Combat use of C-75 anti-aircraft missile system

Combat use of C-75 anti-aircraft missile system

The creation of the C-75 anti-aircraft missile system began on the basis of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2838 / 1201 dated 20 in November 1953. “On the creation of a mobile anti-aircraft missile system weapons to combat enemy aircraft. "During this period, the Soviet Union had already passed tests of the C-25 stationary anti-aircraft missile system designed for air defense of large administrative and industrial centers of the country. However, given the high cost of such stationary complexes, it did not appear possible to provide reliable anti-air cover all the important objects in the country, as well as areas of concentration of troops. The Soviet military leadership saw a way to create nogo antiaircraft missile system (SAM), though inferior in their capabilities stationary system, but allows for a short time to regroup and concentration of forces and air defense weapons in threatened areas.
The new complex was designed to intercept tactical and strategic bombers and reconnaissance aircraft flying at subsonic or moderate supersonic speeds at medium and high altitudes.

The rocket, with the radio command guidance system, which received the designation B-750 (product 1D), was created on the basis of the normal aerodynamic configuration. It had two stages - starting with a solid-fuel engine and a sustainer - with a liquid one, which ensured a high initial speed from an inclined start.

Scheme rocket 1D: 1. Transmitting antenna RV; 2. Radio fuse (PB); 3. Combat unit; 4. Receiving antenna PB; 5. Oxidizer tank; 6. Fuel tank; 7. Air tank; 8. Autopilot unit; 9. Radio control unit; 10. Ampoule battery; 11. Current transducer; 12. Steering; 13. Buck "and"; 14. Marching engine; 15. Transitional compartment; 16. Starting engine

Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and USSR Council №1382 / 638 from 11 December 1957g. the first version of the SA-75 "Dvina", operating in the 10-cm range was adopted. Simultaneously with the organization of the mass production of the CA-75, the design team of the KB-1 continued to work on the creation of a complex operating in the 6 cm range. In May, the 1957 g. C-75 prototype, operating in the 6 cm range, was sent to the Kapustin Yar test site. In the new complex, the option of placing the elements of the SNR in three cabs located in two-axle car trailers, in contrast to the CA-75, where the equipment was located in five KUNGS ZIS-151 or ZIL-157, was implemented.

At the end of the 50 complex began to enter the army. At that time, violations of the Soviet borders by US and NATO aircraft were widespread. Even the "neutral" Swedes did not hesitate to fly into the Soviet airspace in the Kola Peninsula.

But oddly enough, the first successful combat use occurred outside the USSR.
In the 50-ies, the reconnaissance aircraft of the United States and Kuomintang Taiwan for a long time flew with impunity over the territory of the PRC.
At the personal request of Mao Zedong, two sets of SA-75M Dvina SAM systems were handed over to the Chinese and a training of calculations was organized.
October 7 1959, the high-altitude reconnaissance of the Taiwanese Air Force was shot down by a C-75 complex near Beijing, at an altitude of 20 600 m, the pilot of the aircraft was killed. The tape recording of the airman’s negotiations with Taiwan was cut short in mid-sentence and, judging by it, he saw no danger.

It was the first aircraft in the world, destroyed Zur. The aircraft was American-made - RB-57D, a twin-engine long-range reconnaissance aircraft, which is a copy of the British Canberra reconnaissance version.

In order to conceal the presence of the latest, in those times, anti-aircraft missile systems in China, the Chinese and Soviet leaders agreed not to give an open message about the downed aircraft. However, when the Taiwanese media reported that RB-57D crashed, fell and sank in the East China Sea during a training flight, Xinhua agency responded with the following message: "BEIJING, October 9. October 7 in the first half Day one of the Chiang Kai-shekish American-made reconnaissance aircraft, with provocative targets, invaded airspace over areas of northern China and was shot down by the air forces of the People’s Liberation Army of China. " Like what kind of weapon - for reasons of secrecy - not a word.

Subsequently, several more aircraft were shot down over China, including the X-NUMX high-altitude reconnaissance U-3 Scout Lockheed. Several pilots were captured. Only after this reconnaissance flights over the territory of mainland China ceased.

