Military Review

Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. 2-Part I

49



Soviet divisional 76-mm guns, designed to solve a wide range of tasks, primarily the fire support of infantry units, the suppression of firing points, the destruction of light field shelters. However, during the war, divisional artillery guns had to fire at tanks the enemy is even more likely than specialized anti-tank guns. In the initial period of the war, in the absence of armor-piercing shells, tanks fired on shrapnel, putting their fuses “on strike”. The armor penetration was 30-35 mm.

At the end of 20, at the beginning of 30, our military leadership was fascinated by the idea of ​​creating a universal artillery system that combines the functions of an anti-aircraft and divisional weapon. One of the apologists for this trend in the field of artillery weapons was M. N. Tukhachevsky, who from the 1931 year occupied the post of head of the Red Army weapons, and from the 1934 year - the post of Deputy Commissar of Defense for Armaments. Energetic, but without proper education in the field of design and technology of artillery systems (and, consequently, incompetent in this matter), he actively promoted his personal ideas in their practical implementation. All divisional artillery became a testing ground for the concept of universalism promoted by Tukhachevsky and a number of other high-ranking officials.

Such a tool, which received the designation F-22, was created, unknown to anyone then VG Grabin. In April, 1935 collected the first prototypes. New guns had a muzzle brake and an elongated chamber under the new cartridge. For the F-22, new projectiles weighing 7,1 kg were specially designed, which she fired with an initial velocity of 710 m / s. The 11 May 1936 of the F-22 was put into service under the name "76-mm divisional gun of the 1936 model of the year." The muzzle brake was excluded from the serial guns (according to the customer, he strongly unmasked the gun with raised clouds of dust), and also adopted a chamber under the sleeve of the 1900 sample of the year. At that time, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) was not ready to switch to another sleeve (or other caliber) of the divisional guns, since there were very large stocks of 76 mm shots with a sleeve at the warehouses arr. 1900



By virtue of the demands of universalism imposed on the new instrument, it turned out to be unsuccessful.
As an anti-aircraft gun, the F-22 was absolutely flawed. She did not have a circular attack, which is unacceptable for anti-aircraft guns, and the low initial velocity is of the order of 700 m / s. In practice, this meant a low reach in height and lower shooting accuracy. When firing at angles of elevation, large 60 °, the automatic shutter with the corresponding consequences for the rate of fire refused to work.
As a divisional, the F-22 did not satisfy the military. The gun had very large dimensions (especially in length) and weight (a ton more than ZIS-3). This greatly limited its mobility, in particular, the possibility of its movement by the forces of calculation. In terms of firing range and armor penetration, the F-22 had no major advantages over the older divisional gun of the 1902 / 30 g. Using the F-22 as an anti-tank weapon was difficult because the scope and vertical guidance mechanism were on opposite sides of the barrel, respectively, pointing guns could not be carried out only by the gunner. The gun had a lot of flaws, was difficult to manufacture and capricious in operation.

Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. 2-Part I


Mastering the gun in production was difficult, both because of its much more complex structure compared to previous tools of the same class, and because the gun had a lot of defects and was constantly improved. In 1936, 10 guns were handed over, in 1937 - 417, in 1938 - 1002, in 1939 - 1503. Tool production was discontinued in 1939.



In addition to being used as a divisional, the F-22 was part of the artillery brigades of anti-tank defense (24 guns), from 1942 onwards - 16 guns (anti-tank brigades). During 1941 - 1942 these guns suffered great losses, but met in small quantities until the end of the war. In particular, the 2 artillery regiment armed with these guns (40 units) participated in the Battle of Kursk. Basically, the gun was used as a divisional gun, less often as an anti-tank gun (naturally, having a higher initial speed, the F-22 had more armor penetration than the ZIS-3) and never as an anti-aircraft gun.


In 1937, the ideas of universalism, as with many other ill-conceived experiments and campaigns, were over; their apologists have lost their jobs, and in some cases, lives. The military leadership of the country realized that the army before the oncoming world war did not have a satisfactory divisional weapon, since the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1902 / 30 model was clearly outdated, and the new 76-mm divisional gun of the 1936 model of the year (F-22) had some major flaws . The simplest solution in this situation was the creation of a new, modern gun with a cannon ballistic arr. 1902 / 30, which allowed the use of huge stocks of ammunition for this gun.
V.G. Grabin urgently began to design a new weapon, to which, for whatever reasons, he assigned the FV X-NUMX index to the SPM, meaning that the new tool is only a major modernization of the F-22. In fact, constructively it was a completely new instrument.



From 5 June to 3 July, 1939 passed military tests of the gun, in the same year it was put into production. In 1939, 140 guns were launched, in 1940 - 1010. At the beginning of 1941, SPM was discontinued. This decision was due to two reasons: firstly, the mobilization plan for divisional guns was fully implemented (the mobilization reserve for 1 June 1941 was 5730 guns, there were also 8513 guns), and secondly, the transition to divisional guns of a larger caliber was planned .



With the beginning of the war, according to the mobilization plan, the production of SPM was redeployed to the factories No. 92 and Barricades. The 1941 cannon was launched on 2616, the 1942 6046 of these guns. The production of SPM was discontinued at the end of 1942 due to the adoption of the new divisional gun ZIS-3, which has several advantages over the SPM. It is worth noting that the removal of SPM from production occurred gradually, in particular, Plant No. 92 continued to produce SPM in the 1942 year (706 guns were produced), although at the end of the summer 1941, the ZIS-3 was already produced at this plant.
On 1 June 1941, the Red Army had 1170 such guns. The gun was used as a divisional and anti-tank. In 1941-1942 these guns suffered significant losses, the rest continued to be used until the end of the war.



Compared to the F-22, the new SPM tool was certainly more balanced.
However, for a divisional weapon, the SPM was too large, especially in height. Its mass was also quite large, which adversely affected the mobility of the gun. Placing the sight and guidance mechanisms on different sides of the barrel made it difficult to use the gun as an anti-tank gun. The flaws of the gun led to the replacement of it with a more successful and technologically advanced ZIS-3 gun.

