In March 1962, several submarines of 641 projects from 211 brigades of the 4th squadron of the North fleet (Polyarny town) they began to prepare for the campaign, wherever unknown. Vague rumors circulated about Ghana and Guinea, but there was no clarity. Money certificates were issued for the families remaining in the Soviet Union, and all submarines of the 69th brigade were relocated to Sayda Bay. "B-36" began to catch up with the remaining ships of the brigade in replenishment of spare parts and consumables. There were no particular difficulties with replenishing spare parts in other combat units, but they replied to our application for hydrography that everything had already been issued to other ships for a long time and nothing was requested from the warehouses.
From the domestic technical equipment to the boats of the 69 brigade, even additional refrigerators were previously offered. But they had to be abandoned because the ZIL refrigerators did not crawl through the removable sheets to load the batteries into the robust submarine hull. The “catch-up” “B-36” lacked even tabletop electric fans. Well, there was no air conditioning on the submarines of the 641 project at that time. In order to escape the heat and dullness, one of the spare selsins had to go to the gyrocompass, attach a propeller cut from a tin can and provide airflow in the navigational cabin.
Worst of all, the ship for navigation support did not have KPI and KPF pulse-phase instruments, which had already appeared in the Navy to determine the position of the ships using the "ROUTE" system. They allowed to use American systems for the same purpose. "LORAN", reliably working in the Atlantic and in the areas of the intended base of the 69-th brigade of submarines. The only possible way to determine the place in the ocean was astronomical observations of the stars and the sun, as in the days of Columbus. The presence on the ship of three well-trained observers (two navigators and an assistant commander), who conducted the observations at the same time, made it possible to obtain an “averaged position” with high accuracy. An additional control was, though less accurate, but still useful “averaged space” obtained by all watch officers and command of the ship by observing the sun.
Unfortunately, all astronomical observations were possible only in the surface position, when the tactical situation allowed. With an increase in the activity of the antisubmarine forces of the US Navy, astronomical observations were made extremely rarely and with a greater risk of being detected due to a decrease in stealth. Nevertheless, during the whole trip, it was possible to provide the necessary navigation accuracy.
Ahead of the unknown
From Sayda Lip all the brigade's boats made several one-day exits to be checked by the staff officers of the readiness of the ships for the march. Occasionally the officers were allowed to go to the families in Polyarny, and in other free time, if it appeared, we would go over the hills and eat blueberries.
On the night of September 30, all four submarines, in the context of the strictest secrecy and enhanced berth security in the presence of a group of officers and generals, were loaded into torpedo tubes one torpedo with a nuclear warhead and one officer from the 6 Fleet Division in the rank of captain lieutenant as an observer. In the late afternoon, the submarines of the 69 brigade were built on the quay near the Dmitry Galkin floating base. First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral V.A.Fokin, spoke to us with a wish of happy sailing to the port of one of the friendly countries. At the same time he warned that, despite the peaceful situation, one must be prepared for any change.
To the question of V.A. Arkhipov about the use of special weapons, he swore firmly and said: “Well, guys, write to the journals:“ Use special weapons in the following cases. The first is when you will be bombed, and you get a hole in a solid case. The second is when you emerge, and you are fired, and again get a hole. And the third - by order from Moscow! ".
Immediately after building on the ships began preparations for battle, march and dive. On the night of October 1, the X-NUMX of the B-31962 and the rest of the crew’s brigade began to depart from the pier at an interval of 6 minutes and began the transition to a new home base.
Before entering all submarines, one special purpose group (OSNAZ) arrived to provide radio intelligence and radio interception of reports from foreign anti-submarine forces. In addition, the flagship mechanic of the brigade, Captain 36 of the rank of Lyubimov, went on a campaign to "B-2".
