Military Review

Forty years of the legend of “expelling Soviet military instructors” from Egypt

19
One of the most enduring myths of the Cold War is the theory that 18 July 1972, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, "unexpectedly expelled Soviet military advisers from the country." The theory is described in a variety of memoirs and scientific works, from which readers will learn that the Egyptian president “suddenly” decided to expel “impudent Soviet advisers” who, in addition to their unleashed manners, embarrassed Egyptian officers, did not let him unleash a new war with Israel. Sadat allegedly already then, in July, 1972 matured in order to fly over from the Soviet camp to the American camp. Also called the number of “deported” advisors - 15-20 thousands.


The traditional version of the event is compressed, and its perception is then and now set forth in the following documentary work, which in itself is a worthy epoch monument.

In August, 2007, Isabella Ginor and Gidon Remez, published a curious work on the “Distorted term“ expulsion ”of Soviet“ advisers ”from Egypt to 1972. They put forward a series of arguments indicating that the theory of “exile” was created by Henry Kissinger, the Soviet elite, and the Egyptian regime. At the same time, each of the parties proceeded from its specific and momentary interests, but together they managed not only to mislead the public, but also the intelligence of most friendly and hostile states, including Israel’s intelligence. Kissinger owns the “expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt” stamp, and for the first time he spoke about exile as one of the main goals of American foreign policy in June 1970.

Ginor and Remez point to a number of obvious discrepancies between dramatic PR pictures and what actually happened.

The first and strong argument destroying the theory of “expulsion” is the mass evacuation of the families of Soviet advisers in early October 1973, on the eve of the Doomsday war - through 15 months after the “deportation” of the advisers themselves.

The reason Sadat decided to send advisers was the USSR’s reluctance to provide Egypt with the newest types. weapons, just does not hold water. The flow of deliveries of Soviet weapons in Egypt not only did not stop, at the request of Sadat he was provided with SCAD missiles, whose technical services and launches were carried out by Soviet specialists.

Even at the time of the “deportation”, it was clear to any attentive observer of the movement of Soviet military personnel in Egypt that this was not about “advisers” —the individual officers of the officers assigned to the Egyptian formations, but about the withdrawal of integral combat units. It was about the Soviet military units transferred to Egypt as part of Operation Caucasus - the rescue of the Egyptian army during the 1970 war of the year. Among the “deportees” was a fully equipped air defense division, several experimental squadrons of the MiG-25, electronic warfare units and special forces.

Relying on declassified American documents, for the first time a proposal for the withdrawal of Soviet military units from Egypt was made by USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko during a meeting with President Nixon in May 1971 of the year. The motivation of the Soviet side remains unclear, but, apparently, the leadership of the USSR, satisfied with the rescue of an Egyptian ally in 70, found it too costly and risky to keep whole combat units on the Israeli front, and decided to limit it to advisers and trainers, who were not in anyone sent and did not withdraw. Around the same time, a similar proposal was received by US Secretary of State Rogers from Egyptian President Sadat. Sadat told Rogers that “Russian land forces will be withdrawn from the country within 1972 months.”

The proposals of Sadat and Gromyko played into the hands of Kissinger, who was in the midst of building a “policy of defusing international tensions.” Within the framework of this policy, the “deportation of Soviet instructors from Egypt” was one of the most important achievements of Kissinger’s political genius — or at least how he described his genius, and with what he remained stories.

In exchange, the Russians and Arabs got what they wanted, namely that America would not dispute the Arab-Soviet interpretation of the UN Resolution 242, which, in their version, demanded the withdrawal of Israeli troops "from all the occupied territories." Gromyko demanded American guarantees that after the withdrawal of the Soviet military units from Egypt, the United States would pressure Israel to go to "the conclusion of a complete and comprehensive peace."

In retrospect, the Soviet leadership made a classic diplomatic maneuver — by offering the opponent something that they were going to do anyway.