Structurally, the ZIS-3 was the imposition of the swinging part of the previous model of the F-22USV divisional gun on the light gun carriage of the ZIS-57 anti-tank 2-gun. Significant recoil force was compensated by the muzzle brake, which was absent in the F-22USV. Also on the ZIS-3 an important drawback of the F-22USV was eliminated - the placement of pick-and-place handles on opposite sides of the gun barrel. This allowed the calculation numbers of four people (commander, gunner, loader, subcarrier) to perform only their functions.
The design of the new tool was carried out in close cooperation with technologists, the design itself was immediately created for mass production. The operations were simplified and reduced (in particular, high-quality casting of large parts was actively introduced), technological equipment and requirements for the machine park were thought out, materials requirements were reduced, their savings were introduced, unification and continuous production of nodes were envisaged. All this made it possible to obtain a weapon that was almost three times cheaper than the F-22USV, while no less effective.




The development of the gun was started by V. G. Grabin in May 1941 of the year, without the official assignment of GAU in May 1941. This is due to the rejection of divisional artillery by the head of this department, Marshal G. I. Kulik. He believed that divisional artillery was unable to fight with heavy German tanks (which Germany did not have in 1941 year).
After the German attack on the USSR, it turned out that German tanks were successfully hit by 45-76,2 mm caliber guns, and at the beginning of the war due to heavy losses, there was a shortage of these types of guns, and the production of divisional guns was restored. The assignments for the production of 76,2-caliber guns were given to the Privolzhsky plant, where the Grabin Design Bureau was located, and the Stalingrad Barricades factory.

A certain amount of ZIS-3 was made back in the 1941 year - these were experienced guns and equipment for two artillery battalions aimed at troop tests. In the 1941 battles, the ZIS-3 showed its advantage over the heavy and inconvenient for the F-22USV gunner.



The mass production of the ZIS-3 was launched in the 1941 year, at that time the gun was not officially accepted into service and was issued "illegally." In consultation with the director of the Volga plant, Yelyan, Grabin made a bold decision to launch the ZiS-3 into production under his own responsibility. The works were organized in such a way that the parts F-22-SPM and ZiS-3 were made in parallel. The only clearly "not that" part - the muzzle brake ZIS-3 - was made in an experimental workshop. But representatives of the military acceptance refused to issue “illegal” guns without the permission of the State Agrarian University, the head of which was then N.D. Yakovlev. A request was sent to the GAU, which remained unanswered for a long time, new ZiS-3 cannons accumulated in the shops, and finally the head of the military acceptance at the plant I.F. Teleshov gave the order to take them.
As a result, this allowed V. G. Grabin to present ZIS-3 personally to JV Stalin and obtain official permission to manufacture the gun, which had already been produced by the plant and was actively used in the army. In early February, 1942 was conducted official tests, which were more of a formality and lasted only five days. Following their results, the ZIS-3 was adopted by the 12 in February of 1942, with the official name “76-mm divisional gun mod. 1942



The troops received three types of 76-mm guns arr. 1942 g. Which differed angles of elevation, riveted or welded frame and the shutter.
Due to its high adaptability, the ZIS-3 was the first artillery gun in the world to be put into on-line production and conveyor assembly.
It is also the most massive cannon of the Great Patriotic War - in the period from 1941 to 1945, 103 produced thousands of pieces (about 13 300 trunks were mounted on the SU-76 SAU).

Since 1944, due to the slowdown in production of 45-mm guns and the lack of 57-mm guns ZIS-2, this tool, despite the lack of armor for that time, became the main anti-tank gun of the Red Army. The guns sent to the anti-tank artillery were completed with direct-aiming sights PPNNXX-1 or OP2-2.


Projectiles for 76-mm divisional weapons:
1. UBR-354А shot with a BR-350A projectile (Fouberhead with a ballistic tip, tracer).
2. UBR-354B shot with a BR-350B projectile (Blunt-headed with a ballistic tip, with localizers, tracer).
3. UBR-354P shot with a BR-350P projectile (Podkaliberny armor-piercing projectile, tracer, "coil" type).
4. Shot UOF-354M with a shell RP-350 (steel high-explosive fragmentation projectile).
5. Shot of USH-354T with a W-354T projectile (Shrapnel with a T-6 tube).

With a good efficiency of the high-explosive fragmentation projectile in manpower, which gave a breakdown with the installation of a fuse for fragmentation effect around 870 of slaughter fragments, with an effective radius of destruction of manpower around 15 meters.
The armor penetration capability of the armor-piercing projectile, which was pierced at a distance of 300 meters along the normal 75-mm armor, was not enough to fight with the average German tanks Pz.IV.
As of 1943, the booking of the heavy tank PzKpfW VI “Tiger” was invulnerable to the ZIS-3 in the frontal projection and weakly vulnerable at distances closer than 300 m in the onboard projection. Weakly vulnerable in frontal projection for the ZIS-3 were also the new German tank PzKpfW V Panther, as well as the upgraded PzKpfW IV Ausf H and PzKpfW III Ausf M or N; however, all these cars were confidently amazed from the ZIS-3 into the board.
The introduction of the sabot projectile from 1943 improved the anti-tank capabilities of the ZIS-3, allowing it at distances closer than 500 and m to confidently hit vertical 80-mm armor, but 100-mm vertical armor remained unbearable for it.
The relative weakness of the anti-tank capabilities of the ZIS-3 was realized by the Soviet military leadership, but until the end of the war, it was not possible to replace the ZIS-3 in the anti-tank units in 57 2 anti-tank guns in 1943 — 1944. units, and ZIS-4375 for the same period - in the amount of 3 units, of which about half was sent to anti-tank units. The powerful 30052-mm BS-100 field guns hit the troops only at the end of 3, and in small numbers.
The lack of armor penetration capability of the guns was partially compensated by the tactics of use aimed at defeating the vulnerable places of the armored vehicles. In addition, against the majority of German armored vehicles, the armor penetration capability of the ZIS-3 remained adequate until the end of the war. This was partially facilitated by the decline in the quality of armor steel of German tanks in the second half of the war. Due to the lack of alloying additives, the armor was brittle and when it hit the projectile, even if it was not pierced, it gave dangerous chips on the inside.

