Military Review

Combat use of C-75 anti-aircraft missile system

Combat use of C-75 anti-aircraft missile system

The creation of the C-75 anti-aircraft missile system began on the basis of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2838 / 1201 dated 20 in November 1953. “On the creation of a mobile anti-aircraft missile system weapons to combat aviation ". During this period, the Soviet Union already tested the S-25 guided stationary anti-aircraft missile system designed for air defense (air defense) of large administrative and industrial centers of the country. However, given the high cost of such stationary systems, it did not seem possible to provide reliable anti-aircraft covering all important facilities in the country, as well as areas where troops were concentrated, the Soviet military leadership saw a way out in creating mobile anti-aircraft missile complex (SAM), albeit inferior in its capabilities to the stationary system, but allowing for a short time to regroup and concentrate air defense forces and means in threatened areas.
The new complex was designed to intercept tactical and strategic bombers and reconnaissance aircraft flying at subsonic or moderate supersonic speeds at medium and high altitudes.

The rocket, with the radio command guidance system, which received the designation B-750 (product 1D), was created on the basis of the normal aerodynamic configuration. It had two stages - starting with a solid-fuel engine and a sustainer - with a liquid one, which ensured a high initial speed from an inclined start.

Scheme rocket 1D: 1. Transmitting antenna RV; 2. Radio fuse (PB); 3. Combat unit; 4. Receiving antenna PB; 5. Oxidizer tank; 6. Fuel tank; 7. Air tank; 8. Autopilot unit; 9. Radio control unit; 10. Ampoule battery; 11. Current transducer; 12. Steering; 13. Buck "and"; 14. Marching engine; 15. Transitional compartment; 16. Starting engine

Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and USSR Council №1382 / 638 from 11 December 1957g. the first version of the SA-75 "Dvina", operating in the 10-cm range was adopted. Simultaneously with the organization of the mass production of the CA-75, the design team of the KB-1 continued to work on the creation of a complex operating in the 6 cm range. In May, the 1957 g. C-75 prototype, operating in the 6 cm range, was sent to the Kapustin Yar test site. In the new complex, the option of placing the elements of the SNR in three cabs located in two-axle car trailers, in contrast to the CA-75, where the equipment was located in five KUNGS ZIS-151 or ZIL-157, was implemented.

At the end of the 50 complex began to enter the army. At that time, violations of the Soviet borders by US and NATO aircraft were widespread. Even the "neutral" Swedes did not hesitate to fly into the Soviet airspace in the Kola Peninsula.

But oddly enough, the first successful combat use occurred outside the USSR.
In the 50-ies, the reconnaissance aircraft of the United States and Kuomintang Taiwan for a long time flew with impunity over the territory of the PRC.
At the personal request of Mao Zedong, two sets of SA-75M Dvina SAM systems were handed over to the Chinese and a training of calculations was organized.
October 7 1959, the high-altitude reconnaissance of the Taiwanese Air Force was shot down by a C-75 complex near Beijing, at an altitude of 20 600 m, the pilot of the aircraft was killed. The tape recording of the airman’s negotiations with Taiwan was cut short in mid-sentence and, judging by it, he saw no danger.

It was the first aircraft in the world, destroyed Zur. The aircraft was American-made - RB-57D, a twin-engine long-range reconnaissance aircraft, which is a copy of the British Canberra reconnaissance version.

In order to conceal the presence of the latest, in those times, anti-aircraft missile systems in China, the Chinese and Soviet leaders agreed not to give an open message about the downed aircraft. However, when the Taiwanese media reported that RB-57D crashed, fell and sank in the East China Sea during a training flight, Xinhua agency responded with the following message: "BEIJING, October 9. October 7 in the first half Day one of the Chiang Kai-shekish American-made reconnaissance aircraft, with provocative targets, invaded airspace over areas of northern China and was shot down by the air forces of the People’s Liberation Army of China. " Like what kind of weapon - for reasons of secrecy - not a word.

Subsequently, several more aircraft were shot down over China, including the X-NUMX high-altitude reconnaissance U-3 Scout Lockheed. Several pilots were captured. Only after this reconnaissance flights over the territory of mainland China ceased.

At that time, Americans from the territory of Western Europe were mass launching reconnaissance high-altitude balloons. These were very difficult targets for Soviet air defense. When trying to shoot them down, several Soviet fighters were killed as a result of the collision.
New air defense systems began to be used to combat them, although of course the cost of the rocket was many times higher than the cost of the reconnaissance probe.
16 November 1959 of the year was recorded the first case, at Stalingrad, the C-75 air defense system was destroyed by flying at an altitude of 28000 and American reconnaissance balloon.