We go to Cuba
After leaving the Kola Bay, I turned to the commander asking where to set the course. In response, the commander gave the coordinates of the beginning and end of the next course and the distance between them. This continued until the passage of the Faro-Icelandic frontier and access to the Atlantic Ocean. With access to the Atlantic by ship, it was announced that we were going to Cuba in the port of Mariel for permanent deployment, and that on the way to the port we would be met by a Cuban torpedo boat. The passage to the port of destination was prescribed not by the shortest route through the Strait of Florida, but through the Strait of Caicos between the Bahamas and further along the long, narrow and winding Old Bahamas canal. Secretive trouble-free passage through such a channel seemed at least problematic, but it was decided to sort out this issue on the spot.
Already in the first hours of the transition, the calculation of the average speed of a ship on a cruise at specified time intervals surprised the commander unpleasantly. Instead of the average speed of 5-6 nodes adopted for the fleet for the covert transition of diesel-electric submarines, the speed of 10 nodes was assigned to us. And if you observe secrecy and have time to dive when evading anti-submarine forces, you will have to have a speed of at least 12 knots, which in the stormy sea will require diesel engines to work at full speed, that is, very intense and unfavorable mode of operation of the main engines.
The stormy weather that accompanied the submarine in the Barents and Norwegian Seas did not leave us in the North Atlantic either. The impacts of the waves have become more powerful, especially at the forced speed of 12 nodes. The first losses appeared: the waves tore off the nasal emergency buoy and damaged the top cover of the VIPS device (launcher for setting signaling devices and EW devices). During the next storm, these same waves crushed the watch officer of Lieutenant Commander Lieutenant Mukhtarov, who had not dodged them, to the fencing of the felling and broke his two ribs, “freeing” him from keeping the watch for almost two weeks. As the political officer wrote the commander of the ship captain 3 rank Saparov, the injured officer Mukhtarov was replaced by the communist Saparov on the watch. By the way, Mukhtarov was a communist.
As a navigator, the weather didn’t give me the opportunity to clarify the number of the ship’s space by astronomical observations, and we simply didn’t have other ways to hike after leaving the Norwegian coast. As a result, after the passage of the Faro-Icelandic anti-submarine line on all four ships (as it turned out after the cruise) there was a discrepancy about 13-18 miles back along the course, which indicated the presence of the North Atlantic Current, which, having no absolute lag on ships, we simply did not know how to take into account.
But in every phenomenon there is not only a negative, but also a positive side, and in bad weather. Due to bad weather at all three anti-submarine lines, the anti-submarine NATO did not annoy us aviation, which helped to almost withstand a given average transition speed.
If the reconnaissance of NATO countries found the brigade’s exit from the Kola Bay, they counted on our transition at an average speed of 5-6 knots and were late in increasing the activity of anti-submarine forces on the lines. There were no storms in the Central Atlantic, yes, and the probable enemy has not yet shown increased activity, which allowed astronomical observation of the place not only at evening and morning twilight, but also group determination of the place in the sun by the watch officers and the command team of the ship under the command of the commander.
Soon the air and water were significantly warmer. We entered the subtropics. During the night watch, using a tropical rain, I gladly took a shower on the bridge with soap and washcloth.
In the morning twilight of October 23, the X-NUMX of B-1962 approached the Caicos Strait at a distance of 36 miles and began to prepare to force the strait underwater.
The battery was fully charged at this point, it only remained to determine the location reliably, which was done by three observers in three or four stars. Survey of the situation showed the presence in the strait of two American destroyers who worked as radar. Having stayed at the periscope depth for a communication session, we received a radiogram according to which “B-36” was assigned a position to the southeast of the Caicos Strait, where we headed away from the strait.
Meanwhile, the tactical situation began to deteriorate sharply. The activity of the US Navy anti-submarine forces has increased incredibly. Aircraft of the PLO so often overflew the water area that the B-36 lost the ability to fully charge the batteries (AB), and the recharging became a very problematic event. Soon, our radio intelligence officers intercepted reports announcing a naval blockade of Cuba by US President John Kennedy and banning all warships from approaching the US coast closer than 400 miles.
