Soviet divisional 76-mm guns, designed to solve a wide range of tasks, primarily the fire support of infantry units, the suppression of firing points, the destruction of light field shelters. However, during the war, divisional artillery guns had to fire at tanks the enemy is even more likely than specialized anti-tank guns. In the initial period of the war, in the absence of armor-piercing shells, tanks fired on shrapnel, putting their fuses “on strike”. The armor penetration was 30-35 mm.
At the end of 20, at the beginning of 30, our military leadership was fascinated by the idea of creating a universal artillery system that combines the functions of an anti-aircraft and divisional weapon. One of the apologists for this trend in the field of artillery weapons was M. N. Tukhachevsky, who from the 1931 year occupied the post of head of the Red Army weapons, and from the 1934 year - the post of Deputy Commissar of Defense for Armaments. Energetic, but without proper education in the field of design and technology of artillery systems (and, consequently, incompetent in this matter), he actively promoted his personal ideas in their practical implementation. All divisional artillery became a testing ground for the concept of universalism promoted by Tukhachevsky and a number of other high-ranking officials.
Such a tool, which received the designation F-22, was created, unknown to anyone then VG Grabin. In April, 1935 collected the first prototypes. New guns had a muzzle brake and an elongated chamber under the new cartridge. For the F-22, new projectiles weighing 7,1 kg were specially designed, which she fired with an initial velocity of 710 m / s. The 11 May 1936 of the F-22 was put into service under the name "76-mm divisional gun of the 1936 model of the year." The muzzle brake was excluded from the serial guns (according to the customer, he strongly unmasked the gun with raised clouds of dust), and also adopted a chamber under the sleeve of the 1900 sample of the year. At that time, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) was not ready to switch to another sleeve (or other caliber) of the divisional guns, since there were very large stocks of 76 mm shots with a sleeve at the warehouses arr. 1900
By virtue of the demands of universalism imposed on the new instrument, it turned out to be unsuccessful.
As an anti-aircraft gun, the F-22 was absolutely flawed. She did not have a circular attack, which is unacceptable for anti-aircraft guns, and the low initial velocity is of the order of 700 m / s. In practice, this meant a low reach in height and lower shooting accuracy. When firing at angles of elevation, large 60 °, the automatic shutter with the corresponding consequences for the rate of fire refused to work.
As a divisional, the F-22 did not satisfy the military. The gun had very large dimensions (especially in length) and weight (a ton more than ZIS-3). This greatly limited its mobility, in particular, the possibility of its movement by the forces of calculation. In terms of firing range and armor penetration, the F-22 had no major advantages over the older divisional gun of the 1902 / 30 g. Using the F-22 as an anti-tank weapon was difficult because the scope and vertical guidance mechanism were on opposite sides of the barrel, respectively, pointing guns could not be carried out only by the gunner. The gun had a lot of flaws, was difficult to manufacture and capricious in operation.
Mastering the gun in production was difficult, both because of its much more complex structure compared to previous tools of the same class, and because the gun had a lot of defects and was constantly improved. In 1936, 10 guns were handed over, in 1937 - 417, in 1938 - 1002, in 1939 - 1503. Tool production was discontinued in 1939.
In addition to being used as a divisional, the F-22 was part of the artillery brigades of anti-tank defense (24 guns), from 1942 onwards - 16 guns (anti-tank brigades). During 1941 - 1942 these guns suffered great losses, but met in small quantities until the end of the war. In particular, the 2 artillery regiment armed with these guns (40 units) participated in the Battle of Kursk. Basically, the gun was used as a divisional gun, less often as an anti-tank gun (naturally, having a higher initial speed, the F-22 had more armor penetration than the ZIS-3) and never as an anti-aircraft gun.
In 1937, the ideas of universalism, as with many other ill-conceived experiments and campaigns, were over; their apologists have lost their jobs, and in some cases, lives. The military leadership of the country realized that the army before the oncoming world war did not have a satisfactory divisional weapon, since the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1902 / 30 model was clearly outdated, and the new 76-mm divisional gun of the 1936 model of the year (F-22) had some major flaws . The simplest solution in this situation was the creation of a new, modern gun with a cannon ballistic arr. 1902 / 30, which allowed the use of huge stocks of ammunition for this gun.
V.G. Grabin urgently began to design a new weapon, to which, for whatever reasons, he assigned the FV X-NUMX index to the SPM, meaning that the new tool is only a major modernization of the F-22. In fact, constructively it was a completely new instrument.
From 5 June to 3 July, 1939 passed military tests of the gun, in the same year it was put into production. In 1939, 140 guns were launched, in 1940 - 1010. At the beginning of 1941, SPM was discontinued. This decision was due to two reasons: firstly, the mobilization plan for divisional guns was fully implemented (the mobilization reserve for 1 June 1941 was 5730 guns, there were also 8513 guns), and secondly, the transition to divisional guns of a larger caliber was planned .