Kissinger did not say anything to the Israelis about the coming withdrawal, and on July 18 portrayed extreme surprise and “shock” that he continues to express in his abundant memoirs.

The trilateral web of Soviet-American-Egyptian claims, double deals, secret moves, coincidences, and conflicts of interest to this day remains largely unsolved. A comment to the incident could be a tirade from the famous film “Blat”, where a Soviet investigator says to the British: “You know, this is like an orgy in a dark room. Everybody fucks someone, but no one knows for sure. ”

Ginor and Ramirez base their version of events, namely that in July 1972, Soviet military units were withdrawn from Egypt, agreed with the Americans, and not “sudden deportation of advisers” from three types of sources: Egyptian secret documents seized by the Israelis during the War Judgment Day, the memoirs of the Soviet participants in the events and on the declassified document of the Foreign Ministry of Britain, which reflects the perception of the incident from the point of view of the friendly to the Americans, but uninformed intelligence.

Captured Egyptian documents were translated into Hebrew and published almost 30 years ago. Only they are enough to dispel the myth of “expulsion”. The documents show that nothing happened with the Soviet advisers in July. Among them are the work plans of advisers for 1973 year. Other documents demonstrate that the number, military ranks and functions of 1973 advisors of the year were no different from 1972. Some advisers arrived in Egypt in 1971 and remained in the Egyptian parts until May 1973 - without at least a brief recall.

In the spring of 1972, Brezhnev, in preparation for the summit with Nixon, was very interested in cultivating Egyptian ties in Washington. The USSR Ambassador in Cairo, Vinogradov, writes in his memoirs that at the meeting of the 11 Politburo in October 1971, the idea of ​​withdrawing half of the Soviet military personnel from Egypt was approved. On July 16, advisers, in some cases even civilians, were recalled to Cairo by personal order of the USSR Ambassador, Vinogradov. The review was noted by curious observers - for example, the French military attache in Cairo. The same information was provided by secret agents in Cairo to the British military attache Urvik. The secret agent of Urvik, most likely, was the son-in-law of Sadat Marouane Ashraf. Ashraf was an Israeli intelligence agent, as many later wrote, most likely a double agent who merged Israelis into misinformation, and as it turns out now, perhaps a triple agent.

The withdrawal of the Soviet air defense division, stationed at the Suez Canal, was the most dramatic and noticeable event of July 1972. The division was deployed in Egypt in 1969-1970 and consisted of conscript soldiers. The division numbered 10 thousands of people.

There are different versions of what happened, but most agree on one thing - after 10 days of drinking and drinking in Cairo, advisers were sent in their parts. The scale, the simultaneous recall of advisers to Cairo created the required impression that Soviet military advisers did leave Egypt. While it was easy to notice the dispatch of military personnel to Cairo on such a scale, it was almost impossible to spot the return of individual officers — real advisers, and not conscripts in combat units.

The most visible confirmation of the “expulsion” of Soviet specialists for Western intelligence agencies and Israel was the cessation of flights over Sinai and Israel by the then experimental MiG-25 aircraft. Since both the Egyptian and Soviet pilots could control the MiG-21 fighters, it was impossible to distinguish the pilot’s nationality on the aircraft of this model. Unlike the MiG-21, the MiG-25 was controlled solely by the best Soviet test pilots. The withdrawal of the Soviet MiG-21 squadrons from Egypt began in August 1970 of the year - immediately after the armistice. The last Mig-25 squadron was launched on 16-17 in July 1972 and became the most visible “confirmation” of the “exile” theory. Part of the Soviet aircraft, along with instructors, was transferred to Egypt, part - Syria. Since, in any case, the aircraft carried Egyptian identification marks, and the pilots were in Egyptian form, foreign intelligence was not able to fully distinguish the Soviet MiG-21 squadrons from the Egyptian squadrons. Most of the memories of the Soviet pilots say that their units were withdrawn from Egypt until June 3. 16-17 July was the last squadron of the MiG-25.