In addition to aviation, US destroyers began to appear in the form of paired patrols, constantly working with their own radio and sonar. In the daytime, due to the excellent visibility, it was possible to observe the actions of the destroyers at a great distance when they detected any civilian ships. They quickly approached the stranger and, after a brief delay near the ship, continued patrolling. The vessel also fell on the opposite course and moved away from Cuba.
The actions of US anti-submarine aircraft have become more aggressive. Having an assumption about the possible presence of an underwater target in the area according to the data of a radar contact or according to a system of hydrophones unknown to us at that time VOCUS, American aircraft began to specify the place of submarines using sonar buoys system "JULIE". The structure of this system included explosive devices to clarify the place of the submarine with buoys due to direction finding of the reflection of the blast wave from its hull. Since the explosions were very intense, and we were also unfamiliar with the "JULI" system, their appearance initially caused some concern.
Loading sonar buoys into the Grumman S-2E Tracker aircraft of the CVSG-55 aircraft carrier antisubmarine group
Soon our assumption of their appointment was confirmed by an intercepted radio message from the plane about the coordinates of the submarine. They differed from the numerical coordinates by ten miles. I answered evasively to the question of the first maid, if these are our coordinates. During the next determination of the location, I became convinced that the aircraft was transmitting the most accurate coordinates of the B-36 at that time, and they could be taken for further calculation of the ship’s position, since the accuracy of determining the position of the American aircraft significantly exceeded our capabilities.
Soon the rather difficult situation for us turned into an extreme one. About a day later, in the darkness that had come, the commander decided to recharge an accumulator battery that was discharged per day during the night at the periscope depth when diesel engines operated in the RDP mode (diesel engines work underwater). We embarked under the RDP and set off on a course to the east.
Some time later, I suddenly remembered that before setting up under the RDP in the west direction, there was a weak operation of two shipborne radars, which after the turnaround turned out to be shaded by the RDP mine for observation in the periscope feed sector. Hydroacoustic observation in this sector is also impossible, both because of the design features, and because of the rumble of working diesel engines. Taking into account the possibility of approaching ships in the shaded sector and finding the “B-36” in the center of the position, I reported to the commander about the turnaround time to the left by 90 degrees by compass.
The commander agreed with this: “That's right, there’s nothing for us to go in the direction of Shumkov’s position. On the "B-130" old batteries, you can not bring it and bring to him the US anti-submarine forces. With the start of circulation, an alarming report of acoustics about the appearance of strong and rapidly increasing propeller noise of two destroyers followed. "B-36" urgently plunged, but even before arriving at the submariners safe from ramming in all the compartments, the submariners heard a strong whistling noise from the working propellers of the destroyers.
Destroyers began to walk around the "B-36" in a circle with a radius of 15-20 cable with a speed of about 20 nodes, working sonars on their course angles 90 degrees left side, moving counterclockwise and shifting the circle, as if throwing loops to the side of the offset submarine from the center of this circle. The contact was maintained reliably and did not leave us any chance to break away from tracking with our discharged battery.
We maneuvered on 3-4 nodes, making aperiodic changes in course, poorly hoping for a possible change in the situation or the weather. The entire crew knew about the presence of the destroyers the whole time, listening to the parcels of the sonars, which soundingly beat the hull of the boat and human nerves, making it difficult to rest.
About a day later, only the destroyer of the radar patrol Charles P. Cecil remained with us.
Decided to break away from tracking. When the destroyer, continuing to describe around the "B-36" circles in the counterclockwise direction, passed the boat traverse along the starboard, "B-36", increasing the course to the 9 nodes, turned him behind the stern, and the destroyer, continuing circulation to the left, moved away from the boat . At the end of the circulation, finding that the "B-36" out of the circle, the destroyer rushed after her, inevitably reducing the traverse distance. Bringing the submarine to traverse its left side, the destroyer again began to circulate to the left, and the B-36 again turned 90 degrees to the right behind the destroyer stern, going beyond the circumference, and began to quickly move away from the destroyer, which, continuing circulation, also retreated from the boat at least the diameter of its circulation.
