisers, it lagged behind its fellow 5-6 months, and this gap tended to increase.
By the end of 1915, the construction of cruisers had almost completely ceased. Most of the workers were transferred to build a floating dock for battleships and landing barges. By 1 in January 1916, the readiness of the Admiral Lazarev in the mass of the hull was 54,2%, and by the end of May the ship was completely ready for descent. To participate in the ceremony, the shipbuilding department head of the Main Department of the Faculty of Industrial Complex PF Veshkurtsev arrived at the plant. On the 19.00 28 in May 1916, the cruiser “Admiral Lazarev”, after the traditional ritual ended, started off and slid along the slipway. But after the first 70 m, the speed slowed down dramatically and the cruiser, passing a total of 106,7 m, stopped, having a bulkhead of the 81-rm on the slipway. The ship was mounted on the stocks, and the preparatory work began to re-descent. Created from representatives of the plant and HUK, the commission came to the conclusion that the most likely reason for the shutdown was the increased friction of the trigger runners on the foundation of the stocks. The horn was much softened due to the high temperature (in Nikolaev these days the temperature of the air in the shade reached 35 ° C, and in the sun — 50 ° C) and was easily scraped off by the front faces of the runners. In the technical bureau “Russuda”, a project was developed for shifting the cruiser using hoists with a total traction force 200 t, hydraulic jacks at 200 t and tugboats with traction force 30 t. The runners that did not enter the water were removed and the hinge was resumed under them. 7 June, when raising the water to 1 m above the ordinary, an attempt was made to move the cruiser with hoists and jacks, but by the evening the water was asleep and the attempt failed. On the morning of June 8, in order to redistribute the load, the two nasal compartments were filled with water of the total weight of 350 t. The cruiser's feed was raised by a floating crane with a load capacity of 200 t. In 19.20, when the water in the river rose by 2 m above the ordinary, all jacks and tali were pulled at their locomotives. As a result of these efforts, the cruiser descended from the stocks.
Since two more cruisers were to be lowered (in September, 1916 was supposed to be lowered by Admiral Kornilov), an in-depth analysis of the reasons for the Admiral Lazarev's stop on the slipway was made. As a result, a new type of trigger skid was developed.
After launching, the Admiral Lazarev was towed to the ONZiV wall. Sheets of the upper and lower decks, longitudinal and transverse beams were disassembled on it, and then the loading of 14 boilers began.
Rear Admiral A.Danilevsky, Chairman of the Supervisory Commission on the Black Sea, analyzed with the plant management the progress of construction, in June 1916 once again informed the “Final” terms of readiness of light cruisers in the State Management Company: “Admiral Lakharev” "- March and September 1917," Admiral Kornilov "and" Admiral Istomin "- May and July 1918, respectively. But priority was given to the battleship "Emperor Alexander III" and destroyers of the "Novik" type, built at the same factories.
By 1 January 1916, the readiness of cruisers by the mass of the hulls was: “Admiral Nakhimov” - 61,2%, “Admiral Lazarev” -54,2%, “Admiral Kornilov” and “Admiral Istomin” - on 39,6%.
In the turbine workshop started the processing of turbine rotors, delivered from England. Equipment ordered by other enterprises in Russia and abroad was received at Russud and ONZiV. By the end of the 1916, the readiness of the Admiral Nakhimov cruiser reached 79,3% in terms of hull mass, all turbines and boilers were loaded onto it. The readiness of “Admiral Lazarev” on the hull is 71,7%, however, the availability of auxiliary mechanisms was no more than 26%. At the 17 December meeting of 1916, which was held in Petrograd under the chairmanship of the GUK with the participation of representatives of the factories, new deadlines for the delivery of Admiral Lazarev cruisers -1 December 1917 were outlined. But the pace of work was declining more and more due to the breakdown of railway transport cargoes were not delivered to the plant, due to the lack of coal the power station was not working. Therefore, the deadline for preparation for delivery was postponed to the first half of 1918.
At a meeting of 11 in October 1917, the Provisional Government approved the shipbuilding program submitted by the Marine Ministry. In accordance with it, the factories of Nikolaev should: complete the light cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”, suspend the construction of the cruisers “Admiral Lazarev”, “Admiral Istomin” and “Admiral Kornilov”.