In the spring of 1943, the VG Grabin, in his memorandum addressed to Stalin, proposed, along with the resumption of production of the 57-mm ZIS-2, to begin designing the 100-mm cannon with a unitary shot, which was used in naval implements.
When creating this gun designers KB under the leadership of VG Grabin widely used their experience in creating field and anti-tank guns, and also introduced a number of new technical solutions.
For the sake of high power, weight reduction, compactness and high rate of fire, for the first time, a wedge semi-automatic shutter and a two-chamber muzzle brake with 60% efficiency were used for the first time.
The wheel problem was originally solved; for lighter guns, wheels from GAZ-AA or ZIS-5 were usually used. But for the new gun they did not fit. The wheels of the five-ton YAZ were too heavy and large. Then the Spark wheel was taken from GAZ-AA, which allowed it to fit into the specified weight and dimensions. The guns equipped with these wheels could be transported by mechanical ping at fairly high speeds.



A year later, in the spring of 1944, BS-3 was put into mass production. Until the end of World War II, the industry supplied the Red Army with 400 guns. The 100-mm BS-3 proved to be a very effective anti-tank weapon.
The heavy 100 mm BS-3 field gun appeared in service in May 1944. For excellent armor penetration, ensuring the defeat of any enemy tank, soldiers, front-line soldiers named it "St. John's Wort".



Due to the presence of a wedge gate with a vertically moving wedge with semi-automatic, the location of the mechanisms of vertical and horizontal pickup on one side of the gun, as well as the use of unitary shots, the firing rate of the gun is 8-10 shots per minute. Shooting from a cannon was carried out with unitary ammunition with armor-piercing tracer shells and high-explosive fragmentation grenades. An armor-piercing tracer with an initial speed of 895 m / s at a distance of 500 m at a meeting angle of 90 ° pierced armor with a thickness of 160 mm. Direct shot range was 1080 m.
However, the role of this weapon in the fight against enemy tanks is greatly exaggerated. By the time it appeared, the Germans practically did not use masses of tanks.
The BS-3 was released in small quantities during the war and could not play a big role. For comparison, PT SAU SU-100 with a gun of the same caliber D-10 was released in wartime in an amount of about 2000.
The creator of this gun, VG Grabin never considered the BS-3 anti-tank system, which is reflected in the name.



The BS-3 had a number of flaws that hampered its use as an anti-tank. When firing, the gun jumped heavily, which made the gunner’s work unsafe and knocked down the aiming installations, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed fire — qualities for a very important anti-tank gun.
The presence of a powerful muzzle brake with a small height of the line of fire and flat trajectories characteristic of shooting at bronzelem, led to the formation of a significant smoke-dust cloud that unmasked the position and blinded the calculation.
The mobility of a weapon with a mass of more than 3500 kg left much to be desired, transportation by the forces of calculation on the battlefield was almost impossible.

If towing 45-mm, 57-mm and 76-mm guns was carried out by horse-drawn carriages, GAZ-64, GAZ-67, GAZ-AA, GAZ-AAA, ZIS-5 vehicles or semi-trucks Dodge delivered from the middle of the war on lend-lease. WC-51 ("Dodge 3 / 4").
That for towing the BS-3 required tracked tractor, in extreme cases, all-wheel drive trucks Studebaker US6.

At the final stage of the war, the 98 BS-3 were attached as a means of strengthening five tank armies. The gun was in service with light artillery brigades of the 3-regimental personnel (forty-eight 76-mm and twenty 100-mm cannons).
The artillery of the RGCs as of 1 in January of 1945 had 87 BS-3 guns. At the beginning of the 1945 of the year, in the 9 of the Guards Army, as part of three rifle corps, one cannon artillery regiment of BS-20 3 was formed.

Basically, thanks to the long range - 20650 m and a fairly effective high-explosive fragmentation grenade weighing 15,6 kg, the gun was used as a body cannon to fight enemy artillery and suppress long-range targets.


Significant role in the fight against tanks, especially in the initial period of the war played anti-aircraft artillery.
Already at the end of June 1941, the decision was made to form individual anti-tank artillery regiments of the GDG. These regiments were armed with twenty 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. In July and August, 1941 formed 35 of such regiments. In August and October, the second wave of formation of anti-tank regiments of the Russian command and control group followed. These regiments were armed with eight 37-mm and eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. 37-mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 of the year before the war was created as anti-tank and had a spent armor-piercing projectile. An important advantage of anti-aircraft guns was also the carriage, providing circular rotation of the gun. To protect the crew, anti-tank guns re-trained in anti-tank guns were equipped with an anti-splinter shield.



At the end of 1941, 37-mm machine guns from anti-tank artillery were seized. 85 mm anti-aircraft guns have been used for this purpose for at least another two years. The Battle of Kursk was attended by 15 anti-tank artillery divisions of twelve 85-mm guns. This measure, of course, was forced, since the anti-aircraft guns were much more expensive, the mobility was less, and they were masked harder.

In the anti-tank artillery fighter actively used captured German guns. Especially prized 75-mm Cancer-40, which had high levels of armor penetration and low silhouette. During offensive operations 1943-1944 r our troops captured a large number of these guns and ammunition.



It was formed several anti-tank divisions equipped with captured guns. Divisions were, as only with captured guns, and mixed composition. Part of the captured anti-tank guns used by the supernumerary, which is not reflected in the reporting documents.