In contrast to the widespread illusion that the military-technical cooperation of the USSR and Egypt was buried along with the conclusion of the advisers, the facts and memories of the participants indicate the opposite. Andrei Jena was suddenly sent to Egypt at the head of a group of 11 specialists in June 1972. His task was to lead the assembly of the newly delivered Soviet C-20 aircraft, and he was directly subordinate to the Egyptian Air Force commander, General Hosni Mubarak. Jena writes that six weeks after his arrival, he was informed about the end of the mission. Despite this, another two weeks later he was informed about the continuation of the mission “at the request of the Egyptian side”. Jena writes that the streets of Egyptian cities, especially Cairo, Yu are much smaller than Russians: “Our high-rise hotel in Naser City was empty, the Soviet headquarters were transferred to a private villa. We also now lived in a three-story villa near the new headquarters. ”

Kissinger described the “expulsion” of advisers in triumphant terms: “One area where Soviet policy is completely upset and confused is the Middle East. The sudden refusal of the services of Soviet instructors in the United Arab Republic is the final touch to the fact that the Soviet offensive in the region was choked. Their influence on Sadat has decreased. ”

Soviet diplomat V. Marchenko in his memoirs gives a somewhat different and more sober assessment of the incident: “Sadat’s break with the Soviet Union was a more theatrical gesture than a real political reversal. The flow of Soviet weapons and ammunition to Egypt did not stop and did not fall. ”

Based on: The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73
Originator:
http://mishmar.info/sorok-let-legendi-ob-%E2%80%9Cizgnanii-sovetskix-voennix-instruktorov%E2%80%9D-iz-egipta.html
Photos used:
Israeli soldiers
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  1. xetai9977
    xetai9977 23 September 2013 09: 03 New
    +6
    If I am not mistaken, the cooling of Soviet-Egyptian relations took place at the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975. Our neighbor, the deceased, served there as a medical doctor. As he said, the Americans persuaded Sadat with promises to return Sinai without a single shot and massive economic assistance in exchange for entering the US zone of influence.
  2. patriot2
    patriot2 23 September 2013 10: 14 New
    +3
    xetai9977
    As you can see, the word amer "harder than peas" - Sinai returned.
    1. Professor
      Professor 23 September 2013 10: 18 New
      0
      Quote: patriot2
      still Sinai return

      Who and to whom is Sinai still returning? Egypt Isaril? wink
  3. patriot2
    patriot2 23 September 2013 10: 50 New
    +3
    Quote: Professor
    Quote: patriot2
    still Sinai return

    Who and to whom is Sinai still returning? Egypt Isaril? wink


    The Israelis did not understand and did not appreciate the significance of the victory achieved in the Six Day War. Israel became different, it could no longer develop according to the laws of a small country and defend itself in the framework of the concept of protecting individual regions, relying on a happy occasion and improvisation. Unable to orientate correctly in the new geopolitical situation, the political leadership of Israel was drawn into the process of the systemic crisis. Instead of smuggling IDF divisions through the Suez Canal and defeating the Egyptian army, the Israeli government sought a shaky peace. On August 7, 1970, a truce was concluded for a period of three months, but it lasted more than three years. On October 6, 1973, the Doomsday War began, the Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal, broke through the Bar-Leva line and began to advance deep into the Sinai. The IDF suffered heavy losses in defensive battles, tank divisions in difficult conditions crossed the Channel and defeated the Egyptian army.
    On March 26, 1979, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, and Jimmy Carter signed a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in Washington. Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and recognized the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." In principle, agreement was reached on the provision of autonomy to the inhabitants of the territories controlled by Israel until the final decision on their future political status.

    That was the case, but it is very short. The history of this issue is more old and deeper.
    1. Professor
      Professor 23 September 2013 10: 59 New
      +1
      I didn’t catch in your copy-paste information about "still returning the Sinai."