Starting in the summer of 1956, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Lockkeheed U-2 began to fly over the USSR. They repeatedly flew with impunity over large administrative and industrial centers, cosmodromes and rocket ranges.

Flying at heights above 20 km, U-2 was invulnerable to Soviet air defense fighters.
This situation greatly unnerved our leadership. On all Soviet diplomatic notes, the Americans declared their innocence.
Finally, the 1 of May 1960 of the year over the Sverdlovsk anti-aircraft missile was shot down by the previously unattainable US high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2, the pilot Gary Powers was captured.

The destruction of the high-altitude intelligence officer who was considered invulnerable was a real shock for the Americans. After this flight reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of the USSR was no more.

At that time, there was still no experience of shooting at real enemy planes, so the cloud falling to the ground from the wreckage of U-2 was initially taken by rocket engineers for the passive interference delivered by the aircraft, and the wounded U-2 was re-fired from three missiles. However, this was nothing terrible. More sadly, the fact that the intruder was destroyed for almost half an hour was never fixed, and at that time there were several Soviet aircraft that tried in vain to intercept the intruder aircraft. As a result, half an hour after the defeat of U-2, due to the confusion at the local command level, another MiG-19 pair was fired at, intercepted by an interceptor, almost an hour before. One of the pilots, Ayvazyan, promptly dived below the lower boundary of the zone of destruction, and another pilot, Safronov, was killed along with the aircraft.
Nevertheless, despite this tragic episode, the anti-aircraft missile forces for the first time confirmed their high efficiency. Particularly impressive was the victory of the missile against the background of repeated unsuccessful attempts by fighter aircraft to intercept U-2.

Another politically significant application of CA-75 was the destruction of U-2 over Cuba 27 in October 1962. The pilot, Rudolf Anderson, was killed, and this "first blood" added fuel to the "Caribbean crisis." At that time, on the "island of freedom" there were two Soviet divisions with anti-aircraft missile systems, armed with a total of 144 launchers and twice as many missiles. However, in all these cases, as with the use of anti-aircraft missiles on U-2 over China in 1962, low-speed and non-maneuverable aircraft were attacked, however, flying at very high altitude. In general, the conditions of live firing differed little from the range, and therefore the ability of the SA-75 to hit tactical aircraft was not assessed by the Americans as low.

The situation was completely different in Vietnam during the fighting in 1965-1973. After the first "rehearsal", which took place during the "Tonkin crisis" in August 1964, the United States, from the beginning of 1965, began a systematic bombardment of the DRV (North Vietnam). Soon the DRV was visited by a Soviet delegation headed by A.N. Kosygin. The result of the visit was the start of large-scale deliveries of weapons to the DRV, including the SA-75 air defense system. By the summer of 1965, in Vietnam, two CA-75 anti-aircraft missile regiments, staffed by Soviet military experts, were deployed. The Americans, who recorded the preparation of positions for 5 on April 1965, rightly assumed the presence of “Russians” on them and, fearing international complications, did not bomb them. They did not show increased concern after the 23 of July 1965 of the electronic reconnaissance aircraft RB-66С recorded the first launch of the SNR-75 missile guidance station.

The situation changed radically the very next day, when on July 24 three F-4С, flying at an altitude of about 7 km, were fired at with three missiles fired by the Soviet crew under the command of Major F. Ilinykh. One of the missiles struck the "Phantom", which was piloted by captains R. Fobeir and R. Cairn, and the fragments of two other missiles damaged three other "Phantom". The pilots of the downed "Phantom" ejected and were captured, from which 12 February 1973 was released only R. Keirn, the fate of the co-pilot remained unknown.

So, it is extremely bad for Americans, events developed the first time after the start of the use of the air defense system. Moreover, the Americans began to prepare for a meeting with Soviet anti-aircraft missiles immediately after the destruction of the Powers aircraft. In 1964, in the California desert, they carried out a special exercise “Dessert Strike”, during which they evaluated the capabilities of aviation in the zone of action of missile air defense weapons. And immediately after receiving information about the first shot down by the Phantom missiles, the Hopkins Institute was involved in the work on studying possible means of countering the air defense system.

Following the first received recommendations to counter the air defense missile system, the Americans significantly increased their intelligence activities, assessing in detail the capabilities of each detected air defense missile system, taking into account the surrounding terrain, and taking advantage of unreported areas at junctions and at low altitudes, laid out their flight routes. According to the testimony of Soviet specialists, the quality of intelligence was very high, and it was conducted with such care that any movement of missilemen in the shortest possible time became known to the Americans.