At this point, the acoustics reported to the submarine commander "B-36" that the destroyer had lost contact with the boat and switched to a circular search. Unfortunately, the commander immediately took advantage of the advice of the most competent acoustics - the 69 instructor of the brigade of the submarine midshipman Pankov. From an acoustic point of view, he gave competent advice - turn his nose on the destroyer to reduce the reflecting surface of the submarine hull, but did not take into account the factor that, turning on the destroyer, the B-36 would stop tearing and get close to the destroyer, making it easier for him to search. What happened as a result. The commander, trusting the authority of the master of military affairs, did not listen to objections against such a maneuver, and the destroyer restored acoustic contact with the B-36. This attempt was the last opportunity to break away from tracking. Our battery could not provide more than three nodes.
It remained to hope for a miracle. But tropical wonders in the form of storms and hurricanes did not appear, the weather remained a resort, and the battery was inevitably discharged.
In order to delay the imminent need for ascent to the surface, the commander decided to minimize power consumption up to stopping propeller motors and to maintain the required depth by pumping out and receiving the necessary portions of water into the surge tank using the main drainage pump. And in the twilight that came "B-36" hung without a turn at a depth of 70 meters.
Invitation to the ascent
Suddenly, a stern bulkhead door opened in the central post and a healthy man literally burst through it in a faint and dizzy state. “Where is the commander?” Asked the officer assigned to us on the march. "And what happened?" - Anxiously responded to the request of the chief officer, who was on the commander's watch. Showing with his hand to the stern, the one who entered said: “People are dying there, you need to surface and give battle!” “Nothing, some will be saved,” Arkady Kopeikin reassured. And the officer retired to the stern. The statement that people “die” in the compartments was not too far from reality. The microclimate in the compartments was close to the limit of the possibility of habitat. The temperature was within 40-65 ° С with the highest humidity, increased carbon dioxide content and harmful fumes from fuel, oil, electrolyte in the air for a long time not ventilated compartments.
The sweat-covered people constantly wore only slippers with cropped backs and disposable briefs torn into petals, like a loincloth of palm leaves from savages. Fresh water on the ship was a shortage, but if it was possible to intercept an extra glass, the water immediately appeared on the skin, and the person remained as hot, sweaty and tormented by thirst as before the glass of water. Despite the unfavorable situation, the entire crew meekly fulfilled their duty. At the posts, where the temperature was close to 70 ° C, electricians, hydroacoustics, even with a reduced duration of the watch, were forced to carry it with ammonia because of frequent cases of loss of consciousness. In the meantime, the American destroyer was tired of spinning around the motionless "B-36" and he began to blow up signal grenades, obviously inviting us to ascend.
I had the experience of listening to grenade explosions simulating depth charge explosions at C-178 joint exercises and anti-submarine ships of the Kamchatka military fleet of the Pacific Fleet, but the intensity of American grenades explosions did not bear any comparison with what I heard on the Pacific Fleet. They echoed loudly on the hull of the boat, causing blinking of light bulbs and shedding crumbs of cork insulation from the ceiling of the compartments.
When the "B-36" made a move by the motors, the explosions stopped, and the discharge of the batteries accelerated, inevitably bringing the moment of forced ascent. Finally, this moment has come. On the "B-36" was blown all the main ballast as soon as the destroyer passed our traverse and left the boat astern. At the same time, the radio began broadcasting on the Navy GKP about the ascent and pursuit of a boat by the US anti-submarine forces.
Before removing the manhole, it was necessary to equalize the pressure in the compartments with the atmospheric pressure through the ventilation ventilation shaft. This action caused the hissing of slush evaporating from the decks in the compartments, for a short time the appearance of lilac mist, with the disappearance of which the compartment decks were completely dry. Luke otdraval assistant lieutenant commander lieutenant Anatoly Andreev. Before going up to the bridge, he pushed the “Shtyr” radio antenna with the naval flag of the USSR attached to it through a manhole hatch, and then stepped onto the bridge, holding the antenna with the flag high above the wheelhouse. By this time, "Charles P. Sessil" was approaching the boat from its stern angles. Very low over the wheelhouse, almost touching the flag raised on a pin, an anti-submarine aircraft of the United States Navy type Neptune flew by.