Characteristics of anti-tank guns


The saturation of troops with anti-tank artillery occurred by the middle of 1943. Prior to this, the lack of anti-tank guns was partially compensated by the massive release of anti-tank guns (PTR).
Quantitative saturation of troops with weapons was not always enough to ensure
anti-tank defense.
So the use of divisional ZIS-3 was a measure largely forced. Even a snapping 76-mm projectile did not provide a confident penetration of armor heavy tanks. The cumulative 76-mm projectile was used only in short-barreled regimental
guns, due to the imperfection of the fuse and the possibility of rupture in the trunk of a divisional gun.
Because of the position of the GAU, the possibility of creating an effective 76-mm gun was lost before the war. What the Germans did later, capturing and modernizing hundreds of captured Soviet F-22 and SPM.
For some unknown reason, an 85-mm anti-tank gun was not created. Such a tool was designed by F.F. Petrov and adopted under the designation D-44 after the war.



It was the anti-tank artillery that destroyed the German tanks 2 / 3, despite the shortcomings and omissions, the Soviet soldiers of the anti-tank artillery, showing resilience and mass heroism, often sacrificing themselves, managed to smash the Pantserffe steel fist.


Based on:
http://www.tvoyrebenok.ru/zis3.shtml
Shirokorad A. B. The genius of the Soviet artillery: The triumph and tragedy of V. Grabin.
Shunkov V.N. Weapon Red Army.
Author:
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  1. Civil
    Civil 26 September 2013 07: 45
    10
    Good stuff, I didn’t know that we had problems with anti-tank artillery
    1. Bongo
      26 September 2013 08: 49
      10
      All the belligerents had problems.
    2. igordok
      igordok 26 September 2013 09: 18
      11
      VET no matter how many there are, there is always not enough (in the right place, at the right time). Not to mention the 41 and 42 years.
    3. malikszh
      malikszh 27 September 2013 06: 53
      0
      if there were no problems, Guderyap’s tanks wouldn’t stand near Moscow.
  2. avt
    avt 26 September 2013 09: 02
    10
    Good material good can without any frills, but soundly made, popular. Plus for both parts.
  3. igordok
    igordok 26 September 2013 09: 16
    10
    I don't remember who said. "The weapon in the sight of which the enemy tank appears becomes - anti-tank". So in 3 parts you can talk about the anti-tank use of all artillery. soldier

    What was the name of the trophy RAC-40?
    1. Bongo
      26 September 2013 09: 34
      +7
      In different documents in different ways, most often: "German 75-mm anti-tank guns arr. 1940."
  4. Omskgasmyas
    Omskgasmyas 26 September 2013 10: 29
    0
    The material seemed to be copied from the Soviet history textbook with the addition of a photo. The reality was much more severe, and the leadership of the Red Army and the Soviet Government knew about it. In my opinion, the mediocre ability of Soviet tank guns and anti-tank missiles to fight German tanks is rooted in weak shells a la 1900. Forty-five is the English marine three-pound (47-mm) taken from the ships by the beginning of 1 MV for complete uselessness. But in the infantry they began to use it as a battalion, or trench cannon for fighting machine guns. The shell, although weak (119 g of explosives), was stronger than a two-pound shell (37 mm, 35 g of explosives). After 1 MV, millions of shells remained in the USSR, delivered both by the Allies and produced at Russian factories. Since the Soviets have their own pride, the 47-mm projectile (the British measure the caliber by the leading belt) honed the belt by 0,5 mm and announced the creation of its own 45 mm caliber gun (this is the caliber of the projectile body, it remained unchanged).
    The rifling depth of the "new" gun was slightly reduced by the required 0,5 mm and the production of such guns began at the factories of the USSR.
    I will continue in the next post.
  5. Omskgasmyas
    Omskgasmyas 26 September 2013 10: 49
    -5
    Then an armor-piercing shell was made for this 45-mm gun and assigned to the VET. And also added to the tanks. They washed the awards and began to wait for victorious broadcasts from the fronts. Reality, as always, exceeded expectations.
    I think, from the photo in this article, everyone noticed that 45 and 76 mm shells are almost cylindrical in shape, and not bottle, like, for example, 85 and 100 mm shells. This indicates a small volume for the powder charge in the cartridges. Enough to defeat the infantry and field fortifications, for tanks - no longer.
    In the LJ of one historian and along the way, the writer posted interesting documents of the armored control of the Red Army for the study of armor penetration of shells and resistance of armor. Link: http://litl-bro.livejournal.com/ Many different docks.
    He is the author of a book about the first T-34s. But this is not about him, but about the Soviet vocational schools. I continue using the documents laid out by him:
    In 1940, the USSR received weapons from Germany, including the T-3 tank (I will call it in Russian). He was tested at the training ground, fired from guns, and I will give some results.
    I will continue in the next post.
    1. Bongo
      26 September 2013 13: 28
      +5
      Not everything is so simple, did you read the first part?
    2. igordok
      igordok 26 September 2013 13: 41
      +8
      Quote: Omskgazmyas
      shells are almost cylindrical, not bottle

      More precisely it is necessary to be with terms. That part of the artillery cartridge about which you mention is called a sleeve. And the shell is what flies towards the enemy.
  6. Omskgasmyas
    Omskgasmyas 26 September 2013 11: 34
    0
    So: 30-mm frontal armor T-3 with a distance of 500 m and an angle from the normal 30 gr. 45-mm PTO arr. 37 d. NOT PUNCHING. It makes its way from a distance of 150 m. Although, according to calculations, it should easily penetrate 40 mm.
    A similar weakness is demonstrated by 76-mm guns L-11 and F-32 on 50-mm armor. They start punching it from 300 m. F-34 is better - from 800 m.
    Given that the Germans in the experience of the French company began to shield their tanks and by the beginning of the Second World War, many German tanks had 50-60 mm frontal armor. To penetrate such armor 45-mm Soviet PTO could only point blank and at right angles with the armor.
    There is much more interesting in these documents, I note the validity of howitzers for firing at tanks:
    Shelling the T-3 tank from 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers of different models from a distance of 500 m did not give a result. 10-15 shells were fired, not a single one fell into the tank.
    Py.Sy. At the test site T-3 showed the speed of 70 km \ h. BT-7 showed 0,5 km less.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 27 September 2013 23: 16
      +1
      Py.Sy. At the test site T-3 showed the speed of 70 km \ h. BT-7 showed 0,5 km less.