Other recommendations on countering the air defense missile system were reduced to the implementation of tactical and technical methods - approaching low-altitude bombardment sites, maneuvering in the zone of the air defense missile system, setting up radio interference from aircraft EB-66. The main option of avoiding missiles during the 1965-1966 years. became an intense reversal. A few seconds before the approach of the rocket, the pilot entered the plane into a dive for a rocket with a turn, change in altitude and course with the maximum possible overload. With the successful implementation of this maneuver, the limited speed of the missile guidance and control system did not allow to compensate for the new error, and it flew past. In the case of the slightest inaccuracy in the construction of the maneuver, fragments of the missile warhead, as a rule, hit the cockpit.

For the first month of the combat use of the SA-75, according to Soviet estimates, 14 American aircraft were shot down, while the entire 18 SAM was spent. In turn, according to American data, over the same period, only three aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles - in addition to the previously mentioned F-4С (Soviet experts counted the destruction of three “Phantoms” in that battle at the same time) at one August 11E (according to Soviet data - four at once) and August 4 one more F-24В. Such a disagreement in casualties and victories, however, characteristic of any war, over the next seven and a half years of hostilities became an indispensable companion of the confrontation between the air defense systems of Vietnam and American aviation.

Having suffered the first tangible losses, in February 1966, the Americans were forced to practically stop the air war over North Vietnam for two months, using this break to retrofit the aircraft with electronic warfare and develop new tactics. At the same time, unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily BQM-34, equipped with electronic reconnaissance equipment, were used to gather the necessary information. The greatest success at that time, according to American data, was accompanied by the “drone” Ryan 147 “Firebee”, which 13 February 1966 was unsuccessfully fired by rockets. As a result, information was recorded on the operation of the missile guidance systems, the remote detonation of the warhead and the characteristics of the warhead of the rocket.
In March, 1966 launched the first Shrike missiles on American aircraft, designed to attack radar against air defense missiles, and in summer Vietnam received specialized EF-105F "Wild Weasel" aircraft (later received the designation F-105G).

According to American data, only about 200 machines were lost from the fire of the air defense missile system. One of the pilots shot down by an anti-aircraft missile was future presidential candidate John McCain, which apparently made an indelible impression on him, only this can explain his pathological hatred of the Russians.
It can be assumed that, in addition to, in principle, possible deliberate disinformation caused by the Americans' underreporting of the losses from the air defense missile systems, there may be a lack of objective data on the specific causes of the death of their airplanes - the pilot could not always inform the command that he had been shot at by the air defense missile system. On the other hand, история of all wars indicates the inevitable and often unintentionally overstatement of the number of their victories by the participants in the battles. Yes, and a comparison of missile reports, which judged the effectiveness of shooting marks on screens, with a more primitive method of counting downed American aircraft by Vietnamese factory numbers on the wreckage in some cases showed an overestimate of the number of aircraft destroyed by missiles 3 times.

The average missile consumption per downed aircraft accounted for 2-3 missiles at the initial stage of use and 7-10 missiles at the time of the end of hostilities. This is due to the development of enemy countermeasures and the use of anti-radar missiles "Shrike". In addition, it should be remembered that the "Dvina" fought in extremely difficult conditions. It was not supported by the air defense missile systems of other classes, the air defense missile system conducted combat operations in the conditions of single combat with an opponent constantly adapting to the situation, letting the enemy change his tactics. There was no continuous zone of anti-aircraft rocket fire in Vietnam. The Americans reacted very flexibly to the use of new weapons, organizing countermeasures in the form of introducing effective jamming stations, changing tactics and organizing “retaliation attacks”.

The Americans entered the new stage of the air war with a renewed material part and acted in accordance with an elaborate tactic. The flights, as a rule, were carried out outside the zones of defeat of the air defense missile system, outlined on the basis of a precise determination of the closing angles, which are very significant in the conditions of the mountainous terrain of Vietnam. Practically all Americans' planes were equipped with warning equipment about the irradiation by the C-75 missile guidance stations, according to information from which the pilots worked out anti-missile maneuvers.

Most of the aircraft were also equipped with active jamming stations for self-protection, with the means of shooting passive jamming. The group cover was carried out by the active jammers EB-66A from the distance from 60 to 120 km. As a result, the screen constantly observed light from passive interference - from a narrow band to a bright uniform glow of the entire screen. When using powerful active interference self-protection fighter-bombers to shoot down almost failed. Theoretically, in this case, it was necessary to locate the active interference and direct the missile using the "three-point" method, but practically it was not possible to determine the center of interference due to the powerful illumination of the screen.