With the beginning of the war, according to the mobilization plan, the production of SPM was redeployed to the factories No. 92 and Barricades. The 1941 cannon was launched on 2616, the 1942 6046 of these guns. The production of SPM was discontinued at the end of 1942 due to the adoption of the new divisional gun ZIS-3, which has several advantages over the SPM. It is worth noting that the removal of SPM from production occurred gradually, in particular, Plant No. 92 continued to produce SPM in the 1942 year (706 guns were produced), although at the end of the summer 1941, the ZIS-3 was already produced at this plant.
On 1 June 1941, the Red Army had 1170 such guns. The gun was used as a divisional and anti-tank. In 1941-1942 these guns suffered significant losses, the rest continued to be used until the end of the war.
Compared to the F-22, the new SPM tool was certainly more balanced.
However, for a divisional weapon, the SPM was too large, especially in height. Its mass was also quite large, which adversely affected the mobility of the gun. Placing the sight and guidance mechanisms on different sides of the barrel made it difficult to use the gun as an anti-tank gun. The flaws of the gun led to the replacement of it with a more successful and technologically advanced ZIS-3 gun.
Structurally, the ZIS-3 was the imposition of the swinging part of the previous model of the F-22USV divisional gun on the light gun carriage of the ZIS-57 anti-tank 2-gun. Significant recoil force was compensated by the muzzle brake, which was absent in the F-22USV. Also on the ZIS-3 an important drawback of the F-22USV was eliminated - the placement of pick-and-place handles on opposite sides of the gun barrel. This allowed the calculation numbers of four people (commander, gunner, loader, subcarrier) to perform only their functions.
The design of the new tool was carried out in close cooperation with technologists, the design itself was immediately created for mass production. The operations were simplified and reduced (in particular, high-quality casting of large parts was actively introduced), technological equipment and requirements for the machine park were thought out, materials requirements were reduced, their savings were introduced, unification and continuous production of nodes were envisaged. All this made it possible to obtain a weapon that was almost three times cheaper than the F-22USV, while no less effective.
The development of the gun was started by V. G. Grabin in May 1941 of the year, without the official assignment of GAU in May 1941. This is due to the rejection of divisional artillery by the head of this department, Marshal G. I. Kulik. He believed that divisional artillery was unable to fight with heavy German tanks (which Germany did not have in 1941 year).
After the German attack on the USSR, it turned out that German tanks were successfully hit by 45-76,2 mm caliber guns, and at the beginning of the war due to heavy losses, there was a shortage of these types of guns, and the production of divisional guns was restored. The assignments for the production of 76,2-caliber guns were given to the Privolzhsky plant, where the Grabin Design Bureau was located, and the Stalingrad Barricades factory.
A certain amount of ZIS-3 was made back in the 1941 year - these were experienced guns and equipment for two artillery battalions aimed at troop tests. In the 1941 battles, the ZIS-3 showed its advantage over the heavy and inconvenient for the F-22USV gunner.
The mass production of the ZIS-3 was launched in the 1941 year, at that time the gun was not officially accepted into service and was issued "illegally." In consultation with the director of the Volga plant, Yelyan, Grabin made a bold decision to launch the ZiS-3 into production under his own responsibility. The works were organized in such a way that the parts F-22-SPM and ZiS-3 were made in parallel. The only clearly "not that" part - the muzzle brake ZIS-3 - was made in an experimental workshop. But representatives of the military acceptance refused to issue “illegal” guns without the permission of the State Agrarian University, the head of which was then N.D. Yakovlev. A request was sent to the GAU, which remained unanswered for a long time, new ZiS-3 cannons accumulated in the shops, and finally the head of the military acceptance at the plant I.F. Teleshov gave the order to take them.
As a result, this allowed V. G. Grabin to present ZIS-3 personally to JV Stalin and obtain official permission to manufacture the gun, which had already been produced by the plant and was actively used in the army. In early February, 1942 was conducted official tests, which were more of a formality and lasted only five days. Following their results, the ZIS-3 was adopted by the 12 in February of 1942, with the official name “76-mm divisional gun mod. 1942
The troops received three types of 76-mm guns arr. 1942 g. Which differed angles of elevation, riveted or welded frame and the shutter.
Due to its high adaptability, the ZIS-3 was the first artillery gun in the world to be put into on-line production and conveyor assembly.
It is also the most massive cannon of the Great Patriotic War - in the period from 1941 to 1945, 103 produced thousands of pieces (about 13 300 trunks were mounted on the SU-76 SAU).