At that time, Americans from the territory of Western Europe were mass launching reconnaissance high-altitude balloons. These were very difficult targets for Soviet air defense. When trying to shoot them down, several Soviet fighters were killed as a result of the collision.
New air defense systems began to be used to combat them, although of course the cost of the rocket was many times higher than the cost of the reconnaissance probe.
16 November 1959 of the year was recorded the first case, at Stalingrad, the C-75 air defense system was destroyed by flying at an altitude of 28000 and American reconnaissance balloon.

Starting in the summer of 1956, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Lockkeheed U-2 began to fly over the USSR. They repeatedly flew with impunity over large administrative and industrial centers, cosmodromes and rocket ranges.

Flying at heights above 20 km, U-2 was invulnerable to Soviet air defense fighters.
This situation greatly unnerved our leadership. On all Soviet diplomatic notes, the Americans declared their innocence.
Finally, the 1 of May 1960 of the year over the Sverdlovsk anti-aircraft missile was shot down by the previously unattainable US high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2, the pilot Gary Powers was captured.

The destruction of the high-altitude intelligence officer who was considered invulnerable was a real shock for the Americans. After this flight reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of the USSR was no more.

At that time, there was still no experience of shooting at real enemy planes, so the cloud falling to the ground from the wreckage of U-2 was initially taken by rocket engineers for the passive interference delivered by the aircraft, and the wounded U-2 was re-fired from three missiles. However, this was nothing terrible. More sadly, the fact that the intruder was destroyed for almost half an hour was never fixed, and at that time there were several Soviet aircraft that tried in vain to intercept the intruder aircraft. As a result, half an hour after the defeat of U-2, due to the confusion at the local command level, another MiG-19 pair was fired at, intercepted by an interceptor, almost an hour before. One of the pilots, Ayvazyan, promptly dived below the lower boundary of the zone of destruction, and another pilot, Safronov, was killed along with the aircraft.
Nevertheless, despite this tragic episode, the anti-aircraft missile forces for the first time confirmed their high efficiency. Particularly impressive was the victory of the missile against the background of repeated unsuccessful attempts by fighter aircraft to intercept U-2.

Another politically significant application of CA-75 was the destruction of U-2 over Cuba 27 in October 1962. The pilot, Rudolf Anderson, was killed, and this "first blood" added fuel to the "Caribbean crisis." At that time, on the "island of freedom" there were two Soviet divisions with anti-aircraft missile systems, armed with a total of 144 launchers and twice as many missiles. However, in all these cases, as with the use of anti-aircraft missiles on U-2 over China in 1962, low-speed and non-maneuverable aircraft were attacked, however, flying at very high altitude. In general, the conditions of live firing differed little from the range, and therefore the ability of the SA-75 to hit tactical aircraft was not assessed by the Americans as low.

The situation was completely different in Vietnam during the fighting in 1965-1973. After the first "rehearsal", which took place during the "Tonkin crisis" in August 1964, the United States, from the beginning of 1965, began a systematic bombardment of the DRV (North Vietnam). Soon the DRV was visited by a Soviet delegation headed by A.N. Kosygin. The result of the visit was the start of large-scale deliveries of weapons to the DRV, including the SA-75 air defense system. By the summer of 1965, in Vietnam, two CA-75 anti-aircraft missile regiments, staffed by Soviet military experts, were deployed. The Americans, who recorded the preparation of positions for 5 on April 1965, rightly assumed the presence of “Russians” on them and, fearing international complications, did not bomb them. They did not show increased concern after the 23 of July 1965 of the electronic reconnaissance aircraft RB-66С recorded the first launch of the SNR-75 missile guidance station.

The situation changed radically the very next day, when on July 24 three F-4С, flying at an altitude of about 7 km, were fired at with three missiles fired by the Soviet crew under the command of Major F. Ilinykh. One of the missiles struck the "Phantom", which was piloted by captains R. Fobeir and R. Cairn, and the fragments of two other missiles damaged three other "Phantom". The pilots of the downed "Phantom" ejected and were captured, from which 12 February 1973 was released only R. Keirn, the fate of the co-pilot remained unknown.