On the destroyer, a signal was raised from four colorization flags, which we could not make out for a long time, until we saw that the same flags were painted on his battle house. Here we guessed that this was the international call sign of the destroyer, which he raised on the mast as a representation when meeting. The next signal from the three flags, raised by the destroyer, I easily found in the International Three-Flag Code (MCC). It meant a request: “What happened? Do you need help?
The content of the signal I reported to the bridge, where the commander and senior officer of the B-36 were already. In response, he heard the order of the commander: "Do not respond." He probably accepted my report for a report from radio operators. After repeated transmission of radio to the Navy GKP about the forced ascent, we received all the necessary receipts for radio inquiries, but did not receive any instructions in response, until we were informed about successful separation from pursuit and tracking.
Navigation accompanied by an American destroyer turned out to be extremely calm, and if it were not for the moral torment about losing a kind of duel with the US Navy PLA, it could even be called comfortable. On the "B-36" compartments were continuously ventilated, there was a full charge of the battery, all the garbage and spoiled food was removed, the remaining vegetables were sifted on the upper deck, and repairs were made to individual mechanisms. The bilge repairs repaired the top cover of the VIPS device, the engine mechanics did something with the gas outlets of the diesel engines, and I repaired the direction finder flooded with water on the bridge.
All those involved in the maneuvering of the submarine, developed a plan for the upcoming separation from tracking. "B-36", continuing to charge the battery, had a course of no more than 4-nodes. Such a low speed for the American destroyer was difficult, so he constantly maneuvered along the port side of the submarine, not moving away from it on more than 5 cables. After passing along the "B-36" hull in a parallel course at a traverse distance of about 50 m and moving away from it on the cable 5, the destroyer turned to the left on the reverse course and countercourse, after which he again lay down on a parallel course.
Such "delicate" maneuvering, corresponding to the high marine culture, continued uninterruptedly until the very dive of the B-36. The actions of helicopters and airplanes of the US Navy could hardly be called delicate. They periodically flew over the boat at very low altitudes, producing television and photography.
Shortly before the completion of the necessary preparations for the preparation of the "B-36" for a long dive, it seemed to us that it was an opportunity for diving and detachment from tracking. In the twilight the vessel seemed, judging by the lights, the tanker. When the tanker approached us one mile, the destroyer headed for him. Mindful of how not a simple process in the Soviet Navy was the acceptance of fuel into the sea on the go, the commander gave the command "Prepare for immersion." To our amazement, the destroyer departed from the tanker, and radio intelligence intercepted his report to the shore about the transfer of tons of fuel from the tanker to the 150 boat. Having completed all the work for which it was necessary to be on the surface, the crew of the "B-36" faced the need to carry out the separation from tracking. By this time, the prerequisites for successful separation have increased significantly. A normal microclimate was established in the compartments, everything that required urgent repairs was repaired. After repairing the top cover of the VIPS device, the boat got the opportunity to dive to the working depth of 240 m, and the ship's underwater acoustics - to shoot noise devices. A fully charged rechargeable battery made it possible to use the entire speed range of the submarine.
Detachment from tracking
But the main factor of success in isolation from tracking was the decision of the commander of the ship captain 2 rank Dubivko A.F. apply a technical method of suppressing the destroyer sonar, proposed by the midshipman Pankov. During the entire joint voyage with the submarine, the destroyer worked continuously with radar and sonar. Having determined the frequency of sonar operation, Pankov noticed that it lies in the frequency range of our Sviyaga hydroacoustic communication station and suggested adjusting it to the frequency of the destroyer sonar in order to make it useless with the help of a continuous Sviyagi directional signal. The success of the separation maneuver exceeded all expectations. Almost from the moment the B-36 was immersed, the destroyer was not able to establish hydroacoustic contact with her for a minute.