The work of the air defense missile system became more complicated with the start of the use of Shrike anti-radar missiles. As their carriers, F-4E Wild Weasel planes saturated with radio intelligence and radio countermeasure equipment were used.

The Shrike rocket itself in the absolute majority of cases was not observed on SNR screens due to the small effective scattering surface. Its launch was recorded by changing the shape of the mark from the carrier to the indicator "5 km". As a rule, in this case, the calculation of the air defense missile system had to reset the target, turn the antenna, after which the power was switched to the equivalent. With a favorable time scenario, these operations could not be carried out immediately after the launch of the Shrike rocket, but after the defeat of the aircraft fired at the SAM system.

In addition to measures of electronic warfare, the Americans widely used fire counteraction. Positions of the air defense system were subjected to aviation strikes 685 Slightly less than half of them were produced by Shrike missiles, the rest by bombs. In 1966, the 61 missile was damaged by shrapnel, in 1967, the 90 missiles, of which no more than half were recovered. In total, during the war years, the air defense system failed 241 times. On average, each division was put out of operation approximately once a year. The positions changed on average 10-12 once a year, and in the period of the most intense fighting - through 2-4 of the day. As a result of the actions of the American aviation from 95 of anti-aircraft missile systems delivered by the Soviet Union to the 1973, there were 39 combat ZRKs left in the ranks and four training centers.

In the context of the confrontation with American aircraft, the calculations of the air defense system used new tactical techniques. The practice of “ambush” and “wandering” divisions was organized. In order to increase maneuverability and mobility, the number of technical means was reduced to one CHR-75 and 1-2 PU guidance station. Divisions hid in the jungle without the inclusion of technical means, waiting for the moment to make a productive start. Regardless of the shooting results, an emergency relocation of the complex was organized during 30-40 min. The “false” launch method was practiced, with the inclusion of the CHR-75 guidance channel without launching rockets. That often forced American planes to get rid of the combat load in order to carry out an anti-missile maneuver, substituting themselves under the fire of anti-aircraft artillery. The “false launch” brought the greatest benefit at the time of the direct attack of the object - the pilots immediately became not up to the ground operations.

In Vietnam, a number of other tactical innovations were implemented. Since November 1967, the method of tracking a target without radiation of a SNR has been applied - according to the mark from an active self-interference disturbance. In the future, the calculations of the air defense system turned to the use of the field commander's periscopes specially installed on the P cabins and control units connected to the control units for visual tracking.

Despite the fact that, even according to Soviet experts, less than a third of American planes were shot down by air defense systems, the most important result of their use was the need for a radical change in tactics of aviation operations, its forced transition to low-altitude flights, where it suffered heavy losses from fire artillery, small arms and low-altitude attack fighters, as a result of which the effectiveness of the use of aviation was significantly reduced.

Created to combat low-maneuverable bombers and high-altitude scouts, the complex proved to be quite effective against tactical aircraft. This was facilitated by the continuous improvement of the complex and the emergence of new, more long-range and high-speed missiles to it.

In addition to Vietnam, C-75-type air defense systems were massively used in conflicts in the Middle East. The first experience of their use in the "Six Day War" is difficult to attribute to successful. According to Western data, the Egyptians, having 18 complexes, could only launch 22 SAM, knocking down two Mirage-IIICJ fighters.

According to Soviet data, the Egyptians had 25 divisions C-75, and the number of downed aircraft was 9. However, the most unpleasant event of that war was the capture of some C-75 components by the Israelis on the Sinai Peninsula, including missiles.

More successfully, anti-aircraft missiles were used in the so-called "war of attrition". 20 July 1969 The Egyptians shot down the Israeli Piper Cub and, before the outbreak of the war, 1973 brought the number of victories C-75 to 10. One of them was highly appreciated by the Egyptians when the September 75 X-NUMX X-NUMX was “removed” by the C-17 radio intelligence plane at the 1971 km range.

Judging by foreign data, in the course of the “October war” 1973, another 14 of Israeli aircraft was shot down by Egyptians and Syrians using C-75-type air defense systems.

Satellite image of Google Earth: positions of the Egyptian S-C-75

Israeli pilots had a low opinion of the combat capabilities of the C-75. But the use of this air defense system forced to abandon flights at altitude and go to low-altitude flights. This made it difficult to perform combat missions and led to large losses from low-altitude air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery. In addition, combat aircraft were forced to carry containers with jamming stations, which reduced the combat load and reduced flight data.