      yes, I remember those times when people wrote Yentsu, and explained where these 70 grow from .... I’ll notice from the polygons
  7. vietnam7
    vietnam7 26 September 2013 12: 49
    +4
    Wow, and with what then the Germans were beaten and finished off? Veterans say that about the tank, what about the anti-tank forty say its penetration was enough, and the accuracy at the level of a rifle, "documents" and real eyewitnesses are apparently different things.
    1. Omskgasmyas
      Omskgasmyas 26 September 2013 13: 06
      +3
      The forty-five was modernized as best they could. And also her shells. First, new shells increased the armor penetration from 42 to 50 mm. The Germans responded by shielding their tanks up to 50-60 mm and such attacked the USSR. In 1942, the barrel of the magpie was lengthened, gunpowder was slightly added to the sleeve (from 360 to 390 grams), armor penetration was 60 mm. Subcaliber shells appeared. But with them, the Tiger was generally too tough. T-4, Panther - only on board. Light tanks, self-propelled vehicles and armored personnel carriers made their way. Few people know that Germany riveted armored personnel carriers for 30 thousand. "Democrats" always compare only the tanks of the USSR and Germany on 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, leaving out of brackets all other armored vehicles, for which Germany had an overwhelming advantage. But do not forget to indicate the heavy armored vehicles of the USSR.
      No wonder that its soldiers called: "Farewell, Motherland!"
      By the way, a German cannon of a close caliber 50 mm - Pak-38 with a barrel of 60 calibers pierced the 500 m 90 mm armor. 45 only 60 mm. So compare the effectiveness of weapons. The difference is 1,5 times.
      1. Bigriver
        Bigriver 26 September 2013 13: 37
        10
        Quote: Omskgazmyas
        Forty was upgraded as best they could. As well as her shells. First, new shells increased armor penetration from 42 to 50 mm.

        ... 50 mm, - Pak-38 with a barrel of 60 calibers pierced 500 mm armor on 90 m. 45-ka only 60 mm. The difference is 1,5 times.

        Ches word, incomprehensible your train of thought?
        You first state that:
        "mediocre ability Soviet tank guns and anti-tank war against German tanks has roots in weak shells a la 1900 "

        Then, nevertheless, it turns out that the birth injury is not an injury at all, and you can upgrade and BP and guns. As a result, the return on the system is almost doubled. If you roughly consider armor penetration: 25-30 mm at the entrance to the war, 60-80 - in the middle-end of the war.

        Second.
        You take the Pak-38's armor penetration at 500 meters for the tungsten "crowbar" and compare it with the caliber armor-piercing M-42.
        Take, for correctness, a 45 mm "coil" and find not an impressive difference.
        1. Omskgasmyas
          Omskgasmyas 27 September 2013 10: 41
          -5
          First: On the weaknesses of the 45-mm gun, below I gave a link to the site, and placed the document, read. Penetration from 40 mm to 80 mm increased due to such measures: increasing the length of the barrel and sub-caliber shells with a tungsten core.

          Second: Pak-38 with a projectile on the 500 m pierced 130 mm of armor at an angle of 30 gr. from the normal.

          And the HE shell of the 45-mm contained a charge of 100 g of gunpowder. In armor-piercing, they filled up to the eyeballs and entered 360 of gunpowder. No longer allowed the size of the sleeve. The 76-mm guns have the same picture: in the projectile arr. 1902 years there is little space for a large charge for throwing armor-piercing shells at high speed. So we have the long-barreled 76-mm F-34 guns (T-34 tank) with a mediocre projectile speed of 660 m / s. The same is all the guns of the Red Army 76-mm caliber. They all had to shoot munitions of the 1902 model of the year. This was the terms of reference for designers from GAU in the design.
      2. Bigriver
        Bigriver 26 September 2013 16: 57
        +4
        Quote: Omskgazmyas
        ... Forty have been modernized as they could. As well as her shells. First, new shells increased armor penetration from 42 to 50 mm. The Germans responded by shielding their tanks up to 50-60 mm and attacking the USSR like that ...

        Attentive reading reveals many miracles smile
        I confess, I read you fluently the first time.
        So, in your opinion, does the Nazi screening happen in response to the modernization of the 53-K and its shells? And all this happened before the start of the Eastern campaign?
        And what was modernized in the gun and shell before the start of the war? Due to what increased (in your opinion) armor penetration?
  8. vietnam7
    vietnam7 26 September 2013 13: 16
    +3
    Quote: Omskgazmyas
    The Germans responded by shielding their tanks to 50-60 mm and attacking the USSR in such a way.
    the Germans began to screen like at the end of 41 beginning of 42 year. In Europe, they had enough booking.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 26 September 2013 13: 47
      +2
      Quote: vietnam7
      ... it’s like the Germans began to screen at the end of 41 beginning of 42 year. In Europe, they had enough booking.

      The VLD "three" and "four" were screened in front of the Eastern company.
      But, according to various sources, they could not strengthen the forehead even in half of the tank fleet.
      And in the winter and spring of the 43rd there was another screening - spaced on the sides of the hull and towers.
  9. vietnam7
    vietnam7 26 September 2013 13: 18
    -4
    "goodbye homeland" was called su76 or columbine.
  10. msv
    msv 26 September 2013 13: 58
    +5
    Quote: Omskgazmyas
    Then an armor-piercing shell was made for this 45-mm gun and assigned to the VET. And also added to the tanks. We washed the awards and began to wait for victorious broadcasts from the fronts ....