So, it is extremely bad for Americans, events developed the first time after the start of the use of the air defense system. Moreover, the Americans began to prepare for a meeting with Soviet anti-aircraft missiles immediately after the destruction of the Powers aircraft. In 1964, in the California desert, they carried out a special exercise “Dessert Strike”, during which they evaluated the capabilities of aviation in the zone of action of missile air defense weapons. And immediately after receiving information about the first shot down by the Phantom missiles, the Hopkins Institute was involved in the work on studying possible means of countering the air defense system.

Following the first received recommendations to counter the air defense missile system, the Americans significantly increased their intelligence activities, assessing in detail the capabilities of each detected air defense missile system, taking into account the surrounding terrain, and taking advantage of unreported areas at junctions and at low altitudes, laid out their flight routes. According to the testimony of Soviet specialists, the quality of intelligence was very high, and it was conducted with such care that any movement of missilemen in the shortest possible time became known to the Americans.

Other recommendations on countering the air defense missile system were reduced to the implementation of tactical and technical methods - approaching low-altitude bombardment sites, maneuvering in the zone of the air defense missile system, setting up radio interference from aircraft EB-66. The main option of avoiding missiles during the 1965-1966 years. became an intense reversal. A few seconds before the approach of the rocket, the pilot entered the plane into a dive for a rocket with a turn, change in altitude and course with the maximum possible overload. With the successful implementation of this maneuver, the limited speed of the missile guidance and control system did not allow to compensate for the new error, and it flew past. In the case of the slightest inaccuracy in the construction of the maneuver, fragments of the missile warhead, as a rule, hit the cockpit.

For the first month of the combat use of the SA-75, according to Soviet estimates, 14 American aircraft were shot down, while the entire 18 SAM was spent. In turn, according to American data, over the same period, only three aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles - in addition to the previously mentioned F-4С (Soviet experts counted the destruction of three “Phantoms” in that battle at the same time) at one August 11E (according to Soviet data - four at once) and August 4 one more F-24В. Such a disagreement in casualties and victories, however, characteristic of any war, over the next seven and a half years of hostilities became an indispensable companion of the confrontation between the air defense systems of Vietnam and American aviation.

Having suffered the first tangible losses, in February 1966, the Americans were forced to practically stop the air war over North Vietnam for two months, using this break to retrofit the aircraft with electronic warfare and develop new tactics. At the same time, unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily BQM-34, equipped with electronic reconnaissance equipment, were used to gather the necessary information. The greatest success at that time, according to American data, was accompanied by the “drone” Ryan 147 “Firebee”, which 13 February 1966 was unsuccessfully fired by rockets. As a result, information was recorded on the operation of the missile guidance systems, the remote detonation of the warhead and the characteristics of the warhead of the rocket.
In March, 1966 launched the first Shrike missiles on American aircraft, designed to attack radar against air defense missiles, and in summer Vietnam received specialized EF-105F "Wild Weasel" aircraft (later received the designation F-105G).

According to American data, only about 200 machines were lost from the fire of the air defense missile system. One of the pilots shot down by an anti-aircraft missile was future presidential candidate John McCain, which apparently made an indelible impression on him, only this can explain his pathological hatred of the Russians.
It can be assumed that, in addition to, in principle, possible deliberate disinformation caused by the Americans' underreporting of the losses from the air defense missile systems, there may be a lack of objective data on the specific causes of the death of their airplanes - the pilot could not always inform the command that he had been shot at by the air defense missile system. On the other hand, история of all wars indicates the inevitable and often unintentionally overstatement of the number of their victories by the participants in the battles. Yes, and a comparison of missile reports, which judged the effectiveness of shooting marks on screens, with a more primitive method of counting downed American aircraft by Vietnamese factory numbers on the wreckage in some cases showed an overestimate of the number of aircraft destroyed by missiles 3 times.