In a letter of directive from 17 in November, the GOK ordered all vessels suspended by the construction to be urgently launched. For the descent of Admiral Istomin and Admiral Kornilov, who were on the stocks of the Russud, it was necessary to test the compartments for water and oil resistance, to make and install the propeller shaft brackets, the shafts and screws, steering wheels, anchors, as well as underwater reinforcement. This work required at least two months, but the ORZiV was overloaded with work on destroyers.
No matter how hard the plants tried to build at least the leading ships, they didn’t manage to do this before the October Revolution.
% readiness on 1.1.1918
The fate of the ship after 1918
|Time of entry into operation|
Finished like a cruiser
Finished like a tanker
Finished like a tanker
Finished like a cruiser
Disassembled after descent
Finished like a cruiser
disassembled on the stocks
There was one more reason. It turned out that more than cruisers, fleets needed minesweepers, mine and net minelayers, patrol and landing ships, floating bases, etc. The construction of these vessels before the First World War (as well as before the Great Patriotic War) was not given due attention. The maritime ministry did not include them in shipbuilding programs. It was believed that, if necessary, mobilized ships could be used for these purposes. But the course of the fighting showed that the tasks are best carried out by special-built vessels. Yes, and for the refurbishment of mobilized ships required financial resources and capacity of the plants.
The delay in accepting shipbuilding programs, numerous reworkings of design specifications, the fact that the factories were not ready, led to the fact that before 1917 a battleship for the Black Sea Fleet, four battlecruisers for the Baltic Fleet, eight light cruisers, and a third destroyer of the Great Shipbuilding Program were not built . The absence of light turbine cruisers in the composition of the operating fleets had to be compensated by installing additional guns on the Novik-type destroyers under construction. The absence of new turbine cruisers on the Black Sea, where there were only two cruisers with steam engines and a maximum speed of 21 ties, which were exploited for wear during the war, was particularly acute. It was also necessary to accelerate the rearmament of the "pre-Susim" cruisers with new 130-mm guns.
The beginning of the Civil War caught the cruiser in varying degrees of readiness. Their fate was different. And if in Petrograd from 25 of October 1917 the Soviet power was established "seriously and for a long time", then in Nikolaev the power was changed several times: Bolshevik soviets, Central Rada, German occupiers, Petliura Directory, Antanta, Grigoriev gang, Denikin, Soviets. None of the new "owners" of the city tried to organize the work of the factories, but sought to divert ships and ships. Each new government raised its flags on ships, and some gave them new names. Ukrainian nationalists renamed Admiral Nakhimov to Mazepa.
In January, 1920, leaving Nikolaev, the White Guards towed the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" to Odessa, from where they intended to transfer it to the Crimea, and then to Constantinople. But February 8 Odessa was liberated by the Red Army. Before the surrender of the city, the White Guards tried to divert the cruiser, but they did not have sufficiently powerful tugs for this. At the end of February of the same year, the cruiser was successfully removed from the bank and delivered to Nikolaev.
Completion of the cruisers "Svetlana" and "Admiral Nakhimov"
Four years have passed since the work on the cruisers stopped. The First World War and the Civil War ended. "Svetlana" and "Admiral Greig" stood at the wall of the Admiralty Plant, "Admiral Butakov" and "Admiral Spiridov" - in the extension pool of the Putilov shipyard, "Admiral Lazarev" - at the wall of the Naval plant, "Admiral Istomin" and "Admiral Kornilov "-In the stocks of the factory" Russud ". The ships waited for the decision of their future fate. And the prospects were very vague.
In November, 1922, while discussing the program for the repair and construction of naval vessels, V. I. Lenin, who was already ill and could not personally participate in the meetings, wrote two letters to JV Stalin on the issue under consideration. November 25: “I talked in detail with Sklyansky * yesterday and hesitated a little, but the expenditure of 10 millions is so outrageously high that I still can’t but suggest the following:
To approve the completion of the Nakhimov cruiser, then reduce the rest of the large ships to 1 / 3 ... I think the fleet in its present size, although it seems to be a fleet ... yet for us an exorbitant luxury.