    Put a minus for the passage ... With the depth of knowledge on these issues, which you undoubtedly possess judging by the posts, it is generally unforgivable to make superficial judgments. It is obvious that in the 30s there was neither a corresponding industry, nor a corresponding engineering school with the possibility of independent full-fledged design from scratch. There are also people like Tukhachevsky, who almost sentenced artillery in general. The article does not mention Grachevsky (Tukhachevsky protected him) with his dynamo-guns (prototypes without recoil, but not brought to mind) with which it was planned to replace all artillery. In general, if you notice, then in the 30s all the equipment was foreign models, often not the most modern, converted to your own needs or copied.
    T34-BT-chassis Christie
    T26- Vickers
    GazAA- Ford, etc.
    Unfortunately, there could be no other way as a result of the revolution, civil war and various purges, precisely in that period (and not in 37). Based on your passage, we can assume that everyone was just snickering fools, but this is not so.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 26 September 2013 14: 45
      +5
      Quote: msv
      The article does not mention Grachevsky (Tukhachevsky protected him) with his dynamo-guns (prototype recoilless

      Amendment - Kurchevsky.
      I will add, in pursuit, the SU-76 was popularly called "bitch" - the driver was located next to the fuel tank - then everything is clear.
    2. Bongo
      26 September 2013 14: 52
      +4
      And what was the attitude of the boxless during the war had to the PTA?
  11. chenia
    chenia 26 September 2013 15: 29
    +4
    Quote: Omskgazmyas
    Forty was upgraded as best they could. As well as her shells.


    That's right, but we must remember that 45 is a battalion anti-tank system. And after a certain modernization it was quite out of place and in time.

    And here is 57 (an excellent system) for a reserve reserve from a regiment and higher, but at the beginning of the war it was powerful, and not powerful enough during the war. And a 57 mm shot for only one system is not technologically advanced.

    Now, if we had a 76 mm PT system for 60 calibers, like the Cancer-40. This shells are compatible with the ZIS-3, (the unitary charges of the PT systems are naturally larger - it differs by the sleeve), and by the end of the war almost any tank would take.
    Here is the D-44, too, an unfortunate fate system (like a PT naturally). An excellent anti-tank gun, it was too late for the war, and for the next generation of tanks it was already weak. And so they transferred to field artillery.
  12. mithridate
    mithridate 26 September 2013 16: 26
    +5
    good article in two parts
  13. Eugeniy_369
    Eugeniy_369 26 September 2013 16: 56
    +2
    "The creator of this weapon, VG Grabin, never considered the BS-3 an anti-tank system, which is reflected in the name." But the "Soviet people have their own pride" (as noted above), and some "authoritative" historians, experts considered BS-3 to be the best VET II MV.
  14. revnagan
    revnagan 26 September 2013 20: 15
    0
    You know, I look at the photos of the burned German tanks and I think, but they were lived by ordinary, living people, our grandfathers. Try to stop such a colossus. Glory to them for centuries.
  15. I'm Russian
    I'm Russian 26 September 2013 20: 21
    +1
    In addition to the cannons, in the Red Army there was an acute issue with their ammunition until mid-1944. Soviet gunners saved shells for shooting.
  16. samoletil18
    samoletil18 26 September 2013 20: 23
    0
    Forty-five is the English marine three-pound (47-mm) taken from the ships by the beginning of 1 MV for full



    Quote: Omskgazmyas
    The material seemed to be copied from the Soviet history textbook with the addition of a photo. The reality was much more severe, and the leadership of the Red Army and the Soviet Government knew about it. In my opinion, the mediocre ability of Soviet tank guns and anti-tank missiles to fight German tanks is rooted in weak shells a la 1900. Forty-five is the English marine three-pound (47-mm) taken from the ships by the beginning of 1 MV for complete uselessness. But in the infantry they began to use it as a battalion, or trench cannon for fighting machine guns. The shell, although weak (119 g of explosives), was stronger than a two-pound shell (37 mm, 35 g of explosives). After 1 MV, millions of shells remained in the USSR, delivered both by the Allies and produced at Russian factories. Since the Soviets have their own pride, the 47-mm projectile (the British measure the caliber by the leading belt) honed the belt by 0,5 mm and announced the creation of its own 45 mm caliber gun (this is the caliber of the projectile body, it remained unchanged).
    The rifling depth of the "new" gun was slightly reduced by the required 0,5 mm and the production of such guns began at the factories of the USSR.
    I will continue in the next post.
  17. stalkerwalker
    stalkerwalker 27 September 2013 02: 27
    +7
    On the whole and in general, summarizing the articles on anti-tank artillery of the USSR and Germany, we can conclude that each of the sides went its own, chosen for certain reasons, by developing the PTA during the Great Patriotic War.
    ZiS-3 is a very successful, but still a divisional universal weapon. In terms of armor penetration, it left not far from the "magpie". If the Soviet industry had the opportunity to significantly improve the quality of gunpowder in the charges, as well as to establish the production of cumulative projectiles, the "magpie" would justify all the hopes placed on it, and would solve almost all problems as the main anti-tank gun.
  18. PSih2097
    PSih2097 27 September 2013 04: 30
    +1
    Quote: stalkerwalker
    ZiS-3 is a very successful, but still divisional universal weapon.

    ZiS - 2 versatile person, and ZiS - 3 need ...
    1. family tree
      family tree 27 September 2013 07: 33
      +2
      Quote: PSih2097
      ZiS - 2 universal

      belay 57mm?
      Here is the universal:

      This weapon did not happen, and could not happen, decide the outcome of a major battle or demonstrate record firing accuracy. It was a tool designed for everyday, everyday military work.