The average missile consumption per downed aircraft accounted for 2-3 missiles at the initial stage of use and 7-10 missiles at the time of the end of hostilities. This is due to the development of enemy countermeasures and the use of anti-radar missiles "Shrike". In addition, it should be remembered that the "Dvina" fought in extremely difficult conditions. It was not supported by the air defense missile systems of other classes, the air defense missile system conducted combat operations in the conditions of single combat with an opponent constantly adapting to the situation, letting the enemy change his tactics. There was no continuous zone of anti-aircraft rocket fire in Vietnam. The Americans reacted very flexibly to the use of new weapons, organizing countermeasures in the form of introducing effective jamming stations, changing tactics and organizing “retaliation attacks”.

The Americans entered the new stage of the air war with a renewed material part and acted in accordance with an elaborate tactic. The flights, as a rule, were carried out outside the zones of defeat of the air defense missile system, outlined on the basis of a precise determination of the closing angles, which are very significant in the conditions of the mountainous terrain of Vietnam. Practically all Americans' planes were equipped with warning equipment about the irradiation by the C-75 missile guidance stations, according to information from which the pilots worked out anti-missile maneuvers.

Most of the aircraft were also equipped with active jamming stations for self-protection, with the means of shooting passive jamming. The group cover was carried out by the active jammers EB-66A from the distance from 60 to 120 km. As a result, the screen constantly observed light from passive interference - from a narrow band to a bright uniform glow of the entire screen. When using powerful active interference self-protection fighter-bombers to shoot down almost failed. Theoretically, in this case, it was necessary to locate the active interference and direct the missile using the "three-point" method, but practically it was not possible to determine the center of interference due to the powerful illumination of the screen.

The work of the air defense missile system became more complicated with the start of the use of Shrike anti-radar missiles. As their carriers, F-4E Wild Weasel planes saturated with radio intelligence and radio countermeasure equipment were used.

The Shrike rocket itself in the absolute majority of cases was not observed on SNR screens due to the small effective scattering surface. Its launch was recorded by changing the shape of the mark from the carrier to the indicator "5 km". As a rule, in this case, the calculation of the air defense missile system had to reset the target, turn the antenna, after which the power was switched to the equivalent. With a favorable time scenario, these operations could not be carried out immediately after the launch of the Shrike rocket, but after the defeat of the aircraft fired at the SAM system.

In addition to measures of electronic warfare, the Americans widely used fire counteraction. Positions of the air defense system were subjected to aviation strikes 685 Slightly less than half of them were produced by Shrike missiles, the rest by bombs. In 1966, the 61 missile was damaged by shrapnel, in 1967, the 90 missiles, of which no more than half were recovered. In total, during the war years, the air defense system failed 241 times. On average, each division was put out of operation approximately once a year. The positions changed on average 10-12 once a year, and in the period of the most intense fighting - through 2-4 of the day. As a result of the actions of the American aviation from 95 of anti-aircraft missile systems delivered by the Soviet Union to the 1973, there were 39 combat ZRKs left in the ranks and four training centers.

In the context of the confrontation with American aircraft, the calculations of the air defense system used new tactical techniques. The practice of “ambush” and “wandering” divisions was organized. In order to increase maneuverability and mobility, the number of technical means was reduced to one CHR-75 and 1-2 PU guidance station. Divisions hid in the jungle without the inclusion of technical means, waiting for the moment to make a productive start. Regardless of the shooting results, an emergency relocation of the complex was organized during 30-40 min. The “false” launch method was practiced, with the inclusion of the CHR-75 guidance channel without launching rockets. That often forced American planes to get rid of the combat load in order to carry out an anti-missile maneuver, substituting themselves under the fire of anti-aircraft artillery. The “false launch” brought the greatest benefit at the time of the direct attack of the object - the pilots immediately became not up to the ground operations.

In Vietnam, a number of other tactical innovations were implemented. Since November 1967, the method of tracking a target without radiation of a SNR has been applied - according to the mark from an active self-interference disturbance. In the future, the calculations of the air defense system turned to the use of the field commander's periscopes specially installed on the P cabins and control units connected to the control units for visual tracking.

Despite the fact that, even according to Soviet experts, less than a third of American planes were shot down by air defense systems, the most important result of their use was the need for a radical change in tactics of aviation operations, its forced transition to low-altitude flights, where it suffered heavy losses from fire artillery, small arms and low-altitude attack fighters, as a result of which the effectiveness of the use of aviation was significantly reduced.