The cruiser "Nakhimov" must be completed, because we will sell it profitably, but otherwise I am convinced that our marine specialists are still immensely fond of our skills. We don't need a fleet. ”
As a result, the entire program has been allocated 7 millions.
On November 29, he again writes to Stalin: “I was completely convinced that the Nakhimov cruiser should be among our fleet, because at worst we should be able to sell it profitably ...”
By order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of 7 in December 1922, the cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov” was given the new name “Chervona Ukraine”. 250 thousand rubles were allocated for its completion. gold, which was clearly not enough. In the same month, the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was held, which adopted a resolution on the patronage of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee on this ship. 8 May 1923. The Council of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR considered the issue of additional financing for the completion works and decided to allocate an additional 200 thousand rubles to the ship building stock. in gold.
29 October 1924 of the USSR Labor and Defense Council approved a report by the High Government Commission on the allocation of funds for the completion, overhaul and modernization of a number of ships, including the Chervona Ukraine and Svetlana cruisers. There were two options for the completion of cruisers - on the original draft and on the revised project with reinforced weapons, the composition of which would bring them closer to similar cruisers built abroad. The second option was to increase the caliber of the main artillery to 180-203 mm (in the towers), the installation of three-tube surface torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, as well as a significant increase in anti-aircraft armament - the replacement of 2,5-inch guns with Lender anti-aircraft guns of the 76,2 mm caliber. Such a project was developed, but the installation of artillery of a larger caliber and new torpedo tubes inevitably entailed large rework in the already fully finished building. This did not allow for the completion of construction in a short time (2-3 of the year) and meet the allocated budget allocations. After a lengthy discussion at the end
1925. Returned to the first option, i.e. We decided to finish the construction of both cruisers according to the original design, but to abandon the old 63-mm antiaircraft guns and replace them with the 75-mm anti-aircraft guns of the Möller system, as well as supplement the mine-torpedo armament with three 450 mm three-way torpedo tubes.
1 April 1923, work began on the construction of the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine" at the Nikolaevsky State Plant them. A. Marti (b. ONZiV, "Naval").
Initially, it was necessary to remove dirt and rust. Then it was necessary to finish the installation of the main and auxiliary pipelines, turbo-generators and electrical wiring, make adjustments to all the mechanisms and devices, prepare them for commissioning. At the end of April, 1926 of Chervona Ukraine successfully completed factory testing of mechanisms and mooring trials. The ship was put into the dock for inspection and painting the underwater part of the hull. 13 June 1926 cruiser presented on sea trials. The average speed with five runs was 29,82 knots, the highest speed obtained during the tests was close to the requirements of the original Design Specification (30 knots).
In the course of the sea trials, as per the decision of the acceptance commission, the plant carried out work on additional reinforcement of the aft hull of the hull due to its strong vibration at large strokes. 24 November 1926. A control exit to the sea took place. December 7 admissions tests successfully completed, and the plant began to eliminate the small comments of the selection committee. 21 March 1927 The cruiser Chervona Ukraine raised a naval flag and joined the Black Sea Naval Forces.
“Svetlana”, after seven years of staying in the basin of the Admiralty Plant, in November 1924 was transferred to the wall of the Baltic Plant for completion. 5 February 1925 g. Order for the Red Army Naval Forces cruiser was given a new name - "Profintern".
In October, the 1926 cruiser was transferred to Kronstadt and docked to inspect and paint the underwater hull. The docking was delayed and the delivery of the ship was postponed until the beginning of navigation next year. 26 April 1927 The Baltic Shipyard presented the cruiser to surrender. Despite the overload in the 200 t, the cruiser developed on acceptance tests the speed of more than 29 knots with the power of the 59 200 turbines. On trial was
The rate of economic progress was established and recorded in the form: 14 knots under the action of four turbines and 8 knots with two. Navigation area with normal and full fuel, respectively, for different speeds: 29,5 knots - 320 and 850 miles; 14,0 knots - 1250 and 3350 miles; 8,0 knots -1700 and 4400 miles.
By order of 1 in July 1928, the light cruiser “Profintern” was enlisted in the Baltic Sea Naval Forces and raised the naval flag.