The maneuver was started when the destroyer, following a parallel course, went to the 2-3 cable forward. The boat urgently plunged into the 12 units on the move, crossing the wake of the destroyer, set up an imitation cartridge at the depth of 60 meters from the VIPS device that created a cloud from the bubbles that simulates a submarine hull for sonar. Continuing the dive to the depth of 200 meters, led the destroyer by the stern and began to quickly move away. When the destroyer began to work in the direction of the boat with a sonar, our acoustics "B-36" "Sviyagoy" suppressed his work, and the destroyer was forced to turn off his sonar. The third time the destroyer sonar began to work in a circular search. But he was far enough away and no longer dangerous for the boat, so we decided not to interfere with him and continued to increase the distance. I was concerned about the need to increase the gap as quickly as possible. After making sure that the “B-36” moved away from the dive site by no less than 12 miles, I reported to the commander about this distance and suggested that it was possible to slow down to save battery power.
From this point on, the B-36 did not have any meetings with the US Navy ships until the end. The detachment of the tracking was immediately reported to the Navy GKP, and a receipt was received to receive our report. After a short time came the instructions on the connection. The commander was waiting for the radio indicating our further actions. And only after more than a day, having received the next service radiogram, the cryptographer stated that, judging by his demonstration groups, the radio operators had missed one radiogram. It turned out that the second radio with the same radio group with radio operators as well as with instructions on communications, they took the first radio for repetition and did not send it to the cryptographer, but sent it to the basket. Thus, due to the fault of the transmitting radio center in Moscow, the submarine B-36 was left without control for more than a day from the DKP. In the radiogram “B-36” extracted from the basket, a new position was assigned five hundred miles northeast of our location, where we were already late. I had to surface and carry out the received order in full swing. To the general surprise and pleasure of the first 400 miles of this transition took place in the absence of opposition from the antisubmarine forces of the enemy.
In the area of positions assigned to submarines of the 69 Brigade, our radio intelligence recorded the presence of the American Tetis Bay helicopter carrier with escort ships and intensive patrolling of the area by the forces of basic anti-submarine aviation. Approaching our position on the 50-40 miles, we felt their opposition in full. On the surface position could not be out of the question because of the incessant signals of aircraft and ship radars.
The officers of the ship came up with the assumption that such a timely concentration of anti-submarine forces in the areas of positions of our submarines is impossible without a spy in the control system of the forces of the USSR Navy. And although much was explained by the operation of the “SUSUS” system, about the existence of which we did not know about that campaign, these assumptions were not completely dispelled. If there was Penkovsky, there could be others like him.
In the new position area
After occupying a given position, another trouble awaited us. November 7 when trying to run the left diesel to work on the screw under the RDP (diesel operation under water) as a result of hydraulic shock due to ingress of seawater into its cylinders, the diesel was disabled. In the right diesel engine in all cylinders, too, was water.
Before carrying out labor-intensive work on opening the covers and inspecting all cylinders in the field conditions and determining the causes of water ingress into them, both diesel engines were not operational. At the disposal of the boat commander remained only the average diesel, not adapted to work under the RDP. Long stay "B-36" on the position threatened to completely discharge the battery and the inevitable re-ascent among the anti-submarine forces of the US Navy. In this situation, the commander made the only right decision to begin commissioning the right diesel engine, for which, for the time of the work, leave the area for 60 miles, so that after work is completed, return to the specified position.
Moving away from the area on the 60 miles, we found a relatively calm environment, which allowed us to be at night in the surface position without running, drifting, and in the daytime - submerged. Even before the end of the audit of the right diesel engine, we received a command to return to Sayda Bay. The return took place in a calm atmosphere. The anti-submarine forces of the likely enemy rested after the resolution of the Caribbean crisis, yes, and the weather was unfavorable for intensive flights of NATO aircraft.
Return to base
The sea exhausted us with rolling, and me - the navigator with the inability to reliably determine the place of the ship due to inclement weather without the sun and stars.