Created to combat low-maneuverable bombers and high-altitude scouts, the complex proved to be quite effective against tactical aircraft. This was facilitated by the continuous improvement of the complex and the emergence of new, more long-range and high-speed missiles to it.

In addition to Vietnam, C-75-type air defense systems were massively used in conflicts in the Middle East. The first experience of their use in the "Six Day War" is difficult to attribute to successful. According to Western data, the Egyptians, having 18 complexes, could only launch 22 SAM, knocking down two Mirage-IIICJ fighters.

According to Soviet data, the Egyptians had 25 divisions C-75, and the number of downed aircraft was 9. However, the most unpleasant event of that war was the capture of some C-75 components by the Israelis on the Sinai Peninsula, including missiles.

More successfully, anti-aircraft missiles were used in the so-called "war of attrition". 20 July 1969 The Egyptians shot down the Israeli Piper Cub and, before the outbreak of the war, 1973 brought the number of victories C-75 to 10. One of them was highly appreciated by the Egyptians when the September 75 X-NUMX X-NUMX was “removed” by the C-17 radio intelligence plane at the 1971 km range.

Judging by foreign data, in the course of the “October war” 1973, another 14 of Israeli aircraft was shot down by Egyptians and Syrians using C-75-type air defense systems.

Satellite image of Google Earth: positions of the Egyptian S-C-75

Israeli pilots had a low opinion of the combat capabilities of the C-75. But the use of this air defense system forced to abandon flights at altitude and go to low-altitude flights. This made it difficult to perform combat missions and led to large losses from low-altitude air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery. In addition, combat aircraft were forced to carry containers with jamming stations, which reduced the combat load and reduced flight data.

In fairness, it is worth noting that the use of the C-75 in Vietnam was more successful. According to the recollections of our specialists, as well as the general, not high motivation of the Arabs to fight, sloppiness, stereotyped actions and frank betrayal, as well as more complex conditions of military actions, have affected. In the desert it was many times harder to mask positions. When launching rockets, the complex gave itself off as a cloud of dust visible from afar.

In addition to the most large-scale wars in Vietnam and the Middle East, C-75 complexes were used in many other conflicts, starting with the Indo - Pakistani 1965 clash, when the Indian An-12 became their first victim in the "third world", mistakenly for Pakistani C-130.

The C-75 SAM system was used by the warring parties in 1979 during the Vietnamese-Chinese conflict, the Chinese counterparts of the "seventy-five" HQ-2, two Vietnamese MiG-21 were shot down.

The complex was intensively used during the Iran-Iraq war. Both sides used it to cover cities, areas of concentration of troops and oil production sites. Iran used the Chinese SQM HQ-2.

Google Efrth Satellite Image: Iranian ZRK HQ-2

In 80, the Syrians once again used it against Israeli air raids.
The Libyan missiles of the C-75 complexes were launched on American planes while repelling airstrikes during Operation Canyon Eldorado in April 1986.

From the most recent examples of the use of C-75-type complexes, foreign sources point to the destruction of the Russian Su-27 over Georgia during the Abkhaz conflict of 19 in March of 1993.

During the Gulf War 1991 of the year, in service with Iraq was the 38 divisions of the C-75 SAMs. During the fighting, they shot down and damaged several planes of coalition forces, including the "ganship" AC-130. Later, however, most of the Iraqi S-75 air defense system was suppressed or destroyed.
During the US invasion of 2003. The complexes were not used for their intended purpose. At the same time, several missile launches were recorded, the Iraqis tried to use them to fire ground targets.

During the aggression of the West against Libya, not a single launch of the C-75 was recorded.

Satellite image of Google Efrth: Libyan air defense system С-75 destroyed by air strike

All Libyan complexes were destroyed as a result of airstrikes, shelling from the ground or captured by "rebels".

In our country, the C-75 was removed from service at the beginning of the 90, but continues to be in service in the PRC and several other countries.

Based on:
Sergey Linnik
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