      PS
      I see you corrected your original comment on "Sinai returned." Then the question is cleared. hi
  4. nazgul-ishe
    nazgul-ishe 23 September 2013 11: 33 New
    +3
    Lost a good training ground for fine-tuning equipment in combat conditions. There they tested MIG25, they realized that 75 became a little effective. Yes, a lot of things are a pity for this had to pay the lives of our soldiers. This is a war and not a training ground where you can adjust the result.
    1. drop
      drop 23 September 2013 16: 19 New
      +1
      Dear Al Barto, not a landfill lost. We then showed that we were stronger and smarter than the United States. Based on my recollections of that period, I published the article “Creative business trip” in Military Review. Then we were young, and the country developed equipment and military hardware for fear of our enemies. These enemies should live in peace with us. Then there would be order, not terrorism in countries
  5. Samy
    Samy 23 September 2013 13: 05 New
    +3
    Father served in Egypt at that time, the family was there. Everything was just that, sharply and unexpectedly, an indication was given of the removal of the advisers and their families. The entire Cairo airport was clogged with IL 18 from the Union. Export was in July 1972 and it was massive. After they lived a few more weeks at a hotel in Moscow, they expected a new appointment for their father.
  6. nazgul-ishe
    nazgul-ishe 23 September 2013 13: 22 New
    +1
    Quote: Samy
    . Export was in July 1972 and it was massive. After they lived a few more weeks at a hotel in Moscow, they expected a new appointment for their father.

    Alas, the heavy burden of the military. The bases of Europe, the base of Africa and the Middle East Cuba
  7. smprofi
    smprofi 23 September 2013 13: 29 New
    +4
    The first and strong argument that destroys the theory of “expulsion” is the mass evacuation of the families of Soviet advisers in early October 1973

    Yes of course. my friend evacuated with his parents in the 73rd. only ... his father was not a military adviser, but a builder. The factory was building. and such "advisers" in Egypt were pretty much. both Soviet and other countries of the socialist camp. and when the air smelled of war they were really massively and urgently evacuated.
    as to why the relations between Egypt and the USSR have cooled, then the comrade has his own opinion, based on what he heard there, in Egypt, in the early 70's.
    and the story is this: Sadat received a guest, Muammar Gaddafi. Well, the owner and the guest "rode"
    in Egypt. Well, somewhere they stumble upon a barbed wire, and at the checkpoint there is a Soviet soldier. Of course, the "master" fingers fan "Open the barrier!". and the watch "I will not be without an order." Well, here the "owner" went to the station "they say the owner and that's it." ultimately from the soldier he received a definition of the type of “monkey” and an offer to proceed to a specific address. and this is in the presence of Gaddafi ...

    Well, the "problems" of communication were not only among Soviet soldiers with the Egyptians. Somewhere in February this year, the Turkish base was not just a verbal skirmish, but it came to a fight: on the one hand, the German MIM-104 Patriot battery was involved, and on the other, a Turkish general supported by his adjutant.

    East is a delicate matter...
    1. atalef
      atalef 23 September 2013 19: 54 New
      0
      Quote: smprofi
      then the comrade has his own opinion, based on what he heard there, in Egypt, in the early 70's.
      and the story is this: Sadat received a guest, Muammar Gaddafi. Well, the owner and the guest "rode"
      in Egypt. Well, somewhere they stumble upon a barbed wire, and at the checkpoint there is a Soviet soldier. Of course, the "master" fingers fan "Open the barrier!". and the watch "I will not be without an order." Well, here the "owner" went to the station "they say the owner and that's it." ultimately from the soldier he received a definition of the type of “monkey” and an offer to proceed to a specific address. and this is in the presence of Gaddafi ...