Since 1944, due to the slowdown in production of 45-mm guns and the lack of 57-mm guns ZIS-2, this tool, despite the lack of armor for that time, became the main anti-tank gun of the Red Army. The guns sent to the anti-tank artillery were completed with direct-aiming sights PPNNXX-1 or OP2-2.
Projectiles for 76-mm divisional weapons:
1. UBR-354А shot with a BR-350A projectile (Fouberhead with a ballistic tip, tracer).
2. UBR-354B shot with a BR-350B projectile (Blunt-headed with a ballistic tip, with localizers, tracer).
3. UBR-354P shot with a BR-350P projectile (Podkaliberny armor-piercing projectile, tracer, "coil" type).
4. Shot UOF-354M with a shell RP-350 (steel high-explosive fragmentation projectile).
5. Shot of USH-354T with a W-354T projectile (Shrapnel with a T-6 tube).
With a good efficiency of the high-explosive fragmentation projectile in manpower, which gave a breakdown with the installation of a fuse for fragmentation effect around 870 of slaughter fragments, with an effective radius of destruction of manpower around 15 meters.
The armor penetration capability of the armor-piercing projectile, which was pierced at a distance of 300 meters along the normal 75-mm armor, was not enough to fight with the average German tanks Pz.IV.
As of 1943, the booking of the heavy tank PzKpfW VI “Tiger” was invulnerable to the ZIS-3 in the frontal projection and weakly vulnerable at distances closer than 300 m in the onboard projection. Weakly vulnerable in frontal projection for the ZIS-3 were also the new German tank PzKpfW V Panther, as well as the upgraded PzKpfW IV Ausf H and PzKpfW III Ausf M or N; however, all these cars were confidently amazed from the ZIS-3 into the board.
The introduction of the sabot projectile from 1943 improved the anti-tank capabilities of the ZIS-3, allowing it at distances closer than 500 and m to confidently hit vertical 80-mm armor, but 100-mm vertical armor remained unbearable for it.
The relative weakness of the anti-tank capabilities of the ZIS-3 was realized by the Soviet military leadership, but until the end of the war, it was not possible to replace the ZIS-3 in the anti-tank units in 57 2 anti-tank guns in 1943 — 1944. units, and ZIS-4375 for the same period - in the amount of 3 units, of which about half was sent to anti-tank units. The powerful 30052-mm BS-100 field guns hit the troops only at the end of 3, and in small numbers.
The lack of armor penetration capability of the guns was partially compensated by the tactics of use aimed at defeating the vulnerable places of the armored vehicles. In addition, against the majority of German armored vehicles, the armor penetration capability of the ZIS-3 remained adequate until the end of the war. This was partially facilitated by the decline in the quality of armor steel of German tanks in the second half of the war. Due to the lack of alloying additives, the armor was brittle and when it hit the projectile, even if it was not pierced, it gave dangerous chips on the inside.
In the spring of 1943, the VG Grabin, in his memorandum addressed to Stalin, proposed, along with the resumption of production of the 57-mm ZIS-2, to begin designing the 100-mm cannon with a unitary shot, which was used in naval implements.
When creating this gun designers KB under the leadership of VG Grabin widely used their experience in creating field and anti-tank guns, and also introduced a number of new technical solutions.
For the sake of high power, weight reduction, compactness and high rate of fire, for the first time, a wedge semi-automatic shutter and a two-chamber muzzle brake with 60% efficiency were used for the first time.
The wheel problem was originally solved; for lighter guns, wheels from GAZ-AA or ZIS-5 were usually used. But for the new gun they did not fit. The wheels of the five-ton YAZ were too heavy and large. Then the Spark wheel was taken from GAZ-AA, which allowed it to fit into the specified weight and dimensions. The guns equipped with these wheels could be transported by mechanical ping at fairly high speeds.
A year later, in the spring of 1944, BS-3 was put into mass production. Until the end of World War II, the industry supplied the Red Army with 400 guns. The 100-mm BS-3 proved to be a very effective anti-tank weapon.
The heavy 100 mm BS-3 field gun appeared in service in May 1944. For excellent armor penetration, ensuring the defeat of any enemy tank, soldiers, front-line soldiers named it "St. John's Wort".
Due to the presence of a wedge gate with a vertically moving wedge with semi-automatic, the location of the mechanisms of vertical and horizontal pickup on one side of the gun, as well as the use of unitary shots, the firing rate of the gun is 8-10 shots per minute. Shooting from a cannon was carried out with unitary ammunition with armor-piercing tracer shells and high-explosive fragmentation grenades. An armor-piercing tracer with an initial speed of 895 m / s at a distance of 500 m at a meeting angle of 90 ° pierced armor with a thickness of 160 mm. Direct shot range was 1080 m.
However, the role of this weapon in the fight against enemy tanks is greatly exaggerated. By the time it appeared, the Germans practically did not use masses of tanks.