In fairness, it is worth noting that the use of the C-75 in Vietnam was more successful. According to the recollections of our specialists, as well as the general, not high motivation of the Arabs to fight, sloppiness, stereotyped actions and frank betrayal, as well as more complex conditions of military actions, have affected. In the desert it was many times harder to mask positions. When launching rockets, the complex gave itself off as a cloud of dust visible from afar.

In addition to the most large-scale wars in Vietnam and the Middle East, C-75 complexes were used in many other conflicts, starting with the Indo - Pakistani 1965 clash, when the Indian An-12 became their first victim in the "third world", mistakenly for Pakistani C-130.

The C-75 SAM system was used by the warring parties in 1979 during the Vietnamese-Chinese conflict, the Chinese counterparts of the "seventy-five" HQ-2, two Vietnamese MiG-21 were shot down.

The complex was intensively used during the Iran-Iraq war. Both sides used it to cover cities, areas of concentration of troops and oil production sites. Iran used the Chinese SQM HQ-2.

Google Efrth Satellite Image: Iranian ZRK HQ-2

In 80, the Syrians once again used it against Israeli air raids.
The Libyan missiles of the C-75 complexes were launched on American planes while repelling airstrikes during Operation Canyon Eldorado in April 1986.

From the most recent examples of the use of C-75-type complexes, foreign sources point to the destruction of the Russian Su-27 over Georgia during the Abkhaz conflict of 19 in March of 1993.

During the Gulf War 1991 of the year, in service with Iraq was the 38 divisions of the C-75 SAMs. During the fighting, they shot down and damaged several planes of coalition forces, including the "ganship" AC-130. Later, however, most of the Iraqi S-75 air defense system was suppressed or destroyed.
During the US invasion of 2003. The complexes were not used for their intended purpose. At the same time, several missile launches were recorded, the Iraqis tried to use them to fire ground targets.

During the aggression of the West against Libya, not a single launch of the C-75 was recorded.

Satellite image of Google Efrth: Libyan air defense system С-75 destroyed by air strike

All Libyan complexes were destroyed as a result of airstrikes, shelling from the ground or captured by "rebels".

In our country, the C-75 was removed from service at the beginning of the 90, but continues to be in service in the PRC and several other countries.

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  1. Apollo
    Apollo 19 September 2013 09: 08
    topic video
  2. Airman
    Airman 19 September 2013 09: 29
    Americans in the Vietnam War considered acceptable losses of aircraft in a raid of up to 3%, as soon as the losses exceeded 3%, the raids ceased to develop countermeasures and reduce losses. This applies not only to the air defense system, but also anti-aircraft artillery.
  3. smiths xnumx
    smiths xnumx 19 September 2013 10: 09
    I would like to note a few more episodes of the combat use of the S-75 air defense system, in addition to the self-transport An-12 that was shot down by mistake, one Pakistani Air Force reconnaissance plane RB-75F was shot down by Indian anti-aircraft gunners with the S-57 air defense missile. In December 1965, an American Air Force scout RB-57F was shot down over the Black Sea near the Russian coastal territory. Iranian HQ-2, i.e. A copy of the S-75 during the Iran-Iraq war shot down the Iraqi MiG-25RB (during the entire war, the air defense systems won only one reliable victory over this type of aircraft). The S-75 was used in November 1994 against NATO aircraft that raided western Bosnia. Serbs used C-75 against ground targets of Bosnian Muslims and Croats. About 18 missiles were launched in November-December 1994 on ground targets. In this case, the missiles were blown up in contact with the ground or the blasting was carried out at low altitude. This caused NATO forces to crush Bosnian Serb air defense systems.
    A few photos of interesting modifications of the S-75:
    self-propelled version of the Chinese air defense system HQ-2

    Cuban self-propelled variant S-75

    S-75 KPA
  4. ivanovbg
    ivanovbg 19 September 2013 10: 18
    We have "Dvina" in Bulgaria in the Vounno-Historical Museum in the capital Sofia.
  5. Anatole Klim
    Anatole Klim 19 September 2013 10: 42
    My father served in the 60s on the border with Norway, Rybachy Peninsula, was the commander of division 75 of the complex. I was small, but I remember, just when he comes for lunch, he takes a spoon, the siren is buzzing - it is running to the position, everything was nearby, in an hour it will come - Orion flew away, only it takes a spoon again - it flies again, Orion could all day along the border to fly. The Cold War, it was hard to serve, but they held the border and the Norwegians knew that they would poke their heads in and out in full.
    1. Proud.
      Proud. 19 September 2013 12: 14
      Quote: Anatol Klim
      Father served in the 60s on the border with Norway