At the end of the 1920s, two cruisers were completed - the Admiral Nakhimov (from 1922 - Chervona Ukraine) and the Svetlana (from 1925 - Profintern). These ships were completed almost on the initial projects and entered service in 1927 and 1928, respectively.
However, if the elements of these cruisers still met the most modest tactical requirements for the start of the 20, with the deployment of so-called “Washington” type “Profintern” and “Chervona Ukraine” in foreign fleets by the time they entered service, they seemed to command fleet materially and morally obsolete.
Therefore, already in 1925, the RKKF Headquarters considered the completion of the rest of the light cruisers expedient only for modified projects, namely, with the reinforcement of the main armament.
For the completion of the redesigned project with reinforced armament in the Baltic remained the Admiral Butakov, launched at the Putilov shipyard in 1916, and on the Black Sea, Admiral Lazarev, which in the same 1916 descended from the slipway of the Nikolaev Russud ".
In January, 1918, the construction of "Admiral Lazarev" because of the devastation that swept the country stopped (as well as the construction of other cruisers). By this time, the cruiser hung armor, loaded the boilers, mounted the bow mast, partly bridges, cabin bulkheads, mines and fences in the boiler rooms. Parts of turbines manufactured in England managed to be delivered to the factory, but the turbines themselves were not yet ready.
26 November 1926 STO USSR, by its resolution approved the program of building the Red Army Naval Forces in two turns. The first phase (1926 / 27-1929 / 30 fiscal years) included the completion of the Voroshilov cruiser (formerly Admiral Butakov) for SMBM and the Krasny Kavkaz cruiser (former Admiral Lazarev) for the MSCM.
Given the urgent needs of the Maritime Forces, the RKKF Headquarters at the beginning of 1925 focused on completing the construction of these cruisers as high-speed “squadron barriers” capable of taking 600 mine barriers and armed with new 180-mm guns in deck installations behind shields. A year later - 16 March 1926 - for “Admiral Lazarev”, in order to accelerate the work planned as early as 1924, but not started, the USSR Revolutionary Military Council approved the design of the STC UVMS with weapons of eight 203-mm guns, which were removed from the old Baltic ships scrapped. But soon this option was tactically unprofitable.
In 1925, the design bureau of the Bolshevik plant (the former Obukhov Steel and Gun Plant of the Marine Department) developed a project for 180-mm guns with a barrel length of 60 calibers. It was supposed to provide the projectile weighing 100 kg with an initial speed of 1000 m / s, with a gas pressure in the barrel of 4000 kg / cm 2 and a firing range of more than 200 kb. It was the first weapon developed after the revolution for naval artillery. The Leningrad Metal Plant was given the task of creating tower installations with these tools. New 180-mm single-turrets and intended to arm both cruisers.
The design projects of the NTK provided for the installation of five 180-mm towers in the diametral plane and boules to increase the stability of cruisers, which was reduced by placing 120-ton artillery installations on the forecastle and upper deck. The preliminary cost of work on two ships was 41 million rubles.
A general project for Admiral Butakov (from 26 in October 1926 of Pravda, from 24 in November of 1926 in Voroshilov) was developed at the Baltic Shipyard under the guidance of PG Goinkins. It was based on a variant with the location of three bow towers along the lines of the English battleship Nelson: Tower No. XXUMX above Tower No. XXUMX and Tower No. XXUMX on the same level as the first, all in front of the conning tower and foremast. In the stern, tower No.2 towered above tower No.1. This arrangement provided the same fore and aft light - two 3-mm guns each and a side salvo of five. Other options were developed by the Baltic, such as the step arrangement of the bow towers, the withdrawal of all the chimneys into one pipe.
A review of 8 August 1927 projects took place rather under the influence of financial rather than technical considerations. On both cruisers, only 25 million rubles were released, which did not ensure their completion even with a reduction in the number of towers to four and abandoning the boules. It soon became clear that two of the four rotors of high-pressure turbines on the Voroshilov had cracks, which necessitated their replacement. This circumstance, combined with the lack of funding, decided the fate of the Baltic ship.