      76-mm Regimental Gun Model 1943 of the Year

      Weight in combat
      600 kg
      Long range
      4200 m
      Largest elevation angle
      + 25 °
      Largest declination angle
      -8 °
      Horizontal firing angle
      60 °
      Maximum rate of fire
      10-12 rounds / min
      Highway speed
      50 km / h
      Projectile Type:
      Weight, kg

      Primary. speed, m / s

      The range is straight. shots at a target height of 2,5 m, m
      High explosive
      6,2

      262

      365
      Cumulative
      3,94

      240

      330
    2. Bigriver
      Bigriver 27 September 2013 07: 44
      +5
      Quote: PSih2097

      ZiS - 2 versatile person, and ZiS - 3 need ...

      In the terms of reference for the future ZIS-2 it was said: anti-tank. Well, she served in the appropriate places. And for the general-purpose OFS, she is weak.
      And ZIS-3 is a division. Universal tool for a wide range of tasks.
  19. Omskgasmyas
    Omskgasmyas 27 September 2013 09: 51
    -4
    I will try to answer the comments in one post, in one place.
    Let me remind comrades of a well-known episode in literature and films, where Adolf Aloizych busts generals and industrialists in front of Barbarossa because, contrary to his instructions, when modernizing the T-3, instead of 37 mm guns, they put an 50-mm kurts (43 caliber) instead of a long one ( 60 calibres). And after all, as he looked into the water, he was possessed and turned out to be right! The French campaign showed weak armor of German tanks. And, although the Germans won, not all of them rested on their laurels, and after the French Somois and B1, the English Matild-2 prepared to meet with the T-34 and KV. In one of the battles, it seems Colonel de Gaulle with his tank division caused trouble for the Germans, having eliminated their 171 tank for their 110. Then the Germans did not have anti-aircraft guns at hand.
    And I give a link about the weakness of the 45-mm Soviet gun, with documents of the 41 of the year that no one considers necessary to read from opponents:
    http://litl-bro.livejournal.com/27883.html

    Well, a few quotes from there:
    The topic of the inability of the "forty-five" in 1941 to hit German tanks of the latest modifications (and the previous modifications docked before their protection) was raised in my LJ repeatedly, but every time there were avatars of Thomas the unbeliever, suspecting the use of individual non-curvy shells, unreasonable generalization of individual special cases and similar spiritually uplifting patriotic myths, directly leading their carriers into the hospitably open arms of Mukhin or Solonin.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 27 September 2013 23: 17
      -1
      I gave a similar table from Shein since a year ago, but nobody stubbornly notices it
    2. mvbmvbmvb
      mvbmvbmvb 2 June 2017 22: 43
      0
      And my father, the commander of the PTAB fire platoon, always answered my questions about the "knock out of tanks" - "You can always kill, you just need to aim well." Well, for a 7 year old child to understand. He fought on the 45th end of the war, took Vienna and Prague with her, and was at Balaton.
  20. Omskgasmyas
    Omskgasmyas 27 September 2013 10: 18
    -1
    I forgot to add that in addition to reinforcing tank and anti-tank weapons, Hitler ordered reinforcement of the reservation of tanks, which was done during the medium and overhaul of tanks in factories. Yes, the Germans managed to rearm and book no more than half of their tanks by 22.06.41, but the result is already impressive and the process went on. And if you know that almost 90% of the USSR tank fleet (T-26 and BT) break through with a heavy machine gun, not to mention the anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft guns, then the result of the 41 year was a little predictable.
    Question from BigRiver RU Yesterday, 13:37 "You take the Pak-38's armor penetration by 500 meters for the tungsten crowbar and compare it with the caliber armor-piercing M-42 ..."
    Answer: I look in the reference book "Penetration of German guns", we read:
    5cm PaK 38 L / 60 PzGr 39 (gauge) 2,039 kg 833 m / s 60 gr 69 mm
    PzGr 40 (sub-caliber) 0,906 kg 1177 m \ s 60 gr 130 mm
    We see that PaK 38 with a barrel in 60 calibres at an angle of 60 gr. penetrates 69 mm of armor, normal it will be 90 mm. Our 45-mm armor penetration is 60 mm.
    With the caliber shells the same.
    And comrades, sometimes drop in at least Pedivikia before disputes. There, for example, it is written that the Germans even the Czech tank 38-T screened up to 50 mm forehead and 30-mm side, and at first they had 25 and 15.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 27 September 2013 16: 26
      +5
      Quote: Omskgazmyas

      Answer: I look in the reference book "Penetration of German guns", we read:
      5cm PaK 38 L / 60 PzGr 39 (gauge) 2,039 kg 833 m / s 60 gr 69 mm
      PzGr 40 (sub-caliber) 0,906 kg 1177 m \ s 60 gr 130 mm
      We see that PaK 38 with a barrel in 60 calibres at an angle of 60 gr. penetrates 69 mm of armor, normal it will be 90 mm. Our 45-mm armor penetration is 60 mm.
      With the caliber shells the same.
      And comrades, sometimes drop in at least Pedivikia before disputes.

      You Pak-38 with which weapon for armor penetration do you compare? With 53-K or with M-42?
      Comrade, than in the Pedevikii porridge in the head to brew, would be engaged in sources. From them would learn that:

      In all countries, when developing a criterion for the armor penetration threshold, they chose a figure of at least 50% of the probability of through penetration, and only the USSR chose 1931% in 60, and in 1938-40. - further tightened the criterion, at least 75% of the ideal through penetration.
      In the German system, armor was considered to be broken if it was pierced by 50% of the shells, and according to the Soviet system, penetration was required in at least 75% of cases, or the initial and guaranteed penetration was taken into account, which were, respectively, in 20% and 80% of cases.