The BS-3 was released in small quantities during the war and could not play a big role. For comparison, PT SAU SU-100 with a gun of the same caliber D-10 was released in wartime in an amount of about 2000.
The creator of this gun, VG Grabin never considered the BS-3 anti-tank system, which is reflected in the name.
The BS-3 had a number of flaws that hampered its use as an anti-tank. When firing, the gun jumped heavily, which made the gunner’s work unsafe and knocked down the aiming installations, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed fire — qualities for a very important anti-tank gun.
The presence of a powerful muzzle brake with a small height of the line of fire and flat trajectories characteristic of shooting at bronzelem, led to the formation of a significant smoke-dust cloud that unmasked the position and blinded the calculation.
The mobility of a weapon with a mass of more than 3500 kg left much to be desired, transportation by the forces of calculation on the battlefield was almost impossible.
If towing 45-mm, 57-mm and 76-mm guns was carried out by horse-drawn carriages, GAZ-64, GAZ-67, GAZ-AA, GAZ-AAA, ZIS-5 vehicles or semi-trucks Dodge delivered from the middle of the war on lend-lease. WC-51 ("Dodge 3 / 4").
That for towing the BS-3 required tracked tractor, in extreme cases, all-wheel drive trucks Studebaker US6.
At the final stage of the war, the 98 BS-3 were attached as a means of strengthening five tank armies. The gun was in service with light artillery brigades of the 3-regimental personnel (forty-eight 76-mm and twenty 100-mm cannons).
The artillery of the RGCs as of 1 in January of 1945 had 87 BS-3 guns. At the beginning of the 1945 of the year, in the 9 of the Guards Army, as part of three rifle corps, one cannon artillery regiment of BS-20 3 was formed.
Basically, thanks to the long range - 20650 m and a fairly effective high-explosive fragmentation grenade weighing 15,6 kg, the gun was used as a body cannon to fight enemy artillery and suppress long-range targets.
Significant role in the fight against tanks, especially in the initial period of the war played anti-aircraft artillery.
Already at the end of June 1941, the decision was made to form individual anti-tank artillery regiments of the GDG. These regiments were armed with twenty 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. In July and August, 1941 formed 35 of such regiments. In August and October, the second wave of formation of anti-tank regiments of the Russian command and control group followed. These regiments were armed with eight 37-mm and eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. 37-mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 of the year before the war was created as anti-tank and had a spent armor-piercing projectile. An important advantage of anti-aircraft guns was also the carriage, providing circular rotation of the gun. To protect the crew, anti-tank guns re-trained in anti-tank guns were equipped with an anti-splinter shield.
At the end of 1941, 37-mm machine guns from anti-tank artillery were seized. 85 mm anti-aircraft guns have been used for this purpose for at least another two years. The Battle of Kursk was attended by 15 anti-tank artillery divisions of twelve 85-mm guns. This measure, of course, was forced, since the anti-aircraft guns were much more expensive, the mobility was less, and they were masked harder.
In the anti-tank artillery fighter actively used captured German guns. Especially prized 75-mm Cancer-40, which had high levels of armor penetration and low silhouette. During offensive operations 1943-1944 r our troops captured a large number of these guns and ammunition.
It was formed several anti-tank divisions equipped with captured guns. Divisions were, as only with captured guns, and mixed composition. Part of the captured anti-tank guns used by the supernumerary, which is not reflected in the reporting documents.
Characteristics of anti-tank guns
The saturation of troops with anti-tank artillery occurred by the middle of 1943. Prior to this, the lack of anti-tank guns was partially compensated by the massive release of anti-tank guns (PTR).
Quantitative saturation of troops with weapons was not always enough to ensure
So the use of divisional ZIS-3 was a measure largely forced. Even a snapping 76-mm projectile did not provide a confident penetration of armor heavy tanks. The cumulative 76-mm projectile was used only in short-barreled regimental
guns, due to the imperfection of the fuse and the possibility of rupture in the trunk of a divisional gun.
Because of the position of the GAU, the possibility of creating an effective 76-mm gun was lost before the war. What the Germans did later, capturing and modernizing hundreds of captured Soviet F-22 and SPM.
For some unknown reason, an 85-mm anti-tank gun was not created. Such a tool was designed by F.F. Petrov and adopted under the designation D-44 after the war.
It was the anti-tank artillery that destroyed the German tanks 2 / 3, despite the shortcomings and omissions, the Soviet soldiers of the anti-tank artillery, showing resilience and mass heroism, often sacrificing themselves, managed to smash the Pantserffe steel fist.
Shirokorad A. B. The genius of the Soviet artillery: The triumph and tragedy of V. Grabin.
Shunkov V.N. Weapon Red Army.