Design Bureau Nikolaev State Plant them. A. Marti began to develop a new version of the re-equipment of the cruiser “Red Caucasus” with four towers. He was assigned the code "project of the vessel №815". Engineers B.Ya. Vinogradov, I.A.Levakov, A.K.Emelyanov participated in its design. The project of completion was approved by the Chief of the Naval Forces R.M. Muk-Levich 29 in May 1929.
1 March 1927 began the preparation for the overhaul of the cruiser "Red Caucasus", and work on the completion and modernization of the ship at the plant. A. Marty (former ONZiV) began in the autumn of 1927 after docking and cleaning the littered hull and took four years. The cruiser, which was presented to 1931 in September by the state commission, was still being tested for about 5 months and only 25 in January, 1932, raising a naval flag, entered the Black Sea Naval Forces 18 years after laying. Such deadlines were explained both by the need to manufacture the newly lost parts of the mechanisms and the finalization of the project, and most importantly by the problems in creating the 180-mm turret installations of the main armament of the cruiser.
Thus, as a cruiser on a revised project, only one ship was completed - the “Red Caucasus”.
Neither cruisers nor tankers
Of the eight Svetlana-type cruisers built, three were completed as warships. There were still five. The highest percentage of readiness had "Admiral Butakov", who stood at the extension wall of the Putilov shipyard.
24 February 1927 began work on the completion of the ship on a new project with 180-mm guns. However, after the discovery of cracks in the rotors of the two turbines and in connection with the insufficient funding of the RVS of the USSR 28, December 1927 decided to abandon its completion. In 1928, the cruiser was transferred to the port of Kronstadt in readiness 40% of full.
The leaders of the UVMS did not give up hope for the completion of the construction of Voroshilov. 13.6.1930 The USSR Revolutionary Military Council approved for the remaining three years of the five-year plan additions to the Navy construction plan, adopted at the 4.2.1929 STO meeting. Additions provided for the completion of the cruiser "Voroshilov" for SMBM. In 1928-1929 he worked out the option of turning him into a “minelayer and hydrating carrier”, and at the beginning of 1932, the options for maintaining the “cruiser” with 180-mm or 130-mm artillery. Assessing the feasibility of these proposals, the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army, V.M. Orlov, in February 1932, spoke in favor of building exclusively new cruisers.
On the use of an unfinished ship returned in the late 1930-ies. At this time, the fleet began to replenish with new ships, which in their characteristics differed from the ships of pre-revolutionary construction. To recruit new ships, the crew required well-trained specialists. Training ships equipped with modern species weapons and technology in the fleet was not. The Commission, chaired by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff of the 2 flagship of the rank, VA Alafuzov, proposed to convert the Voroshilov into a training ship. The initial tactical and technical assignment provided for the ship’s armament to have deck 130-mm and 100-mm guns by analogy with the original 1913 project. The shipbuilding yards under the “Big Fleet Construction Program” laid down the battleships, cruisers and destroyers, which not only had main artillery, but the anti-mine and anti-aircraft artillery were placed in tower installations. Therefore, the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) recommended to install on the training ship 130-mm turret-laying installations, 76,2-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns of new models in the towers and modern artillery fire control devices.
The main military council of the fleet 25 August 1939 of the year approved the main tactical and technical elements of the training and artillery ship being converted from an unfinished cruiser, and ordered the NTK to submit a new TTZ to October 1.
According to him, the ship should have four B2-LM (130-mm), ZEK (76,2-mm), two 46К (37-mm) and eight DShK machine guns in turrets. Mine-torpedo armament was to consist of a five-pipe 533-mm torpedo tube, depth charges and mines barred to the upper deck. The two-shaft main power plant of the echelon location was to consist of mechanisms created for destroyers of the Ognevoy type (project No. XXUMX) or leaders of the type Kiev (project No. XXUMX). The cruising range of the economic course - not less than 30 miles.
Development of draft and technical projects was planned to be completed by 1 in January and 1 in May of 1940, respectively, and the ship could be reequipped in 1941. However, due to overloading of design bureaus, the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry could only carry out a draft design in 1940. In this regard, the start of conversion was relegated to the end of 1941, with its possible ending in 1943.