      Yes, jolly. This is the so-called "first line." My friend from the Yevpatoriya training school was happy when he was attached to serve, after training, in a battalion located near Saki (Crimea). Well, what about Crimea, sea, girls on leave ... After the army crossed. I spat farther than I saw. Twenty times, in a day, they ran to the position, on the other side of Turkey.
    2. Andrey NM
      Andrey NM 8 February 2016 18: 14
      My father also raided in the 60s. The 75th complex in Vietnam also hit two on the battleship, although the warheads did not explode due to the characteristics of the rocket modification, I can’t say the details, not a specialist in air defense systems. One of the calculation officers who participated in that shooting, he told VIRTA, with his father. And after the academy they were dressed in marine uniforms and sent to master missile systems for submarines. Once, at that time, my grandfather came to visit the place, he then finished the service, prepared for retirement, a front-line soldier, a fighter pilot, he was amazed, how can you run so often on alarm.
      An officer with the Order of the "Battle Red Banner", whose crew in Vietnam had several "Americans" shot down, also studied in their group. Yes, our fathers and grandfathers had a very fighting time. And the boys and I went to pick berries and mushrooms at the position with the permission of the unit commander and accompanied by a warrant officer, only we were not allowed to approach the "guns". The territory was fenced, there were no strangers, so there were a lot of mushrooms and berries there. The fighters got a ration, plus there was a decent subsidiary farm. This was in the early 70s.
  6. creak
    creak 19 September 2013 11: 06
    The low efficiency of the use of the S-75 in Egypt led to the decision to transfer the Soviet air defense division there, whose anti-aircraft missile launcher, in conjunction with fighters, equipped with more modern systems, inflicted significant losses on the Israeli Air Force ..
    1. smiths xnumx
      smiths xnumx 19 September 2013 11: 21
      To begin with, the low efficiency of the S-75 air defense system, namely the low efficiency of the entire Arab air defense system, both the air defense system and the IA and ZA. For the same, the Vietnamese at the same time could only dream of such "goodies" as the S-125, KUB M1, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", the latest radars and the latest modifications of the MiG-21. Since all this was supplied to Vietnam only after the end of the Vietnam War. It was simply that the Arabs abandoned the S-1967 launcher during their flight in the 75 Six Day War, and it went to the Israelis, which allowed them to develop methods and methods of countermeasures, which they subsequently "kindly" shared with the Americans. Israeli specialists carefully analyzed its tactical and technical characteristics and developed recommendations for jet pilots. An important factor was the fact that the complex was intended mainly to destroy aircraft at medium altitudes, and the training of Israeli pilots and the main use of aviation was carried out at low altitudes.
      S-75 launcher captured by the Israelis in 1967 from the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula
      1. Airman
        Airman 19 September 2013 11: 39
        Quote: smiths xnumx
        It was just that the Arabs abandoned the S-1967 launcher during their flight in the 75 Six Day War, and it went to the Israelis, which allowed them to develop methods and methods of countermeasures, which they subsequently "kindly" shared with the Americans. Israeli specialists carefully analyzed its tactical and technical characteristics and developed recommendations for jet pilots. An important factor was the fact that the complex was intended mainly to destroy aircraft at medium altitudes, and the training of Israeli pilots and the main use of aviation was carried out at low altitudes.
        S-75 launcher captured by the Israelis in 1967 from the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula

        All the "salt" of the complex is not in the launcher, but in the SNR (missile guidance station), although having a combat-ready missile you can learn something.
        1. smiths xnumx
          smiths xnumx 19 September 2013 11: 49
          Well, in December 1969, during Operation Rooster-53, the Israelis managed to steal from the Egyptians the P-12 Yenisei early warning locator, which was designed to issue target designation S-75:
          Three helicopters Super Frelon with paratroopers on board boarded six kilometers from the station. Three groups of paratroopers prepared to disassemble the radar and load it onto helicopters. Two CH-53s were waiting in the wings on the Israeli side of the Gulf. The Egyptians managed to take by surprise. Their detachment consisted of only a dozen soldiers. Two of them died in a shootout. Suppressing resistance, part of the group began to disconnect the wagons from the ZILs. The dismantling of the radar ended at 02:43 - then a message was sent to the helicopters about readiness for loading.
          After cutting the mounting brackets with autogenes, the Israelites dismantled both parts of the radar station: the radar hardware and antenna mast device, and on the external sling of two heavy helicopters were transported to Sinai.
          Together with the station, her calculation was captured and stolen.
          The entire landing party moved to the place from which they were supposed to be evacuated, helicopters with paratroopers flew to Sinai and landed there at 04:35.
          The Soviet P-12 radar was delivered to Israel without any damage and was carefully studied, which made it possible to create the necessary electronic protection systems for aircraft.