      Tales that are simply 100% divorced from reality (about the relationship with Gaddafi, Gaddafi in general in his youth did not disdain the desire to take away no leaders he liked), and further on, Libya was the base of almost all world ter. organizations - From the Red Brigades and the IRA, to the PLO and Sendero Luminorso.
      It is rarely mentioned that one important fact influenced Sadat’s decision to go to Jerusalem: in June 1977, the Israeli government literally saved Sadat’s life. Israeli general Yitzhak Hofi, director of Mossadd (Israel’s foreign intelligence), found evidence of the existence of a plan for the assassination of Sadat, coordinated by Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Hofi transmitted this information to Begin, who, through the Moroccan king Hassan, arranged for Hofi to meet with Lieutenant General Kamal Hassan Ali, the head of Egyptian military intelligence. Hofi provided Ali with detailed information about the names of the conspirators and their safe houses in Cairo. The Egyptian authorities immediately arrested the conspirators and found a lot of documents incriminating them. There is no doubt, historian Howard Sugar wrote that Sadat was "sincerely grateful."

      A few months later, Sadat announced his intention to visit Israel and declare peace and the need to return the occupied territories within the walls of the Knesset. Many considered this statement a bluff, but when Prime Minister Begin sent an official invitation, Sadat immediately accepted it.
    2. Mikhail Matyugin
      Mikhail Matyugin 31 May 2016 13: 00 New
      0
      Quote: smprofi
      my friend evacuated with his parents in 73. only ... his father was not a military adviser, but a builder. The factory was building. and such "advisers" in Egypt were pretty much. both Soviet and other countries of the socialist camp
      Now, if you evaluate as military experts and such "advisers" then yes, thousands of 10-20 can be gained. But the number of military experts was small, within a few thousand.
  8. creak
    creak 23 September 2013 14: 37 New
    +5
    If everything was so simple and straightforward ... Our soldier undermined Soviet-Egyptian relations in two sentences - President Sadat got into a skirmish with a sentry ... It doesn’t even draw on a historical joke - it’s just that he didn’t tell had to see how the Egyptian leaders go ...
  9. slacker
    slacker 23 September 2013 16: 14 New
    0
    Kissinger owns the stamp “expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt”

    Such is his nationality ... His fellow tribesmen are ready to cheat everything, everyone and always!
  10. Beck
    Beck 23 September 2013 18: 18 New
    +4
    Something the article is implausible. Some dubious sources, memoirs resembling gossip, the substitution of concepts, distortion. I will cover as far as I know the situation.

    The Soviet Union supplied military equipment to Egypt on credit, count for free. The USSR transferred military units to Egypt of a defensive nature, in case of repulsing Israeli aggression, but not offensive units at all. Since the USSR did not want to be directly involved in the very aggression of Egypt against Israel. Military secrecy when the USSR was overwhelming and the foreign state could not, a priori, be supplied with the latest weapons, the latest developments. And the families of Soviet advisers were evacuated in advance, and it is prudent not to take them out with air raids.

    Of course, Egypt warned the USSR about approximate dates for the outbreak of hostilities against Israel. Not wanting to directly participate in the aggression, the Soviet Union and withdrew its military units ahead of time, as they were intended only to repel a possible Israeli attack and defend Egyptian territory itself.

    There is no need to talk about any unbridled actions of the behavior of Soviet officers. Reliable people were sent there and control was very strict.

    Anwar Sadat did not plan to break off relations with the USSR until the 1973 war. Only after the depressing results of a comparison of Western Israelis and outdated military equipment supplied by the USSR during the war did Sadat go on a break. Not at all paying attention to the low moral and combat qualities of Egyptian soldiers, but only pointing to the low performance characteristics of outdated Soviet military equipment. And objectively - the MiG-17 and MiG-19 aircraft did not go to any comparison with the Mirages and Phantoms. And a dozen Egyptian MiG-21s did not weather. Yes, the Soviet air defense division was equipped with the latest systems, but such systems were not transferred to the Egyptian army.