18 February 1940, the head of the NMSS flagship 2 of the rank L.Maller approved the TTZ and 23 in March, it was sent to the CDC-32 with the order to develop the project of conversion of the Admiral Butakov to the training cruiser with the presentation of the draft design in the IV quarter of the same year .
The project of the training ship was received No. XXUMX, LMNogid was appointed its chief designer. The development of the project turned out to be very difficult, since all the armaments and mechanisms needed to be placed in an already finished hull. TsKB-78 tried to make the most of the finished hull, and mainly its underwater part, in order to keep the lines of the propeller shafts and their mortars and fillets.
Having completed the development of the conceptual design, TsKB-32 sent it for approval to the Shipbuilding Department, where on August 23 its consideration was held by the Technical Council at the STC. During the discussion, a number of comments and recommendations were issued. Taking into account the recommendations, the technical council approved the draft design No. XXUMX.
Simultaneously, the technical department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet from 2 to 14 in September 1940 inspected the hull and the premises of the Admiral Butakov in the dock named after him. Mitrofanova in Kronstadt. Inspection of the hull showed that it had a significant amount of corrosion, especially in the area of variable waterline, where the depth of the shells reached 2,5-3 mm, which reduced the thickness of the sheets by more than 25%, 2 / 3 heads of all the rivets were also corroded by rust. In the main armor belt, two plates were missing from each side. Approximately half of the upper deck armor was not riveted, and the rest of it was supposed to replace 90% rivets due to rusted rivets.
Set the ship was in satisfactory condition. According to the commission, the hull could be used for conversion into a training cruiser. But for this it was necessary to completely change the two bottom casing belts on each side, separate parts of the platforms, flooring the second bottom in the turbine compartments, rivet 75% of all rivets.
The final tidying of the ship was completed in late December. The remaining equipment was removed from it, the holds and internal premises were cleared of debris. The underwater part was cleaned of rust and painted.
Meanwhile, TsKB-32 introduced the latest recommendations of various units of the Navy to the draft, including it provided for its own installation option for the bulls, and sent it to a conclusion in the Shipbuilding Directorate. Thus, the main elements of the training cruiser Aurora (the ship was assigned the name 25 of September) obtained in the draft design looked as follows (in brackets the variant with boules): the standard displacement is 7800 (6810), the normal 8500 (7535) t, the greatest length 158,4 m , KVL width without armor 15,18, side height to the upper deck 9,03, draft at normal displacement 6,45 (5,55) m, transverse metacentric height at standard displacement 0,36 (0,82) m. Total power of the power plant (two steam turbines according to the type of project №30) , six Lavna boilers №29 project and support the project boiler № 26) - 54 000 HP, speed and complete economic turn around 28 and 14 bonds at an appropriate distance sailing 1300 and 4000 miles, fuel capacity of about 1200 ie, autonomy 15 days.
The hull reservation was preserved according to the original 1913 project. Tower-like installations of the main caliber and 76,2-mm anti-aircraft guns were protected by 8-mm, and 37-mm machine guns and 12,7-mm machine guns were respectively 14-mm and 10-mm armor.
Armament four 130-mm Fitting B2-LM with the ammunition 100 shots at the trunk, four 76,2-mm Fitting 39-K (300 shots per barrel), two 37-mm Fitting 46-K (1000 cartridges on the trunk) and 8 guns DShK (2500 ammo per barrel). The main-caliber artillery fire control devices consisted of the KDPNNXX-2 B-8-41 bow group with a central post in the design of the cruiser No.3 (Chapaev-type) and the stern - KDPNNXX-68 B-2-4 program -9-KNPXN-NNX-X-NNX; Anti-aircraft guns of the right side were controlled with the help of a stabilized aiming station SPN-43, the left side - SVP-1.
Mine-torpedo armament: two three-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes of type 1-H and forty (overload) mines of the AG or KB-3 type, anti-submarine - twenty large and small depth bombs, anti-mine - two combat and reserve para-boats K -1.
The armament of the ship was supplemented with the KOR-2 aircraft and the DA-2B and DA-1 smoke apparatus, three 90-cm combat and four 45-cm signaling searchlights. Means of communication - typical for light cruisers. The number of trainees consisted of 220 people.