Almost the entire transition was made on the surface. Initially, the commander decided to return under the RDP, but after the watch officers a couple of times showed him unknown vessels found in the aft sector, which did not hear the acoustics, the commander changed the decision and the boat surfaced. In the stormy sea, the surface position more reliably ensured the safety of the ship. There remained concern about fuel consumption, which, by all accounts, might not be enough to reach the home base.
For me, this concern cost the biggest discrepancy in determining a place in the ocean for the entire nine-year service in navigator positions. For two days before determining the location, a flagship mechanic of the 69 Brigade, Captain 2 of the rank of Lyubimov, stood over me with a slide rule. He checked the measured fuel consumption and compared it with the distance traveled by the boat. Based on the measurement results, a decision was made to request assistance in the form of a tanker for refueling. Due to the low speed indications for hydraulic lags in determining the location, the residual was 67 miles ahead along the course, which indicated the actual speed of the 5,4 ship node. Radio was sent ashore about the need to replenish the fuel, which was really not enough. Someone suggested that the remnants of the fuel, mixed with sea rolling in ballast tanks with water, be pumped into the expendable fuel tank from which to drain the distilled water and add engine oil to the tank. In this mixture, the "B-36" entered the Barents Sea, and the Kola Bay had to enter on the motors due to the battery.
The tanker met us in the Norwegian Sea, but the storm presented no opportunity to receive fuel from it.
A remarkable event on my return was the presence on the bridge when the motorists tried to inspect diesel pipelines in the stern superstructure of the boat.
The motorist, securely tied with a flattering end, went to inspect the pipelines, accompanied by an insured sailor. Reaching the middle of the aft superstructure, it was washed away overboard by a wave. Fortunately, the next wave, thanks to the throwing end, brought him back. The pipeline inspection operation was immediately terminated.
Meeting at Sayda Bay
As a navigator, I was pleased with the efficiency of the Frame antenna, despite the fact that it was still flooded with sea water in the Sargasso Sea. This antenna allowed to confidently become attached to the coast along the Norwegian radio beacons with the received residual 7 miles.
Our return from a trip to Saida lip can not be called solemn. After mooring, only one person met is remembered - someone from the engineering and mechanical service who asked if all the diesel engines on the B-36 are in service. Having received the answer that one diesel engine is broken, he hopelessly waved his hand on the boat and left.
From the stories of eyewitnesses, the analysis of the campaign on the 4 squadron was rather strange. The squadron warned the officers of the submarine command groups so that the speaker, the representative of the higher headquarters, was not interrupted and asked no questions. The report commanders of ships 69-brigade accused of all mortal sins. Not knowing the true state of affairs, the listeners were silent, but when the speaker blamed the commanders that they floated at a sufficiently high density of 1,050 electrolyte in batteries, the exclamations of bewilderment swept through the hall, as every submariner knows that below this value the density should not be can. There was a shout "Do not interrupt", the speaker read the report and quickly retired.
When parsing with the Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal A.A. Grechko, according to the recollections of those present, there were even more oddities. It turned out that, criticizing the actions of the commanders of the 69 brigade, Marshal Grechko was sure that they commanded nuclear submarines, and could not understand why they floated to charge the batteries. Having learned that the American destroyers were approaching 50 m, the Marshal asked why submariners did not throw grenades at submarines. When he realized that in peaceful conditions, the ascent was inevitable, said that he "would rather have drowned than disgraced himself."
To explain the behavior of submarine commanders, the background on which decisions were required was important. Submarines had unstable radio communication with the Navy PCR. They learned about developing events from fragmentary interceptions of messages from US broadcasting stations. From this information, they concluded that the situation was tense, but that the case was on the brink of war, they found out only in the database, when a member of the Northern Fleet's Armed Forces, Vice-Admiral Sizov, at a meeting with the submariners 69 BPL, said: "And we are alive and not waited.
In the end, everything ended well. Participants were not punished.