    So the breakdown of relations between Egypt and the USSR occurred after the hostilities of 1973. And Egypt, having signed peace agreements with Israel, gained access to Western weapons.

    An important factor was played by the factor of the general educational level of the soldiers. It is difficult for the son of a fellah, who saw only a wooden plow, to master the machine gun and the gradations of setting the scope for various distances, not to mention the more complex technique.
    1. Beck
      Beck 23 September 2013 18: 35 New
      +4
      Quote: Beck
      An important factor was played by the factor of the general educational level of the soldiers. It is difficult for the son of a fellah, who saw only a wooden plow, to master the machine gun and the gradations of setting the scope for various distances, not to mention the more complex technique.


      I recalled anecdote of those times about this topic.

      Front line. The trenches on the other side are Arab, on the other Israeli. A scream is heard from the Israeli trenches.

      -Said, and Said.
      Said leans out of the trench.
      -I am Said.
      A sniper shot sounds and dead Said falls to the bottom of the trench. After some time, a scream from the Israelis is again heard.
      -Anwar, and Anwar.
      Anwar sticks out.
      -What do you want?
      The sniper shots again and Anwar falls dead. A Soviet adviser intervenes.
      -That bastards, what did you come up with? But we will teach them the Arabs. You sniper Abdullah get ready for shooting and scream - Moishe, Moishe. As soon as he pops out and shoot him. Abdullah is made, screams.
      -Moysha, Moysha, and Moysha.
      From the side of the Israeli trenches
      -Abdullah is you?
      Abdullah rises.
      -I, me.
      A shot sounds and dead Abulla falls.
    2. atalef
      atalef 23 September 2013 19: 47 New
      +2
      Quote: Beck
      Of course, Egypt warned the USSR about approximate dates for the outbreak of hostilities against Israel

      Of course, the Pomegranate Commission (last name) (created by the government
      to investigate the failure of intelligence services and government actions (Golda Meer) before the Doomsday War), - testimony of the head of military intelligence -
      In early October, an urgent evacuation of the families of all Soviet military and civilian specialists to their homeland began. In recent days, the evacuation has become so rapid that some specialists, leaving in the morning, escorted to work as a wife, returned from service already to empty apartments with notes of their wives about an urgent departure. The last families from the capital's garrison managed to fly by air on the morning of October 6, the day the war began

      Quote: Beck
      Anwar Sadat did not plan to break off relations with the USSR until the 1973 war. Only after the depressing results of a comparison of Western Israelis and outdated military equipment supplied by the USSR during the war did Sadat go on a break.

      This is the result that Sadat came to (of course, with the support of America). He perfectly understood that he could not overpower Israel by military means (even taking into account more than 40 tons of the Soviet troops) and all attempts would only lead to even greater losses and economic collapse. Do not forget that in general the beginning of everything is Nasser. His united Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria), he was a prisoner of pan-Arabism, Assad (papa), of course, he substituted for his leg more than once in this and did not share the idea (while sucking juices from Egypt and help (free from the USSR) under this raspberry
      Well, once again screwed up to the ears and losing Sinai (the hero’s heart is Nasser) could not stand it and he left this (the world that had put so much slaps on him) He was replaced by a more pragmatic Sadat and, as history has shown, he was right. Egypt has been living in peace with Israel for more than 30 years, has received all the territories to the last centimeter and although the world is not an enthusiastic fraternity - but this made it possible to turn Egypt into a world resort and develop quietly (without wars every 5 years)

      Quote: Beck
      And Egypt, having signed peace agreements with Israel, gained access to Western weapons

      Under the Camp David agreement, military aid to Israel is equal (cent to cent of military aid to Egypt) as well as the nomenclature of armaments - all that. what Israel buys - automatically has the right to buy Egypt.
      1. Beck
        Beck 24 September 2013 08: 04 New
        +1
        Quote: atalef
        He perfectly understood that the military way (even taking into account more than 40 tons of the contingent of the Soviet troops) Israel could not overwhelm him and all attempts would lead only to even greater losses and economic collapse.