The ship should have been able to return independently to the base when two any compartments were flooded, however, in the draft, this did not apply to the case of the flooding of adjacent turbine sections, with which the Shipbuilding Administration had to agree, as the ship had a linear arrangement of the engine-boiler installation.
At the conclusion of the Shipbuilding Directorate, the general arrangement proposed in project No. 78 was approved when the CDB-32 complied with the following instructions: to achieve sufficient stability for various load options, allow the installation of buoys; review the placement of add-ons and posts on the foremast, reducing its height and bulkiness; accept in the technical project the installation of four turbogenerators and two diesel generators for 165 kW each; execute other observations of the central offices of the Navy.
However, agreeing with the possibility of implementing this project, the head of the Shipbuilding Directorate, Rear Admiral N.V. Isachenkov still considered it necessary to abandon the conversion of the “Admiral Butakova” into the training cruiser, since the overall labor-intensive work to restore the hull in case of installation of the bulls became comparable with the construction of a new ship, and thus the period of refurbishment turned out to be the same as the construction of the head cruiser (that is, three or four years). In addition, the weapons and mechanisms provided for by the project were also installed on new ships under construction, which could cause tensions in their deliveries, and this would affect the timeframe of the training cruiser. In addition, the cost of conversion according to preliminary estimates amounted to 110125 million rubles., While the cost of a serial cruiser of the "Kirov" type with armaments is just 150 million.
In addition, despite the installation of mechanisms and weapons of the latest models, the ship still remained with an outdated reservation system and did not meet modern requirements for buoyancy, stability and unsinkability.
Claiming 30 of December 1940, draft concept №78 of the training cruiser "Aurora" and thereby recognizing the technical possibility of its implementation, Admiral L.M. Galler could not ignore the opinion of N.V.Isachenkov. Therefore, after the report to the Navy Commissar on Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, the final decision on the issue was entrusted to the Main Council of the Fleet, whose meeting was scheduled to be held in January 1941.
As a result, the completion of the training cruiser was canceled, mainly because of the high cost of the future training cruiser, which was close to the cost of new cruisers. The name "Aurora" passed to the new cruiser, pr.68, scheduled for the bookmark in 1941. Thus, the last attempt to use the unfinished cruiser "Admiral Butakov" was never implemented.
25 April 1942, while stationed at the Leningrad commercial sea port from falling into the submarine part of the enemy’s large-caliber artillery shell and close explosions of several bombs, the corps of an unfinished cruiser got a number of holes and sank with a large list. In 1948, it was raised by ASO KVMK and by 1952, it was cut into metal at the Vtorchermet Leningrad base.
The remaining four corps were in different stages of readiness. In the conditions of devastation, lack of materials and experienced personnel at shipbuilding plants, the idea to complete the construction of these ships, if not as fighting vessels, then as transport ships, was very tempting.
Unfinished cruisers “Admiral Greig” and “Admiral Spiridov” in accordance with the five-year merchant fleet construction plan, approved in 1925, were converted into tankers.
The design of the tankers began in the technical bureau of the Baltic Shipyard, and then the Northern Shipyard joined in the work. Since the readiness of the ships reached 45 - 50% of their hull, they decided not to fundamentally alter them, limiting themselves to installing a longitudinal and a number of transverse bulkheads, which divided the internal volume of the hull into several tanks. A dry cargo hold was provided in the bow of the vessels, and in the aft - engine room, which housed two diesels, each of which worked on its own propeller. Power plant with a total capacity of 1500 hp (two units with a capacity of 750 hp each at the Russky Diesel plant) provided a speed of 9,75 knots.
The completion works were performed by the Baltic Shipyard and the Northern Shipyard. Domestic diesel engines were installed as main engines. The tanker contained 5000 tons of liquid cargo. In 1926, tankers named Azneft and Grozneft were transferred to the fleet. They went to the Black Sea to work on the Batum-Port Said and Batum-Alexandria lines. However, the very idea of converting a high-speed cruiser into a tanker was flawed. Narrow hulls designed for high speed were weak for transporting a large mass of cargo. They experienced loads exceeding the allowable.