          P-12 radar at the Israeli Air Force Museum
          1. Revolver
            Revolver 20 September 2013 08: 59
            Quote: Kuznetsov 1977
            in December 1969, during Operation Rooster-53, the Israelis managed to kidnap the P-12 Yenisei early warning radar from the Egyptians

            Tipo opetushili Arabs laughing
  7. Kovrovsky
    Kovrovsky 19 September 2013 11: 07
    Probably the S-75 was the most warring air defense system in the world. It performed its mission with flying colors, especially in Vietnam! The article is good, a lot of photo material, thanks to the author.
  8. Zymran
    Zymran 19 September 2013 11: 58
    All the same, most of the losses of American aviation in Vietnam are not due to missiles, but to barrel artillery. Especially ZPU-2 and ZPU-4, which were a nightmare for helicopters.
    1. Bongo
      19 September 2013 13: 20
      For helicopters, maybe you still mentioned DShK and ZSU. But to combat tactical and strategic aviation anti-aircraft machine guns is not enough.
      1. Zymran
        Zymran 19 September 2013 14: 25
        Yes, I agree with you.

        My father served as a gunner at ZPU-2, DMB-1971. He told me that they wanted to be retired, but they unexpectedly showed themselves very well in Vietnam. Plus, the Americans also write that the helicopter pilots were very afraid of the ZPU.
        1. Bongo
          19 September 2013 14: 32
          With all due respect, it is doubtful that the gunner ZPU knew about the plans for the adoption or decommissioning of certain models.
          Installations based on the Vladimirov 14,5-mm machine gun proved to be excellent in all conflicts where they were used.
          The article about them was 7 September.
          1. Zymran
            Zymran 19 September 2013 18: 20
            From his words, this was not a secret; the army talked about it.
            1. Bongo
              20 September 2013 04: 39
              At the level of conversations between private and junior command staff.
              ZPU-3 and ZPU-4 were before the advent of ZU-23 and MANPADS the main means of air defense battalion and regimental link. In the event of a big war, the targets for them would be basically not helicopters, but tactical strike aircraft.
              In Vietnam, ZSU-1 recommended themselves best, which could be disassembled into several parts and carried in packs.
  9. zinander
    zinander 19 September 2013 16: 14
    Arrange Americans to another Vietnam to discourage hunting for a long time to climb into someone else's garden.
  10. VKBZ45
    VKBZ45 19 September 2013 18: 12
    So they remembered the old S-75.
    I am a military commander of the KIPS (control and testing station) missile complex S-75.
    I would like to restore justice on the effectiveness of the use of the complex in Vietnam.
    One third of the shot down aircraft by this complex is not a minus, but an indicator of efficiency.
    The S-75 forced the Americans to descend to low altitudes where they were shot at by all and sundry.
    More about the rocket itself - warhead is a grenade with a reflex inside the case and a charge of 100 kg.
    A radio fuse of a relatively simple type, by our standards, a transmitter-receiver, when the reflected signal reached a certain level, the warhead was undermined. The rocket worked at a temperature range
    -50 - + 50 C but there was a pear on the accelerator nozzle, decreasing-increasing the diameter of the nozzle according to special tables by maintenance personnel depending on the ambient temperature (but not daily but after a few days of a specific temperature. In subsequent modifications, this adjustment disappeared. And the powder accelerator draft varied depending on the ambient temperature from 17 to 26 tons).
    And yet - the missile defense maneuver goal was able to get away from the missile not through the fault of the command system, but purely to save the missile from destruction when exceeding the overloads. On the rocket itself there were linear acceleration sensors, which did not allow the radio to perform a maneuver dangerous for the rocket. In the initial versions, when testing missiles without sensors, the missiles simply collapsed)
  11. cobalt
    cobalt 19 September 2013 18: 45
    This year, my father visited the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Here I removed as a keepsake the wreckage of U-2 of the downed C-75, the missile above the wreckage of apparently S-75 without a tail.
  12. creak
    creak 19 September 2013 19: 04
    Quote: Kuznetsov 1977
    To begin with, the low efficiency of the S-75 air defense system, namely the low efficiency of the entire Arab air defense system, both the air defense system and the IA and ZA. For the same, the Vietnamese at the same time could only dream of such "goodies" as the S-125, KUB M1, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", the latest radar and the latest modifications of the MiG-21