      We look here.
      Comparative table of armor penetration of guns carried out according to the Soviet method in 1944 (Source: TsAMO RF 81-12038-303, TsAMO RF 38-11369-250)
      test data Soviet, Lend-Lease and German guns according to the Soviet method (at least 80% of guaranteed penetration of the armor).
      M-42, as the peak of the development of the system in this caliber, is absent here.
      But, I think, you will not mind the value of 80 mm "coil" for 500 meters along the normal? smile
      1. Bigriver
        Bigriver 27 September 2013 16: 54
        +2
        Omskgasmyas
        Yes, the most important thing.
        I see that you want to prove something by long posts? And what? What is the thesis?
        The Red Army - the losers, the Wehrmacht - rulez?
        But, for such large-scale conclusions, it is not enough to compare the armor penetration of individual systems. Pak-35/36 hints about this.
        They’re fighting not guns and tanks, but formations and associations capable of performing combat missions.
        PS
        Try to be stricter to yourself. You have in every post absurdity.
        1. Omskgasmyas
          Omskgasmyas 30 September 2013 08: 39
          -2
          Comrade, in my posts I want to convey that the PT artillery of the Red Army throughout the war lagged behind the requirements of the battle, and the 45-mm PTO - from the very beginning of the war to its end, despite the modernization of guns and shells. My grandmother’s brother fought the gunner during the entire artillery war (full Glory Bow + Red Star) and didn’t tell us anything about the 45-ke, the grandchildren, except that the 45-ka is very light. But he was glad when, after another wound, he returned to duty and received an 76-mm gun, and not an 45-mm.
          Soviet and German guns, I compared the latest modifications - i.e. the Soviet M-42 and the German Pak 38 L \ 60, I was only mistaken, I admit that Pak 38 130 mm b / n had on 100 m, and on 500 m it pierced 86 mm. The weakness of the 53-K from the table given by you is clearly visible, as well as the poor quality of its sub-caliber projectile, which already at 500 m has almost the same armor penetration as the caliber (48 \ 51 mm). In German, even on 1000 m, the sub-caliber is even better than the caliber.
          Of course, I know about the differences in the methodology for determining armor penetration in different countries. But it is necessary, in addition to the technique, to take into account the quality of the armor used to shoot. I gave an example above, when in 1940 the T-53 tank purchased from the Germans was examined by shelling from 3-K, it was unable to penetrate its 500-mm armor with 30 m. Although the tables pierced 43 mm from this distance. I emphasize: the 30-mm armor of the German T-3 tank was stronger than the Soviet 43-mm. What conclusions have been drawn from this and what measures have tried to take the leadership of the Red Army and the designers, in 2's words can not be described. But if interested, I will give a link, read it.

          So it remained for our grandfathers to let the enemy get closer, at a distance of dagger fire, or to hit the side of the tank in order to destroy the enemy. How much at the same time the anti-aircraft guns were lost and the lives of our gunners in one tank of Germans, one can only guess.
    2. The comment was deleted.
  21. cobalt
    cobalt 27 September 2013 20: 47
    +1
    The country's leadership understood the value of anti-tank units and fighters of these units. To increase their status, the following NCO ORDER was issued:
    order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0528 signed by I.V. Stalin, which read:

    "In order to improve the quality of the fight against enemy tanks, to create and accumulate cadres of artillery-destroyers of tanks, to improve their qualifications and to separate anti-tank artillery units from other types of artillery, I order:

    1. Light and anti-tank artillery regiments RGK, anti-tank divisions of infantry divisions and batteries 45-mm guns of infantry regiments renamed to anti-tank anti-tank artillery regiments, divisions and batteries.

    2. To establish to the commanding staff of these units and divisions one and a half, and to the younger commanding and rank-and-file staff - a double salary of the maintenance.

    3. All commanding personnel of anti-tank artillery units and subunits, up to and including the division commander, should be registered and used only in the specified units.

    4. The commanders of the guns and the deputy commanders of the guns (gunners) of these units should be assigned the military rank of "senior sergeant" - "sergeant", respectively, and to introduce the position of deputy gunner with the military rank of "junior sergeant".

    5. The commanding officer, the junior commanding officer and the rank-and-file composition of anti-tank artillery units and subunits, being treated at hospitals, after curing, should be sent only to the specified units.

    6. To install a special sleeve insignia for all personnel of anti-tank artillery units and subunits, according to the attached description, worn on the left sleeve of the overcoat and tunic.

    7. Set a bonus for each wrecked tank in the amount of: 500 rubles to the gun commander and gunner, 200 rubles to the rest of the gun crew.

    8. The number of tanks destroyed by the gun should be marked with a number on the tank figure, drawn in the upper right corner of the inside of the cannon shield. The figure of the tank to draw black, and the figure showing the number of wounded tanks, white paint.

    9. In order to use anti-tank artillery units to solve the tasks of directly supporting infantry, personnel of these units should be trained not only to fire at direct-fire tanks, but also to fire at other targets from open and closed firing positions.
  22. Langeo
    Langeo 27 September 2013 21: 20
    0
    Also a good anti-tank gun.
    1. Hudo
      Hudo 27 September 2013 22: 21
      0
      Quote: Langeo
      Also a good anti-tank gun.

      What is the beauty? Maybe in a rate of fire 1 shot in 2 minutes? Or is it that the very first HE shell of the tank will disable the entire calculation?
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 27 September 2013 23: 19
        0
        or that the hit from this "crap" on a crawling tank tends to 0?
        And the calculation of the guns is enough 1 PF, as mentioned.
      2. Langeo
        Langeo 5 October 2013 12: 38
        0
        But with one shot you can bang to a company of tanks.
  23. bublic82009
    bublic82009 27 September 2013 22: 56
    0
    all decisions were made taking into account the situation. at the beginning of the war were alone at the end of the war were different decisions. are they good or bad? it showed time.
  24. Woldemar
    Woldemar 5 May 2014 00: 29
    +2
    You can generally make a cycle not only about anti-tank guns, but also about all the artillery of the Red Army, or rather about all the samples of guns that were used during the war.
    1. Bongo
      5 May 2014 05: 33
      +3
      The idea is certainly interesting, but in the format of the site, it is not easy to implement.
  25. mvbmvbmvb
    mvbmvbmvb 2 June 2017 22: 37
    0
    Read better primary sources, for example, Grabin himself.