        I agree with you completely. I just somehow missed this aspect, and it is the most important. Of course, Anwar realized that the power of unbridled fanaticism did not shake decisive stability. Because the aggressor always, initially, loses in a morally fighting spirit. It’s one thing to capture something that does not belong to you, and it’s quite another thing to defend your homeland that you regained after 2000 years of ordeals across the wide world.
  11. Algor73
    Algor73 23 September 2013 18: 51 New
    +2
    Nah yes. The USSR was power, everyone was afraid and respected. And politics is a delicate matter, especially in the East. Not every loss means defeat, but victory. Weapons of both our and American-European were tested on such Egypts. Now it seems that it’s good that ours do not participate in these mini-wars, but on the other hand, it inspires something else ...
  12. Beck
    Beck 23 September 2013 19: 09 New
    +2
    Quote: Algor73
    Nah yes. The USSR was power, everyone was afraid and respected.


    That is what these camp concepts are for. Respect due to fear is not respect, but servility. And for a normal person, such respect is unacceptable.

    And Respect is worthy of Respect if it does not come out of fear of power, but comes from Kindness, Mercy, Legality, Decency, Responsiveness and much more.
    1. Beast
      Beast 27 November 2013 17: 14 New
      0
      Actually, in politics, slightly different criteria for behavior and supposedly moral standards always and everywhere only veil true dispositions and understandings.
  13. patriot2
    patriot2 23 September 2013 21: 51 New
    0
    Quote: Beck
    And Respect is worthy of Respect if it does not come out of fear of power, but comes from Kindness, Mercy, Legality, Decency, Responsiveness and much more.

    I agree with you. Only in this way should the domestic and foreign policy of the state of Russia be pursued. smile
  14. LSV
    LSV 24 September 2013 12: 47 New
    0
    "This is the result that Sadat came to (of course, with the support of America). He perfectly understood that he could not overpower Israel by military means (even taking into account more than 40 tons of the contingent of the Soviet troops) ...."
    As for the Egyptians, it may be true, but the fact that 40 tons of the Soviet contingent would not have spread Israel is “this is fantastic, son” (c))
    1. Beast
      Beast 27 November 2013 18: 02 New
      0
      As I understand it, our leadership did not have such a task at all. There was no purpose to destroy Israel with the leadership of the USSR.
  15. Mikhail Matyugin
    Mikhail Matyugin 31 May 2016 12: 56 New
    0
    I read the article and would like to put a few remarks.

    Sadat allegedly already then, in July 1972 matured in order to cross from the Soviet camp to the American camp. Also called the number of “sent” advisers - 15-20 thousand.
    I see that there were simply no such number of military advisers in Egypt at the same time. It could be about a few thousand, no more. The indicated figure most likely indicates the total number of all Soviet military experts in Egypt at the beginning of 1970x.

    The withdrawal of the Soviet air defense division, stationed at the Suez Canal, was the most dramatic and noticeable event of July 1972. The division was deployed in Egypt in 1969-1970 and consisted of conscript soldiers. The division numbered 10 thousands of people.
    I wonder where such data comes from, so that the rank and file are conscript soldiers? According to the people who were there and with whom my acquaintances spoke, the rank and file and sergeant were there Egyptian soldiers, not Soviet.

    Captured Egyptian documents were translated into Hebrew and published almost 30 years ago. Only they are enough to dispel the myth of “expulsion”. The documents show that nothing happened with the Soviet advisers in July. Among them are the work plans of advisers for 1973 year. Other documents demonstrate that the number, military ranks and functions of 1973 advisors of the year were no different from 1972. Some advisers arrived in Egypt in 1971 and remained in the Egyptian parts until May 1973 - without at least a brief recall.
    The last Soviet military experts left Egypt in the 1974 year - I know this from information from my friends who spoke directly with those who left there.