    I would like to note that during this period in the Egyptian air defense there were no "goodies" such as, for example, the S-125 and Shilka, there were only the S-75 air defense missile systems. In addition, unlike Vietnam, the advancement and deployment of complexes in a desert area practically excluded the element of surprise ... Certain results were achieved only during ambush operations in the Nile Delta, where, when advancing at night, terrain conditions made it possible to disguise the position of the anti-aircraft missile launcher. And Israeli aircraft operated not only at low altitudes, but at ultra-low altitudes (the so-called tree top level), which allowed them to strike not only at the forward positions of the troops, but also at the rear infrastructure facilities. I myself had a chance to see such bomb-assault strikes in the Suez Canal zone during the "war of attrition" when I was in a group of Soviet military advisers.
    1. Tourist Breakfast
      Tourist Breakfast 21 September 2013 13: 43
      I would like to note that during this period in the Egyptian air defense there were no "goodies" such as, for example, the S-125 and Shilka, there were only the S-75 air defense missile systems.

      Sorry, what period are we talking about? Egypt received the S-125, "Shilki" and "Strela" somewhere in March-April 1970. Ie the height of the "war of attrition".
  13. xomaNN
    xomaNN 19 September 2013 21: 33
    The fact that the current American Russophobe and McCain hawk were shot down by this air defense system is pleasing. Man has now found himselffellow True to him, like the S-75, it’s time to rest!
  14. smart ass
    smart ass 19 September 2013 21: 40
    I’m thinking about 53 years ... height 20 km !!! this is how much technology was developed in the USSR ... when the Chinese ran through the woods in their underpants at the 4th ... the USSR could already shoot down planes at 20 km altitude ...
  15. alone
    alone 19 September 2013 23: 26
    superb zrk of its time.
  16. ded10041948
    ded10041948 20 September 2013 00: 41
    Looked at the article, photos and comments. I remembered my youth (I began my service as a "start" platoon commander). Whatever they say, but the complex was great for its time. As for comparing the actions of the complex in Vietnam and in African regions, we must not forget that Vietnam fought with 13 missiles, which the Arabs had never even heard of, and the Dvina and Desna (aka Pechora) missiles from " Volkhova "differed as" Emka "from" Zhiguli ". Heard about Chinese and Cuban Pushek "upgrades", but never saw pictures. Neighing heartily. It’s necessary to think of such nonsense! As a "starter" I can imagine all the "pleasure" of operating and configuring this "crazy constructor's nonsense". God forbid! The only plus is that a tractor is not needed for installation and the folding time is reduced, but the rest is a solid minus. Only one transverse instability at start-up is worth something!
    "Plus" author and many thanks, but inaccuracies crept into the performance characteristics table. I will only say about one thing: in the length of the rocket - the comma is shifted one character to the left (I will not say anything about the rest of the "bloopers", let the adversaries "turnip" frown and scratch the "pumpkin"!).
  17. Strashila
    Strashila 20 September 2013 06: 39
    And they did not say anything about Yugoslavia ... and in Iraq, the same Stealth was flunked with this complex.
    1. Bongo
      21 September 2013 02: 28
      The article used only confirmed facts about the use of C-75 in Iraq, it is mentioned in 1991 in the year. In 2003. there was no success with this complex. In Yugoslavia, the F-117 was shot down by the low-altitude C-125 air defense system. C-75 was practically not used there.
  18. vlad_pr
    vlad_pr 20 September 2013 08: 13
    Author ++++++. I remembered youth. In the third photo, P.'s native cabin
  19. scientist
    scientist 23 September 2013 21: 16
    It is a pity that such discontinued systems are withdrawn from service, and if you look at the S-75, there is a huge potential for modernization. If only you could see how he beautifully knocks down his own rockets, which launch as targets. I don’t think that even the S-300 is capable of such time.
  20. gusar007
    gusar007 7 October 2013 04: 32
    And me too. I remembered youth. In the third photo, P.'s native cabin
  21. umeletz
    umeletz 19 December 2013 12: 51
    I remembered the youth and native Ordzhonikidze school. I sincerely believe that the complex is the best.
  22. Al_lexx
    Al_lexx 20 January 2014 16: 38
    He served on the Volkhov complex (C-75M3), 79-81. Directly at the SRC P-12. They had already been removed, P-18s were going to be replaced. Just on the P-18, at the end of the service I went to the training ground (not far from Lake Balkhash). Night shooting is absolutely stunning. We had a mixed regiment, three S-75s and two S-200s. When the S-200 rises at night, as if it got to Boykonur.)))
    At that time, C-75 had a very good air defense system.
    Thank you.